 Good evening friends, a judgment which had come and created a lot of discussions, a lot of debates and I remember for a chance I was also associated with one of the judgments wherein an issue arose as to whether in view of the judgment of Asian resurfacing as to whether a judge could deem that this day had been located or it would be that this day had to be advocated by a specific order. Thereafter directions were issued to all the judicial academies to understand the nuances of Asian resurfacing. Keeping in view the debates day in and day out, the matter was reconsidered and there we have the judgment in respect of high court bar association alabar versus state of UP. It's not only considers and discusses what is the effect and impact of Asian resurfacing as such though we can say that that particular aspect has been settled in so far as present situation is concerned. It also discusses and delves upon the past under article 142 of the constitution of India, what are the past and how it can be used. This particular aspect since we also discussed a lot of sessions in respect of the judgments, the today's session discusses what is the effect of the judgment of high court bar association alabar versus state of UP and when it comes to the discussions in respect of judgments, one name which clicks in our mind is Murti Denaik, a senior advocate from Karnataka High Court who has done various sessions with us, therefore Thruvikram and beyond law CLC requested him and he has been kind enough to accept our invite. I will request Mr. Thruvikram to just give a short intro and then we will request Mr. Murti to take things forward. Mr. Vikas Chathrat, I think five years ago, 2017, when the first time this judgment was delivered, I had occasion to interact with the senior advocate Mr. Thruvikram Denaik. Immediately I think Sir had also authored one article which was published in ILA and this is second opportunity now when the judgment is reversed and I have been fortunate enough to again have a session online all of you and I take this pride to extend my warm welcome to senior advocate Murti Denaik who has agreed to our request and will be delivering and enlightening us on the advances at the cases of this judgment. Sir, on behalf of beyond law CLC and my personal behalf Sir, I extend a very warm welcome to you. Go to you also. Yeah, thank you, thank you Vikas Ji. Thank you Vikram. In fact, this is the fifth time I am delivering a lecture on the beyond law CLC platform and this time it is to discuss the judgment of the Constitution bench in High Court Bar Association, Alabad versus State of UP. Before I touch upon the salient features of the Constitution bench judgment, it would be necessary to broadly touch upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Asian resurfacing that was reported as 2018-16 SCC 299. See in Asian resurfacing judgment, the precise question before the bench was whether an order rejecting prior for discharge or framing charge is an interlocutory order as contemplated under section 397-2 of CRPC and whether the bar under section 397-2 would get attracted. The three judges bench while dealing with this aspect thought it fit to digress a bit and was pleased to issue certain guidelines. Essentially, the guidelines centered around automatic vacation of state and time bound disposal of matters, time bound disposal of cases in which an interim order of state of the criminal proceedings was granted. So, I will quickly summarize the six directions that were issued by the three judges bench in Asian resurfacing. One, an order framing of charge or rejection of prior for discharge is not an interlocutory order but an intermediate order and an petition under 397-482 or an article 226 of the Constitution was maintainable. Second, order of stay of further proceedings, stay of an order, framing charge, stay of trial can be passed by High Court even in prevention of corruption at cases. Third, the above power has to be exercised sparingly and with great caution in the rarest of rare cases. Fourthly, order of stay should be a speaking order and should not be mechanically passed and should be for a limited duration. Fifth, in respect of pending matters wherein stay has been granted, the same will automatically come to an end on expiry of six months from 28-3 2018 unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order, such stay is extended. Sixth, the above directions passed will not apply not only apply to the cases under prevention of corruption act 1988 but to all criminal cases proceedings pending in all pending in all courts and all civil cases pending. So, mainly the last two directions that is automatic expiry of stay within six months from 28-3 2018 that is the date on which the judgment was pronounced. And second, that the said direction would not only apply to cases under the prevention of corruption act but also to all criminal proceedings, so all criminal cases as well as civil cases. Hence, these directions were to be followed by all courts across the country especially the last two directions had lot of far-reaching consequences. Having said that, I would pause here for a moment and deal with the first two direction that is with regard to framing of charge and that was as I said earlier that was the precise question before the three judges bench as to whether framing, whether an order framing charge or an order rejecting a prayer for discharge is an interlocutal order or not. So, the bench was pleased to hold that it is not an interlocutal order but an intermediate order and a revision or a petition under 482 or a petition and an article, a written petition and article 226 of the constitution is maintainable. And further, it also clarified that an order of stay can be passed in respect of prevention of corruption act cases because there was some confusion created with regard to granting of stay as far as PC act of instance is concerned by virtue of the janvature of the Supreme Court in Satyanarayan Sharma because it was held that a stay of further proceedings cannot be granted as per the janvature of Satyanarayan Sharma. Hence, these two points were laid to rest but however, the three judges bench extensively dealt with the aspect of pendency of criminal petitions and criminal revision petitions before various high courts for years together. And hence, it thought it fit that an embargo be placed with regard to the operation of a stay order. And hence, it made it clear and issued direction exercising its power under article 142 of the constitution, saying that it shall be in force for a period of six months and six months from 28 3 2018 and automatically it will expire if it is not extended by way of a speaking order. And it also went one step ahead and held that the High Court while granting order of stay should necessarily pass a reason and a speaking order in all the cases. Hence, these were the directions issued in exercise of article 142. No sooner this judgment was pronounced in 2018 that is 28 3 2018. Within few days, I had written an article in Karnataka law journal which is published in volume 2 of 2018 volume 2 page 9 journal section where I dealt with these aspects and I was of the opinion that this judgment will require reconsideration by a larger bench particularly because it was against the dictum passed by the honorable Supreme Court, but more particularly the constitution bench of the honorable Supreme Court. Hence, I gave reasons in my article particularly in Paras 12 and 13 as to why the judgment required reconsideration. I would quickly summarize the reasons given by me. Firstly, the Supreme Court was in particular dealing with a question of law as to whether an order framing charge or refusing to discharge is an interlocutory order. Second, the bench was not dealing with any other question and hence had overstepped by extending the directions not only to criminal cases but also to civil cases without affording an opportunity to the parties who would be affected by these directions. So, I had underlined this aspect that one it had exceeded the scope of reference to it passed a blanket order in respect of all criminal revisions, all criminal petitions which were stayed and thirdly to all civil cases without affording opportunity to the parties who would be affected by this order. Thirdly, the bench had exceeded its scope of reference and had totally digressed into an unwanted territory by passing the above direction and declaring it to be the law. According to me, the same is orbiter to the extent of laying down an outer limit for operations of the state and also in respect of disposal of pending cases. Most importantly, in the light of the seven judges bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of P Ramchandra Rao versus state of Karnataka reported as 2002-04 ACC 578 wherein it was held that no outer limit for completion of trial can be fixed by the Supreme Court. Hence, I had applied that the above direction passed by the three judges bench was without considering the Constitution bench judgment in P Ramchandra Rao's case. Fourthly, the Supreme Court had not taken into consideration the fact that there are empty number of civil and criminal cases pending before all the high courts and other courts mainly attributable to lack, oblique shortage of judges and as such it would be humanly impossible to pass speaking orders on interlocutory applications which would be time consuming. Normally, an entry murder is passed as a temporary measure pending disposal of the main petition and as such orders are passed only after the court is satisfied that the issue raised in the main petition requires consideration. If the courts are called upon to pass speaking, oblique reason, oblique elaborate orders on question of stay, etc., then most of the judicial time would be consumed and exhausted in passing such orders only leaving very less time for hearing the other matters that are listed on the board. Fifthly, I had applied that one of the judges in his judgment had though held that no mandatory time limit can be fixed had proceeded to indicate that it should not exceed two to three months. This is against the dictum laid down by the larger benches of the Supreme Court in earlier judgments. Sixthly, the bench had lost sight of the fact that reports to challenge by way of petition either under section 397 or 401 of CRPC or 482 of CRPC or under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are not only made in respect of reaming of charge but also are often resorted to even in respect of the very registration of the FIR or initiation of a criminal proceedings, issue of process, arraigning of additional accused at section 319 CRPC, etc., so on and so forth. And approach in respect of such cases have been clearly delineated by the Supreme Court in container of earlier judgments including that of Bajandran versus state of Haryana, Pepsi, foods, ginseng, etc. That being so, the above blanket directions in respect of all kind of criminal and civil cases pending in my opinion is nothing but judicial overreach. Seventhly, the bench lost sight of the fact that the power to grant stay or pass an entry murder is inherent in the power which they are exercising either under section 397 or 401 or 482 or for that matter 483 of CRPC or under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such the said power cannot be circumscribed by certain limitations imposed by way of directions which has been done in the present case. In the case of popular Muthaya versus state represented by Inspector of Police reported in 2006, 7 SCC 296, the Supreme Court has exhaustively dealt with the powers exercised by the High Court under various jurisdiction and further in Para 21 has held that the Code of Criminal Procedure is an exhaustive court providing a complete machinery. It has provision at each stage to correct errors, failure of justice and abuse of process under the supervision and supertenance of High Court as would be evident from the various powers accepted therein in the judgment. Most importantly, in subpara 8 of paragraph 21, it has been observed that revisional court during the pendency of the trial may exercise its revisional jurisdiction under section 397 in which case it may further it may direct further inquiry in terms of section 398 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Further it is held that revisional powers of High Court and Sessions Court are pointed out in the court separately from a perusal where it would appear that High Court exercises larger power. Further in subpara 10 it has been held that High Court has inherent powers under section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure to correct errors of court below and pass such orders as may be necessary to do justice to the parties and or to prevent the abuse of process of court. In paragraph 22, friends I am referring I had referred to popular Muteas is that is 2006 7 SCC 296. In paragraph 22, it has been held that the Court of Criminal Procedure provides for a corrective mechanism at each stage with investigation, trial, appeal and revision. And lastly I had referred to the provisions of Court of Civil Procedure and other civil laws had not been kept in mind at all while passing the above directions regarding stay even in respect of civil cases and civil appeals. The inbuilt mechanism pertaining to stay provided in the Court of Civil Procedure as postulated under order 41 rule 5 of CPC and other ancillary provisions have not been considered nor discussed while issuing the above direction. In fact as stated by me earlier there was absolutely no reason nor occasion to extend the scope of reference because the said point was not even being remotely considered or was subject matter of reference. To say the least the Supreme Court has unnecessarily transgressed the scope of their reference. So friends these were the eight points in support of my conclusion which I had summed up in paragraph 14 to say that the judgment required reconsideration by a larger bench and this was sometime in April 2018. Subsequently the judgment was followed by some of the trial judges and some of the trial judges did not follow because they were in a catch-22 situation and because most of the entry models of stay of criminal proceedings are passed by the High Court either in exercise of its criminal revision jurisdiction, revisional jurisdiction or its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution or in a 482 petition. Hence the trial judges were in a pondering as to they have to follow the specific order of stay granted or an entry model passed by the concerned High Court in the particular case before them or to follow the sweeping directions issued by the three judges bench in Asia. So this went on for some time and most some of the judges were insisting as I told you earlier. This being the fact situation the three judges bench of the Supreme Court again in October 2020 retreated its view taken in Asian resurfacing in 2018 and which is reported as 2022 10 SCC 592 and one of the judge who was party to the earlier judgment authored this and who was also a party to this judgment and the honourable judge was of the opinion that and in that case a particular criminal court had not followed its 2018 judgment hence in paragraph 3. It was observed that the trial judge ought to have followed the judgment its direction which were issued under article 142 of the Constitution and hence it was observed that it was read it was observed that the 2018 directions should be followed in letter and spirit and that the trial judges cannot give it a go by or cannot neglect it. It also went one step ahead and in this 2022 order the bench observed that though the High Court is not subordinate administratively but is certainly subordinate judicial. So this was the observation made and which will be dealt with in the course of my discussion of the Constitution bench judgment because I had great reservations about this observation made that though the High Court is not subordinate administratively but is certainly subordinate judicial. Hence friends the subsequent to this direction the trial judges were forced to follow the various directions issued in 2018 and not only the criminal courts across the country but also the civil courts had to apply this judgment while dealing with either first appeals before the civil courts or first appeals before the district courts. In fact our High Court had to the division bench of our High Court that is the Karnataka High Court had clarified that the direction issued in the 2018 Asian resurfacing judgment would not apply to a civil appeal more particularly a first appeal because a first appeal is not only decided by a district judge but it is also decided and heard and decided by the High Court first and second second appeal is necessarily decided by the High Court. So it was clarified by the division bench of our High Court that the directions would not apply as far as civil appeals are concerned but still the magistrates were forced to follow and in spite of a specific direction or a specific entry order of state the trial judges were forced to implement the order and the various directions issued in 2018 and which was reiterated in 2020. Hence the trial judges started insisting that either the parties get an order of extension from the High Court or get it finally disposed of or they were proceeding with the trial automatically. Hence this went on for some time and this created a lot of confusion and more particularly hardship to litigants even when there was a specific order of state and those orders of state were all reasoned orders because most of the entry models are not bald orders they are necessarily entry models though not lengthy orders. See reasoned order does not mean it has to be lengthy and run into several pages. So that being the case in spite of a specific entry model the trial judges were forced to insist for an order of extension or they started proceeding with trial. Hence this created a lot of confusion and hence in one of the case before the Supreme Court this was brought to the notice and the Supreme Court refused to in fact there was an order entry order granted by the Supreme Court because now this asian resurfacing 2018 judgment had created so much of confusion and vacuum as to whether they will apply to Supreme Court orders that is the entry models granted by Supreme Court. Friends as you are aware in certain cases where the High Court has declined to grant an entry model or has declined to cause your proceedings or pass a favorable order in favor of the petitioner that is the accused they would file an SLP and if the Supreme Court found that there was some substance in the petition it would grant entry model. Hence there was a great deal of confusion created as to whether these entry orders whether these directions issued in asian resurfacing apply to Supreme Court judgment. So in 2022 the Supreme Court refused to implement the 2018 asian or rather follow the dictum laid down by the three judges bench in the 2018 asian resurfacing judgment. This went on and subsequently in 2023 two separate benches of the Supreme Court did not concur with the directions issued and they found that they were of the opinion that it required reconsideration and hence it was referred to a larger bench and the the coordinate the two coordinate benches were of the opinion that the correctness of the directions issued in 2018 required reconsideration and hence they doubted that judgment the correctness of that judgment. Hence it was referred to larger bench on 1st December 2023 and thereafter the constitution bench comprising of five judges was constituted and the same has been decided in the case of High Court Bar Association Allahabad versus state of Uttar Pradesh and others. The same has been reported as 2024 SCC online SC 207. Friends the constitution bench has dealt with two honorable judges have rendered their separate opinion and the majority of all the five judges have concurred have unanimously concurred with the views expressed therein. The first few paragraphs deal with the directions issued in asian resurfacing which I have already summarized and the straight away you can go to Parasix where the two points were formulated and for the benefit of the viewers I would read those two points which were formulated Parasix we are called upon to decide the following questions a whether this court in exercise of its jurisdiction and article 142 of the constitution of India can order automatic vacation of all entry models of the High Courts of staying proceedings of civil and criminal cases on the expiry of a certain period be whether this court in exercise of its jurisdiction and article 142 of the constitution of India can direct the High Courts to decide pending cases in which entry models of stay of proceedings have been granted on a day to day basis and within a fixed period. So primarily these were the two points for consideration formulated by the constitution bench then all the submissions have been referred to in fact I had the opportunity to discuss with one of the arguing councils about this matter on the previous day when it was heard and all the submissions have been recorded and the analysis starts at paragraph 13 which is with a caption analysis and the Supreme Court has subdivided the constitution bench has subdivided the same into six into eight parts they are firstly object of parting of passing entry models second High Courts power to vacate or modify entry relief third whether an entry model can come to an end automatically only due to lapse of time fourthly scope of exercise of powers and article 142 of the constitution and fifthly position of the High Courts and its power of superintendents sixthly whether the court should deal with an issue not arising for consideration seventhly clause 3 of article 226 of the constitution has been discussed eighthly direction issued by the constitutional court to decide pending cases in a time bound manner and lastly the procedure to be adopted by High Courts while passing entry models of stair proceedings and for dealing with the applications for vacating entry state hence friends the constitution bench has subdivided its formulations into nine distinct heads which I read out earlier and I would quickly deal with each of them for the benefit of the viewers and for understanding the ultimate opinion rendered by the bench firstly it has dealt with object of passing entry models here the constitution bench has held that when the High Court passes an entry model of state though the entry model may not expressly say so the three factors with prima facie case irreparable loss and balance of convenience are always in the back of the judge's mind though entry models of stair proceedings cannot be routinely passed as a matter of course it cannot be said that such orders can be passed only in exceptional cases further it has held that an occasion for passing an order of stay of proceedings arises as it is not possible for the High Court to take up the case for final hearing immediately hence broadly it has held that there is a purpose behind passing an entry model and hence and the factors to be considered are prima facie case irreparable loss and balance of convenience and hence these things are to be factored in while passing an entry model is what the constitution bench has observed now as far as the second point formulated that is the High Court's power to vacate or modify interim relief the constitution bench has held that held in paragraph 16 that High Courts are always empowered to vacate or modify an order of interim relief passed after hearing the parties on the following amongst other grounds a if the litigant after getting an order of stay deliberately prolongs the proceedings either by seeking adjournments or unwarranted grounds or unwarranted grounds or by remaining absent when the main case in which interim relief is granted is called out for hearing before the High Court with the object of taking undue advantage of the order of stay be the High Court finds that the order of interim relief is granted as a result of either suppression or misrepresentation of material fact by the party in whose favor the interim order of stay has been made and see the High Court finds that there is material change in circumstances requiring interference with the interim order passed earlier in a given case a long passage of time may bring about a material change in circumstances hence it has also held that these are not exhaustive and the there can be other valid grounds for vacating an interim order of stay then thirdly and most important which dealt with the main the core issue in Asian resurfacing that is whether an interim order can come to an end automatically only due to lapse of time the constitution bench has held that interim order of stay can come to an end a by disposal of the main case by the High Court in which interim order has been passed be by a judicial order vacating interim relief passed after hearing the contesting parties on the available grounds some of which has been already referred to by way of illustration so the constitution bench made it very clear that an interim order can come to an end only under two main circumstances then it also held that elementary principles of natural justice which are well recognized in our jurisprudence mandate that an order of vacating interim relief or modification of the interim relief is passed only after hearing all the affected parties an order of vacating interim relief passed without hearing the beneficiary of the order is against the basic tenets of justice so these are the words used by the constitution bench with regard to automatic vacation of an interim order due to lapse of time further it has also referred to the subsequent order passed by the bench three judges bench in two thousand twenty nation resurfacing and it has referred to the income tax act reference has been made to income tax act section 254 to a two capital A of the income tax act provided for automatic vacation of stay granted by the income tax appellate tribunal and that was challenged before the honorable supreme court and by virtue of that provision the state granted would automatically vacate within a period of 365 days if the appeal was not heard hence this was decided by the honorable supreme court in the case of Pepsi foods limited that is reported as two thousand twenty one seven sec four one three and the supreme court had held that the provision automatically vacating a state was manifestly arbitrary and therefore violating of article 14 of the constitution of india paragraph 20 and 22 of the judgment in Pepsi foods has been extracted and I would skip that hence ultimately in paragraph 22 the constitution bench has held that therefore even if the legislature were to come out with such a provision for automatic vacation of stay the same may not stand judicial scrutiny as it may suffer from manifest arbitrariness accordingly the third formulation was answered then fourthly the scope of exercise of powers and article 142 of the constitution was discussed extensively and referring to the constitution bench admin in the case of Premchand Ghar versus the excise commissioner UP and Anita constitution bench admin in the case of supreme court bar association versus union of India the constitution bench in this case has laid down certain parameters in paragraph 26 of the SEC report and the it reads does however a few important parameters which are relevant to be which are relevant to the issues involved in the reference are as follows one the jurisdiction can be exercised to do complete justice between the parties before the court it cannot be exercised to nullify the benefits derived by a large number of litigants based on judicial orders validly passed in their favor who are not parties to the proceedings before this court to article 142 does not empower this court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants and three while exercising the jurisdiction and article 142 of the constitution of India this court can always issue procedural directions to the court for streamlining procedural aspects and ironing out the creases in the procedural laws to ensure expeditious and timely disposal of cases this is because while exercising jurisdiction and article 142 of the constitution this court may not be bound by procedural requirements of law however while doing so this court cannot affect the substantive rights of those litigants who are not parties to the case before it the right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right and lastly the power of this court under article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice which are integral which are an integral part of our jurisprudence hence as far as exercise of its power and article 142 the constitution bench has delineated these four important parameters now the fifth formulation that is position of the high courts and its power of superintendents there the constitution bench has held that a high court is also a constitutional court and it is well settled that it is not judicially subordinate to this court friends please remember that in the 2020 asian resurfacing order the bench had observed that the high court may not be administratively subordinate but it is judicially subordinate and I had made it very clear that I had reservations about the said observations and now the constitution bench and rightly so has held that it is not judicially that is the high court is not judicially subordinate to the supreme court in fact it has referred to the case of Tirupati Balaji developers private limited versus state of Bihar where the supreme court had explained the position of the high court vis-a-vis the supreme court and in paragraph 8 of Tirupati Balaji developers case it had held that under the constitutional scheme as framed for the judiciary the supreme court and the high courts both are courts of record the high court is not a court subordinate to the supreme court hence friends I would pause here for a moment and would once again emphasize that the observation made in the second judgment that is 2020 order in the form of reiteration of asian resurfacing was not supported but was a sweeping observation made by the bench which has been clarified by the constitution bench now that the high court is not or rather to put it differently is neither subordinate administratively nor judicially and both that is the supreme court and the high court are courts of record and they both and hence the high court is not subordinate to the supreme court in any way further by dealing with this formulation with regard to the high courts and its power of superintendence it has referred to the judgment of l chandra kumar versus union of india and paragraphs 78 and 79 of the said judgment has been called out and further it has dealt with the power of the high court at article 227 etc hence this aspect has been made very very clear by the constitution bench now sixthly with regard to the point as to whether the court should deal with an issue not arising for consideration friends i had also pointed this out in my article that this was not at all the the aspect of automatic vacation of stay or speedy disposal of a case was not at all the point referred to the three judges bench for consideration hence it the constitution bench has referred to sanjeev coke manufacturing company which is again a constitution bench judgment and has called out para level of the said judgment and has held which para level reads does we that is in bracket judges are not authorized to make disembodied pronouncements on serious and cloudy issues of constitutional policy without battle lines being properly drawn judicial pronouncements cannot be immaculate legal conceptions it is but right that no important point of law should be decided without a proper list between parties properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swaths we think it we think it is inexperienced for the supreme court to delve into problems which do not arise and express opinion there on hence by basing its opinion the constitution bench has held in paragraph 31 that in asian resurfacing there was no lists before this court arising out of the orders of stay granted in different categories of cases pending before the various high courts this court was dealing with a case under the pc act thus an attempt was made to delve into an issue which did not did not arise for consideration this is the observation of the constitution bench friends now seventh formulation is with regard to clause three of article 226 of the constitution and in paragraph 33 of the scc report it has held that on plain reading clause three is applicable only when an interim relief is granted without furnishing a copy of the petition along with supporting document to the opposite party and without hearing the opposite party and further it holds that even assuming that clause three of article 226 is not directly it provides for an automatic vacation for interim relief only if the agreed party makes an application for vacating the interim relief and when the application for vacating state is not heard within the time specified hence this is with regard to the scope of clause three of article 226 now friends the eighth formulation and most important formulation was with regard to directions issued by the constitutional courts to decide pending cases in the time bound manner here the Supreme Court from paragraph 34 onwards has extensively dealt with this aspect and has in particular considered paragraph 36 and 37 of the Asian resurfacing government wherein these embargoes and specific directions with regard to automatic vacation of state and time bound disposal of cases were laid down hence the constitution bench has referred to A.R. Antule and P. Ramchandra and both are constitution bench judgments and has called out the relevant paragraphs and I would just refer to two lines from paragraph 83 of Antule's case that is for all the above reasons we are of the opinion that it is neither admissible nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings it is not necessary to do so for effectuating the right to speedy trial we are also not satisfied that without such an outer limit right becomes illusory further the constitution bench has called out paragraph 21 of P. Ramchandra Rao's constitution bench judgment and has held that it is not advisable to lay down a outer limit for conclusion of criminal cases then having referred to both the constitution bench judgment the constitution bench in this case has held in paragraph 37 that the principles laid down in the said decision will apply even to civil cases before trial course because friends as I submitted earlier by virtue of the Asian resurfacing government lot of confusion was created and because the bench went one step ahead and held that it was applicable to civil cases also hence the constitution bench has made it very clear that the principles laid down apply to civil cases also and it has held that the jurisdiction of this court cannot be exercised to make such a judicial legislation only the legislature can provide that cases of a particular category should be decided within a specific time there are many statutes which incorporate such provisions however all such provisions are usually held to be directory friends kindly bear this in mind because I am going to refer to this paragraph before concluding my talk today so in 37 it has made very clear the constitution bench has made very clear and has emphasized on the fact that the jurisdiction of the supreme court cannot be exercised under article 142 to create judicial legislation or to lay down a legislation by way of a judgment and the same can be done it is the duty and job of the legislature alone is what the constitution bench has heterologically held then further it has referred to all India judges association versus union of India etc and has held that it cannot be in especially in paragraph 42 it has given its own reason and has held that there is another important reason for adopting the said approach not every litigant can easily afford to file proceedings in the constitutional courts those litigants who can afford to approach the constitutional courts cannot be allowed to take undue advantage by getting an order directing out of turn disposal of their cases while all other litigants patiently wait in the queue for their turn to come the courts superior in judicial hierarchy cannot interfere with the day-to-day functioning of the other courts by directing that the only that only certain cases should be decided out of turn with a time frame within a time frame in a sense no court of law is inferior to the other this court is not superior to the high courts in the judicial hierarchy therefore the judges of the high courts should be allowed to set their priorities on a rational basis thus as far as setting the outer limit is concerned it should be best left to the concerned courts unless there are very extraordinary circumstances hence friends in this formulation while dealing with the formulation with regard to the directions to be issued for speedy disposal of cases and fixing of an outer limit the constitution bench has taken into consideration the fact that there has been a docket explosion and certain criminal courts are over flooded not only criminal courts even civil courts are over flooded with cases hence the superior courts will not be aware as as to the ground reality as to what is happening in a particular court and hence it will not be practical to issue directions saying that a particular case has to be disposed of within a particular period of time and most importantly it has held that the sweeping directions issued in nation resurfacing cannot be implemented in and is not workable because the sweeping directions where that if stays granted then it has to be disposed of within two or three months so meaning thereby if it is not disposed of then there would be automatic vacation of entry murder thereby frustrating the very object for which an entry murder was granted hence the supreme court by virtue of its eighth formulation has held that such a thing cannot be done and it is best left to the concerned high court it is best left to the concerned court to decide and choke out its way of functioning and lastly the constitution bench has dealt with procedure to be adopted by high courts while passing entry murder of state of proceedings and for dealing with applications for vacating entry mistake your friends the constitution bench has clearly bifurcated between an expatriate and add entry relief which is granted without hearing the opposite party that is at the first instance itself a state is granted that is by way of expatriate add entry relief and then the expatriate relief granted is confirmed or modified hence it has been observed that to avoid any prejudice to the opposite parties while granting expatriate add entry relief without hearing the affected parties the high courts should normally grant add entry relief for a limited duration after hearing the contesting parties the court may or may not confirm the earlier add entry murder add entry relief once granted can be vacated or affirmed only after application of mind by the concerned court hence the courts must give necessary priority to the hearing of the prayer for entry relief where add entry relief has been granted hence this is with regard to the add entry murders and entry murders to be passed by high court this is the broad guidelines laid down by the constitution bench now the conclusions are recorded in paragraph 45 of the report which reads thus hence with greatest respect to the bench which decided the case we are unable to concur with the directions issued in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the decision in the case of asian resurfacing we hold that there cannot be automatic vacation of stay granted by the high court we do not approve the direction issued to decide all the cases in which an interim stay has been granted on a day to day basis within a time frame we hold that such blanket directions cannot be issued in the exercise of the jurisdiction and article 142 of the constitution of India we answer both the questions framed in paragraph five above in the negative then in para 46 the constitution bench has summarized and has held that subject to what we have held earlier we summarize our main conclusion and follows a a direction that all the entry murders of stay are proceedings passed by every high court automatically expire only by reason of lapse of time cannot be issued in the exercise of jurisdiction by this court under article exercise of the jurisdiction of this court and article 142 of the constitution of India be important parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction and article 142 of the constitution of India which are relevant for deciding the reference RS follows one the jurisdiction can be exercised to do complete justice between the parties before the court it cannot be exercised to nullify the benefits derived by a large number of litigants based on judicial orders validly passed in their favor who are not parties to the proceedings before this court article 142 does not empower this court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants three while exercising the jurisdiction and article 142 of the constitution of India this court can always issue procedural directions to the courts for streamlining procedural aspects and ironing out the creases in the procedural laws to ensure expeditious and timely disposal of cases however while doing so this court cannot affect the substantive rights of those litigants who are not parties to the case before it the right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right and for the power of this court under article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice which are an integral part of our jurisprudence see constitutional courts in ordinary courts should refrain from fixing a time bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending before any other courts constitutional courts may issue directions for the time bound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances the issue of prioritizing the disposal of cases should be best left to the decision of concerned courts where the cases are pending and finally friends in paragraph D it is held that while dealing with the prayers for grant of interim relief the high court should take into consideration the guidelines incorporated in paragraph 34 and 35 above and in para 47 it has been clarified that in cases in which trials have been concluded as a result of automatic vacation of stay based on the decision based only on the decision of Asian resurfacing the orders of automatic vacation of stay shall remain valid accordingly the constitution bench answered the preference now friends before I conclude one I would want to leave the viewers with one thought to ponder one serious issue that is with most of y'all are aware that the honorable supreme court that is a three judges bench has in the case of Ashwini Kumar upadhyayi laid down series of directions with regard to constitution of special trial courts that is special criminal courts both sessions as well as as well as special magistrates and also constitution of a special bench before the high court in respect of cases criminal cases filed against or instituted against elected representatives both former and city and the latest direction or order is issued on November 9 2023 that is in the case of Ashwini Kumar upadhyayi versus union of India in fact for the benefit of the audience the same is reported as 2024 volume 1 sec 185 and while issuing these series of directions commencing from the year 2017 onwards pursuant to which the criminal courts were constituted and in 2020 a direction was issued with regard to constitution of a special bench now in 2023 further directions are issued seeing that sumoto the special bench has to either the chief justice of the concerned high court or the concerned judge heading the special bench should sumoto take cognizance of all the cases pending before the trial courts both sessions as well as magistrate hence the point to be ponder is and before that I would make it very clear that while passing these directions series of directions the Supreme Court took note of the judgment of Asian resurfacing so more particularly the time bound disposal of cases now that the constitution bench has held that such a thing cannot be done the point to be taken into consideration is does the various orders passed by the three judges bench in Ashwini Kumar upadhyayi constituting special bench and special courts pass the test envisaged by the constitution bench in High Court Bar Association High Court of Allahabad case more particularly paragraphs 37 and 42 hence friends I would leave with that because probably this would require another elaborate discussion because by virtue of the various directions issued in Ashwini Kumar upadhyayi the honorable Supreme Court has treated the elected representatives and former representatives as a special class and that their cases have to be disposed of on a time bound manner in a time bound manner within a particular duration and friends having said that all cases not only cases under the prevention of corruption act or money laundering all cases even if a elected representative is accused of a case under negotiable instruments act even such cases are transferred to the special magistrates court constituted and special indulgence has been given so my simple point which I want to emphasize and leave the audience to ponder is does it not be contradictory more particularly when that decision was based on the decision in Asian resurfacing and which has been ultimately held to be not a good law by the constitution bank hence thank you one and all thank you because the I think we are I think it is 720 yeah in fact Amit spy had connected and he said that he was just listening to your video okay yeah so we don't have any questions as such I believe that after your session and after reading the judgment people will be able to understand yes the new answers in a much better way so thank you friends for connecting with us and those who have missed to subscribe the channel they can do that or beyond law clc thank you