 Our next speaker is an amazing person been in the community for a long time and also an award-winning author with a forward by Jeff Moss himself, The Dark Tangent, so let's hear it up. All right, and you didn't come to see me speak so I'm gonna turn it over to our speaker so everyone give a round of applause, thank you. Thank you for the introduction. Thanks to all of you for showing up today. My name is Mikko. I live in Helsinki, which is in Finland, which is in Europe. And Finland is right next to Russia. So Russia, what do you think about when you hear Russia? Big country, long history, great culture. Also the biggest country in the world, by far. So Finland has five and a half million people. We have 1,300 kilometers, that's 800 miles of border with the biggest country on the planet. So let me tell you about this guy. This is Emil, Emil Saukkonen, a shoemaker from the southeastern part of Finland born in 1905. He was happily making shoes and tending his small farm with his wife and their six daughters in Karelia, that's the southeastern part of Finland, when Russia invaded Finland in 1939. So you can sort of see the picture. The biggest country on the planet invades a country of five million people at the time. It's pretty clear who's gonna win, right? It's pretty obvious to everybody who's gonna win. So what should you do when the biggest country in the world starts invading your small country? You can't win. So why fight? That's the logic big part of Eastern Europe followed during those defining moments of the beginning of the Second World War. Well, Finland chose different and Finland fought the Russians for six years. And I guess it tells something about the Finnish mindset when it's obvious that you're entering a fight which you will not win. You cannot win this fight, but you go and fight anyway. Well, after six years, Russia invaded the southeastern part of Finland and the northeastern part of Finland, but Finland kept its independence. 1945, we signed a peace treaty, we lost some part of our land to the Russians, but we were independent, the most important part. Unfortunately, the farm where Emil was living was in Karelia, that's the part we lost to Russians. So Emil took the family, the six daughters and the wife and the cows. And they started a long trek from Karelia which was no longer part of Finland. They moved to central Finland. During the long trek, which took like two months to get where they finally settled, the seventh and final daughter of the family was born. And they named her Rauha, which means peace because she finally had peace in Finland. And this wouldn't be a story of a family living in Finland if we wouldn't have to add the fact that when they left Karelia, they took the kids and the cows, they also took their sauna, this sauna right here. The sauna which they then rebuilt when they rebuilt the farm and their family in central Finland, the sauna which still stands there today. So over these 80 years, Finland has been part of the West because of the decisions and the sacrifice done during the Second World War where we managed to keep our independence. Big part of Eastern Europe was part of Soviet Union for decades and we had a quite different story for our country. Finland is a Western country with Western values, a very high tech country, home of Linux and Angry Birds and what have you. And also I'm coming to you from the newest NATO country in the world. Thank you for having us, we promise to do our part. So we've had a very long history with a very large and complicated neighbor and I'm not an expert in Russian mindsets or psychology but it's quite clear that it is a nation which sort of needs a strong leader. Whether that strong leader is right or wrong, that's the history that they seem to have. But I do know a guy who is an expert in the mindset and if you're more interested in how an expert in Russian psychology sees the way Russia has been shaped, there's a YouTube talk by a friend of mine, Marti Gikari, a retired colonel from Finnish intelligence. She has an hour long, sorry, he has an hour long talk in YouTube about this exact topic. It's definitely not supposed to trust short links but if you trust me, that's a link to the talk. So I've been working with computer security all my life. The first DEF CON I went to was in 1999. The first malware by reverse engineer was in 1992. This one. And for the younger members in the audience, this is a thumb drive from the 1990s. This is what thumb drives used to look like. This is single-sided single density. So it's 360 kilos of data. That's how we used to roll. Back then when I was analyzing viruses in 1992, 1993, of course they were spreading much slower because we had to physically carry viruses around. There was no internet. Well, the technology existed but nobody was using it at the time. So all outbreaks were physical outbreaks of floppies which people were carrying with themselves as they were traveling. Which means in Finland we got quite a bit of Russian malware. It's a lot of travel between the neighboring countries. Couple of examples of viruses, Russian viruses, I analyzed at the time here in the top, a virus called Phantom. On the top, a virus called Crash. These are both from 1992. I've analyzed both of them back then over 30 years ago. Well times changed. Internet became a thing. Floppy-based viruses died out. Email worms became a thing. And we started to see a lot of Russian-made email worms as well, but all the way until roughly 2003, they were mostly just pranks. Viruses written for fun. They were not trying to make money or make anyone famous or send a message. They were basically the same thing as these early viruses under MS-DOS. Playing pranks with the users, deleting files, formatting hard drives, or showing messages, maybe playing music. One thing which changed then was with mobile phones. So we started seeing mobile phone malware around the turn of the century. 2005 was the first money-making malware we found, again, Russian-made malware. The thing you see here on the screen is called Convario, written by a Russian malware writer called Elodor. This is a Symbian series 60 virus. So this is 2005, years and years before iPhone phones had internet connectivity, but it was really, really basic. Most of the things which were being sent between devices were SMS text messages or Bluetooth. Convario is a Bluetooth virus. I actually have a video here. If you watch closely, the phone which is in my hand right there in the top, I'm running Convario, and if you watch the phones on the table, you can see how quickly it jumps to five different phones like that, five infected phones over Bluetooth. This is how bad things were in 2005 because Bluetooth at the time was really insecure protocol where overloading attacks were easily done. The protocol was later changed and these things died out, but it's an example of the kind of malware we were seeing at the time. Now, there's a crucial difference between infecting mobile phones and infecting computers. Mobile phones could make phone calls, which means they could call expensive numbers. You would call them 1,800 or 1,900 numbers here in USA. Many of the early viruses spreading on the early mobile phones made money by either sending text messages to premium rate numbers or making long phone calls to premium rate numbers, which means money enters the picture. Right around the same time, we start seeing botnets being turned into spam botnets, which were being used by spammers to send Viagra spam by the millions, which of course is being done to make money, and that means we now have a connection between malware writers and spammers, and that means money enters the picture as well. That means online forums specializing in crime started to appear. Forums or websites like Gangsta Box operating from St. Petersburg, or Iframe Biz operating from Moscow, we're popular at the time, and you can sort of see the lifestyle image, these Russian crime gangs, early Russian crime gangs we're trying to impose on the users. Like join us, you can make a lot of money, you can buy a nice car, hang out with beautiful ladies. They also like to portray themselves as like organized crime at the time. This is Carter Planet or the Images Carter Planet we're showing of themselves. Carter Planet was another early forum run by, let's say Russian speaking online criminals. Russian speaking means it's not just Russians, it's basically all of a big part of the Soviet Union, which of course at the time had disbanded, but the language of course lives on in countries which are no longer part of Russia. Carter Planet was one of the leading criminal forums, Russian criminal forums in the late 2000s, together with Dog Market. As an example of the kind of trading that was being done there, this is script selling credit cards. The price at the time in 2003, well Visa Gold, $80, Amex, $50 and so on. Crime helped by key loggers which were infecting people around the world, except in Russia. And this is a trend we've seen from the very early days of money making Russian malware. They're infecting victims everywhere except in their own country. The typical way they detect where they are is simply looking at the keyboard layout. And if it's a Cyrillic keyboard, they don't infect the machine. If it's anything else, they infect the machine. So it's not only avoiding victims in Russia, it's also avoiding victims in Ukraine or Georgia or Bulgaria and some other countries which use Cyrillic layout in their keyboard. Why do they avoid local victims? Is this some sort of patriotism? No. It's about avoiding the local law enforcement. If all the victims are in faraway countries, traditionally Russian law, criminal hunting, well, Russian cops don't really care. These early crime forums did a lot of marketing as well. Here's an early video from Cardiplanet. It actually has a nice soundtrack as well but I've lost it over the years. Want to change your lifestyle? Become one of us and, you know, you can buy dumps that's stolen credit cards or COBs will make you rich. Be independent, Cardiplanet is the place to be. A year or two later, we started seeing commercial exploit kits. Some of you will remember. Eight, nine, 10 years ago, still the most common way of getting infected on your computer was to browse a website. We were still running Java and Flash at the time. Exploit kits would, I mean, you would have a website install an exploit kit and anybody who would visit the website would get infected if they had unpatched Java Flash or something like that on their machines. One of the most popular ones was Blackhole. That's what the control interface or admin interface for Blackhole looked like so you would actually get very good analytics and statistics about who you've infected and where in the world they are. Some of the related criminals of the time included this guy, this is Kenadi Kapkanov or famous of the Avalanche botnet. He was actually eventually apprehended. He was involved in real world crime as well. Fun detail is that when the cops actually busted his apartment in Moscow, he actually shot at the cops with a Kalashnikov and then jumped from the fourth floor window and ran away, he was found later. But these are the kinds of online criminals that were around at the time. Other examples of the players we were tracking back then Dmitry Fedotov in left, also known as Paunsch online in the center of Roman Seleznev with his pile of rubbles. And last but not least, Eugene Yevgeny Bogachev, famous of the Zeus botnet. And Yevgeny was eventually apprehended. He was charged. I think he should have been charged with crimes against good taste as well. Mysteriously, he was let go by the Russian law enforcement and the legend is that he gave his botnet to Russian intelligence and in exchange he gained his freedom. We don't really know if this is true, but it's possible. If you imagine from the point of view of Russian intelligence gaining access to an existing botnet with tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of infected workstations around the world is interesting. Because you can use that to find interesting victims in the interesting organizations in countries that you are interested in. So the cooperation, voluntary or involuntary cooperation between Russian online criminals and Russian intelligence, there are many anecdotes and legends about it and it's likely that it has happened. And if it has happened, it's probably something along these lines. The money started to be good. This is the parking place of Karin Baratov. Who hacked most of you? Because he's the LinkedIn hacker. He stole huge amount of LinkedIn credentials 10 years ago. Maxim Boyko in downtown Moscow, alleged launderer of a lot of money for, ransomware groups, ransomware groups which are a big problem still today. And that gets us to where we are today. Lockpit, Quantum Alpha, Ransomex, Blackpasta, another Russian speaking ransomware gangs. Gangs which I've started calling cybercrime unicorns. Unicorn companies are private, typically high tech companies which are valued to be worth over a billion dollars. Cybercrime unicorns are cybercrime gangs which would be valued at a billion dollars if they could be valued. Of course they're not gonna do an IPO or something like that. But if you look at the revenues of some of these gangs, if you look at the revenues of Lockpit, if it would be a company, it would be a unicorn. So we are living in the age of cybercrime unicorns. Ransomeware has gone through major age or different eras if you think back where we were in the beginning of ransomware problems which really started 10 years ago in 2013 with CryptoLocker and CryptoWall. Initially this was a consumer problem. Initially it was infecting home computers because home computers are the easiest target and it was encrypting photos. So you would get hit with ransomware on your home computer and the ransomware would encrypt your holiday pictures and you would have to pay a hundred bucks or 300 bucks to get your own pictures back. That's what the problem looked like 10 years ago. But 10 years ago they were already using Bitcoin and very quickly these groups realized that the real money is not in home users, it's in companies and enterprises. And eventually they migrated to this double extortion mechanism which we see today with these leak sites like this. So it's not just that they encrypt your files, it's not just that they gain access to your data centers, your cloud instances, your backups and they encrypt all of that, they also steal the files. And if you don't pay the ransom, you're gonna end up on this leak site and they're gonna upload your files. And it's actually really eye-opening to simply to go to one of these Tor leak sites for one of these large groups like Lockpit or Blackpasta or Ransomex or Klopp and simply scroll through the list. It's a never-ending list of victims, like hundreds and hundreds of companies from all over the world of all business areas of all sizes. You'll see a car dealership from Denmark, then you see a steel factory from Venezuela, then you see a integrator from United States. And the reason why the victims are so different is that these attackers typically are simply going after a vulnerability. They have an exploit. Then they just scan the IPV for address space for the two billion IP addresses and they find victims. Then they pick victims from there and they end up being completely different countries, completely different businesses. The amount of money ransomware gangs have been making has been roughly doubling for the last couple of years and to make matters worse, they've been keeping their wealth in Bitcoin. Many of these gangs had thousands of Bitcoins, tens of thousands of Bitcoins five years ago. Imagine how much their wealth has grown simply by holding on to the Bitcoins they have. They prefer to keep their wealth in cryptocurrencies instead of real-world currencies simply because it's harder to track. So what do these cyber crime unicorns do with their money? Well, I guess we already saw some examples with this. They go and buy the Ferrari. Sure. Then beyond that, well, they invest. They built their own data centers. They start to run physical operations. Some of these gangs have offices. They have people coming to the office five days a week. They have holidays for their employees. They pay salaries twice a month. They have lawyers working for them. They have HR units recruiting more criminals to join them. They have business analysts. They run these as professional operations. Another thing they do is this. This is Bustion Secure, a pen testing company which we ran into some time ago. And it was a little bit weird because they were paying really well. They had a lot of open positions. They were basically paying twice the salary that anyone else was paying for pen testers. Fully remote positions. Sounds like a good deal. Well, this is not really Bustion Secure. This is a Russian cyber crime gang called Fin7. They set up at least two different fake front ends for pen testing companies which didn't exist to hire people like us who don't realize that the company that they just joined for a fully remote pen testing position isn't actually a company at all. They would train the new employees, then they would give them tasks. This week you're doing a pen test for this company. Please write a report by Friday. And this company had not ordered a pen test. So when these cyber crime unicorns can afford to invest in their operations, they become more professional in every way including that they are starting to compete for the same skills or for the same people. Whether the people know that they are joining a crime gang or not. So in 2007 we saw what many people call a web war one. This happened in Estonia. Estonia is the closest neighbor to Finland. It's just 80 kilometers between the capital of Finland and capital of Estonia. Tallinn, that's the two closest capitals in the world. And this is really weird in a way because I've lived all my life in Helsinki. In 1980s Tallinn was really far away. Like no one ever went to Tallinn. You needed a visa, there was no reason to go to Tallinn, it was Soviet Union. Like why would you go there? Then Estonia got its independence in 1992. Today it's the most digital country in the world. There's every hour a boat ride going over this 50 mile trip to go from Helsinki to Tallinn or back. We have employees who work for us in Helsinki who actually live in Tallinn who commute every day. It's that close. So it used to be really far away and now it's really close. Which is really weird because nothing really changed except the politics, right? In 2007 independent Estonia started getting rid of some of the old statues they had around including their statue for the Russian soldier. This started real world riots in Tallinn because the Russian speaking Estonian people felt that this was somehow hurting their feelings. And these attacks very quickly moved to online attacks. Denial of service attacks which we had never seen in scale anywhere in the world. Shutting down all infrastructure Estonia had at the time including all the banks, public sector, law enforcement websites, all of that. The whole story about how Estonia started from nothing and became the most digital country in the world is amazing. Again I'm gonna give you a link to somewhere else. I'm a host for a podcast called Herrasmies Hakkerit which in English is the gentleman hackers. That's me and Tomi Tuominen. We're the hosts of the podcasts. It's typically in Finnish but we did a special episode in English because last summer we interviewed this gentleman, this is Thomas Hendrik Ilves, the previous president of Estonia. He served full terms as the president and he was one of the brains behind the operation on how to convert an ex-Soviet state into the most digital country in the world. It's a two hour podcast so when you have two hours to kill when you're driving somewhere, download and listen to it, it's pretty amazing how they turned the country completely around. Again a short link for the brave of you right over there. And as we speak about gentlemen, this is Jevgeny. Jevgeny Kaspersky or Eugene Kaspersky as many of you know him over here. Kaspersky Lab is the biggest technology success story, international success story out of Russia. I've known Jevgeny for years and years. He's, we used to work together. He's been to Helsinki countless times. We've spent so much time in bars together. I haven't seen him in five years now. Of course right now situation is quite different. Everything changed. Of course in February last year when Russia physically invaded Ukraine. But the story of Kaspersky Lab is significant and it's important to understand how successful they were internationally. For many years, if you went to amazon.com and you sorted the biggest selling software products on amazon.com, number one would be Kaspersky Antibox here in the United States, which is remarkable. Like try to think of Russian technology success stories. It's actually hard to come up with other examples than Kaspersky. Like can you name Russian mobile phone manufacturers? No. Or Russian laptop makers? No. You might know some software projects. Like maybe Nginx, the reverse proxy would be an example of a project people would know about which is Russian. Well, it was Russian, it was sold. But Kaspersky really went international. They were able to sell their products to US government for many years, which is remarkable. They were sponsoring Ferrari in Formula One. Sponsoring goddamn Ferrari in goddamn Formula One. It doesn't get much bigger than that. And it's also interesting when you compare Russia and China. Russia is the biggest country on the planet. China has, well, hold on. China was the biggest country by population. India just bypassed them earlier this year. Nevertheless, we can all think of Chinese technology companies we know. We know China. I'm actually running this DEF CON laptop. It's a Lenovo laptop. It's a Chinese company right here. Or Huawei. Or OnePlus. Or Foxconn. This unlimited amount of Chinese companies which sell their products all over the world. Russia really doesn't. They don't export their technology, which is interesting. And also right now in this situation where we are imposing very strong sanctions on Russia, that's a blessing. We couldn't put the kind of sanctions we're putting on Russia on China. Because we all use Chinese technology. We don't use Russian technology. You all have Chinese chips in your pockets right now. None of you have anything made in Russia in your pockets, unless someone of you is carrying a Kalashnikov. And if you are, I don't want to know. Now, Russia has been a powerhouse of governmental activity as well. Our labs in Helsinki have over the years analyzed over and over different Russian governmental operations, some of which have been hit targets in Finland, including Finnish government or Finnish ministries, some of which we've uncovered as we've been investigating international cases. But for example, we did a long research on the Dukes or APT-28 or Cozy Beer, as it's known by other names, when they were really active in the Nordic countries or in Finland around 2007, 2015. Fun fact, many of the BAPE files they were using at the time were related to Ukraine. I actually went back to look at my notes of the Duke operations that we investigated 10 years ago. And for example, these word documents right here which have exploits in them both are related to Ukraine. But before we go further into Ukraine, let's jump back to Russian crime gangs. Now, Evil Corp or Dark Side or Are Evil is one of the best known Russian cyber crime unicorns, or WAS, because they no longer exist. They made the headlines after they hit major targets around the world. Their lifestyle was very well known. This is in the center, the Lamborghini Huracan, which belongs to Maxim Jakubets. The oddies next to him are his arms generals. That's the logic. It goes, the boss gets the Lambo, the second in command get the oddies. And here's Maxim downtown Moscow, showing off with his Lamborghini. We have to wait a while while the Lenovo laptop will... So, targets that Are Evil or Dark Side or Evil Corp hit included Colonial Pipeline and JSP Foods at the same time. Here in USA, SolarWinds operation was underway. All of this resulted in President Biden taking a stand. Let me play you another video. I'm resisting the temptation to click again because I know it's... Then it would just jump over it. I believe this thing doesn't have an SSD. It actually has a physical spinning drive. All right, I'm gonna click again. Wish me luck. Now it's probably going to jump over it when it finally loads the video. I talked about the proposition that certain critical infrastructure should be off limits to attack, period. By cyber or any other means, I gave them a list. If I'm not mistaken, I don't have in front of me 16 specific entities. 16 defined as critical infrastructure under US policy, from the energy sector to our water systems. Of course, the principle is one thing. It has to be backed up by practice. Responsible countries need to take action against criminals who conduct ransomware activities on their territory. Responsible countries have to take action against criminals who conduct ransomware operations on their soil. Very true. The next step we saw happening was a lot of movements done by the US State Department where they first put out wanted by the FBI science, then started offering $10 million rewards for information leading to arrests of some of these gangs, which is the same amount the US State Department is offering for terrorist leaders. So, yeah, they started to take this thing seriously. As a result, we started seeing more arrests than we've seen ever. I started calling it the cyber crime unicorn hunting season. So it looked good for a while. Unfortunately, all of that ended and was mostly undone in February last year when Russia invaded Ukraine. The intelligence we have shows that many of these arrested people have been let go. Maybe they are cooperating with the government with cyber attacks or something like that. So fighting nation states is different than fighting criminals. The comparison I've used is that if a street thug wants to kill you, you can probably defend yourself against that. You can have a life vest or whatever. If James Bond wants to kill you, James Bond will kill you. Doesn't really matter if you have a life vest. And this is the difference between defending against criminals and defending against nation states. Criminals will just find another target because they want money. They don't want to hit you, they want money. Nation states want you. That's the difference. Now, one of the first Russian nation state attacks was the Bakhshut Yankee case from 2008. And I have a small part to play in the unraveling of this history because the very first malware of the Bakhshut Yankee case, which was a USB malware spreading on USB thumb drives, was called agent PD sets. I named it. We analyzed this back in our lab. We got a sample on a USB thumb drive from a NATO country in 2008. I just picked a name for it with no particular importance, but it is the very first sample in the Bakhshut Yankee incident, which actually if you compare code, matches some of the code in Turla or Turla today, which is of course one of the biggest FSB operations run by Russian nation states. Countries have had a different attitude on what to do about Russian governmental hacking. I love what the Dutch have done. The photograph here is taken at the Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, showing Russian cyber operatives taking off from a, or landing from a air flock plane, which just arrived from Moscow to Amsterdam. Then Dutch intelligence follows this group of five individuals as they travel from Amsterdam to The Hague. They check in to Marriott The Hague, which is right next door to the building you see in the background, which is the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons. This happens in 2018. Ex-Russian agent Sergei Schriphol was poisoned two months earlier in London. The samples of that poison were being investigated inside this building as this group of Russian hackers, governmental hackers, parked their car outside, or in the next door, and then the Dutch intercept them, look at the car, and realize that the car is full of wifi hacking equipment. So what do they do? These Russians have diplomatic passports, they can't be arrested. What did the Dutch do? Well, they sent them home, they drove them back to Schiphol, put them on the first air flock plane, put them back to Russia. And then they took their passports and posted them online. That's nice. This is the kind of operation, or this is the kind of retaliation the Russians understand. If you put sanctions on them, or if you tell them that that wasn't nice, they don't care. If you punch them in the mouth, they understand what you mean. This is the virtual punching in the mouth. Related cases we've seen since, we've seen, of course, the Prikarpattu Oblenergo case, that's the Ukrainian power grid operator, which was famously hacked and caused the big outage in 2017. Ukrainian power grid has hacked again in 2018. But then when the war broke out again last year, the Russians were unable to do it again. They tried and failed. Ukraine has been able to defend itself amazingly well, both in the real world, but also in the online world. Why is Ukraine so good in fighting Russian governmental attacks? Because they've been doing it longer than anyone else. For the last 10 years, or at least for the last eight years, let's say, they've been defending against governmental attacks from Russia over and over and over again. In fact, I would claim they are the best country in the world in defending their network against Russian governmental attacks. When you look at other countries, we do tabletop exercises or play war games, play make-believe, like if the Russians would do this, what would we do then? If they would do this, what would we do then? Ukraine doesn't do that. They've been defending against very real attacks for longer than anyone else. You become an expert in anything when you do it long enough and they've done this long enough. And that's one of the things we can learn from Ukraine. Of course, they've also received a lot of help from the West, but Ukraine will rise. This one day, this war will be over and the West will be there to rebuild Ukraine and welcome Ukraine as part of the West. Russia will not rise. It's gonna be quite different story for them. So what's the way out of this conflict? What's the way out of this war? What's the way out of this crisis? Our previous prime minister, Miss Sanna Marine, was asked this question a couple of months ago. I'm actually waiting for the next video to start. So it's a... Again, I'm tempted to click again, but I'll bring my own laptop the next time. I promise. I'm certain it will come, just like Biden showed up eventually. But while we wait for the machine to wake up, I will be done in just a moment, so we will go to questions and answers. Okay, here we go. So the question posed to our prime minister while he was, I believe, in Prague, in Czech Republic was Miss Sanna Marine. What is the way out of this conflict? Her answer is that the way out of this conflict is for Russia to leave Ukraine. That's the way out of this conflict. As simple as that, there is no other way. Russia leaves Ukraine, conflict is over. That's all they have to do. So what about the sauna that Emil took with his family when they left Karelia in 1945? Like I said, the sauna is still standing there. The youngest daughter, Rauha, who was born during the trip from Karelia to central Finland, later moved to Helsinki and had three sons, the middle one of those three sons. She went to work for the Finnish State Computing Center in 1968. Pretty much nobody was working with computers in 1968. My mom was. That, of course, meant that we got a home computer very early on. This is the receipt for a Commodore 64 and the 1541 floppy drive my mom bought me in March, 1984. I still have this computer today. I wrote my first commercial software on it in 1987. I wrote a series of published games on this computer back then. And I'm really glad I was able to tell my mom before she passed away. Thanks, because she's the reason I'm here today. Thank you very much. And we have time for a couple of questions. The first two people to ask me a question will get a copy of the book. The guy with the funny hat has the first question. Shout it out. Because this very little, okay, the question was why is posting a passport important or anything like that? Well, it burns, of course, the individual to all countries forever. It is known as a spy, Russian spy forever. And there's not much more you can do. These are diplomats. You can't arrest them. You can't put them in the jail. You can expose them. Most countries don't do that. The Dutch do. Points to the Dutch. And the second book goes to you. So question was about the difference on offensive operations from Russia and to Russia. There's a big difference how Western intelligence agencies look at offensive operations. We're right now in the United States. USA has the best offensive capability in the world. USA has put more money for more years than any other country in the world. Best offensive capability is right here. Yet USA is almost never seen using offensive operations or they're almost never caught. And that's the difference. Russians and pretty much the Chinese, they don't really care if they're caught. Because they know nothing's going to happen. The worst thing is that the passport gets posted online. Western intelligence agencies, the worst thing that could happen for them would be to get caught. It's seen as an embarrassment. The West is not supposed to hack. They're not supposed to do that. The operations they do are very rarely caught. If they are caught, they're to be caught because an insider leaked information about the operations. That's the difference. So there are offensive operations from the West to Russia. They're almost never caught. That's my analysis of what's going on. Do we have more questions, please? Can you say a bit louder? Sorry, who's being made? I'm sorry, the Pentagon. The Pentagon, yes. The US fiscal infrastructure would be treated as a man's audience of physical concern. Right. Do you think that's the answer? So the question is, the claims from US government that they would retaliate attacks, cyber attacks with real world attacks, the first time this was claimed was by Obama. It's been repeated many times. It's got to be empty talk. The threshold of retaliating a cyber attack with real world attacks is impossibly high, especially because of false flag attacks. You can simply make your attacks look like it's a friendly country. Would USA retaliate an attack from Vancouver against Pentagon with missiles unlikely to happen? And that's all we have time for today. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.