 A very good afternoon to everyone and welcome to a historic panel. This is historic because to the best of our knowledge, a dedicated panel on the future of militaries has never ever taken place in the World Economic Forum. So you're pressing that creation first but not the last. You will have seen from the program that we put much more emphasis this year on geopolitics, international security, and the phenomenon of geo-economics, which is the intersection between global political change and global economic change. That's no coincidence because we have just lived through a year that many has described as a geopolitical annual horribilis. We have seen both an exacerbation of problems related to asymmetric threats like the growth of the Islamic State in the Middle East. But we also see in the return of strategic competition between key players, for instance over the conflict in Ukraine. Just remind the audience that exactly a year ago when we were ending Davos, there were political troubles in Ukraine but no fighting. So all of that has happened over the last year and likewise in many parts of the world we're seeing a world that is more conflictual than it has been in a long time. So that's a major theme in many panels and I see many people who have attended other panels in the same vein. You know, this panel is on the future of militaries. So it's on the implication of these broader geopolitical security trends on the military profession and on military choices and on military leadership and on the leadership of those entrusted with overseeing how militaries are run, prepared, trained, how investments are made. And that's the part of it which is innovative to the World Economic Forum. But so far the impression has been that this is an area in which there's a lot of interest in many of our communities because these things intersect with each other in completely new ways. We have a remarkable panel here this afternoon. We have people with live experience from conflicts, some of them ongoing in their own country. To start with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Rosh Shavaz, who has a distinguished political career in Iraq, but who has also been commander of the Peshmerga. And the Peshmerga are among those around the front line in the battle against IS on the ground. Others are in the air. They are on the ground in the battle against the Islamic State. We have Minister Pinsan Bueno, Juan Carlos Pinsan Bueno, who is Minister of National Defense of Colombia, another country who hopefully is on its way out of an internal military conflict that has been going on for, I guess, long before you were born. Not only because you were a young man, but also because the conflict has been going on for a long time. We look very much forward to hear your perspectives. Professor Joe Nye, renowned thinker on hard security, soft security, no sort of hard power, soft power and smart power, but also somebody with a background from military leadership as he has been Assistant Secretary of Defense in the U.S. during the Clinton administration. Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, who again, a long-distinguished career in German diplomacy, no head of the Munich Security Conference, which is upcoming in a couple of weeks, and Vice Admiral Kurt Tidd, who is Assistant to the Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff and represents the American military, has also been here with Secretary Kerry, and we very much appreciate that you were able to stay on and be with us in this panel. So that's the cost. And I would like to start, maybe, with the Deputy Prime Minister, also because you are, as we said, that battlefront. What lessons for the future of the militaries and the present, of course, in your case, are you drawing from what's going on right now in the battle of IS that the rest of us would like to learn something about? Well, first of all, I have to speak frankly about the situation in Iraq. We are facing many challenges. The most important challenges are tackling the terrorism, the fight which is going on in Iraq. The humanitarian problems which we had, we had to deal with a huge number of refugees, almost two million people inside Iraq. Some of them are from Syrian, other are internal people from the areas of Mosul, Tikrit, Amba, Samara, the Sunni regions, especially, and beside the other challenges, which are mainly the heritage of the previous dictator regime of Saddam Hussein. And beside all of that, the main problem in Iraq now is the oil prices. Because of the oil prices, the budget of the Iraqi budget is lower to mostly about 60%. Now we have to deal with 40% of the revenues which were awaited for this year. So this means in general that Iraq to tackle the terrorism very effectively needs economic help. This is one of the main realities in Iraq. Secondly, the Iraqi security forces, especially after the collapse in June 2014 in Mosul, the Iraqi army and the police forces, all they need to be reorganized from the beginning, oriented and equipped. The main duty is to be successful, to gain victory against the terrorists. I don't want to call them the Islamic State because they are not Islamic State, they are terrorists in general. But the militias who are working and supporting the Iraqi government in this moment, they have also to be controlled through the governmental institutions and put in line with the benefit of the country in the direction of helping to achieve reconciliation and mutual understanding among the component of the Iraqi community. Beside all of that, the Iraqi security institution, they have to cooperate much better with the Peshmerga forces who are fighting in the north and at the same time, they have to coordinate with the alliance, with the coalition forces and take benefit from the opportunity that there are a lot of people who are trying to help them and train them. In Kurdistan, the Peshmerga are fighting very severely, but they are effective. It is not an exaggeration if I say the only force who have gained some victory against Daesh people, against the terrorists and has broken their magic that they are undefeatable. And the Peshmerga has approved that. The Peshmerga now is very close to Mosul, but alone they cannot enter Mosul because of many reasons. First of all, Mosul is an urban center. It has to be studied very carefully how to deal with the problem of such a large city, how to deal with the such a population center. And at the same time, Mosul is a center of the Sunni Arab people. And this might, when the Peshmerga alone tries to attack Mosul or try to free Mosul then alone without the cooperation of the Arab Sunnis and without the cooperation of the Iraqi armies, this is almost impossible. Besides all of that, the Peshmerga, they are still not very equipped. They have some help. These are some weapons, some ammunition. But if you really want to tackle the terrorism, you need a real army in the region. And the Peshmerga, they are a reliable force. If the international community and Iraqi government itself tries to organize the Peshmerga as a real symmetric military force, then they can be a force which can tackle the terrorism in Iraq, even in Syria, and for a long period of time. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for bringing us up to date to some very harsh military realities in your region. Let's go to Minister Pilsson Bueno. We talked a little bit yesterday, and we talked about the challenges related to dealing with a present conflict, while at the same time planning for the near and the more long-term future. Share some of those thoughts with us, please. Well, first I would like to comment that if you look at the context of Colombia, 15 years ago, for many experts the country was almost called a failed state. And I think the most important institutions that really helped contribute to turn around the country was precisely the armed forces. Our armed forces were built up in a way that we were able to start protecting the people, recovering territorial control, fighting crime, the sources of violence like drug trafficking, kidnapping and other kinds of crime. And with a very strong cooperation, but I would say at the same time, very low-cost cooperation from the U.S. as compared to what they have done in other parts. But it really created the possibility to create the environment in which we are right now. When we did all that build up, what we wanted was at the end to bring peace to the Colombian people. What we have now is a process in which the consequence of our military and police successes and the degrading of terrorist organizations have allowed President Santos to lead the idea of a peace process. And that is credible, that hopefully is visible, and in which we're moving forward. That puts me on this discussion, on the future of the military and in our case our police, because in the Colombian case it's in the same shop of the Ministry of Defense. So we have been planning in three different avenues that somehow have been, you know, being planned in parallel, but they are overlapping already because of the way events are happening. So the first line of thought was how do we plan for the present? How do we push enough first the terrorist groups and their sources of funding to put them in a position that they cannot have a different alternative than going into a negotiating process? That's where we are. We haven't finished. So we need to keep the pace, we need to keep the success and we need to keep specially giving confidence to the people and to investors that have come to the country, that have turned around the economy, that have created jobs in order to really move forward. So that's our first effort. Second, most of the Colombian people is asking these days not anymore for protection against war, which is now happening just in 9% of the total territory as compared to 50% 15 years ago. But people is asking now for the same things people will ask in any city of the world, street crime protection. I mean they want to feel secure. So we have been able in this initiative of the present to launch a street crime or what we call citizen security policy in order to strengthen the national police, strengthen security tools, technology cameras and other capabilities, even the attorney general office to really offer the people now this new level of security that they are asking. Then we have a second line of planning. So it's what we call transition. The question is if we sign a peace agreement and we keep pushing for that and that's the national strategy as we speak, what is important is that the day after we really have a plan that guarantees a very orderly process of demobilization, disarmament, reintegration and at the same time tackling other issues like even the security of those who are demobilizing and other types of efforts related. We create a joint command led by a force general that is dedicated with an interagency and as I said join effort with the other services to plan on this and to be part even of the ending phase of the negotiation as long as we're able to get there. So I think that's another important signal. And finally we have a third line of planning. She's thinking for the future. How are we going to shape the armed forces for what comes next? So first of all, we have to look at this on two visions. One, our internal issues and second, how can we contribute to peace and stability in a region and in the world as a major interest? So when we think internally, the first challenge we will have is to tackle those crimes that will still continue beyond the peace process. I mean drug trafficking, criminal mining, extortion will just not vanish. It might continue there. So we will have to guarantee that we have the national police and the armed forces that can tackle that depending on the region, depending on how we do things. Second, there is a major issue for a country like Colombia. Colombia and in general terms Latin America, particularly ending countries Brazil, we are very well endowed with natural resources, with sorts of water and with biodiversity in general terms. Those three things might appear one of the things that are more valuable if you think 50 years from now, starting even now. So we have to plan our armed forces to become more environmental friendly, if I can put it that way, and to really be close to this national endowment that is very important for our future and certainly for the future of our people. Then strengthening national police, that is critical. That's what we see for the future. If we were able to get here, the only thing we cannot do is weaken the armed forces, weaken the national police on the country, is strengthening these capabilities, considering budgetary constraints, but it's strengthening these capabilities what will offer that sustainability of peace. Certainly border control. I mean we have been for a long time not providing that kind of border control and that has a lot for smuggling weapons, drug trafficking and other situations, so we have to look how to do that. And finally is our international approach. What we see in our case is that we never wanted the experience we have, but we now have it. And suddenly when we come to these international discussions, it appears that one of the most important challenges everybody is facing is what you might call a rural warfare or asymmetric threats. Well, that's what we learned to do somehow. So that experience is already being offered to the world by different ways. First we have been training in the past five years 18,000 police and military out of 63 nations. Most of them certainly from our region, Central America, the Caribbean and other parts. So that's a way to contribute to stability. And on the other side we have been signing agreements with the European Union. Next week we will sign an agreement with United Nations for peace missions and that kind of cooperation. My impression, our impression after this study, because this is a consequence of a large analysis we're involved in, is that in the coming future, even today, no nation, and I would say even the U.S. can tackle problems alone. So cooperation is the issue, it's the way of doing things. And certainly peace and stability in the world is a matter of importance for a country like Colombia, certainly for its own internal peace, certainly for what is required, I think among nations. Thank you very much, Minister. Let's move to Professor Nye, whom I also mentioned had been key policymaker, assistant secretary of the fence in the biggest armed forces in the world. But still an armed force that has to make choices because being big doesn't mean that you don't have to make some serious choices. If you were asked by the President right now to say what are the main issues for the U.S. military or the future, where would you start? Well, I think the hardest thing for a large country military like the U.S. is for the military to ask, what kind of war are we planning for? And you know, we go in cycles of conventional beliefs of what the next war, there may never be another Iraq, there will never be another Vietnam, so on and so forth. The answer is we don't know, and we're often wrong when we make these predictions. Twenty years ago, I think it was a British general who said we're now fighting fourth generation warfare. He was commanding in Bosnia. He said it's war among the peoples. It's not large military units confronting each other. It's war among the people. When you might say we're really in a fifth generation warfare, it's almost war without people. Drones, cyber, you know, where are the people? Not near the battlefront. They're all the receiving end of the drones. Well, then the receiving end, and somebody has to push the button, but it's a very different concept than Napoleon getting his phalanxes in the right positions. We talk now about hybrid warfare, which is, if you look at Gaza in 2006 or Ukraine today, it's really a mixture of covert military units with political units struggling to control the message. So you're mixing your propaganda with your fighting in ways in which you're trying to accomplish what your real objective is, is a political objective, and how you mix the battling with the propaganda. So the short answer then is if you ask if the President says, I have to cut my defense budget or I want to save money, what do I do? Don't make the mistake we made after Vietnam where we deliberately unlearned the lessons of counterinsurgency. I'm not in favor of coined, but I'm just saying to think that you will never need it again would be a grave mistake. You do have to basically have a wide portfolio of capabilities and particularly if you can't predict what kind of war you're going to be in and you may be involved in many, you're going to have to build a portfolio which allows you to deal with a lot of contingencies which you hope you won't have to deal with. And in that sense, I think I've just written a book called Is the American Century Over It? And I think my answer is no, and I think American military power will be preeminent for quite some time, but it only will be preeminent if you learn how to use it without other instruments and don't make the mistake of thinking you know what the shape of future war is. So a good military planner has to have a very broad horizon. Thank you very much Professor Nile. Let's go to Ambassador Ishinger. Two weeks you'll have the Munich Security Conference and you've had that now for 50 plus years. I think not you personally, but the conference has been there. Which means of course the main issues of the day are always debated. Can you help us with extracting some of the mega trends when it comes to how conflict is involving and how the battlefield is changing? Well Espen, you made the most important point at the beginning and I think Professor Nile just underlined that also. The difficulty is to predict what's going to happen next. A year ago today as you were conducting this conference and as we were in the last stages of preparing Munich, not one person, and I was talking to many here in this room, not one person in mid-January of last year told me that I should stage the debate about Ukraine as a debate about the failure, the breakdown of European security. Everybody said let's have some of these actors from Ukraine, you know, Klitschko and hopefully some of the rebels. This is a debate, this is a conflict in Ukraine. This was a year ago. Now it is a European conflict, maybe even a global challenge. And the same of course is true with the so-called Islamic State etc. In other words, we have no choice. Professor Nile just made the point, our militaries have to be prepared for all sorts of contingencies. We can not only prepare for territorial defense for a while, some of us in Europe thought that was over completely. Now we are rediscovering that the core task of NATO should still be an important part of our agenda. But again, not the only one. We also need to prepare for the kinds of modern variants like hybrid warfare, insurgency situations etc. Now, if it is true that most of the conflicts that we will be looking at will tend to be more conflicts within countries than classic conflicts between state A and state B trying to send tank armies against each other, then it is going to be generally more difficult than in the past to end a conflict. World War II in Europe was ended by the Nazis surrendering and the Allies occupying. And that was that. That definitely ended that war. Ending a war like the one you are engaged in, I believe is much harder because you are not likely to have some kind of official surrender. So the question of how you can create a sustainable, lasting political solution in these difficult circumstances is I think the big challenge. What does that require? It requires that our militaries need to be trained highly intelligently. They need to understand the environment. They need to be engaged in either themselves or with other parts of our institutions in civil elements, reconstruction, nation building. I don't want to be too long here, but in Europe we believe and we continue to believe in deterrence as a major instrument of preventing conflict. When I look at some of these conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere, maybe preventive nation building to prevent countries from becoming failed states, to prevent countries from being so weak that they cannot deal with insurgent groups is also important. In other words, these non-military aspects of post-conflict rehabilitation, nation building and pre-conflict preventive financial, political, social and other methods of soft intervention are also very important. Let me make one final point. In Europe, for the 28 members of the European Union, the future of the military will not work, will not produce meaningful results unless we are willing to make concessions on the principle of sovereignty. We need to accept the fact that if we keep lowering our defense budgets, the only way to have capable fighting forces is if we pool and share. Effectively pooling and sharing means that you're going to have to rely on your ally that he will be with you. In other words, that you have joint decision making, and that's a hard thing to do. So for the 28 members of the European Union, pooling and sharing and discussing the question how we can move into a more joint decision-making apparatus, respecting our parliamentary caveats and prerogatives, that's really a huge political task for coming years. Thank you, Wolfgang. I think the message from the panel so far to you representing the soldiers and sailors is that we want you to be best at everything at the same time. Back in the Cold War, we were happy as long as you were deterring Third World War. That was kind of easy and it worked. And then we asked you to do OOTW, which was operations other than war, or which some American soldiers said operations other than what I signed up for. And now I think you have to do a little bit of both. How does that look from your perspective? I think I would contest the argument. I think we have always been expected to deal with whatever card was put on the table at any time in history. And as has already been pointed out, our ability to predict what may be coming with a high degree of accuracy is almost 100% imperfect. So we do need to be able to prepare forces that are able to deal with a wide range. The types of adversaries, I think we're all in agreement, expand the range of nation-states engaged in conventional nation-on-nation combat operations. It could be nation-states engaged in hybrid or proxy warfare, employing either direct proxies or sometimes employing the services of transnational organized criminal networks. And we also have to deal with the phenomena of heavily ideologically motivated terrorist networks. And so in order to deal with that wide range of contingencies, modern militaries will have to retain the ability to engage in high-end nation-state war-on-war, state-on-state warfare. For two reasons, principally, one, if you retain that capability, that serves as a strong deterrent of nations perhaps miscalculating or engaging in dangerous activities that could lead to that kind of a conflict. Secondly, if you purport to be an exporter of security, an exporter of the ability to train and equip other countries, you have to show that you are proficient in that type of warfare. So we place a high priority on, regardless of the degree of technology that it's employed and regardless of the advanced futuristic types of concepts, the small unit infantry tactics, the dirty, bloody, difficult end of the business, you have to prove that you can master or you won't be effective. But I think as we look to the future and particularly as we look to the development of military leaders, we have discovered that we must make sure that we develop the kind of leaders that have the intellectual agility and certainly the flexibility of doctrine and of procedures to be able to work not just with other military services. That was the big argument 30 years ago. But to be able to work very, very effectively with the full spectrum of the national security enterprise. So that means military forces being able to communicate effectively and understand and work with law enforcement organizations, intelligence organizations, professional diplomats, as well as in many instances, non-governmental organizations that we find all around the world. So it is a difficult challenge but we have found over the last 10 years that we have been able to blend those kinds of capabilities into very effective networks that we can lay down on top of these adversary networks, that we can work very, very closely with international partners who also have developed a high degree of expertise, as is the case with Columbia, that we are able to in some instances and in some countries help them as they try to develop the synapses between their interagency organizations to try and build the trust between law enforcement and intelligence community and the military. So that's where we're going. That's the direction that we need to go because this has already been pointed out. With today's global security challenges, there is no single country in the world that is able to deal with these challenges individually in isolation. We all have recognized this a long time ago and placed great importance on the ability to work effectively with partners. Which was also a major theme in the State of the Union address from President Obama. Are you actively trying to learn the lessons from, for instance, Columbia or the Peshmerman? I would say we have been learning the lessons and we've been working very closely with Columbia and we share a rich history of working together. And I would say in today's era we are learning as much or more from Columbia as perhaps we might have taught in the past. So they are an excellent exporter of security both within the region and as Minister Pinzon has pointed out, into West Africa and other places. So it's a good partnership. One of the thorny questions that the defense ministers in I think every country in the world struggles with, I've tried that myself in my own tenure, is how do you make the long term investment decisions given that the world changes as much as we just heard in one year? Because if you particularly if you're a smaller country, but even for the US, you will have it, sometimes you have to make a choice. Do you want to invest in a new frigate or a submarine? Or do you want more light special forces? And of course the, you know, your preferred answer is both. But if you have to make a choice, how do you know? Because the lead time is many years to take many, many years to build this equipment and take years to train people to do it, to run it. And then you will have it for 40 years until you have to decide whether you want to do it again or not. How do you make these decisions in such a volatile world? Open question. One of the vice... A former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once said, platforms aren't what you focus on. Your platforms will be around, but what's on the platforms, the information systems, those are going to change very rapidly. So invest in platforms which you can adapt and adapt quickly. So, you know, the B-52 has been around longer than Davos. But the B-52 today is not the B-52 of the 1960s. The same thing as you think of aircraft. It was an innovator just like Davos. Yeah, right, exactly it was. It's the continual change, but the continual application of information technology systems. So don't focus too much on the platform. Focus instead on the ability to keep adapting the platform. Should we open the floor for a quick question? It must be a quick question. We have very few minutes. But before I do that, just as a teaser, the next panel in this very room, just after this, is on the future of intelligence services. And I think there's some overlap in interest. You may want to stay so you can come back to this in the next panel. But for the military, the first question is here. Thank you. I'm Farid Yasin. I'm the Iraqi ambassador to France, which puts me in an interesting point of perspective. There is much more to the military than fighting. The military as an institution is in many countries a force for social cohesion. And that's a point that's being raised by many countries, including my own, and including France, where I currently reside. Because we've seen lots of people take a tangent and go off and become deadly insurgents elsewhere. And there is debate now in France, as there is in Iraq about reintroducing conscription as a measure of social cohesion, to ensure social cohesion. And I note that we're in Switzerland, which is the country par excellence of the citizens army and it's exemplary in its social cohesion. So my question to the panel is, what role do you see for the future military in terms of implementing, ensuring social cohesion in countries? And what do you think conscription play a role in an ever increasingly specialized forces? Thank you. Great question. Please collect a few so the audience has a chance and Nari Woods will have the floor in a second. But I just want to recognize the presence of the Chief of Defence of Switzerland and thank him for his troops actually making it possible for us to be here. And the people who are protecting the outer perimeter are actually largely conscripts. So that's part of the answer to your question, I guess. Over here. Hello, I'm Amanda Ellis, the New Zealand Ambassador to the UN in Geneva. You mentioned the importance of working with a range of actors, including international diplomats. For those of us who are now on the Security Council, tell us what we can be doing to support you helping create a safer world. Okay, one more question. I can't see it. Yeah, right there. Gideon Rose. Gideon Rose, Editor of Foreign Affairs. In the last year we've seen Russia invade Crimea, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and Western sanctions applied in response. Taken as a whole, has this experience undermined norms about the use of force and aggression or reinforced them? Great question. Thank you, Gideon. Okay, I'll have one more if there's somebody. General, no? Okay, let's go back to the panel. Yeah, there was one. You're there. Right there. Thank you. Noah Barkin at Reuters based in Berlin. I have a question for Mr. Ischinger. A year ago at the Munich Security Conference we had heard speeches from the German President, the German Defense Minister, the German Foreign Minister, calling for a more active German farm policy, a more muscular farm policy. Where are we a year later after Ukraine, the arming of the Kurds in Iraq? Okay, great. Thank you for those questions. Yeah, why don't we start with this? Okay, thank you. Thanks for the question. Well, there's good news and there's bad news. The bad news is that we have just released, actually, yesterday the results of a poll taken in Germany of, to what extent, Germans would support a more proactive, including more militarily proactive, foreign policy. The result does not lead to great euphoria. In other words, Germans apparently remain rather skeptical. At the same time, that's the good news, I think the debate in Munich last year started not only a broad discussion in Germany, it led to certain decisions and to certain policies, which without the start of this debate would not have happened. One is the delivery of certain types of weapons to the Peshmerga. Totally impossible to imagine a year ago. Second, the kind of, and I put it in quotes, in quotation marks, the kind of leadership role which Chancellor Merkel and our Foreign Minister have had to assume more or less in terms of how to deal with our Russian counterparts on the Ukrainian crisis. I think that is something which has been encouraged by this debate. So in other words, I think things have changed. Some of you may feel they haven't changed enough, but I think things are changing in the right direction. Great questions on social cohesion, as created by the military. You talked about the role of the military in taking a nation ahead, not only security, I think was what you mentioned, and the issue of conscript, who want to go in? I think we recognize historically there have been very, very important roles played by militaries in the role of social cohesion. The challenge that you will always run into is there is going to be a tension. Among the professional military, I suspect they will always prefer to have a professional military that can be highly trained, that has a degree of commitment to the mission that perhaps may be greater, and perhaps national leaders may find it easier to use professional militaries, because there won't be constrictions placed on where those military forces can be deployed to or how they may be employed. So there's going to be more flexibility. But that's not to say that there's not an important role to be played, and I think we all recognize that the more members of certainly a democracy understand exactly what is at stake, exactly what the price to be paid for enjoying the types of freedoms and liberties that we enjoy, the stronger the democracy will be. So it's a tension. We have exactly three more minutes and three more speakers to come with their final comment. Can I give a one-minute answer then to Gideon's question about norms? If there had been no response to the taking of a neighbor's territory by force, which profoundly violates the 1945 settlement, then I think the norm would have been damaged. The fact that we've had sanctions, the fact that they're having an effect, I mean oil price makes some important difference, but even before that, Putin was being cut off from the sources of Western technology he needs for frontier oil and gas. Instead, he's becoming China's gas station, which is not where he wants to be. He's destroyed the prospects for his Eurasian Union, and he's done something which we couldn't do if we tried, which is solidified NATO as we saw at Wales. So if you ask, is this man a brilliant strategist? No, he's a disastrous strategist. He's a brilliant tactician, but his tactics have included, unsuspectingly, reinforcement of the 1945 norm rather than destruction of it. And just a very quick 10 seconds on the UN Security Council. Never underestimate the importance of the United Nations peacekeeping forces. They're not perfect. They have all sorts of problems, but when the world gets into a mess in some area and can't figure it out, the presence of UN peacekeepers is extraordinarily important. Thank you very much for that. Before I get the floor to Pins on One, I just want to point out that in your answer, which I think is a good answer to that question, you also suggest one of the reasons why we're interested in geoeconomics, because actually the response to a military attack if in all practical purposes has been in the economic realm, which of course matters to the members because it means the return of the active use of economic instruments for strategic political means. And then we can reflect on that in future panels. Pins on One. There's some final observations on things that we have been doing in the present that I believe are important for the future listening to the discussion and to the questions. First, giving capabilities other than military to the armed forces is very important. Capabilities to giving building capacity or supporting natural disasters. I think that gives credibility, legitimacy, and at the same time certainly there are platform, a logistical platform that anyone else can match, at least in a country like mine and I believe in many countries. Second, education, military education. I think that is critical. The kind of problems the world is going to confront as Professor Nye very well described are unexpected. You never know. But the only way you can tackle those is if you have a cadre of professionals, in this case military professionals that are educated beyond their own technical or military responsibilities. So in our case right now I have more military than ever sewing in different universities in the world around 60, 65 officers and we're trying to increase that. That's a little bit of an effort that I believe is going to be important for the future. Third, understanding that we have to merge the capabilities of the military and the police and that's critical. At least on asymmetric challenges. When you go and try to confront the problem with a military, suddenly they will find that they are fighting crime or at least sources of violence that are related to crime. So we need a military that can be effective on policing but or a police that can have some kind of military capabilities at least in the short term to confront issues. I might have more but many times constraining. Sorry for that. So the last minister for Deputy Prime Minister. Thank you. Very shortly, in the beginning as we started the democratic process in Iraq the main idea of the main forces of the Iraqi population was to keep the army out of the interior conflicts to limit the activities in the defending the country from the threats which are coming from outside. But the crimes of the terrorists since 2004 or 2005 have turned that all over. So we were forced to use the army inside the country and here is the point. Here we should think that the army shouldn't be a tool of one component in the interior conflicts because it is very very high how to distinguish a terrorist from another people who have another idea or is opposing the policy of the government. That's why just to keep the army in a right way inside the country and having an effective role to tackling the terrorism there should be a political stability in the country. There should be a mutual understanding between the components of the Iraqi population on the basis of real partnership and equality. Thank you very much, Deputy Prime Minister. Thank you to all of you for an excellent panel and as I said there's no reason to leave because next panel is in quarter an hour future of intelligence services which will also be a very interesting panel. Thank you very much and thank you for your attention.