 Hello everyone, today we are going to talk about Ethical Naturalism. It says, whatever is explicable is in the ambit of nature. Now, this is a very, this is a metaethical theory, which talks about the role of nature in understanding the moral domain. Now, let us take a moment to reflect on our understanding of the world. Now, Ethical Naturalism, as you could surmise, the origin of the word naturalism is coming from the word nature. Now, what is naturalism? How, what is Ethical Naturalism? And, what is it as a metaethical theory? Now, you would recollect that earlier, we have talked about various ethical theories. Now, we are dealing with metaethics, which is the foundation of ethical theories, the very possibility of morality, the very justification of the ethical domain. Now, today we are going to talk about something called Ethical Naturalism. If you look at the slide, it reads that well, whatever is explicable in the ambit of nature. Now, stay with this for a while, and let us not confuse us that well, what is there in the ambit of nature is enough, or the domain of nature is enough to explain, analyze or understand everything in the cosmos. Now, let us go ahead to see, what do we exactly mean by this? Well, first, what is naturalism? Naturalism is a metaethical or a philosophical theory that claims that the universe is totally explicable in the parlance of nature. That is, we do not need to postulate any supernatural notion to complete our understanding of the universe. Well, what is a natural entity? Is it the same thing as empirical, as an empirical entity? Well, now let us take a moment to reflect on, what is naturalism? Now, naturalism is a philosophical metaphysical theory of which ethical naturalism is a derivative or a component. Now, naturalism as the very name suggests, gives importance or foundational importance to nature. Now, by nature, we do not necessarily confine ourselves to trees, plants and wildlife as one interpretation of it could have. But well, when we talk in philosophy about nature, we mean everything that is empirically perceivable, that is, comprises of the cosmos. Perhaps, this is one concept that can easily be understood, if we give examples of what is not nature. Well, things that are postulations or entities that are supernatural, starting from the postulation of God as a supernatural entity, of mystery, of unexplicable intuitive power. Now, these are examples of supernatural notions, and this would make, this is clearly out of the ambit of nature. So, clearly nature is not as the philosophical understanding of naturalism would go ahead. It is not confined to just, what many botanists or biologists or people would believe to be only plants, trees, animals and life on earth. But, it comprises of everything that is almost empirical, that we can know and perceive, that is not strange, that is explicable. So, naturalism by that currency is a very powerful or all-encompassing theory. When we seek an explanation for a behavior, when we seek that well, Venus is passing over the sun to the other side. Now, we seek a natural explanation to this, which is that well, the satellites or planets revolve in their orbits, and their orbits sometimes overlap each other, and therefore, there is an overlap in their paths. Now, this is a purely naturalistic explanation in the ambit of nature. But, if I say, if I postulate that well, one planet is a life form, which is visiting another planet, or that God is arranging the motions of these satellites. Well, these are supernatural explanations. So, now, as we would see most of the disciplines that we study, most of our knowledge in the world is quite naturalistic. We know that well, examples of naturalism would be that well, if I take this kind of a drug, I have seen that drug X empirically correlates with the phenomenon Y. So, doctors prescribe a drug X to treat the phenomenon Y, or likewise. Now, this is a very naturalistic explanation. But, what if the doctor tells you that, why do not you go and pray for the healing of your condition? Now, that is a supernatural claim that well, having praying as a form of treatment is not naturalistic, is not governed by natural laws as we know them. It is a part of a supernatural domain. Now, well, having known this explanation, perhaps we would think that well, most of the way the world works is naturalistic, and most of the studies that we do, and knowledge that we have is naturalistic, and that is all. Why this talk of supernaturalism? Well, now, having had a little clarity about what is naturalism, let us proceed to see what is ethical naturalism, and then try to analyze it as a theory. So, I repeat what naturalism would mean, that it is a metaphysical and philosophical theory that claims that the universe is totally explicable in the parlance of nature. We do not need to postulate any supernatural notion to complete our understanding of the universe. What is a natural entity? Is it the same thing as empirical? Yes, mostly when we are understanding natural entities or we are naturalistic in our understanding, we would comprise almost everything empirical. However, rational truths or self-evident truths can also be subsumed under the domain of naturalism. So, what cannot be subsumed under the domain of naturalism is what we would generally understand as mystery or something which is supernatural. So, as we see mystery, supernatural as something which is not natural. Now, coming on to the next slide, let us take a look at what is ethical naturalism. Now, ethical naturalism is a variant of metaphysical naturalism, and it claims that ethical claims can be analyzed into natural facts and properties. The domain of ethics can be understood without any assumption of the supernatural or mysterious. It is complete within the natural order that there is no mystery or explanatory gap in the understanding of the ethical domain. Now, let us proceed step by step into understanding what exactly do we mean by ethical naturalism. Ethical naturalism is a variant of metaphysical naturalism. So, naturalism is the broader theory which talks about explanation of any domain in terms of in the natural parlance. Ethical naturalism specifically confines itself to the domain of ethics which can be understood in terms of natural facts and properties. The domain of ethics can be understood without any assumption of the supernatural or mysterious. It is complete within the natural order. Now, let us take a look. If we are ethical naturalists, what are we saying? We are saying that well, what is it for an action to be right or wrong or good or bad? These classifications can be analyzed and explained in terms of natural facts and properties. Now, does it appear very obvious or a little problematic? Let us take a look. What would an ethicist mean or what would this metaethical claim mean of claiming that all ethical claims can be reduced or can be understood in terms of natural claims. That means, ethical claims can be for example, be psychologically felt, not intuitively felt. So, when they are saying say, when I can feel something as right or wrong, which is clearly what ethicist would not like to mean similar to intuition, because that would be a part of supernatural domain. So, I will give you an example, perhaps to make things clearer. We will talk about it in detail say, when I say what gives me happiness is the right thing to do. Now, we have talked about a moral theory which has this as its premises. So, what gives me happiness is the right thing to do. If that is the case, then I am equating what is right with what is with happiness, which is a very natural phenomena that I feel. Now, in this case, so looking at the slide, presentation slide, we see that there is the third bullet would be saying that there is no mystery or explanatory gap in the understanding of the ethical domain. So, we need not postulate anything supernatural to explain the ethical domain. Now, coming to the next slide, well what is an example of ethical naturalism? Perhaps it is clearer, one would be clearer about ethical naturalism, when we see an example of ethical naturalism. Say for example, an action x brings along suffering, which is a natural property because it can be felt by the agent. Whereas, action y brings about no suffering in anybody. Thus, one ought to choose x over y. This is the moral claim, assuming one values the absence of suffering over its presence. This is our assumption. Now, this ought claim or a value claim can be understood in terms of natural property. And what is that natural property? That natural property is suffering. Now, let us look at this claim. It appears quite simple and perhaps, most of us would agree with it. That if an action brings along suffering, whereas action y brings about no suffering. x gets suffering, action x gets suffering, action y gets no suffering. So, most of us would perhaps choose x over y. Well, if that is the case, then we are making, if that is the case and we go ahead and make a prescription, make a moral claim that x is the right thing to do over y or x is right and y is wrong or x is good and y is evil or that one ought to choose x over y, we are making this as a value claim. Now, if this is a value claim, what is the basis of the value claim? The basis of the value claim is suffering. And what gives it objectivity is that well, of the two choices x and y, one gets more suffering than the other. Suffering is a natural phenomena, which can be experienced and felt psychologically, not intuitively. It can be felt and experienced psychologically. And this ought claim therefore, can be understood in terms of a natural property and suffering. So, this is an example of ethical naturalism. Now, let us go ahead to the next slide. Now, what does it mean that therefore, suffering is bad, it is to be avoided and the lack of it is good and is to be aimed at? Well, the moral theory utilitarianism comes to mind. This is the moral theory that I was referring to. It is a classical example of ethical naturalism. Utilitarianism is a classical example of ethical naturalism, wherein the parameter of good and bad is the natural or psychological property of happiness and suffering. Thereof, ethical naturalism faces many of the difficulties that utilitarianism faces. Now, let us take a look at the assumptions that we have come across. That suffering is bad and the lack of suffering is good. That, to put it more simplistically, happiness is desired over suffering and that this is how the case ought to be, is what ethical naturalists say. Now, if you would recollect from our earlier themes and discussion on utilitarianism, what we meant was well, utilitarianism is a moral theory that promotes the greatest good of the greatest number. That, once judge is right and wrong by the psychological feeling of happiness and so forth, which seemed quite obvious. But, the metaethical assumption for utilitarianism was ethical naturalism. Now, we did not talk about the metaethical assumption, because these are perhaps sometimes so implicit that we take it for granted. But, when we explore the foundations of any moral theory, we are bound to arrive at deeper philosophical claims and naturalism here is one such of an example. Because, this such a philosophical claim would entail its, it would color the moral theory that is based on such a claim. Now, for utilitarianism, ethical naturalism is the foundational metaethical claim and what is the metaethical claim that well, suffering, it is true as an empirical fact that human beings or living entities prefer the lack of suffering over suffering. But, that this is what ought to be the moral parameter or the ethical parameter is the claim of naturalism. But, when I can make a judgment that well, one ought to, now let us take a look at the board. A simple claim like suffering is worse than no suffering. Suffering is worse than no suffering or no suffering is better than suffering. Now, if we make a second claim, suffering is bad, are these two claims one and two, the same thing that is the question that this is the division that would bring about the presence of the metaethical claim in this moral theory. Now, if you agree that suffering is worse than no suffering well, I understand that these are very generic statements and well, one could argue for various gradations of suffering what exactly do we mean by suffering. But, let us take it in the most generic sense that you would like to understand. In whichever sense you would like to understand suffering or in whichever degree or magnitude you would like to understand suffering hold on to that magnitude and if you agree that suffering is worse than no suffering. See, studying overnight in the lack of sleep for an examination is also suffering. Now, if that suffering is worse than no suffering, you would rather sleep peacefully or watch a movie and sleep peacefully rather than study. So, you are suffering when you are preparing for your examinations, then suffering is bad, would you say that? Well, it seems a very intuitive jump from one is to two that well suffering is worse than no suffering well, suffering is bad. Well, this jump is only possible if you are holding an ethical naturalism as a metaethical claim. Therefore, if there is, if you believe that well, what is bad or suffering is something that you do not desire, you desire to stay away from, then that makes it bad. So, you are therefore, making a naturalistic claim. So, suffering is bad or the equivalent of it that one ought not to encourage suffering that one ought not to encourage suffering. Now, such claims that suffering is bad and one ought not to encourage suffering assumes that this is a value claim, this is a psychological fact or a natural fact. Now, this value claim can be derived from this factual or psychological fact only if we have this middle assumption of ethical naturalism. Now, most of our ethical or metaethical assumptions are almost implicit and very subtly implanted in the way we think and therefore, it is sometimes too obvious or too trivial for us to be true, because consider this when we have a difference of opinion, it could mostly be a difference in the theory or the metaethical claim that we have. Now, somebody who is not an ethical naturalist would be of the opinion that well, yes psychologically I would prefer no suffering over suffering, but that does not make suffering anything evil or wrong, because suffering could be on its way to a greater goal or suffering could be a way that human beings, there are various explanations given, suffering could be a means to get the best out of human beings and various other claims. So, thereby making a claim that well, suffering is bad and suffering is not bad in fact, that too cannot be arrived from one. So, that is an example of a non naturalist claim. Now, this is one of the difficulty as we look in the slides, this is one of the difficulty that the ethical naturalist faces, because this is a difficulty also which is faced by the utilitarianism. How can one move from a factual claim to a value claim? This is a question which we will tackle later in context of a particular philosopher called David Hume, that how do we move from a factual claim to a value claim. For instance, now let us take an example. Suppose I do an action B, which is by a DVD of a movie, I saw at my friends place and liked it, it has a small budget and a new maker, implying that insufficient or just barely sufficient funds. Now, if I do this act B, what could be the reason? Now, I have already watched a movie, I do not intend to watch it again, let me mention that too, do not intend to rewatch or narrow cast or share it with anybody else or I do not have any value for keeping it as a collector's item. I purely buy a DVD of this movie, which I have seen as a vote to the movie maker. Now, why do I do this B? I do this B probably, I do this B not probably, but definitely to transfer resources to the movie maker. Now, why would I like to transfer resources to the movie maker? Well, first to encourage the movie maker to provide resources say money to settle dues or invest in new project. Now, if this is basically the reasoning that I go through, that I buy a DVD of a movie, which I saw at my friend's place, I like the movie, but I do not intend to rewatch the movie or to narrow cast it to anybody or to have it as a collector's item. I see that the movie is a small budget movie by a new movie maker, so barely the movie maker would be having sufficient funds. So, I decide to buy a DVD or a set of DVDs of the same. My aim is to transfer resources to the movie maker. I also recommend others as I make a moral claim that one ought to buy, one ought to do B, if one has liked the movie and shares the same conditions. Now, what is it that makes an action B morally evaluable? Well, the reason for it can be two. The first is to encourage the movie maker, which is psychological and to provide resources or money to settle dues for the old movies made or to invest in a new movie that the director is making. So, material, nevertheless, both of these are natural facts. So, that is an example of an ethical naturalism foundation that well, if I am an ethical naturalist, I would like to wish, I would like to buy a DVD or a set of DVDs, even though I do not have any use for it as a matter of psychologically encouraging the movie maker and providing him resources to settle his or her dues or to invest in a new project. Now, what if I were not an ethical naturalist? Now, if I were not an ethical naturalist, I would silently say I would silently thank the maker. Now, that does not have any natural ramifications. So, other ways of looking at an ethical naturalist domain would be that well, to play the devil's advocate to argue that what, who is not an ethical naturalist could argue that well, my silently thanking the maker could turn the attention of cosmos towards the maker. So, something as unusual or which in today's parlance is as unbelievable as a good wish, which does not even serve as a psychological encouragement that for an ethical naturalist that has no value and that cannot be incorporated into an ethical domain. .. Now, let us look at a few more clarifications. Well, ethical naturalism and moral realism. Now, what is realism? We have talked about this term realism quite often. Realism in philosophy would mean that an object or an entity is real, if it exists independent of the perceiver. A very bare simple, but rigid definition of what is something, what is it for something to be real. So, realism is opposed to being the mere figment of imagination or creation of the mind. So, realism or moral realism would mean that well, there are moral facts which are independent of the perceiver. That moral facts do not are not figments of imagination or creations of mind and thereof differ from person to person, but there is something real about it. Let us take a look at what the slide reads. Now, moral realism claims that ethical claims can be classified as true or false. Now, when anything is real or claim to be under the purview of realism, any that claim can be judged as true or false. Thus, for the moral realist, there is an objective criteria of determining the truth value of moral judgments. The ethical naturalist is a moral realist as far as the ethical naturalist. As for the ethical naturalist, there are criteria to serve as the criteria for validating ethical judgments. Now, take a moment to read these bullets by yourself. Now, let us try to understand what we mean by ethical naturalism and its relation to moral realism. So, what are moral realists? Moral realists claim that there is an objective criteria for determining the value of truth value of moral judgments. How are these to be determined? Well, that depends on the parameter that you take. So, moral realist is not claiming how. It is only explaining that it should be determinable. Now, one of the answer to this how is ethical naturalism. Well, because the ethical naturalist is a moral realist. As for the ethical naturalist, there are criteria to serve as the criteria for validating ethical judgments. What are these criteria? These criteria are natural facts and properties, but there can be other answers to the same question. So, there can be moral realists who are not ethical naturalists. Now, let us take a look at them. Obviously, all moral realists are not naturalists. As there are realists who assert the objectivity of moral judgments without resorting to natural facts or properties. Cannot categorical imperative or raw ethical rules or examples of moral realism, but not ethical naturalism. Now, let us take a look at what do we mean by moral realism. Well, realism first meant that, well, entities exist independent of the perceiver. Moral realism meant that, well, there can moral claims can be true or false. Why can they be true or false? Because there is an objective criteria in determining their truth or falsity. Hence, the word realism applied to the term moral. So, moral realism is saying that, there can be objective right and wrong. How can there be objective right and wrong? Because there is a parameter. There is an answer book. There is a manual or a code or something out there with which we need to verify. What is this something with which we can verify? Here is where ethical naturalism is an answer to the index posed by moral realism. It is like this, that moral realism claims that there is an answer to moral question. How do you find out the answer is what the ethical naturalists do? That they find out the answer by going back to or analyzing it in natural terms, in the terms of nature or natural facts or properties. Are there other answers possible? Yes, there are other answers possible. One can be a deontologist or Kantian deontologist claiming that, well the categorical imperative determines right and wrong. One can be a rule follower as Ross that, well these are the set of rules and as long as you confirm with these, it is right. As long as you do not concur with these, it is wrong. So, there are also moral realists. So, naturalism is a part, is a kind of moral realism. But of course, all moral realists do not have to be ethical naturalists because, there can be other parameters for assessing moral judgments. So, as we see that well, ethical naturalism is a part of moral realism, but does not occupy the whole of the space of ethical naturalism.