 Section 57 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG EXPLOSION OF THE MINED BEFORE PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN IN THE SHINNANDOA VALLEY CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had, as already indicated, sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the Virginia Central Railroad. General Hunter had been operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought a battle near Staunton, where he captured a great many prisoners besides killing and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed a junction at Staunton with Abarill and Crook, who had come up from the Canawah or Gawley River. It was supposed, therefore, that General Hunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do. I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he shouldn't meet him about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the Potomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, started Breckenridge out for its defense at once. Learning later of Sheridan's going with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and Fitzhugh Lee's. Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to Trevillian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On the night of the 10th he bevwacked some six or seven miles east of Trevillian while Fitzhugh Lee was the same night at Trevillian Station and Hampton but a few miles away. During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a counter move, sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully so that at daylight when the assault was made the enemy found himself at the same time, resisted in front and attacked in rear and broke in some confusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides and killed and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to City Point. During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevillian Station and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. There was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. In the meantime at night the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he left Trevillian. Sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here that General Hunter was about Lynchburg and therefore that there was no use of his going on to Charlottesville with a view to meet him. Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field hospital, which he had established near Trevillian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the enemy. White House, up to this time, had been a depot, but now that our troops were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies, Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up, which he did on the 22nd of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train with him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month and Sheridan ready to follow. In the meantime, Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroy the Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton free to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became precarious. Meade, therefore, on the 27th ordered Sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon repaired. After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until late in July. The time, however, was spent in strengthening the entrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a sudden attack. In the meantime I had to look after other portions of my command where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I could have wished. General Hunter, who had been appointed to succeed Siegel in the Shenandoah Valley, immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont and defeated him. On the 8th he formed a junction with Crook and Aberreal at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Up to this time he was very successful and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march through a hostile country he would no doubt have captured Lynchburg. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent early, with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return, but by the way of the Gawley and Conawar Rivers, dense up the Ohio River returning to Harpers Ferry by way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. A long time was consumed in making this movement. Meantime the valley was left open to early's troops and others in that quarter and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on Washington. In the absence of Hunter, General Lee Wallace, with headquarters at Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. His surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in number. Most of these were raw and consequently very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which early had with him, but the situation of Washington was precarious and Wallace moved with commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the monocacy. He could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation for his reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send a division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defenses of Washington, and he had sent Ricketts division of the Sixth Corps, Wrights, which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Finding that Wallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to the monocacy with his entire division. They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated, but they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. The next morning, early started on his march to the capital of the nation, arriving before it on the 11th. Learning of the gravity of the situation, I had directed General Meade to also order Wright, with the rest of his corps, directly to Washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that early arrived before it. The 19th Corps, which had been stationed in Louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe on their way to join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which place they reached almost simultaneously with Wright on the 11th. The 19th Corps was commanded by Major General Emery. Early made his reconnaissance with a view of attacking on the following morning the 12th, but the next morning he found our entrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. He at once commenced to retreat Wright following. There is no telling how much this result was contributed to by General Lou Wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. If early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause that often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory. Farther west, also the troubles were threatening. Sometime before, Forest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. This left Forest free to go almost where he pleased and to cut the roads in rear of Sherman, who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with and all of his military divisions so long as he could communicate with it. But it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Two divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to banks in Louisiana some months before. Sherman ordered these back with directions to attack Forest. Smith met and defeated him badly. I then directed that Smith should hang to Forest and not let him go, and to prevent by all means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad. Sherman had anticipated me in this matter and given the same order in substance, but receiving my directions for this order to Smith he repeated it. On the 25th of June, General Burnside had commenced running a mine from about the center of his front under the Confederate Works confronting him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasence of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted this scheme to Mead and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. The position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. In the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position was unfavorable in this particular, that the enemy's line at that point was re-entering so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left. Then too the ground was sloping upward back of the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. The work progressed, and on the twenty-third of July the mine was finished ready for charging, but I had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. On the seventeenth of July several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in Richmond and that Lee was coming out to make an attack upon us, the object being to put us on the defensive, so that he might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the army commanders Mead and Butler on the lookout, but the attack was not made. I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that Lee had had. Rightes and Emory's corps were in Washington, and with this reduction of my force, Lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defenses to send west. I had other objects in view, however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible. Accordingly, on the 26th we commenced a movement with Hancock's corps and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of deep bottom where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Cots's cavalry of the army of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the Virginia Central Railroad while, in the meantime, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. We were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as I expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minute orders on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged. Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were all that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution which he could have taken and which he could not foresee would have been to have different men to execute them. The gallery to the mine was over 500 feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works and with a cross-gallery of something over 80 feet running under their lines. Eight chambers had been left requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed and on the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River with their troops. Under the river of night they started to recross the bridge at deep bottom and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. Warren was to hold his line of entrenchments with a sufficient number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's core. While Ord, now commanding the 18th core, temporarily under Meade, was to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. All were to clear off the parapets and the Abitas in their front so as to leave the space as open as possible and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside's core was not to stop in the crater at all but pushed on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's cores. Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making ready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions and left all the instructions in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. The four divisions of his core were commanded by Generals Potter, Wilcox, Ledlye, and Ferraro. The last was a colored division and Burnside selected it to make the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took Ledlye's division, a worse selection than the first could have been. In fact Potter and Wilcox were the only division commanders Burnside had who were equal to the occasion. Ledlye, besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualifications less common among soldiers. There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. When it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length, instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy lines, commenced playing. Ledlye's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of anyone to give directions, their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing but some of the troops did get in and turned to the right and left carrying the rifle pits as I expected they would do. There had been great consternation in Petersburg as we were well aware about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we were mining and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of entrenchments to the rear of that part of their line, fronting where they could see that our men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg, that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions and that our troops, if they moved properly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an hour before musketry firing to amount to anything was opened upon our men in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops. The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us about four thousand men, mostly however, captured and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault. After being fully assured of the failure of the mine and finding that most of that part of Lee's army, which had been drawn north of the James River, were still there, I gave mead directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning before Lee could get his forces back to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad. But misfortunes never come singly. I learned during that same afternoon that Wright's pursuit of early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington while I was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across Chesapeake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not aware of the fact that Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg. Finding that he was not pursued he turned back to Winchester where Crook was stationed with a small force and drove him out. He then pushed north until he had reached the Potomac. Then he sent McCausland across to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to destroy that town. Chambersburg was a purely defenseless town with no garrison, whatever, and no communications. Yet McCausland under Early's orders burned the place and left about three hundred families homeless. This occurred on the thirtieth of July. I rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the Weldon Railroad and directed them to embark for Washington City. After burning Chambersburg, McCausland retreated pursued by our cavalry towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelly and driven into Virginia. The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond. It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us, heretofore, to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders but chiefly because of interference from Washington. It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital. And, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined to put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry. I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command. But Mr. Stanton objected on the ground that he was too young for so important a command. On the 1st of August, when I sent reinforcements for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders. City Point, Virginia, August 1, 1864, 1130 a.m., Major General Halleck, Washington, D.C. I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also. Once started up the valley, they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give Sheridan direct command of the 6th Corps and Cavalry Division. All the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course of tomorrow. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. The President, in some way or other, got to see this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field operating against early, and sent me the following very characteristic dispatch. Office, U.S. Military Telegraph, War Department, Washington, D.C., August 3, 1864, Cypher, 6 p.m. Lieutenant General Grant, City Point, Virginia. I have seen your dispatch in which you say, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also. This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please, look over the dispatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of anyone here of putting our army south of the enemy, or of following him to the death in any direction, I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day and hour and force it, Abraham Lincoln. I replied to this, that I would start in two hours for Washington, and soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping at Washington on my way. I found General Hunter's Army in camp there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy with many hundreds of cars and locomotives belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied that he did not know. He said the fact was that he was so embarrassed with orders from Washington, moving him first to the right and then to the left, that he had lost all trace of the enemy. I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and the trains made up, giving directions to push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry and the Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. I knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would, in very short time, be found in front of our troops moving south. I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. I told him that Sheridan was in Washington and still another division was on its way and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere, and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. He said that General Halleck seemed so much to distress his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. He did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause, thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not many major generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. I told him, very well then, and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come to the monocacy and suggested that I would wait and meet him there. Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until he arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the monocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and directed to that officer. Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry. Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the National Commander over the Confederate Commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted, early was soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced early but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would. To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces about his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the James River to threaten Richmond, Hancock's Corps, part of the Tenth Corps under Bearney and Greg's Division of Cavalry were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the 13th, 14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing and some tolerably hard fighting, although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, and less opportunities should present themselves, which would ensure great success. General Meade was left in command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly entrenched, and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was no particular victory gained on either side, but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley. I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements being sent from Richmond against him, and also at the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent the going of any more. To add to my embarrassment at this time, Sheridan, who was now near Atlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the northwest saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the northwest be sent to him. Sherman also wanted to be assured that no eastern troops were moving out against him. I informed him of what I had done, and assured him that I would hold all the troops there, that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his real danger was from Kirby Smith who commanded the Trans Mississippi Department. If Smith should escape steel and get across the Mississippi River he might move against him. I had therefore asked to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in case Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to draw him to the defense of that place instead of going against Sherman. Right in the midst of all these embarrassments, Halleck informed me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the north to resist the draft and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the field to put it down. He also advised taking in sail and not going too fast. The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on the night of the twentieth. Before they were withdrawn, however, and while most of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with most of the fifth corps to capture the Weldon Railroad. He took up his line of march well back to the rear south of the enemy while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A division was ordered from the right of the Petersburg Line to reinforce Warren while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River to take its place. This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge Warren's corps, but without success and with heavy loss. As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad, and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons for a distance of about 30 miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that source. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon Railroad as having been lost to him. But along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recapture it. Again he failed and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon Railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of August to the close of the war. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 58 Sheridan's Advance Visit to Sheridan Sheridan's Victory in the Shenandoah Sheridan's Ride to Winchester Close of the Campaign for the Winter We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it. Sherman just getting through to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties. Discharges and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him. Washington threatened but a short time before and now early being strengthened in the valley so as probably to renew that attempt it kept me pretty active in looking after all these points. On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on early up the Shenandoah Valley, early falling back to Strasbourg. On the 12th I learned that Lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen early. It was important that Sheridan should be informed of this so I sent the information to Washington by telegraph and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to Sheridan at all hazards giving him the information. The messenger, an officer of the army pushed through with great energy and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of Snickers gap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just making his preparations to attack early in his chosen position. Now however he was thrown back on the defensive. On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack early or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington to Sheridan to make a move because they would be stopped there and such orders as Haleck's caution and that of the Secretary of War would suggest would be given instead and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine. I, therefore, was out stopping at Washington, went directly through to Charleston some ten miles above Harper's Ferry and waited there to see General Sheridan having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet me. When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side pocket showing all roads and streams and the camps of the two armies. He said that if he had permission he would move so and so, pointing out how, against the Confederates and that he could equip them. Before starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had brought with me, but seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his views and so confident of success I said nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket. Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry where all of his stores were. By keeping the teams at that place their forage did not have to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions, and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester. Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagon trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday. Oh yes, he said. He could be off before daylight on Monday. I told him then to make the attack at that time and, according to his own plan, and I immediately started to return to the Army about Richmond. After visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point on the 19th. On the way out to Harper's Ferry, I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. It was a large piece of property to have standing idle. I told him I could not answer then positively, but would try and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett met me again with the same, and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no further information, however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to have the road cleared for his workmen. Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met early at the crossing of the Opiequin Creek, a most decisive victory, one which the country. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy. He had sent GT Anderson's division east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry, and about the time I arrived there he started other divisions, leaving but two in their camps, to march to Martinsburg with a purpose destroying the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at that point. Early here learned that I had been with Sheridan, and supposing there was some movement on foot started back as soon as he got the information, but his forces were separated, and as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell back to Fisher's Hill, Sheridan, following. The valley is narrow at that point, and early made another stand there behind works which extended across. But Sheridan turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit. The pursuit was continued up the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market. Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. The houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with Early's wounded and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally on the twenty-fifth, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at Harrisonburg in undisputed possession. Now one of the main objectives of the expedition began to be accomplished. Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops, and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. What he could not take away, he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be delighted to come back there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory, and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory. I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the November elections. The convention which had met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked, as boldly in Chicago at that convention, as ever been in Charleston. It was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrest and punish those who talked treason. But this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvas. Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in Washington, and the president became very much frightened about him. He was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of General Cass was said to have been in one of our Indian wars when he was an officer of army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in front and the Indians pursuing him. The president was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side of the country and that early was in behind him. He was afraid that Sheridan was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from Richmond to enable early to beat him. I replied to the president that I had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to early by attacking the former where he was. On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord with the 18th Corps and Bearney with the 10th Corps to make an advance on Richmond to threaten it. Ord moved with the left wing up to Shafen's Bluth. Bearney with the 10th Corps took a road farther north while Cass with the cavalry took the Darby Road still farther to the north. They got across the river by the next morning and made an effort to surprise the enemy in that, however, they were unsuccessful. The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Standard's division of the 18th Corps with General Burnham's Brigade leading tried an assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with 16 guns and a good many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevens, who succeeded him, was badly wounded and his successor also fell in the same way. Some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them, six in number, and a few more prisoners. Bearney's troops to the right captured the enemy's entrenched picket lines but were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line. Our troops fortified their new position bringing Fort Harrison into the new line and extending it to the river. This brought us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the James and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance but it failed. Ord fell badly wounded and had to be relieved. The command devolved upon General Heckman and later General Weitzel was assigned to the command of the 18th Corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troops about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eight additional brigades from Petersburg and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. All their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. In one of these assaults upon us General Standard, a Gallup officer who was defending Fort Harrison lost an arm. Our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, 1554 wounded, and 324 missing. Whilst this was going on General Mead was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Park and Warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their enclosed batteries manned with a scattering line on the other entrenchments. The object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. Mead was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack. On the 30th these troops moved out under Warren and captured an advanced entrenched camp at Peeble's Farm driving the enemy back to the main line. Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. The number of killed and wounded was not large. The next day our troops advanced again and established themselves entrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad very considerably. Sheridan, having driven the enemy out of the valley and taken the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to beset where it could be of more use. I approved of his suggestion and ordered him to send Wright's Corps back to the James River. I further directed him to repair the railroad up to Shenandoah Valley towards the advanced position which we would hold with a small force. The troops were to be sent to Washington by the way of Colpepper in order to watch the east side of the Blue Ridge and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate Army that contrary to our expectations they determined to make one more strike and save it, if possible, before the supplies should be all destroyed. Reinforcements were sent therefore to early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at Harrisonburg, but the latter had not remained there. On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle before him, early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of early which, under the lead of Rosser, was pursuing closely and routed it, most completely capturing eleven guns and a large number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men. His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10th of October the march down the valley was again resumed early again following. I now ordered Sheridan to halt and to improve the opportunity if afforded by the enemies having been sufficiently weakened to move back again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad. But this order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted and when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted him to do it was something entirely different. How they conformed Sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville, that he should fortify his position and provision it. Sheridan objected to this most decidedly and I was impelled to telegraph him on the 14th as follows. City Point Virginia, October 14, 1864, 1230 p.m., Major General Sheridan, Cedar Creek, Virginia. What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad and Canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best holding yourself ready to advance if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. If you cannot do this then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry, U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. Sheridan, having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15th leaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar Creek some 20 miles south of Winchester. The next morning, while at front royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright saying that a dispatch from Longstreet too early had been intercepted. It directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley to join Wright. On the 18th of October early was ready to move and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. The Wright under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front falling back to Middleton where it took a position and made a stand. The cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester and held them for the use of our troops in falling back. General Wright having ordered a retreat back to that place. Sheridan, having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester that night. The following morning he started to join his command. He had scarcely got out of town when he met his men returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediately ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers. Leaving members of his staff to take care of Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worse frightened than hurt, the men did halt and turn back. Many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night. When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holding their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops. Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to entrench his position and he awaited an assault from the enemy. This was made with vigor and was directed principally against Emery's corps which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By one o'clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that he seemed disinclined to make another attack but went to work to entrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. He thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him unmolested, but in this he was mistaken. About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent his cavalry by both flanks and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The contest was close for a time but at length the left of the enemy broke and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. Early tried to rally his men but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates captured twenty-four pieces of artillery besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back to Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. Wright's corps was ordered back to the army of the Potomac and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. Early had lost more men and killed wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan had commanded from first to last. On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, who succeeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorable part. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as a display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere personal daring. This might well have been expected of one who could write, at the time he is said to have done so, any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to election near for a seat in Congress ought to be scalped. Having entered the army as a major of volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by meritorious service the rank of brevet major general before its close. On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kotze's cavalry on the 7th of October and drove it back with heavy loss and killed wounded and prisoners and the loss of all the artillery. This was followed up by an attack on our entrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnaissance was sent out by General Butler with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing which resulted in heavy loss to us. On the 24th I ordered General Mead to attempt to get possession of the south side railroad and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. The attempt proved a failure, however. The most advanced of our troops, not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw and they were all back in their former positions the next day. Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of the James River in order to support this move by detaining there the Confederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this but failed a further result by not marching past the enemies left before turning in on the Darby Road and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place. This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets but no serious battle was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around Petersburg and at other parts of my command and it would not interest the general reader if given. All these details can be found by the military student in a series of books published by the Scribner's Badoe's History of My Campaigns and also in the publications of the War Department including both the National and Confederate reports. In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the command of the Second Corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to Washington to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the First Corps. It was expected that this would give him a large command to cooperate with in the spring. It was my expectation at the time that in the final operations Hancock should move either up the valley or else east of the blue ridge to Lynchburg, the idea of being to make the spring campaign the close of the war. I expected with Sherman coming up from the south, Meade south of Petersburg and around Richmond and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that state to move from the direction of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg. We would then have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely making it impossible for him to support his army. General Humphries, Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, was assigned to the command of the Second Corps to succeed Hancock.