 Well, let us start the second session if we if we will please My name is Tom McNar. I teach in the security studies program at Georgetown And I have anticipated this panel in particular with great interest because as sort of your typical American national security analyst I think of China as a rule breaker more than a rule maker And I think it's a stroke of genius to sort of put this panel here So we can talk about the other side of that coin and to do that we have three really Terrific experienced panelists. I'll introduce them in the order in which they're sitting Which is also in the order in which they're they're speaking with the only admonition that we do try to Hold to 10 to 15 minutes, which as I told the panel is it's just impossible. Nobody speaks for just 10 minutes But I'd like you to really give it a try Susan Lawrence Is at the Congressional Research Service where she's an Asia specialist She lived in China for 13 years most of that as a journalist for the likes of the Far East or an economic review Wall Street Journal The US news and world report fluent in Mandarin And I think probably fluent in the way China sees the world and sees itself as well Robert Daley is is the director of the Kissinger Center on the US and China at the Woodrow Wilson Center Came down there just last year from Maryland where he ran the China project, but About 11 years in China Including six directing the Nanjing Center, which I regard as a very special a very special place Again fluent in in Mandarin and has interviewed and translated for interpreted for Several Chinese high-level officials American high-level officials Patrick Klossin like me is not fluent in Mandarin He's fluent in Pentagon ease which is an equally different Tonal language and it's hard because it changes all the time those acronyms just keep getting longer and longer He is now senior director and director of the Asia program at CNAS the Center for New American Security If you look at his longer bio, you'll see he's been a number of places And he's always written very very cogently about US national security in particular about Asian issues so so with that let me turn this over to Susan and we'll get started talking about China as a rulemaker like to start by thanking Georgetown Oriana and USIP for the invitation to be here and I'm speaking my personal capacity and my views don't necessarily Represent those of CRS This panel is on China as rule maker the framing language that you will have seen in the brochure about the conference Seem to assign two meanings to that phrase The first one was China as joiner as participant in the international system epitomized by decision to join most international and regional organizations and The second meaning is China as rule maker in the international system in the sense of playing a leadership role Actively proposing changes to the international order, so I'm going to split my remarks into those two categories Starting with China as joiner China has been an enthusiastic joiner in recent decades making up for time lost as the junior partner in the Sino-Soviet Alliance and in the aftermath of the Korean War China of course joined the United Nations and took on the seat on the national on the Security Council held by the Republic of China Taiwan in 1971 Its membership in international organizations picked up after 1978 It is now joined most UN affiliated agencies the World Bank the International Monetary Fund and so on It began efforts to join the general agreement on tariffs and trade in 1986 and Finally joined the gap successor organization the World Trade Organization of course in 2001 Nonetheless for most of the time since 1971 China's often been described as under participating in global governance a 2009 study by the Center for American Progress described China as in the ring, but punching below its weight Chinese scholars have characterized China's role differently as admirably restrained Chinese scholars sometimes seek appreciation for the fact that China has generally not sought to use its UN Security Council seat for example as a way to counterbalance or block the United States One imperfect metric of China's activity Maybe vetoes in the UN Security Council China cast its first veto in 1972 Blocking Bangladesh's UN membership because China considered Bangladesh to be a breakaway province of Pakistan its ally But it didn't use its veto again for 25 years until 1997 When it vetoed a resolution to send ceasefire observers to Guatemala because Guatemala's diplomatic relations with Taiwan And China abstained in the on the 1991 Gulf War resolution allowing the Gulf War to happen They voted for the ultimatum to Iraq leading up to the second Gulf War They voted for resolution 1386 authorizing the international security assistance force in Afghanistan so they China sort of Basically wants credit for not not blocking the United States With that brought with that position But of course, you know the list of vetoes doesn't reflect situations in which China wielded influence with its threat of a veto or Otherwise may have informally influenced the behavior or actions of other members Moving on to China as rule maker Many observers remarked on an apparent gradual shift in China's attitude toward the international system in the last few years a Desire to move cautiously beyond the Deng Xiaoping dictum of Tao Guang Yang Hui this idea that China should keep its head down not take the lead Focus on domestic development and that that dictum has been in place since the fall of the Soviet Union It's still officially there, but there's now a lot of debate about how much China should feel guided by that We're seeing senior Chinese Chinese officials indicating a desire to pursue gradual changes to the international system an example November 2013 last year State Council Yang Jiechi China's most senior diplomat Stated that China wants to quote pursue incremental progress in adjusting and reforming the international system That appears to mean preserving the authority of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization But wanting the UN to renew and improve itself and play a bigger role It means securing a greater role for emerging markets and developing countries in the global system For example the G20 China really likes the G20 reforming the international Monetary and financial systems to give China a bigger role Ensuring a global development agenda that is firmly focused on economic development and poverty alleviation and not on promoting democracy democratic governance China is also engaged in a parallel effort to create new institutions in which China can be a rule maker from the start One example is the Shanghai cooperation organization Its mission is includes big quote moving towards the establishment of a new democratic just and rational political and economic international order Principles of the SEO include ideas like respect for the diversity of cultures, which is a byword for Not pursuing democracy promotion in places like China It's also got a major focus on tackling what the SEO countries call terrorism separatism and extremism and that of course just that that formulation reflects China's Role as a rule maker in this situation China of course uses that phrase The the terrorism separatism and extremism to justify its actions in places like Xinjiang and Tibet and it calls those three things the three evils and Yet, you know the SEO all all of the SEO countries have signed on to that focus and the SEO countries You know Kazakhstan China Kyrgyz Republic Russia Tajikistan Uzbekistan Observers or Afghanistan India Iran Mongolia and Pakistan China is also Seeking to be a rule maker in the context of the Bricks the sorry the Bricks grouping Brazil Russia India China and South Africa It has established the China Africa Cooperation forum and now expanded on we now have also a China Arab cooperation forum and looks like this year There will be a new China Community of Latin American and Caribbean states forum. So basically the three major Regions China is now setting up specific entities for China's relationships with Those whole continents China has also under Xi Jinping is pursuing two very high-profile initiatives which China is portraying as an example of the way that it is beginning to innovate in foreign policy and And and and you know create rules By being the innovator by being the country that putting out these ideas So one is the Silk Road economic belt Proposed when Xi Jinping was in Kazakhstan the other is the 21st century maritime Silk Road Which is leveraging the China asian maritime cooperation cooperation fund which China established That was proposed when Xi Jinping visited Indonesia And I think we're gonna be hearing a lot more about those two initiatives in the months to come They're becoming very high-profile in China Part of the shift in China's approach to the international system is in statements Saying that China is willing to step forward and shoulder greater international responsibilities Which is something the United States has long urged China to do Wang Yi the Chinese Foreign Minister for example last fall Pledge that China would fully and more actively involve ourselves in international affairs and work closely with other countries to meet Intricate global challenges and tackle difficult issues facing mankind. He promised to provide more public goods to the international community As examples of China's provision of public goods China points to its active participation in UN peacekeeping missions Points to its anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden its diplomacy related to North Korea And in August China will be hosting the ministerial conference of the Istanbul process on Afghanistan China's also said it's willing to get more involved with Afghanistan Another area in which I think we'll be seeing more Chinese More Chinese Chinese activity which may lead to more rulemaking is China's pledge to do more to protect protect the interests of Chinese overseas There are now a hundred million Chinese traveling abroad every year 20,000 Chinese companies operating overseas and China is now much more overtly making this part of China's foreign policy agenda And finally, you know part of the shift China is now casting more vetoes in the UN Security Council So from 1997 to the present to remember from from 1972 to 1997 There were no vetoes from 1997 to the present China has used its veto seven times Five times following Russia's lead The last three vetoes in 2011 and 2012 were on resolutions championed by the United States related to Syria, of course But China abstained on the UN Security Council vote on the Crimea issue, which Russia vetoed So I will put that out here. I think all three of us are going to be talking on kind of different aspects of this question Which is which is good and We will then discuss how they all mesh. Thank you It will thank you I'd like to thank Oriana for putting this together and also to congratulate you on the on the structure of the day Which is very enticing as I went through your schedule. I was very glad to I hope have the time to be here to listen to the other Panels as well. It's very good conference When I was given this topic China as a rule maker I had some of the same thoughts Yeah, China hasn't proposed that many rules as such and so I went back as I often do if I'm looking at something in a Comparative context United States and China to etymologies to try to see whether we meant different things in English by rule And the Chinese do by primarily by Guizha because it's often the case when we speak for example of education and jiu You that they're fundamentally different concepts interestingly etymologically Notions of rule and Guizha are quite similar They both come from the idea of making straight and from measurement and delineation Initially now the the processes of rulemaking in the United States broadly internationally and in China are quite different particularly with reference to notions of who gets to participate But what I wanted to focus on and here thinking back to the first panel and professor Wang Zheng's Comments in particular is the degree to which rules are Culturally construed in both the Western and the Chinese tradition. They are not static Rules evolve to reflect changes in values technologies and power relationships and So we tend to I think overall in the United States We tend to describe and to judge the efficacy of rules based on whether or not they form the foundation For human flourishing and for human interaction, including economic interactions Security interactions, etc. Do we do does the rule provide a good and fair foundation from below for human activity? Whereas in China it's more often the case that a rule is seen as imposing order on chaos from above and we often run into this difficulty When we speak of international rules and the question of whose notion of what rules are for is going to predominate So that in some of the examples that that Susan Lawrence just gave of China as a rule maker I think there is a question in some of these institutions these organizations these policies whether we are really talking about rules as such Or as mechanisms for power projection and influence on the Chinese side And so it's tough to make these distinctions all the time, but it's it's worth I think making the effort Earlier you spoke also of the the culturalist lens through which China Approaches these these issues and I think that's correct in the case of rules Rules are also designed to create and to perpetuate a culture And often this function of rulemaking is not explicit But it can be and I'm thinking of course because Georgetown is sponsoring this event with the Institute of Peace We have the rule of Saint Benedict the rule of Saint Augustine the rule of Saint Francis and of course the rule of Saint Ignatius Loyola and this once common now less common notion of a rule is a way of life that enforces a Discipline schedules rituals declarations of faith in order to cultivate certain virtues Certain practices actually the whip that it was used in some of the harsher orders for self-flagellation That was actually called the discipline by the people who used it And so this notion of the rule as perpetuating a set of disciplines and cultures is not altogether unknown to the CCP in Its histories. This is another sense of rule that I would I would like to bring in So rules I think are inseparable from values and from cultural practices Which is one of the reasons that we've had so much difficulty in working with China on this front This week in the States, of course, we've seen this in the US We've been debating rules about affirmative action about land use rights in the Clive and Bundy case so I My last comment on that but I think that in talking to China or with China about its rules a rule maker We need to bear in mind the inadequacy the inconsistency and the changing character of our own rulemaking So what what our China's attitudes toward the making of rules to date? We don't have a whole lot of evidence to go on although it was somewhat encouraging Just this week to have in Qingdao a new agreement reached on a non binding code of maritime conduct conduct It's encouraging what we'll see how it goes We can also look to China's recent international behavior as a clue to its attitudes toward rulemaking and I think that certainly over the past year or so The evidence there has been far less encouraging When we look at the East China Sea and the South China Sea where we have declarations of Interests rather than rulemaking activity And as its power grows another ongoing Indicator of China's attitude toward rules is China's own Domestic laws it is becoming clear I would argue that China's first instinct and preference in Treating problems and people beyond its borders is to treat them as it treats problems and people within its borders This isn't unique to China. It's not really very surprising But that kind of treatment often can threaten Established and emerging international norms that much of the rest of the world regards as essential To the functioning of modern nations and indeed I would argue many of these rules are essential to China's own efforts To develop an innovative knowledge economy And so there's a tension that we see in China and Professor Zhu Feng referred in the first panel to this paradox between a desire to be involved a desire to be integrated the desire to benefit from international rules, which are sometimes at variance with the domestic rules that are very strongly enforced by China that we see a paradox In that China's domestic standards for example treatment of individuals treatment of labor the environment the free flow of information protection of intellectual property rights Chinese attitudes toward the rule of law and the role of law are not commensurate with established international norms and China experiences this as a big problem it describes it as its problem in Controlling discourse why you can it sees very little room to Defend or promulgate its own standards for rules that it sees working for it domestically internationally Because the discursive field is already occupied. It's it's hard for China to step out And that is why I think that what kind of rule maker China will become is going to depend On its ability to resolve this sort of nay. Why you know internal or domestic? international paradox Which is what I understood Ju Feng to be referring to in other words. It is Chinese exceptionalism China's uniqueness which we discussed in the first panel Which like all exceptionalism doesn't meld easily with principles of international law and The attempt to work with China as a co-rule maker is further complicated by Chinese views toward its foreign policy deeply held beliefs among Chinese elites, but also among Chinese people more broadly Which were also referred to In passing in the first panel the belief that China is fundamentally and Characteristically peaceful that it never has and never will threaten a neighbor Therefore incursions in the Scarborough Shoal cannot be threats This is this is that this is the argument is also strongly believed that China also respects nations and peoples and never interferes in the international in the internal affairs of other countries that it does not seek to change the systems of other nations That Chinese foreign policy is always correct and that China is never at fault in International conflicts this makes it this belief which I think is fairly deeply held in China I'm sure many of you have encountered in the past and if you haven't I'd be happy to send you some speeches and articles that Make this point, but this disposition that China is never at fault is always peaceful This makes it more than usually difficult for China to accept international judgments Whether they're from the WTO or for example with the case that the Philippines is bringing About the Spratlys how are we going to reconcile these deeply held beliefs about China's correctness with? international judgments Furthermore China it is believed as a historical victim is incapable of being an aggressor The very suggestion is almost oxymoronic from the Chinese point of view Xi Jinping at Davos in 2014 said that China will never seek hegemony because quote This is not in the DNA of the country given our long historical and cultural background So these just these beliefs about Chinese foreign policy are going to make it as a difficult these ideas of Chinese exceptionalism for it to make and Co-design rules as such on the other hand and those that sort of the Negative side of the equation on the more positive side China is aware that it is changing When I first went to China as a diplomat in the late 80s and I would you know, unfortunately Embarrassingly, you know preach to China in those days about all the things it should do My Chinese friends would say well just a good boy. Trump. This is a process And of course, this is very tough as an American because it's it's so transparently an excuse and It's so undeniably true at the same time So it makes it as sometimes tough to have these conversations But certainly there's a very healthy discourse in among Chinese policymakers and in the universities about the fact That China needs to integrate as had been mentioned It is China is also understandably Uncertain about what it wants and where it is headed I was in a panel yesterday with Jia Qinghua of Beijing University and he made this point That strongly and quite convincingly that one of the reasons for China's silence about its desires and rules is that it Doesn't know thing China is changing Very quickly and we spoke earlier this morning about the need for empathy and this is I think one of the areas where we have to exercise at some of the time So this is this uncertainty is one of the things that is making China a hesitant rule maker It is conflicted and so it rails against the supposed injustices of the existing world order Even as it games that order with great success and increasingly now recognizes that it is a beneficiary and therefore that it's Interested to refine that certainly not to overthrow that order Yunpeng of the China institutes for contemporary international research writes about this in a book I'd recommend called debating China a series of dialogues about major issues in US-China relations and Yunpeng Wrote China itself has not yet made adequate Psychological and strategic Preparations for changes in the international system Therefore quoting but from a separate part of his article China will continue to play the role of constructive participant and gradual Reformer and I don't think that we will see this changing in in the very near term So this question of what China becomes as a rule maker It's really inseparable from questions about China's modernization and integration into a rapidly evolving world generally It's rulemaking I would not expect it's rulemaking capacity to get out ahead of other aspects of the way Kaifeng and its opening policies So in closing how should the US? Faced with so many international problems the need to work closely with China economically and across the board But we're dealing with a China that is that is uncertain Although it's quite comfortable declaring what it doesn't like about the existing rules, but it's uncertain about proposing new rules How should we work best work with China? First, I think that it is incumbent upon the US and other countries to make clear to China that it is welcome as a Participant an active participant in the rulemaking process. We do not expect it to be just a Responsible stakeholder a phrase that to the Chinese means we welcome your rise as long as you play by the existing rules China does have a legitimate interest in Refining those rules for a changing world and I think could have something positive to contribute to them Although it hasn't really begun to do so yet So looking for ways to work jointly with China and to try to listen to China is going to require I think a humility and a patience on our part that doesn't always come naturally Even as we have to insist on upholding certain fundamental principles I think the best way to have these dialogues with China Is to try to focus in rulemaking with China in areas where China? Recognizes that it has equities and where it can come to rulemaking not as a latecomer, but more or less as an equal It's a good idea to start on new frontiers. There aren't so many of those We have them in space And we have them in obviously in cyberspace and the new frontiers for rulemaking come to us now mostly not from geography from but But from technology rules about the human genome for example and how that is going to be treated questions Technology raises privacy questions Internationally that China recognizes as such as it potentially impinging on the rights of individuals These are very good opportunities to work with China as an equal as rule makers where some of the paranoia that was described earlier Can tend to drop away So that's I think there is room on the positive side to work with China as a rulemaker I think it's essential that we do so on the negative side China as has been mentioned has this idea of dog what do we of big country? relations and big country prerogatives that would sometimes Seem to preclude rulemaking in the normal circumstances. We don't always agree with China on the rules for rules We disagree about rules in the first instance and we sometimes disagree about what constitutes a rule should a rule for example on the use of EEZs apply equally to all countries. This is something China has difficulty answering So China as I say to date remains largely silent as a rulemaker because of uncertainty Because it has problems with discourse. I think it doesn't know how to express its desires without sometimes frightening people and also I believe because it sees time as being on its side it sees America as in at least relative decline and China as rising and therefore the later China Declares a rule or makes a deal the better the deal China is likely to get These Chinese attitudes toward rule-based order. I think have serious strategic consequences in the immediate term that we have to deal with But the underlying challenge is for China our cultural and cultures change slowly The CCP's default attitudes toward rules are still based on self-interest Maintaining order maintaining discipline and on maintaining virtues that are idiosyncratic to the Chinese system And as the Benedictines and the Franciscans know that really doesn't work so well Except in the cloister when you're opening to the outside world. It's a little bit tougher and that's where we have to work. Thank you Well, good morning. I'm Patrick Crohn and I'm the senior director at the Center for a new American security And it's great to be back at the US Institute of Peace and with Georgetown University security studies program I've worked at both institutions. They're tremendous institutions and I think today's event shows just how strong their current program is as well I think Oriana asked me to talk maybe a little bit more about the specific security issues we face today I've tried to cover some of the same ground as the two previous speakers who've done a better job than I've done But I will just for the sake of letting you know my outline of an article. I'm finishing Give you at least the punchlines Because I see China as a partial rule maker and a partial rule breaker going back to Tom's earlier point Yes, they break the rules as well and they they they also make them and sometimes they just are not interested in the rules Breaking them or making them When you think I've tried to ask three questions one is what does it mean to be a rule maker and I think one of the points I'd make here is that from an American perspective You'd expect predictability you'd expect Transparency and you'd expect a sense of fairness and without those three qualities of predictability like the nine-dash line Does it apply to land features? Well, maybe maybe not. There's no predictability There's no predictability in this issue. How about transparency? Well, there's no transparency either because you can't really see inside China's decision-making. It's so difficult. There's so many actors I Hesitate to ever say China as a rule maker because what is China and is there A sense of fairness well from a Chinese perspective. Yes, but but it's historically based It's it's and that's so rich as as we've just heard That is very difficult to try to put that in our especially American but more generally Western context So that's why I want to move on to a second question About the scope of rules being made because I think it really is important to differentiate the kind of rules We're talking about and so when we focus on the hard issue the neurologic issues between say US and China on security and between China and some of its neighbors on security Especially the maritime domain, but you can increasingly bring it issues like cyber security. You start to see the pattern of Chinese rule Sort of making and breaking There's no doubt that China is looking at this as a justification for power projection as much as rules I think as Robert just suggested that is to say it's both They're interested in the rules But not if it touches upon and infringes upon what they think our core national interest and that's a loaded term as well Because that could be changing as China Reawakens old maybe old claims not necessarily new claims, but new interests in old claims Is leading to a greater desire for influence over those old old claims Where this new awakened power of China again the nine-dash line also these China see Including the air defense Identifications on can be seen as sort of an extension of China's conscious power projection toward its near seas Not necessarily out of an imperious desire, but what they think is a historical right And that's why this rights movement in China is becoming a more dominant strand of decision-making Influence then then say ideology Chinese clearly prefer bilateral agreements with smaller neighbors then they And they don't they don't want binding Sort of agreements certainly through a multilateral mechanism Those are those seem to be true throughout all their negotiations on security We can certainly talk about this with respect to the Philippines Scarborough shawl in terms of moving the Philippines out They used of course the rationale that the Philippines brought in a Navy ship Which was a very very old American Coast Guard cutter dressed up as the Philippine Navy ship To sort of enforce domestic Philippine law on poaching And that allowed China to justify moving in their civilian law enforcement agency ships and basically control now Scarborough shawl They've also moved in terms of second thomas reef in the Spratlys to stake a territorial claim over submerged feature land feature Which doesn't offer any any territorial claim because it is submerged And yet they're taking on the Philippines on this issue and they're also as Robert mentioned Not participating in the international tribunal on the law the sea arbitration case at least to this point They can do so at any point over the coming months or even years. This may play out through 2016 But they don't really want to get into a binding arbitration through that international mechanism They prefer to deal with this bilaterally between the disputants between the claimants And they want to have The binding agreement bilaterally that favors the chinese sort of point of view In east china sea where you have a bigger power japan Here the chinese made it very clear to me at least in many meetings Most recently in australia last week that they will not sign up to kind of confidence building measures and risk reduction measures that are meaningful with japan until japan makes good on Acknowledging the dispute acknowledging some chinese dispute over administrative control over the senkaku daio islands Islands which now president obama has just clarified US policy, but not a new policy. It's the old policy But he's articulated as president united states to say that article five of the us japan mutual security treaty does indeed cover Territories administered by japan and we recognize that those islands are administered by japan Because when we reverted okinawa and the islands back to japan with a 71 agreement that started in 1972 We said japan you now have administrative control. So that's just a statement of fact It stopped short of saying that's a sovereign claim. It's it simply states the facts according to post-war war two history from a us perspective Nonetheless, it's likely to flout chinese expectations So chinese will compete and will raise up the temperature even more on this issue just as they did with the air defense identification zone Last november where they took a legal mechanism a legal right to have an aid is But they used it when they were not happy with the united states sort of supporting The normalization of japan's defense posture the the two plus two agreement between defense and foreign ministers last october Where the united states basically got behind prime minister abe and said yes We support this and now those statements have become even stronger and more clear In the statements that just came out of the summit meeting in tokyo So you can expect that this writes diplomacy From china this competition this unwillingness to engage in serious hot lines Between japan and china will grow now You're saying but we're just reading these stories about About The code for unplanned encounters at sea cues. Yes. Let's let's talk about cues for just a minute and put that in context So this is actually less rigorous than the binding Regulations that are already on the books that the chinese and americans have signed up to among others The coal regs, um, which uh go back and have a standing in international law That are binding and they apply to military and civilian shipping alike in terms of avoiding These kinds of dangerous incidents cues is voluntary Chinese immediately came out and said by the way they're not only voluntary But they don't apply to internal territorial waters. Well, what are internal territorial waters? Is it the nine dash line? Well, you haven't clarified what you mean by the nine dash line So we don't know so the lack of predictability again is is an ongoing problem and dilemma um Here for china as a rule maker now it does help Symbolically though. So it's a good thing everybody up here I'm sure wants to encourage china to be more a part of the international system We're trying to encourage this kind of rulemaking participation and we're trying to figure out Where's the middle ground? How do you get to the happy medium? But they can't be rules at the expense of others And so that's why this western pacific naval symposium, which is one of the major de facto institutions in the maritime space across the end of pacific region Is an important opportunity for china to show that it is Interested in joining the rules and making those rules. It's a good sign symbolically We're about to host them for the very first time as a participant in the rim of the pacific naval exercise this summer So it was very important for china to join cues before the rim pack But again as I say this is not the incidence at sea agreement between the us and the soviet union the cold war Those were serious professional Maritime documents that apply to surface in air Domains not to submarines by the way. Why u.s. Submariners didn't want any rules In the stealthy sub subsurface. That's another issue altogether. So, you know, there are rules and you know When you make the rules you can kind of make the rules Cover the issues that you want to cover And and the fact is that frankly subsurface surface and air And as I mentioned cyber and space are all going to be more competitive and in in sort of in the years ahead in these issues We you know, we also talked touched on earlier The exclusive economic zone and the interpretations differ between china and the united states when it comes to naval activity within the 200 nautical mile limits China has a minority view on this that's shared by a few other countries that it's pushing But it's doing so within the scope of international law That is it's our chinese interpretation that you should not be able to conduct spine essentially inside our 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone Because unclaws the u.n. Conventional law to see says that you have to pay due regard to coastal countries And the americans and most the other nations who Follow unclaws even though we haven't ratified it Blight on us, but nonetheless, we follow as an executive law unclawed principles and in customary law And we think that no you're allowed to conduct this kind of peaceful activity We think peaceful activity not hostile activity Inside the ez and other countries are allowed to do it within ours As they did during the cold war. Anyway, so this is a long way of saying that China's a partial rule maker. It's conditional. It is seeking power projection as much as rules It's it's seeking greater influence. It's also seeking to keep the outside world the periphery calm by peripheral diplomacy Is is is more important than some of the global rulemaking that the united states is interested in I could if there were time talk as well about some of the cyber I will just mention that it's interested that the multilateral aspects of chinese cyber policy Are with like-minded countries. So the recent agreement that China was pursuing Was with Tajikistan Russia And and one other I've forgotten But the but in any event more like-minded countries on this issue and they've resisted kind of strong us-china cyber rules of the road, but it is a contentious issue It will be hot for dear questions. Thank you very much I just want to Thank the panelists for allowing me to sit here comfortably and not get up with my little two minute sign They they did that voluntarily. I'm not an intimidating person. They just they did that. So thank you very much Which leaves us about 15 minutes for questions And we we have the usual rule that oriana Articulated earlier. I identify yourself first. We have might wait for the mic identify yourself and ask your question Where I can't oh, okay It's presupposes. I can see the hand so put them up Now good. Good morning. My name is rosemary. It's a girl I'm trying to ask about the china Relationship with africa and the rule of law into africa since we are talking about the world How does how do you look at that and the long-term relationship or partnership with africa and china? Looking at business and the humanity and security. How do you look at that and how is How can africa or china? Getting to that relationship looking at a long time because many times china is in africa and they are doing a great job in africa But when it comes to manpower you find they are bringing in their own manpower How do you make that as a rule of law to the african on other on the continent with china relationship? Thank you Anybody We'll go right. Sure. We can all talk a bit on this There's actually been a there was an interesting Project that ran for a number of years that I found quite intriguing It was sort of coordinated by the world bank and Working with the OECD and with an entity in china Basically trying to give china feedback on its involvement in africa So I think there were six african countries involved and there were a series of conferences and the idea was They started by by doing this Big study I guess of china's development and the lessons that it might have for africa And then after that They had these sessions where african countries got a chance to give china some of that the feedback that you're mentioning here, you know about for example Countries wanting to not have china bring in all the labor for projects and actually to use local labor or You know standards of worker safety other issues that you know at mines and so on I mean there's been the series of sort of controversy around some of these issues Um So that was a that I think was a was a useful exercise. Unfortunately the chinese entity that was involved in that wasn't An entity that was sort of in a position to do a lot I guess to change China's approach to some of these issues china is of course very sensitive about the criticism of some of its Its activities in africa The chinese I think sometimes have been accused of sort of neocolonialism which they they strongly Resist that characterization And china actually sees as a real Positive the fact that it goes in without any political preconditions Unlike the united states and other OECD countries Um It's It's also a topic that the u.s. And china are discussing. There is an effort to try to Get china to sign on to some of the OECD rules on development assistance for example And that's been part of the u.s. china's S&ED the strategic economic dialogue. There's a piece of that which has been looking at Development assistance and ways in which china can maybe start merging its practices or not merging but making its practices Accord better with the practices of other countries. So sorry, but robbie you have things to say I would just say that it's as you suggest It's it's changing quite rapidly china is has become a big power. It now has international worldwide interests and as it pursues them It's encountering some of the difficulties that america as a fellow large country has had And so it's having to revisit as you see in the ukraine where it has sacred principles on either side of that dilemma And so it keeps a distance and it Professes, you know these vague principles, but it doesn't get involved because suddenly it's discovering why The united states has always had what it calls double standards Because it has interests in a big complex evolving world with limited information And so china is a climatizing itself to this and you feel it In africa where yes initially china was very proud that for example in the south sudan that That it wasn't It didn't come in with political preconditions on the other hand the foreign minister wang yi I think just in either february or march when he was there did call for You know peaceful resolution. I thought that was a big move. That was a a slight adjustment to this policy I think it was positive. I think we should welcome it So it's it's changing china is discovering the Essential big country flexibility slash hypocrisy double standard if they wanted to call it and there's an acclimatization to that process In southeast asia as well where it's building high speed rail Also using mostly chinese labor the countries That are transited don't feel that they're getting the benefits that they should And so china had this wonderful soft power opportunity because it's it's extending really vital infrastructure in africa or southeast asia But then it doesn't get the south the soft power benefit in many cases because it tends to hold on too tightly But it is learning it's changing Well 10 years ago, and I was working with the chinese government trying to help them on adapting oecd rules They clearly were expressing a strong interest, but at the same time they revealed their Fragmented decision-making that is the bureaucratic politics who was in charge of the development policy The fact that state-owned enterprises might be making a key Sort of exploitation of resources in a country Would be driving policy and they wouldn't touch that But they clearly are interested and I think as robert has just suggested they've made a lot of progress in the last 10 years US policy has to continue to work with both developed countries oecd and developing countries to put pressure on china In a good way Give them incentives to be part of that and of decision-making at oecd and to and to make those rules They're more inclined to go along with these when they see some benefit Because they're not touching in as a general sense their direct core national interest their indirect interest sure about their economy But they see their enlightened self-interest The problem is when you have weak governance in a state and i'm thinking like south pacific islands forget about africa Where it's very tempting for a leader in a south pacific island To say just give me that one big infrastructure project. That's what I want and It's it's hard to get the transparency that you you would Want in an international development project so helping the international community and oecd Can work with developing countries to enforce transparency and raise those standards and I think china will keep keep moving in that direction Thank you How about right here denise Remember to introduce yourself, please Thank you. Don't worry with china the real news agency of hong kong. My question is for mr. Cronin You mentioned that as a rule maker He should be transparent. He should be credible but We often see that as a rule maker the united states policy actually has a lot of ambiguity for example In terms of the san kagu and gao u islands issue president obama just Affirm the u.s principle, but in terms of the detail he Failed short of Qualifying the detail of this issue how to defense the Diao yu island if there's any emergency over there So my question for you is As a variable rule maker how to keep the balance between the policy credit it and the Facibility, thank you Well, this is a panel about china as a rule maker So I'm restrained from spending my 12 minutes talking about the united states and its ability to be a rule maker a rule breaker But sure the united states is ambiguous at time to all policy makers in fact Prefer to have some executive ambiguity and leeway in policymaking if it's possible But at the same time I think the united states is making a concerted effort to strengthen And adapt an international system that we largely contributed to building post world war two And that includes an asia pacific through the united nations But also through institutions like the association of southeast asian nations And sometimes I think that the chinese approach to asian is to see it as a sand castle that they can kind of keep divided And it'll it'll be very weak and they can pick it apart Japan is a tough or not and when the united states sides with japan China's a very difficult position about how to press its claims and its influence The ambiguity you see over the senkaku islands Is the fact that the history is ambiguous I think president obama has done As much as possible for any american leader to articulate clearly what the us interest is He wants a peaceful resolution of the dispute and expects it But at the same time he acknowledges that It is under administrative control of japan and that our treaty stipulates that we will support Territories administered by japan. So he's stating all the facts He's talking about peace. He's looking for cooperation. He's encouraging japan to reach out to china We have a very strong u.s. china strategic dialogue But unfortunately these disputes are not going to be resolved. They have to be managed That's why the united states prefers serious risk production measures But as I mentioned in my talk china prefers to employ a bit of risk here to press its claims And doesn't really want to enter into a binding agreement with the japan in particular with the united states It's a bit different because they see us as co-equal sharing the pacific And they'd like to sort of enforce that principle that idea at least symbolically So it's a it's an important difficult problem china has legitimate claims But we don't know how to adjudicate those and it's not for the united states to say This is definitely japanese sovereignty, you know, but we can say definitely. This is the treaty This was the reversion treaty. This is our policy Um, and by the way, we want everybody to resolve this peacefully So let's make sure we figure out ways to do that Thank you. My name is john kong from china's hashi media We have been talking about rulemaking But I think the other as a very important aspect of rulemaking is rule enforcement So the u.s. Has been able to be a rule maker is partly thanks to its ability capability of rule enforcement So can you talk a little bit about the capability of china of enforce the rules whatever rules they want to make From this aspect to analyze this this issue and also I would like to hear about your Because I'm particularly interested in in in the breaks because I think among all the the platforms that susan laid out outlined their Greece perhaps has the biggest potential as a global Platform for china to sort of become a global player or Or global power compared to all the other more regional ones. So what have you seen? what kind of Vision have you seen that china developed developed through this platform. Thank you First I think we need in terms of china's ability to enforce rules I'm not sure if you mean enforce rules or defend interests that so I think we've got to Keep on the definitions of what we mean by rules and international rules in particular And in terms of enforcement, uh, let's give a very brief answer and then kick it over I think it's it's interesting in a lot of in many cases. We see that the united states and china While both talk a fairly strong Multilateral game both for different reasons are not inclined to give up any sovereignty In order to strengthen international enforcement mechanisms china has your sort of turn to run this this idea The united states again for different notions for different reasons You see this in the senate in particular is not inclined to yield power Which is seen as sovereignty to international organizations for enforcement purposes And this this is something that we have in common I mean just on on enforcement. Obviously, this is a huge issue internally in china This question of trying to enforce anything And that's a problem. I mean it's interesting when we're talking about rulemaking This conference is about rulemaking in the international environment But robert was robert was saying, you know, you sort of start with the domestic environment and then you move out and You know and internally china as we know has tremendous problems with rulemaking and rule enforcement because of issues of overlapping jurisdiction different levels of Of authoritativeness of the different regulations and laws that come out The power of local Governments to sort of push back and pick and choose about which rules they want to follow which ones they don't and so on But when it gets to the international level of I guess is your question about you know enforcing rules that china's made is china then able to enforce And I guess what we're saying is that china hasn't made a lot of rules In the world it's it's sort of gradually cautiously easing towards the position where it would be starting to make more rules But it's not really then china's if it's if something like this the shanhai cooperation organization I mean that's an organization where china has been very active in developing the rules of that organization And You know then enforcing those rules. I think it's probably a matter of the like, you know those countries being like-minded countries and and and and Being committed to the same set of goals. So therefore that maybe isn't such an issue of enforcement Sorry, that's a bit of a waffle Just a brief different point on my concern would be the lack of international enforcement I think there's a dissipation Of enforcement that is the united states has less capacity perhaps less interest In other countries including the bricks have not yet stepped up because of a lot of reasons To this but they will protect their interests. So we see in krania. We see chemical weapons in syria. We see Sanctions not followed against north korean proliferation. There are lots of challenges. How do we enforce the rules? Who's enforcing them and what I worry about is that if there's no enforcement There's a great incentive to break the rules not from china necessarily but from others as we see with russia I think in ukraine You know, I see a lot of hands rising, but it's noon and Lunch calls So let me try and draw this excellent panel to oppose, you know in some ways. I think I've been trying to think of ways to extend orionis marriage analogy and it's i'm just going to drop that Thank you very much But I see this as a transition to this afternoon's panel I mean susan actually did identify some areas where china is making rules and and to go to the marriage This is where the couples go to separate rooms and decorate the room that way they want right the sco, you know The heck with you. I'm going somewhere else Robert I thought was more how hard this is for china and and in many ways as it is for the united states We're both exceptional countries. We have very different but very powerful histories that shape our Approach to the world and then patrick. I think more Expressing the skepticism that I expressed initially about how Difficult this is when the married couple really has to deal with one another. There's just a real a real problem there So so it's a nice transition into this afternoon's Session on china's a rule breaker I am first of all, I want to thank you know We've extolled the beauty of the room the the wisdom of the agenda. I agree with all of that I'd like to thank the institute of peace for electronics that are unobtrusive and work And and even though this is the information age and you'd think that would go without saying it often Doesn't go that way If we're going to continue this marriage metaphor through the day I would like to interject that it was an arranged marriage There was no courtship. We didn't fall in love. We didn't choose each other It was circumstantial and we went to the bridal chamber as strangers and there were surprises And so it's still in unfolding. So I don't know how long how far we want to push this this afternoon's moderator You're entirely excused from picking this issue up ever again Now too Okay, I am enjoying to tell you that to get to lunch it's out back door So you come down and out to the right and those doors are just opening right now. Thank you to the panelists That was excellent