 Good afternoon. Welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. My name is Andy Kutchins. I am the director of the Russia and Eurasia program here. And I'm very happy to introduce my colleague and friend, Sergei Markodonov, who has now been a visiting scholar here at the Center for more than three years. Yeah. It's hard to believe. Yeah. It's a long visit. And it's been a great visit. And I feel fruitful. Extremely fruitful to contribute a tremendous amount to the work of the Russia Eurasia program and to CSIS and more broadly to the Washington community with interest in Russia, particularly in the Caucasus and the states around the Caucasus. It's hard to believe that in about seven months, the Winter Olympic Games of 2014 in Sochi will start. I remember almost, I think it was seven years ago, when Mr. Putin went to Guatemala City. And surprisingly, I think, convinced the International Olympic Committee to award the Games to Sochi. I think it was one of his major achievements and symbolically quite important, I think, for him and for Russia, kind of symbolizing Russia's return back as a recovering and resurgent power in the world. Now there was a joke going around at the time that Mr. Putin arrived with a lot more luggage in Guatemala City than he left with. But all joking aside, I mean, it really was quite an achievement. And we're not going to be talking really about the logistics of getting all of the equipment and hotels and sites ready for the Games today, which is quite a challenge in and of itself. But we're going to be talking really about some of the security challenges to holding the Games in Sochi. I don't think ever has a winter or summer Olympic Games been held in a place with so close in proximity to a region, the Northern Caucasus, which is so rife with conflict, instability, and acts of violence, many of them terrorist acts. So the security challenges for these Games is obviously monumental. And I look forward to hearing what Sergei has to say about this kind of broader geopolitical and security environment under which the Games will be taking place. So Sergei, it's great to have you with us here. And look forward to your presentation today. Thanks. Thank you, Andy. Just today it would be my second presentation. The first one took place a couple of hours ago in Heritage Foundation. That one was devoted to the Eurasian Union and Russian desires in this project. But now let me move a little bit to another direction to Sochi and problems of ethnic politics and security around the upcoming Olympics. Just Andy mentioned the session of International Olympic Committee in Guatemala. In 2007, those times, I was just in Asia when I firstly heard about their final decision of this committee and understood that it would be a good topic for my investigations. Of course, the next February, Sochi would be the host of the Winter Olympic Games. Those Olympic Games will be the first Russian-hosted Olympics since the dissolution of USSR. By the way, the idea of Olympic Games in Sochi was discussed in the Soviet times, in the late of Soviet times. But after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and for the first years of the existence of Russia, this topic was put aside because some more important topics were on the table than Sochi. But finally, International Olympic Committee made its choice, and Sochi will be the host city of Winter Olympics. Those Olympics, and Andy is absolutely right, is considered like a symbolic importance event. Just today, the Olympic Games are much more than only sport events. In 2008, in Beijing, China proved its international aspirations and desire to be superpower. Or in 1972, Germany tried to demonstrate that it radically changed its image after the Nazis. Of course, you know, taking into account the context of the Munich Olympic Games, this attempt was failed, or maybe not completely, but partially taken into account terrorist attack. But anyway, it was an attempt. In Moscow of 1980, originally, Games conceived like a demonstration of detente, demonstration of Razryatka with the West. Of course, Afghanistan changed a little bit, these conceiving, original conceiving. But anyway, it was conceived in this way. Nowadays, Russia tries to demonstrate its recovery, its return to the major league of international policy. And those Games are extremely important personally for Vladimir Putin. Now we are not discussing is it right, is it wrong to consider Russia's returning power to the major league. But it's a perception shared not only by Russian officials, but the Russian society also. It's a kind of challenge, because the first Winter Games will be held in subtropical climate. I specially clarified the situation, because it was kind of discussion with my colleagues. They claimed Torino in Italy, like the first city hosted the Winter Olympic Games. But there is no consensus among geographers on Torino. There was on some reasons Torino belongs to subtropical climate, but in terms of rains and winter weather, no. This is why Sochi could be considered like the unique space of Winter Olympics in the subtropical zone. And don't forget that Sochi has been a reputation of the Russian semi-capital city. And because Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, and other representatives of the Russian leadership tend to spend their vacation in Sochi. And this place is also important in terms of decision-making concerning both the Caucasus and global things. Let's remember the trilateral meeting on Nagorno-Karabakh and some other things. This is why Sochi is so important. But climate aside, however, Sochi faces a number of more difficult challenges. Now they are enlisted. First one is the instability in the North Caucasus and challenge of terrorism from this territory. The Circassian issue having a particular importance in the context of history of the Russian penetration and expansion in this region. The Georgia-Russian bilateral relations. Russian policy towards the de facto Abkhaz Republic. Because in the West, many observers tend to consider Abkhazia like puppet figure of Russia. But in reality, on the ground, situation is much more complicated. And there are many contradictions in bilateral relations between big Russia and small Abkhazia, small Abkhaz de facto state. And last but not least, the dynamics in the Krasnodar region. You know that leader of this region, Alexander Tkachev, governor of this region, is one of public figures of the federal level. He is not only governor of the territory like Krasnodar. And taken into account strategic importance of Krasnodar region and status of some informal capital city of Sochi, the role of Alexander Tkachev and his statements is very important. And I'm going to touch particularly this role in my presentation. Unlike recent Olympic host cities such as Beijing, London, or Vancouver, Sochi is very close to the hot spots of the Russian Federation. I mean here, the North Caucasus is the most turbulent region of the Russian Federation. Sochi is 100 kilometers away Karachay-Charkasia. And it's about 200 kilometers away Kabardino-Balkaria. You know that in the early 90s, Kabardino-Balkaria was called as a sleeping beauty of the Caucasus. Nowadays, it's incorrect because in the period between 2010-2012, Kabardino-Balkaria held the third rate in so-called terrorist competition in the North Caucasus. Even winning this competition with Chechnya. It's interesting that data of 2012 demonstrated a decrease of the number of terrorist attack practically everywhere in the North Caucasus. The one exception was in Guzhetia. Even in Dagestan, leader of terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus since 2005, the number of terrorist attacks decreased in 15% in 2012. Many reasons, many prerequisites for it. But anyway, till nowadays, the North Caucasus still keeps turbulence. And it's considered like a potential threat, potential danger for Olympic Games. Don't forget that in 2007, one of terrorist structures of the North Caucasus underground, Dagestani-Vilayat, claimed to attack Olympic objects in Sochi. And nowadays, Dagestani-Vilayat is the most powerful terrorist structures in the North Caucasus. Because taking aside Chechnya, the strongest counter-terrorist operation was provided by the Russian troops of forces of interior just against the Dagestani-Vilayat. It's a part of the Caucasian Emirate, but it's impossible to consider a Caucasian Emirate like CPSU or other vertical structures. It's a kind of network. And different cells of this network behave in accordance of their own strategy tactics. And this is why it's so hard to make any prognosis or predictions on the future development of those structures like the Caucasus Emirate or Dagestani-Vilayat. Today, the North Caucasus braids instability beyond the region itself. It's also necessary to understand. And by the way, Dagestani-Vilayat was engaged in bombings in Moscow metro attack on Nevsky Express, a special railway between Moscow and St. Petersburg. That is photo of Dama Dedeva International Airport, one of the biggest transportation hub in Moscow. The Circassian issue, the second important question, I try to consider it separately from the general context of the North Caucasus. Of course, in the period of late 90s and especially since the first half of 2000s, nationalism was replaced as leading political discourse in the North Caucasus by radical Islamism or politicized Islamism. It's more correct because politicized Islamism have different faces. It's not restricted by Salafi activities. Let's see on Ramzan Kadyrov. He is also politicized Islamist, but pro-Russian, loyal to Vladimir Putin personally. But anyway, he is not champion or provider of secular policy, of course, in the territory of Chechnya. Another example, Sufi Muslims in Dagestan. They are not also providers of secular policy. They make very actively on the area of Islamization. This Islamization is very different from Salafi activities or jihadism. But anyway, it's also part of the picture of politicized Islamism. And politicized Islamism became the leading discourse, leading political discourse in the Caucasus. But it doesn't mean that nationalism was abolished completely. We could speak about new nationalism. New nationalism, which doesn't appeal directly to separation from Russia, but which is active in terms of interpretations of history or prerogatives, discussion of original prerogatives of the original local powers. And we have now in the North Caucasus two types or two phases of new nationalism. One of them is represented by Ramzan Kadyrov. It's the practice of privatization of republic by one person and political group close to him. And other case is extremely different. It relates to grassroots activity. It's multi-phased. I mean, here, a Circassian issue. Nowadays, it's kind of myth to consider Circassian issue like a consequence of preparation to the Olympic Games. Of course, Sochi itself has historical importance for Circassians, both in Russia and in diaspora. Because in 1961, Mijlis was provided in Sochi. It was a attempt to resist to the expansion of the Russian Empire. It was a attempt to create something similar or something looking like proper state. Because proper state of Circassia, it's not reality, of course. It's kind of discovery of the British diplomats. By the way, I've prepared a special quote of one British diplomat, David Urquhart, if you would have some questions, of course. Anyway, it was a attempt to create proper state, to be more active, to resist the Russian imperial expansion. But in 1864, Gbaade, nowadays, it's Krasnaya Polyana, beloved place of vacations of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, was the first battle of the Caucasian War. After this battle, fourth son of Nicholas I, Russian Emperor Mikhail Nikolaevich, provided the military parrot on the Krasnaya Polyana. And one of the consequences of the finish of the Caucasian War was immigration, or outflow of Circassians from the Caucasian region. And some historians, but more journalists, tend now to consider those events like genocide. And you know that in May 2011, the Georgian parliament recognized alleged genocide of Circassians. It's interesting, by the way, that the first declaration of genocide recognition was done within the framework of the Russian Federation. Now it's completely forgotten. In 1992, the parliament of Kabardino-Balkaria adopted a special law on the recognition of genocide. But in 1996, another Republican parliament of Adigea adopted an address to the federal power to recognize genocide of Circassians. And in 1994, President Yeltsin, with no recognition of genocide, begged a pardon for the Russian policy for atrocities, damages taken place in the period of Caucasian War. But it would be wrong to restrict the problem to discussion on genocide, its recognition, and history. The Circassian question could be characterized in more correct way, like Circassian questions. Because in different Adigean entities of the Russian Federation, there are full entities in Russia with Adigean population. Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Circusia, Krasnodar-Krai, and Adigea, those entities have their own agenda. In Kabardino-Balkaria, the problem of self-governing and problem of land disputes is the most topical. In the context of Karachay-Circusia, the most important problem for Circassian minority, unlike Kabardino-Balkaria, where Circassians are in majority, Circassians in Karachay-Circusia suffer from their underrepresentation in the power, in the Republican-level power. This is why any appointments within the Republican administration are rather sensitive for different ethnic groups. In the case of Adigea, the most important problem is repatriation. This problem has become more topical after the civil war in Syria. You know that there is a Adigean population in Syria. Estimates are rather different between 30,000 to 120,000. You know that in the censuses of Syria, as well as in the Turkish Republic, there were no special criteria like ethnicity. Only religion background, but not ethnicity. And don't forget about intermarriages between Arabs, Kurds, and Circassians. This is why what criteria of identification do you apply? And the number and estimate of your number would depend on the criteria used for the identification of this person or that person. Anyway, there is a problem which is so topical, and Circassians from Syria addressed about seven times to the parliament, to the Russian government, to consider this problem. This problem is not so simple, taking into account a variety of challenges existing in the North Caucasus. Ethnic tensions, growing Islamism, and so on. But anyway, Russia experienced some more or less successful attempts for repatriation. First of all, in this context, I wish to mention the experience of repatriation of Adyks or Circassians from Kosovo in 1999. They were more or less successfully adopted and integrated. In Adygea, only some families left this republic for Germany and Turkey. But most of them, till nowadays, have been existing in this territory. I think the problem of Russia is the absence of clear position on this topic. We could agree or disagree with the position of the Turkish Republic on the Armenian genocide, on issues of Kurds or problems related to Greeks or Assyrians. But anyway, there is an interpretation, there is a model, explanation model of the government. In case of Russia, we have seen keeping silence as the best option for this discussion and this topic. I'm not sure that it's the best option for this issue. By the way, speaking about Circassian movement, couple of last but no least points. This movement or movements, unlike Salafis and Jiharis, are nonviolent. It's necessary to understand. It's very important. And there is a bunch of different attitudes to the Russian Federation. Some of organizations, especially Adygea Hussain, Krasnodar Krai or Adygea, are engaged in the cooperation with the local governments and federal government in issues of repatriation, discussion of quotas, and so on. Some of them are more radical. And of course, speaking about diaspora attitudes, we need to take into account such phenomenon as remote nationalism. It's not unique in this Circassian case. The same cases could be described if we'll speak about Armenian development, development of Armenian diaspora or Jewish diaspora and so on. Sochi is a part of the Russian-Georgian relationship. Practically immediately after the decision of the International Olympic Committee, officials of Georgia tried to discuss the perspective of boycott of the Olympic Games, comparing the Sochi Olympic Games with Afghanistan, situation in 1979 with Moscow for 1980, but just recently a new government of Georgia, which won elections in previous October, promoted the Georgian participation. The National Committee of Georgia supported the participation of the Georgian delegation for the Olympic Games. Till nowadays, Russian and Georgian normalization processes is maybe not so successful. It's not a success story, of course. We could note only some steps towards each other, like opening of the Russian market for wines, for mineral waters, or a facilitation in the checkpoint Kazbegi-Vyarkhnilars on the military Georgian road, Vajna-Gruzynskaya It's a North Ossetian part of the Russian-Georgian border. But the Georgian participation in the Olympic Games could be also considered like one of the steps towards each other, because nowadays the problem of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not be considered like a real ground for compromise, because views on those topics are completely different. And don't forget about more actors in this problem. This problem is not too colored issue between Russia and Georgia. Don't forget about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And now let me turn to Abkhazia and the Russian-Abkhaz partnership. I'm repeating once again. In the West, many people tend to consider Abkhazia like puppet figure of Russia, forgetting about very complicated dynamics of Russian Abkhaz bilateral relations, like blockade of Abkhazia in the late 90s, some attempts of Russia to put Georgia and Abkhazia together, project of Evgeny Primakov of the common state, and so on, so on. This politics was not permanent after the USSR demise in 1991. Nowadays, Abkhaz people and Abkhazian leadership, of course, enjoy the protection from the Russian side. Many people in Abkhazia really believe that Georgian issue is over. Now it's not in question in agenda. Because nowadays, Abkhazia is protected by the Russian militaries. But the situation closing one side of the problems opened another one. And nowadays, people in Abkhazia, especially opposition, it's irony that Raul Hajimba, the leading opponent of the current president of Abkhazia in 2004, was supported by Russia as a successor of Vladislav Arzimba, the first de facto president of Abkhazia. But currently, Raul Hajimba is leader of opposition, who is so critical to the current leadership of Abkhazia. And he repeats from time to time, we need to develop our own security structure, not relying completely on Moscow. I guess Moscow has its own interests. It's normal, of course. Each country has and provides its own interests. It's not know-how of Russia or United States or any other countries. And of course, Abkhazian dependence is not recognized by the most of countries. But it doesn't deny a presence or existence of proper interest on the Abkhaz side. They are concerning, first and foremost, by the penetration of the Russian big business. Some desires of Russia to make discoveries of oil in the Black Sea, it's a problem. It's not coincidence that previous year, president of Abkhazia, Alexander Kvap, who is loyal to Russia, of course, rejected the project of road building between Cherkessk and Sukhumi. Concerning about ecology, environmental protection, and so on, but we understand that the most important concern of Abkhaz is demography. In the Soviet Georgia, they composed 17% of the total population. It was data of 1989, three years before the conflict with Georgia. But Russia is a little bit bigger than Georgia. And migration of relatives, Circassians, Abaza people from the North Caucasus, even ethnic Russians, could be also treated like demographic challenge for Abkhazia. And in this context, Sochi is considered on the one side as maybe benefit, but on another side as a concern. Because we have, I am repeating once again, deal with a symmetric partnership between Abkhazia and Russia. And the difference of scales, weights is so visible in Abkhazia. This is why Abkhaz were rather concerned about the appointment of Alexander Tkachev as a special envoy in Abkhazia, by the way. Now let me turn to Alexander Tkachev, the next hero. Krasnodar Krai has a strategic importance for the Russian Federation. First of all, in terms of population, Krasnodar Krai is the third area in Russia after Moscow and Moscow region. You know that Moscow as a capital city and Moscow region are different constituencies according to the Russian constitution. There are some plans to unite them, but it's only plans or drafts for discussion. The total population of Krasnodar Krai is roughly 5.5 million people. And this territory is interesting to migrants from their former USSR. Today, Armenians are the second ethnic group in Krasnodar Krai. Different estimates of population, but about half a million people. Georgians, people from the North Caucasus, and so on. And of course, Krasnodar Krai is the only territory of Russia which has access to the Black Sea, sure, after the loss of Sebastopol and Crimean Peninsula. And who knows? Maybe Novorossiysk would be considered like one of the important bases for the Russian Black Sea fleet. They could not predict or make prognosis on the development of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations or some other issues. And after the USSR collapse, Krasnodar region is represented like interesting or particular type of the Russian regions with the traditionalism, ideology, sentiments. And maybe it's the most effective region in terms of the development of the process of Kozak's revival. Because the idea of primordial Kozak land became kind of semi-official in Krasnodar region. And this is why many statements of Alexander Tkachev are rather nationalistic. In comparison with his predecessor Nikolai Kondrtyenko, who was rather anti-Semitic, he fought against Zionism, conspiracy in Moscow and around. Tkachev concentrated on the different Caucasian ethnic groups. In the early 2000s, Armenians became target for his criticism, Armenian-Karminians with their enterprises, and so on and so on. Mesketean Turks, by the way, in 2004, practically all Mesketean Turks from the Krasnodar region left this territory. It was a unique case. When migration was done due to ethnic reasons, not problems of everyday life or some other problems, but in terms of ethnic tensions, ethnic reasons. And Kurdish people. And previous year, Alexander Tkachev proposed a rather specific idea to create so-called migration filters against the people from the North Caucasus. Forgetting that North Caucasus is not Turkey, it's not Armenia, it's an integral part of the Russian Federation, I think this attempt could be characterized like policy of the Russian separatism. In one of my articles, I proposed this term because this idea really promoted answer from the side of ethnic republics. If we are citizens of Russia and could not live, could not stay, in Krasnodar area was the sense for us to be citizens of the Russian Federation. I think those attempts could be considered more like destructive for the unity and integrity of the Russian Federation. But previous year, after his statements on the migration filter, Alexander Tkachev received a black mark. Black North from the Kremlin, he didn't lead the party list of United Russia for their local parliamentary elections. Let's see. Many sources say that Tkachev would be untouchable before the Olympic Games. Let's see after. Because after the Olympic Games, another sport holiday is expected, World Cup, Soccer World Cup in 2018. And some citizens, Sochi, by the way, would be one of the hosts of this soccer cup. Thus, making a conclusion. The first subtropical Winter Olympic Games will require from the Russian authorities not only high quality creativity in public relations, in advertising, but also in enhanced ability to provide security as a high standard. Security and more or less a reliable level of interethnic relationship on those territories. Thank you. And now I am ready to receive your questions, comments, to react on your no subjections. Thank you. OK, Sergei. Thanks very much. It's a very comprehensive presentation. I wonder if I could offer the first question. You alluded to the Dagestani Viliota, I think, that had said it was looking to target the Sochi Games. How much, to the extent that you are aware of this, I mean, how much chatter among other groups and individuals have expressed or have identified Sochi as a target, as a specific target for their cause. OK, good question. It's not coincidence I paid special attention to the Dagestani Viliot because till nowadays, by this time of day, only Dagestani Viliot expressed this opinion to label Sochi as a potential target. But it doesn't mean other groups or subgroups would not have any ideas to target Sochi because for terrorists, maybe it's better to keep secrets, to not discuss the potential scenarios or maybe number of forces for participation in such terrorist attacks. Dagestani is further to Sochi in comparison with Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Churkesi. Kabardino-Balkaria is, in my mind, much more important in this context. Because for the last five, four years, this territory became much more vulnerable in terms of terrorist challenge and dangers. And this situation is brilliantly understood by the leadership of both republics. Because from time to time, they ask federal government to maybe increase their financial support of those republics to keep more stable and more comfortable, for whom the war is war for anybody. It's kind of interesting business, administrative business, who knows. OK, let's open the floor to questions and comments. Please raise your hand. When I call on you, identify yourself, your name, and your affiliation. Yes, over here. Mikhail. I'm sorry, yes. Thank you so much. Thank you. OK, Mikhail, my maid of Georgetown University. Well, you mentioned several. You concentrated on several points in your presentation. By the way, thank you so much for a fascinating presentation. But I watch from time to time Echo of Moscow, its program where the editor-in-chief Alexey benedictov. And they keep saying when they talk about the Sochi Olympics, they go from time to time. And they keep saying that Russia is not ready for Sochi Olympics. The Sochi Olympic would be major fiasco. So what is it? Is it taken simply out of blue? How would you react to this? Thank you. And well, the second question is, you mentioned, you talked several times about Great Cherkessia. But Abkhazia is also a part of Great Cherkessia. Abkhazians were also Cherkess to a certain point. Or maybe the cousins of Cherkess. And when you talk about repatriation, how would you know about the repatriation of Mukhajirs? Mukhajirs are those people who were forced out by the Russians in 1860. Some of them were forced out from Abkhazia. And when Russians moved, well, Cossacks moved on the north part of Great Cherkessia. Georgians moved to the south, which eventually became, Abkhazia became a part of Georgia. What do you know about the repatriation of Abkhazia? So Cherkessians into Abkhazia. Thank you. Great questions, especially the second one. As for the echo of Moscow, of course, I am observing all Russian media. And I got acquainted with estimates made by Boris Nemtsov, my first estimate. I am not going now to criticize Alexey Vinodiktov or Boris Nemtsov, but in the case of Boris Nemtsov, it's necessary to understand that he is a politician. For a politician, the problem of analysis is not the problem. For him, there is another agenda, another methodology, another aims and goals. It's not bad, it's not good. He is a politician, I am not a politician, I am an analyst. When I would be a politician, I would behave like Nemtsov Navalny or some other persons. But I'm not sure that this choice is optimal. Of course, I could agree with some points of criticism from Nemtsov's side or Ehemovsky's side. First of all, environment, corruption, maybe violation of human rights and rights of property in social, of course. But this goal is begun realizing. Nowadays, it's impossible to stop this process because losses from this stopping would be more than currently. It's understandable for any policymakers. Putin, Ivanov, Petrov, no matter. As for Circassians and Abkhaz people, you are absolutely right, characterizing those relations like relations between cousins, not brothers, not sisters, cousins. A relationship between Circassian movements, it's more correct to say, because we have no such judicial faces like Circassians or Abkhaz people. Different movements, of course, national movements. And Abkhaz were dependent on many factors. In the early 90s, many Circassians were engaged in the conflict with Georgia on the Abkhaz side. About 3,000 volunteers were engaged. And Circassian groups led by Moayet Shorov played a significant role in the assault of building of a council of ministers controlled by Georgia in Sokhumi. And then Sultan Sassnaliev was a minister of defense in Abkhazia and even a vice prime minister. Now he died. But after 2011, we could speak about differences between Abkhazia and some Circassian movements. Because you know that Georgia recognized the alleged genocide of Circassians and many Circassians, including guys who fought against Georgians like Ruslan Keshav, like Ibrahim Yaganov. Of course, like Ibrahim Yaganov supported these decisions and they opposed themselves to Abkhaz people. And nowadays, especially in the internet, in social networks, we could see internet fight, not real fight between Circassian activists and Abkhaz activists. Because many Circassians proposed Abkhaz people to be more tolerable to Georgians like Ibrahim Yaganov and so on and so on. It's interesting that in the 90s, the Abkhaz parliament adopted a special law on repatriation and recognition of genocide in 1997. And Abkhaz government tried from time to time to realize programs on repatriation. The problem of Mahajir is also so sensitive for Abkhaz people. It's point of consensus. As for Abkhaz people, many of them left Abkhazia in 1966 after the so-called Lichni rebellion. And nowadays, in the territory of Turkey, there were more descendants of ethnic Abkhaz than on territory of Abkhazia. But any programs, any attempts to make repatriation, to realize programs of repatriation of Abkhaz people failed. Because you know, Abkhazia is a country with suspended sovereignty, with disputed status. It's great. Russia recognized its independence as well as Venezuela or Nicaragua, but not most of countries of the world, like in the case of Kosovo. In terms of poverty or prosperity, Abkhazia is incomparable with Turkey, for example. This is why we could name some cases of repatriation. I know, even personally, some people who repatriated to Abkhazia. But it's limited by maybe dozens, not hundreds, not thousands. Some of them began business in Abkhazia. Hotel Yasemin, maybe you know, if you travel to Abkhazia, Hotel Yasemin belongs to a guy, the Turkish citizen of the Abkhaz background. Some business in coal mining and so on. But it's very limited. But anyway, nevertheless, Turkey recognizing the territorial integrity of Georgia tries to keep Abkhaz window opened. In 1999, deputy of minister of foreign affairs of Turkey visited Abkhazia, for example. And Sergey Bogapsh, on the eve of his death, also visited Turkey. And the Georgian Foreign Ministry protested and imagined what answer was given by the Turkish foreign policy minister. It's a personal deal of Sergey Bogapsh. We have not been informed about this visit. Looks like a Getskisad kindergarten. But seriously in terms of realization of national interests. Yeah, so Steve Benson, CSIS. Sergey, I've looked back to Vancouver and then to London where there were arguably pretty good security apparatus and capabilities in place. They still scrambled at the last minute. Lots of stories about putting capabilities in place and problems with security. Enhancing the security in this region and this geography. Are they on schedule to do this? Beyond the logistics and the infrastructure and all that, is that going to be in place to considering that up front? They're working with the folks that did this before to make this a secure Olympics? In both cases, in Vancouver, there was not as much in place with regards to keeping track of what moved in and around the region, specifically from an air standpoint. So the land-sea boundaries there, being able to keep track of all the private air, the helicopters, the yachts that come in. Everyone who is rich and has a means of transportation wants to come in and saturates the space. So from a standpoint of just looking at this from a dependent standpoint, that put in more capability. But from the London standpoint, there was an issue of an independent standpoint in Vancouver. From a dependent standpoint, it was looking at targets just that they thought or just looking at the traffic in the area so they could keep track of who was there and what was moving around. This was both from actually looking at it from a radar standpoint and actually looking at it from a transponder standpoint. These kinds of territories with this topography that's canalized and difficult to get around, there's a lot of ways to egress and ingress from the space. So I'm wondering if they're looking at this. Hey, I am not the best person who could speak about technical stuff of the security because I concern more on the political dimension of the security. But of course, you are absolutely right speaking about vulnerabilities. In the case of Sochi, there are many vulnerabilities like access to the sea, for example. Seashore, it's a kind of potential challenge. Or narrow roads. Most of them were built in the period of Stalin. And they are rather vulnerable in terms of traffic jams and so on. So Montana's relief is also dangerous and so on. I know that Russians addressed for consultancy to Israeli specialists. By the way, it provoked some tensions in relationship between Georgia and Israel because those guys visited Abkhazia and they were former generals, highest rank generals of the Israeli army. But it's impossible to discuss the issues of the Sochi security without Abkhazia. In the Soviet times, Sochi-Suchumi was the United, was the single tourist or resort complex. It was considered in this way. I think in terms of security, it's impossible to separate. Even we put aside the problem of Russian Georgian relations, status of Abkhazia and so on and so on. And I think observing the current tendencies, Russians would secure security based on the Soviet patterns, first of all. Limitation of people who would travel to Sochi registration. By the way, many people know about specific regime of registration both in Moscow and St. Petersburg. But there is a regime of registration in Stavropol Krai and Krasnodar Krai. No in my native Rostovskaya Oblast. But in Krasnodar, yes. Once upon a time, I traveled to Abkhazia and stopped in Adler. It's the last railway point to the de facto border. And I heard the information in the station. Ladies and gentlemen, if you have no registration in Krasnodar Krai, please do it as soon as possible. This is why due to those mechanisms, Russians would provide more or less effective control. I, Steve, just a couple of times I've raised questions, but they've been in public or semi-public formats with the US government officials from the State Department of the National Security Council. But are we working with our Russian colleagues to address the security challenges in Sochi? And the answer is yes. Period. That's all I've gotten. Yeah, that's a good start. Could be good. Anyway, special thanks to Andy for this commentary. Yeah, I also heard more positive estimates from the Russian side on this cooperation. Because usually, United States of America represent their most numerous delegations for all Olympics. Sochi would not be accepted. And this is why there is a special concern. For US-American cooperation, there is another thing, another topic deficit of pragmatism. We continue to discuss tactics with ideological stamps, like reservitization and so on, so on. Put them aside. Discuss real interests and mutual benefits. It's much more productive, I think, for both sides. Magnitsky law, Dima Yakovlev law, some other things. They are not so important for their mutual relations. Ella Soin, Freedom House. Sergei, thank you very much for a great presentation. I have two questions, actually. In the list of the potential security obstacles listed, terrorist threat from the underground, militant underground is very real, which also imply that the competence or the ability to deter this terrorist threat by the security services may be limited. Should the competence of security services also be a consideration of the security concern with respect to Sochi Olympics? That's one question. The second question is, in light of the recent what some call political cleansing of the political elite in Dagestan, starting with the arrest of Said Amirov and all the corruption cases that have emerged since then, do you believe that may be some connection to preparing and ensuring some security or changing the political dynamic in Dagestan to provide a better security before the Olympics? Thank you. Thank you. Let me be brief on the first question. Of course, yes. Of course. And because when corporate interests violate or dominate or violate interest of the state, it's a danger in any way. In every cases, American, Russian, and so on, I think cooperation or strict coordination is required if you would be interested to raise your chances. As the second question, first of all, I'm not sure that now we could make any conclusions about the real changes of the Russian attitude to Dagestan. Said Amirov was kind of symbol who was the mostly visible or clear that Dagestan maybe is the only constituency not only in the Caucasus, but generally in the Russian Federation without vertical and with real freedom of press. Not due to democracy, but due to different groups controlling different mass media. This is why it's really admiration or satisfaction to read Dagestan newspapers, Chernivik and so on. You could agree or you could disagree, but the level of estimate is really different from the third general topics of the regional mass media. The first topic is love to Vladimir Putin. The second topic is love to the regional president and third topic is about animals, about zoos, about theaters and some other blah blah. But in the case of Dagestan, it was a really interesting content, but don't forget that any other cities of Dagestan are real policy makers. What's about Said Pasha Makhanov? I'm not sure that resources of Said Pasha Makhanov, Mayor of Khasavut are really less or weaker than the resources of Said Amirov. What's about resources of Imam Yerelev, Mayor of Derbent, Gateway of Russia to the South Caucasus? Huge resources. Amirov is kind of symbol. Symbol in terms of PR, first of all, because the federal government tries to demonstrate it. Please see, please be afraid of Ramazan Ablutipov. He is a very strong guy, he can, he could, he should. And so on. But in reality, I don't see real prerequisites for changes. Till nowadays, and of course, Russia criticized or representatives of Russian officials or some guys who are close to the federal authorities criticized Said Amirov. He's bandit, he's gangster and so on, so on. But why did you keep silence guys in 1999 when Said Amirov secured real military help to the federal troops against Basaev and Khatap? Why did you keep silence when Said Amirov secured results for United Russia, minimizing chances of communists which were very strong, by the way, in Dagestan? And I think in Dagestan communists are very required because it was the only secular force, including different ethnicities of Dagestan. Communists are very, very valuable in Dagestan. It was in another way a social protest would be privatized by radical Muslims. And it's interesting because a situation in Dagestan was formed as a result of deficit of the federal presence, especially after formation of the Chechen Republic of Echkeria. You know that Dagestan was practically cut from the rest of Russia. And of course, clans, informal ties, began playing a more important, sometimes key role. But it's not only a responsibility of Said Amirov or guys who were closer to him. And the most important question, what kind of model could replace the model of Amirov or Amirovs around Dagestan? It's an inevitable question. The most important thing. What effective model would replace this? Of course, I recognize this model is not so good. It's ineffective. It's privatization of republic. What's instead? Are you ready to propose real things? Not only one demonstrative step like arrest of Said Amirov, but real changes. I'm not sure. Competency and security services, the first question. Yeah, I answer. It's a challenge, yes. OK, let me make a comment. I can't help but this. But because it also ties in with the US Russian relationship. I think there are so many questions about the experience of Tamerlan Sernayev and the Sernayev brothers. I mean, obviously, it was a massive security failure on the part, on our part, on the US part. But there are an awful lot of questions about what Russian security services were doing or not doing when Tamerlan Sernayev returned to Dagestan and to Russia for the six, seven months in the first half of 2012. And I mean, to believe the reports that have come out from Novaya Gazeta and other Russian sources, there's fairly clear evidence that Tamerlan Sernayev was engaged in meetings and activities, which should have certainly been of concern to Russian local and federal intelligence services who had alerted us, who had alerted the US the previous year about their concern about the radicalization of Tamerlan, Tamerlan believed the reports that have come out from Novaya Gazeta and other Russian sources. There's fairly clear evidence that Tamerlan Sernayev was engaged in meetings and activities, which should have certainly been of concern to Russian local and federal intelligence services who had alerted us, who had alerted the US the previous year about their concern about the radicalization of Tamerlan Sernayev. I guess the good news is that this experience has led to some, well, led to the awareness on the US and Russian government that are the inadequacies of our cooperation on intelligence sharing and about that. But I mean, the competency of, it doesn't look like a sterling hour for the competency of intelligence services on either side for sure. I guess I'll leave it at that. Maybe there'll be some other commentary further. In your case, Andy, the problem is confidence and trust. It's other deficit, deficit of pragmatism but deficit of trust. Well, no, I think there were other problems on the, well, there were serious procedural bureaucratic problems on the US side leading to the oversight of Tamerlan Sernayev. The distrust issue is certainly a big piece of it and why it makes, why intelligence sharing is so hard anyway, even with close allies because of concern about the revelation of sources and all that. Hi, Michael Heischman, State Department. Just a couple of quick questions. First one specifically to, can you talk about the organized crime element in a relationship with the host organizing committee and senior officials? And the second question is, in this region specifically they've recently hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Conference. They have the Winter Games. They had the World Cup coming up as well after Brazilia, they're gonna have G8 following the Olympics. They have the Kazan Games going on right now. So what's changed to move such international events in such a small timeframe? If you understand what I'm trying to say. From what, since what time do we analyze the changes? I don't, I don't, I don't see any real change but with what period? No, APEC was last year. No, Vladivostok. Yeah. APEC was held in Vladivostok in the question Far East. It's far East, it's about 4,000 kilometers from Krasnodar, but anyway, of course, you are absolutely right at the influence of organized crime or corruption or informal ties in the business around such objects like Olympic objects or objects for forum. Of course they exist. I don't think that we could really make conclusions on radical decrease of them or real changes. Well, one difference is that Russia is much more wealthier than it was in the 1990s for sure. I mean, holding major events like the Olympics or the World Cup are very, very, very expensive. So for Russia, Russia was not really realistic for Russia to consider doing that at the end of the 1980s and throughout, through the 1990s. And I think it's no coincidence that, you know, Russia effectively became solvent. They paid off their Paris Club debt. They paid off their IMF debt the year previously in 2005 and 2006, 2007 was, you know, then they go international and get this big prize for Sochi. So just simply the wealth factor of the country is important. For things like, you know, APEC or G8, that's, those are different things that are driving them. I mean, holding APEC for Russia was, that was, you know, Russia's effort to make it sort of symbolizing its own Asia pivot, if you will. Russia hosting the G8 back in 2006 for the first time and now in 2014 again in Sochi, you know, this is a, well, 2006 was very symbolic because this again, you know, represented Russia's, you know, membership, if not quite full membership in the G8, the first time that it was hosting it. So it held a lot of, you know, I think political significance. I'd like to ask about demographic challenge, Armenians' demographic challenge for Asia and so forth. This being, how it will influence on first world and between, what is the place of this game, Krasnodar Try and the authority in Krasnodar cried their position concerning to Armenians. What do you think about that? Thank you, Tigran. First of all, let me make one methodological distinction to two different cases in principle because in Krasnodar Cry, the ethnic majority, Russian majority is about 85, 84, 85%. In the case of Abkhazia, the number of Armenians is practically equal to the number of Abkhaz people. Even if we would follow the official data, official statistics of the de facto authorities. And the problem of Armenian community is not related directly with the Sochi. But this problem is crucially important for the national building of Abkhazia and perspective of Abkhazia. Because you know that nowadays, Abkhazia tends to combine principles of ethnocracy and multi-ethnicity. On the one side, any representatives of Abkhazia try to demonstrate their benevolence to multi-ethnicity. They try to stress, in the period of 1992, 1993, Armenians, Russians, Greeks, Jewish people fought with us against Georgian invasion, aggression, and so on, so on, so on. But at the same time, let's see on the number of Armenians in the government or in the parliament. In the parliament of Abkhazia, there are only three Armenians. Three Armenians, no more. But we know about active engagement of Armenians in the war on the Abkhaz side. Battalion Bagramiana, and the engagement of such persons like Galustra Pisanyan and Sergey Matyvosyan and some other persons. It was very important for Abkhazia. But at the same time, we have under-representation of Armenians in the structures. But at the same time, in the sphere of business, Armenians are very active. In terms of tourism business, private driving from the Russian side to Abkhazia, personally, I prefer to cross the border through so-called Tormansky Dvorik in Blinovo district. It was cheaper and faster. For extra 100 rubles, you would save a couple of hours of expecting on the border. And private excursions made by Armenians are also cheaper inside Abkhazia. And in terms of quality, I prefer to those excursions. I don't have anything against Abkhaz people, but anyway. This is why it's a real problem. By the way, as a situation in Gali district inhabited by a migrae alliance of Georgians, these numbers about 45 or 50,000 people, the problem of their integration is also very important. The problem of citizenship, obtaining citizenship for them is very important. And you know that Abkhaz constitution, article 49, strictly prohibits for all minorities, non-Abkhaz people to be elected as a president of Abkhazia. This is why it's a problematic. Okay, I've got three questions from the back row. Thank you for your presentation, Alexander Melikishvili, IHS Global Insight. I have two questions. One has to do with your perspective on the Russian Georgian Security Corporation in the run-up to Social Olympics. As you probably know, Prime Minister Ivanishvili made a statement in this regard, promising full cooperation with regard to security of the upcoming games and made a rather controversial decision about Georgia's participation in the Olympic Games. It seems like Georgia will be sending a delegation to the Social Olympics. And the second question has to do with your take on Bilalov's dismissal and the whole controversy surrounding that in the context of the preparations for the Social Olympics. Thank you, thank you. Let me start briefly from the second question about Bilalov. Bilalov played a role of a symbol like PR victim. Let's guys see we could dismiss any guys engaged in corruption and so on and so on. I am not sure that problem of social development or social business is restricted by the personality of such a distinguished guy like Bilalov. As for the Russian Georgian Security Corporation, thank you for this question. Couple of years ago, maybe this question would be perceived like paradox or inadequate question, but I raised it even after the five days war, but in a little bit different context. I am absolutely sure that this cooperation would be and it's inevitable in the context of the North Caucasus because Georgia and Russia share the Gestani, Chechen and Ngush parts of the border. And this problem is not problem of only Russia. You remember brilliantly the recent experience of Lapota Gorge and previous experience of Pankisi Gorge. It's very dangerous. Many people in Georgia dreamed and dream now Russia would leave the North Caucasus. I think it would be nightmare for Georgia because Russia could go to Siberia or Ural forest, but Georgia has no Siberia or Ural forest and so on. It would face real problems. And I think this context would make our countries closer. As for social security cooperation, maybe but here I am more skeptical, but in the North Caucasus, eastern part of the North Caucasus from the Russian side, yeah, it's potentially possible. It would help, by the way, to promote normalization of the countries. Taking aside the status issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Toby Davis, U.S. Department of State, thank you very much for your presentation. If Russia gets through the Sochi Olympics without any major incident, what do you predict relations will be like between Russia and the North Caucasus, Republics, Georgia, Abkhazia region? And then on the other side, if there is some incident, how do you think those relations will change? Thank you. Yeah, of course I want to be optimist, of course, but being an expert, I could not be optimist extremely. It's necessary to be more or less pessimistic, to be an expert. What's the over-under in Vegas? In another way, I would be politician, I would be politician, especially European politicians who believe in progress, Bosnia progress, Kosovo progress, Georgia progress, everywhere progress. But I'm not European politician, I am an expert with the Russian background, this is why I need to be more pessimistic or realistic. I don't think that Sochi would dramatically change the Russian attitude to the Caucasus or to Georgia. Maybe if those incidents would be directly connected with Georgian engagement or Abkhaz engagement, yes. If no, I don't think that Russia would make something new in terms of struggle against terrorism or normalization with Georgia in order to have more chances to effectively struggle against terrorism and so on. This is why, of course, I want that Sochi Olympics would be with no incidents. I have many criticism to Vladimir Putin to the Russian government, but at the same time, I'm not Vladimir Vladimirovich Lenin and Bolshevik, who really wished their defeat of their own national government in World War I. We know the results of these desires. This is why I am not champion of this approach. And it's sad for me that many competitors of mine try to behave like Bolsheviks. That's an interesting question, Toby. Depend upon the incident and the extent to which we knew from where the incident was perpetrated or who were the perpetrators. But boy, I think this would be extremely inflammatory for Russian public opinion. And personally for Putin would be a, he would take it very, very, very badly. This, I mean, this really is a, there's a lot of symbolic value in this event. So, of course, I agree with Sergey. But nevertheless, I could not imagine right now that Russia, after some incidents, if they would be, would provide a carpet bombarding of the North Caucasus or so on. Even understanding the symbolic importance of the East Event for Vladimir Putin and the Russian government. Thank you very much for an interesting presentation. Ulviz Mayol, independent consultant. You mentioned, you started your presentation with what happened in 79 and subsequent 1988 Olympic Games in Soviet Union. Was, you know, Soviet Union's intervention of Afghanistan and the boycott from the West. Well, today we have Syria issue, which as recent G820 summit showed, disagreements between President Putin and President Obama, the pictures around and Russia media still today writes about victory of Russia on this issue. Do you think that as history can repeat itself as few years ago, something like that, in which is a security issue beyond Russian border or USSR border, not within, but toppled with Russia's human rights issues that has been criticized recently, be it, you know, the recent protests and arrests, the Pussy Riot case and other cases can be causing to again, boycott of the Olympics by the Western countries. And would you think then it is, would be considered as kind of, you know, jealousy or skepticism of the West on fair treatment of the Russia by the West? And do you think Russia in this case is much different from China, for example, who hosted Beijing Olympics to fascinate? So what's your take on that? Thank you so much. Interesting question and maybe it takes to write a special monograph about it, but it's very important thing. I think you raise, you draw our attention to the differences between the USSR and contemporary Russia. I'm repeating once again, tensions and bilateral problems in relationship between the West, United States and the European Union and Russia are not ideological. They're based more on business on pragmatism. Many people from Georgia like to repeat, let's see 2,000 soldiers from Georgia serving Afghanistan. Great, of course, but 4,500 flights annually from the West to Afghanistan are provided through so-called Northern corridor through Russia. Russia is not member of NATO. And it's official information represented by the Department of State. This is why I think there are many common points in terms of business, in terms of security. And Syria, I don't think that it's a problem of clash or differences between President Obama and President Vladimir Putin. I think President Navalny or even Prokhorov, by the way, who was rather critical to the Western approach to Syria, would provide practically the same policy, maybe with noisy anti-American rhetoric addressed first and foremost to the domestic audience. Maybe. As for me personally, I am against this noisy anti-American rhetoric. It's not pragmatic, I'm for pragmatism. But it doesn't mean that Syria is a case of dictatorship, solidarity, and so on. Don't forget that Russia has a substantial Muslim minority, very substantial. In seven constituencies, Muslims are the dominant groups, ethnic Muslims, and turmoil around Russia and influence from the Middle East to Russia is a concern. Secular Syrian regime supported Russia in Chechnya, supported Russia in Georgia, and so on. But if we would imagine they overthrew and maybe collapse of power in Syria or split of the country, or victory of radical Muslims, it's not theories because we see some negative results of so-called Arab Spring in Egypt and- We'll go ahead, sort of. Yeah, and so on, so on. This is why I don't think that the West would repeat approach of 1979, 1980 to Russia today. Because one principle difference, no Russian troops in Syria. If they would be deployed there, let's come back to this discussion. But I'm not sure that they would be really deployed. Mikhail Lyontev or some other journalist could discuss it for the TV watchers, for the Russian audience. But I'm not sure that Vladimir Putin would seriously take it into account. Let me give you a little personal response. I remember very well the boycott of the 1980 Olympics. I hated that decision. I thought that was a terrible decision on the part of the Carter administration and other European governments that followed it. Why? Because basically who was punished were the athletes. The athletes who would compete. At the time I was a track athlete. I was a 400 meter runner. I was not a world-class runner, but I was a national-class runner. I was a pretty fast white guy. And I ran against a lot of guys that would have competed in those Olympics and sometimes trained with them. And to lose that opportunity, for some people it was the opportunity of a lifetime. One of the greatest track athletes ever, Ronaldo Nehemiah, who held the world record in the 110 high hurdles. He didn't run that and never ran again. He started playing pro football. I just thought it was a terrible decision to even further politicize the Olympic games, which are already overly politicized in my view. So I would be violently opposed to any boycott of the games. But there are some people that you'll hear some voices calling for a boycott of the games because the Russians doing this and the Russians doing that. And if something very bad happened in the US-Russia relationship from the perspective of the US, you would hear those voices more. But I think the only justifiable reason to not to boycott Olympic games, would be to cancel Olympic games because of a very, very, very imminent security risk. Which is not unimaginable, but not the most likely thing to happen. Okay, sorry, I just had to say that. I was very, very angry and I still am about it. It was 30, 32 years later. It was very interesting answer because I was a student that time, but I brilliantly remember the situation around. And for the Olympic games in Lake Placid, I was especially impressed by Eric Hayden, who was a skate runner, who won five gold medals. I was really impressed and I supported him putting aside Cold War and some American sentiments and so on. And I remember his interview to the Soviet newspapers when he reproduced practically the same argument that Andy does now. But I don't suppose you were rooting for that American hockey team in 1980, were you? I cried. Also, I'm sure, just like I cried when the United States lost in basketball in 1972 in Munich. But the other thing is that, I mean, okay, you've got this international venue and it's, you know, so let the athletes compete. I mean, let the American athletes go to Moscow or go to Sochi. And, okay, you got the point. All right, I think we have time for, well, we're running out of time. If someone's got a question or comment, they absolutely feel necessary. Okay, you've got it. Last one, right here. Evgenia Tahirian, independent analyst. Sergei, thank you very much for your great presentation. Just to finalize, if you can give some kind of suggestion or advice to the Russian government, if you can just draw some kind of conclusion, what would you do or what you would change to make Sochi Olympics more secure and more successful? Thank you. If I would be brief, I could give such suggestions. First of all, be more sophisticated. Be more careful, be more pragmatic. For such money, snow would be. Right, 50 billion dollars, you think they could get some snow there. And counting, I would follow up on a line. I would be consulting with those that were responsible for previous Olympic games, the Vancouver games, the London games, the Beijing games. And this would be going on quietly and behind closed doors to just try to bring every means possible from a technical and logistical security standpoint to ensure the safety of the games. As a last point, since I want to wish success once again, not because this will be a feather in the head of Vladimir Putin, but just because you want to see a successful Olympic games and what the Olympic spirit movement is all about. There was an Olympic games in which at the time there was not a major resort at this area which developed into one of the premier largest ski resorts in the world. That happens to be Squaw Valley, 1960, California. Now, and this is right around Lake Tahoe, similar to in the Sierra Nevada mountains, similar to the region around Sochi, the combination of this beautiful water, Lake Tahoe and the mountains, but it had not snowed at all. And literally there was a serious, there was a serious problem because they didn't have the kind of snow making equipment that they have now. And thank God about a day or two before the Olympics, it did snow and the games came off successfully and it put Squaw Valley and the Sierra Nevada and the Lake Tahoe region on the map as a major, major ski resort and destination. So I hope that Sochi has the same impact for the Caucasus as a world-class ski resort and destination for Russia. Sir Gay, thanks for a terrific presentation. And as always, and thank you for coming and providing very thoughtful comments and questions.