 I have a few people still in Washington, and I'm very encouraged by the interest in today's topic. Clearly, I think we have an opportunity to talk about an issue that plenty of people are interested in. Perhaps we don't talk about enough here in Washington. So today is a unique opportunity. The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership is a supporter of the Japan Studies program here at Carnegie. And one of the things that they allow us to do is once a year to bring a younger, up-and-coming scholar, but still accomplished, from Japan to talk about foreign policy issues of interest to both countries, the United States and Japan. And so we had an opportunity this year to bring Professor Aizawa and his expertise on Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand and Indonesia. So I want to thank him for coming all this way and to CGP for that support. It fits very well with the theme of our research program here at Carnegie, which is the US and Japan in Asia. And we try to have a very outward looking view on the US-Japan relationship in this dynamic region. Thailand is clearly an important country for both of us economically and politically and geopolitically, as we'll talk about today, as a key player in ASEAN. US officials have talked about how our relationship with Thailand has been challenged by the military coup there, and the Thai Prime Minister, Pryut, has been critical of that criticism. And so we now have a new ambassador confirmed for Thailand, which is, I think, a very positive development, but it's still unclear how the future of US-Thai relations will evolve in the near future. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Pryut, earlier this year, visited Tokyo, met with Prime Minister Abe, pledged a deep in economic cooperation, developed Thai railway networks, cooperated on the Dawei special economic zone, developed in Myanmar. So there's a whole host of developments going on in the Japan-Thai relationship as well. And I think today we're also going to talk a little bit more about really the broader impact in ASEAN and the geopolitical implications there. So let me introduce our speakers today. As I mentioned, we have Professor Nobuhiro Aizawa, who's an associate professor at the Graduate School of Social and Cultural Studies at Kyushu University, and I think one of Japan's rising scholars on Southeast Asia. He was a researcher at IDE JETRO, starting in 2007, and was also a research associate at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. Previously, he has done visiting research since at the faculty of economics at Chulalong Korn University in Bangkok, and at Southeast Asian program in Cornell University, and also served as a research fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia. And because I am no Thai expert, I have engaged the help of a good friend who has broad experience in both Japan and the region. Abigail Friedman is here to be a discussant today. She's the founder and CEO of the Wisteria Group, an international advisory firm with a particular focus on Asia and Europe. Prior to this, she served a 25-year-plus career in the State Department as an American diplomat with postings in Japan, France, Canada, Portugal, Afghanistan, and also served as a senior advisor to the Asia Foundation. So very pleased to have Abigail here with us today. So let me turn it over to Professor Aizawa. He's gonna start with a presentation about 20, 25 minutes or so, and we'll hear from Abigail, and then we'll have a chance to talk amongst ourselves and include some of the talent that we have in the room today joining us. Professor Aizawa. Thank you very much, Jim, for your kind introduction and also for inviting me, and I also thank the Japan Foundation for hosting this program as well. It is my great pleasure coming here. I rarely come to Washington. My expertise on Southeast Asia, all my travel mainly isn't Southeast Asia because I study mainly both Indonesia and Thailand, so those two countries pick up a lot of my travel time. But coming to Washington DC gives me a really good perspective because I'm thinking in the small hemisphere of Asia, like Japan, we don't have jet lags, by the way, when we travel. So I now know how hard for everybody in Washington DC to go and to come back frequently with this kind of physical burden that you're having. But because I was living in Japan, because I'm living in Japan, I have privilege that I can easily go. So I tend to come to a narrow perspective, but here coming to Washington DC, talking to everybody here, it really opens up my mind. So it's a wonderful time here. And thank you very much for inviting me. And I wanna, so today I wanna share the story about Thailand. I'm not going to talk about the Thai politics per se because I'm sure there are so many Thais who can do that better than I do. But it's more about how the political change in Thailand means to a broader context of other Southeast Asian region and also to Japan or the geopolitics of Asia. I think that's something that it's not very much talked about because it's too dynamic domestically. So, but there is a subtle, but a fundamental shift that Thai political change is making toward the other regions. So that's what I really wanted to share. And this is because not just for Japan, but I think Thailand is such an important, strategically important country. Of course the Thai people may not like that a foreigner discussing too much about Thailand, but I have to say it is too important not to discuss about it. So even though I'm a Japanese, I do talk about a lot. And also I want to know you in Japanese community, I think the Thai study group is the biggest within Southeast Asia. I mean we have like 40,000 people registered in Bangkok and we assume there's triple numbers living there. And we do all these seminars and symposiums about Thailand in Japanese. And both in Bangkok and Tokyo very frequently. And it has much more audiences. Than when we do that for Indonesia or for other countries. And that's how concerned in Tokyo is and also the Japanese community in Bangkok are. And so I want to share several key things that we have discussed there here in this Carnegie Foundation. The basic question is for example, so has Thailand changed? And the question is, the question is has Thailand changed? And the answer is yes and no. Yes, of course domestically. Of course the constitution has been ripped up and then renewed so it's sort of changed. The game of the rule of the game has changed. So it's a big change. But what is striking is that when I look at the foreign policy, I mean the more I look into the details, I rather see a similarity rather than a difference. For example, between Inglaq period and Pryut period. Many people argue that there is a very serious shift toward China, like US as Jim shared with us that there is a criticism against Thailand and then it's kind of shifting away toward China. But if you look at the records, for example, one record, some tangible records, travel records of leaders, where did Pryut go? And where did Inglaq go? First and foremost, the neighboring countries, ASEAN countries, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, that's for sure. China and Japan, and once in Europe, this mix is totally the same and they never go to United States. Inglaq didn't come to United States. Pryut doesn't come to United States. So Pryut not coming to United States is nothing new. And going to China and Japan, too much maybe is also the same with Inglaq and Pryut. So if you look by these kind of tangible records, not the words that they talk about, but the records because we consider the time of the leadership is very, very valuable. I mean, of course we look at the money, but also the time of the leadership, I think is very, very important. And this is one kind of tangible data that we can see how their foreign policy priorities are set. And if that's the criteria to judge in one way, there's much more similarities. So when I question, has Thailand changed or not? Yes, domestically, yes. But in terms of foreign policy, I would rather see much more similarities or in a way a continuity of a trend of Thai foreign policy. And what is that fundamental Thai foreign policy is? I didn't prepare a good slide, but I just wanted to give you some visual ideas what I'm going to talk about. The key thing is that Thailand wants to remain a hub, geographical hub of continental Southeast Asia. I think that is the fundamental foreign policy interests that Thailand want to pursue. And this is a very typical idea. Now with the era of aviation, I think none of you traveled to Thailand by sea these days. So we have this kind of geographical or this time geographical sense by the arrow roots and this is the typical image of center in Bangkok. But to think about the history, what made Thailand a centerpiece in Southeast Asia? There's two major things. One, absolutely the US military strategy. I think the US priorities to Thailand for their military or security strategy in Southeast Asia centering on Thailand was very, very crucial. The other thing, it was Japanese investment, especially the industrial investment. I think the Eastern seaboard investment has picked off the best in Southeast Asia. If you look at 20 years, this 20 years, and if you map out the lights, if you have the satellite and you map the nighttime lights, I think you will imagine how Bangkok area, the bigger Bangkok area has been so bright compared to Singapore, compared to the Jakarta, the Jabotay Tape or the Big Zone, and Bangkok stands out. So those two in terms of security, in terms of industry, a lot coming from US and Japan, that add up to create Thailand, or more specifically, a Bangkok area, a hub of continental Southeast Asia. I think that setting, that geographical setting is the core interest of Thailand that they want to maintain. Whoever the leadership is, whether it be the elected leader or the military junta. I think that is the fundamental reason of the similarity during this political change. And to look at that, but having said that, there are major things that took place in prior period. I will argue that the path is not changed, but there are many things that took place in this one year in prior period. And these are, one is about infrastructure projects, and other is about changing norm of politics in Southeast Asia. I want to share with you these two things. First, about the infrastructure project. I want to touch upon two things about the railroad project and also the way project. These two, as you might know, is nothing new for prior period. It has been there for a long time, that way period for 20 years. And also the railroad project, it was much more earlier. But it is true that this time in this one year from 2014 to 2015, the deal has been accelerated. I mean, the deal making has been accelerated. The key thing is why, to understand why. Let me go through first with the railroads. So the railroads, this is how, there's two key things. The railroads, especially that connects from China to Makta Put, Makta Put is the industrial zone. It's not Bangkok, that's the key. Well, I'm talking about high-speed trains, so it's north to south. And that's what is significant about the railroad project right now. The negotiation was there since the Ingak period, but when the coup happened, it was canceled. But the military government revitalized it very quickly. Because there is, this shows the consensus of policy makers that upgrading the connectivity, the railroad connectivity is very crucial for Thai economy. I mean, of course, there is a political fight on who gets the pie out of this project. But the basic thing, the basic consensus that we need an upgrade of domestic connectivity is there. But it's not that only the domestic connectivity that strategically matters, it's the connectivity with the international connectivity, especially on this Chinese project. This was the map 2014 August. So this is the details. So there's two lines, A and B. A starts from a place called Cheng Kong. It's by the Mekong River. And another one starts from Nong Kai. That's also from the Mekong River. But there was two lines. But gradually after that, Japan also gets the agreement. And so Japan and China, the two countries are having the MOUs. And now the China plan, the Cheng Kong line has disappeared. This is something important to understand. And the Japan side, it was mainly to Chiang Mai and Bangkok. And then China project with Nong Kai and Nong Kai to Mahdaput. So it now has two lines here. But the key thing is that there is a very different logic of these railroad projects. First for the Chinese project. This is for China side, it is absolutely crystal clear. This is the whole bigger picture of China's strategy in finding connectivity toward Southern Sea. In this case, it's the Chiang Mai. But there's another project which was canceled in Myanmar. There's another project in Pakistan which went through. So it's in all this bigger strategy of China. And ultimately it is to make a kumming, a hub of the continental Southeast Asia. So this was the idea if Bangkok is the hub and this will be if kumming is the hub. So I'm showing this to simplify because the aviation route is much more simple. But the overall, what the stake is that who gets to get hub status in an economic integration period. And then you want to change the geographical condition by these infrastructure. And that's I think the ultimate goal. And this is where China is aiming at. The kumming wants to be the hub and then it connects to Bangkok, connects to Hanoi, connects to Yangon. But in the end it's this kind of geographical shifting that China wants to make. But going back to the Japan side, I mean Chiang Mai Bangkok line doesn't connect to Japan at all. So it's not gonna be the same logic why Japanese are funding this. Chinese funding and Japanese funding is fundamentally different in the sense that Chinese funding will fund this project as a domestic project. So I won't go into the details but if you look at the funding schemes and the MOUs, it is a Chinese project. While in Japan case, the Japanese want to really want to push it to the Thai side. This is your project. So the Japanese negotiation always want to make sure the Thai takes more responsibility, Thai takes more risk, to make sure that project will go through. But in China side, it's more that I want to define the roots, the design, or especially in real-world strategy, what is key is the standard gauge or the narrow gauge that gauge setting is really, really crucial. And here the negotiation, the standard gauge, the standard gauge only connects to Laos and China because Myanmar or Malaysia, which goes down to Singapore, it's a narrow gauge is and Vietnam, it's a narrow gauge as well. So it's not connected. I mean, so a single rail, a single train cannot go through. So if you look at those details, you know what is this for. And if you look at this line, especially why you have to go to Mahdaput, is because they're not interested in Bangkok. And more to say, if you go back to the initial plan, why from Chiang Kong and Chiang Rai all the way down to Mahdaput, it don't go through Chiang Mai, you know, like. So there's no domestic connectivity in this plan. So this is the connectivity clearly for China's benefit. So this is the different negotiations for Thailand. Thailand will play between Japan and China to get a better deal, especially in funding and many deals. But there is a fundamental difference of the China's interest in the project and Japanese project. There is going to be a slight mismatch. And the good thing about the military junta is this project was able to get an MOU at this point. I think it's because it was a junta. Remember in Ingla period, this project funding two trillion Baht was judged this is unconstitutional. So a constitutional court said this funding is unconstitutional. But now the junta, you know, they scrapped the constitution. So there was a red light, but they take away the traffic light. So there's a clear road, go ahead. So there's pros and cons here. So this kind of project, the pros is that the more centralized the power, like the junta, you can go through because you don't have to negotiate all the division of the interest to the local politicians and everything which happen everywhere, like in Japan too. But at the same time, when it comes to the international negotiation, when you make a mistake, whether Thailand will get, or maybe the Thailand will lose its hub status that has created the 30 years with this project, it's that critical. And I think this is what private government is right now facing. That's one thing. Another project, I think I'm starting to talk too much about each case. Another case, this is very, very interesting, is that this Dawei project. Dawei project, as you might all know, also has been a very long plan strategy. And it's basically saying that connecting Bangkok and Dawei will open up a new channel of logistics that doesn't need to go through Malacca Straits. So there is a huge difference in terms of major maritime connectivity. And with this Dawei port, who gets to benefit? I think it's absolutely Thailand. With the industrial clusters in Thailand, they will find a much bigger market. The production of Thailand, the Thai product will have a much closer reach to then in the current status of the logistic network. So clearly this also benefits Thailand the most. And so Thailand was the initiator. They were the driving force to make this project happen. And it was Myanmar in Japan, a bit reluctant. Myanmar, of course, there has a lot of big issues, especially with land ownership, environmental issues, human rights issue. I mean, you name it, there's a lot of issues, security issues with the road that goes path through. This is a very difficult place, not just geographically, but also because of the ethnic tension as well. So Myanmar was very reluctant. The Japanese side also, the money that you requires to make this go through is huge. And it is unsure that whether this will be also a feasible project or not. So it was the Thailand who was always pushing. And I remember always when Thai Prime Minister comes to Japan, when they have time to present in, for example, in K-dan-ren, they use most of the time explaining how the way is promising. I remember when Ing-la came, I think Ing-la came to Tokyo three times and two times. And she and all the transport minister and all the NSTV chief, spent most of the time explaining this. But last conference, the Japan-Mekong leadership, it was surprising who was talking about this, the way it was. It was Tenshin, the Myanmar president. It was not Prayut. Prayut didn't talk too much because in this Mekong leadership, summit with Japan, there's a 10-minute slot that each leader speaks, especially in the business forum, not in the government, but in the business forum. Tenshin surprisingly spent all 10 minutes of speaking about the way. Even though with Japan and Myanmar, there's tons of other projects, but he focused on. And this is a very different shift right now. I'm not a Myanmar special. I don't know why exactly the changing political will in Myanmar, but also one thing is clear, is the Japanese political will is now clear. Japanese political will is very clear in pushing the NOA project. The Abe administration, especially the prime minister's office, has already assigned a special envoy and it's tasked to do it. And I think this changed very much in this one year. So the political will is coming from Myanmar and Japan right now, rather than one and a half years ago it was Thailand. So this shift, this is not just that Thailand's political change per se, but it's the changing overall dynamics in Asia. I think with the North and South project, connecting with China and Southeast Asia and South Asia country is realizing there is a strategic interest. And one more thing that is crucial is that we have to put India here. India's involvement was also a very strong catalyst of pushing Myanmar and Japan and putting more political will into it. And even the Chinese are putting their interest in the way. And all this change has happened very dramatically in this one year. And therefore, I think we saw the signing of this special purpose, special purpose, oh, it's SPV, forgot the V. The venture was it? Of the development of the way this year. Was it July or June I forgot, but recently? And I think it's still a high hurdle, very high hurdle because there's so many issues there. But I think in this 20 years, I think 2014 to 2015, this is the first time that the political will is gathered. And I think this is going to be a new start. And if this realizes, it's clearly going to be a very strong game changer. And I think with this the way on the table of the Asian politics, if I look at all the cabinet meeting, there are many things that were unseen before. For example, in Thai cabinet meetings, there's this all projects of India, Myanmar, Thailand, highway projects and connectivity. I mean, this kind of thing didn't happen before. And this kind of connectivity, not just within Southeast Asia, but going vertically toward China. And because of this going horizontally to East West. I think right now, this 2014, 2015, especially under the military junta, with not changing its policy from the previous government, I think it's now Thailand has become an ever more important strategically geopolitically place in the current political dynamics. So that's the very geographical part of the impact of what Thailand's doing right now. But the other thing, more subtle, but more overlooked impact of Thai political change is this impact on Southeast Asian political norms. Southeast Asia, if you recall from 2006, there was a kind of a milestone called ASEAN Charter. Maybe not many people will pick it up anymore these days, but there was an ASEAN Charter. And their ASEAN Charter, it was the way that ASEAN unite each other and show the broader international society. ASEAN is a meaningful collection of countries. It's not just, it's not an empty box, but there is substance to it. And why did that happen? It really was this kind of sense of crisis of like Southeast Asia has to be united and also has to have a centralized role in the regional architecture and et cetera. And to gain that status, international status, there was one thing very important. It was the political norms. Remember in Southeast Asia, it's a very diverse set of countries. Like, let me show you. Well, everybody, I think everyone knows that the end of 2015, ASEAN will, on paper, will take place. And everybody's in, especially in Thailand, we have all these socialization materials. But they talk about cultural differences. They know the language are different. They have to understand each other's flags and everything. But what they never tell is they have different political system. But this was the kind of the difficulty for Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia has a kingdom like Brunei or Thailand. And also they have a democracy, full democracy, like Philippines and Indonesia. And also there's a one-party system like Vietnam, Laos, and also there is a semi-one-party like Cambodia or Myanmar or Singapore or Malaysia. So you have wide range of political system. This is very different from the European side. You don't have political conditionalities to be a member of this regional club. So it's more of a geographical club, regardless of your political norms. But if that was the case, I mean this entity called ASEAN was not given good credit. And the ASEAN charter was the only moment that the other international society is sending ASEAN ambassadors and gaining more voice to it. But this is fundamentally because of the agreement on political norms that they will go for democracy or they put human rights. This especially was pushed by Indonesia. So I think this goes, a lot of credit goes to Indonesia's foreign minister, Hassan, you doubt this, that he pushed really hard that ASEAN has to be, has to step forward to kind of restrict the non-interference rule. Of each others. So ASEAN has agreed to interfere, has okay to interfere to each other and they will go for democracy. And that was the kind of the binding political development trend. And I think therefore ASEAN had a lot of respect and many countries believed in ASEAN's political role. I think the Myanmar's change couldn't have been done without the role of ASEAN. So there was food. But this kind of democracy as a common agenda for ASEAN was very much stopped with the Thai coup. I think this was a huge impact. The Thai coup did not only change the Thai politics but I think it changed or it undermined the kind of the cornerstone that ASEAN finally agreed, which is the ASEAN Charter. And ASEAN Charter clearly stated that they do not allow an unconstitutional way of grabbing a power. I forgot the real term, but the unconstitutional means of political change is unacceptable. And at that moment Indonesia at that time, SBY and also for Minister Martin Atalegawa pushed Myanmar to criticize Thailand because Thailand was considered a very strong partner for Indonesia that to uphold democracy, visa, visa, special visa, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. But so Indonesia felt very much betrayed with that. But at that point Myanmar played a very critical role and Myanmar did not accept Indonesia's request. The de facto leader's voice was not heard. Myanmar as a chairperson endorsed or acknowledged that, well, you know, there are times that military has to intervene. I know and understand. And so the Myanmar was very comfortable with saying that to what happened in Thailand. And with that statement, the kind of accumulated political capital was gone. And then after that Cambodia also endorsed. Well, they were royally endorsed. We are royally endorsed. So, you know, so the royal endorsement or military intervention in times of need is very much an ASEAN legitimized way of politics. And I think at that point Indonesia has, I think, pretty much given up their strong foreign policy based on values. So this kind of value-based foreign diplomacy within ASEAN that started to bear fruit really was cut off with this Thai coup. And since then, not just because the pendulum from Sushil Bhavan Udena to Jokowi. Well, I think one of the reason why there's no more talk about democracy or like liberal Islam from, but the way they find the national interests is very much on economic terms. And so all the countries in Southeast Asia started to again define their national interests. Very much in economic terms. And what you get more with these mega projects, what you get more in free trade agreements, what you get more than the others. I mean, so this kind of changing definition of national interest, I think this was very much initiated from the Thai coup. So I think this is a very subtle impact, but I think it really was a fundamental impact in understanding the overall Southeast Asian strategy. It geographically, with those infrastructure, politics, Thailand is pretty much making a very strong impact, but also in terms of political norms, there's not gonna have a strong consensus in ASEAN for human rights or democracy, but more economy-oriented. Everybody will talk about a lot of your own country's middle income traps or what kind of maritime interests that you have to secure. And so I think there are much more internal ASEAN fighting within the neighbors, more than the ASEAN in cooperation in times ahead. And I think this is a fundamental shift that happened. This is one big reason that the Thai political change impacted. So let me stop here. Thank you very much. Terrific, thank you. Thank you. Thank you, as I was saying, there's so many things you can talk about, but you focused on a couple of particularly interesting and useful topics that I wanna follow up on in conversation. But before we do that, Abigail, I wanted to give you a chance to offer your thoughts. You just came back from a six-week work stint in China. You've been looking at the region in different capacities and wanted to give a chance for some additional thoughts on this broad topic. Great, thank you. That was fascinating. I really appreciate it, Professor Izoa. And in preparation for this, I did what all good students do. I read everything that you had written up to now. And I watched some of your videos that are up on YouTube and thought a lot about your work up to now. And one of the things that you have talked about a lot is resilience. And in the particular conversation of thinking of, you were talking about one of the things that Japan has to offer. So for some reason, as you were talking today, I was thinking about this issue of resilience. And I was actually thinking about it in terms of countries outside of Thailand, the ability of nations to be resilient and to respond flexibly to events going on in a country like Thailand. How does that happen? Can it be done? One of the things that I learned in my years in government is that governments move slowly, especially democratic governments. In the face of a coup, policies can't really change overnight. One can change one's statements, one's rhetoric, one can make clear one's position. But a lot of the things you were talking about, whether they are economic engagement, political or security relationships, those things don't turn on a dime. So when you spoke about there was not a change in the Thai strategies pre and post-coup and Thai foreign policy, I thought that was interesting. But I also, perhaps for me, I see that as a weakness in terms of international responses. That are we continuing with business as usual simply because we believe that's the best thing economically or because it's difficult to do something other? In the media aftermath of the coup, if I recall correctly, Japan's position was to state that it was extremely regrettable. They cut diplomatic ties. And then what happened in the coming months was Thailand actually had various options. It started engaging a little more actively with China. That then provoked, and I'm simplifying obviously, but that provoked rethinking I would suspect on the Japanese side, which is we've got long-term strategic interests, we've got economic, major economic interests. And can we really afford to simply take textbook reaction? And we saw shifts taking place in terms of the Japanese position. All well and good. But another thing that I would point out is that when you spoke, you spoke first about the economic issues and then the political issues. And I would suggest that some of what goes on politically has an impact on economics. For ASEAN to stand back from encouraging democracy in ASEAN countries has economic consequences. Weakness in the democratic arena can in many cases so domestic instability. Domestic instability then can cause rethinking of countries that are investing in a country. So, and I don't mean to be too abstract and theoretical, but it isn't really sufficient, I think, to say that there are things going on. There's sort of a political stance and then there's an economic stance. They are tied. And I think no more important country and relationship for Thailand in which that is taking place than with Japan, Thailand. Japan was, and I think maybe still is, the number one trading partner. With Thailand now it's China. Trading is China, but investment is China. Investment is Japan trading is China. This is an issue. Japan, a Japanese manufacturing. Immediately after the coup is I also recall reading the press. The sense in Japan was well, you know, this is a coup, it's not the first coup. Actually, people didn't really wanna call it a coup. Talk about difficulty for countries to respond, you know, the first reaction is to say it ain't so, you know. Oh, it's not gonna happen. But in fact, it pretty quickly became clear that what was underway was a coup. Japanese economic interests initially was to sort of, well, this has really historically been the most stable important country in Southeast Asia for us and let's just keep going in that direction. I sense that there is a little bit of a rethinking of that and looking around, wondering whether there are alternatives. So while flexibility reaction is not, as I said earlier, turning on a dime, I do think that there are shifts underway. And we should stay tuned to see which ASEAN countries pick up some of the benefits and which ones are harmed by that. Talking about China, that's another, you know, what goes on in, it's not just what goes on in Thailand that affects Thai-China relations, but what goes on in China has a massive impact. I am no China expert and I am no economist. But, you know, recent Chinese actions and the devaluation of Ren Minbi, analysts that I am reading note that this suggests that it may be a hiccup or a pause or it may have an impact on China's shifting from an export-driven economy to a consumer-driven economy. That, it seems to me, has an impact on Thailand and on things like the railroad. Is that railroad project in a consumer-driven economy, Chinese-driven economy? Then a railroad like that is great for Thailand because it suggests that manufacturing that's taking place in Thailand could eventually be sold to consumer-driven China. If China's model is not consumer-driven, then that railroad is basically access to the sea for Chinese experts and I'm not sure where the benefit for Thailand is. So I don't have answers to these, but I think these are some of the analytical lenses that we need to put on to see what's going on in the region. I also appreciated your raising the issue of ASEAN. I think for the last several years, ASEAN has been pulled in many different directions. Actually, everyone wants to see ASEAN succeed. I can't think of a country that doesn't want to see ASEAN succeed, but the challenges are great, whether it's TPP versus RCEP, whether it is the role of democracy, encouraging democracy, whether it is competition between some of the major players. This is a challenge. How that plays out for Thailand, I'm not sure, but again, my sense is that we no longer live in an era where we can talk about one country or bilateral relations with one country. This is a network and nowhere is that network more obvious than Southeast Asia. I think that's pretty much what I wanted to cover. One last thing that you talked about, and again, I go back to Japan because Japan's role vis-a-vis Thailand is so important, but it seemed to me that there was a little bit of a disconnect when you were talking about Japan negotiating strategy, which is a little more passive, encouraging the ties or the Myanmar to step up and you tell us what you need. I've actually heard that in other areas. Japan does not wanna be in a position where it's telling ASEAN what it needs to do. That seems to be a slight disconnect between that behavior and the very clear vision of Prime Minister Abe, who is certainly no passive player. So what's going on between the Prime Minister's vision and commitment to the region and to Thailand and the bureaucratic positioning? And then secondly, of course, is that how does, how can Japan really compete, frankly, with a China that has a very clear vision that can send the message down the line that is basically moving forward in a very clear, direct way. So maybe later you can comment a little about that. That's pretty much it for us. Thank you. Thank you, Abigail, appreciate that. Listening to some of your comments has spurred some thoughts in my mind as well. The big question that's on my mind and I wanna get your reaction to this. Thailand is clearly at a point of transition right now. So whatever we think about what happened in terms of the coup or the merits and the steps to develop a new charter and new constitution, et cetera. If we stand at this point going forward, there's a tremendous opportunity domestically in Thailand, potentially also from the outside with encouragement to contribute to political development in Thailand. Now the question is, do you want to focus primarily on economic development and have that almost be the main focus in lieu of political development? This is all in my mind because one of my colleagues, Mutayal Agapa, is writing an article on this issue in terms of the prioritization to date of economic development at the expense of political development in Southeast Asia. And he's arguing for much more attention to political development. So here we have this very important country right in a point of important transition. Which way are they gonna go? And to what extent can the United States and Japan have some positive influence in that regard? And if so, how? Is it a shared strategy? Is it a kind of symbiotic strategy? Or we're good at this and you're good at that and we'll try to collaborate in that way. The simplistic view is that almost a good cop, bad cop type of approach, but I don't think that's quite the right way to view it. Or will Japan kind of de-emphasize the political development aspect for the sake of the economic model and also for the sake of not wanting to lose out piece of each China in that regard? So I guess my broad question is, how do we seize upon this opportunity to contribute positively to political development in Thailand? Is it possible? The ties have the biggest say in all of this. But then if so, how should the U.S. and Japan think about that? Thank you very much. It's a huge set of questions right here. I will answer maybe not all, but some of them, especially on flexibility. I think it's very important. My take on the current Thai government is somehow, it might be a too flexible in certain policy making process. For example, after the coup, they implemented a very strict rule vis-a-vis a foreign workers. And they had a huge protest from the business sector. And then they changed the policy again. That's, for example, that's one. Another one, the Thai government wanted to implement a new foreign investment, I forgot it wasn't an act or something that changes the law or the changes to all the incentive rules, big protests, they changed. This gives two implications. One, first he is negotiable, that's one positive. But at the same time, it's unpredictable. So it's both good and bad. If you're a business person, I mean you don't want that unpredictability. I mean the top leadership can decide something and then suddenly you can change it. I mean that's how the political system right now is. The good thing is that he seems to be open to, for example, especially for the business people. I think to connect to the second question we raised with Japan and Thailand, the first foreign delegate he met was really the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok. So in a way I think he understands the importance to it. But at the same time the policy-making process is too short that it's much easy to make a mistake or a negative policy-making as well. So there's both good and bad. So whether I question how flexible they are in analyzing the current situation and adjusting those policies, I'm sure they are flexibilities. But the kind of information gathering process and the decision-making process, I think the team is a bit too narrow. And the first year there are some records that played a bit a negative sign as well. So that's one. For Japan's role, yes you're right that the Secretary of Cabinet Suga was the first to react to condemn or to, I don't know the English word, but was it translated to, was it regrettable? Yeah, yeah. Extremely regrettable. Extremely regrettable, yeah. Well Japan doesn't have any law that kind of discouraged to say a coup, not like the United States. So even though we call it a coup, there is no automatic legal binding to it. But of course it was not the Japanese government that had a political weight in there. I think the new player, and I think the new Japanese policy-making structure is changed that we could see in Thailand is that it's local Japanese played a very important role. It's not the local embassy. It's not the ministers, the ministries. It's the local Japanese. The Japanese in Thailand is huge, I think this is. And they're- Commercial, the commercial. The commercial, yeah. I think their voice or their interest was the Japanese leadership's interest to take it seriously. And I think that kind of spectrum of voicing. I think this wasn't obvious before. I think this was the very clear first time that this local Japanese had a very defining voice and how to shape. So the cabinet secretary of Suga did not repeat that word ever again, just once in that time, but never after. And so Abe Prime Minister, Abe met Prayud in Milan where they asked their meeting. So all of this, I think, I try to think why was this and why it's so different from United States. One of the major differences is the huge community in Thailand. The expats. The expats, yeah. I think, I mean, the American expats or the Chinese doesn't have an expats, too. I mean, there is Chinese projects, but the expat community is not there. I mean, there's local Thai-Chinese, but it's very different. So I think that's something that Japanese policy vis-a-vis Thailand differs from the condition, the policy-making condition is different. Well, the consumption-led or the export-led, I think Thailand has been trying very hard to change Thai economy into a consumption-led as well. I think the Lehman shock experience, I think when the export, you know, they realize they rely too much on export. So whenever Chinese demand slows down, US demand slows down, it gives a huge impact on Thai economy. It's too vulnerable. So if we want to have this middle-income trap and to go to upgrade this, we can't afford to be too dependent on outer market. So that's the lesson that learned in 2000s and 2008, and therefore the governments after that trying to make a consumption-led economy within Thailand. And therefore there was all kinds of popularistic policies. You're giving a lot of income upgrades to the workers, to the farmers. And I think that was the trend. But I think right now, I think it seems to be this consensus not very clear. So, but at the same time, I think there's a lot of tensions within the economic business circles. Those business, the Thai business, who rely solely on Thai market, and those business whose portfolio is maybe more in abroad, I think there is going to be eventually a big fight here. We have a new Thai, what, new young BOT governor. And I think how he plays out the monetary policy, I think it will be a very defining politics here. So I think this kind of different mix of business sector will define. And right now I think in this smaller, it's very difficult to check because the information is not quite open. But I think the tide in the opposite in luck period, or maybe since before, it's like from Surayut period to in luck period. There was a very strong tide to make it a consumer led. Right now it's, and I don't know because of that, I'm not sure how this impact the railroad. I mean, this railroad doesn't, they have a lots of plans that attach to it with the local economy enhancing programs with the, but right now, if you look at the negotiation table, it's very much on railroads, not development side. So yeah, I think that's something that's just changing. On for political development, I think this is a huge issue. Japan is not a good country to learn from. Especially, yes, I talked to your colleague, Dr. Alagapa too, about this. And well, like Japan, like the fundamental question, who is Japanese, who is Thai? A country like Japan and Thailand hasn't paid a huge effort onto this. The country who paid a huge effort to this is like India or Indonesia, who fought the war, a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country, fought the war with the common agenda, and therefore the nation building was there. There is an Indonesian identity, even though you're Japanese, Chinese, Papuanese, of course you have in-fights, but then you can have, this is what Dr. Alagapa said, they can allow a lot of autonomy. While like in Thailand, you can't allow autonomy in Southern Thai. Back hook people has very limited understanding of the Southern Thai people. This is the same case with Japanese. Japanese has very limited understanding about the Okinawa situation. This kind of structure is very similar, I think, in Japan, and Japan and Thailand really shares this weakness of nation building. Well, the state, the development state building was there. It was clear, the state building with strong bureaucratic institutions was there, but the nation building, historically speaking, wasn't there. It's not like United States or maybe certain Singapore or Australia with immigration state. You have this kind of immigration state model of creating identity as a citizen. Regardless of your background, you're not born to be an American. You have to practice yourself to be an American or you have to be that kind of nation, kind of immigration state model of nation building. It's also not there in Thailand or Japan. So we are neither an independent war fighting country or an immigration country. So because of that, the nation building, especially in Thailand and Japan, is very much limited. And I think that's gonna be in the future. I think I agree that this is gonna be a big time bomb, especially when there's a lot of disparity vis-a-vis the generation, vis-a-vis the region, vis-a-vis the, it could be the ethnic. One thing if there is a thing that Japan has a little more than Thailand is about decentralization. Thailand's political structures is very much centralized. And with the coup, it's even more centralized. I think this is something that limits the capacity or the flexibility of Thai government to kind of arrange or revise themselves into different needs of different region. Many countries currently with all these flows of humans, goods and information, there will be disparities. But this kind of arrangement, really the key is decentralization. And I think Thailand, I think the biggest challenge is whether Thailand can decentralize. And if a centralized power like the current can deliberately decentralize, I think this is gonna be a huge legacy. It's like the Habibi period in Indonesia. Habibi period had a lot of discredit, but I think one of the huge credit that he got is this decentralization. Without him, the history of Indonesia was not as peaceful as such. But we never know when this kind of political will happens. And if the Thai has a kind of a calculate deliberate choice, I think it is now or never. It's very tough in a democratic situation. But right now with the centralized power, he gets the military rule, the NCPO rules that we are going to decentralize the structure. I think that legacy will live forever and Pryut will have a very strong position in history. Yeah, thank you very much. I mean, I think this ought to be one of the top U.S.-Japan alliance agenda issues is really thinking through, granted they're limited. We are limited in our influence, but whatever we can do to encourage it in that direction, I think would be productive. Abigail, do you have any comments before I turn it over to the audience here and get the audience involved? Okay, me too. So we're gonna have microphones come around. And for those that call on, please let us know who you are, where you're from, and ask your question. And I'll start with Scott right here. Scott Harold from the Rand Corporation. Hi, Azal Sensei, thank you so much for this really very rich presentation today. I have two questions for you, one on Thailand, one on Japan. You started out by noting that the travel schedules for Ing-Luk and Pryut didn't really differ. One possible interpretation is the one you offered, that really there's no change, or that that's a good thing. The disturbing counter-hypothesis is, no matter who's ruling Thailand, they're moving increasingly towards more comfortable, feeling more comfortable with China, engaging with China in ways that are maybe not seen as positive for the region, for Japanese interests, for US interests. So I'd just like to ask you to talk a little bit more about that because I think being in Thailand before the coup, one often heard that the US relationship with Thailand is deteriorating, ties don't understand why the US thinks the relationship, the alliance relationship is important. In fact, they think the US has basically written the alliance relationship's value off, whereas in DC, you often hear people saying, this is a critical alliance relationship, we need Thailand, there seems to be a big disconnect there, and I think the ties who you talk to don't see the rise of China, or China's assertiveness is being very concerning, they don't share a border, they just see the value of the economic relationship, so the question is, is there a broader gauge move that we can't really gain insight into by just looking at whether it's Pryut or Ing-Luk? On Japan, Ms. Friedman commented that there's this clear imperative from Beijing to develop the relationship along a trade alliance, a trade relationship. My perception is that Japan's strategy plays to that the interest of both Japan, the US, and all of the countries across Southeast Asia, which is to say, would you like to be just a Chinese trading port? Would you like to be just a provider of raw materials, or would you like to have east-west connectivity that provides you a chance to retain some of your autonomy? You didn't highlight that as much, but I'd like to hear the extent to which you see that as being a broad gauge understanding, undergirding Japanese foreign and development policy in the region, and if that touches on Myanmar, if it touches on Vietnam, if it touches on Laos or Cambodia too, you'd welcome your comments on that. Thank you so much. Okay, let's. Go ahead, yeah, we'll do it in rapid-fire succession here. Thank you very much. Both are really, really critical questions. For whether it is a kind of inevitable shift to China or not, it's a different way to say this. I was talking to one of the person close to the three gentlemen in Thailand, the three meaning Prawit, Prayut, Anupong. So there are circles there. And they put it in a very interesting way. Well, we do emphasize China, but it is not that we shift from United States, that the US is not change, I mean, we cannot alter. So what their perception was that the current perception is that they are too US. So the system, the military system and everything, the structural, the values and everything, the professionalism and everything, we are too US, which is too risky. So we always wanted to shift a little more into balance. And therefore, how you do that, it's pretty difficult. But right now, under Prayut government, because US had to retreat, it's a good chance because you don't have to explain too much. So I think that was the kind of sense that they have. And I think this is very much profound and not only in Thailand and everywhere. I think because of the changing powers. The more the US allies, the more they feel the need to get new partners. And the more they were non-US allies, they want more of US. For example, like Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam. I mean, the non-US allies will be more friendly to US because they want to balance it. And so they want more. While the US allies are the ones who feel that maybe we are too US. And so it's a kind of an ironical, you know, a vector. I mean, you know, where your starting point is, like you're too close to US, you go away. So you give the impression that you're moving away, even though your starting point is very close to US. Well, while when your starting point is very far, it feels that you're moving towards the United States because they are from far away. So I think that is the overall trend. And right now it's the kind of the adjusting transition period. And I think this is very, very difficult to change. But one thing I want to note is that not only Thailand, but the ultimately what they want to do is not to be in between US and China. So if you look carefully more, they are much more, they pay effort in inviting India, Russia, Europe, Korea, recently because of the change in Japan, Japan too. So they want different portfolios. And even these portfolios, they are very careful, like it's a different country, like Indonesia case. They have a new Suhoi purchase, but their management relies on India. So they don't want spare parts rely on Russia. They have India because of their lessons learned from the embargo with the United States. So this is the kind of trend that they see each other. And what is worrisome is that eventually they wanted to grow their industrial military themselves. And to what extent this goes, I think this is something a little bit worrisome. So it's a balancing, but also it's more a self, trying to self-sufficient it. And how much are they going to put it? Where's the consensus of economic development and where's the mix with the defense industry? I think this is a big challenge to way forward. For Japan, yes, the political will absolutely has highlighting to make a strategy with the changing Chinese strategy too. And I think the East-West connectivity is clearly, you need to open. You need to make sure the, not just the ports, but the markets and the supply chain and also the information network is open, energy. Energy information is very critical and also a movement of people. So I think these three components are very, very critical. And to make sure you don't have one center, like you don't want Ku-Mint to, you don't want all roads leads to Ku-Mint geography, but you want multiple. And I think the role of Japan is always to secure the multiple connectivity. And I think that is a very much matched supply demand with the Southeast Asian partners because I'm sure the Southeast Asian also wants multiple centers. And I think that is also a common consensus. You don't want one country. They didn't want only Japan, rule Asia, and they don't want any China, rule Asia. It's the same. But I think they're much more comfortable with multiple group of leaders. Thank you. Okay. So Scott got special treatment. He got two questions in. From now on, let's, we'll try to keep it to one. I'm going to take two right in succession, this gentleman and then Prasan. And then I'll go to the back. Thank you very much. Michael Kurtzig, who worked on the Middle East economics. You talked about the challenges that Thailand has and about Japan. I'm curious for your opinion and your comments on why Prime Minister Abhi is now pushing for the Japan military to play a larger role. Is that a challenge to China considering what's going on in the South China Sea and the South Chinese Island, the Chinese Sea? Do you see that as a challenge between the two of them? This is a power game. Thank you. Okay. Hi. Thanks for your comments. I wanted to actually shift the focus to your other country of interest, which you mentioned earlier, which is Indonesia and talk about some of the regional impacts that you were referring to earlier as well with respect to Thailand. I think some have argued that since Jokowi has come to power, we've seen a little bit less or maybe a lot less emphasis on ASEAN in Indonesia compared to the Mardi period. And I'm wondering if you share that sentiment to what extent you share it. And then also, to the extent that that's true, what are the regional implications for that given the ASEAN economic community and some countries talking about greater connectivity and ASEAN's role among the major powers, et cetera, et cetera? Thanks. Please. Thank you very much for the questions. For Japan, I'm not expert on this, but I can tell you one thing is that this is a very much domestic constraint. It's not really vis-à-vis China, but there is a domestic constraint that you have to go over. And this is not easy. And this is a huge thing that it's highlighting in Japanese politics right now. I mean, we have the constitution. We have the rules that prohibits, that doesn't allow easy channel to be able to promote the military deployment of the arms sales. So I think there is a domestic rule that we cannot do it. So I think currently it's simple as such. Even though you have a leadership rule, it's not going to be easy for this one. For the Indonesia, yes, I agree that there is much less of an ASEAN emphasis. How is it impacting? I'm sure it is impacting, but in a longer time ahead, it's still yet to come to a conclusion, but there's three elements that we have to look at. One, absolutely what I mentioned, the Thai case was very critical. So how much does the Thai, or the coming two, three years, whether they have an election, a Myanmar election, Thai election, Cambodian election, how does this going through? I think this is going to be critical. Right now, I don't think Indonesia is interested because it's too much of a long shot. So there's no point of putting democracy on the table. So I mean, if it's not feasible, why do they do so? So there is no priority here. But the other thing is, of course, it's vis-à-vis China as well. There's a big gap within ASEAN countries vis-à-vis China. And how much Indonesia is going to be involved in that is also going to be really critical. And one thing that worries about Indonesia is about how much does the Jokowi government has a grip on the military, the civilian control. Since last year, the worrisome thing is that a lot of military top leaders like Muldoko, right now we have a new commander, but how much they follow the line of the government? For example, it was not the defense minister or the president at that time, but it was the military commander who raised the issue of Natuna and things like that. So it's the same with the China. The question is how much this military and civilian relationship in Indonesia is stable, because of the weak position of Jokowi, he does rely a lot on military support. So I think that relationship is pretty much crucial. And the third is that maybe it is also because of the confidence that Indonesia has. Indonesia's confidence exceeds itself, the self-image of Indonesia, maybe have so-called grown-out of Asia. And therefore, they don't need Asia. They rather have more... If you look at, for example, a lot of big deals like mining deals, they have a lot of deals with the African countries and Brazils. Their partner, I mean, go beyond Southeast Asia. And I think this confidence, if there is... I'm not judging that there is because... But if there is, I think this is also a factor that tries to undermine the importance of ASEAN. So I think these three points is going to be a challenge to put ASEAN back on centrality, because if Indonesia doesn't put its importance to it, there is a less political leverage among Southeast Asian countries to prioritize. For example, in the continental Southeast Asia, the Mekong initiative or the Mekong... I mean, that package, the sub-regional package is already a very comfortable thing. Remember in the taxing period, I think that was much more comfortable. Especially for Thailand, you can be a leader for the Mekong setting, because if you include Indonesia, you cannot include Indonesia or Singapore, you cannot be the leader. But this is much more comfortable. So the kind of regional category will try to be much more smaller and smaller, because that way you have a bargaining power. So in the end, Indonesia really matters. But whether that will come in or not, I think that three factors still matters a lot. Thank you. Thanks. My only comment on the Japan security policy is that I think what's going on in the South China Sea is more of a symptom of an overall dynamic that Japan is responding to. And I wouldn't want to forget North Korean nuclear missile development as a driver there. I'm sorry, this is going to be tough. But let me go to the back and here. I think time for two more. So here and this gentleman here. And if we have time, we'll squeeze in a couple more. Steve Winters, independent consultant. I had numerous trips to Thailand in the 80s and 90s when the security relationship between Thailand and the U.S. was just, I mean, just so smooth. It was unbelievable. I was also in Malaysia during the Asian economic crisis. And I know the people up in Thailand got absolutely infuriated somehow of the business groups blaming the U.S. for groups for coming over and what they call bottom feeders, sort of picking up industries at fire sale prices that had gone under because of the crisis. And this created a tremendous amount of bad will towards U.S. And it seems to me that looking back on it, that was sort of a turning point. You mentioned the layman crisis, which of course in 10 years later just sort of underscored maybe the questionability of tying oneself totally into the western framework. So did you hear anything about still repercussions from the Asian economic crisis in Thailand in terms of that thinking? And then this gentleman here. Mark. Yeah, thank you. I'm Mark Tocalo from the Korea Economic Institute. Rather than distinguish between a principled political agenda and economic agenda, I wonder if I could ask you to comment on principled economics and less principled economics. Is the Thai government concerned about the quality of the four direct investment infrastructure projects in terms of human rights, transparency, environmental sustainability? Are those things that Japan is urging? Okay, so let's take those two and then we'll see if we have a little time. Yes. I'm sorry. The first question, I really couldn't... I think it's focused on the impact of the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s. 1990, 1997, 1998. And then to some extent, 10 years later in the layman kind of that. What impact did that have on Thai perceptions of its relationship with the United States? Or are those seminal periods in Thai foreign policy or not that? If I paraphrase. I see. Let me think. I don't ring a bell if that being debated. Well, of course, the 97, 98 experience, the IMF experience is there. But the lesson is that, not just vis-a-vis the United States, but what they learn is that Southeast Asian countries are well connected or not the Asian countries are well connected. So it's not just to demonize the United States in handling the crisis, but it is much more of realizing how connected the regional economy is. And I think that was the stronger lesson. And therefore, because of that, you have a lot of political will to cooperate rather than compete. The kind of Chiang Mai initiative was the kind of tangible result of it. And since then, I think there are the political will of the regional arrangement. I think it's still there. And I don't know whether this was strengthening or weakened by the demon shock. That part, I cannot comment it. I don't know about that because I haven't heard the discussion that connects the 97, 98 lessons with the 2007, 2008 events. So for the quality of the development projects, the political voice does not... Well, the political package for Japan is always use the word quality right now. I mean, that's the kind of... Right now, I think Japan is trying to craft their value onto how different is it, the Japanese package. I mean, especially vis-a-vis the AIIB. Japan didn't join it, but Japan is throwing the similar money especially in Southeast Asia. But what's the difference? Is it just because of the interest rate or not, it's not just the interest rate, it's not just the amount of money, but it is the quality of the infrastructure. That quality, is it a human rights or environment? I'm not sure about the human rights, but environment is definitely yes. Environment is yes, and environment package is there. And there are so many environmental agreements, especially not just the railroads or roads, but especially for urbanization projects. Urban projects like subways or the monorails and also connected to that a lot of waste management. Those are the waste governance. I mean, those are very much attached to it. And one big trend in Asian society is this urbanization. I mean, this is the first in history that 50% and more is living in the urban zone. Asia is not anymore a rural Asia. It's an urban Asia. And so therefore the kind of policy priorities is gradually shifting. And therefore the kind of quality of policies and quality of infrastructure is also changing. And that emphasis is clearly there. And I come from a place called Fukuoka. And Fukuoka and also another city called Kitakyushu is very famous for this waste management. If you look at Southeast Asian municipal places, it's the same standards as everywhere. Just for one example, collecting garbage in nighttime. I think this already had a very big impact, especially in Taipei. You remember Chenshupian became a very popular mayor. I think there was two or three policies. And one of them was garbage, the garbage collection system. It changes. There's no crows that munching and spreading the garbage. Because crows shouldn't be able to see the dark. These days the cities are too bright, but it's less. But these kind of small governance models then creates a popular mayor. Chenshupian become a president. And so becoming a good mayor like Jokowi as well or always in Seoul or maybe in Shanghai and Beijing as well. A good mayor type of governance will lead to a good model of leadership. And this kind of political asset is attached to a new quality of infrastructure. And I think this mix is very much emphasized in Japan. Thank you. Yeah, I just wanted to add to that. I think it's a great point. And my sense is that the issue is not for me whether governments or countries want to address care about environmental issues or care about local communities or not. It's the existing model for infrastructure development able to address that. And I would argue that in many cases the answer is no. That you commit to building a road, hire the company to build the road. That construction company just does roads. That construction company does not have the tools, the mechanisms to do some of the engagement with civil society, some of the environmental soundings that are expected today. So that's why I think the role of civil society, the role of NGOs, the relationship between NGOs and civil society and governments is key. And that needs to be grown whether it's in Thailand or anywhere. And it also goes back to that's also why these political models of countries are not disconnected from the economic environment. Because if you've got a situation where, as Professor Aizawa just pointed out, your governments are accountable to people, are voted in or out based on their ability to respond to the interest and priorities of the people, you are more likely to get decisions that also are supported by local communities than if that isn't factored in at all. Thank you. We get back to the importance of political development and all the connections. Well, unfortunately, I apologize. We've run out of time and I know there's some more questions out there, but perhaps Professor Aizawa will stay around for a couple of minutes and have a chance to engage those. But before we conclude, I just want to thank you for a wonderful presentation and for coming. And then Abigail for joining us as well. Thank you very much. And thank you all for joining us today. Have a pleasant day.