 Section 72, Part I of IV, of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Jim Clevenger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, by Ulysses S. Grant. Report of Lieutenant General U.S. Grant of the United States Armies, 1864, 1865. Headquarters, Armies of the United States, Washington, D.C., July 22, 1865. Honorable E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Sir, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to command the same. From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field regardless of season and weather were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours, but as an offset to this we had a vast territory with a population hostile to the government to garrison and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. The armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, like a bulky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed and to furlough large numbers during seasons of inactivity on our part to go to their homes and do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conductive to the happiness of the people both north and south until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources until by mere attrition if in no other way there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. These views have been kept constantly in mind and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people who mourn the loss of friends fallen and who have to pay the pecuniary costs to say. All I can say is what I have done has been done conscientiously to the best of my ability and in what I conceive to be for the best interests of the whole country. At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows. The Mississippi River was strongly garrisoned by federal troops from St. Louis Missouri to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi north of that stream. A few points in southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy with an army of probably not less than 80,000 effective men that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The let alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one half of it was ever present in garrison at one time. But the one half or forty thousand men with the bands of guerrillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas and along the Mississippi River and the disloyal character of much of the population compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston Rivers running eastward to include nearly all of the state of Tennessee south of Chattanooga. A small foothold had been obtained in Georgia sufficient to protect east Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia with the exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the Potomac lying along the rapidan was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea coast footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington and Newburn in North Carolina, Buford, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski and Port Royal in South Carolina. Fernandia and St. Augustine in Florida, Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the Navy. The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and other commanders in March 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy. Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerrillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the south a rain of military despotism prevailed which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier, and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field. The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best Generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan extending from Main Run westward, strongly entrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly entrenched position at Dalton Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad center, against the armies under Major General W. T. Sherman. In addition to these armies, he had a large cavalry force under forest in northeast Mississippi, a considerable force of all arms in the Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee, and also confronting our sea coast garrisons and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land. These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign. Major General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the military division of the Mississippi, embracing all of the armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghenies, and the Department of Arkansas west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against Johnston. Major General George G. Mead had the immediate command of the army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies. General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army to break it up and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the army of the Potomac to do so, more specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. Major General N. P. Banks, then, on an expedition up Red River against Shreveport, Louisiana, which had been organized previous to my appointment to command, was notified by me on the 15th of March of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days more time than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the Mississippi. That should his expedition prove successful, he would hold at Shreveport and the Red River with such force as he might deem necessary and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held, that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile, that it certainly would be if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements, that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition, also that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him, General Banks, instead of a demonstration as Steele thought advisable. On the thirty-first of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows. First, if successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defense of the Red River to General Steele and the Navy. Second, that you abandon Texas entirely with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. Third, by properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty five thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions, as I can give you from elsewhere lose no time in making a demonstration to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to cooperate. You can make your own arrangements with the Admiral for his cooperation and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base, but from your long service in the Gulf Department you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movement shall be cooperative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is that you commence the concentration of your forces at once, preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General N. P. Banks, Major General Mead was instructed that Lee's army would be his objective point, that wherever Lee went he would go also. For this movement two plans presented themselves, one to cross the rapidan below Lee moving by his right flank, the other above, moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other with corresponding objections. By crossing above Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out. Besides it separated us from Butler so that he could not be directed how to cooperate. If we took the other route Brandy Station would be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or James Rivers. Of these however it was decided to take the lower route. The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major General B. F. Butler. Fort Monroe, Virginia, April 2, 1864. General, in the spring campaign, which is a desirable shell commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field as far as this object can be accomplished. It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But generally speaking concentration can be practically affected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the army of the Potomac and of covering your department with your army makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose therefore what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable. The army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty, I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men, to operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina under Major General Gilmore who will command them in person. Major General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you to command the troops sent into the field from your own department. General Gilmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe with all the troops on transports by the eighteenth instant or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. When you are notified to move, take city point with as much force as possible, fortify or rather entrench at once and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can from city point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. The fact that has already been stated, that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point and that there is to be cooperation between your force and the army of the Potomac must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then should the enemy be forced into his entrenchments in Richmond, the army of the Potomac would follow and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. You will please forward for my information at the earliest practicable day all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of disorder. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General B. F. Butler. On the 16th these instructions were substantially re-interrated. On 19th, in order to secure full cooperation between his army and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of April that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper and Richmond if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his General Butler's army on the James River. That, could I be certain, he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side so as to have his left resting on the James above the city, I would form the junction there. That circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow. That he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move, that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible. In cooperation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal states and the armies operating against them. A very considerable force under command of Major General Siegel was so held for the protection of West Virginia and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania, whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. General Siegel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions to move from Beverly and Charleston under command of Generals Ord and Crook against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord, having been relieved at his own request, General Siegel was instructed at his own suggestion to give up the expedition by Beverly and to form two columns, one under General Crook on the Conawa, numbering about 10,000 men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about 7,000 men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley and advance as far as possible. While General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the Tennessee Railroad doing as much damage as he could destroying the New River Bridge and the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of May when everything being in readiness and the roads favorable orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May. My first object being to break the military power of the Rebellion and capture the enemy's important strongholds made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond as that would tend more than anything else unless it were the capture of Lee's army to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my determination by hard fighting either to compel Lee to retreat or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north and still retain enough for the defense of Richmond, it was well understood by both Generals Butler and Meade before starting on the campaign that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James River in case of failure to destroy Lee without it. Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort Monroe and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of Petersburg and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As the army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defense of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River. I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him and were general in their nature leaving all the details and the execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding, always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him too, and which he would otherwise have received. The movement of the army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the Fourth of May under the immediate direction and orders of Major General Meade pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across the rapidan, the fifth and sixth corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the second corps at Elies Ford, the cavalry under Major General Sheridan moving in advance, with a greater part of its trains numbering about 4,000 wagons meeting with but slight opposition. The average distance traveled by the troops that day was about 12 miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected. Early on the fifth, the advance corps, the fifth Major General G.K. Warren commanding, met and engaged the enemy outside his entrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all day. The whole army, being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got up on the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rappahann was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the fourth. By six o'clock of the morning of the sixth he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern. Some of his troops, having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rappadan rivers, considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accruediments of the soldier, this was a remarkable march. The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the sixth, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the fifth. After dark the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the seventh reconnaissance showed that the enemy had fallen behind his entrenched lines with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battlefield. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond, and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the seventh the march was commenced towards Spotsylvania Courthouse. The fifth corps moving on the most direct road, but the enemy having become apprised of our movement and having the shorter line was enabled to reach their first. On the eighth, General Warren met a force of the enemy which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance to gain time to fortify the line taken up at Spotsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main force within the recently constructed works after considerable fighting resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the ninth, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The ninth, tenth, and eleventh were spent in maneuvering and fighting without decisive results. Among the killed on the ninth was that able and distinguished soldier Major General John Sedgwick commanding the Sixth Army Corps. Major General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the twelfth a general attack was made on the enemy in position. The second corps, Major General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. The thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth were consumed in maneuvering and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Washington, deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spotsylvania Courthouse. Orders were issued on the fifteenth with a view to a movement to the North Hanna to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the nineteenth. Late in the afternoon of the nineteenth, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank, but the attack was promptly repulsed with heavy loss. This delayed the movement to the North Hanna until the night of the twenty-first when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorter line and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Hanna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The fifth corps reached the North Hanna on the afternoon of the twenty-third, closely followed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren affected a crossing the same afternoon and got a position without much opposition. Soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the twenty-fifth, General Sheridan rejoined the army of the Potomac, from the raid on which he started from Spotsylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations. Four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad track, recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war. Met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern, carried the first line of works around Richmond, but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault, recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahomani at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved, by a detour, to Hochsell's Landing on the James River, where he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to carry our trains. General Butler moved his main force up to James River in pursuance of instructions on the Fourth of May, General Gilmore having joined him with the Tenth Corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry by way of West Point to form a junction with him wherever he might get a shot hold, and a force of three thousand cavalry under General Cots from Suffolk to operate against the road south of Petersburg in Richmond. On the Fifth he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the Sixth he was in position with his main army and commenced in trenching. On the Seventh he made a reconnaissance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the Ninth he telegraphed as follows. Headquarters, near Bermuda Landing, May 9, 1864, Honorable E. M. Staunton, Secretary of War. Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up to Peninsula, forced to check a hominy and have safely brought them to their present position. These were colored cavalry and are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond. General Cots, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk on the same day, with our movement up James River, forced the Blackwater, burned the railroad bridge at Stony Creek below Petersburg, cutting into Beauregard's force at that point. We have landed here, entrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up to supplies. Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by Cots. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill, I have whipped today, killing and wounding many and taking many prisoners after a severe and well contested fight. General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard's force. Benjamin F. Butler, Major General. On the evening of the thirteenth and morning of the fourteenth he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the sixth lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in north and south Carolina and bring them to the defense of those places. On the sixteenth the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his entrenchments between the forks of the James and Appomattox Rivers. The enemy entrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond, as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there. On the twelfth General Cots, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the Danville Railroad which he struck at Coldfield, Palhatton, and Chula stations destroying them. The railroad track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores, thence crossing to the south side road, struck it at Wilson's, Wellsville, and Blacks and White stations destroying the road and station houses, thence he proceeded to City Point, which he reached on the eighteenth. On the nineteenth of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the enemy was a land force under General Hoke and with an iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, North Carolina, commanded by General H.W. Wessels and our gun boats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami, disabled. The army, sent to operate against Richmond, having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by hauling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia. The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined therefore to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained, and, accordingly, on the twenty-second, I directed that they be sent forward under command of Major General W. F. Smith to join the army of the Potomac. On the twenty-fourth of May, the Ninth Army Corps, commanded by Major General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the army of the Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of Major General Meade's command. Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the twenty-sixth to the North Bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's position by his right. General's torbids and merits divisions of cavalry under Sheridan and the Sixth Corps led the advance across the Pamunkey River at Hanover Town after considerable fighting, and on the twenty-eighth the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes' Shop. On the twenty-ninth and thirtieth we advanced with heavy skirmishing to the Hanover Courthouse and Cold Harbor Road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out, and attacked our left but was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his entrenched skirmish line. On the thirty-first, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the South Anna River after defeating the enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor and held it until relieved by the Sixth Corps and General Smith's Command, which had just arrived via White House from General Butler's Army. On the first day of June, an attack was made at five p.m. by the Sixth Corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the Sixth Corps and in front of General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps, not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. The Second was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the Third. On the Third of June we again assaulted the enemy's works in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the rapid down to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them, but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. From the proximity of the enemy to his defenses around Richmond it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank and invest Richmond from the north side or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James, while the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long vulnerable line which would exhaust much of our strength to guard and that would have to be protected to supply the army and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond if possible then after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and beseech Lee in Richmond or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them and where in case of repulse he could easily retire behind them without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make all could not be accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves until the cavalry could be sent to Fitzville and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley in Lynchburg and when the cavalry got well off to move the army to the south side of the James River by the enemy's right flank where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply except by the canal. On the seventh, two divisions of cavalry under General Sheridan got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's and, after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions. On the tenth of June General Butler sent a force of infantry under General Gilmore and of cavalry under General Cots to capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side and penetrated well in towards the town but were forced to retire. General Gilmore, finding the works which he approached very strong and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one. Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and city point General Smith's command by water, via the White House, to reach there in advance of the army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place. The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the twelfth, one division of cavalry under General Wilson and the fifth corps crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and moved out to White Oak Swamp to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Courthouse on the night of the thirteenth. During three long years the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight without materially changing the vantage ground of either, the southern press and people. With more shrewdness than was displayed in the north finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. Hence Antietam, Gettysburg and all the other battles that had been fought were by them set down as failures on our part and victories for them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great owing to the fact that we were, save in the wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party and when he did attack it was in the open field. The details of these battles which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery have rarely been surpassed are given in the reports of Major General Mead and the subordinate reports accompanying it. During the campaign of forty-three days from the rapid down to the James River the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base by wagons over narrow roads through a densely wooded country with a lack of warbs at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot therefore be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster Brigadier General R. Ingalls the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water base and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. The movement in the Kanawa and Shenandoah valleys under General Siegel commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook who had the immediate command of the Kanawa expedition divided his forces into two columns giving one composed of cavalry to General Averell. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad near Weithfell on the 10th and proceeding to New River and Christiansburg destroyed the road several important bridges and depots including New River Bridge forming a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th. General Siegel moved up the Shenandoah Valley met the enemy at New Market on the 15th and after a severe engagement was defeated with heavy loss and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of General Siegel as satisfactory, I ask his removal from command and Major General Hunter appointed to supersede him. His instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major General H.W. Chief of Staff of the Army near Spotsylvania Courthouse, Virginia May 20, 1864. The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction, reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own he will be doing good service. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General H.W. Hallick. Jericho Ford, Virginia May 25, 1864. If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canals should be destroyed beyond possibility of repair for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base or from about Gordonsville join his Army. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General H.W. Hallick.