 After the session has to start, I will please God to hear that the first speaker is a semi-local, excellent person who is speaking about symmetry and deflationism. Okay, thanks everyone for coming. Many thanks, Alexander, Kevin and Charles for organizing this fantastic workshop. A pleasure for me to be here. Okay, symmetry and deflationism. If you see, also many thanks for introducing this quotation mark. I like it because I don't believe that we can go from science to metaphysics, so my answer is going to be no. And this is going to be probably, it's not a general argument, but it's an instance in which I see that this root from science to metaphysics doesn't work. So, with the motivations. The motivation is something like the following. We have some symmetries in physics, and I'm going to say something more about that. I mean, this could be represented as science part, right? Why is it in green? And the other side we have the ontology, but things we believe that they are out there. And this side we have a lot of things like space and symmetries in different theories, permutation of symmetry, education symmetries. There's a huge amount of different kind of symmetries in the physical theory, right? But on the other side, ontology, people are concerned about the nature of space-time, physical objects and their properties, fundamental interactions, blah, blah, blah. And some people came to understand the idea that, okay, probably there's some connection between the two things. The connection in general is, okay, we can start from symmetries and then we can go to ontology. We can say something about, for example, the nature of the space-time if we look at the space-time symmetries. My question is, which is the justification for this root? Why are we allowed to go from one place to another? What I'm going to say, I mean, of course, this is many things to say, but what I'm going to defend is our half-view that they call symmetry-flashing system. This is very, very close to what Angel was saying before about the different stances, right? I mean, I am definitely in the first stance, the flashing stance. So this is going to be a piece of that stance, right? What is symmetry-flashing? Okay, just to keep it simple, I'm going to give a more careful definition and specification of what I mean by symmetry-flashing system. But this is simply the view that the relation between symmetries, you know, the green side on the other side, on the one hand, and the ontology on the other. This relation is very, very, very fixed, right? If you push me forward and say, no, there's no relation whatsoever. But I'm here, I'm going to be fine. So this is the view, right? Okay, it has many details, but one of the important implications is that from symmetries to ontology, there is no straightforward path, right? I mean, the relation can be only sustained if you have other assumptions, but it's not just taking symmetries and rid of your ontology from that, it's doing something else. But the symmetry-flashing is just a view in which, when you assume some metaphysical assumptions, then you are going to read the symmetries in some particular way, and they are going to be not so much informative about ontology. So, okay, this is what I already said. The nature of the relation depends on some metaphysical assumptions, your views on law, the nature of space and time, et cetera. I mean, many people that were discussing about the metaphysical symmetries, they usually, or sometimes they just think of symmetries in general, right? But I believe that it's not that symmetries are in the air, just floating around, it's that they are always attached to some mathematical structure within a physical theory, within some very strict definitions, and you also have to say something about the metaphysical background of these things. So, the other idea is that the justification of the relation between the symmetries and ontologies is going to depend ultimately on the symmetries, but it's going to depend on other metaphysical assumptions. So, this is just the opening of the presentation. Just give the general problem of the metaphysical problem of symmetries a coarse-grained map of the metaphysical symmetries, and then the view that I'm going to defend in two of the versions that I could come up with. So, physical symmetries and the metaphysical problem. First of all, to talk about the symmetries in general is kind of embarrassing because there's, of course, so many symmetries, different kinds, global symmetries, local symmetries, geometrical symmetries, dynamical symmetries, mathematical symmetries, physical symmetries. I mean, of course, it's just a very general term, an umbrella term to refer to something like the following. Primafakia, there is a very abstract definition of symmetries. Okay, in the paper there are more details about a more formal definition, but I think that this is good enough to get an idea of what's in general a physical symmetry. They usually start with this very abstract definition. You take some symmetry as a transformation that keeps some relevant structure analog. Usually, the structure that we should keep an alter is the space of solution, right? I mean, we have some dynamical equations. They're going to see that it's invariant under some transformation. It's going to convert solutions into solutions, or no solutions into no solutions, right? This is the abstract definition. But, okay, whoever has read and got embedded, I believe that this is probably a too liberal definition of symmetry, right? There are many things that physicists usually don't consider as a symmetry that falls between these definitions. So, we need to say something more precise or stronger. Some people say, okay, we take the abstract definition, this idea that we should preserve the space of solutions, but also to add some format of physical constraints. For example, that some additional structure in the theory should be also preserved. Some objects in the theory like the Hamiltonian, the Lagrangian, et cetera. Also, we can impose some other constraints on transformations that we are going to implement with the symmetries, et cetera. But some people are still not very happy and say, okay, this is still true. We need something stronger than that. Then, some philosophers start to think, some philosophers and physicists start to think of something else about, I mean, to add something to this definition of symmetries. And they are usually related to objectivity, redundancy, observation, detection, et cetera. So, the stronger definition that I can come up with right now is something like, okay, what I'm going to mean by a physical symmetries is something that satisfies the abstract definition that taking into consideration some formal physical constraint that is going to depend on the theory, of course, but also some interpretative constraint, right? For example, the preservation of observational content. It could be anything else, right? I am not in this part committed to anything like any particular interpretation of that. I'm just going to say that this is for me a strong enough definition of what is a physical symmetry, should meet all these criteria, right? So, yes. But some features that most symmetries share, even though you have this very leafy landscape. Well, I mean, there are some transformations that are particularly important for philosophers of physics. For example, gauge transformation, permutations, space transformation, et cetera. So, I'm going to focus on these ones. When I talk about physical symmetries, I'm usually referring to space transformations or permutations of base transformations, right? I'm not referring to any other weird transformations, right? But also all these transformations apply first and foremost to formal structure. I mean, you start to prove that some mathematical structure has some symmetries in a formal way, right? You prove that these differential equations formulated in some particular language is invariant under some transformation that you also define formally. So, first and foremost is a property of formal structures. And the formal structure that we are usually interested in are within a dynamical context, right? And we want to know how things would behave if things were transformed in such and such a way. So, yeah. I mean, this could be debatable. I mean, I know that the last part, many people have told me that, well, okay, we have the symmetries of objects, symmetry of models, symmetry of other things. But in general, I would say that everything, or almost everything, goes down to some dynamical context. But I mean, this is also very important for the main object. So, what is the metaphysical problem? We have all these things on the science side, right? We have all these formal definition of symmetries. We apply some constraint because we want to single out some particular subset of this transformation. We give an interpretation of this. What this means related to objectivity, related to observation, to detection, wherever you want. And now, as a philosopher of metaphysics, we ask, okay, which place this physical symmetry occupies in one's ontology? This is one of the questions. The other question is to specify the relation between physical symmetries and one's ontology, right? When you're about to see something born, it's not saying just that we have these symmetries in the fundamental ontology, and particles just pop out right now. We have to say something metaphysical relevant about this relation between things that we are used to, like chairs, tables, blah, blah, and the physical symmetries. I mean, this is what I'm thinking about the metaphysical problem of symmetry, which should give an answer to these two questions. Of course, grain map. I mean, there are many different positions. Usually people distinguish between epistemic and ontic view. I was not very happy with that extension because I think that it doesn't recover very well the nuances of different views. So I tried to give a map or a different view. And this is what I thought about. What they found is that people usually feel the tension between concierge these physical symmetries in the sense that I talked about before as dispensable or indispensable. I don't remember who I think was Bruno before, was referring to Alexander Bird. Alexander Bird is one of the guys that believes that symmetries could be indispensable, right? But other people I think that could feel in these different views. I mean, I don't have the time to talk about each particular view, but I don't know. I would place people like Hugh Brice or Gennan Ismael here. Gennan Ismael is some kind of symmetry agencerism, like saying, okay, we have symmetries as a concept that help us to guide us in the world. Other people like G-Lord. Okay, this is complicated to elaborate right now, but I think that we can just make inference from symmetries to ontology, even though they are not part of ontology, but all the view very influenced this one, the Symmetry Founder Autism by Stephen French and David Schroen and other guys. Okay, there are different views, they have different things, but the main issue between being dispensable with symmetries or indispensable with them. The role that I want to run right now is something I will follow it. What I believe or what I think that symmetry with the flashing is, the flashing is to say. It's going that, okay, we start with something that is the symmetry fact. I'm going to talk about that later on. We believe that they are indispensable, but I see this is not, per se, a commitment to an ontological view of symmetries. We can be indispensable with symmetries, but also epistemically indispensable. This is going to call symmetry to flashingism in two different versions. It depends on the background metaphysics that we could have. But this is the role that I want to go for. So what is this symmetry fact? This is very trivial, right? This is the modern physics presents us with symmetry claims, in the sense that I talked before, you open up any physics textbook, and I'm going to say, okay, we are going to prove that this theory is invariant under validant transformations, and they got some symmetry claims, right? And we have these propositions in many different theories, from quantum mechanics to classical mechanics, productivity, blah, blah. And we see that all these propositions, the state in theoretical frameworks, very varied, all of them participated in the empirical sectors of physics. We have some theories that work very well, and most of the theories involve some propositional symmetries. And this is just a symmetry fact. And now we can ask ourselves, okay, what should we believe about that? These claims are indispensable or indispensable? Some people, like me, believe that, okay, we should believe that these claims are indispensable. In the sense that all the references to symmetries appear in the symmetry file, cannot be dispensed while preserving physics' empirical success. So I am not on the, for example, Alexander's birth site saying, we should wait for future physics to get rid of the symmetries. I think that future physics is going to still do in physics with symmetries. But this is not really the point. And there's something very important about symmetries that we should preserve. But this doesn't mean per se that then we should be ontologically committed to symmetries. And this is the distinction that I would like to draw. There are two ways in which we can be indispensable with respect to symmetries. One is being indispensable in the epistemic sense, and the other is being indispensable in the ontological sense. For example, if you follow the Stephen French and other guys' road, you are going to say, okay, of course they are indispensable, but they are indispensable because they are out there in the world. So there's this ontological background for indispensability in the sense. But no, I mean, I'm saying, okay, no, this is not the right way to go. The right way to go is just think of them as epistemic in dispensing. Here is where I would place my view on symmetries. So what I mean by symmetry is the flashiness. Okay, I mean, this is a very general definition that I'm going to go to in particular details. But first of all, I would say that all these putative references to symmetries appearing in the symmetry fact in different theories across different domains do not refer to classical reality, but have an epistemic justification in terms of the epistemic gain for physical theories. And this epistemic gain is indispensable for physics to be fixed. It's not just a convention, it's not just an instrument, it's something else. It's something that is really at the very core of the way in which physics has been down in the last centuries. But the two more immediate conclusions are that, of course, I mean, in this case, we are not placing symmetries, physical symmetries in the ontology, right? We are not saying that they are aspect of ontology. We are not saying that they are structures of their ontology. They are just not in ontology. They are just the epistemic justification. Then I'm going to say something that is a little bit milder on this, but prima facche, they are not aspect of ontology, or at least they are not aspect of the fundamental ontology. But also they are not guides to the ontology. In this, in the case that we can read, for example, in Jill Norr's new book, she says that they are not part of ontology, but they could help us to read off the ontology from symmetries. Okay, this view implies that we cannot do that either. So this is one of the things that I came to believe when I was reading about the metaphysical discussion of symmetries is that, well, I mean, usually when you look at the symmetries in the theory, they are not just defined there, right? It's not that we can just isolate it from a bunch of other mathematical structures, right? They are usually properties of some differential equations, or they are within some mathematical structures, defining some space with some properties, and so on and so forth. So when we go to the metaphysical symmetries, I believe that we should also take into account our metaphysical commitment with the rest of the mathematical structure that is making these symmetries in the physical form. What I'm saying is that we should be very explicit about if you believe that symmetries are aspects of ontology, of they are up there in the world. Okay, you should tell me what's your metaphysical view about the other things that are around the symmetries, the laws of the space structure, the underlying geometry, blah, blah, blah, blah. And since they cannot be isolated, they came, I mean, they come in a package, so to speak, right? So what do I mean? I mean, my claim is in a conditional form, right? It says, okay, it's not the case that you can have a metaphysical view on symmetries alone. What you can do is to give me your metaphysical assumptions about how you are interpreting, for example, laws on the space time structure, and then I'm going to tell you which is the right view or which is the more adequate view for symmetries that you can have within this metaphysical frame, right? But it's not the case that, for example, you can just believe that symmetries are out there in the world, in the fundamental ontology and remain silent about, for example, the underlying mathematical structure or the underlying the laws, blah, blah. So everything should be read in this conditional form, right? Some assumptions with respect, some metaphysical assumptions with respect to this point could give us some view about symmetries. In particular, what I'm going to say is that, okay, when we have some assumptions about laws about down the line geometry, et cetera, then symmetries of the processes make sense. Of course, if you change these commitments, probably it makes no sense, but again, you need to tell me, okay, which are your other ontological commitments with respect to this part? What is there now to put some flesh on this? I believe that symmetries of the flesh and the smooth is very comfortable within contemporary humanism and some form of neo-canthanism, right? Again, if you're reading this conditional form, if you adopt something like contemporary humanism for whatever reason you have, one symmetry of the flesh and the smooth is a good view. If you adopt something like neo-canthanism for whatever reason you have, then symmetries of the flesh and the smooth is also a good view. Of course, if you reject symmetries of the flesh and the smooth, for example, you believe that they are out there in the world, then you should give me the metaphysical background that is behind that, that according to me cannot be humanism or neo-canthanism. Again, I'm not going to say that this is the right view, but I'm saying that if you have this conditional form, we can vote from one place to another to the other. Suppose that you are a human. A variety of what I call symmetry of the flesh and the smooth is symmetry epistemicism, and this is the view that I think that goes along with contemporary humanism. Again, conditional form, if you are human for whatever reason, well, you should adopt something like symmetry of the flesh and in particular symmetry, what I call symmetry epistemicism. There's an analogy with how humans usually talk about laws. Now everything is going to depend on the human you're talking about, but in general they could say that the justification of law is both epistemic and ontological, that they are ontological because they are grounded in the regularities, but also they are epistemic because they play a very active role in having these best sisters. Well, I'm going to place that, well, I think that symmetries, if you are human, shouldn't be quite different from laws. They are just a particular kind of laws, like metals or something that is at a different level, but what is clear is that for humans, the ontology is whatever you have in the human mosaic. Again, it depends on the human. The human mosaic could have different things, local matter or structures or just point-like particles. It depends on the human again, but it's clear that this is the ontology. Whatever is the ontology is the regularity that you are going to find in the human mosaic. And then in virtue of these regularities that you just find in the human mosaic, you are going to formulate some generalizations about how things behave in this mosaic. Some of these generalizations are going to be theorems in the best system, but to be theorists in the best system, they should have some specific epistemic virtues, like, for example, this virtue of simplicity or having some informativeness or planetary power, whatever you want to call it. But it's clear that all the generalizations that we can have, there are some of them that also have some epistemic virtues, and they are going to be part of this best system. And the way in which I would introduce symmetries in this framework is to say something like the physical symmetries are kind of second-order generalizations of first-order generalization. The first-order generalizations are just the theorems in the best system. That's super big on first-order facts. To get it simple. In order to have these theorems in the best system, to have some generalizations that are powerful enough that are, yeah, that are powerful enough and are simple enough, we need some symmetries. We need some similar reasoning to have these first-order generalizations. But what is clear is that there's a huge division between theory and ontology, right? Everything, what is an ontology? This isn't a human mistake, but what we have in the theory is what belongs to the theorists in the best system and whatever is playing a role in contributing to this epistemic virtue. Symmetries are there. They are not part of ontology. Usually humans don't place the laws in ontology. They play in the representational part of ontology. And symmetries are also contributing to having this representational part. So this is what I think most humans should accommodate symmetries according to their own commitments about other things. About laws, for example, about what they think that the ontology should be about. So it's very simple. Symmetry epistemicism is just a view that the epistemic justification is in turn of the optimal systematization of the first-order generalization that's super-been upon the hypnosis. And this optimal systematization usually balances simplicity and informativeness, and we'll have that contributed to make physical theories the best system. Okay, they are just then justified epistemically because they help us to have good, bad systems, right? But again, they are not part of ontology either. Neocantianism, I'm going to be a bit quick about that. This is a more controversial view, but again, this justification here is non-empirical. It's not ontological, but as many Neocantians like to say it's not transcendental. In the sense that symmetries could be viewed as a condition of possibility for physical objects to be possible. The core of this Neocantian view is, of course, the concept of what we mean by objectivity, and they depart from the tradition saying that physical theories are not actually... They shouldn't follow the copy theory in the sense that we have something out there and what our physical theory tried to capture is not the case. They developed this functional theory of objectivity which objectivity is just a property of the whole system and the whole theory, and not something that is just out there in the world. So, and this could be controversial, I know, but some symmetries of this could be seen like at least a priori norms that are transcendental in the sense that they just contribute to objectivity in modern physics. They make that our laws refer to physical objects as objects and not to something different. I have this quote by a beginner. We have been talking about it with Chris before about this, but I think that, again, I'm not going to say that a beginner is a Neocantian, but it seems like he's going along with a Neocantian spirit at least in the sense that, okay, the role that symmetries are playing here is distinguishing between what they call initial conditions and laws. To laws to be possible, we need to make the distinction and the way in which we make the distinction is by symmetries, right? By keeping, for example, initial conditions inverted under some transformations. Yeah, okay, this is more than the same. So, what symmetry normative is, I would say, okay, physics is not in the business of explaining, I'm sorry, physics is in the business of explaining regularities, right? For it, we need laws, we formulate these laws, but for laws to be possible, we need to draw a distinction between the laws and our return initial conditions and symmetries, at least some symmetries, beginner refers to the space and symmetries in particular, they just play this role. They are playing the role to distinguish between these two things. But it's clear that here we are, we have this machine behind physics trying to give you some concept of objectivity and some concept of law that is behind this reasoning. Okay, so, okay, what's symmetry in your body, just to dispute that in order for physics to be possible at all, in the sense that to refer to physical objects, symmetries are required to give us unity, systematicity, and permanency the physical object requires, because we need laws. I'm going to the conclusion right now. So, final remarks. We start with this idea, right? Okay, we have some symmetries, and the ontology on the other side. Well, I mean, I said, okay, I'm not gonna say that you cannot go this way. What I'm gonna say is that this this disconnection between symmetries and ontology depends on previously adopted metaphysical frame. I can give you a different metaphysical frame with about space and time, about laws, or about physics in general, and I don't need to connect ontology with symmetries, at least in this straightforward sense. Okay, this is just when I'm part of the conclusion. If you feel that contemporary humanism is a good view, then symmetry and systemic system makes sense. If you believe, for some reason, that you are a Neocantian, well, probably something like symmetry and normativeism makes sense. So, okay, I mean, for science and metaphysics, well, no, I mean, in a way, I mean, you need metaphysical premises to arrive to metaphysical conclusions, and you have metaphysical premises because you need to endorse other views. The thing is that you are not being very explicit about what are your metaphysical premises, right? Okay, there are different ways to argue in favor of this view, and I have done it in different papers. In two papers, I'm going to be out very soon, in which I argue against symmetry fundamentalism and the other I argue against what they call symmetry inferentialism. But again, it's a way to see that all the alternatives are destructive, and for any other views, just to argue in favor of humanism or Kantianism, and then you're also arguing in favor of symmetry, the flashities. So, thanks. Thank you. I love your presentation. This is quite, quite brief. So, you say that you may, well, you outline this epistemic approach to symmetries, to distinguish between symmetries for the sake of their argument, and epistemic, I take it to mean that it's conducive to the production of knowledge. I understood it this way. But I couldn't quite get why you couldn't go for a dispensabilist approach. A dispensabilist approach. For example, for some mathematical symmetries, you may say that symmetry inferentialism, dispensabilist symmetry inferentialism, that could work. That could be due to the production of knowledge, but when you have the knowledge of the physical domains, you can dispense with the mathematical symmetries. Or at least they must do this. But now, it depends on what you mean by knowledge in this case. What I am arguing is not that they don't provide knowledge, but I'm saying that they don't provide knowledge about what is the ontology, what is the fundamental ontology, if you will. I mean, in that case, you kind of read of properties of fundamental ontology from the symmetries, though you do have knowledge about phenomena, about things, because they contribute epistemically to the way in which you want to know the world. Now, why I don't endorse the other view, the dispensabilist view? Honestly, I have a very strong answer to that. I do believe that the symmetries are important, and I want to recover that in my metaphysical view, and I want to say, okay, I cannot solve the... For example, okay, if you are a dispossessionist, you have this issue with the symmetries, which is over-determination of phenomena, and then you say, okay, probably future physics are going to dispense with symmetries. I don't want to do that, because I do believe that they play a very important role. Again, I couldn't go through the details, but in the paper I said that how this reasoning really helps to empirical research and to formulate good physical theories in the sense that physics requires to have good physical theories that could be extended to different domains and that can be universalizable in some sense. And symmetries, I think that they are very important in the sense in which laws are. So, why I still have some strong commitment with symmetries, but I wouldn't go down the dispensability view right now. Amazing. So, I want to ask you about some specific symmetries and then apply your argument. So, let's think about a really simple case where we shift all the material contents of the universe over in that direction by a meter. So, if we have a theory formulated in Galilean space-time and the shift will be a symmetry of the solution space. If it's formulated in Aristotelian space-time, it will not be. And I can understand these symmetries as relations between possible worlds according to these theories. So, let's suppose that I think there really are relations between possible worlds. Okay. So, according to your argument, I apply modus tolens with your conditional. That means I must reject some ontological assumptions. So, what are the ontological assumptions that I'm rejecting? Well, for example, I mean, when you are saying, okay, let me see if I, because what are you actually rejecting is a whole metaphysical framework that is saying something about what is space and time, what is the loss of nature, and blah, blah. But what I'm going to say is that it's not really, I mean, you could have independent reasons, for example, to keep something like absolute positions, right? Metaphysical reasons to have absolute positions. So, when you say, okay, I have these symmetries here, space translation, for example, everything is smooth, there's not absolute positions. Well, I mean, that could be an argument, but there could be also a metaphysical argument saying, okay, we need metaphysical, some absolute positions, because there's all kind of things that could help us to underline some theory. I mean, I'm thinking, for example, okay, you could say something like, well, I mean, I don't believe that, let's say, for example, we have something like special relativity, it's Lorentz invariant. Okay, but I have a very strong combination with Bohmian particles, and I want a relatively version of Bohmian particles. Well, I mean, I could say, okay, I have a problem because there is Lorentz invariant, and it discards a privileged framework, but if I am Bohmian, I have independent reasons to say, okay, probably this is not the right symmetry, so I could reject this view. Right, but without the examples that I mentioned, I wanted to keep the examples really extremely simple. Okay, yeah, I mean, what I would say is that you are projecting, okay, it depends on which is the particular metaphysical commitment that you want to reject. In that case, you have, you're having a realist view of some symmetries in some sense. Or you are a community friend. But I'm saying, okay, then within a bigger framework. Right, and this is defined with a definite structure, but also this structure could be, I know, idealized. Right, it could be some idealization in which I suppose that I can move everything one meter to the east, for example. And I have this space translation invariance. But the space transition invariance could hold only or could hold mainly in very highly idealized case. Why should I believe that this idealized case are conformative with respect to what the word is like? I would have some independent reasons to say, well no, I don't believe in idealization, so seriously. So you need to see something about how do you metaphysically stand with respect to, for example, idealization, because many symmetries are defined within highly idealized models, for example. For example, you don't have interaction, you don't have anything, you don't have non-conservative forces for it, right? I mean, the space translation invariance in this case could fail if you have a space-dependent potential, right? Okay, okay, we'll get to abstract that. Maybe we take this conversation like this. Yeah, sure. There's one minute left, so do you have time for one short question? Or no? Okay, I have at least 10 questions. So I'm not sure about the content. Yeah, I'm here. You can either. Yeah, I'm on it. So, first of all, to me, I'm a philosophical training and for me, symmetries are like unicorns. I don't know what they are. So I would have loved to have at least one example even if I wouldn't have understood it just to have some sense of what symmetries are. But then you have that in the content view, in the content view, they are a condition of possibilities of the objects, right? Physical objects. Physical objects. Not of our knowledge. No, physical objects. But they must be metaphysical substantive, some sense of being a condition of possibility of those things, right? I don't understand how you can have an epistemic attitude toward symmetries. Symmetries are a condition of possibilities of possibility of physical objects. But maybe I am confused there. Yeah, I mean I have called it symmetry and normativism in this sense that in the content way, there are some regulatory principles or heuristic principle that guides knowledge or research. In this sense, I mean, so again, it depends now what you mean by epistemic. They are not epistemic in the human sense, of course, but they are epistemic in this much more flexible way, but I would just say that they are more like norms, norms that prescribe how we should think about some objects, some physical objects, and when we are going to recognize a physical object as a physical object, right? They are just part of the how, again, considers for you about the conditions for objectivity that a theory implies. So I am not sure how to read your word epistemic in this sense. I mean, it's epistemic in this... Related to knowledge, right? Yeah, it's knowledge. They are conditioned for having some specific knowledge. This specific knowledge is physical knowledge and they are conditioned for that. But they are not part of the content. Again, you have in the content for the epistemic principle, the heuristic principle, I mean, this is really a mess. I should be very more careful about that. But my idea is that they are they are guiding... Sorry, sorry. Very short break.