 The USIP team, our Iraqi partners, partners in the network of Iraqi facilitators, Senate for Peacebuilding, organizations and individuals we trained in conflict, resolution and peacebuilding. We were monitoring the aftermath of the massacre. We knew what was at stake. We knew the danger that we're dealing with. We knew that the revenge cycle of violence will get out of control. So we designed a dialogue process that the facilitators, the Iraqi facilitators led, and brought together the Sunni tribal chiefs from Tikrit and Salahuddin, the Shia tribal leaders from the south, and the representative of Grand Ayatollah, the Grand Shia cleric, and the representative of Prime Minister Abadi's office, the National Reconciliation Committee, as well as parliamentary members, and talk about, here's your top-down, bottom-up working together. The dialogues culminated in a peace agreement in which the Sunni tribes disavowed membership of any of the members who have collaborated with Daesh, and they have also committed themselves to work with the judicial process to bring perpetrators to justice. The Shia tribal chiefs have disagreed to drop blanket statements and accusations that all Sunnis are responsible for this crime. They agreed to not go for tribal revenge. They both agreed, both of the Sunni tribes and the Shia tribal leaders, agreed not to go to prevent politicization. And this is important. This was an effort to reverse the seeds of violence that Daesh left behind. This was preventing violent extremism at its core, because the massacre had become a recruiting tool for the militias to go and revenge for the Shia. And it had also the risk of pushing the Sunni population furthermore in the direction of Daesh. So this was important, that it was prevented. The dialogue process did succeed in containing the tensions and preventing violence and preventing further loss of life. And it was also very important and came handy when Tikrit was liberated. Remember, we started this work four months before the city of Tikrit was liberated. And when Tikrit was liberated, the people did not trust the Iraqi security forces to go home, because they had heard reports about how the popular mobilization forces, the Hashdel Shabi, what's called the Shia militias, have been attacking certain populations. And the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi government did not know who to trust to allow back to the city. They didn't know who was ISIS, who was supporter of ISIS. So the trust and the relationship we built between the tribal leaders and the Iraqi government interlocutors we work with led to a vetting process that facilitated the return of the initial 400 families to Tikrit, about 1200 people. And then the mechanism was used to facilitate the return of other people. And I'm happy to report that today, more than 320,000 people, 320,000 people, have returned to Salah-e-Din and Tikrit. And that's a major achievement. As someone who was displaced twice and has seen the hardships of displacement, I could tell you what that meant for these families to go home.