 The book is really, really important. And it has a very nice methodology, which is that it starts with the history of each issue, then a deep analysis of issues, and then it makes policy proposals. And I would say that the policy proposals are radical enough to make a significant change in the system, but are also, I think, moderate enough to have some possibility with the right president of the United States of being acceptable. So I want to make some general comments about the book, and then I want to talk a bit more about capital account management, which is the polite version, as Joe Stiglitz said. So I think the major challenges for the world economy is an inappropriate international monetary system accompanied by a highly dysfunctional and problematic international financial system. So it's a combination of both, which is, I think, a major cause for need for reform. And I think that the discussion today, particularly as led by the current president of the United States, is deeply problematic for, in one particular aspect, it's problematic in many, but he stresses that the main problem with globalization is international trade. And yet the broad consensus in the profession is that international trade has net benefits. They may not be that large, and they may be badly distributed, and there is an issue of compensating losers, and the difficulties related to that, but there are net positive effects, whereas there is also a growing professional consensus, including from the IMF, that international capital flows, particularly of a short-term nature, are deeply problematic, and that, especially if there is a process of deregulation not accompanied by appropriate regulation, this will lead to boom bus cycles. And therefore, it seems that the net benefits from the point of view of growth, development, jobs, poverty reduction are either neutral or negative. And so Trump is doing exactly the wrong thing because he's trying to restrict trade, which is net positive, and he's trying, of course, to deregulate finance, particularly in the US, which of course has a major effect internationally, by for example, trying to reverse the not bad Dodd-Frank regulation, which was introduced, which should be improved and deepened, but he's doing the opposite. So he's unleashing the force that is most negative in globalization and restricting the more positive one. So the system as it exists, if you look more broadly at the monetary and the financial system, is first you have asymmetric adjustment of surplus and deficit countries. And this has, as Kosenton and Joe already mentioned, highly problematic effects on growth, employment and poverty reduction. This is an old problem, which Keynes tried to grapple with at Bretton Woods and tried to fix. But I think since the North Atlantic crisis, we like to call it or more generally known, the global financial crisis, has become especially bad in advanced economies. All the surpluses now are in advanced economies. This is a very small one of China, but basically it is between the Eurozone and specifically Germany and Holland, the rest of the Eurozone and the rest of the world. And I think one of the disturbing things, because if we're trying to think of reform the system, is that even within the Eurozone, which has had a lot of political, economic and financial integration, there are no mechanisms that work to reduce surplus in surplus countries. There is actually a rule that says that if a country has a bigger surplus than 6% of GDP, the European Commission can impose on the surplus country to adjust and could even find them. But this has not been used. It has not been used in the same ways that the scarce currency clause has not been used ever by the IMF. So if it can't even be done within the Eurozone, which is so closely linked together, it's worrying how we can convince it to work international. And what happens, and Joe has, you know, led the discussion on that very brilliantly, is that adjustment has been all done basically by the deficit countries or the crisis countries, like Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and dramatically of course Greece, but also by Italy, who hasn't had a crisis, but which is under pressure. At the same time as the countries that have these massive surpluses, 8% of GDP for a long period in Germany, and even worse, 10% in Holland, in Netherlands. Actually, Finland are the good guys because they started after the global financial crisis with a surplus and they now have a deficit. So, well done. I'm sure you didn't do it for the rest of the world, but nevertheless you did well. And this kind of adjustment that has been imposed on the deficit countries, of course, has had dramatic negative effects on growth. Most dramatic in the case of Greece, where GDP fell by 25% under all these terrible statistics. But also from the point of view of growth in the Eurozone, the Eurozone has grown much less than it could have and it's recovered far slower than the US. And from our perspective, looking at it from developing countries and emerging economies, this has had negative, important negative spillovers for the rest of the world, including emerging and developing economies, because it has a depressive effect. But as I said, neither the European Commission, the IMF, the G20 have had much influence on the policies of the US surplus countries. The IMF actually says very reasonable things, a lot of economists say reasonable things. The Germans carry on with their policy, which is actually also bad for them because they have a lot of infrastructure deficit. I don't know if you try to use email in Germany, it's not very good, the internet. They could invest in that, but they don't. So there are these negative spillovers from bad fiscal policy. There are also large spillovers of US monetary policy. This, of course, is linked to the issue that has been raised by Jose Antonio and by Joe in particular, about the fact that the US is the main currency worldwide. And this has had negative spillovers always, talk about sudden stops, reverses of capital flows. But it has been dramatized, I would say, since the North Atlantic crisis because of quantitative easing, because non-conventional monetary policy has implied that the monetary policy expansion of the US and of other countries like Eurozone is so extremely large, which has contributed in this expansionary phase to massive capital flows to the emerging economies and developing economies, and led to overvaluation of currencies, overheating of the economy, increase in dollar-denominated debt in a massive way, that in developing and emerging economies has gone up. And this weakening, the strengthening of the currencies of the developing world has been called a currency war by the then finance minister of Brazil, and also is criticized by people like Rajan, when he was governor of the Central Bank of India. Precisely emphasizing these large spillover effects, because the problem is that the US Fed has massive impact on the rest of the world in its monetary policy decisions, but its mandates, and this is recognized, I mean the speeches, for example, by Stan Fisher, saying, you know, we have big effects. But then he concludes in the same speech, but our main obligation, given to us by US Congress, our mandate is to look after growth and inflation in the United States. So this leads, as Rajan and others have argued, to suboptimal solutions from the point of view of the world economy. Of course, now we have the opposite problem, because we have the beginning of consolidation of this monetary policy, which has started in the US, is going to start in the Eurozone, and we already had the taper tantrum, and this will begin to have the reverse effects to which Joe mentioned, which is a slowdown of capital flows, both to emerging markets, and to developing economies. The poor countries in Africa found themselves in the period of quantitative easing being courted by all these bankers and institutional investors, and they all believe them, because countries always believe it, when people tell you your policies are fantastic, we want to invest in you. They don't tell them it's because the interest differential is so good, and we can't make any money in the US or in the Eurozone. And so they borrowed, of course, too much, and now the cost of refinancing that debt has shot up in Africa. And of course, we now are beginning to have problems in the emerging economies in Turkey and Argentina, and we wake up every day trembling as we open the financial times to see, has there been contagion somewhere else? So there is this big, big problem. So I think there's further work to be done in integrating these challenges, which José Antonio emphasizes, with the interactions of the international financial system, which, of course, as Joe has so brilliantly presented in his research, is riddled with imperfections and market failures. And perhaps the biggest market failure is, of course, this boom-bust nature of finance, which is accelerated by deregulation and increasing growth of the size of the financial sector and of the complexity and opaqueness of the instruments used, especially in the still growing shadow banking sector. I think they've done quite a good job, not perfect, but quite an important job in improving regulation of banks, nationally and internationally, but they've done very little on regulating the shadow banking, which is still growing again. And so capital flows have, as I said, some advantages, but they seem to be negative. And we've just finishing some work, actually, on capital flows to Africa. And to our surprise, if we look at the impact on productivity, even FDI doesn't, and we're looking at a sector, doesn't seem to surprisingly have much impact on increasing productivity. And we've done a lot of rigorous analysis. And the fourth element, because Antonio describes very well, is that it's very good to have the IMF, but it should be bigger. You know, a lot of the critics of the IMF want to close it down. You know, I'm an ice critic. I say, be bigger. But, of course, it has too high conditionality. As Antonio said, there's too little automatic lending, particularly in the face of external shocks for which developing countries have no control. And especially now, if there is a possible new crisis in the emerging and developing countries, it's very worrying that these external shock facilities are so small in the IMF. They're good, but they're very small for the low-income countries, and for the middle-income countries, on trade, the IMF has eliminated the compensatory financing facility, which I thought was great. Because they put up a conditionality, so countries didn't use it, and therefore they said nobody's using it, so we're gonna close it down. A little bit perverse logic. So, I have one small nuance with Antonio. I think he rightly emphasizes the greater vulnerability of developing countries to these external shocks, partly because they're a relatively small part of the market, but I think after this global financial crisis, we can see even more clearly than we did before that a lot of the problems that we saw as characterizing only the developing world also bedeviled many of the advanced economies. And here I want to mention Dudley Sears, who was mentioned this morning, and he very insightfully, many years ago, analyzed Europe from a core periphery perspective, and he put in the periphery, the countries that all suffered the crisis. But more broadly, the problems that the international and domestic financial system have are also typical of developed economies. The boom bus patterns, the costly crisis, and so I think if we emphasize this more now, A, we're more realistic, and B, we may get more policy traction because this is something that is also affecting the developed economies, so they should be perhaps also more willing to try and fix it. And this is perhaps why there was so much progress on financial regulation, for a time at least. Now, I want to say a few words very quickly about managing the capital account. And I want to say that Jose Antonio has a really very nice historical analysis of the influence of Keynes, the fact that in the initial articles of agreement, the IMF actually said that countries can manage their capital account as they like. There was the threat of reversing it in 1997, and then the East Asian crisis came and it was not reversed. And also due to the resistance of good finance ministers, including then Jose Antonio. Now, what is I think also very important, and it's been already mentioned briefly, but I want to emphasize it, that as a result of a lot of good research done outside the IMF, but also inside the IMF, including particularly by Jonathan Ostry and his co-authors, the IMF took what is called the institutional view, which I think is very important, that capital account management should be part of a battery of policy instruments, including counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies, but that it is a legitimate instruments. And I think this is a great step forward, but it has some limitations. I think it should also include source countries. And in fact, there is an IMF study by Gosha Tal, which shows that the benefits of capital account regulations are bigger if they're including regulations by source countries, that the value of coordination reduces the cost to individual countries, and that also the burden is less because all the burden is on these small recipient countries. It's more difficult to resist these walls of money than if, say, the US and the Eurozone are giving a helping hand. So it's encouraging that they are a little bit returning to the spirit of Bretton Woods where both Keynes and White, the two creators of Bretton Woods, actually said that you should regulate in recipient countries and in source countries, which has really not been done at all. I have a slight worry that in this new world, the position of the IMF holds because the US, of course, is now moving in the other direction. But my main concern is something that relates to the trade regime because in the WTO, and particularly in the bilateral and trade treaties, there is a very strong emphasis to demand total freedom of capital flows without any exceptions from developing countries. So more or less at the time when the IMF was moving to accept this good position on capital management, the US and the Europeans were moving to impose trade and bilateral investment treaties that set the opposite. And I think there is a very strong need for sort of a ornamental of these new and old bilateral trade and investment treaties to be consistent with this new consensus, which is, of course, comes from the IMF and the IMF is the expert group of dealing with issues of the capital account. So, and we have a report coming out by the sort of social democrats in the European parliament which argues this very strongly. And the problem is a bit in the WTO, in the GATS, but at least the disputes if they arise are intra-state disputes. So it's government to government, which is tough, but it's intra-government. But more serious in these FTAs and BITs, it's private sector versus government dispute. So a bank can challenge a Chile for its capital control, an American bank, and it will be tested in an American court. And also, I just finished, also it covers all transfers and all instruments that are not excluded. And it has often no exceptions, no carbons. So I think I want to finish is that to guarantee the continued success of this, it is urgent that there is updating of capital account management. So countries are allowed to follow policies that will allow them to pursue national policy objectives and reduce the risk of financial instability, which in the end is also bad for the developed economies. Thank you very much.