 On behalf of the United States Institute of Peace, we are very pleased to welcome you to this important and timely discussion of U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific. My name is Lise Grande, and I am the President of USIP, which was established by Congress in 1984 as an independent, nonpartisan national institution dedicated to preventing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflict abroad. It is a special honor to welcome to USIP Dr. Kirk Campbell, Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the National Security Council. Dr. Campbell has a long and distinguished career inside and outside of government, having served as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Asia Group and Chairman of the Center for New American Security. Dr. Campbell has been a member of the Defense Policy Board at the Pentagon, a senior fellow at the Belfast Center at Harvard, on the Board of Directors for Standard Chartered in London, and from 29 to 2013, Dr. Campbell served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he was a key architect of the Obama Administration's pivot to Asia. We are also privileged to welcome Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush, and from 2014 to 2021, USIP's Chair of our Board, who will lead us in a conversation with Dr. Campbell. Probably no region is more central to US foreign and security policy than the Indo-Pacific. During this morning's discussion, we will look forward to reflecting on the virtual summit between Presidents Biden and Xi, the new OCAS Alliance, and the role of the Quad, Australia, Japan, India, and the US in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific as the bedrock of our shared security and prosperity. We also look forward to reflecting on China's position and role in the Indo-Pacific, including the buildup and modernization of its military and, very particularly, its new investments in nuclear and missile programs that could alter the global nuclear balance. There is now a wide bipartisan consensus in Washington that success in the Indo-Pacific requires a smart, energetic US strategy for competition and, where possible, cooperation with China. In his recent summit with President Xi, President Biden stressed the importance of establishing some common-sense guardrails in the relationship as a means to keep the competition from boiling over into outright conflict. At the same time, our President has left little doubt about the many deep differences that separate the United States and China. For those of you joining us online, we invite you to pose your questions via the chat function on our website, and we welcome everyone to follow the discussion on Twitter using the hashtag at USIP Indo-Pacific. Dr. Hadley. Thank you very much. Kurt, thank you so much for being with us today. Steve, it's my honor. Thank you very much. I'd like to pick up really where Lee's left us with the virtual summit between the two presidents. I think there seemed to be an appreciation in that summit of both the depth of the disagreements and also the potential risks of an increasingly competitive relationship. So in light of the virtual summit, where does the US-China relationship stand at the present time? And what can you tell us about the emerging Biden administration approach to the US-China relationship? Well, first of all, Steve, I want to thank you and thank the US Institute of Peace for hosting us. I do want folks to know I hope this isn't a problem, probably the person who's been most generous and helpful behind the scenes, providing private counsel. Very few people understand the challenges of these jobs, has been Steve Hadley, and enormously helpful in thinking through what are the most important challenges confronting the United States. So gratitude to him and appreciation for that selfless service, both when he was in government and now helping others struggling with the same challenges. So Steve, I hope you, if it's okay, if I just put this in a broader context. And I think the most important thing for us to think about is when we conceptualize and talk about US-China policy. It's not simply the bilateral context. And it's not exclusively the international domain. So what the president and his senior team tried to articulate at the outset is that we were going to try to pursue a comprehensive integrated strategy, which actually fundamentally begins at home. And I think what he has tried to do through consultations and engagements across the political aisle is make clear the most important ingredient in our success in the Indo-Pacific and with China is to demonstrate that we can engage actively, domestically, invest appropriately, and be competitive internationally. The ramparts of competition in this new era that we are confronting in the Indo-Pacific, of course, there will be military issues that we have to focus on. But it's really investment in technology, AI, quantum computing, 5G, human sciences. These are the arenas where the United States has enjoyed unique advantages. But frankly, our advantages have been tested and challenged. And we have to invest and double down on those areas of innovation inside the United States. And so what the president has tried to do with a series of engagements again across the aisle is to make those investments so that we can, in fact, run faster. And so it's not an accident that the virtual summit, virtual engagement, between the two leaders happened on the day that the signing of the bipartisan infrastructure bill, which has many elements associated with not just traditional infrastructure, but technological innovation. It's also the case that the important ingredients in our strategy are deep engagement with partners and allies. So the week before the president had participated in the APEC summit, hosted by New Zealand, US ASEAN summit, a variety of engagements as part of the East Asia Summit, a number of innovative meetings and engagements on technologies with Europeans, and again, the first ever Quad summit that we'll talk a little bit about as we go forward. This is meant to send a larger context of both domestic innovation and international commitment with partners, friends, and allies to basically send a signal that the United States is here to stay in the Indo-Pacific and we're going to defend and support the operating system that has been so good for so many of us for many years. So that's the context that was set before President Biden sat down for deep interactions over almost four hours on Monday night with President Xi. I think what we sought to do in those meetings, that those interactions were a couple of things, the first and most important is to have open, clear lines of communication and to engage deeply in a statesman-like important fashion in which we addressed the issues where we disagree and the perspective areas where we could work together openly and clearly. I think we recognize, given what's happened in China, in which so much power has been accumulated by President Xi, that we have to engage in this current period of relations with China between the two leaders and, in fact, ensuring that there is this open, respectful line of communication between the two is an essential feature of our diplomacy. In the past, we had a lot of big meetings and engagements in this current environment, ensuring that there is this ability to communicate honestly at the highest level is most important. We also wanted to make clear that we believe the dominant paradigm, the chief characteristic of U.S.-China relations right now is competition and that we are competing across the board everywhere. We believe it's possible to compete responsibly in a healthy way, but at the same time, I think the President, our team recognizes that it will be important to try to establish some guardrails. We can talk about what that means, that will keep the relationship from veering into dangerous arenas of confrontation. We recognize that this is a challenging endeavor and this was really meant as an initial conversation about areas that we think we can potentially work together like climate change, but also make clear where our purpose and determination are clear, like on the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. So see, that's a long answer, but I think what I'd like you to take from this is that our strategy in the Indo-Pacific is integrated. It's multifaceted and it's not just about competing with China. It's also about advancing areas where we believe we have something to offer. We'll have the summative democracy upcoming. We have been made a major commitment to vaccine diplomacy across Asia. These are the interconnected pieces of what we think will help the United States sustain our leadership in the region. Thank you for that. I'd like to focus on this quad. I mean, one of the things you've done in terms of this strategy is made clear that working with friends and allies on the challenge presented by China is a critical part of that strategy and this revitalization and upgrade of the quad is clearly part of that. I really want to ask you three questions about that. One, what is the focus going to be on the quad? It's a pretty broad agenda. What are the three or four things that are most important? That's the first question. Second question is how does the quad relate to the other institutions that are in the Asia-Pacific, particularly ASEAN? How does it relate to ASEAN? What do the ASEAN countries think of the quad? Do they view it as a competitor? Is there a possibility actually for coordinated action between the quad and ASEAN? And then thirdly, what's been the Chinese reaction to the quad? Pretty hysterical or pretty polemical, I guess. How do you think they have reacted to it? So if you could address it well. First of all, for those who perhaps are not aware, but the parentage of this institution is critical to keep in mind, and I'm sitting next to the person who helped bring the quad together originally after the tragedy of the tsunami in Indonesia. And it was President George W. Bush, Steve Hadley, Condi Rice, who realized that there would be a need to bring countries together to respond to an unprecedented catastrophe that had hit Indonesia and other parts of Asia as a whole. Since then, the institution has waxed and waned. During the Trump administration, there were some important meetings. I think when President Biden and his team came to office, I think there was a recognition that these four maritime democracies, Japan, India, Australia and the United States, shared so much with respect, Steve, to what we wanted to promote in the Indo-Pacific. And I do want to underscore that what we see this venue as being about is actually promoting common good, not against any particular issue. And so if you look at the agenda that has emerged over the last 10 months, Steve, around the quad, it is deeply about deliverables that are of interest to the people in the Indo-Pacific. Huge commitment by the end of 2022 to provide upwards of a billion doses to Asia that will be manufactured in India, supported by the United States and Japan. We will work on a number of initiatives in terms of infrastructure, clean health. Steve, at the virtual summit in September, the President announced that we will be inaugurating an educational initiative that will bring STEM students from all four countries, including the United States, to study at American universities to link our countries together as we go forward. And so you will note in much of what we have discussed and the work that we've done, it is about a positive agenda. It's about serving the interests of the people in climate change and pandemic. I'm actually here with one of the architects of the initiative and want to just highlight Mirrap Hooper, who's a big fan of Steve as well. We've been able to work together with each of these countries in building out habits of cooperation, large groups of both in the public and private sector that want our four countries to work together, Steve, on common purpose. It is not a formal alliance. It's an informal gathering. I think all countries, all four countries recognize that that's important at this juncture. And I think we all recognize that we have to go slowly, purposefully, and carefully, and that's what we've tried to do. Japan has agreed to host the meeting in 2022 and we'll work with them on timing and to make sure we follow through on what we've committed to, which is extraordinarily important, but also look at new initiatives as well. We're most focused on ensuring that ASEAN understands that the Quad recognizes and wants to support the concept of ASEAN centrality in our overall strategy. We believe that the two institutions frankly have complementary goals and ambitions, but we have a lot of work to do to make sure that ASEAN understands that these initiatives are really designed to help them in health across the board as I've laid out. We are looking to advance those conversations. We've already done a lot, but more needs to be done. I think it would be fair to say at the virtual meeting, President Xi made very clear that a number of things that the United States is doing caused China some heartburn. And I think at the top of that list is our bilateral reinforcing and revitalizing our bilateral security alliances with Japan, South Korea, with Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, new partnerships that are of critical importance like Vietnam, the Quad working constructively with India, AUKUS and frankly talking to the Europeans in a more dynamic way about areas of cooperation on technology and the like. I think President Xi made clear that those from the Chinese perspective represent what they would describe as Cold War thinking. We believe they're essential features, interconnected, overlapping, multipurpose, some formalized, some informal that together help pursue this operating system that has led to such profound prosperity over the last 30 years. I think the critical thing for us going forward, Steve, is to be open and transparent about the work. And so that's one of the reasons why each of the leaders has put out clearly their goals and ambitions. We have made clear what our game plan is for areas we want to work together. We've also made clear that we want to work with other nations. So we've had a long line of countries that want to associate. That's always a good sign and we hear that both in Europe and Asia and I think that's our goal going forward. I think the initial effort though is to make sure that the partnership between these four countries, the partnership that you help build, Steve, is strong and stable as we go forward. I want to get to a lot of other subjects to talk about, but one last question on the Quad. If I can push you a little bit, where does this head over the next three to five years? Are you thinking of it? Will it become more institutionalized? Will it have a former secretariat? Will other countries be available and asked and permitted to join? You know, there are even some people who think this is in the future going to be the NATO of Asia. How do you see this Steve? I think the consensus of the four countries at this stage is that it is appropriate to be considered as an informal gathering. I do not believe we will take steps in the near term to institutionalize and that is the strong view of all countries involved. That does not mean that there won't be deeper cooperation sustained working groups. In fact, we are working deeply and collaboratively as we speak on a whole range of issues and I think that will continue. I do believe that there are some areas that the four countries want to work more deeply in. I believe we will leave our mark in the next year and beyond on vaccines, but I think there is a goal as we put in place, build back better world, work with Japan, with Australia and India infrastructure, particularly in Southeast Asia, is going to be critical and that we offer opportunities for other kinds of investments in the region as a whole. That might be investments in education and technology. We will explore that as we go forward. I also believe that each of these countries in their way are interested in clean technology more generally in elements of 5G and so I think there are going to be a number of venues for cooperation that are practical, constructive that you can actually point to more directly. I think we will also see more efforts in new domains like cyber and space, maritime domain awareness. These are things that we think are critical and already we have groups inside each of the governments, numbering in the hundreds frankly, that are engaged on a regular basis on finding ways to deepen and strengthen cooperation among the four. I do think we will work with other countries, whether they will join formally or whether they will associate with project basis. That's really the topic for the leaders and I think they agreed at the last session that let's get deeper among the four of us first before we look to figure out how to expand institutionally or the like. I think that's the best answer I can give. I will say that what was exciting to see, Steve, is it's a hard thing to be a Democratic leader right now and to see those four leaders get together and there is a common experience and to see each of them together in a sense of working constructively was frankly deeply satisfying and at the end of, I don't mind revealing at the end of the session that we had planned in Washington in the White House, the President said, do we get to meet some more? It's because he enjoyed the interaction so much with Prime Minister Modi, Prime Minister Suga which was his last venue and Prime Minister Morrison from Australia. Let me ask you one last question on the Quad and that is the role of India. I think a lot of people were surprised that India would be willing to affiliate with the other three in such a public way. India is the only Quad member of course who is not a formal U.S. treaty ally and in the past has been reluctant to engage itself in anything that looks like a kind of alliance structure, even a soft alliance structure. But I think China's behavior towards India on the border has probably moved India's thinking along and let me just ask you, were you surprised that India was willing to affiliate it? Do you think this shift, if you will, from the traditional India, Indian point of view is enduring? And finally, can you talk a little bit about where U.S.-India relations are going outside of the Quad? Thanks, Steve. Look, I'm going to be careful. I don't want to throw you too many bouquets, but the origins of the closer partnership between the United States and India began in the Bush administration in which dynamic engagement on very complex issues in the nuclear arena opened up the initial windows of opportunity and cooperation that we have built on subsequently. So I would say just a couple of things just to keep in mind as we go forward. First of all, the people-to-people connectivity between India and the United States has really manifested much more clearly in a bipartisan way. And so you see a succession of administrations which vary dramatically. I don't need to tell you all this, but are united in a recognition that a key fulcrum player on the global stage in the 21st century will be India. And it is profoundly in American interests to build that partnership, right? And we share so much in common in terms of innovation and spirit. I think despite some bureaucratic challenges in both governments and some historical legacies, the broad sweep of history has pulled us together, and that's going to continue. And so I think the most important thing, Steve, is the attraction and the desire and dynamism to tackle problems together. It is also undeniable, though, that things happen on the global stage that we need to recognize. The border disputes in the disputed territories in the Himalayas and these ungodly conditions in which a number of Indian troops were killed last year. And a real sense of heightened tensions between China and India. It would be difficult to exaggerate the strategic significance that is at Indeli. I don't like the 9-11 because it's an international but a real sense of a new strategic paradigm which has forced India or encouraged India to reach out and to build not just with the United States but other countries' stronger bonds to signal that India is not alone and is working with other countries. And I believe that sense of wanting to work with others and to stand up is part of the essential Indian character. And I believe that that will continue. And I will also say that, you know, this was a point that was made by President Biden, to be honest. I can't go into too much detail in these private conversations, Steve. But in the interactions between the two leaders, President Biden just very directly said, look, I've had so many conversations with leaders and they all say the same thing that they're worried that China has taken steps, coercive steps, militarily, commercially, that has created tensions globally and has upset the bilateral relationship with China. And basically said, you know, I think some of these things are, you know, not antithetical to China's interests. I don't think she was, he didn't respond directly to it, but a very clear statement about that. I would say the country that was most affected in terms of thinking in those terms, Steve is probably India. So I would be of the view, I'm very bullish about the future with India. I think we all recognize that the critical, crucial member in the Quad is India. And it holds a deeply meaningful place in all international gatherings right now. And we respect that. And we are determined to do what we can in the bilateral context to build relations. I would just simply say you see a lot of areas that we're working together on in the defense realm diplomatically. We probably need to do more commercially figuring out the way forward. There are challenges there, probably not for this venue. It has to be done appropriately, but at the same time, this is a moment for thinking creatively and strategically about what's possible between the United States and India. And if you look at a couple of, again, sort of critical countries in Asia that will be defining in the future, India is probably at the top of that list, maybe Vietnam, a few others are also central. And I believe that whoever is in office in Washington, Democrat or Republican, will do what's necessary to build that relationship. Thank you for that. I want to turn a bit to another subject. Just before the Quad Leaders Summit, the administration announced a new defense arrangement with Australia and the UK, the so-called AUKUS arrangement. I want to focus really on two aspects of that. Most of the public focus has been on the help that will be provided to Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines. I want first question is sort of at the strategic level, is there more to AUKUS than the submarine deal? Are there other important aspects of the arrangement that you would like to talk a little bit about? And the second is a question actually that came from one of the listeners in the audience. And it's this, Australia needs to upgrade its maritime defenses quickly. And the AUKUS timetable to get Australian flag nuclear submarines on patrol could be very long indeed. Is the Biden administration considering any plan to help Australia to lease or buy diesel submarines, perhaps even from the French, to give it enhanced interim capability even while it builds a new nuclear subs of its own? This is from Misha Zelinsky, who's the full scholar at the CSBA, the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessment. It's a good question. So if you could address strategically what's in the AUKUS arrangement and then this tactical or specific question about helping Australians get a submarine capability early. So I would say from my perspective, the strategic rationale behind this grouping of the United States, Great Britain, Australia are closest allies in many respect. The strategic rationale is just unassailable. Each of these countries has deep reasons to be connected and cooperating in the Indo-Pacific going forward. And I think this grouping seeks to do this in a myriad of complex ways. See what I'm glad that you asked about that. So basically earlier this week, President Biden and our National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan announced that we had just brought on board a team that will lead the 18-month study, which will basically provide a roadmap architecture for how the three countries will work together in the years ahead. Not just on the submarines, but more broadly. Yeah, more broadly. So the President announced Jim Miller, who's well known to Steve. He had served with distinction in previous administrations, deeply knowledgeable about defense, about design, procurement. I can't imagine a better person. He has been tasked essentially to do three things. The first is basically design and architecture about how the three countries will work more proactively on defense, on sharing perspectives of the Indo-Pacific. And so what that means sort of on the day to day basis is how defense, state, diplomatic, other officials will meet regularly and will basically seek to harmonize our views and our positions in the Indo-Pacific. For us that's important because basically it ties Australia more deeply to us. We already have a very strong partnership, but this I think is fundamental. And I think Great Britain, as it considers its global role, wants to be much more focused on the Indo-Pacific. And so that's part of the effort of bringing Europe and Great Britain is obviously a critical player. We want to extend this overall engagement with Europe about Asia, but Britain as a first step will then be focusing more on the Indo-Pacific. Both of these countries have now made a fundamental strategic choice to work with us in a range of ways in the Indo-Pacific. So that's the first thing, Steve, and that's actually of critical importance. As you know from your time in government, these high level meetings and engagements tend to drive policy and decisions. So that's his first task. The second task, the one that I'm grateful for asking about is that each of our countries has certain areas of deep innovation, whether it's in cyber, whether it's in undersea capabilities, whether it's military AI. And so I think there's a desire to engage, to see what we can learn from each other, to see what can be harvested from that in applicable ways that will help engender a more effective security and deterrent approach. I think the goal here, Steve, and I think Mr. Sullivan has said in his Loewe speech is that this part of the arrangement is meant to be an open architecture. And we expect that other countries, both in Asia and Europe, will participate with us, perhaps not immediately, but over time. So it's made clear that they're, and particularly, they'll have to be careful work in terms of scoping about certain sharing of sensitive technologies. But we think that is important and we've made that clear to Europeans. And then the last is Dr. Miller and his team, and the teams in Australia and Great Britain, remember they've also got very high level teams working on this. Their task is to do whatever possible to provide the Royal Australian Navy with options to build nuclear submarines as rapidly as possible. And I don't want to prejudge this long-term that we can't meet these challenges. Jim is deeply innovative, creative. We're looking at a lot of different options. I'm not going to go through them here today, but we realize and recognize that this is, that there are some immediate and medium-term challenges and that we can't simply wait for long-term solutions. And I think there's a deep recognition that that's the timeframe we're working on. And so each of the countries are seized with this and they understand. And I think, Jim will have more and we will have more to say about the way forward. But I do want to underscore why this is important, Steve. I would think in the next little while we will have more British sailors serving on our naval vessels, Australians and the like, more of our four deployed assets in Australia. This leads to a deeper interconnection and almost a melding in many respects of our services and working together on common purpose that we couldn't have dreamed about five or 10 years ago. And fundamentally, it leads to what we believe is going to be the most essential feature of an effective strategy in the Indo-Pacific. And that's deeper cooperation with allies and partners. These tasks ahead in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot take on alone. We must take it on in partnership. Just the other day, the Pentagon released its annual report on Chinese military power in which it assessed that Beijing is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, which could reach 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade. This is up from 400 estimated in the last report. It's been publicly reported that President Biden quote, underscored the importance of managing strategic risks in the conversation with President Xi and that some form of strategic stability dialogue between the countries may be in the offering. I know Jake Sullivan made some comments about this, very much a work in progress. Was there an agreement actually to launch a strategic stability dialogue with China? And what do you think would be its form and would it address the nuclear programs of the two countries? See, good questions. And I'll try to put in a larger context. I think it would be fair to say since beginning in about 1996, 1995, and you experienced when you were in government, what we have witnessed is one of the largest military build-ups across every sector, shipbuilding, nuclear, a number of technologies that are concerning on the part of China in modern times, this massive military investment and new capabilities of the like. I think we're of the view that some of this is destabilizing. Much of it has been done in a non-transparent manner. And I think behind the scenes, many in Asia are worried about this substantial dramatic set of military investments. And indeed, some of those steps have led other countries to respond. And I would say AUKUS is one of those responses. And you see a lot of efforts in deeper dialogue with the United States for vitalization of other forms. I would say that the military capabilities that stretch from nuclear to cyber to space raise a host of concerns. And what the president sought to do was to say, as great powers, we have an interest in doing what we can to head off problems, inadvertence, miscalculation and accident. That's at the first level. And so I think what we would like to do, and we have tried in the past, is to enlist China in discussions about what we would do if we faced some sort of accident or inadvertence. We're at the very earliest stages of that kind of discussion. And I think it'd be fair to say that President Xi indicated that they would at least engage in that discussion. We would sort of identify potentially who the right people would be for that kind of discussion. And that would involve people on the military side, perhaps in other parts of our governments as well. But we're at the earliest possible stages there. And I think that would be one element that I think the president and Jake have in mind. I think another is we think the Chinese are embarking in certain areas, again in nuclear cyber and space, and they are undertaking certain practices that we think are destabilizing. And I think we want to just have a very general discussion on what we might call doctrinal issues about, look, certain steps that you might take in the nuclear realm would be potentially destabilizing. And so I think that, again, very early stages China in the past has never been interested in arms control. They have been generally reluctant to talk about operational limitations. And they've been very careful about revealing anything associated with key attributes of their defense posture and the like. So I think we go into this carefully, Steve. We're at the very early stages of this. I think we have to make sure inside our own government what is the specific ask, what can be done to help lead towards greater stability and to reduce misunderstandings or misperceptions on both sides. I was in the meeting. I think President Xi indicated that he was prepared for some of this, but I think that's going to have to be tested over time. Kurt, as we listen to you about the Quad, about AUKUS, about the possibility for an initial incipient strategic stability dialogue with China, it sounds like on the diplomatic and defense side, we've got a posture that is evolving and developing, but we're still missing an essential economic component of a China strategy. And if you think about China has joined RCEP, this Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is a regional economic association that China has been behind, they've also applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the CPTPP. CPTPP, yeah. It's a hard one to say. It's a hard one to say, which is the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership which we designed and built and then withdrew from. There are various people who have said economics and trade are the coin of the realm in Asia, and if we do not have an economic and trade strategy, we're fighting with one hand behind our back or competing with China with one hand behind our back and maybe two hands behind our back. What are the prospects for seeing in the coming months something on the economic and trade side? Thank you, Steve. It's a really good question. I do want to also, you mentioned China's desire to join the CPTPP, the RCEP. I do want to also indicate that there was a digital agreement that was in the region that includes Japan and countries in Southeast Asia and Chile. China also indicated last month that they would like to join that, and so what you have seen just for handicap and to get a sense is after a period of substantial movement, strategic movement on the part of the United States, and I'm grateful for Steve to draw some of these things out, what we've done with each of these institutions with Build Back Better Vaccine Engagement, China's answer, strategic answer, has been to move out in these areas and move out assertively. And so those who say that China is doing this for show in CPTPP, I would beg to differ. This is deadly serious. They are interested in deep discussions about what it would take to join. The most anxious calls I have received about anything that we've been involved in in the Indo-Pacific have come in the aftermath of some of these indications, and I would say that the message generally, Steve, is the message that you just delivered. It's great that you're doing these diplomatic things. It's great that you're doing these strategic things, but you've got to have an open, optimistic, engaged economic message and policy going forward. I do want to underscore that the President at the East Asia Summit and then last week at APEC indicated that the United States is now embarking on an effort to engage some key like-minded and effective partners in the Indo-Pacific on the prospect of building an economic framework around some key issues that are going to be critical in the 21st century, digital trade, decarbonization, workers' rights, issues associated with technology vetting, investment vetting, supply chains. These are going to be the features of what will be the standard setting, the defining aspects of the economic architecture, commercial architecture of the Indo-Pacific. Just this week, Secretary Ramondo, in fact, as we speak, is engaged in deep consultations across Asia about this framework, gathering input and ideas, working closely with our U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Tai. The President has both of them to work on this going forward. I think this is an important initiative. It has been welcomed and the reaction has been optimistic and great. Let's get busy in the Indo-Pacific. I would say more to follow here, but I think the general approach is your general observation is true, Steve. This is the demand signal for Asia. I think everyone acknowledges and understands how complex these issues are. Domestically, we have to make an argument that we do this in ways that support working families, that support larger American purpose, and I think the administration is determined to do this. I will also say, Steve, that I find that in a world in which partisanship and tension domestically is high, I find in my conversation with my Republican friends, sometimes they'll say we have to put on our thinking caps and figure out how to do this economic stuff in a way that brings parties together that can be politically sustained domestically and can help us be successful in the region. I would simply say your general metaphor about one hand or two hands tied behind your back, it may be even more than that. Maybe one foot tied back there as well. This is the coin of the realm. Our ticket to the big game has often been our military. I don't think there are any questions about that in Asia now. I don't think there's any questions about our bipartisan strategic commitment and our innovation. This is the area that the region is looking towards. I want to ask a couple. I've asked one question that we got from our audience. I want to ask two more, and one is a sort of follow on and might be an element of the kind of thing that Ambassador Tai and Secretary Ramondo are looking at. This question comes from Samir Lawani who is a senior fellow Asia strategy at the Stimpson Center. Their question is, is there any consideration of a major technology partnership agenda approaching the magnitude and import of AUKUS in the defense area but in the technology area that might involve the United States, India and Japan? If so, what might that look at? And if it's not being considered, the questioner asked, why isn't it being considered? So I give that to you. So I would say that the discussions around technology partnerships, whether it's innovation, education, investment protocols, those extend to every element of our strategy. And what you've seen is when we've gathered like-minded countries together from Europe in Pittsburgh for the Trade Partnership Council or the discussions that we've had directly with countries in Asia, I believe that this is going to be the most important arena of potential cooperation going forward. I think the likely venue though, Steve, is not going to be one dominant form that involves everyone. It's going to be a series of mini-lateral and multilateral engagements, some focused on some areas and others. I think, for instance, the areas that we've seen the greatest collaboration to date have been on semiconductors and you've seen that an array of partnerships with South Korea, with Taiwan, with countries in Europe. I think we're going to see some of the same sort of engagements on AI going forward. If I can just give you all a sense, though, of what the challenges here are. So Steve and I are of a generation that when we first started working on strategic issues, it was the Cold War. And to be relevant, to understand how to participate, we needed to learn a lot about areas that had previously been largely in the military realm, how to think about throw weights and military conventional and nuclear technologies, right? And those things we'd had to learn about to be able to participate in the conversation and to be effective. And that was the coin of the realm then in terms of discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Increasingly for us to really understand this new arena of competition, you have to understand how to engage at least knowledgeably a little bit on these areas of technology that I've just laid out. And so what we have is a strategic community that is still learning, frankly, and a scientific community that has not been as advanced or engaged in the policy deliberations. And so what we're seeing is some, it's not a reconfiguration, but sort of new groupings inside governments. So for instance, I work a lot with the science advisor, with technology folks, about how to design protocols that would be around investment in the United States or how to prevent certain kinds of seepage of innovations outside the United States in ways that were antithetical to our interests. So Steve, what the questioner is asking about is how to kind of form these partnerships. That effort is already well advanced now. It's really more about what form it will take, how it will be nested in larger discussions, and importantly ensuring that the key players inside the US government actually understand what they're working on. Always a challenge. Yeah. Secretary Austin and Vice President Harris had successful visits to Vietnam and the Vietnamese leaders agreed to expand the bilateral comprehensive partnership without yet raising it to the level of the strategic partnership. And this is a question from Andrew Wells-Dong, who's the senior expert for Vietnam here at USIP. And the question is what do you see as the next steps in US-Vietnamese relationships? How do we strengthen strategic trust between the two countries and what are the obstacles to moving that relationship forward? Thank you Steve. Excellent question. Very much appreciated. So I think this too is a multifaceted challenge and it's critically important. When you think about who are those key states, we often think about ASEAN obviously as a grouping, but within ASEAN the one of the most critical states and partnerships is obviously Vietnam. What we have seen is in high tech and manufacturing a lot of companies and groupings who are looking to diversify their holdings, investment patterns of trade in Asia are looking more and more in Vietnam. And Vietnam has seen remarkable growth in its technology sectors and the like. We've also seen Vietnam playing a more active role within ASEAN. We've had strong bilateral engagements with Vietnam, but that doesn't just extend to Vietnam in the United States. The same processes underway between Vietnam in Japan, Vietnam in India, Vietnam in Australia, they are raising their diplomatic game deepening their engagement across the board. So I would say, Steve, I think there are a number of things that we've got to undertake. First, their leadership in ours have to become more familiar with one another. And those meetings have to be less scripted and more about sharing true strategic purpose. And I think that's a work in progress. I'm part of some of those discussions. I think we've made some strides, but more needs to be done. Second, Vietnam deeper in certain kinds of institutional gatherings. And they're careful. They understand the neighborhood they live in and they have some limitations that they feel that they have to be careful about. But I think that's going to be important. Third, building a stronger defense relationship. And the Vietnamese are interested in that, I think given some of the last legislation that Senator McCain passed actually helped open the arena for greater cooperation between our defense firms and our government and the defense realm. I think that will take place over time. I think there's going to be more training, more ship visits and the like. I think that's going to be critical. But then I'm going to end where you asked the last question, Steve, that the core is going to have to be some sort of economic engagement that has a vision that sets parameters between the United States and Vietnam. Vietnam in the past was a member of CPTPP. I think we've had some general discussions about sort of the way forward. But this is going to be a critical swing state, not just strategically, but commercially and technologically. Even though we have different kinds of government, overall values, I believe fundamentally the ability to work closely with Vietnam will be decisive for us going forward. We're running short of time. I've got one last question for you. And it's kind of a grand strategy question. Question is this, if U.S.-China strategic competition is the sort of ordering principle of the age in which we live, and if the end of Pacific is the principal theater for that competition, what about the rest? Does a U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific necessarily come at the cost of U.S. interests and presence in Europe and the Middle East and elsewhere? In that context, are there policy trade-offs that you're prepared to make? We should make in terms of our interests and presence in the other regions. My own worry is that if we are so double down on the Indo-Pacific, the challenge from China is a global challenge. And do we actually open the door for China to, in some sense, eat our lunch in these other theaters if we over-commit to the Indo-Pacific? It's sort of the reverse of the rebalance to Asia. Yeah. Steve, I actually share that very much. And ironically, I worked with others on this idea of pivoting or rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific. But I am deeply aware of the potential downsides of an over-focus on a region to the exclusion of others. And I think we did a little bit of that in the Middle East and South Asia. And I agree fully that we have to be careful about not repeating that in the Indo-Pacific. So we do have to step up our game. We do need to recognize that it's going to require more for us in terms of investment in building capabilities inside our own governments. I see that every day in understanding what the nature of the challenges are. But increasingly, the quote, quote, China challenge is a global challenge. And we see it in Latin America and Africa on technology, on this idea of the export of the technologies of authoritarianism. These are profound challenges that we have to meet. And so I would say that the key effort here is not to overinvest or not to over-focus, to realize that keeping our, you know, our global balance is going to be essential. But it really means more than anything else, working with global partners. And so although there's a wonderful piece in foreign policy by our mutual friend Richard Fontaine, in which he makes precisely this point, you know, and I tease him that, you know, God, we've had like five weeks in the Middle East, five weeks in Asia after 20 years in the Middle East. And he's already saying, no, no, let's be careful not to overinvest here. I do believe it's going to be important to have this global balanced approach. But at the same time that we work with allies, partners, and friends, we're going to have to sustain, Steve, which you know better, the bipartisan understanding about what it is that the United States is about on the global stage. And that's probably our biggest challenge going forward. And let me thank you again for being here. We need to let Kurt go back to work. He's got a lot on his plate, as we've heard, but we're grateful for your being here. I think you've given us a lot to think about and we appreciate very much your candor. So if you could all join me in thanking Kurt. Thank you. And let me also just thank the U.S. Institute of Peace for the work that they do. And I want to thank Steve for his leadership, his service. I'm incredibly grateful for the opportunity to work with them and to call them a friend. So thank you. Thank you so much.