 Chapter 6 of Democracy in America, Volume 1 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Anna Simon. Democracy in America, Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville, translated by Henry Reeve. Chapter 6 Judicial Power in the United States Chapter Summary The Anglo-Americans have retained the characteristics of judicial power which are common to all nations. They have, however, made it a powerful political organ. How? In what the judicial system of the Anglo-Americans differs from that of all other nations? Why the American judges have the right of declaring the laws to be unconstitutional? How they use this right? Precautions taken by the legislator to prevent its abuse. Judicial power in the United States and its influence on political society. I have thought it essential to devote a separate chapter to the judicial authorities of the United States, lest their great political importance should be lessened in the reader's eyes by a merely incidental mention of them. Confederations have existed in other countries beside America, and republics have not been established upon the shores of the New World alone. The representative system of government has been adopted in several states of Europe, but I am not aware that any nation of the globe has hitherto organized a judicial power on the principle now adopted by the Americans. The judicial organization of the United States is the institution which at Stranger has the greatest difficulty in understanding. He hears the authority of a judge invoked in the political occurrences of every day, and he naturally concludes that in the United States the judges are important political functionaries. Nevertheless, when he examines the nature of the tribunals, they offer nothing which is contrary to the usual habits and privileges of those bodies, and the magistrates seem to him to interfere in public affairs of chance, but by a chance which recurs every day. When the parliament of Paris remonstrated or refused to earn register and edict, or when its summit of functionary accused of malversation to its bar, its political influence as a judicial body was clearly visible, but nothing of the kind is to be seen in the United States. The Americans have retained all the ordinary characteristics of judicial authority, and have carefully restricted its action to the ordinary circle of its functions. The first characteristic of judicial power in all nations is the duty of arbitration, but rights must be contested in order to warrant the interference of a tribunal, and an action must be brought to obtain the decision of a judge. As long therefore as the law is uncontested, the judicial authority is not called upon to discuss it, and it may exist without being perceived. When a judge in a given case attacks a law relating to that case, he extends the circle of his customary duties without however stepping beyond it, since he is in some measure obliged to decide upon the law in order to decide the case. But if he pronounces upon a law without resting upon a case, he clearly steps beyond his sphere and invades that of the legislative authority. The second characteristic of judicial power is that it pronounces on special cases and not upon general principles. If a judge in designing a particular point destroys a general principle by passing a judgment which tends to reject all the inferences from that principle, and consequently to annul it, he remains within the ordinary limits of his functions. But if he directly attacks a general principle without having a particular case in view, he leaves the circle in which all nations have agreed to confine his authority. He assumes a more important and perhaps a more useful influence than that of the magistrate, but he ceases to be the representative of the judicial power. The third characteristic of the judicial power is its inability to act unless it is appealed to or until it has taken cognizance of an affair. This characteristic is less general than the other two, but notwithstanding the exceptions, I think it may be regarded as essential. The judicial power is by its nature devoid of action. It must be put in motion in order to produce a result. When it is called upon to repress a crime, it punishes the criminal. When a wrong is to be redressed, it is ready to redress it. When an act requires interpretation, it is prepared to interpret it, but it does not pursue criminals, hunt out wrongs, or examine into evidence of its own accord. A judicial functionary who should open proceedings and usurp the censorship of the laws would in some measure do violence to the passive nature of his authority. The Americans have retained these three distinguishing characteristics of the judicial power. An American judge can only pronounce a decision when litigation has arisen. He is only conversant with special cases, and he cannot act until the cause has been duly brought before the court. His position is therefore perfectly similar to that of the magistrate of other nations, and he is nevertheless invested with immense political power. If the sphere of his authority and his means of action are the same as those of other judges, it may be asked whence he derives a power which they do not possess. The cause of this difference lies in the simple fact that the Americans have acknowledged the right of the judges to found their decisions on the Constitution rather than on the laws. In other words, they have left them at liberty not to apply such laws as may appear to them to be unconstitutional. I am aware that a similar right has been claimed but claimed in vain by courts of justice in other countries. But in America it is recognized by all authorities, and not a party nor so much as an individual is found to contest it. This fact can only be explained by the principles of the American Constitution. In France the Constitution is, or at least is supposed to be, immutable, and the received theory is that no power has the right of changing any part of it. In England the Parliament has an acknowledged right to modify the Constitution. As therefore the Constitution may undergo perpetual changes it does not in reality exist. The Parliament is at once a legislative and a constituent assembly. The political theories of America are more simple and more rational. An American Constitution is not supposed to be immutable, as in France, nor is it susceptible of modification by the ordinary powers of society as in England. It constitutes a detached whole, which, as it represents the determination of the whole people, is no less binding on the legislator than on the private citizen, but which may be altered by the will of the people in predetermined cases according to established rules. In America the Constitution may therefore vary, but as long as it exists it is the origin of all authority and the sole vehicle of the predominating force. It is easy to perceive in what manner these differences must act upon the position and the rights of the judicial bodies in the three countries I have cited. If in France the tribunals were authorized to disobey the laws on the ground of their being opposed to the Constitution, the supreme power would in fact be placed in their hands, since they alone would have the right of interpreting a Constitution, the clauses of which can be modified by no authority. They would therefore take the place of the nation and exercise its absolute sway over society as the inherent weakness of judicial power would allow them to do. Undoubtedly, as the French judges are incompetent to declare a law to be unconstitutional, the power of changing the Constitution is indirectly given to the legislative body, since no legal barrier would oppose the alterations which it might prescribe. But it is better to grant the power of changing the Constitution of the people to men who represent, however imperfectly, the will of the people, than to men who represent no one but themselves. It would be still more unreasonable to invest the English judges with the right of resisting the decisions of the legislative body, since the parliament which makes the laws also makes the Constitution. And consequently a law emanating from the three powers of the state can in no case be unconstitutional. But neither of these remarks is applicable to America. In the United States the Constitution governs the legislature as much as the private citizen. As it is the first of laws it cannot be modified by a law, and it is therefore just that the tribunals should obey the Constitution in preference to any law. This condition is essential to the power of the Judicature for to select that legal obligation by which he is most strictly bound is the natural right of every magistrate. In France the Constitution is also the first of laws, and the judges have the same right to take it as the ground of their decisions. But were they to exercise this right they must perforce and crouch on rights more sacred than their own, namely on those of society in whose name they are acting. In this case the state motive clearly prevails over the motives of an individual. In America where the nation can always reduce its magistrates to obedience by changing its Constitution, no danger of this kind is to be feared. Upon this point therefore the political and the logical reasons agree, and the people as well as the judges preserve their privileges. Whenever a law which the judge holds to be unconstitutional is argued in a tribunal of the United States he may refuse to admit it as a rule. This power is the only one which is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to immense political influence. Few laws can escape the surging analysis of the judicial power for any length of time, for there are few which are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and none which may not be brought before a court of justice by the choice of parties or by the necessity of the case. But from the time that a judge has refused to apply any given law in a case, that law loses a portion of its moral cogency. The persons to whose interests it is prejudicial learn that means exist of evading its authority and similar suits are multiplied until it becomes powerless. One of two alternatives must then be resorted to. The people must alter the Constitution or the legislator must repeal the law. The political power which the Americans have interested to their courts of justice is therefore immense, but the evils of this power are considerably diminished by the obligation which has been opposed of attacking the laws through the courts of justice alone. If the judge had been empowered to contest the laws on the ground of theoretical generalities, if he had been enabled to open an attack or to pass a censure on the legislator, he would have played a prominent part in the political sphere. And as the champion or the antagonist of a party, he would have arrayed the hostile passions of the nation in the conflict. But when a judge contests a law applied to some particular case in an obscure proceeding, the importance of his attack is concealed from the public gaze. His decision bears upon the interest of an individual, and if the law is slighted, it is only collaterally. Moreover, although it is censured, it is not abolished. Its moral force may be diminished, but its cogency is by no means suspended, and its final destruction can only be accomplished by the reiterated attacks of judicial functionaries. It will readily be understood that by connecting the censorship of the laws with the private interests of members of the community and by intimately uniting the prosecution of the law with the prosecution of an individual, legislation is protected from wanton assailants and from the daily aggressions of party spirit. The errors of the legislator are exposed whenever their evil consequences are most felt, and it is always a positive and appreciable fact which serves as the basis of a prosecution. I am inclined to believe this practice of the American courts to be at once the most favorable to liberty as well as to public order. If the judge could only attack the legislator openly and directly, he would sometimes be afraid to oppose any resistance to his will, and at other moments party spirit might encourage him to brave it at every turn. The laws would consequently be attacked when the power from which they emanate is weak and obeyed when it is strong. That is to say, when it would be useful to respect them, they would be contested, and when it would be easy to convert them into an instrument of oppression, they would be respected. But the American judge is brought into the political arena independently of his own will. He only judges the law because he is obliged to judge a case. The political question which he is called upon to resolve is connected with the interest of the suitors, and he cannot refuse to decide it without abdicating the duties of his post. He performs his functions as a citizen by fulfilling the precise duties which belong to his profession as a magistrate. It is true that upon this system, the judicial censorship which is exercised by the courts of justice over the legislation cannot extend to all laws indiscriminately, in as much as some of them can never give rise to that exact species of contestation which has turned a lawsuit. And even when such a contestation is possible, it may happen that no one cares to bring it before a court of justice. The Americans have often felt this disadvantage, but they have left the remedy incomplete, lest they should give it an efficacy which might in some cases prove dangerous. Within these limits, the power vested in the American courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to be unconstitutional forms one of the most powerful barriers which has ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies. Other powers granted to American judges. In the United States, all the citizens have the right of indicting public functionaries before the ordinary tribunals. How they use this right. Article 75 of the French Constitution of the Year 8. The Americans and the English cannot understand the purpose of this clause. It is perfectly natural that in a free country like America, all the citizens should have the right of indicting public functionaries before the ordinary tribunals and that all the judges should have the power of punishing public offenses. The right granted to the courts of justice of judging the agents of the executive government when they have violated the laws is so natural a one that it cannot be looked upon as an extraordinary privilege. Nor do the springs of government appear to me to be weakened in the United States by the customs which renders all public offices responsible to the judges of the land. The Americans seem, on the contrary, to have increased by this means that respect which is due to the authorities and at the same time to have rendered those who are in power more scrupulous of offending public opinion. I was struck by the small number of political trials which occur in the United States but I had no difficulty in accounting for this circumstance. A lawsuit of whatever nature it may be is always a difficult and expensive undertaking. It is easy to attack a public man in a journal but the motives which can warrant an action at law must be serious. A solid ground of complaint must therefore exist to induce an individual to prosecute a public officer and public officers are careful not to furnish these grounds of complaint when they are afraid of being prosecuted. This does not depend upon the Republican form of American institutions for the same facts present themselves in England. These two nations do not regard the impeachment of the principal officers of state as a sufficient guarantee of their independence but they hold that the right of minor prosecutions which are within the reach of the whole community is a better pledge of freedom than those great judicial actions which are rarely employed until it is too late. In the Middle Ages when it was very difficult to overtake offenders the judges inflicted the most dreadful tortures on the few who were arrested which by no means diminished the number of crimes. It has since been discovered that when justice is more certain and more mild it is at the same time more efficacious. The English and the Americans hold that tyranny and oppression are to be treated like any other crime by lessening the penalty and facilitating conviction. In the year 8 of the French Republic a constitution was drawn up in which the following clause was introduced. Article 75. All the agents of the government below the rank of ministers can only be prosecuted for offenses relating to their several functions by virtue of a decree of the conseil d'état in which case the prosecution takes place before the ordinary tribunals. This clause survived the constitution de l'envite and it is still maintained in spite of the just complaints of the nation. I have always found the utmost difficulty in explaining its meaning to Englishmen or Americans. They were once led to conclude that the conseil d'état in France was a great tribunal established in the centre of the kingdom which exercised a preliminary and somewhat tyrannical jurisdiction in all political causes. But when I told them that the conseil d'état was not a judicial body in the common sense of the term but an administrative council composed of men dependent on the crown so that the king, after having ordered one of his servants, called a prefect to commit an injustice has the power of commanding another of his servants, called a councillor of state, to prevent the former from being punished. When I demonstrated to them that their citizen who has been injured by the order of the sovereign is obliged to solicit from the sovereign permission to obtain redress they refused to crowd it so flagrant in abuse and were tempted to accuse me of falsehood or of ignorance. It frequently happened before the revolution that a parliament issued a warrant against a public officer who had committed an offence and sometimes the proceedings were stopped by the authority of the crown which enforced compliance with its absolute and despotic will. It is painful to perceive how much lower we are sunk than our forefathers since we allow things to pass under the colour of justice and the sanction of the law which violence alone could impose upon them. End of Chapter 6 Definition of political jurisdiction what is understood by political jurisdiction in France, in England and in the United States In America the political judge can only pass sentence on public officers he more frequently passes a sentence of removal from office than a penalty Political jurisdiction as it exists in the United States is notwithstanding its mildness and perhaps in consequence of that mildness a most powerful instrument in the hands of the majority Political jurisdiction in the United States I understand by political jurisdiction that temporary right of pronouncing a legal decision with which a political body may be invested In absolute government no utility can accrue from the introduction of extraordinary forms of procedure The print in whose name an offender is prosecuted is as much the sovereign of the courts of justice and the idea which is entertained of his power is of itself a sufficient security The only thing he has to fear is that the external formalities of justice should be neglected and that his authority should be dishonoured from a wish to render it more absolute But in most free countries in which the majority can never exercise the same influence upon the tribunals as an absolute monarch the judicial power has occasionally been vested for a time in the representatives of the nation It has been thought better to introduce a temporary confusion between the functions of the different authority than to violate the necessary principle of the unity of government England, France and the United States have established this political jurisdiction by law and it is curious to examine the different adaptations which these three great nations have made of the principle In England and in France the House of Lords in the Chambre de Paris constitute the highest criminal court of their respective nations and although they do not habitually try all political offences, they are competent to try them all Another political body enjoys the right of impeachment before the House of Lords The only difference which exists between the two countries in this respect is that in England the Commons may impeach whosoever they please before the Lords while in France the deputies can only employ this mode of persecution against the ministers of the Crown In both countries the upper house may make use of all the existing penal laws of the nation to punish the delinquents In the United States as well as in Europe one branch of the legislature is authorised to impeach and another to judge The House of Representatives arraigns the offender and the Senate awards a sentence But the Senate can only try such persons as are brought before it by the House of Representatives and those persons must belong to the class of public functionaries Thus the jurisdiction of the Senate is less extensive than that of the peers of France while the right of impeachment by the representatives is more general than that of the deputies But the great difference which exists between Europe and America is that in Europe political tribunals are empowered to inflict all the dispositions of the penal code while in America when they have deprived the offender of his official rank and have declared him incapable of filling any political office for the future their jurisdiction terminates and that of the ordinary tribunals begins Suppose for instance that the President of the United States has committed the crime of high treason The House of Representatives impeaches him and the Senate degrades him He must then be tried by a jury which alone can deprive him of his liberty or his life This accurately illustrates the subject we are treating The political jurisdiction which is established by the laws of Europe is intended to try great offenders whatever may be their birth, their rank or their powers in the state and to this end all the privileges of the courts of justice are temporarily extended to a great political assembly The legislator is then transformed into the magistrate He is called upon to admit, to distinguish and to punish the offence and as he exercises all the authority of a judge the law restricts him to the observance of all the duties of that high office and of all the formalities of justice When a public functionary is impeached before an English or a French political tribunal and is found guilty the sentence deprives him ipso facto of his functions and it may pronounce him to be incapable of resuming them or any others for the future In this case the political interdict is a consequence of the sentence and not the sentence itself In Europe the sentence of a political tribunal is to be regarded as a judicial verdict rather than as an administrative measure In the United States the contrary takes place and although the decision of the Senate is judicial in its form since the Senators are obliged to comply with the practices and formalities of a court of justice although it is judicial in respect to the motives on which it is founded since the Senate is in general obliged to take an offence at common law as the basis of its sentence Nevertheless the object of the proceeding is purely administrative If it had been the intention of the American legislator to invest a political body with great judicial authority its action would not have been limited to the circle of public functionaries since the most dangerous enemies of the state may be in the possession of no functions at all and this is especially true in republics where party influence is the first of authorities and where the strength of many a reader is increased by his exercising no legal power If it had been the intention of the American legislator to give society the means of repressing state offences by exemplary punishment according to the practice of ordinary justice the resources of the penal code would all have been placed at the disposal of the political tribunals but the weapon with which they are entrusted is an imperfect one and it can never reach the most dangerous offenders since men who aim at the entire subversion of the laws are not likely to murmur at a political interdict The main object of the political jurisdiction which obtains in the United States is therefore to deprive the ill-disposed citizen of an authority which he has used amiss and to prevent him from ever acquiring it again This is evidently an administrative measure sanctioned by the formalities of a judicial decision In this matter the Americans have created a mixed system They have surrounded the act which removes a public functionary with the securities or political trial and they have deprived all political condemnations of their severest penalties Every link of the system may easily be traced from this point We'd once perceive why the American constitutions subject all the civil functionaries to the jurisdiction of the Senate whilst the military whose crimes are nevertheless more formidable are exempted from that tribunal In the civil service none of the American functionaries can be said to be removable The places which some of them occupy are inalienable and the others are chosen for a term which cannot be shortened It is therefore necessary to try them all in order to deprive them of their authority But military officers are dependent on the chief magistrate of the state who is himself a civil functionary and the decision which condemns him is a blow upon them all If we now compare the American and the European systems we shall meet with differences no less striking in the different effects which each of them produces or may produce In France and in England the jurisdiction of political bodies is looked upon as an extraordinary resource which is only to be employed in order to rescue society from unwanted dangers It is not to be denied that these tribunals as they are constituted in Europe are apt to violate the conservative principle of the balance of power in the state and to threaten incessantly the lives and liberties of the subject The same political jurisdiction in the United States is only indirectly hostile to the balance of power It cannot menace the lives of the citizens and it does not hover as in Europe over the heads of the community since those only who have submitted to its authority on accepting office are exposed to the severity of its investigations It is at the same time less formidable and less efficacious Indeed it has not been considered by the legislators of the United States as a remedy for the more violent evils of society but as an ordinary means of conducting the government In this respect it probably exercises more real influence on the social body in America than in Europe It must not be misled by the apparent mildness of the American legislation in all that relates to political jurisdiction It is to be observed in the first place that in the United States the tribunal which passes sentence is composed of the same elements and subject to the same influences as the body which impedes the offender and that this uniformity gives an almost irresistible impulse to the vindictive passions of parties If political judges in the United States inflict such heavy penalties as those of Europe there is the less chance of their acquitting a prisoner and the conviction if it is less formidable is more certain The principal object of the political tribunals of Europe is to punish the offender The purpose of those in America is to deprive him of his authority A political condemnation in the United States may therefore be looked upon as a preventive measure and there is no reason for restricting the judges the definitions of criminal law Nothing can be more alarming than the excessive latitude with which political offences are described in the Laws of America Article 2, Section 4 of the Constitution of the United States runs thus The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors Many of the constitutions of the states are even less explicit Public officers, such as the Constitution of Massachusetts shall be impeached for misconduct or mal-administration The Constitution of Virginia declares that all the civil officers who shall have offended against the state by mal-administration, corruption or other high crimes may be impeached by the House of Delicates In some constitutions, no offences are specified in order to subject the public functionaries to an unlimited responsibility But I will venture to affirm that it is precisely their mal-dness which renders the American Laws most formidable in this respect We have shown that in Europe, the removal of a functionary and its political interdiction are the consequences the penalty is to undergo and that in America, they constitute the penalty itself The consequence is that in Europe, political tribunals are invested with rights which they are afraid to use and the fear of punishing too much hinders them from punishing at all But in America, no one hesitates to inflict a penalty from which humanity does not recoil To condemn a political opponent to death in order to deprive him of his power is to commit what all the world would execrate as a horrible assassination But to declare that opponent unworthy to exercise that authority to deprive him of it and to leave him uninjured in life and limb may be judged to be the fair issue of the struggle But this sentence, which it is so easy to pronounce is not less fatally severe to the majority of those upon whom it is inflicted Great criminals may undoubtedly brave its intangible rigor but ordinary offenders will dread it as a condemnation which destroys their position in the world, casts a blight upon their honour and condemns them to a shameful inactivity worse than death The influence exercised in the United States upon the progress of society by the jurisdiction of political bodies may not appear to be formidable but it is only the more immense It does not directly coerce the subject but it renders the majority more absolute over those in power It does not confer an unbounded authority on the legislator which can be exerted at some momentous crisis but it establishes a temperate and regular influence which is at all times available If the power is decreased it can, on the other hand, be more conveniently employed and more easily abused By preventing political tribunals from inflicting judicial punishments the Americans seem to have eluded the worst consequences of legislative tyranny rather than tyranny itself and I am not sure that political jurisdiction as it is constituted in the United States is not the most formidable weapon which has ever been placed in the root grasp of a popular majority When the American republics begin to degenerate it will be easy to verify the truth of this observation by remarking whether the number of political impeachments augments End of chapter 7 This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org I have hitherto considered each state as a separate whole and I have explained the different springs which the people sets in motion and the different means of action which it employs but all the states which I have considered as independent are forced to submit in certain cases to the supreme authority of the Union The time has now come for me to examine separately the supremacy with which the Union has been invested and to cast a rapid glance over the federal constitution Chapter Summary Origin of the First Union Its Weakness Congress Appeals to the Constituent Authority Interval of two years between this appeal and the promulgation of the new constitution History of the Federal Constitution The thirteen colonies which simultaneously threw off the yoke of England towards the end of the last century professed as I have already observed the same religion, the same language, the same customs and almost the same laws They were struggling against a common enemy and these reasons were sufficiently strong to unite them one to another and to consolidate them into one nation But as each of them had enjoyed a separate existence and a government within its own control the peculiar interests and customs which resulted from this system were opposed to a compact and intimate Union which would have absorbed the individual importance of each in the general importance of all Hence arose two opposite tendencies the one prompting the Anglo-Americans to unite the other to divide their strength As long as the war with the mother country lasted the principle of union was kept alive by necessity and although the laws which constituted it were defective the common tie subsisted in spite of their imperfections But no sooner was peace concluded than the faults of the legislation became manifest and the state seemed to be suddenly dissolved Each colony became an independent republic and assumed an absolute sovereignty The federal government condemned to impudence by its constitution and no longer sustained by the presence of a common danger witnessed the outrages offered to its flag by the great nations of Europe whilst it was scarcely able to maintain its ground against the Indian tribes and to pay the interest of the debt which had been contracted during the war of independence It was already on the verge of destruction when it officially proclaimed its inability to conduct the government and appealed to the constituent authority of the nation If America ever approached for however brief a time that lofty pinnacle of glory to which the fancy of its inhabitants is wont to point it was at the solemn moment at which the power of the nation abdicated as it were the empire of the land All ages have furnished the spectacle of the people struggling with energy to win its independence and the efforts of the Americans in throwing off the English yoke have been considerably exaggerated Separated from their enemies by 3,000 miles of ocean and backed by a powerful ally the success of the United States may be more justly attributed to their geographical position than to the valor of their armies or the patriotism of their citizens It would be ridiculous to compare the American war to the wars of the French Revolution or the efforts of the Americans to those of the French when they were attacked by the whole of Europe without credit and without allies yet capable of opposing a 20th part of their population to the world and of bearing the torch of revolution beyond their frontiers whilst they stifled its devouring flame within the bosom of their country But it is a novelty in the history of society to see a great people turn a calm and scrutinizing eye upon itself when apprised by the legislature that the wheels of government are stopped to see it carefully examine the extent of the evil and patiently wait for two whole years until a remedy was discovered which it voluntarily adopted without having rung a tear or a drop of blood from mankind At the time when the inadequacy of the first constitution was discovered America possessed the double advantage of that calm which had succeeded the effervescence of the revolution and of those great men who had led the revolution to a successful issue The assembly which accepted the task of composing the second constitution was small but George Washington was its president and it contained the choicest talents and the noblest hearts which had ever appeared in the new world This national commission after long and mature deliberation offered to the acceptance of the people the body of general laws which still rules the union All the states adopted it successively The new federal government commenced its functions in 1789 after an interregnum of two years The revolution of America terminated when that of France began Summary of the federal constitution Division of authority between the federal government and the states The government of the states is the rule the federal government, the exception The first question which awaited the Americans was intricate and by no means easy of solution The object was so to divide the authority of the different states which composed the union that each of them should continue to govern itself in all that concerned its internal prosperity whilst the entire nation represented by the union should continue to form a compact body and to provide for the general exigencies of the people It was as impossible to determine beforehand with any degree of accuracy the share of authority which each of two governments was to enjoy as to foresee all the incidents in the existence of a nation The obligations and the claims of the federal government were simple and easily definable because the union had been formed to express purpose of meeting the general exigencies of the people But the claims and obligations of the states were, on the other hand complicated and various because those governments had penetrated into all the details of social life The attributes of the federal government were therefore carefully enumerated and all that was not included amongst them was declared to constitute a part of the privileges of the several governments of the states Thus the government of the states remained the rule and that of the confederation became the exception But as it was foreseen that, in practice questions might arise as to the exact limits of this exceptional authority and that it would be dangerous to submit these questions to the decision of the ordinary courts of justice established in the states by the states themselves a high federal court was created which was destined, amongst other functions to maintain the balance of power which had been established by the constitution between the two rival governments prerogative of the federal government power of declaring war making peace and levying general taxes vested in the federal government What part of the internal policy of the country had made direct? The government of the union, in some respects more central than the king's government in the old French monarchy The external relations of a people may be compared to those of private individuals and they cannot be advantageously maintained without the agency of a single head of a government The exclusive right of making peace and war of concluding treaties of commerce of raising armies and equipping fleets was granted to the union The necessity of a national government has imperiously felt in the conduct of the internal policy of society but there are certain general interests which can only be attended to with advantage by a general authority The union was invested with the power of controlling the monetary system of directing the post office and of opening the great roads which were to establish a communication between the different parts of the country The independence of the government of each state was recognized in its sphere Nevertheless, the federal government was authorized to interfere in the internal affairs of the states in a few predetermined cases in which an indiscreet abuse of their independence might compromise the security of the union at large Thus, whilst the power of modifying and changing their legislation at pleasure was preserved in all the republics they were forbidden to enact expost facto laws which would create a class of nobles in their community Lastly, as it was necessary that the federal government should be able to fulfill its engagements it was endowed with an unlimited power of levying taxes In examining the balance of power as established by the federal constitution in remarking on the one hand the portion of sovereignty which has been reserved to the several states and on the other the share of power which the union has assumed it is evident that the federal legislators entertained the clearest and most accurate notions on the nature of the centralization of government The United States formed not only a republic, but a confederation Nevertheless, the authority of the nation is more central than it was in several of the monarchies of Europe when the American constitution was formed Take, for instance, the two following examples Thirteen Supreme Courts of Justice existed in France, which, generally speaking had the right of interpreting the law without appeal and those provinces which were styled pae d'etat were authorized to refuse their assent to an impost which had been levied by the sovereign who represented the nation In the union there is but one tribunal to interpret, as there is one legislature to make, the laws and an impost voted by the representatives of the nation is binding upon all the citizens In these two essential points, therefore the union exercises more central authority than the French monarchy possessed although the union is only an assemblage of confederate republics In Spain, certain provinces had the right of establishing a system of custom house duties peculiar to themselves although that privilege belongs by its very nature In America the Congress alone has the right of regulating the commercial relations of the states The government of the confederation is therefore more centralized in this respect than the kingdom of Spain It is true that the power of the crown in France or in Spain was always able to obtain by force whatever the constitution of the country denied and that the ultimate result was consequently the same but I am here discussing the theory of the constitution Federal powers After having settled the limits within which the federal government was to act, the next point was to determine the powers which it was to exert Legislative powers Division of the legislative body into two branches Difference in the manner of forming the two houses The principle of the independence of the states predominates in the formation of the senate The principle of the sovereignty of the nation in the composition of the house of representatives Singular effects of the fact that a constitution can only be logical in the early stages of a nation The plan which had been laid down beforehand for the constitution of the several states was followed in many points in the organization of the powers The federal legislature of the union was composed of a senate and a house of representatives A spirit of conciliation prescribed the observance of distinct principles in the formation of these two assemblies I have already shown that two contrary interests were opposed to each other in the establishment of the federal constitution These two interests had given rise to two opinions It was the wish of one party to convert the union into a league of independent states or sort of congress at which the representatives of the several peoples would meet to discuss certain points of their common interests The other party desired to unite the inhabitants of the American colonies into one soul nation and to establish a government which should act as the soul representative of the nation as far as the limited sphere of its authority would permit practical consequences of these two theories were exceedingly different The question was whether a league was to be established instead of a national government whether the majority of the state instead of the majority of the inhabitants of the union was to give the law for every state, the small as well as the great would then remain in the full enjoyment of its independence and enter the union upon a footing of perfect equality If however the inhabitants of the United States were to be considered as belonging to one in the same nation it would be just that the majority of the citizens of the union should prescribe the law Of course the lesser states could not subscribe to the application of this doctrine without in fact abdicating their existence in relation to the sovereignty of the confederation since they would have passed from the condition of a co-equal and co-legislative authority an insignificant fraction of a great people but if the former system would have invested them with an excessive authority the latter would have annulled their influence altogether under these circumstances the result was that the strict rules of logic were evaded as is usually the case when interests are opposed to arguments A middle course was hit upon by the legislators which brought together by force two systems theoretically irreconcilable The principle of the independence of the states prevailed in the formation of the senate and that of the sovereignty of the nation predominated in the composition of the house of representatives It was decided that each state should send two senators to congress and a number of representatives proportion to its population It results from this arrangement that the state of new york has present day 40 representatives and only two senators The state of Delaware has two senators and only one representative The state of Delaware is therefore equal to the state of New York in the senate whilst the latter has 40 times the influence of the former in the house of representatives Thus if the minority of the nation preponderates in the senate it may paralyze the decisions of the majority represented in the other house which is contrary to the spirit of constitutional government These facts show how rare and how difficult it is rationally and logically to combine all the several parts of legislation In the course of time different interests arise and different principles are sanctioned by the same people and when a general constitution is to be established these interests and principles are so many natural obstacles to the rigorous application with all its consequences The early stages of national existence are the only periods at which it is possible to maintain the complete logic of legislation and when we perceive a nation in the enjoyment of this advantage before we hasten to conclude that it is wise we should do well to remember that it is young When the federal constitution was formed the interests of independence for the separate states of union for the whole people were the only two conflicting interests which existed among the Anglo-Americans and a compromise was necessarily made between them It is however just to acknowledge that this part of the constitution has not hitherto produced those evils which might have been feared All the states are young and contiguous their customs, their ideas and their exigencies are not dissimilar to those which result from their size or inferiority do not suffice to set their interests at variance The small states have consequently never been induced to lead themselves together in the senate to oppose the designs of the larger ones and indeed they are so irresistible in authority in the legitimate expression of the will of a people that the senate could offer but a feeble opposition to the vote of the majority must not be forgotten on the other hand that it was not in the power of the American legislators to reduce to a single nation the people for whom they were making laws The object of the federal constitution was not to destroy the independence of the states but to restrain it by acknowledging the real authority of the secondary communities and it was impossible to deprive them of it they disavowed beforehand the habitual use of constraint forcing the decisions of the majority upon this principle the introduction of the influence of the states into the mechanism of the federal government was by no means to be wondered at since it only attested the existence of an acknowledged power which was to be humored and not forcibly checked a further difference between the senate and the house of representatives the senate named by the provincial legislators representatives by the people double election of the former single election of the latter term of the different offices peculiar functions of each house the senate not only differs from the other house in the principle which it represents but also in the mode of its election in the term for which it is chosen and in the nature of its functions the house of representatives is named by the people by the legislators of each state the former is directly elected the latter is elected by an elected body the term for which the representatives are chosen is only two years that of the senators is six the functions of the house of representatives are purely legislative and the only share it takes in the judicial power is in the impeachment of public officers the senate cooperates in the work of legislation and tries those political offenses which the house of representatives submits to its decision it also acts as the great executive council of the nation the treaties which are concluded by the president must be ratified by the senate and the appointments he may make must be definitely approved by the same body dependence of the president he is elective and responsible he is free to act in his own sphere under the inspection of the senate his salary fixed at his entry into office suspense of veto the american legislators undertook a difficult task in attempting to create an executive power dependent on the majority of the people and nevertheless sufficiently strong to act without restraint in its own sphere it was indispensable to the maintenance of the republican form of government that the representative of the executive power should be subject to the will of the nation the president is an elective magistrate his honor, his property his liberty and his life are the securities which the people has for the temperate use of his power but in the exercise of his authority he cannot be said to be perfectly independent the senate takes cognizance of his relations with foreign powers and of the distribution of public appointments so that he can neither be bribed nor can he employ the means of corruption the legislators of the union acknowledge that the executive power would be incompetent to fulfill its task with dignity and utility unless it enjoyed a greater degree of stability and of strength than had been granted to it in the separate states the president is chosen for four years and he may be re-elected so that the chances of a prolonged administration may inspire him with hopeful undertakings for the public good and with the means of carrying them into execution the president was made the sole representative of the executive power of the union and care was taken not to render his decisions subordinate to the vote of a council a dangerous measure which tends at the same time to clog the action of the government and to diminish its responsibility the senate has the right of annulling the success of the president but it cannot compel him to take any steps nor does it participate in the exercise of the executive power the action of the legislature on the executive power may be direct and we have just shown that the Americans carefully obviated this influence but it may on the other hand be indirect public assemblies which have the power of depriving an officer of state of his salary encroach upon his independence and as they are free to make the laws it is to be feared less they should gradually appropriate to themselves a portion of that authority which the constitution has vested in his hands this dependence of the executive power is one of the defects inherent in republican constitutions the Americans have not been able to counteract the tendency which legislative assemblies have to get possession of the government but they have rendered this propensity less irresistible the salary of the president is fixed at the time of his entering upon office for the whole period of his majesty the president is moreover provided with a suspensive veto which allows him to oppose the passing of such laws as might destroy the portion of independence which the constitution awards him the struggle between the president and the legislature must always be an unequal one the latter is certain of bearing down all resistance by persevering in its plans but the suspense of veto forces it at least to reconsider the matter and if the motion be persisted in it must then be backed by a majority of two thirds of the whole house the veto is in fact a sort of appeal to the people the executive power which without the security might have been secretly oppressed adopts this means of pleading its cause and stating its motives but if the legislature is certain of overpowering all resistance by persevering in its plans I reply that in the constitutions of all nations of whatever kind they may be a certain point exists at which the legislator is obliged to have recourse to the good sense and the virtue of his fellow citizens this point is more prominent and more discoverable in republics whilst it is more remote and more carefully concealed in monarchies but it always exists somewhere there is no country in the world in which everything can be provided for by the laws or in which political institutions can prove a substitute for common sense and public morality differences between the position of the president of the united states and that of a constitutional king in France executive power in the united states as limited and as partial as the supremacy which it represents executive power in France as universal as the supremacy it represents the king a branch of the legislature the president the mere executor of the law other differences resulting from the duration of the two powers the president checked in the size of the executive authority the king independent in its exercise notwithstanding these discrepancies France is more akin to a republic than the union to a monarchy comparison of the number of public officers depending upon the executive power in the two countries the executive power has so important an influence on the destinies of nations that I am inclined to pause for an instant on my subject in order more clearly to explain the part it sustains in America in order to form an accurate idea of the position of the president of the united states it may not be irrelevant to compare it to that of one of the constitutional kings of Europe in this comparison I shall pay but little attention to the external signs of power which are more apt to deceive the eye of the observer than to guide his researches when a monarchy is being gradually transformed into a republic the executive power retains the titles the honors the etiquette and even the funds of royalty long after its authority has disappeared the English after having cut off the head of one king and expelled another from the throne were accustomed to a cost the successor of those princes upon their knees on the other hand when a republic falls under the sway of a individual the demeanor of the sovereign is simple and unpretending as if his authority was not yet paramount when the emperors exercised an unlimited control over the fortunes and the lives of their fellow citizens it was customary to call them caesar in conversation and they were in the habit of supping without formality at their friends houses it is therefore necessary to look below the surface the sovereignty of the united states is shared between the union and the states whilst in france it is undivided and compact hence arises the first and the most notable difference which exists between the president of the united states and the king of france in the united states the executive power is as limited and partial as the sovereignty of the union in whose name it acts in france it is as universal as the authority of the state the americans have a federal and the french national government end of chapter eight part one this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org recorded by mel man democracy in america volume one by alexis de decouple translated in rireve chapter seven part two the federal constitution this cause of inferiority results from the nature of things but it is not the only one the second in importance is as follows sovereignty may be defined to be the right of making laws in france the king really exercises a portion of the sovereign power since the laws have no weight and he has given his assent to them he is moreover the executor of all they ordain the president is also the executor of the laws but he does not really cooperate in their formation since the refusal of his assent does not annul them he is therefore merely to be considered as the agent of the sovereign power but not only does the king of france exercise a portion of the sovereign power he also contributes to the nomination of the legislature which exercises the other portion he has the privilege of appointing the members of one chamber and of dissolving the other at his pleasure whereas the president of the united states has no share in the formation of the legislative body and cannot dissolve any part of it the king has the same right of bringing forward measures as the chambers a right which the president does not possess the king is represented in each assembly by his ministers who explain his intentions support his opinions and maintain the principles of the government the president and his ministers are alike excluded from congress so that his influence and his opinions can only penetrate indirectly into that great body the king of france is therefore on an equal footing with the legislature who can more act without him than he can without it the president exercises an authority inferior to and depending upon that of the legislature even in the exercise of the executive power properly so called the point upon which his position seems to be the most anagolous to that of the king of france the president labors under several causes of inferiority the king in france has in the first place the advantage of duration over that of the president and durability is one of the chief elements of strength nothing is either loved or feared but what is likely to endure the president of the united states is a magistrate elected for four years the king in france is a hereditary sovereign in the exercise of the executive power of the president of the united states is constantly subject to a jealous scrutiny he may make but he cannot conclude a treaty he may designate but he cannot appoint a public officer the king of france is absolute within the limits of his authority the president of the united states is responsible for his actions but the person of the king is declared inviolable by the french charter nevertheless the supremacy of public opinion is no less above the head of the one than of the other this power is less definite less evident and less sanctioned by the laws in france than in america but in fact it exists in america it acts by elections and decrees in france it proceeds by revolutions but notwithstanding the different constitutions of these two countries public opinion is the predominant authority in both of them the fundamental principle of legislation a principle essentially republican is the same in both countries although its consequences may be different and its results more or less extensive whence i am led to conclude that france with its king is nearer akin to a republic than the union with its president is to a monarchy in what i've been saying i have only touched upon the main points of distinction and if i could have entered into details the contrast would have been riddered still more striking i have remarked that the authority of the president of the united states is only exercised within the limits of a partial sovereignty whilst that of the king of france is undivided i might have gone on to show that the power of the king's government in france exceeds its natural limits however extensive they may be and penetrates in a thousand different ways into the administration of private interests amongst the examples of this influence may be quoted that which results from the great number of public functionaries who all derive their appointments from the government this number now exceeds all previous limits it amounts to 138,000 nominations each of which may be considered as an element of power the president of the united states has not the exclusive right of making any public appointments and their whole number scarcely exceeds 12,000 accidental causes which may increase the influence of the executive government external security of the union army of 6,000 men few ships the president has no opportunity of exercising his great prerogatives in the prerogatives he exercises he is weak if the executive government is febler in america than in france the cause is more attributable to the circumstances than to the laws of the country it is chiefly in its foreign relations that the executive power of a nation is called upon to exert its skill and its vigor if the existence of the union were perpetually threatened and if its chief interests were in daily connection with those of other powerful nations the executive government would assume an increased importance and proportion to the measures expected of it and those which it would carry into effect the president of the united states is the commander in chief of the army but an army composed of only 6,000 men he commands the fleet but the fleet reckons but few sail he conducts the foreign relations of the union but the united states are a nation without neighbors separated from the rest of the world by the ocean and too weak as yet to aim at the dominion of the seas they have no enemies and their interests rarely come into contact with those of any other nation of the globe the practical part of a government must not be judged by the theory of its constitution the president of the united states is in the possession of almost royal prerogatives which he has no opportunity of exercising and of those privileges which he can at present use are very circumscribed the law allows him to possess a degree of influence which circumstances do not permit him to employ on the other hand the great strength of the royal prerogatives in france arises from circumstances far more than from laws there the executive government is constantly struggling against prodigious obstacles and exerting all its energies to repress them so that it increases by the extent of its achievements and by the importance of the events it controls without modifying its constitution if the laws had made it as feeble and as circumscribed as it is in the union its influence would very soon become still more preponderant why the president of the united states does not require the majority of the two houses in order to carry on the government it is an established axiom in europe that a constitutional king cannot persevere in a system of government which is opposed by the two other branches of the legislature but several presidents of the united states have been known to lose the majority in the legislative body without being obliged to abandon the supreme power and without inflicting a serious evil upon society i have heard this fact quoted as an instance of the independence and the power of the executive government in america a moment's reflection will convince us on the contrary that it is a proof of its extreme weakness a king in europe requires the support of the legislature to enable him to perform the duties imposed upon him by the constitution because those duties are enormous a constitutional king in europe is not merely the executor of the law but the execution of its provisions devolves so completely upon him that he has the power of paralyzing its influence if it opposes his designs he requires the assistance of the legislative assemblies to make the law but those assemblies stand in need of his aid to execute it these two authorities cannot subsist without each other and the mechanism of government is stopped as soon as they are at variance in america the president cannot prevent any law from being passed nor can he evade the obligation of enforcing it his sincere and zealous cooperation is no doubt useful but it is not indispensable in the carrying on of public affairs all of his important acts are directly or indirectly submitted to the legislature and of his own free authority he can do but little weakness and not his power which enables him to remain in opposition to congress in europe harmony must reign between the crown and the other branches of the legislature because a collision between them may prove serious in america this harmony is not indispensable because such a collision is impossible election of the president dangers of the elective system increase in proportion to the extent of the prerogative the system possible in america because no powerful executive authority is required what circumstances are favorable to the elective system why the election of the president does not cause a deviation from the principles of the government influence of the election of the president on secondary functionaries the dangers of the system of election applied to the head of executive the great people have been sufficiently exemplified by experience and by history and the remarks I am about to make refer to america alone these dangers may be more or less formidable in proportion to the place which the executive power occupies and to the importance it possesses in the state and they may vary according to the mode of the election and the circumstances in which the electors argument against the election of a chief magistrate is that it offers so splendid allure to private ambition and is so apt to inflame men in the pursuit of power that when legitimate means are wanting force may not unfrequently seize what right denied it is clear that the greater the privileges of the executive authority are the greater is the temptation the more the ambition of the candidates is excited and firmly are their interest espoused by a throng of partisans who hope to share the power when their patron has won the prize the dangers of the elective system increase therefore in the exact ratio of the influence exercised by the executive power in the affairs of the state the revolutions of poland were not solely attributable to the elective system in general but to the fact that the elected monarch was the sovereign of a powerful kingdom before we can discuss the absolute advantages of the elective system we must make preliminary inquiries as to whether the geographical position the laws the habits the manners and the opinions of the people amongst whom it is to be introduced will admit of the establishment of a weak and dependent executive government for to attempt to render the representative of the state a powerful sovereign and at the same time elective is in my opinion to entertain two incompatible designs to reduce hereditary royalty to the condition of an elective authority the only means that I am acquainted with are to circumscribe its fear of action beforehand gradually to diminish its prerogatives and to accustom the people to live without its protection nothing however is further from the designs of the Republicans of Europe than this course as many of them owe their hatred of tyranny to the sufferings which they have personally undergone it is oppression and not the extent of the executive power which excites their hostility and they attack the former without perceiving how nearly it is connected with the latter here to no citizen has shown any disposition to expose his honor and his life in order to become the president of the united states because the power of that office is temporary, limited and subordinate the prize of fortune must be great to encourage adventurers and so desperate a game no candidate has yet been able to arouse the dangerous enthusiasm or the passionate sympathies of the people in his favor for the very simple reason that when he is at the head of the government he has but little power but little wealth and but little glory to share amongst his friends and his influence in the state is too small for the success or the ruin of a fraction to depend upon the elevation of an individual to power the great advantage of hereditary monarchies is that as the private interest of a family is always intimately connected with the interest of the state the executive government is never suspended for a single instant and if the affairs of a monarch are not better conducted than those of a republic at least there is always someone to conduct them well or ill according to his capacity in elective states on the contrary the wheels of government cease to act as it were of their own accord at the approach of an election and even for some time previous to that event the laws may indeed accelerate the operation of the election which may be conducted with such simplicity and rapidity that the seat of power will never be left vacant but not withstanding these precautions a break necessarily occurs in the minds of the people at the approach of an election the head of the executive government is wholly occupied by the coming struggle his future plans are doubtful he can undertake nothing new and he will only prosecute with indifference those designs which another will perhaps terminate I am so near the time of my retirement from office said President Jefferson on the 21st of January 1809 that I feel no passion I take no part I express no sentiment it appears to me just to leave to my successor the commencement of those measures which he will have to prosecute and for which he will be responsible on the other hand the eyes of the nation are centered on a single point all are watching the gradual birth of an important and event the wider influence of the executive power extends the greater the more necessary is its constant action the more fatal is the term of suspense and a nation which is accustomed to the government or still more one used to the administrative protection of a powerful executive authority would be infallibly convulsed by an election of this kind in the United States the action of the government would be slacking with impunity because it is always weak and circumscribed one of the great vices of the elective system is that it always introduces a certain degree of instability into the internal and external policy of the state but this disadvantage is less sensibly felt if the share of power vested in the elected magistrate is small in Rome the principles of the government underwent no variation although the councils were changed every year because the Senate which was an hereditary assembly possessed the directing authority if the elective system were adopted in Europe the condition of most of the monoracle states would be changed at every new election in America the president exercises a certain influence on state affairs but he does not conduct them the preponderating power is vested in the representatives of the whole nation the political maxims of the country depend therefore on the mass of the people not on the president alone and consequently in America the elective system has no very prejudicial influence on the fixed principles of the government but the want of fixed principles is an evil so inherent in the elective system that it is still extremely perceptible in the narrow sphere to which the authority of the president extends the Americans have admitted that the head of the executive power who has to bear the whole responsibility of the duties he has called upon to fulfill ought to be empowered to choose his own agents and to remove them at his pleasure the legislative bodies watch the conduct of the president more than they direct it the consequence of this arrangement is that at every new election the fate of all the federal public officers is in suspense Mr. Quincy Adams on his entry into office discharged the majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his predecessor and I am not aware that General Jackson allowed a single removable functionary employed in the federal service to retain his place beyond the first year which succeeded his election it is sometimes made a subject of complaint that in the constitutional monarchies of Europe the fate of the humbler servants of administration depends upon that of the ministers but in elective governments this evil is far greater in a constitutional monarchy successive ministries are rapidly formed but as the principal representative of the executive power does not change the spirit of innovation is kept within bounds the changes which take place are in the details rather than in the principles of the administrative system but to substitute one system for another as is done in America every four years by law is to cause a sort of revolution as to the misfortunes which may fall upon individuals and the consequence of this state of things it must be allowed that the uncertain situation of the public officers is less fraught with evil consequences in America than elsewhere it is so easy to acquire an independent position in the United States that the public officer who loses his place may be deprived of the comforts of life but not the means of subsistence I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that the dangers of the elective system applied to the head of the state are augmented or decreased by the peculiar circumstances of the people which adopts it however the functions of the executive power may be restricted it must always exercise a great influence upon the foreign policy of the country for a negotiation cannot be opened or successfully carried on otherwise than by a single agent the more precarious and the more perilous the position of a people becomes the more absolute is the want of a fixed or consistent external policy and the more dangerous does the elective system of the chief magistrate become the policy of the Americans in relation to the whole world is exceedingly simple for it may almost be said no country stands in need of them nor do they require the cooperation of any other people their independence is never threatened in their present condition therefore the functions of the executive power are no less limited by circumstances than by the laws and the president may frequently change his line of policy without involving the state in difficulty or destruction whatever the prerogatives of the executive power may be the period which immediately precedes an election and the moment of its duration must always be considered as a national crisis which is perilous in proportion to the internal embarrassments and the external dangers of the country few of the nations of Europe could escape the calamities of anarchy or of conquest every time they might have to elect a new sovereign in America society is so constituted that it can stand without assistance on its own basis nothing is to be feared from the pressure of external dangers and the election of the president is a cause of agitation but not of ruin mode of election skills of the American legislatures shown in the mode of election adopted by them creation of a special electoral body separate votes of these electors case in which the house of representatives is called upon to choose the president results of the 12 elections which have taken place since the Constitution has been established besides the dangers which are inherent in the system, many other difficulties may arise from the mode of election which may be obviated by the precaution of the legislature when a people meet in arms on some public spot to choose its head it was exposed to all the chances of civil war resulting from proceeding besides the dangers of the elective system in itself the Polish laws which subjected the election of the sovereign to the veto of a single individual suggested the murder of that individual or prepared the way to anarchy in the examination of the institutions and the political as well as social condition of the United States we are struck by the admirable harmony of the gifts of fortune and the efforts of man the nation possessed two of the main causes of internal peace it was a new country but it was inhabited by a people grown old in the exercise of freedom America had no hostile neighbors to dread and the American legislatures, profiting by these favorable circumstances created a weak and subordinate executive power which could without danger be made elective if then only remained for them to choose the least dangerous of the modes of election and the rules which they laid down upon this point admirably correspond to the securities which the physical and political constitution of the country already afforded their object was to find the mode of election which would best express the choice of the people with the least possible excitement and suspense it was admitted in the first place that the simple majority should be decisive but the difficulty was to obtain this majority without an interval of delay which it was most important to avoid it rarely happens that an individual can at once collect the majority of the suffrages of a great people and this difficulty is enhanced in a republic of confederate states where local influences are apt to preponder it the means by which is proposed to obviate this second obstacle is to delegate the electoral powers of the nation to a body of representatives this mode of election rendered a majority more probable for the fewer the electors are the greater is the chance of their coming to a final decision it also offered an additional probability of a judicious choice it then remained to be decided whether this right of election was to be entrusted to a legislative body the habitual representatives assembly of the nation or whether an electoral assembly should be formed for the express purpose of proceeding to the nomination of a president the Americans chose the latter alternative from a belief that the individuals who were returned to make laws were incompetent to represent the wishes of the nation in the election of its chief magistrate and that as they are chosen for more than a year the constituency they represent will be the only opinion in that time it was thought that the legislature was empowered to elect the head of the executive power its members would for some time before the election be exposed to the maneuvers of corruption and the tricks of intrigue whereas the special electors would like a jury remain mixed up with the crowd to the day of action when they would appear for the sole purpose of giving their votes that every state should name a certain number of electors who in their turn should elect the president and it had been observed that the assemblies to which the choice of a chief magistrate had been entrusted in elective countries inevitably became the centers of passion and of cable that they sometimes usurped an authority which did not belong to them and that their proceedings or the uncertainty which resulted from them were sometimes prolonged so much to endanger the welfare of the state it was determined that the electors should all vote upon the same day without being convoked to the same place this double election rendered a majority probable though not certain where it was possible that as many differences might exist between the electors as between their constituents in this case it was necessary to have recourse to one of three measures either to appoint new electors or to consult a second time those already appointed or to defer the decision to another authority the first two of these alternatives independently of the uncertainty of their results were likely to delay the final decision and to perpetuate an agitation which must always be accompanied with danger the third expedient was therefore adopted and it was agreed that the vote should be transmitted sealed to the president of the senate and that they should be opened and counted by the senate and the house of representatives if none of the candidates has a majority the house of representatives then proceeds immediately to elect a president but with the condition that it must fix upon one of the three candidates who have the highest numbers this is only in case of an event which cannot often happen which can never be foreseen that the election is entrusted to the ordinary representatives of the nation today are obliged to choose a citizen who has already been designated by a powerful minority of the special electors it is by this happy expedient that the respect which is due to the popular voice is combined with the utmost celerity of execution and these precautions which the peace of the country demands but the decision of the question by the house of representatives does not necessarily offer an immediate solution of the difficulty for the majority of that assembly may still be doubtful and in this case the constitution prescribes no remedy nevertheless by restricting the number of candidates to three and by referring the matter to the judgment of enlightened public body it has smoothed all the obstacles which are not inherent in the elective system and the 44 years which have elapsed since the promulgation of the federal constitution the United States have twelve times chosen a president ten of these elections took place simultaneously by the votes of the special electors in the different states the house of representatives has only twice exercised its conditional privilege of deciding in cases of uncertainty the first time was at the election of Mr. Jefferson in 1801 the second was in 1825 when Mr. Quincy Adams was named crisis of the election the election may be considered as a national crisis why? passions of the people anxiety of the president calm which succeeds the agitation of the election I have shown that the circumstances which are favored the adoption of the elective system of the United States and what precautions were taken by the legislatures to obviate its dangers the Americans are habitually accustomed to all kinds of elections and they know by experience the utmost degree of excitement which is compatible with security the vast extent of the country and the dissemination of the inhabitants render a collision between parties less probable and less dangerous there than elsewhere the political circumstances under which the elections have hitherto been carried have presented no real embarrassments to the nation nonetheless the epic of the election of a president of the United States may be considered as a crisis in the affairs of the nation the influence which he exercises on public business is no doubt feeble and indirect but the choice of the president which is of small importance to each individual citizen concerns the citizens collectively and however trifling an interest may be it assumes a greater degree of importance as soon as it becomes general the president possesses but few means of rewarding his supporters in comparison to the kings of Europe but the places which are at his disposal are sufficiently numerous to interest directly or indirectly several thousand electors in his success political parties in the United States are led to rally around an individual in order to acquire a more tangible shape in the eyes of the crowd and the name of the candidate for the presidency is put forward as a symbol as a symbol and personification of their theories for these reasons parties are strongly interested in gaining the election not so much with a view to the triumph of their principles under the auspices of the president elect as to show by the majority which returned him the strength of the supporters of those principles for a long while before the appointed time is at hand the election becomes the most important and the all engrossing topic of the discussion the ardor of faction is redoubled and all the artificial passions which the imagination can create in the bosom of a happy and peaceful land are agitated and brought to light the president on the other hand is absorbed by the cares of self defense he no longer governs for the interest of the state but for that of his reelection he does homage to the majority and instead of checking its passions as his duty commands him to do he frequently courts its worst caprices as the election draws near the activity of intrigue and the agitation of the populace increase the citizens are divided into hostile camps each of which assumes the name of its favorite candidate the whole nation glows with feverish excitement the election is the daily theme of the public papers the subject of private conversation the end of every thought and every action is the final interest of the present as soon as the choice is determined this ardor is dispelled and as a calmer season returns the current of the state which had nearly broken its banks sinks to its usual level but who can refrain from astonishment at the causes of the storm end of chapter 7 part 2