 Book 2, Chapter 5 of On-War This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Timothy Ferguson. On-War by Carl von Klausowitz, translated by Colonel J. J. Graham. Chapter 5 Criticism The influence of theoretical principles upon real life is produced more through criticism than through doctrine, for as criticism is an application of abstract truth to real events, therefore it not only brings truth of this description nearer to life, but also accustoms the understanding more to such truths by the constant repetition of their application. We therefore think it necessary to fix the point of view for criticism, next to that for theory. From the simple narration of any historical occurrence which places events in chronological order, or at most only touches on their more immediate causes, we separate the critical. In this critical, three different operations of the mind may be observed. First, the historical investigation and determining of doubtful facts. This is properly historical research, and has nothing in common with theory. Secondly, the tracing of effects to causes. This is the real critical inquiry. It is indispensable to theory for everything in which theory is to be established, supported or even merely explained by experience can only be settled in this way. Thirdly, the testing of the means employed. This is criticism, properly speaking, in which praise and censure is contained. This is where theory helps history, or rather the teaching to be derived from it. In these two last strictly critical parts of historical study, all depends on tracing things to their primary elements, that is to say, up to undoubted truths and not, as is so often done, resting half way, that is, on some arbitrary assumption or supposition. As respects the tracing of effect to cause, that is often attended with the insupperable difficulty that the real causes are not known. In none of the relations of life does this so frequently happen as in war, where events are seldom fully known and still less motives, as the latter have been perhaps purposely concealed by the chief actor, or have been of such a transient and accidental character that they have been lost for history. For this reason, critical narration must, generally, proceed hand in hand with historical investigation, and still such a want of connection between cause and effect will often present itself that it does not seem justifiable to consider effects as the necessary results of known causes. Here therefore must occur, that is, historical results which cannot be made use of for the teaching. All that theory can demand is that the investigation should be rigidly conducted up to that point, and there leave off without drawing conclusions. A real evil springs up, only if the known is made perforce to suffice as an explanation of effects, and thus a false importance is ascribed to it. Besides this difficulty, critical inquiry also meets with another great and intrinsic one, which is that the progress of events in war seldom proceeds from one simple cause, but from several in common, and that it therefore is not sufficient to follow up a series of events to their origin in a candid and impartial spirit, but that it is then also necessary to apportion to each contributing cause its due weight. This leads therefore to a closer investigation of their nature, and thus a critical investigation may lead into what is the proper field of theory. The critical consideration, that is, the testing of the means leads to the question, which are the effects peculiar to the means applied, and whether these effects were comprehended in the plans of the person directing. The effects peculiar to the means lead to the investigation of their nature, and thus again into the field of theory. We have already seen that in criticism all depends upon attaining to positive truth, therefore that we must not stop at arbitrary propositions, which are not allowed by others, and to which other, perhaps equally arbitrary assertions, may again be opposed, so that there is no end to pros and cons. The whole is without result, and therefore without instruction. We have seen that both the search for causes and the examination of means lead into the field of theory, that is, into the field of universal truth, which does not proceed solely from the case immediately under examination. If there is a theory which can be used, then the critical consideration will appeal to the proofs they're afforded, and the examination may there stop, but where no such theoretical truth is to be found, the inquiry must be pushed up to the original elements. If this necessity occurs often, it must lead the historian, according to a common expression, into a labyrinth of details. He then has his hands full, and it is impossible for him to stop to give the requisite attention everywhere. The consequence is, that in order to set bounds to his investigation, he adopts some arbitrary assumptions which, if they do not appear so to him, do so to others, as they are not evident in themselves or capable of proof. A sound theory is therefore an essential foundation for criticism, and it is impossible for it, without the assistance of a sensible theory, to attain to that point at which it commences chiefly to be instructive. That is, where it becomes demonstration both convincing and sans-replique. But it would be a visionary hope to believe in the possibility of a theory applicable to every abstract truth, leaving nothing for criticism to do, but place the case under its appropriate law. It would be ridiculous pedantry to lay down as a rule for criticism that it must always halt and turn round on reaching the boundaries of sacred theory. The same spirit of analytical inquiry which is the origin of theory must also guide the critic in his work, and it can and must therefore happen that he strays beyond the boundaries of the province of theory, and elucidates those points with which he is more particularly concerned. It is more likely on the contrary that criticism would completely fail in its object if it degenerated into a mechanical application of theory. All positive results of theoretical inquiry, all principles, rules and methods, are the more wanting in generality and positive truth, the more they become positive doctrine. They exist to offer themselves for use as required, and it must always be left for judgment to decide whether they are suitable or not. Such results of theory must never be used in criticism as rules or norms for a standard, but in the same way as the person acting should use them, that is, merely as aids to judgment. If it is an acknowledged principle in tactics that in the usual order of battle cavalry should be placed behind infantry, not in line with it, still it would be folly on this account to condemn every deviation from this principle. Criticism must investigate the grounds of the deviation, and it is only in case these are insufficient that it is a right to appeal to the principles laid down in theory. If it is further established in theory that a divided attack diminishes the probability of success, still it would be just as unreasonable whenever there is a divided attack and an unsuccessful issue to regard the latter as the result of the former without further investigation into the connection between the two, as where a divided attack is successful to infer from it the fallacy of the theoretical principle. The spirit of investigation which belongs to criticism cannot allow either. Criticism therefore supports itself chiefly on the results of the analytical investigation of theory. What has been made out and determined by theory does not require to be demonstrated over again by criticism, and it is so determined by theory that criticism may find it readily demonstrated. This office of criticism of examining the effect produced by certain causes and whether a means applied has answered its object will be easy enough if cause and effect means and end are all near together. If an army is surprised and therefore cannot make a regular and intelligent use of its powers and resources, then the effect of the surprise is not doubtful. If theory has determined that in a battle the convergent form of attack is calculated to produce greater but less certain results, then the question is whether he who employs that convergent form had in view chiefly that greatness of a result as his object, if so the proper means were chosen. But if by this form he intended to make the result more certain, and that expectation was founded not on some exceptional circumstances in this case, but on the general nature of the convergent form, as has happened a hundred times, then he mistook the nature of the means and committed an error. Here the work of military investigation and criticism is easy, and it will always be so when confined to the immediate effects and objects. This can be done quite an option if we abstract the connection of the parts with the whole and only look at the things in that relation. But in war, as generally in the world, there is a connection between everything which belongs to a whole, and therefore, however small a cause may be in itself, its effects reach to the end of the act of warfare and modify or influence the final result in some degree. Let that degree be ever so small. In the same manner every means must be felt up to the ultimate object. We can therefore trace the effects of a cause as long as events are worth noticing, and in the same way we must not stop at the testing of a means for the immediate object, but test also this object as a means to a higher one, and thus ascend the series of facts in succession, until we come to one so absolutely necessary in its nature as to require no examinational proof. In many cases, particularly in what concerns great and decisive measures, the investigation must be carried to the final aim, to that which leads immediately to peace. It is evident that in thus ascending at every news station which we reach a new point of view for the judgement is attained, so that the same means which appeared advisable at one station, when looked at from the next above it, may have to be rejected. The search for the causes of events, and the comparison of means with ends, must always go hand in hand in the critical review of an act, for the investigation of causes leads us first to the discovery of those things which are worth examining. This following of the clue up and down is attended with considerable difficulty, for the farther from an event the cause lies, which we are looking for, the greater must be the number of other causes, which must at the same time be kept in view and allowed for in reference to the share, which they have in the course of events, and then eliminated because the higher the importance of a fact, the greater will be the number of separate forces and circumstances by which it is conditioned. If we have unraveled the causes of a battle being lost, we have certainly also ascertained the part of the causes of the consequences which this defeat has upon the whole war, but only a part, because the effects of other causes, more or less according to circumstances, will flow into the final result. The same multiplicity of circumstances is presented also in the examination of the means the higher our point of view. For the higher the object is situated, the greater must be the number of means employed to reach it. The ultimate object of war is the object aimed at by all the armies simultaneously, and it is therefore necessary that the consideration should embrace all that each has done or could have done. It is obvious that this may sometimes lead to a wide field of inquiry in which it is easy to wander and lose the way, and in which this difficulty prevails, that a number of assumptions or suppositions must be made about a variety of things which do not actually appear, but which in all probability did take place, and therefore cannot possibly be left out of consideration. When Bonaparte in 1797, at the head of the Army of Italy, advanced from the Tagliamento against the Archduke Charles, he did so with a view to force that general to a decisive action before the reinforcements expected from the Rhine had reached him. If we look only at the immediate object, the means were well chosen and justified by the result, for the Archduke was so inferior in numbers that he only made a show of resistance on the Tagliamento, and when he saw his adversary so strong and resolute, yielded ground and left open the passages of the Norican Alps. Now to what use could Bonaparte turn this fortunate event? To penetrate into the heart of the Austrian Empire itself, to facilitate the advance of the Rhine armies under Miro and Hoch, and open communication with them. This was the view taken by Bonaparte, and from this point of view he was right, but now, if criticism places itself at a higher point of view, namely that of the French Directory, which body could see and know that the armies of the Rhine could not commence the campaign for six weeks, then the advance of Bonaparte over the Norican Alps can only be regarded as an extremely hazardous measure, for if the Austrians had drawn largely on their Rhine armies to reinforce their army in Styria, so as to enable the Archduke to fall upon the army of Italy, not only would that army have been routed but the whole campaign lost. This consideration, which attracted the serious attention of Bonaparte at Villach, no doubt induced him to sign the armistice of Lieben with so much readiness. If criticism takes a still higher position, and if it knows that the Austrians had no reserves between the army of the Archduke Charles and Vienna, then we see that Vienna became threatened by the advance of the army of Italy. Supposing that Bonaparte knew that the capital was thus uncovered, and knew that he still retained the same superiority in numbers of the Archduke as he had in Styria, then his advance against the heart of the Austrian states was no longer without purpose, and its value depended on the value which the Austrians might place on preserving their capital. If that was so great that rather than lose it they would accept the conditions of peace which Bonaparte was ready to offer them, it became an object of the first importance to threaten Vienna. If Bonaparte had any reason to know this then criticism may stop there, but if this point was only problematical then criticism must take a still higher position and ask what would have followed if the Austrians had resolved to abandon Vienna and retire further into the vast dominion still left to them, but it is easy to see that this question cannot be answered without bringing into the consideration the probable movements of the Rhine armies on both sides. Through the decided superiority of numbers on the side of the French, 130,000 to 80,000, there could be little doubt of the result, but then next arises the question, what use would the directory make of a victory? Whether they would follow up their success to the opposite frontiers of the Austrian monarchy, therefore to the complete breaking up or overthrow of that power, or whether they would be satisfied with the conquest of a considerable portion to serve as a security for peace. The probable result in each case must be estimated in order to come to a conclusion as to the probable determination of the directory. Supposing the result of these considerations to be that the French forces were much too weak for the complete subjugation of the Austrian monarchy so that the attempt might completely reverse the respective positions of the contending armies and that even the conquest and occupation of a considerable district of country would place the French army in strategic relations to which they were not equal, then that result must naturally influence the estimate of the position of the army of Italy and compel it to lower its expectations, and this it was which no doubt influenced Bonaparte. Although fully aware of the helpless condition of the Archduke, still to sign the peace of Campo Formio which imposed no greater sacrifices on the Austrians than the loss of provinces which even if the campaign took the most favorable turn for them they could not have reconquered. But the French could not have reckoned on even the moderate treaty of Campo Formio and therefore it could not have been their object in making their bold advance if two considerations had not presented themselves to their view. The first of which consisted in the question what degree of value the Austrians would attach to each of the above mentioned results, whether not withstanding the probability of a satisfactory result in either of these cases, would it be worthwhile to make the sacrifices inseparable from a continuance of the war when they could be spared those sacrifices by peace on terms not too humiliating. The second consideration is the question whether the Austrian government instead of seriously weighing the possible results of a resistance push to extremities would not prove completely disheartened by the impression of their present reverses. The consideration which forms the subject of the first is no idle piece of subtle argument but a consideration of such decidedly practical importance that it comes up whenever the plan of pushing war to its utmost extremity is mooted and by its weight in most cases restrains the execution of such plans. The second consideration is of equal importance for we do not make war with an abstraction but with a reality which we must always keep in view and we may be sure that it was not overlooked by the bold Bonaparte that is that he was keenly alive to the terror which the appearance of his sword inspired it was reliance on that which led him to Moscow there it led him into a scrape the terror of him had been weakened by the gigantic struggles in which he had been engaged in the year 797 it was still fresh and the secret of a resistance push to extremities had not been discovered nevertheless even in 1797 his boldness might have led to a negative result if as already said he had not with a sort of presentiment avoided it by signing the moderate piece of Campo Formio we must now bring these considerations to a close they will suffice to show the wide sphere the diversity and embarrassing nature of the subjects embraced in a critical examination carried to the fullest extent that is to those measures of a great and decisive class which must necessarily be included it follows from them that besides a theoretical acquaintance with the subject natural talent must also have a great influence on the value of critical examinations for it rests chiefly with the latter to throw the requisite light on the interrelations of things and to distinguish from amongst the endless connections of events those which are really essential but talent is also called into requisition in another way critical examination is not merely the appreciation of those means which have been actually employed but also of all possible means which therefore must be suggested in the first place that is must be discovered and the use of any particular means is not fairly open to censure until a better is pointed out now however small the number of possible combinations may be in most cases still it must be admitted that point at those which have not been used is not a mere analysis of actual things but a spontaneous creation which cannot be prescribed and depends on the fertility of genius we are far from seeing a field for great genius in a case which admits only of the application of a few simple combinations and we think it exceedingly ridiculous to hold up as is often done the turning of a position as an invention showing the highest genius still nevertheless this creative self-activity on the part of the critic is necessary and it is one of those points which essentially determine the value of critical examination when Bonaparte on the 30th of July 1796 determined to raise the siege of Mantua in order to march with his whole force against the enemy advancing in separate columns to the relief of the place and to beat them in detail this appeared the surest way to the attainment of brilliant victories these victories actually followed and were afterwards again repeated on a still more brilliant scale on the attempt to relieve the fortress being again renewed we hear only one opinion on these achievements that of unmixed admiration at the same time Bonaparte could not have adopted this course on the 30th of July without quite giving up on the idea of the siege of Mantua because it was impossible to save the siege train and it could not be replaced by another in this campaign in fact the siege was converted into a blockade and the town which if the siege had continued must have very shortly fallen held out for six months in spite of Bonaparte's victories in the open field criticism has generally regarded this as an evil that was unavoidable because critics have not been able to suggest any better course resistance to a relieving army within lines of circumvalation had fallen into such disrepute and contempt that it appears to have entirely escaped consideration as a means and yet in the reign of Louis the 14th that measure was so often used with success that we can only attribute to the force of fashion the fact that a hundred years later it never occurred to anyone even to propose such a measure if the practicability of such a plan had ever been entertained for a moment a closer consideration of circumstances would have shown that 40,000 of the best infantry in the world under Bonaparte behind strong lines of circumvalation around Mantua had so little to fear from the 50,000 men coming to relief under Wormsur that it was very unlikely that any attempt even would have been made upon their lines we shall not seek here to establish this point but we believe enough has been said to show that this means was one which had a right to a share of consideration whether Bonaparte himself ever thought of such a plan we leave undecided neither in his memoirs nor in any other sources is there any trace to be found of his having done so in no critical works has it been touched upon the measure being one which the mind had lost sight of the merit of resuscitating the idea of this means is not great for it suggests itself at once to anyone who breaks loose from the troubles of fashion still it is necessary that it should suggest itself for us to bring it into consideration and compare it with the means which Bonaparte employed whatever may be the result of the comparison it is one which should not be emitted by criticism when Bonaparte in February 1814 after gaining the battles at Etosha's Shemper Bay and Montmeral left Blucher's army and turning upon Schratzenberg beat his troops at Montereau and Mormont everyone was filled with admiration because Bonaparte by thus throwing his concentrated force first upon one opponent then upon another made a brilliant use of the mistakes which his adversaries had committed in dividing their forces if these brilliant strokes in different directions fell to save him it was generally considered to be no fault of his at least no one has yet asked the question what would have been the result if instead of turning from Blucher upon Schratzenberg he had tried another blow at Blucher and pursued him to the Rhine we are convinced that it would have completely changed the course of the campaign and that the army of the allies instead of marching to Paris would have retired behind the Rhine we do not ask others to share our conviction but no one who understands the thing will doubt at the mere mention of this alternative course that it is one which should not be overlooked in criticism in this case the means of comparison lie much more on the surface than in the foregoing but they have been equally overlooked because one-sided views have prevailed and there has been no freedom of judgment from the necessity of pointing out a better means which might have been used in place of those which are condemned has arisen the form of criticism almost exclusively in use which contends itself with pointing out the better means without demonstrating in what the superiority consists the consequence is that some are not convinced that others start up and do the same thing and that thus discussion arises which is without any fixed basis for the argument military literature abounds with matter of this sort the demonstration we require is always necessary when the superiority of means propounded is not so evident as to leave no room for doubt and consists in examination of each of the means on its own merits and then of its comparison with the object desired when once the thing is traced back to a simple truth controversy must cease or at all events a new result is obtained whilst by the other plan the pros and cons go on forever consuming each other should we for example not rest content with assertion in the case before mentioned and wish to prove that the persistent pursuit of blue chair would have been more advantageous than turning upon schwarzenberg we should support the arguments on the following simple truths one in general it is more advantageous to continue our blows in one in the same direction because there is a loss of time in striking in different directions and at a point where the moral power is already shaken by considerable losses there is the more reason to expect fresh successes therefore in that way no part of the preponderance already gained is left idle two because blue chair although weaker than schwarzenberg was on account of his enterprising spirit the more important adversary in him therefore lay the center of attraction which drew the others along in the same direction three because the losses which blue chair had sustained almost amounted to a defeat which gave bonaparte such a preponderance over him as to make his retreat to the Rhine almost certain and at the same time no reserves of any consequence awaited him there four because there was no other result which would be so terrific in its aspects which would appear to the imagination in such gigantic proportions and immense advantage in dealing with the staff so weakened irresolute as that of schwarzenberg notoriously was at this time what had happened to the crown prince of wortemberg at montereau and to count wittgenstein at mormat prince schwarzenberg must have known well enough but all the underwater vents on blue chair's distant and separate line from the man to the Rhine would only reach him by the avalanche of rumour the desperate movements which bonaparte made upon vitri at the end of march to see what the allies would do if he threatened to turn them strategically were evidently done on the principle of working on their fears but it was done under far different circumstances in consequence of his defeat at leon and arches and because blue chair with a hundred thousand men was then in communication with schwarzenberg there are people no doubt who will not be convinced by these arguments but at all events they cannot retort by saying that whilst bonaparte threatened schwarzenberg's base by advancing to the Rhine schwarzenberg at the same time threatened bonaparte's communications with paris because we have shown by the reasons above given that schwarzenberg would never have thought of marching on paris with respect to the example quoted by us from the campaign of 1796 we should say bonaparte looked upon the plan he adopted as the surest means of beating the austrians but admitting that it was so still the object to be attained was only an empty victory which could have hardly any sensible influence on the fall of mantua the way which we should have chosen would in our opinion have been much more certain to prevent the relief of mantua but even if we place ourselves in the position of the french general and assume that it was not so and look upon the certainty of success to having been less the question then amounts to a choice between a more certain but less useful and therefore less important victory on the one hand and a somewhat less probable but far more decisive and important victory on the other hand presented in this form boldness must have declared for the second solution which is the reverse of what took place when the thing was only superficially viewed bonaparte was certainly anything but deficient in boldness and we may be sure that he did not see the whole case and its consequences as fully and clearly as we can at the present time naturally the critic in treating of the means must often appeal to military history as experience is of more value in the art of war than all philosophical truth but this exemplification from history is subject to certain conditions of which we shall treat in the special chapter and unfortunately these conditions are so seldom regarded that reference to history generally only serves to increase the confusion of ideas we have still a most important subject to consider which is how far criticism in passing judgments on particular events is permitted or in duty bound to make use of its wider view of things and therefore also of that which is shown by results or when and where it should leave outside of these things in order to place itself as far as possible in the exact position of the chief actor if criticism dispenses praise or censure it should seek to place itself as nearly as possible at the same point of view as the person acting that is to say to collect all he knew and all the motives on which he acted and on the other hand to leave out of the consideration all that the person acting could not or did not know and above all the result but this is only an object to aim at which can never be reached because the state of circumstances from which an event preceded can never be placed before the eye of the critic exactly as it lay before the eye of the person acting a number of inferior circumstances which must have influenced the result are completely lost to sight and many a subjective motive has never come to light the latter can only be learned from the memoirs of the chief actor or from his intimate friends and in such things of this kind are often treated of in a very dulcetry manner or purposely misrepresented criticism must therefore always forego much which was present in the minds of those whose acts are criticized on the other hand it is much more difficult to leave out of sight that which criticism knows in excess this is only easy as regards accidental circumstances that is circumstances which have been mixed up but are in no way necessarily related but it is very difficult and in fact can never be completely done with regard to things really essential let us take first the result if it is not preceded from accidental circumstances it is almost impossible that the knowledge of it should not have an effect on the judgment passed on events which have preceded it for we see these things in the light of the result and it is to a certain extent by it that we first become acquainted with them and appreciate them military history with all its events is a source of instruction for criticism itself and it is only natural that criticism should throw that light on things which it has itself obtained from the consideration of the whole if therefore it might wish in some cases to leave the result out of the consideration it would be impossible to do so completely but it is not only in relation to the result that is what takes place at the last that this embarrassment arises the same occurs in relation to preceding events therefore with the data which furnished the motives to action criticism has before it in most cases more information on this point than the principle in the transaction now it may seem easy to dismiss from the consideration everything of this nature but it is not so easy as we may think the knowledge of preceding and concurrent events is founded not only on certain information but on a number of conjectures and suppositions indeed there is hardly any of the information respecting things not purely accidental which has not been preceded by suppositions or conjectures destined to take the place of certain information in case such would never be supplied now it is conceivable that criticism in after times which has before it as facts or the preceding and concurrent circumstances should not allow itself to be thereby influenced when it asks itself the question what portion of the circumstances which at the moment of action were unknown would it have held to be probable we maintain that in this case as in the case of the results and for the same reason it is impossible to disregard all these things completely if therefore the critic wishes to bestow praise or blame upon a single act he can only succeed to a certain degree by placing himself in the position of the person whose act he has under review in many cases he can do so sufficiently near for any practical purpose but in many instances it is the very reverse and this fact should never be overlooked but it is neither necessary nor desirable that criticism should completely identify itself with the person acting in war as in all matters of skill there is a certain natural aptitude required which is called talent this may be great or small in the first case it may easily be superior to that of the critic for what critic can pretend the skill of a frederick or a bone apart therefore if criticism is not to abstain altogether from offering an opinion where eminent talent is concerned it must be allowed to make use of the advantage which it's enlarged horizon affords criticism must not therefore treat the solution of a problem by a great general like a sum in arithmetic it is only through the results and through the exact coincidences of events that it can recognize with admiration how much is due to the exercise of genius and that it first learns the essential combination which the glance of that genius devised but for every even the smallest act of genius it is necessary that criticism should take a higher point of view so that having at command many objective grounds of decision it may be as little subjective as possible and that the critic may not take the limited scope of his own mind as a standard the elevated position of criticism its praise and blame announced with a full knowledge of all the circumstances as in itself nothing which hurts our feelings it only does so if the critic pushes himself forward and speaks in a tone as if all the wisdom which he has obtained by an exhaustive examination of the event under consideration were really his own talent palpable as is this deception it is one which people may easily fall into through vanity and one which is naturally distasteful to others it very often happens that although the critic has no such arrogant pretensions they are imputed to him by the reader because he has not expressly disclaimed them and then follows immediately a charge of a want of the power of critical judgment if therefore a critic points out an error made by a Frederick or a Bonaparte that does not mean that he who makes the criticism would not have committed the same error he may even be ready to grant that had he been in the place of one of these great generals he might have made much greater mistakes he merely sees this error from the chain of events and he thinks that it should not have escaped the sagacity of the general this is therefore an opinion formed through the connection of events and therefore through the result but there is another quite different effect of the result upon the judgment that is if it is used quite alone as an example for or against the soundness of a measure this may be called judgment according to the result such a judgment appears at the first sight inadmissible yet it is not when Bonaparte marched to Moscow in 1812 all depended upon whether the taking of the capital and the events which preceded the capture would force the emperor Alexander to make peace as he had been compelled to do after the battle of Friedland in 1807 and the emperor Francis in 1805 and 1809 after Austerlitz and Wagram for if Bonaparte did not obtain a peace at Moscow there was no alternative but to return that is there was nothing for him but a strategic defeat we shall leave out the question what he did to get to Moscow and whether in his advance he did not miss many opportunities of bringing the emperor Alexander to peace which will also exclude all consideration of the disastrous circumstances which attended his retreat and which perhaps had their origin in the general conduct of the campaign still the question remains the same for however much more brilliant the course of the campaign up to Moscow might have been still there was always an uncertainty whether the emperor Alexander would be intimidated into making peace and then even if a retreat did not contain in itself the seeds of such disasters as in fact did occur still it could never be anything else than a great strategic defeat if the emperor Alexander agreed to a peace which was disadvantageous to him the campaign of 1812 would have ranked with those of Austerlitz Friedland and Wagram but these campaigns also if they had not led to peace would in all probability have ended in similar catastrophes whatever therefore of genius skill and energy the conqueror of the world applied to the task this last question addressed to fate remains always the same shall we then discard the campaigns of 1805 1807 1809 and say that on account of the campaign of 1812 that they were acts of imprudence and the results were against the nature of things and that in 1812 strategic justice at last found vent for itself in opposition to blind chance that would be an unwarrantable conclusion a most arbitrary judgment a case only half proved because no human eye can trace the thread of necessary connection of events up to the determination of the conquered princes still less can we say that the campaign of 1812 merited the same success as the others and that the reason why it turned out otherwise lies in something unnatural for we cannot regard the firmness of alexander as something unpredictable what can be more natural than to say that in the years 1805 1807 1809 burn apart judged his opponents correctly and that in 1812 he erred in that point on the former occasions therefore he was right in the latter wrong and in both cases we judge by the result all action in war as we have already said is directed on the probable not on certain results whatever is wanting uncertainty must always be left to fate or chance call it what you will we may demand that what is so left should be as little as possible but only in relation to the particular case that is as little as is possible in this one case but not that the case in which the least is left to chance is always to be preferred that would be an enormous error as follows from all our theoretical views there are cases in which the greatest daring is the greatest wisdom now in everything which is left to chance by the chief actor his personal merit and therefore his responsibility as well seems to be completely set aside nevertheless we cannot suppress an inward feeling of satisfaction whenever expectation realises itself and if it disappoints us our mind is dissatisfied and more than this of right and wrong should not be meant by the judgment which we form from the mere result or rather that we find there nevertheless it cannot be denied that the satisfaction which our mind experiences at success the pain caused by failure proceed from a sort of mysterious feeling we suppose between that success ascribed to good fortune and the genius of the chief a fine connecting thread invisible to the mind's eye and the supposition gives pleasure what tends to confirm this idea is that our sympathy increases becomes more decided if the successes and defeats of the principal actor are often repeated thus it becomes intelligible how good luck in war assumes a much nobler nature than good luck at play in general when a fortunate warrior does not otherwise less now interest in his behalf we have a pleasure in accompanying him in his career criticism therefore after having weighed all that comes within the sphere of human reason and conviction we'll let the result speak for that part where the deep mysterious relations are not disclosed in any visible form and will protect this silent sentence of a higher authority from the noise of crude opinions on the one hand while on the other it prevents the gross abuse which might be made of this last tribunal the verdict of the result must therefore always bring forth that which human suggestion cannot discover and it will be chiefly as regards the intellectual powers and operations that it will be called inter-requisition partly because they can be estimated with the least certainty partly because their close connection with the will is favorable to the exercising over it an important influence when fear or bravery precipitates the decision there is nothing objective intervening between them for our consideration and consequently nothing by which sagacity and calculation might have met the probable result we must now be allowed to make a few observations on the instrument of criticism that is the language which it uses because that is to a certain extent connected with the action in war but the critical examination is nothing more than the deliberation which should proceed action in war we therefore think it very essential that the language used in criticism should have the same character as that which deliberation in war must have for otherwise it would cease to be practical and criticism could gain no admittance in actual life we have said in our observations on the theory of the conduct of war that it should educate the mind of the commander for war or that its teaching should guide his education also that it is not intended to furnish him with positive doctrines and systems which he can use like mental appliances but if the construction of scientific formulae is never required or even allowable in war to aid the decision on the case presented if truth does not appear there in a systematic shape if it is not found in an indirect way but directly by the natural perception of the mind then it must be the same also in a critical review it is true as we have seen that wherever complete demonstration of the nature of things would be too tedious criticism must support itself on those truths which theory has established on the point but just as in war the actor obeys these theoretical truths rather because his mind is imbued with them and because he regards them as objective inflexible laws so criticism must also make use of them not as an external law or an algebraic formula of which fresh proof is not required each time they are applied but it must always throw light on the proof itself leaving only to theory the more minute and circumstantial proof thus it avoids a mysterious unintelligible phraseology and makes its progress in plain language that is with a clear and always visible chain of ideas certainly this cannot always be completely attained but it must always be the aim in critical expositions such expositions must use complicated forms of science as sparingly as possible and never resort to the construction of scientific aids as of a truth apparatus of its own but always be guided by the natural and unbiased impressions of the mind but this pious endeavor if we may use that expression has unfortunately seldom hitherto presided over critical examinations the most of them have rather been emanations of a species of vanity a wish to make a display of ideas the first evil which we constantly stumble upon is a lame totally inadmissible application of certain one-sided systems as a formal code of laws but it is never difficult to show the one-sidedness of such systems and this only requires to be done once to throw discredit forever on critical judgments which are based on them we have here to deal with the definite subject and as the number of possible systems after all can be but small therefore also they are themselves the lesser evil much greater is the evil which lies in the pompous retinue of technical terms scientific expressions and metaphors which these systems carry in their train and which like a rabble like the baggage of an army broken away from its chief hang about in all directions any critic who has not adopted a system either because he has not found one to please him or because he has not yet been able to make himself master of one will at least occasionally make use of a piece of one as one would use a ruler to show the blunders committed by a general the most of them are incapable of reasoning without using as a help here and there some shreds of scientific military theory the smallest of these fragments consisting in mere scientific words and metaphors are often nothing more than ornamental flourishes of critical narration now it is in the nature of things that all technical and scientific expressions which belong to a system lose their propriety if they ever had any as soon as they are distorted and used as general axioms or as small crystalline talismans which have more power of demonstration than simple speech thus it has come to pass that our theoretical and critical books instead of being straightforward intelligible dissertations in which the author always knows at least what he says and the reader what he reads are brimful of these technical terms which form dark points of interference with the author and the reader part company but frequently they are something worse being nothing but hollow shells without any kernel the author himself has no clear perception of what he means contents himself with vague ideas which if expressed in plain language would be unsatisfactory even to himself a third fault in criticism is the misuse of historical examples and a display of great reading or learning what the history of the art of war is we have already said and we shall further explain our views on examples and on military history in general in special chapters one fact merely touched upon in a very cursory manner may be used to support the most opposite views and three or four such facts of the most heterogeneous description brought together out of the most distant lands and remote times and heaped up generally distract and bewildered the judgment and understanding without demonstrating anything for when exposed to the light they turn out to be only trumpery rubbish made use of to show off the author's learning but what can be gained for practical life by such obscure partially false confused arbitrary conceptions so little is gained that theory on account of them has always been a true antithesis of practice and frequently a subject of ridicule to those whose soldierly qualities in the field are above question but it is impossible that this could have been the case if theory in simple language and by a natural treatment of those things which constitute the art of making war had merely sought to establish just so much as admits of being established if avoiding all false pretensions and irrelevant display of scientific forms and historical parallels it had kept close to the subject and had gone hand in hand with those who must conduct affairs in the field of their own natural genius end of book two chapter five recording by timothy fergusson gold coast australia book two chapter six of on war this libra vox recording is in the public domain recording by timothy fergusson on war by carl von class of its translated by colonel j j graham chapter six on examples examples from history make everything clear and furnish the best description of proof in the empirical sciences this applies with more force to the art of war than any other general shanhorst whose handbook is the best ever written on actual war pronounces historical examples to be of the first importance and makes an admirable use of them himself had he survived the war in which he fell the fourth part of his revised treatise on artillery would have given a still greater proof of the observing and enlightened spirit in which he sifted matters of experience but such use of historical examples is rarely made by theoretical writers the way in which they more commonly make use of them is rather calculated to leave the mind unsatisfied as well as to offend the understanding we therefore think it important to bring specially interview the use and abuse of historical examples unquestionably the branches of knowledge which light the foundation of the art of war come under the denomination of empirical sciences for although they are derived in a great measure from the nature of things still we can only learn this very nature itself for the most part from experience and besides that the practical application is modified by so many circumstances that the effects can never be completely learned from the mere nature of the means the effects of gunpowder that great agent in our military activity were only learned by experience and up to this hour experiments are continually in progress in order to investigate them more fully that an iron ball to which powder has given a velocity of a thousand feet in a second smashes every living thing which it touches in its course is intelligible in itself experience is not required to tell us that but in producing this effect how many hundred circumstances are concerned some of which can only be learned by experience and the physical is not the only effect which we have to study it is the moral which we are in search of and that can only be ascertained by experience and there is no other way of learning and appreciating it but by experience in the middle ages when firearms were first invented their effect owing to their rude make was materially but trifling compared to what it is now but their effect morally was much greater one must have witnessed the firmness of one of those masses taught and led by Bonaparte and the heaviest and most intermittent cannonade in order to understand what troops hardened by long practice in the field of danger can do when by a career of victory they have reached the noble principle of demanding from themselves their utmost efforts in pure conception none would believe it on the other hand it is well known that there are troops in the service of the european powers at the present moment who would easily be dispersed by a few cannon shots but no empirical science consequently also no theory of the art of war can always corroborate its truths by historical proof it would also be in some measure difficult to support experience by single facts if any means is once found efficacious in war it is repeated one nation copies another the thing becomes the fashion and in this matter it comes into use supported by experience and takes its place in theory which contents itself with appealing to experience in general in order to show its origin but not as verification of its truth but it is quite otherwise if experience is to be used in order to overthrow some means in use to confirm what is doubtful or introduce something new then particular examples from history must be quoted as proofs now if we consider closely the use of historical proofs four points of view readily present themselves for our purpose first they may be used merely as an explanation of an idea in every abstract consideration it is very easy to be misunderstood or not to be intelligible at all when an author is afraid of this an exemplification from history serves to throw the light which is wanted on his idea and to ensure he's being intelligible to his reader secondly it may serve as an application of an idea because by means of an example there is an opportunity of showing the action of those minor circumstances which cannot all be comprehended and explained in any general expression of an idea for in that consists indeed the difference between theory and experience both these cases belong to examples properly speaking the two following belong to historical proofs thirdly a historical fact may be referred to particularly in order only to support what one has advanced this is in all cases sufficient if we have only to prove the possibility of a fact or effect lastly in the fourth place from the circumstantial detail of a historical event and by collecting together several of them we may deduce some theory which therefore has its true proof in this testimony itself for the first of these purposes all that is generally required is a cursory notice of the case as it has only been used partially historical correctness is a secondary consideration a case invented might also serve the purpose as well only historical ones are always to be preferred because they bring the idea which they illustrate nearer to practical life the second use supposes a more circumstantial relation of events but historical authenticity is again of secondary importance and in respect to this point the same is to be said as in the first case for the third purpose the mere quotation of an undoubted fact is generally sufficient if it is asserted that fortified positions may fulfill their object under certain conditions it is only necessary to mention the position of wunzel witz in support of the assertion but if through the narrative of a case in history an abstract truth is to be demonstrated then everything in the case bearing on the demonstration must be analyzed in the most searching and complete manner it must to a certain extent develop itself carefully before the eyes of the reader the less effectively this is done the weaker will be the proof and the more necessary it will be to supply the demonstrative proof which is wanting in the single case by a number of cases because we have a right to suppose that the more minute details which we are unable to give neutralize each other in their effects in a certain number of cases if we want to show by example derived from experience that cavalry are better placed behind than in a line with infantry that it is very hazardous without a decided preponderance of numbers to attempt an enveloping movement with widely separated columns either on a field of battle or in the theater of war that is either tactically or strategically then in the first of these cases it would not be sufficient to specify some lost battles in which the cavalry was on the flanks and some gained in which the cavalry was in the rear of the infantry and in the latter of these cases it is not sufficient to refer to the battles of Revoli and Wagram to the attack of the Austrians on the theater of war in Italy in 1796 or of the friendship on the German theater of war in the same year the way in which these orders of battle or plans of attack essentially contributed to disastrous issues in those particular cases must be shown by closely tracing out circumstances and occurrences then it will appear how far such forms or measures are to be condemned a point which it is very necessary to show for a total condemnation would be inconsistent with truth it has already been said that when circumstantial detail of fact is impossible the demonstrative power which is deficient may to a certain extent be supplied by the number of cases quoted but this is a very dangerous method of getting out of the difficulty and one which has been much abused instead of one well explained example three or four are just touched upon and thus a show is made of strong evidence but there are matters where a whole dozen of cases brought forward would prove nothing if for instance there are facts of frequent occurrence and therefore a dozen other cases with an opposite result might just as easily be brought forward if anyone will instance a dozen lost battles in which the side beaten attacked in separate converging columns we can instance a dozen that have been gained in which the same order was adopted it is evident that in this way no result is to be obtained upon carefully considering these different points it will be seen how easily examples may be misapplied an occurrence which instead of being carefully analyzed in all its parts is superficially noticed is like an object seen at a great distance presenting the same appearance on each side and in which the details of its parts cannot be distinguished such examples have in reality served to support the most contradictory opinions to some downs campaigns are models of prudence and skill to others there are nothing but examples of timidity and want of resolution Burnapart's passage across the Noric Alps in 1797 may be made to appear the noblest resolution but also as an act of sheer temerity his strategic defeat in 1812 may be represented as the consequence either of an excess or of a deficiency of energy all these opinions have been broached and it is easy to see that they might well arise because each person takes a different view of the connection of events at the same time these antagonistic opinions cannot be reconciled with each other and therefore one of the two must be wrong much as we are obliged to the worthy few query for numerous examples introduced in his memoirs partly because a number of historical incidents have thus been preserved which might otherwise have been lost and partly because he was one of the first to bring theoretical that is abstract ideas interconnection with the practical in war insofar that the cases brought forward may be regarded as intended to exemplify and confirm what is theoretically asserted yet in the opinion of an impartial reader he will hardly be allowed to have attained the object he proposed to himself that of proving theoretical principles by historical examples for although he sometimes relates occurrences with great minuteness still he falls short very often of showing that the deductions drawn necessarily proceed from the inner relations of these events another evil which comes from the superficial notice of historical events is that some readers are either wholly ignorant of the events or cannot call them to remembrance sufficiently to be able to grasp the author's meaning so there is no alternative between either accepting blindly what is said or remaining unconvinced it is extremely difficult to put together or unfold historical events before the eyes of a reader in such a way as is necessary in order to be able to use them as proofs for the writer very often wants the means and can neither afford the time nor the requisite space but we maintain that when the object is to establish a new or doubtful opinion one single example thoroughly analyzed is Thalmer Instructives and 10 which are superficially treated the great mischief of these superficial representations is not that the writer puts his story forward as a proof when it has only a false title but that he has not made himself properly acquainted with the subject and that from this sort of slovenly shallow treatment of history a hundred false views and attempts at the construction of theories arise which would never have made their appearance if the writer had looked upon it as his duty to deduce from the strict connection of events everything new which he bought to market and sought to prove from history when we are convinced of these difficulties in the use of historical examples and at the same time of the necessity of making use of such examples then we shall also come to the conclusion that the latest military history is naturally the best field from which to draw them in as much as it alone is sufficiently authentic and detailed in ancient times circumstances connected with war as well as the method of carrying it on were different therefore its events are of less use to us either theoretically or practically in addition to which military history like every other naturally loses in the course of time a number of small traits and lineaments originally to be seen loses in color and life like a worn out or darkened picture so that perhaps at last only the large masses and leading features remain which thus acquire undue proportions if we look at the present state of warfare we should say that wars since that of the Austrian succession are almost the only ones which at least as far as armament have still a considerable similarity to the present and which notwithstanding the many important changes which have taken place both great and small are still capable of affording much instruction it is quite otherwise with the war of the Spanish succession as the use of firearms had not then so far advanced towards perfection and cavalry still continued the most important arm the farther we go back the less useful becomes military history as it gets so much the more meager and barren of detail the most useless of all is that of the old world but this uselessness is not altogether absolute it relates only to those subjects which depend on a knowledge of minute details or on those things in which the method of conducting war has changed although we know very little about the tactics in the battles between the Swiss and the Austrians the Burgundians and French still we find in them unmistakable evidence that they were the first in which the superiority of a good infantry over the best cavalry was displayed a general glance at the time of the con de Thierry teaches us how the whole method of conducting war is dependent on the instrument used for at no period have the forces used in war had so much the characteristics of a special instrument and been a class so totally distinct from the rest of the national community the memorable way in which the Romans in the second Punic war attacked the Carthaginian possessions in Spain and Africa while Hannibal still maintained himself in Italy is a most instructive subject to study as the general relations of the states and armies concerned in this indirect act of defense are sufficiently well known but the more things descend into particulars and deviate in character from the most general relations the less we can look for examples and lessons of experience from very remote periods for we have neither the means of judging properly of corresponding events nor can we apply them to our completely different method of war unfortunately however it has always been the fashion with historical writers to talk about ancient times we shall not say how far vanity and charlatanism may have had a share in this but in general we fail to discover any honest intention and earnest endeavor to instruct and convince and we can therefore only look upon such quotations and references as embellishments to fill up gaps and hide defects it would be an immense service to teach the art of war entirely by historical examples as Fuquare proposed to do but it would be full work for the whole life of a man if we reflect that he who undertakes it must first qualify himself for the task by a long personal experience in actual war whoever stirred by ambition undertakes such a task let him prepare himself for his pious undertaking as for a long pilgrimage let him give up his time spare no sacrifice fear no temporal rank or power and rise above all feelings of personal vanity of false shame in order according to the french code to speak the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth end of book two chapter six recording by timothy fergusson gold coast australia book three chapters one through five of on war this libra vox recording is in the public domain recording by timothy fergusson on war by carl von clauswitz translated by colonel jj graham book three of strategy in general chapter one strategy in the second chapter of the second book strategy has been defined as the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the war properly speaking it has to do with nothing but the battle but its theory must include in this consideration the instrument of this real activity the armed force in itself and in its principal relations for the battle is fought by it and shows its effects upon it in turn it must be well acquainted with the battle itself as far as relates to its possible results and those mental and moral powers which are the most important in the use of the same strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action which must be in accordance with the object of the war in other words strategy forms the plan of the war and to this end it links together the series of acts which are to lead to the final decision that is to say it makes the plans for the separate campaigns and regulates the combats to be fought in each as these are all things which to a great extent can only be determined on conjectures some of which turn out to be incorrect while a number of other arrangements pertaining to details cannot be made at all beforehand it follows as a matter of course that strategy must go with the army to the field in order to arrange particulars on the spot and to make modifications in the general plan which incessantly become necessary in war strategy can therefore never take its hand from the work for a moment that this however has not always been the view taken is evident from the former custom of keeping strategy in the cabinet and not with the army a thing only allowable if the cabinet is so near to the army that it can be taken for the chief headquarters of the army theory will therefore attend on strategy in the determination of its plans or as we may more properly say it will throw a light on things in themselves and on their relations to each other and bring out prominently the little that there is of principle or rule if we recall to mind from the first chapter how many things of the highest importance war touches upon we may conceive that a consideration of all requires a rare grasp of mind a prince or general who knows exactly how to organize his war according to his object and means who does neither too little nor too much gives by that the greatest proof of his genius but the effects of this talent are exhibited not so much by the invention of new modes of action which might strike the eye immediately as in the successful final result of the whole it is the exact fulfillment of silent suppositions it is the noiseless harmony of the whole action which we should admire and which only makes itself known in the total result inquirer who tracing back from the final result does not perceive the signs of that harmony is one who is apt to seek for genius where it is not and where it cannot be found the means and forms which strategy users are in fact so extremely simple so well known by their constant repetition that it only appears ridiculous to sound common sense when it hears critics so frequently speaking of them with high-flown emphasis turning a flank which has been done a thousand times is regarded here as a proof of the most brilliant genius there as a proof of the most profound penetration indeed even of the most comprehensive knowledge can there be in the book world more absurd productions it is still more ridiculous if in addition to this we reflect that the same critic in accordance with prevalent opinion excludes all moral forces from theory and will not allow it to be concerned with anything but the material forces so that all must be confined to a few mathematical relations of equilibrium and preponderance of time and space and a few lines and angles if it were nothing more than this then out of such a miserable business there would not be a scientific problem for even a schoolboy but let us admit there is no question here about scientific formulas and problems the relations of material things are all very simple the right comprehension of the moral forces which come into play is more difficult still even in respect to them it is only in the highest branches of strategy that moral complications and a great diversity of qualities and relations are to be looked for only at that point where strategy borders on political science or rather whether to become one and there as we have before observed they have more influence on the how much and how little is to be done than on the form of execution where the latter is the principal question as in the single acts both great and small in war the moral quantities are already reduced to a very small number thus then in strategy everything is very simple but not on that account very easy once it is determined from the relations of the state what should and may be done by war then the way to it is easy to find but to follow that way straightforward to carry out the plan without being obliged to deviate from it a thousand times by a thousand varying influences requires besides great strength of character great cleanness and steadiness of mind and out of a thousand men who are remarkable some for mind others for penetration others again for boldness or strength of will perhaps not one will combine in himself all those qualities which are required to raise a man above mediocrity in the career of the general it may sound strange but for all who know war in this respect it is a fact beyond doubt that much more strength of will is required to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics in the latter we are hurried on with the moment a commander feels himself born along in a strong current against which he does not contend without the most destructive consequences he suppresses the rising fears and boldly ventures further in strategy where all goes on at a slower rate there is more room allowed for our own apprehensions and those of others for objections and remonstrances consequently also for unreasonable regrets and as we do not see things in strategy as we do at least half of them in tactics with the living eye but everything must be conjectured and assumed the convictions produced are less powerful the consequence is that most generals when they should act remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts now let us cast a glance at history upon Frederick the Great's campaign of 1760 celebrated for its fine marches and maneuvers a perfect masterpiece of strategic skill as critics tell us is there really anything to drive us out of our wits with admiration in the king's first trying to turn down his right flank then his left then again his right and such are we to see profound wisdom in this no that we cannot if we are to decide naturally and without affectation what we rather admire above all is the sagacity of the king in this respect that while pursuing a great object with very limited means he undertook nothing beyond his powers and just enough to gain his object the sagacity of the general is visible not only in this campaign but throughout all the three wars of the great king to bring Silesia into the safe harbor of a well-guaranteed piece was his object at the head of a small state which was like other states in most things and only ahead of them in some branches of administration he could not be an alexander and as Charles the 12th he would only like him have broken his head we find therefore in the whole of his conduct of war a controlled power always well balanced and never wanting in energy which in the most critical moments rises to astonishing deeds and the next moment oscillates quietly on again in subordination to the play of the most subtle political influences neither vanity thirst for glory nor vengeance could make him deviate from his course and this course alone it is which brought him to a fortunate termination of the contest these few words do but scant justice to this phase of the genius of the great general the eyes must be fixed carefully on the extraordinary issue of the struggle and the causes which brought about that issue must be traced out in order thoroughly to understand that nothing but the king's penetrating eye brought him safely out of all dangers this is one feature in this great commander which we admire in the campaign of 1760 and in all others but in this especially because in none did he keep the balance even against such a superior hostile force with such a small sacrifice another feature relates to the difficulty of execution marches to turn a flank right or left are easily combined the idea of keeping a small force always well concentrated to be able to meet the enemy on equal terms at any point to multiply a force by rapid movement is as easily conceived as expressed the mere contrivance in these points therefore cannot excite our admiration and with respect to such things there is nothing further than to admit that they are simple but let a general try to do these things like Frederick the Great long afterwards authors who were eyewitnesses have spoken of the danger indeed of the imprudence of the king's camps and doubtless at the time he pitched them the danger appeared three times as great as afterwards it was the same with his marches under the eyes they often under the cannon of the enemy's army these camps were taken up these marches made not from want of prudence but because in down system in his mode of drawing up his army in the responsibility which pressed upon him and in his character Frederick found that security which justified his camps and marches but it required the king's boldness determination and strength of will to see things in this light and not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which 30 years after people still wrote and spoke few generals in this situation would have believed these simple strategic means to be practicable another difficulty in execution lay in this that the king's army in this campaign was constantly in motion twice it marched by wretched crossroads from the Elbe to Silesia in rear of down and pursued by laski beginning of july beginning of august it required to be always ready for battle and its marches had to be organized with a degree of skill which necessarily called forth a proportionate amount of exertion although attended and delayed by thousands of wagons still its subsistence was extremely difficult in Silesia for eight days before the battle of Lignitz it had constantly to march defiling alternately right and left in front of the enemy this costs great fatigue and entails great privations is it to be supposed that all of this could have been done without producing great friction in the machine can the mind of a great commander elaborate such movements with the same ease as the hand of a land surveyor uses the astrolabe does not the sight of the sufferings of their hungry thirsty comrades pierce the hearts of the commander and his generals a thousand times must not the murmurs and doubts which these cause reach his ear has an ordinary man the courage to demand such sacrifices and would not such efforts most certainly demoralize the army break up the bands of discipline and in short undermine its military virtue if firm reliance on the greatness and infallibility of the commander did not compensate for all here therefore it is that we should pay respect it is these miracles of execution which we should admire but it is impossible to realize all this in its full force without a foretaste of it by experience he who only knows war from books or the drill ground cannot realize the whole effect of this counter poise in action we beg him therefore to accept from us on faith and trust all that he is unable to supply from any personal experiences of his own this illustration is intended to give more clearness to the course of our ideas and in closing this chapter we will only briefly observe that in our exposition of strategy we shall describe those separate subjects which appear to us the most important whether of a moral or material nature then proceed from the simple to the complex and conclude with the interconnection of the whole act of war in other words with the plan for a war or campaign observation in an earlier manuscript of the first book are the following pages endorsed by the author himself to be used for the first chapter of the second book the projected revision of that chapter not having been made the passages referred to are introduced here in full by the mere assemblage of armed forces at a particular point a battle there becomes possible but does not always take place is that possibility now to be regarded as a reality and therefore an effective thing certainly it is so by its results and these effects whatever they may be can never fail one possible combats are on account of their results to be looked upon as real ones if a detachment is sent away to cut off the retreat of a flying enemy and the enemy surrenders in consequence without further resistance still it is through the combat which is offered to him by this detachment sent after him that he is brought to his decision if part of our army occupies an enemy's province which was undefended and thus deprives the enemy of very considerable means of keeping up the strength of his army it is entirely through the battle which our detached body gives the enemy to expect in case he seeks to recover the lost province that we remain in possession of the same in both cases therefore the mere possibility of a battle has produced results and it is therefore to be classed amongst actual events suppose that in these cases the enemy has opposed our troops with other superior in force and thus forced ours to give up their object without a combat then certainly our plan has failed but the battle which we offered at either of those points has not on that account been without effect for it attracted the enemy's forces to that point and in case our whole undertaking has done us harm it cannot be said that these positions these possible battles have been attended with no results their effects then are similar to those of a lost battle in this manner we may see that the destruction of the enemy's military forces the overthrow of the enemy's power is only to be done through the effect of battle whether it be that it actually takes place or that it is merely offered and not accepted two twofold object of the combat but these effects are of two kinds direct and indirect they are of the latter if other things intrude themselves and become the object of the combat things which cannot be regarded as the destruction of the enemy's force but only leading up to it certainly by a circuitous road but with so much the greater effect the possession of provinces towns fortresses roads bridges magazines and such may be the immediate object of a battle but never the ultimate one things of this description can never be looked upon as otherwise than a means of gaining greater superiority so as at last to offer battle to the enemy in such a way that it will be impossible for him to accept it therefore all these things must only be regarded as intermediate links steps as it were leading up to the effectual principle but never as the principle itself three example in 1814 by the capture of bonaparte's capital the object of the war was attained the political divisions which had their roots in paris came into active operation and an enormous split left the power of the emperor to collapse of itself nevertheless the point of view from which we must look at all this that through these causes the forces and defensive means of bonaparte were suddenly and very much diminished the superiority of the allies therefore just in the same measure increased and any further resistance then became impossible it was this impossibility which produced the peace with france if we suppose the forces of the allies at that moment diminished to a like extent through external causes if the superiority vanishes then at the same time vanishes also all the effect and importance of the taking of paris we have gone through this chain of argument in order to show that this is the natural and only true view of the thing from which it derives its importance it leads always back to the question what at any given moment of the war or campaign will be the probable result of the great or small combats which the two sides might offer to each other in the consideration of a plan for a campaign this question only is decisive as to the measures which are to be taken all through from the very commencement four when this view is not taken then a false value is given to other things if we do not accustom ourselves to look upon war and the single campaigns in a war as a chain which is all composed of battle strung together one of which always brings on another if we adopt the idea that the taking of a certain geographical point the occupation of an undefended province is in itself anything then we are very likely to regard it as an acquisition which we may retain and if we look at it so and not as a term in the whole series of events we do not ask ourselves whether this possession may not lead to greater disadvantages hereafter how often we find this mistake recurring in military history we might say that just as in commerce the merchant cannot set apart and place insecurity gains from one single transaction by itself so in war a single advantage cannot be separated from the result of the whole just as the former must always operate with the whole bulk of his means just so in war only the sum total will decide on the advantage or disadvantage of each item if the mind's eye is always directed upon the series of combats so far as they can be seen beforehand then it is always looking in the right direction and thereby the motion of the force acquires that rapidity that is to say willing and doing acquire that energy which is suitable to the matter and which is not to be thwarted or turned aside by extraneous influences chapter two elements of strategy the causes which condition the use of the combat in strategy may be easily divided into elements of different kinds such as the moral, physical, mathematical, geographical and statistical elements the first class includes all that can be called forth by moral qualities and effects to the second belong the whole mass of the military force its organization the proportion of the three arms and such and such to the third the angle of the lines of operation the concentric and eccentric movements in as far as their geometrical nature has any value in the calculation to the fourth the influences of country such as commanding points hills rivers woods roads and such and such lastly to the fifth all the means of supply the separation of these things once for all in the mind does good in giving clearness and helping to estimate it once at a higher or lower value the different classes as we pass onwards for in considering them separately many lose of themselves their borrowed importance one feels for instance quite plainly that the value of a base of operations even if we look at nothing in it but its relative position to the line of operations depends much less in that simple form on the geometrical element of the angle which they form with one another then on the nature of the roads and the country through which they pass but to treat strategy according to these elements would be the most unfortunate idea that could be conceived for these elements are generally manifold and intimately connected with each other in every single operation of war we should lose ourselves in the most soulless analysis and as if in a horrid dream we should be forever trying in vain to build up an arch to connect this base of abstractions with facts belonging to the real world heaven preserve every theorist from such an undertaking we shall keep to the world of things in their totality and not pursue our analysis further than is necessary from time to time to give distinctness to the idea which we wish to impart and which has come to us not by a speculative investigation but through the impression made by the realities of war in their entirety chapter three moral forces we must return again to this subject which is touched upon in the third chapter of the second book because moral forces are amongst the most important subjects in war they form the spirit which permeates the whole being of war these forces fasten themselves soonest and with the greatest affinity onto the will which puts in motion and guides the whole mass of powers uniting with it as it were in one stream because this is a moral force itself unfortunately they will escape from all book analysis for they will neither be bought into numbers nor into classes and require to be both seen and felt the spirit and other moral qualities which animate an army a general or governments public opinion in provinces in which war is raging the moral effect of a victory or a defeat are things which in themselves vary very much in their nature and which also according as they stand with regard to our object in our relations may have an influence in different ways although little or nothing can be said about these things in books still they belong to the theory of the art of war as much as everything else which constitutes war for i must hear once more repeat that it is a miserable philosophy if according to the old plan we establish rules and principles wholly regardless of all moral forces and then as soon as these forces make their appearance we begin to count exceptions which we begin to establish as it were theoretically that is make into rules or if we resort to an appeal to genius which is above all rules thus giving out by implication not only that rules were only made for fools but also that they themselves are no better than folly even if the theory of the art of war does no more in reality than recall these things to a remembrance showing the necessity of allowing to the moral forces their full value and of always taking them into consideration by doing so it extends its borders over the region of immaterial forces and by establishing that point of view condemns beforehand every one who would endeavor to justify himself before its judgment seat by the mere physical relations of forces further out of regard to all other so-called rules theory cannot banish the moral forces beyond its frontier because the effects of the physical forces and the moral are completely fused and are not to be decomposed like a metal alloy by a chemical process in every rule relating to the physical forces theory must present to the mind at the same time the share which the moral powers will have in it if it would not be led to categorical propositions at one time to timid and contracted at another to dogmatical and wide even the most matter of fact theories have without knowing it straight over into this moral kingdom for as an example the effects of a victory cannot in any way be explained without taking into consideration the moral impressions and therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in this book are composed half of physical half of moral causes and effects and we may say the physical are almost no more than the wooden handle whilst the moral are the noble metal the real bright polished weapon the value of the moral powers and their frequently incredible influence are best exemplified by history and this is the most generous and purest nourishment which the mind of the general can extract from it at the same time it is to be observed that it is less by demonstrations critical examinations and learned treaties than sentiments general impressions and single flashing sparks of truth which yield the seeds of knowledge that are to fertilize the mind we might go through the most important moral phenomena in war and with all the care of a diligent professor try what we could impart about each either good or bad but as in such a method one slides too much into the commonplace of trite whilst real mind quickly makes its escape in analysis the end is that one gets imperceptibly to the relation of things which everybody knows we prefer therefore to remain here more than usually incomplete and rhapsodical content to have drawn attention to the importance of the subject in a general way and to have pointed out the spirit in which the views given in this book have been conceived chapter four the chief moral powers these are the talents of the commander the military virtue of the army its national feeling which of these is the most important no one can tell in a general way for it is very difficult to say anything in general of their strength and still more difficult to compare the strength of one with that of another the best plane is not to undervalue any of them a fault which human judgment is prone to sometimes on one side sometimes on another in its whimsical oscillations it is better to satisfy ourselves of the undeniable efficacy of these three things by sufficient evidence from history it is true however that in modern times the armies of european states have arrived very much at a par as regards to discipline and fitness for service and that the conduct of war has as philosophers would say naturally developed itself thereby becoming a method common as were to all armies so that even from commanders there is nothing further to be expected in the way of application of special means of art in the limited sense such as frederick the second's oblique order hence it cannot be denied that as matters now stand greatest scope is afforded for the influence of the national spirit and her bituation of an army to war a long piece may again alter all this the national spirit of an army enthusiasm fanatical zeal faith opinion displays itself most in mountain warfare where everyone down to the common soldier is left to himself on this account a mountainous country is the best campaigning ground for popular levies expertness of an army through training and that well-tempered courage which holds the ranks together as if they had been cast in a mold show their superiority in an open country the talent of a general has most room to display itself in a closely intersected undulating country in mountains he has too little command over the separate parts and the direction of all is beyond his powers in open planes it is simple and does not exceed those powers according to these undeniable elective affinities plans should be regulated chapter five military virtue of an army this is distinguished from mere bravery and still more from enthusiasm for the business of war the first is certainly a necessary consistent part of it but in the same way as bravery which is a natural gift in some men may arise in a soldier as part of an army from habit and custom so with him it must also have a different direction from that which it has with others it must lose that impulse to unbridled activity and exercise of force which is its characteristic in the individual and submit itself to the demands of a higher kind to obedience order rule and method enthusiasm for the profession gives life and greater fire to the military virtue of an army but does not necessarily constitute a part of it war is a special business and however general its relations may be and even if all the male population of a country capable of bearing arms exercise this calling still it always continues to be different and separate from the other pursuits which occupy the life of a man to be imbued with a sense of the spirit and nature of this business to make use of to rouse to assimilate into the system the powers which should be active in it to penetrate completely into the nature of the business with the understanding through exercise to gain confidence and expertness in it to be completely given up to it to pass out of the man into the part which is assigned to us to play in war that is the military virtue of an army in the individual however much pains may be taken to combine the soldier and the citizen in one and the same individual whatever may be done to nationalize wars and however much we may imagine times have changed since the days of the old conditieri never will it be possible to do away with the individuality of the business and if that cannot be done then those who belong to it as long as they belong to it will always look upon themselves as a kind of guild in the regulations laws and customs in which the spirit of war by preference finds its expression and so it is in fact even with the most decided inclination to look at war from the highest point of view it would be very wrong to look down upon this corporate spirit a spirit core which may and should exist more or less in every army this corporate spirit forms the bond of union between the natural forces which are active in that which we have called military virtue the crystals of military virtue have a greater affinity for the spirit of a corporate body than for anything else an army which preserves its usual formations under the heaviest fire which is never shaken by imaginary fears and in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch which proud in the feeling of its victories never loses its sense of obedience its respect for and confidence in its leaders even under the depressing effects of defeat an army with all its physical powers in yield to privations and fatigue by exercise like the muscles of an athlete an army which looks upon all its toils as the means to victory not as a curse which hovers over its standards and which is always reminded of its duties and virtues by the short catechism of one idea namely the honor of its arms such an army is imbued with the true military spirit soldiers may fight bravely like vendians and do great things like the swiss the americans or spaniards without displaying this military virtue a commander may also be successful at the head of standing armies like eugene and malbrah without enjoying the benefit of its assistance we must not therefore say that a successful war without it cannot be imagined and we draw special attention to that point in order the more to individualize the conception which is here brought forward that the idea may not dissolve into a generalization and that it may not be thought that military virtue is in the end everything it is not so military virtue in an army is a definite moral power which may be supposed wanting and the influence of which may therefore be estimated like any instrument the power of which may be calculated having thus characterized it we proceed to consider what can be predicated of its influence and what are the means of gaining its assistance military virtue is for the parts what the genius of the commander is for the whole the general can only guide the whole not each separate part and where he cannot guide the part their military virtue must be its leader a general is chosen by the reputation of his superior talents the chief leaders of large masses after careful probation but this probation diminishes as we descend the scale of rank and in just the same measure we may reckon less and less upon individual talents but what is wanting in this respect military virtue should supply the natural qualities of a warlike people play just this part bravery aptitude powers of endurance and enthusiasm these properties may therefore supply the place of military virtue and vice versa from which the following may be deduced one military virtue is a quality of standing armies only but they require it the most in national risings its place is supplied by natural qualities which develop themselves more rapidly to standing armies opposed to standing armies can more easily dispense with it than a standing army opposed to a national insurrection for in that case the troops are more scattered and the divisions left more to themselves but where an army can be concentrated the genius of the general takes a greater place and supplies what is wanting in the spirit of the army therefore generally military virtue becomes more necessary the more the theater of operations and other circumstances make the war complicated and cause the forces to be scattered from these truths the only lesson to be derived is this that if an army is deficient in this quality every endeavor should be made to simplify the operations of the war as much as possible or to introduce double efficiency in the organization of the army in some other respect and not to expect from the mere name of a standing army that which only the veritable thing itself can give the military virtue of an army is therefore one of the most important moral powers in war and where it is wanting we either see its place supplied by one of the others such as the great superiority of general ship or popular enthusiasm or we find the results not commensurate with the exertions made how much that is great this spirit this sterling worth of an army this refining of ore into polished metal has already done we see in the history of the Macedonians under Alexander the Roman legions under Caesar the Spanish infantry under Alexander Farnese the Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus and Charles II the Prussians under Frederick the Great and the French under Bonaparte we must purposely shut our eyes against all historical proof if we do not admit that the astonishing successes of these generals and their greatness in situations of extreme difficulty were only possible with armies possessing this virtue this spirit can only be granted from two sources and only by these two conjointly the first is a succession of campaigns and great victories the other is an activity of the army carried sometimes to the highest pitch only by these does the soldier learn to know his powers the more a general is in the habit of demanding from his troops the sureer he will be that his demands will be answered the soldier is as proud of overcoming toil as he is of surmounting danger therefore it is only in the soil of incessant activity and exertion that the germ will thrive but also only in the sunshine of victory once it becomes a strong tree it will stand against the fiercest storms of misfortune and defeat and even against the indolent activity of peace at least for time it can therefore only be created in war and under great generals but no doubt it may last at least for several generations even under generals of moderate capacity and through considerable periods of peace with this generous and noble spirit of union in a line of veteran troops covered with scars and thoroughly endued to war we must not compare the self-esteem and vanity of the standing army held together merely by the glue of service regulations in a drill book a certain plotting onusness and strict discipline may keep up military virtue for a long time but can never create it these things therefore must have a certain value but must not be overrated order, smartness, goodwill also a certain degree of pride and high feeling are qualities of an army formed in time of peace which are to be prized but cannot stand alone the hole retains the hole and as with glass too quickly cooled a single crack breaks the whole mass above all the highest spirit in the world changes only too easily at the first check into depression and one might say into a kind of rhodomontate of alarm the French Sauvkippot such an army can achieve something through its leader never by itself it must be led with double caution until by degrees in victory and hardships the strength grows into the full armor beware then of confusing the spirit of an army with its temper end of book three chapters one through five recording by Timothy Ferguson Gold Coast Australia