 Question 31 of Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Trinity and Creation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 31 of what belongs to the unity or plurality in God. We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God, which gives rise to four points of inquiry. Concerning the word Trinity, whether we can say that the son is other than the father, whether an exclusive term which seems to exclude otherness can be joined to an essential name in God, and whether it can be joined to a personal term. First article, whether there is Trinity in God. Objection 1. It would seem that there is not Trinity in God, for every name in God signifies substance or relation. But this name Trinity does not signify the substance, otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the persons, nor does it signify relation, for it does not express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word Trinity is not to be applied to God. Objection 2. Further, this word Trinity is a collective term, since it signifies multitude, but such a word does not apply to God, as the unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word Trinity does not apply to God. Objection 3. Further, every trine is threefold, but in God there is not triplicity, since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither is there Trinity in God. Objection 4. Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the divine essence, because God is His own essence. Therefore if Trinity exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence, and thus in God there would be three essential unities, which is heresy. And Objection 5. Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract. For deity is God, and paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine, otherwise there would be nine realities in God, which of course is erroneous, therefore the word Trinity is not to be applied to God. On the contrary, Athanasius says, unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity is to be revered. I answer that the name Trinity in God signifies the determinant number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that we should use the word Trinity, because what is indeterminately signified by plurality is signified by Trinity in a determinate manner. Reply to Objection 1. In its etymological sense, this word Trinity seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as Trinity may mean trine unity. But in the strict meaning of the term, it rather signifies the number of persons of one essence. And on this account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as he is not three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other. And hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another. Reply to Objection 2. Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality of the supposita and a unity of some kind of order. For people is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense, this word Trinity is like other collective words, but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the Divine Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is unity of essence. Reply to Objection 3. Trinity is taken in an absolute sense, for it signifies the threefold number of persons. Traplicity signifies a proportion of inequality, for it is a species of unequal proportion according to Boethias. Therefore, in God there is not traplicity, but Trinity. Reply to Objection 4. In the Divine Trinity is to be understood both number and the persons numbered. So when we say Trinity in unity, we do not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times one, but we place the persons numbered in the unity of nature as the supposita of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the other hand we say unity in Trinity, meaning that the nature is in its supposita. Reply to Objection 5. When we say Trinity is Trine, by reason of the number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself, since the word Trine imports a distinction in the supposita of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is Trine, otherwise it follows that if the Trinity be Trine, there would be three supposita of the Trinity, as when we say God is Trine, it follows that there are three supposita of the Godhead. Second article, whether the Son is other than the Father. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father, for other is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If then the Son is other than the Father, he must be different from the Father, which is contrary to what Augustine says, that when we speak of three persons, we do not mean to imply diversity. Objection 2. Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore if the Son is other than the Father, it follows that he differs from the Father, which is against what Ambrose says, that the Father and the Son are one in Godhead. Nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any diversity. Objection 3. Further, the term alien is taken from Alius, but the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says that in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable. Therefore the Son is not other than the Father. Objection 4. Further, the terms other person and other thing have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Father. On the contrary, Augustine says, there is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another and the Holy Ghost another. Although the Father is one person, the Son another and the Holy Ghost another. I answer that since as Jerome marks, a heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity, we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty, because as Augustine says, nowhere is error more harmful. The quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful. Now in treating of the Trinity, we must be aware of two opposite errors and proceed cautiously between them. Namely, the error of aureus, who placed a Trinity of substance with a Trinity of persons, and the error of Sebelius, who placed unity of person with a unity of essence. Thus to avoid the error of aureus, we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference. We take away the unity of essence. We may, however, use the term distinction on account of the relative opposition. Hence, whenever we find terms of diversity or difference of persons used in inauthentic work, these terms of diversity or difference are taken to mean distinction. But lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the terms separation and division belong to the parts of a whole are to be avoided. Unless quality be taken away, we avoid the use of the term disparity. Unless we remove similitude, we avoid the terms alien and discrepant. For Ambrose says that in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy but one Godhead. And according to Hillary, as quoted above, in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable. To avoid the heresy of Sebelius, we must shun the term singularity lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence, Hillary says it is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are separate in Godhead. We must avoid the adjective only lest we take away the number of persons. Hence, Hillary says in the same book, we exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness. Nevertheless, we say the only Son, for in God there is no plurality of sons, yet we do not say the only God, for the deity is common to several. We avoid the word confused, lest we take away from the persons the order of their nature. And Ambrose says what is one is not confused and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference. The word solitary is also to be avoided lest we take away the society of the three persons, whereas Hillary says we confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God. This word other, however, in the masculine sense means only a distinction of suppositum. And hence we can properly say that the Son is other than the Father because he is another suppositum of the divine nature as he is another person and another hypostasis. Reply to Objection 1. Other, being like the name of a particular thing, refers to the suppositum and so there is sufficient reason for using it where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although he is another. Reply to Objection 2. Difference implies distinction of form. There is one form in God as appears from the text who as he was in the form of God. Therefore the term difference does not properly apply to God as appears from the authority quoted. Yet Damascene employs the term difference in the divine persons as meaning that the relative property is signified by way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each other in substance but according to determinate properties. But difference is taken for distinction, as above stated. Reply to Objection 3. The term alien means what is extraneous and dissimilar, which is not expressed by the term other. And therefore we say that the Son is other than the Father but not that he is anything alien. Reply to Objection 4. The neuter gender is formless, whereas the masculine is formed and distinct, and so is the feminine. So the common essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the common nature. And it's also in human affairs if we ask who is this man, we answer Socrates, which is the name of the suppositum. Whereas if we ask who is he, what is he, we reply a rational and mortal animal. So because in God distinction is by the persons and not by the essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son but not something else. Well conversely we say that they are one thing but not one person. Third article, whether the exclusive word alone should be added to the essential term in God. Objection 1. It would seem that the exclusive word alone is not to be added to an essential term in God for according to the philosopher, he is alone who is not with another, but God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that God is alone. Objection 2. Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every person per se and of all the persons together. For as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says we must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone. Therefore God cannot be said to be alone. And Objection 3. Further if this expression alone is joined to an essential term it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former as it is false to say God alone is Father since man also is Father. Nor again can it be applied as regards the latter for if this saying were true God alone creates it would follow that the Father alone creates as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father and it would be false as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression alone cannot be joined to an essential term in God. On the contrary it is said to the king of ages immortal, invisible, the only God. I answer that this term alone can be taken as a categoromatical term or as a sin categoromatical term. A categoromatical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given suppositum as for instance white to man as when we say a white man. If the term alone is taken in this sense it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined and it would follow that God was solitary against what is above stated. A sin categoromatical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject as this expression everyone or no one and likewise the term alone as excluding every other suppositum from the predicate. Thus when we say Socrates alone writes we do not mean that Socrates is solitary but that he has no companion in writing though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term alone being joined to any essential term in God as excluding the predicate from all things but God as if we said God alone is eternal because nothing but God is eternal. Reply to Objection 1 Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless if plurality of persons did not exist in God he would be alone or solitary for solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature. Thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise God would be alone or solitary though angels and men were with him supposing that several persons were not within him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God such less does it remove respective solitude in reference to a predicate. Reply to Objection 2 This expression alone, properly speaking, does not affect the predicate which is taken formally for it refers to the suppositum as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb only, being exclusive, can be applied either to subject or predicate to the only Socrates that is no one else runs and Socrates runs only that is he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God alone or the Trinity is God alone unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate as for instance the Trinity is God who alone is God. In that sense it can be true to say is that God who alone is God if the relative be referred to the predicate and not to the suppositum. So when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone but that the Trinity is God alone he speaks expositively as he might explain the words to the king of ages invisible the only God as applying not to the Father but to the Trinity alone. Reply to Objection 3 In both ways can the term alone be joined to an essential term. For this proposition God alone is Father can mean two things because the word Father can signify the person of the Father and then it is true for no man is that person or can signify that relation only and thus it is false because the relation of paternity is found also in others in a univical sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates nor does it follow therefore the Father alone creates because as logicians say an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term. For instance from the premise man alone is a mortal rational animal cannot conclude therefore Socrates alone is such. Fourth article whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term. Objection 1 it would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term even though the predicate is common for our Lord speaking to the Father said that they may know thee the only true God therefore the Father alone is true God. Objection 2 further he said no one knows the Son but the Father which means that the Father alone knows the Son but to know the Son is common to the persons therefore the same conclusion follows. Objection 3 further an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined and so does not exclude the part nor the universal for it does not follow that if we say Socrates alone is white that therefore his hand is not white or that man is not white but one person is in the concept of another as the Father is in the concept of the Son and conversely. Therefore when we say the Father alone is God we do not exclude the Son nor the Holy Ghost so that such a mode of speaking is true. Objection 4 further the church sings our most high O Jesus Christ. On the contrary this proposition the Father alone is God includes two assertions namely that the Father is God and that no other besides the Father is God but the second proposition is false for the Son is another from the Father and he is God therefore this is false the Father alone is God and the same of the like sayings. I answer that when we say Father alone is God such a proposition can be taken in several senses if alone means solitude in the Father it is false in a categorical sense but if taken in a sync categorical sense it can again be understood in several ways for if it excludes all others from the form of the subject it is true the sense being the Father alone is God that is he who with no other is the Father is God in this way Augustin expounds when he says we say the Father alone not because he is separate from the Son or from the Holy Ghost but because they are not the Father together with him this however is not the usual way of speaking unless we understand another implication as though we said he who alone is called the Father is God but in this strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate and thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense but true if it excludes it in the neuter sense because the Son is another person than the Father but not another thing and the same applies to the Holy Ghost but because this diction alone property speaking refers to the subject it tends to exclude another person rather than other things and such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally but it should be piously expounded whenever we find it in an authentic work reply to objection one when we say the only true God we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father but to the whole Trinity as Augustin expounds or if we understood of the person of the Father the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of essence insofar as the word only excludes another thing as above explained the same reply can be given to objection two for an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of essence hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term no one is not the same as no man which the word itself would seem to signify for the person of the Father could not be accepted but it is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense in any rational nature reply to objection three the exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined if they do not differ in suppositum as part and universal but the Son differs in suppositum from the Father and so there is no parity and reply to objection four we do not say absolutely that the Son alone is most high but that he alone is most high with the Holy Ghost in the glory of God the Father the end of question 31 question 32 of Summa Theologica of Paras Prima, Trinity and Creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica, Paras Prima, Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province question 32 the knowledge of the Divine Persons we proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the Divine Persons and this involves four points of inquiry whether the Divine Persons can be known by natural reason whether notions are to be attributed to the Divine Persons the number of the notions and whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions first article whether the Trinity of the Divine Persons can be known by natural reason objection one it would seem that the Trinity of the Divine Persons can be known by natural reason where philosophers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than by natural reason now we find that they said many things about the Trinity of Persons where Aristotle says through this number namely three we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God surpassing all things created and Augustine says I have read in their works so many words but enforced by many and various reasons that in the beginning was the word and the word was with God and the word was God and so on in which passage the distinction of Persons is laid down we read moreover in a gloss on Romans and Exodus that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign that is as regards knowledge of a third person and thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons likewise Trimagistus says the monad begot a monad and reflected upon itself and its own heat by which words the generation of the sun and procession of the Holy Ghost seemed to be indicated therefore knowledge of the Divine Persons can be obtained by natural reason objection two further Richard St. Victor says I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth so even to prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God who communicates himself infinitely in the procession of the Divine Persons while some are moved by the consideration that no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership Augustine proceeds to prove the Trinity of Persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind and we have followed him in this therefore the Trinity of Persons can be known by natural reason objection three further it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason for it ought not to be said that the Divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous therefore the Trinity of Persons can be known by natural reason on the contrary Hillary says let no man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind and Ambrose says it is impossible to know the secret of generation the mind fails the voice is silent but the Trinity of the Divine Persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession since therefore no man can know and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given it follows that the Trinity of Persons cannot be known by reason I answer that it is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason for as above explained man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except by natural creatures now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God as effects due to their cause accordingly by natural reason we can know of God that only which of necessity belongs to him as the principle of things and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating of God as above now the creative power of God is common to old Trinity and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence and not to the distinction of the persons therefore by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons whoever then tries to prove the Trinity of Persons by natural reason derogates from faith in two ways firstly as regards the dignity of faith itself which consists in its being concerned with invisible things that exceed human reason where for the Apostle says that faith is of things that appear not and the same Apostle says also we speak wisdom among the perfect but not the wisdom of this world nor of the princes of this world but we speak the wisdom of God in the mystery which is written secondly as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith for when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons and that we believe on such grounds therefore we must not attempt to prove what is of faith except by authority alone to those who receive the authority while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible hence it is said by Dionysius whoever wholly resists the word is far off from our philosophy whereas if he regards the truth of the word that is the sacred word we too follow this rule reply to objection one the philosophers did not know the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attribute such as paternity affiliation and procession according to the apostles words we speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the world that is the philosophers knew nevertheless they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons as power to the father wisdom to the son goodness to the holy ghost as will later on appear so when Aristotle says by this number and so forth we must not take it as if he affirmed a three fold number in God but that he wished to say that the ancients used the three fold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three in the platonic books also we find in the beginning was the word not as meaning the person begotten in God but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all things and which is appropriated to the son and although they knew these were appropriated to the three persons yet they are said to have failed in the third sign that is in the knowledge of the third person because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the holy ghost in that knowing God they did not glorify him as God or because the platonists asserted the existence of one primal being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe they consequently maintained the existence of another substance beneath him which they called mind or the paternal intellect containing the idea of all things as Macrobius relates they did not however assert the existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the holy ghost so also we do not assert that the father and the son differ in substance which was the error of origin and arias who in this follow the platonists when trimigistus says monad begot monad and so forth this does not refer to the generation of the son or to the procession of the holy ghost but to the production of the world for one god produced one world by reason of his love for himself replied to objection too reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point firstly for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle as a natural science where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always in uniform velocity reason is employed in another way not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle but as confirming an already established principle by showing the congruity of its results as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained not however as if this proof were sufficient or as much as some other theory might explain them in the first way we can prove that god is one and the like in the second way reasons avail to prove the trinity as when assumed to be true such reasons confirm it we must not however think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons this becomes evident when we consider each point for the infinite goodness of god is manifested also in creation because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power for if god communicates himself by his infinite goodness it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from god but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness likewise when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness hence it needs to share some others good in order to have the goodness of complete happiness nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of god for as much as the intellect is not in god and ourselves univocally hence Augustine says that by faith we arrive at knowledge and not conversely reply to objection 3 there are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us it was necessary for the right idea of creation the fact of saying that god made all things by his word excludes the error of those who say god produced things by necessity when we say that in him there is a procession of love we show that god produced creatures not because he needed them nor because of any other extrinsic reason but on account of the love of his own goodness so moses when he had said in the beginning god created heaven and earth subjoined god said let there be light in the divine word and then said god saw the light that it was good to show proof of the divine love the same is also found in the other works of creation in another way and chiefly that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race accomplished by the incarnate son and by the gift of the holy ghost second article whether there are notions in god objection one it would seem that in god there are no notions for Dionysia says we must not dare to say anything of god but what is taught to us by the holy scripture but holy scripture does not say anything concerning notions therefore there are none in god objection two further all that exists in god concerns the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons but the notions do not concern the unity of the essence nor the trinity of the persons for neither can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions for instance we do not say that paternity is wise or creates nor can what belongs to the persons be thus so predicated for example we do not say that paternity begets nor that filiation is begotten therefore there do not exist notions in god objection three further we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition for they are known of themselves but the divine persons are supremely simple therefore we are not to suppose any notions in god on the contrary Damascene says we recognize of hypothesis that is of persons in the three properties that is in the paternal the filial and the processional therefore we must admit properties and notions in god I answer that prepositivus concerning the simplicity of the persons said that in god there were no properties or notions and wherever there were he propounded the abstract for the concrete for as we are accustomed to say I beseech your kindness that is you who are kind so when we speak of paternity in god we mean god the father but as shown above the use of concrete and abstract names in god is not in any way repugnant to the divine simplicity for as much as we always name a thing as we understand it now our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence considered in itself and therefore our human intellect apprehends the names divine things according to its own mode that is insofar as they are found in sensible objects when its knowledge is derived in these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms and to signify subsistence in those concrete terms hence also we signify divine things as above stated by abstract names to express their simplicity whereas to express their subsistence and completeness we use concrete names but not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete as when we say deity and god or wisdom and wise but the same applies to the so that we may say paternity and father the chief motives for this can be cited the first to rises from the obstinacy of heretics for since we confess the father the son and the holy ghost to be one god and three persons to those who ask whereby are they one god and whereby are they three persons as we answer that they are one in essence or deity there must also be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are distinguished and these are the properties or notions signified by an abstract term as paternity and filiation therefore the divine essence is signified as what and the person as who and the property as whereby the second motive is because one person in god is related to two persons namely the person of the father to the person of the son and the person of the holy ghost this is not however by one relation otherwise it would follow that the son also and the holy ghost would be related to the father by one in the same relation thus since relation alone multiplies the trinity it would follow that the son and the holy ghost would not be two persons nor can it be said with prepositivus that as god is related in one way to creatures while creatures are related to him in diverse ways so the father is related by one relation to the son and to the holy ghost whereas these two persons are related to the father by two relations for since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another it must be said that two relations are not specifically different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them for the relation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of affiliation and servitude now all creatures are related to god as his creatures by one specific relation but the son and the holy ghost are not related to the father by one and the same kind of relation hence there is no parity further in god there is no need to admit any real relation to the creature while there is no reason against our admitting in god many logical relations but in the father there must be a real relation to the son and to the holy ghost hence corresponding to the two relations of the son and of the holy ghost whereby they are related to the father we must understand two relations in the father whereby he is related to the son and to the holy ghost hence since there is only one person of the father it is necessary that the relation should be separately signified in the abstract and these are what we mean by properties and notions reply to objection one and in holy scripture yet the persons are mentioned comprising the idea of notions as the abstract is contained in the concrete reply to objection two in god the notions have their significance not after the manner of realities but by way of certain ideas whereby the persons are known although in god these notions or relations are real as stated above therefore whatever has order any essential or personal act cannot be applied to the notions for as much as this is against their mode of signification hence we cannot say that paternity begets or creates or is wise or is intelligent the essentials however which are not ordered to any act but simply remove created conditions from god can be predicated of the notions where we can say that paternity is eternal or immense or such like so also on account of the real identity substantive terms whether personal or essential can be predicated of the notions where we can say that paternity is god and that paternity is the father reply to objection three although the persons are simple still without prejudice to their simplicity the proper ideas of the persons can be abstractedly signified as above explained third article whether there are five notions objection one it would seem that there are not five notions where the notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished from each other but the relations in god are only four therefore the notions are only four in number objection two further as there is only one essence in god he is called one god and because in him there are three persons therefore if in god there are five notions he may be called quinary which cannot be allowed objection three further if there are five notions for the three persons in god there must be in some one person two or more notions as in the person of the father there is inassability and paternity and commonspiration either these three notions really differ or not if they really differ it follows that the person of the father is opposed to several things but if they differ only logically it follows that one of them can be predicated up another so that we can say that as the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the common reality so commonspiration is paternity which is not to be admitted therefore there are not five notions objection four on the contrary it seems that there are more because as the father is from no one and therefore the notion of inassability so from the holy ghost no other person proceeds and in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion objection five further as the father and the son are the common origin of the holy ghost so it is common to the son and the holy ghost to proceed from the father therefore as one notion is common to the father and the son so there ought to be one notion common to the son and to the holy ghost I answer that a notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine person now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their origin and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another comes and of someone that comes from another and by these two modes a person can be known therefore the person of the father cannot be known by the fact that he is from another but by the fact that he is from no one and thus the notion that belongs to him is called inassability as the source of another he can be known in two ways because as the son is from him the father is known by the notion of paternity and as the holy ghost is from him he is known by the notion of common aspiration the son can be known as begotten by another and thus he is known by affiliation and also by another person proceeding from him the holy ghost and thus he is known in the same way as the father is known by common aspiration the holy ghost can be known by the fact that he is from another or from others thus he is known by procession but not by the fact that another is from him as no divine person proceeds from him therefore there are five notions in God inassability, paternity affiliation, common aspiration and procession of these only four are relations for inassability is not a relation except by reduction as will appear later four only are properties for common aspiration is not a property because it belongs to two persons three are personal notions between persons paternity affiliation and procession common aspiration and inassability are called notions of persons but not personal notions as we shall explain further on reply to objection one besides the four relations another notion must be admitted as above explained reply to objection two the divine essence is signified as a reality and likewise the persons are signified as realities whereas the notions are signified as ideas notifying the persons therefore although God is one by unity of essence and trying by trinity of persons nevertheless he is not quinary by the five notions reply to objection three since the real plurality in God is founded only on relative position the several properties of one person as they are not relatively opposed to each other do not really differ nor again are they predicated of each other because they are different ideas of the persons as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge although we do say that knowledge is power reply to objection four since person implies dignity as stated above we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is from him for this does not belong to his dignity as it belongs to the authority of the father that he is from no one reply to objection five the son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special mode of existence derived from the father as the father and the son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost the principle on which a notion is based must be something special thus no parity of reasoning exists fourth article whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions objection one it would seem that it is not lawful to have various contrary opinions of the notions where Augustine says no error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity to which mystery the notions belong but contrary opinions must be in some way erroneous therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions of the notions objection two further the persons are known by the notions but no contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated therefore neither can there be about the notions on the contrary the notions are not articles of faith therefore different opinions of the notions are permissible I answer that anything is of faith in two ways directly where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught as the Trinity and unity of God the incarnation of the son and the like and concerning these truths of false opinion of itself involves heresy especially if it be held obstinately a thing is of faith indirectly if the denial of it involves as a consequence something against faith as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Al Cana where it follows that the divine scripture would be false concerning such things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences against faith and particularly if no obstinacy be shown whereas when it is manifest and especially if the church has decided that the consequences follow against faith then the error cannot be free from heresy for this reason many things are now considered as heretical which were formally not so considered as their consequences are now more manifest so we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith if however anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow he would lapse into heresy by what has been said all the objections may be solved the end of question 32 question 33 of Summa Theologica Paras Prima Trinity and Creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Paras Prima Trinity and Creation by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 33 of the person of the father we now consider the person singly and first the person of the father concerning whom there are four points of inquiry whether the father is the principal whether the person of the father is property signified by this name father whether father in God is said personally before it is said essentially and whether it belongs to the father alone to be unbegotten first article whether it belongs to the father to be the principal objection 1 it would seem that the father cannot be called the principal of the son or of the Holy Ghost for principal and cause are the same according to the philosopher but we do not say that the father is the cause of the son therefore we must not say that he is the principal of the son objection 2 further a principal is so called in relation to the thing principled so if the father is the principal of the son it follows that the son is principled and is therefore created which appears false objection 3 further the word principal is taken from priority but in God there is no before and after as Athanasia says therefore in speaking of God we ought not to use the term principal on the contrary Augustine says the father is the principal of the whole deity I answer that the word principal signifies only that whence another proceeds since anything when something proceeds in any way we call a principal and conversely as the father then is the one whence another proceeds it follows that the father is a principal reply to objection 1 the Greeks use the words cause and principal indifferently when speaking of God whereas the latin doctors do not use the word cause but only principal the reason is because principal is a wider term than cause as cause is more common than element for the first term of a thing as also the first part is called the principal but not the cause now the wider term is the more suitable it is to use as regards God because the more special terms are the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature hence this term cause seems to mean diversity of substance and dependence of one from another which is not implied in the word principal for in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power whereas we use the term principal even in things which have no such difference but have only a certain order to each other as when we say that a point is the principal of a line or also when we say that the first part of a line is the principal of a line replied to objection 2 it is the custom with the Greeks to say that the son and the Holy Ghost are principals this is not however the custom with our doctors because although we attribute to the father something of authority by reason of his being the principal still we do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the son or to the Holy Ghost to avoid any occasion of error in this way Hillary says however the father is the greater nevertheless the son is not less to whom oneness of nature is to give reply to objection 3 although this word principal as regards its derivation seems to be taken from priority still it does not signify priority but origin for what a term signifies and the reason why it was imposed are not the same thing as stated above second article whether this name father is properly the name of a divine person objection 1 it would seem that this name father is not properly the name of a divine person for the name father signifies relation moreover person is an individual substance therefore this name father is not properly a name signifying a person objection 2 further a begetter is more common than father for every father begets but it is not so conversely but a more common term to God is stated above therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor rather than father objection 3 further a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone but the word is used by us metaphorically called begotten or offspring consequently he of whom is the word is metaphorically called father therefore the principle of the word in God is not properly called father objection 4 further everything which is said properly of God is said of God first before creatures but generation appears to apply to creatures before God because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds not only by relation but also by essence therefore the name father taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person on the contrary it is said he shall cry out to me thou art my father I answer that the proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons for as body and soul belong to the nature of man so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular body is this particular man distinguished from all other men now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the father hence this name father whereby paternity is signified is the proper name of the person of the father reply to objection 1 among us relation is not a subsisting person so this name father among us does not signify a person but rather the relation of a person however it is not so as some wrongly thought for in God the relation signified by the name father is a subsisting person hence as above explained this name person in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature reply to objection 2 according to the philosopher a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection and by its end now generation signifies something in process of being made whereas paternity signifies the compliment of generation and therefore the name father is more expressive as regards the divine person than janitor or begetter reply to objection 3 in human nature the word is not a subsistence and hence is not properly called begotten or son but the divine word is something subsistent in the divine nature and hence he is properly called son and his principle is called father reply to objection 4 the terms generation and paternity like the other terms properly applied to God our set of God before creatures as regards the thing signified but not as regards the motive signification hence also the apostle says I bend my knee to the father of my Lord Jesus Christ from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named this is explained thus it is manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of the thing generated and the nearer it is to the form of the generator the truer and more perfect is the generation as univical generation is more perfect than nonunivical for it belongs to the essence of the generator to generate what is like itself in form hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the begetter and begotten is numerically the same whereas in creatures it is not numerically but only specifically the same shows that generation and consequently paternity is applied to God before creatures hence the very fact that in God a distinction exists of the begotten from the begetter as regards relation only belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity third article whether this name father is applied to God firstly as a personal name objection one it would seem that this name father is not applied to God firstly as a personal name for in the intellect the common precedes the particular but this name father as a personal name belongs to the person of the father and taken in an essential sense it is common to the whole trinity for we say our father to the whole trinity therefore father comes first as an essential name before its personal sense objection two further in things of which the concept is the same there is no priority or predication but paternity and affiliation seem to be of the same nature according as a divine person is father of the son and the whole trinity is our father or the creatures since according to basil to receive is common to the creature and to the son therefore father and God is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally objection three further it is not possible to compare things which have not a common concept but the son is compared to the creature by reason affiliation or generation according to collosions who is the image of the invisible God the first born of every creature therefore paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to but has the same concept as paternity taken essentially on the contrary the eternal comes before the temporal but God is the father of the son from eternity while he is the father of the creature in time therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the son before it is so taken as regards the creature I answer that a name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained its whole signification before it is applied to that which only partially contains it for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the signification of the name since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things hence this name lion is applied first to the animal containing the whole nature of a lion and which is properly so called before it is applied to the man who shows something of a lion's nature as courage or strength or the like and of whom it is said by way of similitude now it is manifest from the foregoing that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in God the father and in God the son because one is the nature and glory of the father and the son but in the creature filiation is found in relation to God not in a perfect manner since the creator and the creature have not the same nature but by way of a certain likeness which is the more perfect and nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation for God is called the father of some creatures by reason only of a trace for instance of irrational creatures according to Job who is the father of the rain or who begot the drops of dew of some namely the rational creature by reason of the likeness of his image according to Deuteronomy is he not thy father who possessed and made and created thee and of others he is the father by similitude of grace and these are also called adoptive sons as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received according to Romans the spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God and of sons heirs also lastly he is the father of others by similitude of glory for as much as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory according to Romans we glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God therefore it is plain that paternity is applied to God first as importing regard of one person to another person before it imports the regard of God to creatures reply to objection one common terms taken absolutely in the order of our intelligence come before proper terms because they are included in the understanding of proper terms but not conversely for in the concept of the person of the father God is understood but not conversely but common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper terms which import personal relations because the person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production of creatures for as the word conceived in the mind of the artist understood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's mind so the son proceeds from the father before the creature to whom the name affiliation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the son as is clear from the words of Romans whom he foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of his son reply to objection two to receive is said to be common to the creature and to the son not in a univical sense but according to a certain remote similitude whereby he is called the firstborn of creatures hence the authority quoted subjoins that he may be the firstborn among many brethren after saying that some were conformed to the image of the son of God but the son of God possesses a position of singularity above others in having by nature what he receives to use as Basil also declares hence he is called the only begotten the only begotten who is in the bosom of the father he hath declared unto us from this appears the reply to the third objection fourth article whether it is proper to the father to be unbegotten objection one it would seem that it is not proper to the father to be unbegotten for every property there is nothing in that of which it has the property but unbegotten supposes nothing in the father it only removes something therefore it does not signify a property of the father objection two further unbegotten is taken either in a privative or in a negative sense if in a negative sense then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten but the holy ghost is not begotten neither is the divine essence therefore to be unbegotten is not proper to the father but if it be taken in a privative sense as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation it follows that the person of the father is imperfect which cannot be objection three further in god unbegotten does not signify relation for it is not used relatively therefore it signifies substance therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance but the son who is begotten does not differ from the father in substance therefore the father ought not to be called unbegotten objection four further property means what belongs to one alone since then there are more than one in god proceeding from another there is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another therefore the father is not alone unbegotten and objection five further as the father is the principal of the person begotten so he is of the person proceeding with opposition to the person begotten it is proper to the father to be unbegotten it follows that it is proper to him also to be unproceeding on the contrary hillary says one is from one that is the begotten is from the unbegotten namely by the property in each one respectively of inassibility and origin I answer that as in creatures there exist the first and secondary principal also in the divine persons in whom there is no before or after is formed the principal not from a principal who is the father and the principal from a principal who is the son now in things created a first principal is known in two ways in one way as the first principal by reason of its having a relation to what proceeds from itself in another way in as much as it is a first principal by reason of its not being from another thus therefore the father is known both by paternity and by common spiration as regards the persons proceeding from himself but as the principal not from a principal he is known by the fact that he is not from another and this belongs to the property of inassibility signified by this word begotten replied to objection one some there are who say that inassibility signified by the word unbegotten as a property of the father is not a negative term only but either that it means both these things together namely that the father is from no one and that he is the principal of others or that it imports universal authority or also his plenitude as the source of all this however does not seem true because this inassibility would not be a property distinct from paternity inspiration but would include them as the proper is included in the common for person authority signifying god nothing but the principal of origin we must therefore say with Augustine that unbegotten imports the negation of passive generation for he says that unbegotten has the same meaning as not a son nor does it follow that unbegotten is not the proper notion of the father for primary and civil things are notified by negations as for instance a point is defined as what has no part replied to objection to unbegotten is taken sometimes in a negative sense only and in that sense Jerome says that the holy ghost is unbegotten that is he is not begotten otherwise unbegotten may be taken in a kind of privative sense but not as implying any imperfection for privation can be taken in many ways in one way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another even though it is not of its own nature to have it for instance if a stone be called a dead thing as wanting life which naturally belongs to some other things in another sense privation is so called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members of its genus as for instance when a mole is called blind in a third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have in when sense privation imports an imperfection in this sense unbegotten is not attributed to the father as a privation it may be so attributed in the second sense meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not begotten while some person of the same nature is begotten in this sense the term unbegotten can be applied also to the holy ghost hence to consider it as a term proper to the father alone it must be further understood that the name unbegotten belongs to a divine person as the principle of another person so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of principle unbegotten by god or that there be understood in the term unbegotten that he is not in any way derived from another and not only that he is not from another by way only of generation in this sense the term unbegotten does not belong at all to the holy ghost who is from another by procession as a subsisting person nor does it belong to the divine essence of which it may be said that it is in the son or in the holy ghost from another only from the father replied to objection 3 according to damascene unbegotten in one sense signifies the same as uncreated and thus it applies to the substance where thereby does the created substance differ from the uncreated in another sense it signifies what is not begotten and in this sense it is a relative term just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation as not man is reduced to the genus of substance and not white to the genus of quality and since begotten implies relation in God unbegotten belongs also to relation thus it does not follow that the father unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the son begotten but only by relation that is as the relation of son is denied of the father replied to objection 4 in every genus there must be something first so in the divine nature there must be one principle which is not from another and which we call unbegotten to admit two inascibles is to suppose the existence of two gods and two divine natures ancillary says as there is one god so there cannot be two inascibles and this especially because did two inascibles exist one would not be from the other and they would not be distinguished by relative opposition and therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature replied to objection 5 the property of the father where he is not from another is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the son than by the removal of the procession of the holy ghost both because the procession of the holy ghost has no special name as stated above and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the son and simple being denied of the father that he is begotten although he is the principle of generation it follows as a consequence that he does not proceed by the procession of the holy ghost because the holy ghost is not the principle of generation but proceeds from the person begotten the end of question 33 question 34 of summa theologica pars pima trinity and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars pima trinity and creation by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 34 of the person of the son we next consider the person of the son three names are attributed to the son namely son word and image the idea of son is gathered from the idea of father hence it remains for us to consider word and image concerning word there are three points of inquiry whether word is an essential term in God or a personal term whether it is the proper name of the son and whether in the name of word is expressed relation to creatures first article whether word in God is a personal name objection one it would seem that the word in God is not a personal name or personal names are applied to God in a proper sense as father and son but word is applied to God metaphorically as origin says in the beginning was the word therefore word is not a personal name in God objection two further according to Augustine the word is knowledge with love and according to Anselm to speak is to the supreme spirit nothing but to see by thought but knowledge and thought and sight are essential terms in God therefore word is not a personal term in God objection three further it is to be spoken but according to Anselm as the father is intelligent the son is intelligent and the holy ghost is intelligent so the father speaks the son speaks and the holy ghost speaks and likewise each one of them is spoken therefore the name word is used as an essential term in God and not in a personal sense objection four further no divine person is made but the word of God is something therefore it is said fire hail snow ice the storms which do his word therefore the word is not a personal name in God on the contrary Augustine says as the son is related to the father so also is the word to him whose word he is but the son is a personal name since it is said relatively therefore so also is the word I answer but the name of word in God if taken in its proper sense is a personal name and in no way an essential name to see how this is true we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a three fold meaning well in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figuratively the clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word that is the vocal sound itself and the signification of the sound for according to the philosopher vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination as stated in De Anima the vocal sound which has no signification cannot be called a word wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact that it signifies the interior concept of the mind therefore it follows that first and chiefly the interior concept of the mind is called a word secondarily the vocal sound itself signifying the interior concept is so called and thirdly the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word Damascene mentions these three kinds of words saying that word is called the natural movement of the intellect whereby it is moved and understands and thinks as light and splendor which is the first kind again he says the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word but is uttered in the heart which is the third kind again also the word is the angel that is the messenger of intelligence which is the second kind word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a word thus we are wont to say this is the word I have said or which the king has commanded alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command now word is taken strictly in God as signifying the concept of the intellect hence Augustine says whoever can understand the word not only before it is sounded but also before thought with it with imaginary sound can already see some likeness of that word of whom it is said in the beginning was the word the concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself namely from the knowledge of the one conceiving hence word according as we use the term strictly of God signifies something proceeding from another which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God in as much as the divine persons are distinguished by origin hence the term word according as we use the term strictly of God is to be taken as said not essentially but personally reply to objection one the Arians who sprang from origin declared that the son differed in substance from the father hence they endeavored to maintain that when the son of God is called the word this is not to be understood in a strict sense less the idea of the word proceeding should compel them to confess that the son of God is of the same substance as the father for the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it as to remain within him but supposing word to be said metaphorically of God we must still admit word in its stricter sense for if a thing be called a word metaphorically this can only be of some manifestation either it makes something manifest as a word or it is manifested by a word if it is manifested by a word there must exist a word whereby it is manifested if it is called a word because it exteriorly manifests what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except insofar as it signifies the interior concept of the mind which any one may also manifest by exterior signs therefore although word may be sometimes said of God metaphorically nevertheless we must also admit word in the proper sense and which is said personally reply to objection too nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally except word alone for word alone signifies that which emanates from another for what the intellect forms in its conception is the word now the intellect itself according as it is made actual by the intelligible species is considered absolutely likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what existence is to actual being since the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent but an act remaining in the agent therefore when we say that word is knowledge the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect or any one of its habits but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing hence also Augustine says that the word is begotten wisdom for it is nothing but the concept of the wise one and in the same way it can be called begotten knowledge thus can also be explained how to speak is in God to see by thought for as much as the word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought still the term thought does not properly apply to the word of God for Augustine says therefore do we speak of the word of God and not of the thought of God less we believe that in God there is something unstable now assuming the form of word now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless for thought consists properly this has no place in God but when the intellect attains to the form of truth it does not think but perfectly contemplates the truth hence Anselm takes thought in an improper sense for contemplation reply to objection three as properly speaking word in God is said personally and not essentially so likewise is to speak hence as the word is not common to the father son and holy ghost so it is not true that the father son and holy ghost are one speaker so Augustine says he who speaks in that co-eternal word is understood as not alone in God but as being with that very word without which for soothe he would not be speaking on the other hand to be spoken belongs to each person for not only is the word spoken but also the thing understood or signified by the word therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word it belongs to each person to be spoken for the father by understanding himself the son and the holy ghost and all other things comprised in this knowledge conceives the word so that thus the whole trinity is spoken in the word and likewise also all creatures as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone speaks a stone Anselm took the term speak improperly for the act of understanding whereas they really differ from each other for to understand means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to the thing understood in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed but only the definition of our intellect for as much as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood in God however it means complete identity because in God the intellect and the thing understood are all together the same as was proved above whereas to speak means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived for to speak is nothing but to utter a word but by means of the word it imports a habitude the thing understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understands thus only the person who utters the word is speaker in God although each person understands and is understood and consequently is spoken by the word reply to objection for the term word is there taken figuratively as the thing signified or effected by word is called word for thus creatures are said to do the word of God as executing any effect where to they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word second article whether word is the son's proper name objection one it would seem that word is not the proper name of the son for the son is a subsisting person in God but word does not signify a subsisting thing as appears in ourselves therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the son objection two further the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered therefore if the son is properly the word he proceeds from the father by way only of utterance which is the heresy of Valentine as appears from Augustine objection three further every proper name of person signifies some property of that person therefore if the word is the son's proper name it signifies some property of his and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned objection four further whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding but the son understands therefore some word belongs to the son and consequently to be word is not proper to the son objection five further it is said of the son bearing all things by the word of his power when spazzle infers that the holy ghost is the son's word therefore to be word is not proper to the son on the contrary Augustine says by word we understand the son alone I answer that word said of God in its proper sense is used personally and is the proper name of the person of the son for it signifies an emanation of the intellect and the person who proceeds in God by way of emanation of the intellect is called the son and this procession is called generation as we have shown above hence it follows that the son alone is properly called word in God reply to objection one to be and to understand are not the same in us hence that which in us intellectual being does not belong to our nature but in God to be and to understand are one in the same hence the word of God is not an accident in him or an effect of his but belongs to his very nature and therefore it must be something subsistent for whatever is in the nature of God subsists and so Damacine says that the word of God is substantial and has a hypostatic being but other words are the activities of the soul reply to objection two the error Valentine was condemned not as the Arians pretended because he asserted that the son was born by being uttered as Hillary relates but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author as appeared from Augustine reply to objection three in the term word the same property is comprised in the name son hence Augustine says word and son express the same for the sons nativity which is his personal property is signified by different names which are attributed to the son to express his perfection in various ways to show that he is of the same nature as the father he is called the son to show that he is co-eternal he is called the splendor to show that he is altogether like he is called the image to show that he is begotten literally he is called the word all these truths cannot be expressed by only one name reply to objection four to be intelligent belongs to the son in the same way as it belongs to him to be God since to understand is said of God essentially as stated above now the son is God begotten and not God begetting and hence he is intelligent not as producing a word proceeding for as much as in God the word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect but is distinguished from the principle of the word only by relation reply to objection five when it is said of the son bearing all things by the word of his power word is taken figuratively for the effect of the word hence the gloss says that the word is here taken to mean command in as much as by the effect of the power of the word things are kept as also by the effect of the power of the word things are brought into being Basil speaks widely and figuratively in applying word to the Holy Ghost in the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person known may be called his word and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the son's word because he manifests the son third article whether the name word imports relation to creatures objection one it would seem word does not import relation to creatures for every name that connotes some effect in creatures is said of God essentially but word is not said essentially but personally therefore word does not import relation to creatures objection two further whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time as lord and creator but word is said of God from eternity therefore it does not import relation to the creature objection three further word imports relation to the source once it proceeds therefore if it imports relation to the creature it follows that the word proceeds from the creature objection four further ideas in God are many according to their various relations to creatures therefore if word imports relation to creatures it follows that in God there is not one word only but many and objection five further if word imports relation to the creature this can only be because creatures are known by God but God does not know beings only he also knows non-beings therefore in the word are implied relations to non-beings which appears to be false on the contrary Augustine says that the name word signifies not only relation to the father but also relation to those beings which are made through the word by his operative power by answer that word implies relation to creatures for God by knowing himself knows every creature now the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand but because God by one act understands himself and all things his one only word is expressive not only of the father but of all creatures and as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God whereas as regards creatures it is both cognitive and operative so the word of God is only expressive of what is in God the father but is both expressive and operative of creatures and therefore it is said he spake and they were made because in the word is implied the operative idea of what God makes reply to objection one the nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person for person is an individual substance of a rational nature therefore the name of a divine person as regards the personal relation does not imply relation to the creature but it is implied in what belongs to the nature yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures so far as the essence is included in its meaning for as it properly belongs to the son to be the son so it properly belongs to him to be God begotten or the creator begotten and in this way the name word imports relation to creatures reply to objection two since the relations result from actions some names import the relation of God to creatures which relation follows on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect as to create and to govern and the like are applied to God in time but others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect but it buys in the agent as to know and to will such are not applied to God in time and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the word nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to him in time but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect reply to objection three creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves but by his own essence hence it is not necessary that the word should proceed from creatures although the word is expressive of creatures reply to objection four the name of idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God and it is not said personally but the name of word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker and consequently relation to creatures in as much as God by understanding himself understands every creature and so there is only one word in God and that is a personal one reply to objection five God's knowledge of non-beings and God's word about non-beings are the same because the word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God as Augustine says nevertheless the word is expressive and operative of beings but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings the end of question 34 question 35 of Summa Theologica Parse Prima Trinity and Creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Parse Prima Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 35 of the image we next inquire concerning the image about which there are two points of inquiry whether image in God is said personally and whether this name belongs to the son alone first article whether image in God is said personally objection one it would seem that image is not said personally of God for Augustine says the Godhead of the Holy Trinity and the image where unto man is made are one therefore image is said of God essentially and not personally objection two further Hillary says an image is a like species of that which it represents but species or form is said of God essentially therefore so also is image objection three further image is derived from imitation before and after but in the divine persons there is no before and after therefore image cannot be a personal name in God on the contrary Augustine says what is more absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself therefore the image of God is a relation and is thus a personal name I answer that image includes the idea of similitude still not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image but only similitude of species or at least of some specific sign in corporeal things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure for we see that the species of different animals are of different figures but not of different colors hence if the color of anything is depicted on a wall this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise depicted further neither is the similitude of species or a figure is enough for an image which requires also the idea of origin because as Augustine says one egg is not the image of another because it is not derived from it therefore for a true image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species or at least in specific sign now whatever imports procession or origin in God belongs to the persons hence the name image is a personal name reply to objection one image properly speaking means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another that to the likeness of which anything proceeds is properly speaking called the exemplar and isn't properly called the image nevertheless Augustine uses the name of image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the image to whom man was made reply to objection two these as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of image means the form derived from one thing to another in this sense image is said to be the species of anything as that which is assimilated to anything is called its form in as much as it has a like form reply to objection three imitation in God does not signify posteriority but only assimilation second article whether the name of image is proper to the sun it seems that the name of image is not proper to the sun because as Damocene says the Holy Ghost is the image of the sun therefore image does not belong to the sun alone objection two further similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an image as Augustine says but this belongs to the Holy Ghost who proceeds from another by way of similitude therefore the Holy Ghost is an image and so to be image does not belong objection three further man is also called the image of God according to Corinthians the man not to cover his head for he is the image and the glory of God therefore image is not proper to the sun on the contrary Augustine says the sun alone is the image of the father I answer that the Greek doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is the image of both the father and of the son but the Latin doctors attribute the name image to the sun alone for it is not found in the canonical scriptures except as applied to the sun as in the words who is the image of the invisible God the first born of creatures and again who being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance some explain this by the fact that the son agrees with the father not in nature only in the notion of principle whereas the Holy Ghost agrees neither with the son nor with the father in any notion this however does not seem to suffice because as it is not by reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God as Augustine says so neither by reason thereof do we consider that similitude which is essential to image hence others say that the Holy Ghost because there cannot be an image of an image nor of the father because again the image must be immediately related to that which it is the image and the Holy Ghost is related to the father through the son nor again is he the image of the father and the son because then there would be one image of two which is impossible hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is in no way an image but this is no proof for the father and the son are one principle as we shall explain further on hence there is nothing to prevent there being one image of the father and of the son in as much as they are one since even man is one image of the whole trinity therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that as the Holy Ghost although by his procession he receives the nature of the father as the son also receives it nevertheless is not said to be born so although he receives the likeness of the father we cannot call the image because the son proceeds as word and it is essential to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds whereas this does not essentially belong to love although it may belong to that love which is the Holy Ghost in as much as he is the divine love reply to Objection 1 Damocene and the other Greek doctors commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude reply to Objection 2 the Holy Ghost is like to the father and the son still it does not follow that he is the image as above explained reply to Objection 3 the image of the thing may be found in something in two ways in one way it is found in something of the same specific nature as the image of the king is found in his son in another way it is found in something of a different nature as the king's image on the coin in the first sense the son of the father in the second sense man is called the image of God and therefore in order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man man is not simply called the image but to the image whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection but it cannot be said that the son of God is to the image because he is the perfect image of the father the end of question 35