 So let me start by thanking actually Fintar for his support for the writing of this book. It came out actually of having invited him to deliver the 2011 annual wider lecture, which I did in New York actually, and then he asked me to turn this into a book. So it's the result of a low experience. I think let me start by underscoring two features of this book. The first one is that it's written by an economist from the developing world. I think the issues of the developing countries are in a sense all throughout the book, which is a significant difference with other books on the international monetary system, which generally ignore or underestimate the issues of the developing countries. The second is that I finally decided to use this term non-system, which is actually not my invention. It was a term that was very commonly used in the 1970s after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the resulting non-system they say that evolved out of that because the negotiations that took place in the committee of 20 from 1972 to 1974 to actually design an alternative to Bretton Woods were total failure. So what happened were ad hoc solutions. I mean the most notable is the exchange rate system or non-system because the idea was to re-establish some party exchange rates and there were a couple of attempts at doing that, but in March 1973 the Europeans just told the US that there was no hope of that, that the exchange rates have to float. So the floating of the exchange rate of major currencies was not a desired solution. It was a de facto solution or non-solution, let's say. And then later on, of course, the French, for example, wanted to give a role to the gold and there was a heated negotiations about that, about the role of the special Roman rise, which also failed. So let me start with the main messages of the book and then I'll give the floor to the panelists. So on the global research system, the book basically argues for a system that has to be both stable and fair, particularly with developing countries. And it proposes basically a multi-currency system, but with a much stronger role for the special drawing rights of the IMF, which are going to turn 50 next year but have been largely underutilized in the current system. And it particularly argues for a special drawing rights being used more actively, actually as the major source of financing of IMF programs, which in a sense is turning the IMF into a small partial world central bank, which issues its own currency and its currency used like all central banks do. I am a central banker now, so I do it basically to lend. You create money to lend or by lending, let's say. And so this is actually the proposal that the way I propose it is that the SDRs are issued regularly and those that are not used by countries will be considered deposits in the IMF, which the IMF then can lend to countries. So that's basically the proposal in that regard. Now, excuse me, on macroeconomic cooperation, there are a lot of ideas about that. The first one is to actually more actively use the IMF rather than the G20, basically because you can have a limited dialogue of the major countries, but within the IMF they are responsible for the whole membership rather than what happens today is that most negotiations take place totally outside the IMF. But the second one, a second set of ideas relate to the exchange system, which after all is the major mechanism that the international, the world economy has to try to rebalance the imbalances in the balance of payments, which is a recurring problem as I argue in the book. So every time you more or less solve one, a global imbalance, there are new ones that come into being and there are no mechanisms to correct those imbalances. And sometimes the exchange movements go against that. And therefore I go back to the proposals again, proposals that in some cases were developed in the 1970s of using some system of reference rates or reference bands. And actually one of the advantages of a system such as that is first of all that there could be less volatility of the major currencies, I think the volatility of the euro and dollar exchange rate, which is the major dual exchange rate in the world, is a source of a lot of uncertainty for all parties in the international community, including developing countries, which then have to manage that volatility. But also because it would give a very clear definition of what manipulating the exchange rate means, which is basically to move the exchange rate in the opposite direction to what the reference rate would look like. Now in relation to, excuse me, in relation to crisis prevention and resolution, I basically have a whole chapter on the issue of regulating cross-border capital flows as a major topic, a topic which there has been a lot of discussion and as we have seen today, again, the volatility of financing for emerging and developing countries is a major source of macroeconomic uncertainty. Therefore, this regulation should be considered part of the financial regulation in general. It's quite peculiar that the G20, through the financial stability board, has promoted a stronger prudential regulation but has totally ignored cross-border capital flows as a source of uncertainty in finance. And therefore, this should be a major topic on how to do that, a major topic analysis. The second is to have larger emergency financing. But particularly, I argue repeatedly in the book for unconditional automatic facilities of some sort. In a sense, I showed that the swap credit lines or the Fed, for example, which is the major mechanism of financing among developed country central banks, which is a totally automatic unconditional facility, should actually be a model to which the IMF should approach some of its credit lines. I mean, the only one that looks a little like that is the flexible credit line, but it has only been used by two countries now, Mexico and my country, Colombia, which does use it. And it could be even more automatic in terms of the approval line. And the other is the need for an international debt work-out mechanism, a formal mechanism of a sort, going beyond the market mechanism that had been developed, let's say, on a broader scale in the last decades, including in particular in recent times after the problems of Argentina in the US or in New York courts with this debt structuring that happened in 2014. And finally, I have three lines of proposals on improved governance of the system. The first is the traditional issue of the voice and representation of developing countries in the IMF, which is a topic that is again in the agenda. There was the last reforms in 2010, which took place actually six years to be implemented because of US Congress, but this is again the topic that is back in the agenda. The second is a more representative, what I call APEX institution. I call it basically the G20, the APEX institution. And I would say that the Global Coordination Council, for example, that was proposed in the Ciglist Commission in 2009 is probably the model, but you could actually think of trying to use the G20 as a mechanism so long as the G20 represents all countries of the world through some sort of awaited boat of some type. A country like mine, which is not a member of the G20, would never recognize the legitimacy of the G20 because it's not a representative institution. So the question is how to reform the institution to have a representative G20. And finally, I propose what I call a multi-layer architecture. It might be one of the major problems of the international monetary system in contrast to the system of multilateral development banks is that it has lots of holes in international arrangements. The multilateral development bank system, it has, aside from the World Bank, it has a network of regional development banks, including the European Investment Bank, which is the largest of all, but it has sub-regional banks in several parts of the world, only in Latin America and the Caribbean. But it also has inter-regional banks. The Islamic Development Bank being the most important, but now the New Development Bank or the BRICS, and even I can see the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank wants to become also an inter-regional bank. So that structure is dense and the density is good for two purposes. The first one is to provide competition, which is good for countries. And the second one is to provide a stronger voice to small countries, which is something that you don't have when you have just a world institution in which all the small countries have a very weak voice. Therefore, I think trying to construct more regional networks of different character, regional funds, sub-regional institutions, inter-regional institutions in supporting the international monetary stability is the third element of my reform proposals. Okay, with this, let me give the floor. Okay, and of course this is the book. If it... Anyway, this doesn't seem to be working. Okay, this is the book actually. And one of the very good things that Wider has done is to have these books open access. So you can all download the book. It's actually really a great, great idea in terms of dissemination. Okay, with this, let me give the floor first to Joe.