 Thank you so much for finding the time to join us. My name is Romina Strati. I am a future leaders fellow at SOAS, Code of History, Religious and Philosophy. I'm actually based in Ethiopia, but I happen to be here this week. And together with Lars, my colleague, we're very, very pleased to be able to hold this round table event. We're very pleased to be able to do both virtually and physically. Lars is also the chair of the Central War Christianity. He has been leading an excellent series of lectures in the past year. And I have been kind of joining for Ethiopia as much as I have been able to. We are very glad to hold this round table event, which is really a culmination of a series of private conversations, or more informal conversations we have been having in the past year with colleagues from, well, not past year, but the past few months, I'd say, with colleagues from Estonia, UK, Ethiopia, Kenya, who are all concerned about what we see as an unsettling role that orthodox churches, whether Eastern or Oriental, are playing or politics in contexts that are as diverse as if you're in Ukraine. As a way of background, just to position myself, I am removed over by birth, raised in Greece. So I happen to have family both in Ukraine and Russia who are currently affected in various ways. But I also personally happen to be based on working in Ethiopia for the past one year and a half since the conflict started. And I work with a lot of Ethiopian orthodox affiliated institutions. So I've seen closely that convergence between religious and political discourse that underpins pro-war sentiment. One prominent example is found in the case of a very well-known preacher who is an advisor, social affairs advisor to the prime minister of Ethiopia. I want to say names. And he's obviously in favor of the work using religious discourse to justify it. Now, when the Ukraine crisis started, I found it interesting to see some of the same dynamics play out in the context of the Russian politics in the Ukraine crisis. Obviously, despite the important differences ecclesiological, historical, and sociocultural between Ethiopia and Ukraine. Not only is there a strong identification of political and church leadership in Russia that seems to favor the war in Ukraine, but religious identity is also developed as a distinctive characteristic of our Russian or Eastern identity that seems to be threatened by the encroachment of a Western secular modernity and the praframatic of it. The political events, as you know well, seem to have resulted in rifts and divisions between different orthodox churches, whether Eastern or Oriental, and endangering what we all seek and stand for in the orthodox unity in the orthodox world. Both contexts as far as orthodox Christian traditions, despite, again, important theological ecclesial and cultural differences, what historical events have informed and prevented the convergence of political and religious discourse in each context? How has one of theology... Sir, could you repeat? Hello, mom. Mommy. I'm sorry. But I don't have my loves. I think one of the participants... I'm going to have to have them. What are we going to talk about? One second, yes. I'm going to see... Thank you for talking. How are you? Apologies, Phil. I think that was weird. Thank you for your contribution. I'll continue. So both contexts as crime... Did you start with the first question, the epitome of the subject? Yes, I'm repeating that. I'm just trying to answer that. So both contexts as crime to orthodox Christian traditions, despite important theological ecclesial and cultural differences, what historical events have informed or prevented the convergence of political and religious discourse in each context? How has orthodox theology one of self-sacrifice, love, and theosis for achieving likeness with God in Amharic, the example we have on the set, lent itself to politics of war? What has been the role of church hierarchies in war politics? And do their positions reflect those of the late and the clergy of the round? How might we respond to rifts in the Orthodox churches when ethnicity or nationalism-oriented sentiments seem to prevail over a faith that should have no material boundaries and should make no exclusions or differentiations on the basis of material markers? This is a faith of unity. So Lars and I thought it appropriate and urgent to have a reflective discussion on the relationship of orthodox Christianity to war from both a theological perspective, but also informed by the different historical experiences of Ethiopia, very diverse contexts. Today, we'll focus on the Ukraine crisis and the Russian Orthodox context. And in the future round table, we will turn to look at the case of Ethiopia again in order to honor the differences between Oriental and Eastern Orthodox Christianity, but also the socio-political conditions in the two countries. And then we'll try to bring everything together and apply that more comparative lens. The aim of this is not only to deliberate on the relationship of Orthodox Christianity war, but also to improve understanding among those who are perhaps less exposed and have less familiarity with what Eastern or Oriental Orthodox means. We'd like to nuance the conversations and representations in media outlets and really use it for mutual education. So for those who are less familiar with Russian Orthodox or Ethiopian Orthodox respectively to learn from each other. In parallel, we want either as scholars of Christianity or Orthodox practitioners ourselves clarity or theologians to reflect at this pivotal moment in human history might there be a different way of responding to tensions and differences within the Orthodox world and beyond. One that is more in line with the synodical history of the church when it was called to respond to collective challenges in the spirit of sublimity to his Russian term. And one aligned with the phronima, the thinking of the church powers and members venerated in the space. Now, in terms of structures, we plan a number of presentations in the first hour and about 10, 15 minutes for the presenters. And then we'll have a break and refreshments. Apologies to those joining virtually no refreshments for you. And then in the second hour, we'll turn to the round table for around 40 minutes to have a conversation and anyone in the audience can join along with the invited discussants who will join virtually physically. So I'll now pass the word to Lars who will do the first presentation and start. And then Lars will introduce the next speaker. Thank you. Well, first of all, in the name of the center, the SOA Center for World Christianity, I would like to welcome you to this round table which comes at the end of a cycle of presentations which started last October. And last year in the summer when Romina and I sat down in order to discuss the theme for this year, it was, well, Christianity a conflict and or rather conflict resolution. And that was, of course, several months before any conflict but the conflict in Ukraine erupted into war. So it's not a coincidence, but I think we would have had the Russo-Ukrainian conflict on the agenda anyway, in some form. But of course, now it's called the Particular Appointments. Now, I welcome you here to the first in-person session in three years. And you on Zoom, who I've seen several times for the other presentations for the other seminars that we've had, I would like to begin with a topic which I'm not actually an expert in, namely the history of the Orthodox Church. So do I know anything about Orthodoxy? Yes, via the medium of Christianity, which I think I know a little bit about. And also the medium of history, which brings Russia into the center of my own studies a number of times. And Russia, I mean, the historical Russia, so it's the widest sense of the term. And my own specialty in here, so as it's the history of China and here the Russian Church, the Orthodox Church comes in a number of times, usually in the context of negotiating treaties. So this is when the bridge-building, the conflict-resolving element of Russian Orthodoxy comes in. If you have questions on this, because I've not mentioned this in my little outline, then please ask me later. So I'm going to take you back to the very beginnings, not because I would like to fill the time, but because I think it's extremely important to remember that the different churches are manifestations of the same faith, the same belief. And here you could go back to the very first days. I just mentioned in one line that you have here from the very beginning of the apostolic faith, so the 12 apostles and later the 70 apostles who were appointed a tendency to spread into those areas of the known world, which were inhabited by believers of the major, only monotheistic faith, namely Judaism, and those cultures which had a number of other religious traditions, or actually where traditions of agnosticism and atheism were being practiced, so that is the word of the antiquity that we know. And is this important? Yes, it is important. Why? Because as you will see in a moment, Moscow, Russia sees itself as the inheritor of this ancient world. And so everything that happens in this very early gestate in thecipian period of Christianity is actually of relevance to Russian Orthodoxy as well. To follow the process of the proliferation of the word of God, and as opposed to the Quran, for example, it is a text that can be translated. So it's actually, it's a translation. And this translation has the same sanctity as the original text, so it's being translated into the lingua franca of the time, namely Greek, not Latin, first Greek, because that's the eastern part of the Mediterranean. And here you have a very important fact, namely that the very centers of the urban centers that where you find the first Christian converts, they are the ones who are geographically closest to the Slavonic part of Europe that would later convert to Christianity. So from the very beginning, you can see a very strong imprint of the Greek, Hellenic heritage of the ancient world. Having said this, the Christian church, also the Christian faith also spreads into the eastern parts of Africa, spreads over the whole of Africa, but also in terms of a concentration of the clerical, which is the ethical history, is the eastern corner that is important. And here, especially the Roman province of Egypt, where you have a center, that's Alexandria, which then becomes the seat of the first bishop. And this development of an early Christian church then leads to the, you will see that later, to the creation of an orthodox church. So this is the Coptic Church. So if we speak about orthodoxy, it is not just Russian orthodoxy, it's the European orthodoxy. We have this very strong tradition in Egypt and then of course also in Ethiopia. So this is the, I'm going to speed up, so this otherwise it will take a long time. So then this you will be familiar with, these are the persecutions and even at the height of the persecution, you can see that already 10% of the population are Christians. This includes northern Africa and here we have the first schism. So in a nutshell, I want to say, the history of the early church, the first 1,000 years is one of schisms. So it is nothing that would become a hallmark of the later historical period. It's from the very beginning, you have branches of the church that distinguish themselves in theological terms or in terms of the authority. So who's bishop shall we listen to? And you will see some examples, but I actually omitted most of them. In this long period of the Pax Constatina, the relatively peaceful proliferation of Christianity under Constantine, which again is being very much referred to looking back at this imagined root of Orthodox Christianity. They can see that you have the major schism that occurs. Arianism, I spent a whole year studying. So it goes how, what deeply differing interpretations of the Christian faith people can have at this early stage in history. Ethiopia turns here in this corner at the very beginning. So you can see that the core of Christianity, the core lands of Eastern Christianity is already deeply impregnated with the Christian message and the structures of a church, which starts to develop. Constantine then names Byzantium, Constantinople after himself, very modestly. And this is then dedicated to Theotokos, the mother of God, which in itself would then lead to another schism. Here we have Constantinople. You can see, this is airbrushed, the misery it's taken away, but it's just to give you a, this is not with a political message. It's just to give you an idea of what it probably looked and probably these are also advocated, but it's this dome structure, the basilica that you find also in Rome, in the west of Rome. So, and of course, it's literally the city between east and west. In the center of the Hellenic world still, although the Senjuks are arriving. So this is part of a world which is changing. I guess we have the Saint Bologna. So we have, yes, wisdom, yes, wisdom. So we have, we have here a merger of the Christian sainthood and the Greek philosophies. This is a very poignant term. So the next sequence I entitled, I titled the true Christianity. This was the term that you find in Russia for orthodoxy in the third Rome. That is, the second Rome is Constantinople, five minutes, the third Rome is going to be Moscow. And these elements you can find in, if you're very much interested in the early, Christianity, again, I point to the schism which is developed and which leads to the development of orthocephalus churches. These orthocephalus churches, these churches with their own heads, literally, they become a hallmark of the Eastern churches, namely that they have their own patriarchs who give directions to their faith. I put in here, yes, so this is important because from this time onwards, the Eastern church has its own laws. So, but once this is, this canonical law is in place, there is actually a rule for the development of the orthodox church. This is important, not so much because it's a battle, but to show that 15 years after the Islam, you have already the world which looks very different on the map, namely that you have Islam on the map. Islam on the same page as Christianity. And this would be until today the pattern that performed that you have Islam and Christianity as two neighboring houses or as brother and sister who don't always get on, but who live side by side. And then I leave out the third one, which is of course Judaism, who have a home in both of these until at least in the 20th century. This one, you get some pictures like that in the table, but this is the conversion of the Easter Slaves rules. And there, we find a very interesting depiction that you get here in, in one of the paintings of the late 19th century, which becomes a hallmark of Russian patriotism, namely the connection with Christianity. So this is something, it's the conversion of the pagans, I think it's the title, but importantly, this is the, it goes to show that the idea, the very concept of Russia is one with Christianity, although of course the pre-Christian rules go back further, we have Russia, the Russia of the time, and you can see that it looks suspiciously like Ukraine. It is actually almost on the territory. And so you have Stolia up here. So you have a most of far away. So this is the earliest part, which of course is being created out of the Slavic Nordic kingdoms that are being formed during this time. And from the very beginning, we see the importance of Kiev, Kiev as the founding place of Christianity in Russia. It is, this actually is related to the conflict, two minutes. Next. And this key events in the history of Christianity in Russia, namely the Proverty Volga, that's before, and then afterwards Vladimir, who I just saw earlier on in the 19th century picture, Mongol rule over Russia, and then Alexander Nieski, who's seated in Novgorod as a prince and who actually is the northern part of Christianity. And here, some of the most important facts, namely, that we have an Augustophanous Church, which is actually truly established in, existed before from the end of the Mongol Empire onwards, but from 15, so from around 1600 onwards, very firmly united with the idea of the Tsar. And there you get this Kessar and Papis and Tsar, so it's hard at the same time, but you have essentially a union between the church and the state. And what Peter the Great introduces is the single church, where the Tsar has more freedom to appoint it. Although, ironically, it takes the cue from the Protestant movement that you get in Central Europe and Western Europe at the time. Next step would be, I put the question mark here, for acidification of the Tsarist Empire through the Orthodox Church, that's not, and I don't just mean Europe, I also mean Eastern Asia. I put the big question mark behind this. The period of the Soviet Union is completely transformed through the Second World War, when Stalin not just allows, but actually encourages the creation of a patriotic church, if you like, in order to encourage the population to resist the invasion by the Nazis. But the roots of the Bolsheviks as an atheist party to the creation of a church that is outside, a Russian church that is outside Russia itself, and that's the point there are the abbreviations of it too. And of course that leads this, where are we here? This term and the symbol definition, although the church itself has changed, leads to the situation that we need to take. And then just very quickly to remind you that this church in Russia it's not the only Orthodox Church and in fact not the only Orthodox Church that could say that it's a Russian Orthodox Church. So you have offshoots in all of Eastern Europe and then of course, including Georgia as well. So you have Georgia is a very important one, Bulgaria as well. So you have, these are churches with the church of Russia has very tightly aligned alliances. And then there are others which have where I put the, I couldn't think of a better adjective, so disputed, and when you have due to political changes in recent history, and not to not just a theological doubt but actually a certain degree of enmity between the churches. So much for now. If you want to ask me about the details, please ask me later. Thank you. Thank you. We thought it was important to share sharing. So I believe that you can, the people who are watching us virtually can see the presenters. Yeah, excellent. Thank you so much Laura. So the whole point, I believe Laura's presentation has been to put this in a historical framework essentially especially for those who are less familiar with Orthodox Eastern Christianity more generally. I also have very few notes before we lift the speakers for extremely more knowledgeable than we are, but just a few thoughts really to provoke questions and reflections for the presenters with some challenging thoughts and then the round table is set to be the framework for the discussions. So I am a religious scholar, a religious ethnographer of religious and a practitioner and an Orthodox practitioner of myself. So my reflections really are informed by those identities. I'm not a Orthodox theologian or a member of clergy. So evidently what I will offer is a very rafted in the issue because as you saw it's very context-specific when we talk about Orthodox traditions. There's various differences. But I'd like to offer a rafted in the issue and really suggest some directions on how we might think or question or problematize the current relationship between Orthodox Christianity and work. For those who have, so my reflections are primarily for what this, well, what this theology is about and what the theology tells us and then what this theology has translated into when it comes to lived reality since I'm a religious ethnographer and a practitioner and then how we can integrate those frameworks, these multidimensional levels of religious experience into our analysis today. So Orthodoxy for those who have little familiarity pertains to the upright, to the correct ortho, faith or belief, orthodoxy, which was revealed to the disciples of Christ at Pentecost. Art of this faith has been preserved in written form through the Holy Scriptures. However, in Orthodox tradition, the unwritten holy tradition which was perpetrated through the life of the church and embodied in the experience of the saints has been equally important and complementary to the written revelations. The Holy Scriptures validate the importance of the Holy Tradition while the Holy Tradition confirms and reinforces the revelations of the Holy Scriptures. This Holy Tradition has been preserved in its essence as inherited by Christ and his disciples and includes the teachings of the Orthodox church fathers and mothers, the synodical decisions of the church cancels as accepted by different churches and other elements that have defined the political life of the ancient Orthodox churches. The core of this Holy Tradition is the soteriological aim of the Orthodox faith to heal the corruption of the human nature that was incurred following the disobedience of the first-fashioned couple and their expulsion for heaven. In the Orthodox church, the faithful aim to achieve likeness with God and salvation by achieving uninterrupted communion with God, participating in the sacraments and living the life of Orthodox asceses, practice. Following St. Maximus the Confessor, this therapeutic pathway in Amharic Medhanit has been described as purification and life and influences. As the faithful undergoes purification, she or he begins to be enlightened and to obtain insight into divine mysteries. This awakening of the news to the grace and wisdom of God is what the Orthodox tradition has identified with Noetic theology. In other words, theology in this tradition has not been predicated on reason or internet, but rather on the enlightenment of news. The Orthodox Church not only has a distinct ancient theology, but has historically acted with a missionary spirit, engaging cautiously with pre-existing social and political systems with the aim to transcend them and to consolidate the Christian message among new converts. Sociocultural, economic and political realities specific to histories of what have been historically Orthodox societies mediated all the ways in which theology was pronounced and explained by church hierarchies and communicated by the clergy to the lady, but also the extent to which the faithful could embody the Orthodox worldview in their everyday life. For example, regarding the historically Russian Orthodox population, Elizabeth Gasev has observed the following, quote, although these cultures may be considered traditionally Orthodox, given the modern history of these lands, which includes domination by Islamic or communist forces, that often did not allow the church to educate its children fully, one may question how deeply and orthodox ethos has penetrated such societies, close quote. It should be recognized also that the traditional prominence of the Orthodox Church in these societies deemed religious discourse acceptable to appropriation by different parties for political, sociocultural and other vested interests contributing to further distortions. Still, such discursive deployments need to be differentiated from the historical experience-based orthodox fronima or way of thinking and living which the church fathers and mothers have argued who are the true saints and theologians of the Orthodox faith. These discourse and deployment should also be differentiated from the lived experiences of the faithful who may have an incomplete understanding of theological matters and may also be distanced from a life in the church. However, may identify that sources were flux as it happens with a large percentage of Russian Orthodox believers in Russia. What one needs to recognize is that in many traditional-oriented societies organized around a major religious tradition, most of their secular practices, the lived experience of the community, the culture of the community will be natively framed in religious terms. These terms may or may not emerge from a complete theological understanding but may be inherited from generation to generation as a deeply valued tradition integral to one's identity. This is how I was raised from my parents who came out of the Soviet Union knowing very little about the Orthodox faith but yet valued very much. One of the tendencies that we have seen in media since the outbreak of the Ukraine war is for the positions of the Moscow Patriarchate or Patriarch Kirill to be taken as representative of the whole body of clergy or to be given exclusive primacy as an influential ideological force in shaping our thinking and sentiments in the country. These representations seem to assume that the religious leadership in Moscow has substantive power over political decisions and that where this decision to change by this position to change events could take a different direction. Other representations consider the religious hierarchy to be completely enslaved to political interests. Most analysis of this nature have paid limited attention to the complex and nuanced realities that have defined the church-state relations in Russia since the end of the monarchy during Soviet times and the post-Soviet era. Neither has been the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia without any political agency influence nor has it been unrestricted by state powers and interests. The appropriation of orthodoxy by state or political interests is not a new phenomenon nor one that has not been debated intensely within Russia. It is well known for example that orthodox Christian identity has been integral in the conception and evolution of Russian nationalist imaginary. On the topic, Zoe Knox has read them, quote, many Russian nationalists regard orthodoxy as providing the only basis for post-Soviet social and political order. Tizmanyanu identifies one feature of national chauvinism as apocalyptic salvationism by which he means the resistance to alien forms through indigenous traditions. In the Russian context, this is drawn from orthodox messianism, one of the central features of the link between orthodoxy and nationalism in Russia. Close quote. It is also well known that a large percentage of Ukrainians identify as orthodox and consider this integral to their national identity as well. It would not seem opposite to us how have different visions of state building in Russia and Ukraine in post-Soviet times conversed with orthodoxy and kind effects be seen in current war-related politics. What has been the influence of such discourses in Russian and Ukrainian society, but also in the wider Eastern European region? And I know that Eastern Europe is also depending on that. More importantly, it makes asking to the positions expressed by the patriarch or the church leadership have primacy over the clergy and the lady on the ground, especially those who have been critical of the positions of the Moscow patriarch even prior to the current crisis. Many parameters will mediate, not least being how the lady in clergy are processing the political realities, whether they are interpreting them for spiritual lens. Oftentimes, with an orthodox lived experience, the faithful are more likely to be influenced or guided by spiritual elders, saints words of prophecies around war-changing events and their own spiritual fathers and mothers, non-synolastic. The opinions and positions of these diverse actors have not been captured sufficiently in current discussions but might be central in understanding wider sentiments in response to the community of the faithful, not only Russia, but also in Ukraine and in other states. So what can we say about the relationship of orthodox Christianity to war? Obviously, there's not one answer to that. That is very context-specific and it has to be grounded in specific histories and theological traditions, but it can be agreed, I would say, that the orthodox faith takes a clear position against the use of violence, teaching its faithful to love their enemies. As reflected based in the Old Testament law, the orthodox teaching is adamantly against murder. In parallel, it is also understood within the faith that one should protect oneself when their life or the life of the loved ones is being threatened. Thus, the orthodox church has blessed what may be described as defensive and just works historically. Emperor Constantine's vision of the cross prior to the battle against Maxentius is commemorated and well-known among orthodox believers and there are numerous instances in the history of what have been historically orthodox societies when priests took up arms to fight against invaders and external threats to protect their motherlands, their communities and their churches and monasteries. Even in the event of defensive wars, when citizens are called to take up arms to protect themselves and their families, the orthodox faith neither teaches nor celebrates violence. It can be noted, for example, when the Queenie Sext Council of the Orthodox Church ratified two channels by Saint Basil the Great, one of which includes rules on excommunication for those who murdered two times of war attacks. It's questionable how the church applied those rules but that exists. In the history of the Orthodox Church, many soldiers of a strong faith chose martyrdom instead of using their military skills to fight. These military men are venerated as saints precisely because of having chosen to sacrifice their lives rather than take the life of an ally, even that of a Marconian head. Theologically speaking, the orthodox faith considers that only God understood as being love himself and having only science can bring perfect justice in the world. The faithful may believe that using violence to stop what is perceived to be a wrongdoing over injustice, but the faith would argue that the enemy of humanity and his servants will find ways to use the opportunity to foster more evil doing. The orthodox faith aspires to the cultivation of humble awareness among the faithful of their own imperfections and mutations as seen from human beings and asks them to show love and understanding for others if they want God to understand them and forgive them. This is not to suggest that orthodox believers should not strive towards social justice, but to stress that this should be guided by an orthodox conscience, the phronema of the church fathers and others with compassion and concern for humanity, avoiding the use of violence, understanding that violence will only be violence. I find it opposite to conclude this very rough contouring of orthodox theology and the relationship to work by equating the words of one of the churches most delighted for our central crisis style. Quote, for such as our work, it does not render the living ones lifeless, but leads the lifeless ones into life, filled with tenderness and much leniency. My habit is to be persecuted and not to persecute, to be fought and not to fight. Thank you so much. So I'll pass the word to the next speaker, Father Tifrin Vasilev. Please take a seat. So Father Tifrin is born in St. Petersburg, lived many years in the monastery in Eastern Ukraine, Donetsk region, before he completed his D-field in modern theology at Oxford. His current research project in service section of orthodox nationalism in Russia and Ukraine. And you are joining us from the University of Oxford. Correct, Father? Well, at the moment I don't want to be in the University of Oxford, but I've got a couple of basic overviews from... Oh, congratulations! Congratulations, yes, sir! Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. The website shared at this point. Oh, we'll meet you later. Later? Would you like me to prepare it? Yeah. You'd like to start out, prepare it soon. Oh, we don't need to. Sure, yeah. So I was asked to share with you some reflections on the topic of our roundtable, from a slightly ecclesiastical point of view, from all belief, experience, and indeed, I researched at Oxford a slightly different topic from my piece, what angels, rather than such a political field. And so my presentation is not exhaustive in any sense. I just want to point out, perhaps, to mention some directions of trends. And I would like to go to our times and precisely to the current crisis in Ukraine and the war. And the situation found itself with the Russian Orthodox Church in the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. So I would like to mention your attention to three points. First, this is about ideology, which is widely now discussed and argued in all sorts of documents, declarations, articles, analytics, as the ideology which is behind this crisis, which is also called Russian Royal Theology, Rusky Mir. And it's following one of the most well-known declarations against it, published on the Wall Street Academy, the Federal Academy, and the Public Orthodoxy and elsewhere, that's signed by Andretsov and Alvin. So, intellectuals, Orthodox intellectuals against these Russian Royal Theology. When you look at this document, you would imagine that the Russian Orthodox Church is where the only fever of that ideology, which, in my opinion, is not true. And well, you see now the website of the Borsky Club, the club of Borsk, which is probably the main think tank in Russia, which basically created, while the permanent members of this club basically are the creators of the main opponents of this ideology. And just like me, I'll give it to you. I'm sharing it with you. Yes, because it's not super. Yes, absolutely. OK, so now the permanent members. So I was able to find the website of this organization in any other language than Russian. So you can see this. So this website gives the porters. There is nothing secret about this. Well, maybe they have some sort of not public meetings, but they never was the permanent members of this club on this web page. And just quickly going through those names, pay your attention to there are two bishops. Metropolitan Tikhon, my name is safe. I'm chef Kunov, who is also one of the most influential bishops in the Russian Orthodox Church. But you won't find, you will not find the teacher. And another bishop, there is a bishop, what is his name? There's another bishop, Bishop Agastina, Stina Nisikova, two bishops, no clergy. And Bishop Tikhon is said to be like a confidence confidant. But he is indeed very close to the authorities and to himself. But among the permanent members, you also see this man, Alpire Kurganov, who is, well, I won't say you, who is the head of master's degree, the committees of different master's in Russia. So basically, the head of master's degree. Well, he is one of the permanent members of this club. So what are the generals? Well, writers, and governors, members of parliament, very influential film directors, philosophers. I don't know all of them, professors, intellectuals, media people, journalists, well, one of them was the priestess, a priest actor, a suspended priest. Well, that's sort of a media person, one of the sort of social, social. And Ikova hysterical, well, it's an interesting figure. Probably not very well known outside Russia. An author, the main proponent, I would call him, of Stalinism, or basically the main defender of Stalin, the US of Stalin. So he publishes like dozens of books, explaining as it were, and showing that Stalin is not the monster that he was created rather by somebody else. And he is sort of very nice and very good person whose main is a contributor to the Russian statehood. So this is a very important person. So Stalinism, all sorts of Russian nationalism, of course, there are some of them who, for example, Prokhanov, Russian nationalism are excellent. And many other people whom I would talk also to say, there are some, well, Joseph Shorov, an academic who is very famous, one of the first Russian scientists, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a hard science. Yeah, so he has now died. And he was just wanting to draw your attention that he was an open atheist and a very pronounced atheist, opposed to any sort of early literacy in Russia to the race of the rising. So he was a permanent member of this club. And, well, you see some of Stalin and so on. So the main thought, perhaps, the main idea that I wanted to say that there are many components, not just Russian orthodox, Russian orthodox, he's important, but not the only political. And in the church, orthodoxy becomes indeed enslavement. And the feature is the instrumentalization of religion. And the main feature of this ideology is a strong statehood, as what unites all of them. They all support strong statehoods, the imperial, present imperial, past and future fractions. So that's the main feature of this ideology. So Russia, orthodox church, and this particular conflict, there are several levels of engagement on that that's already been mentioned by Romina. That, of course, the first level is one of the most visible levels, the bishop's patriarch, and another level, less discussed, the level of monastics, but it's spiritual followers. And their authority is very high in certain situations, I would say, well, comparable to the authority of the bishop's orthodox church. And it's less visible outside the church, but you very well know it being a member of the church. For example, I received, like, you know, a huge amount of messages from all sorts of people, you know, saying that, well, this elder said that, and that elder said that, and that. So all sorts of opinions which were expressed by those monastic leaders. It's indeed important to know what they say. The other level next, I feel, the level is parish clergy, parish clergy. Well, they have also authority, but it's much more limited. And you can compare it with authority of the monasteries. Some, you know, the monasteries are some sort of opinions which are expressed by monastic leaders. Sometimes, you know, they can spread all over the church basically very easily. Because we have one office, you know, office or the whole of the board of schools. It's important to kind of get them all estimated. And the lowest level, but still sometimes overlooked is the lay people who are those lay people. You know, in Moscow, for example, there is a monastery, some other monasteries inside Moscow who had some monks and priests in there. And who are those lay people who come there? Some of them are members of the government, ministers. And so they could be, and some of them are, you know, church gurus. So of course, among the lay people are all sorts of people. All sorts of people. So, but this is the church probably, it's not always voiceless and non-influential, I would say. So sometimes those lay people are very influential in their opinions and their heard in the churches, but some say some of the oligarchs, lay persons, but they hate the agenda sometimes. So, ideologically, there are some points and some aspirations of the Orthodox people which those people created the ideology they threw on those points. Those points are monogated as a political ideal and it's very popular among the Orthodox people. East-West opposition, you know, this opposition, again, it's something which is sort of widely accepted in the Orthodox circles. And even, you know, among the intellectuals because it's sort of expressed ideologically by the site of the Conferences by the George Vorovsky, one of the Western, one of those theologians that lived in the West, but still he endorsed very much his way of perception of the world. The other point would be conspiracy theories or nascent also, other things. And another point would be traditional family and so-called traditional values. Another important point which is very important and widely accepted by the Orthodox and all although I mentioned that monogies to Western position some conspiracy theories were a traditional family or those ideological points, they are widely accepted by the majority of those people who are worth bishops and clergy and lay people and monastics, of course. And those points are precisely those points which were taken by those creators of this ideology, so the members of the club, you know, and these points which you would find also probably support from the Muslims, other, and so not only Orthodox people, so maybe I'll say if you move on later only while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which is also, let's see if there's a potential talk about the consultation. So there's the potential not to say there is a potential public consultation. Final speaker and we're going to reverse the dynamics of the speaker is online, did you tell me? So those who are joining us virtually will be able to listen to your apologies for the audio. So the next speaker is Father Fianni, Father Evangelus Fianni, a very good friend and colleague joining us from Kenya actually. Father Fianni is a married senior priest for the presenter of the Re-Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria. He's a senior lecturer at the Macarius III Orthodox Patriarchal Seminary in Nairobi County, Kenya. And Bishop Gafuna Theological Institute in Kiambu County, Kenya, where he teaches and publishes on practical theology and development studies. Father Fianni, Father Evangelus Fianni will give us a different perspective coming from all the way of Orthodox Africa. Father Fianni, very good to have you here. Please speak loudly out of the volume at the highest it can be and hopefully we'll hear you. Thank you, thank you very much, Dr. Romina. And thank you very much to all of you. Christ is risen to everybody. And I'm really glad to be here and to highlight a few things here and there. Unfortunately, they are not very good things to discuss, but we'll try our best to make them look nice. Even though they are kind of tormenting us at the moment. So the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria in North Africa is the second and second rank of the Sephora Orthodox Church globally. It deprived itself of being formed by its first patriarch. That is Mark the Evangelist, who served this sea from around 42 to 63 AD. Originally this church governed Eastern North Africa. That is the contemporary countries of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia mainly. Sub-Saharan Africa was only given officially and demarcated as part of the Patriarchate of Alexandria in 1921 by Patriarch Meletius Metaxakis, who is a very interesting figure in the Orthodox Church history because he was once a bishop in Cyprus, the Bishop of Greece, the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Patriarch of Alexandria. So he was quite moving Patriarch. And that's the reason that the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate today calls itself the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria, which is the ancient town and then adds and all Africa from 1921. Since then, this church is grown, especially from the 19, the same period of 1920s when the Patriarchate of Alexandria bought a major contribution of Africans from the Eastern part of Africa joining the Greek Orthodox Church, not because there was any missionary who came to East Africa, but because the Africans themselves became their own missionaries looking and searching for the ancient Christianity and from there joined the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria. At the moment, the Patriarchate has about 60 hierarchs and 50 dioceses. In November of 2019, one senior clergyman of the Church of Kenya wrote to the Patriarchate of Moscow, asking them to take the task of initiating a local mission church in Africa like exist elsewhere in Europe, in America, in Asia, in Australia, where we have parallel Orthodox jurisdictions in those areas. So this priest wrote to the Patriarchate of Moscow and he highlighted a few issues that would make it possible for the Church of Moscow to get a large following that would help start the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa and not from scratch, but from existing clergy and lady and the parishes of the Alexandria Church. So he gave them very good ideas and then the liturgical celebration of the Pope and Patriarch of Alexandria, the other was the second who is the current Patriarch of our church in Africa. He celebrated with Metropolitan Epiphany, Dumeco, who is the cave and bishop who was considered as chismatic and he did that in August of 2019. And that actually helped this agenda of invading Africa, even Alexandria formally, was always on the side of the Church of Moscow. And all of a sudden, actually in 2018, the fall of 2018, he was in Odessa and he celebrated with Metropolitan Onifuri who is under the Patriarchate of Moscow and everything was okay. And he was telling Epiphany and his group to join the Church of Russia. All of a sudden, now he goes and celebrates with the enemy. And he says a different thing than he used to. And so this drove the invasion agenda even further. So the Church of Moscow invaded Africa on 29th of December, 2021 when they established the two dioceses of the Church of Russia in Africa. The North African Church in Cairo and Southern African Church in Johannesburg. But then they only installed one bishop, Metropolitan Leonard, who became the Isaac of Africa. And he's now currently the bishop commemorated by the African clergy and the parishes that are under the Church of Moscow at the moment. Now they cut around, they got around a hundred priests and parishes in Africa. But at the moment, most of these priests, we can say they have remained with about 60, about 40 of them have gone back to their bishops and to the Patriarchate. But the rest are still with the Patriarchate of Moscow. Now, why did the Church of Moscow invade Africa? According to the Church of Moscow, they invaded Alexandria because of this celebration of the Patriarch of Alexandria with the Ukrainian schismatic group. Therefore, for them, the Church of Alexandria then became schismatic by celebrating with group, a group that had been separated from the main church and therefore the kind of separated themselves automatically that therefore this 2019 declaration of Constantinople, which also the Patriarchate of Alexandria kind of joined in, brought these people who joined this schismatic group to be schismatic. What about according to the Church of Alexandria? According to the Church of Alexandria, that Alexandria joined Constantinople in accepting the autosephary of Ukraine. That's one of the reasons that Moscow kind of invaded Africa. Number two, according to Alexandria, Putin has economic expansion politics in Africa, which now he uses the Church of Moscow to come. And then from there, utilize this eventually to take on the territory of Alexandria. Number three is for them, the Church of Russia always wanted to initiate a mission church in Africa, but they were not able to do so because of the canons, because this is, you can't start a parallel jurisdiction in another canonical jurisdiction. But according to the Africans, those under the Church of Russia, the Church of Russia came to assist the African priests to be saved from joining the schismatic group. And two, from the Greek tyrants who are complicating their life by noted, Romina, noted. The Church of Russia came to assist them and to help them. And then according to the priests and the lay people who are under the Alexandria Church, Russia, it is the reason that the Church of Moscow came to invade Africa was one because of the Russian and the Western countries' politics and propaganda that seeks to maintain the former allies that inter, for example, the Church of Alexandria was always an ally of the Church of Moscow on anything that the Church of Moscow was saying, whether it was local politics, whether it was national politics, the Church of Alexandria was always on that side. Now they have gone to the other extreme side. So in wanting to push them back to come and join them, they are doing this. Number two, destroying the Church of Alexandria until they go back to being their allies is also going to help if there would be an Orthodox meeting, because the Church of Moscow would need more allies on their side. So they are pushing Alexandria, they are destroying their church, they are creating challenges within their church, so that the Church of Moscow then can have allies where when a pan-Orthodox vote would be called. Another one is to threaten other churches that want to join Constantinople in their decision on the independence of the Ukrainian church. Now those are the Alexandria and African churches, but what is the impact of the Church of Moscow in Africa on faith questions? The place of the Orthodox Church in war and crisis and the prophetic voice of the church is now very shaky and questioned highly by our lay people in Africa. They do not understand how Orthodox bishops, how Orthodox priests cannot speak about people being killed, about people being displaced in their homes. How can they still pray about peace when there is no peace? Our people keep questioning this and they have a problem with this. Some of them don't even want to come to church. So this is affecting us in a big way. Number two on the unity of the clergy and lady in the national churches as well as the parishes. There is a lot of hatred and foul language among the peace and lay people. You can even see this on social media. You can see these on Facebook, on Twitter. Our clergy and lay people keep abusing each other. You're on this side, you're on that side. Something we had not seen before. Administration-wise, the confusion of who is in charge of the church administration glory. How a class, your challenges and grievances are resolved. This is a major problem about the inter-Orthodox relations. A lot of Orthodox churches now are, either you are with Russia or you are with Constantinople. It's not about Christ anymore. And our people keep asking, who is leading who? Canonically, we have two canonical churches in Africa. This is something very new to us. We never had this kind of situation before. Now it is there. How are we going to deal with it? It's a problem. The clergy needs official transfers to join another church. Now the clergy are giving themselves transfers. We have a problem because those clergy, if they want to leave Moscow, they won't ask for transfers. They never got transfers to go there. Where would they have that? How would some clergy, the enmity between the clergy and their hierarchs? We have many court cases, for example, in Parovkinia. We have many priests in court with the bishops and with the Unlept people. People are fighting. Who will serve in this church? Who is going to come to this church? The loss of clergy in some places, if you go to Anzernanalivo, where joined the church of Moscow, the parishes, they have nobody to take care of them. They are closed. They are shut. Some positive things. The clergy who had grievances against the Greek bishops and they joined the Russian church, they are very happy because they are listened to. Their challenges have been resolved. Some of them need that money. Our priests don't have money. The Russian government is giving us money to give to those priests. So they are very excited. They have salaries. I don't have a salary, I'm under the Greek churches. They have salary, so these things are improvement of their life. It's a very good thing for them. There is direct involvement of the church of Moscow to the parishes in Africa, which never happened before. They were always passing through the Patriarchate. Now it's very direct. So there are some things that are very good, some things that are terrible. At the same time, in conclusion, what would I say? What lesson can we learn from this invasion or end schism in Africa? There need to be a better way of the Patriarchate of Alexandria to handle administrative grievances as well as the life of the clergy to be taken care of. Because most of the clergy who left left because they had grievances that are resolved. Two, because of payment of the salaries of the clergy, the Alexandria Patriarchate was not doing that. They need to think about this. Another thing is the Patriarch is still very highly powerful, because even the Synod did not make this decision. It was the Patriarch who made the decision of joining one or the other side. So the Synod also will need to do a few things. But the reality is the grievances of the clergy and the parishioners should be handled in real time and there should be found a way. There is also need for more African visuals who will contextualize the issues that are happening in Africa, that will help more. But finally, Moscow at the moment invaded Africa where no other local church ever did so. So we expect there will be even more complications because other churches, if this is the way to go, other churches will still come in. So we hope that the chaos and the enmities that exists at the moment may come to an end by a canonical solution found on all of this. But at the moment Africa is suffering because of the Ukrainian issue that is only because of the Ukrainian and Moscow issue. We are so far away from them, but yet we are suffering in real time. And this may go on for decades and decades. Thank you. You did amazing Amara for every little time that I gave you. Thank you so much for your contribution. I will take a break now and then we'll come back after about 10 minutes. So we'll give ourselves 10 minutes for refreshments on our side for you. If you can brought something in your kitchen, whatever you are and just stay in the meeting, you can close your cameras and just be here because we'll start on time in 10 minutes exactly, okay? And then we can take questions as well. Thank you so much. Thank you. I mean, I can start if no one else wants to go first. Thank you, welcome. Hello, thank you for having me. So I'm Nathaniel Wood. I'm speaking as a constructive theologian here. So I have to admit I did have a little trouble hearing some of the presentations. So I don't know that I can interact with them as much as I would have liked to, unfortunately. But to speak to some of the questions that Romina had posed to us, the discussions when she invited us on this topic of orthodoxy and war. One of the questions that we were asked to comment on was this question of whether orthodoxy, which is a religion that's supposed to be focused on self-sacrifice and love has the kind of resources to respond to these problems of war that are caused by issues of nationalism. And one of the things that came to mind when I thought about this question is particularly this idea of self-sacrifice and love within orthodoxy. And I think speaking from a theological perspective, if we're gonna talk about orthodoxy as a religion of self-sacrifice and love, then we need to do that in a way that starts with the idea of Christ's self-sacrifice on the cross. And particularly for orthodoxy, they need to do a better job of developing, I think, a theology of the cross in response to the ongoing war right now. And I'm thinking about this particularly in relation to the type of theology of the cross that was developed mainly in Protestant theology after World War II. So there's this development of this so-called post-Holocaust theology or theology after Auschwitz as the German theologian Jürgen Moltmann called it, where the focus of theological attention turned squarely to the God self-sacrifice as the one nailed to the cross. In terms of orthodoxy's resources, I think in general orthodox theology hasn't focused on the theology of the cross in general nearly enough in its history compared to the Western confessions of Christianity. Because orthodoxy's theory of salvation has tended to focus on theosis and incarnation and has tended to focus on the resurrection as triumph over death. But compared to the Western theology, the focus on the cross has been, I think, under-emphasized and especially that tragic element of the cross. So in the Protestant post-Holocaust theology, the cross became the starting point for these more critical political theologies that were criticizing these so-called theologies of glory. So they were specifically focused on developing these new kind of political theologies that were critical of earthly powers that were victimizing people, not only in the Holocaust as what prompted it, but also in other situations of political oppression. So it's critical of these earthly powers and focusing on God's solidarity with those who are suffering. So what I thought of immediately with this question was the need for orthodoxy, I think in light of the Ukrainian situation to develop some kind of post-Ukraine theology that would be somewhat analogous to that earlier Protestant post-Holocaust theology. So a theology that like that tradition that is focusing more squarely on the cross as this example of God's solidarity with the suffering and a critique of earthly powers because the real problem that animates a lot of the wars that orthodoxy has found itself entangled in and including this current war is orthodox political theologies tendency to focus on the doctrine of theosis and the idea of earthly kingdoms as somehow participating in and mirroring or imaging the kingdom of heaven on earth. And that has caused it to become too complacent and too unwilling to critique earthly powers. And so I think this, my hope I think I guess would be to say that the experience of Ukraine would be this sort of catalyst for this thinking, this theology of the cross, the post-Ukraine theology that would focus more on this critical element. And I know a lot of orthodoxyologians have been talking for a long time now about the need of orthodoxy to criticize nationalism and to criticize these various doctrines that tie the church too closely to empire. I think the theology of the cross is an opportunity to do that. So yeah, I guess that was my initial thought on this question. Thank you so much. And I should have said that you are associate director of the Orthodox Christian Study Center of Fort Humming University. So thank you so much for bringing awareness to the crisis and the religion of this campus as a center. Thank you so much. Is anyone, does anyone want to follow after this without me forcing you? Any of the discussions? Otherwise I'll just start calling names. I could maybe express my appreciation of what Nathaniel has said. I think there is a real need for the reflection, theological reflection on the part of orthodoxyologians on the way in which the whole kind of development of the theology after the Second World War in the West has been unnoticed by orthodoxyologians. And there is a real need to open up to the theology after the Second World War that has been pursued by Western theologians and in particular German theologians. So the need to translate this works and to study this experience. So yes, so I would support that. And I would also mention other points that there is, a need for reflection and looking at the kind of anthropology and generally Christian humanism that has been, again, not very well developed in the orthodox theology. And so the problem of the human subject that has been neglected. And so I think there is only one hand, a need to kind of look at what has been done in the Western theology, but on the other hand to look at the resources that orthodox theology has and its own resources and maybe to look at the resources that orthodox theology has and its own resources and maybe to understand what is there that we can learn from. Yes, so this is something I wanted to mention in response to Nathaniel. And I personally myself try to pursue the theology of peace and understand what could be resources for this. And it seems that there is still again, lots of confusing terms, what it means to, what does peace means, what the Moscow church uses as a just peace and I think we could reflect on that like what it means to have just peace. And where is the place of Christian pacifism? So there are all these kind of issues that been raised by some peace activists and there are several, many of them, well, I wouldn't say there are lots of them, but there are some of them, but it seems that their voice has not been heard. So it's very important work, but we don't really learn much about what they're doing from the kind of mainstream discussion, so to say. And yeah, so this is something I wanted to say, but let's continue and I think there will be maybe more opportunity for me to intervene later on. Thank you so much, Irina and I should say you're at the University of Tartu in Estonia, is that correct? Yes, that's correct. Thank you for joining us. Anyone else would like to go next? I think Alison, Alison, please. We have Andrei, yes. So Alison and Andrei. And then it is a... I don't know if that complicates my question. It never complicates my question. Yes, Alison, please go ahead. So Alison, just as a way of introduction, is a research fellow in church history at the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia. And she has been actively involved in the way of directing peace and ministry with the work of the Russian Orthodox Church. So Alison, the floor is yours. Yeah, I'd like to kind of perhaps just take us down to the level, the kind of grassroots level of Russia itself, which is where I am. And I'd like in particular to just say a word about my involvement in youth work or perhaps I could say my lack of involvement in recent years owing to the way it's... I've seen it being carried out in the area where I am. I mean, I'd like to tie this in with what Nathaniel has said about the kind of need for a critique of the theology of kind of glory or the kind of glorification of war and a need for critique of earthly powers because this in a way is exactly what I'm not seeing here. And I'd just like to give a kind of concrete example. I mean, many people have asked me during the war, well, what are actually people thinking on the ground? And they're asking, why aren't people reacting? Why aren't people saying anything? And obviously there are some people who are against the war. I would say that an awful lot of people here are kind of not exactly indifferent, but they're just kind of getting on with their lives, trying to kind of make sense of the sanctions and things like that. But I would say that within the church itself, there was this very strong strain of... I would say the way that the kind of Russian worldview point is being transmitted to young people. For example, where we are here, the kind of summer camp of the young people is run by an organization which is called Gorlitsa, which means dove. So again, this kind of... I mean, Irina has mentioned that what does peace mean? So in a way, this camp is kind of put across as teaching the young people the ways of peace. But in fact, if you actually look at the aims of what they do during this camp, the primary aim is love of the Fatherland. I mean, I have no kind of... No problem really with teaching young people to respect the country and to be responsible citizens of their country. But that is very much the top aim. I mean, I was just looking today on the website of a nearby diocese to us here and the way they explain the camp, I mean, the aims are love for the Fatherland, then it's strengthening in the Orthodox faith is the next aim. The next aim is knowledge of kind of military kind of practice and regulations from the spiritual point of view. And the last aim is the development of personal qualities. The way that the camps are carried out is that for a week, the young people, this is starting from the age of 11 upwards are kind of divided into two armies. And basically in the course of the week, they're kind of fighting each other in these armies. And the girls are being kind of nurses. And I mean, some of them are taking part in the actual battle as well. You know, a lot of it takes place at night. So I mean, I can see it's very kind of appealing to young people. I mean, this is all kind of interspersed with singing, which is very kind of patriotic. It's about Holy Rose. Then there were talks, which again, I mean, it says here about the people who created who created the Fatherland. And in the list, it gives Suvorov Kutuzov, you know, Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Zanskoy. You know, and I mean, I actually left the youth work of our diocese kind of resigned from my work doing this, you know, simply because I couldn't go along with this kind of way of bringing up young people. And I suppose I would like to ask some questions actually of those who are here. I mean, I wanted to ask a question of Irina, or at least ask her to comment. I mean, she's involved in a school in Estonia. And I'm wondering how you kind of negotiate national identity. I mean, in a kind of Russian, Estonian context where the children are Orthodox as well and they're being raised in the Orthodox faith. But I mean, I think it's a similar, I'd like to ask the question of, you know, anybody who's a parent here or anybody who's an Orthodox believer, if this kind of bringing up children, you know, it's not going to lead to a kind of a generation that is not, I mean, basically not able to make a critique of earthly powers because they're exactly, you know, they're being taught the exact opposite here. And that they're being taught that this is part of the Christian faith as well. So, yeah, anyway, I've said enough. Yeah, I'd be interested to hear people's comments. So before Irina has a little opportunity to answer, which we'd like to hear, can I just have Andrei contribute? And then Elizabeth, I'm a private driver. Thank you, Father. And then we'll, Irina, we'll come back so we'll have the second round, okay? Is that okay? And I made an order of your question on this. So Andrei, may I invite you? So Andrei Shishchirv is a research fellow at the School of Theology and religious studies of the University of Tartu. Ex-Secretary of the Bibliocomission of the Rational Orthodox Church. He's a theologian specialized in political theology and ecclesiology. So Andrei, the floor is yours. Welcome. Thank you, Irina. I would like to draw an attention to another aspect of our discussion or maybe another approach to our discussion. For several decades, at least since 60s, theologians of various denomination have been saying that theology must be contextual. It cannot be seen in isolation from specific circumstances and must not be detached from practice. The same concept in different contexts can be understood quite differently and lead to different practical consequences. As a danger of universal declarations will be realized precisely in forgetting the context of the events to which they are addressed. Solidarity as an option for the poor and struggling works only in the context. This seems to have become commonplace, but Christian leaders and theologians continue to make the mistake of forgetting the context. I would like to show one example to make my idea clear. Such is the case with the notion of fratricidal war or cance as seen in relation to Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, which many Christian leaders have already used in their speeches and statements among them, Pope Francis, Archbishop of the Forest of America, theologians who signed the Oxford Statements statement against the Russian world doctrine and others. Of course, they relied most likely on their rhetorical cliches such as all Christians are brothers or all men are children of God and in what way any war is fratricidal. However, the problem here is that the phrase fratricidal war in the Ukrainian context is closely linked to Russian state and church propaganda which seeks to present Ukrainians as a subatness within the Russian nation. This is the essence of the doctrine of the Russian world which was created and developed by Patriarch Kirill but not the members of this Barst Club who are marginals in their majority. In other words, fratricidal war is a propaganda cliche that reflects the imperialist vision of the Russian state and the church leadership. Father Kirill Gavarun wrote about it two years ago and I found the citation, I quote, the word fratricid from the Russian point of view, therefore implies people of the same nationality. This aphemism became a synonym for civil war and is propagated by the Kremlin through the Russian media. Gavarun criticized Pope Francis who is his opinion called the war in Ukraine by a term from the vocabulary of Russian propaganda, fratricidal. The phrase fratricidal war after 24th February was first used by Metropolitan Anufri head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. He seems to be a Ukrainian but let's not forget the water rhetoric of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate leadership used before the February invasion in Ukraine. Sometimes it repeated Russian propaganda formulas, that is how the rhetorical vocabulary of the Ukrainian church of Moscow Patriarchate was formed. In a critical situation, Metropolitan Anufri didn't find in his vocabulary anything better than the well-established of the year's propaganda cliche. It was later repeated by the synod of the Ukrainian church and now we see that he and the synod of the Ukrainian church of Moscow Patriarchate still didn't end their communion with Petro Kirill who several times made publicly signs of support of the war. In comparison, the heads of the Autosophilus Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Ukrainian Greek Catholics said nothing about fratricidal war. Obviously the universal statements of Christian leaders and theologians about Ukraine now require contextual verification by Ukrainian theology. And to do this, Ukrainian theologians primarily those currently in Ukraine need to be involved in working on them. Ukrainian academic theology is one of the most developed in Eastern Europe, much more developed than Russian for example. And I'm surprised they're neglect by Western theologians during this war I know only one person among the Christian leaders and the intellectuals of the first role who publicly said about the necessity first to hear Ukrainians to be really contextual. This was Rowan Williams former Archbishop of Canterbury. That's why I think that we need not only post-Ukrainian as Nathan said theology but contextual theology based on the view of Ukrainian theologians. Thank you. Thank you so much, Andrei. Thank you. We are applauding you. I would like to, Elizabeth, would you like to go next and see if you on the other side here, Elizabeth? Otherwise we... Do I come up? Would you like to? Yes. You can come up so that you can hear better. So Elizabeth, why don't you come here and then we'll have father try this. Eresko, apologies, father. Wait, is father proper? Please, please, Elizabeth. It's good to have this interaction and our termination. Yep. So you speak straight and with a loud voice and I can change the subject of the audience here. They will start speaking as well. Right, yeah, fine. Yes, thank you very much. I'm coming at this from rather different angle from most of you being nowhere near the countries that are directly affected because of the way that the churches and the so-called diaspora are all tied in to the various patriarchates. And I think this, one thing this highlights is what an enormous problem that is because one can accept that, yes, in principle, we have a lot of issues and we should love our enemies. We should abstain from violence even if necessary bearing violence under whatever circumstances. I mean, that is the Christ-like way. But in practice, we can all recognize that in a conflict, this becomes vastly more difficult. There is so much less excuse for those of us at a safe distance to be engaging in the same tribalism and tragically, that's what happens. And it seemed to me, I was interested in the first speakers who were talking about the need for new theological approaches because I'm not saying categorically, that's not necessary, but it certainly isn't the first thing that occurs to me. It seems that so many of the resources are there even in terms of models. Someone was talking about the, I've got those notes, but I mean, sort of triumphalistic approach to church and state. But I mean, within the Russian tradition, you have, for instance, the tradition of a passion there as saints. People considered saints specifically for non-violence. Examples like that are there. We're not paying attention to them. And beyond that, I mean, the whole of the ascetic tradition of Father Thieland was talking about the, many people discussing what various spiritual fathers and mothers are saying. And I don't know what the content of that is, but one of the real problems, not just in terms of our attitude to war and violence, is that this very developed science of the soul in the ascetic life is not generally taught to people, unless they happen to be families that are particularly close to monasteries. And similarly, another thing that is very rarely discussed is how to act as a Christian in the world. Not the sort of thing that the churches theologians should do, making statements, but particularly those of us in democratic countries where we can participate in politics easily. How do we use that Christian and that responsibility as Christians? In the, some years ago, in the Russian diocese, in Britain, when Metropolitan Anthony was Bishop, we had various study groups, one of which was a Christian in the secular world, chaired and I think, bought up by Costa Carras, Angelo Green, who was a member of the diocese, and actually a really remarkable example of somebody who, to the full, took this responsibility of a conscientious Orthodox Christian fully involved with the world, but the last point is this enormous problem of tribalism extending into the diaspora. Both expatriates and converts run the risk of becoming caricatures of themselves in various ways and one of the most pernicious ways is buying into the political or church political divisions represented by their so-called other churches. I mean, it actually seems to me that there is room for some respectful disobedience on the part of the laity. And I'm thinking now of, you know, of problems of breaking communion rather than directly the war. Somebody has to say, we are not playing these games and somebody, you know, the so-called mother churches will continue to hang on to their jurisdictions if they feel threatened and if they feel that they are if they feel threatened and if they feel that it's only their own people, their own ethnic group or ideological group who care about them. You know, I was listening with interest and also certain horror to the last discussion about fruct societal war as a propaganda phrase. And, you know, I absolutely, I take your word for it that that's how it's used. But that is an appalling thing if because, well, in one sense, any war is fratricidal because humans are brothers, but quintessentially to me, you know, a war between both of our Christians is fratricidal and it shouldn't matter one bit, you know, what ethnicity, jurisdiction they are. You know, it's very easy. I mean, humans are herd animals and it's very easy as they people to buy into this and individually it may not make much difference if we don't, but simply keeping lines of communication open, you know, refusing to divide either, you know, sides in the war or sides in church conflicts into us and them, that in fact, I think is something very valuable that we, you know, we can all do. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you so much. I should say that Elizabeth DeOcreton is a lecture at the Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies, Cambridge. So she came all the way from Cambridge. Thank you so much. And last but not least certainly, Father Dragouche Perez, principal of the Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies in Cambridge. Father, the floor is yours and apologies. Have you waited for so long? Thank you very much. No, it's absolutely fine. In a sense, I have the benefit of having listened to everyone and I feel like I have very little to contribute now, but I did think of three things I wanted to say and I will say them because I did think of them and I wrote something down. So I have to get them out of my system. Otherwise they'll stay there until the next time you have a conference. So the first thing I wanted to address and it resonates with things that the other discussants have picked up on is this question of what justifies war? Because it seems to me that this war in Ukraine, which actually started in 2014 with Crimea is the first Orthodox endorsed war of the 21st century. You know, we've had different conflicts in the 20th century and towards the end and so on in Serbia and all the rest, but this is the first 21st century conflict which very openly has this Orthodox theological underpinning and this is a troubling and a sobering realization. So what justifies war? In a sense, is there such a thing as just war? I mean, we have this just war theory and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Catechism draft of 2017, you kind of dedicate a section to it and again, I think wrongly they twist several things. They cherry pick elements of the just war theory from the Western theology and also kind of twist some of the narrative in the becoming of the Orthodox Church in Russia, but this is not the time to develop that. But the idea that war can be justified I think is troublesome and I don't think it has traction in the Orthodox Church. I mean, possibly defensive war which is never considered necessarily war, but the point I hear to make in a sense is that even just war theory, even if you think that it was justified, this theory is there to keep a check and keep balances and to, in a sense, hold accountable those who are involved in war and to hold accountable the terms in which a war is waged. And I feel that this is not happening at all here in the Ukraine situation. The other question that I had in mind was this issue of pacifism. I mean, it was brought up by Rina, it was brought up by Nathaniel and so on. So pacifism, can we, I mean, pacifism when faced with actions such as those perpetrated by Russia? I mean, is there any place for it? What does it mean to seek peace and reconciliation? And I think peace and reconciliation in this context that we are now, I mean, theologically requires and I think it only comes through a sacrifice. And again, this idea that we need to redevelop or revisit this idea of the theology of the cross and link it with whatever political theology the Orthodox Church manifest in various contexts. Again, I think it's a very potent idea that I hope theologians will take up. But I think peace requires justice. You cannot have peace without justice. When you see it now in the way that negotiations have kind of stalled between the Ukrainians and the Russians because they feel that there is a great deal of injustice that has happened in Ukraine and how communities were butchered and so on. But human justice and divine justice are not always identical, but they overlap in many aspects. I think Christian justice and peace includes and predicated on at least three things, which is prophetic message, speaking truth to power and prioritizing humanity as the icon of God in this world. And also is predicated on this prophetic sacrificial, sometimes risky action on behalf of the weak and of the oppressed. So pacifism as neutrality or passivity or thoughts and prayers, as some people say, I think has no place in Christianity. It requires some form of action. So I think the action that is required is the pacifism of Christ like witness and sacrifice. And we have these examples, I suppose, from St. John Chrysostom, who always stood on the side of those who were oppressed and on the margins to St. Maria Skoptova, for example, in the 20th century, she again fought against injustice and during a time of war, but she did this kind of Christ-like pacifism. And the last thing is, which is related to this is, I think this idea of witness and discipleship because I think what sadly what this situation in Ukraine and this whole war has kind of, I think pulled the cloth of many people's eyes. I mean, certainly of my eyes is that something that's very hard to accept for us as Orthodox that we as Orthodox today have forgotten, have really forgotten the cost of being disciples of Christ in this world. We have forgotten that it comes with a price. And in doing so, we have become very resistant to paying that price of discipleship and of witness to Christ. And we have kind of buried that cost of discipleship under ritual, under tradition and the ethno-religiosity causing up to political power. And we have equated the cost of discipleship with sometimes defending the Fatherland as Alison was mentioning there, or this type of ideology, or theologically with defending the fathers or following the fathers and so on and sneering openly at anything that's possibly acumenical or anything that's part of the modern world in terms of how society develops. So I think I hope one of the developments in terms of our theological awareness in the Orthodox Church will be that people will revisit the idea what it means to be a disciple of Christ, to witness to Christ as individuals, as communities and as church. And the Orthodox are in a very divided anti-mission way to put it mildly. So, yeah, this is what I wanted to say. That was, I've taken this, I think I'll give Irina a chance to respond because she, there was a question about Irina by Alison. And then whoever wants to second round reflect a bit, while Irina answers Alison's question and open it to the audience. Yeah, exactly. Whoever we're here, whoever has thoughts and those speakers as well. So Irina, the floor is yours. I will just reply briefly because this rise of patriotic education which Alison has observed is absolutely overwhelming in Russia. And this is not the case in Estonia where I live, but I can see from the conversations and studies and research that it's been happening for already, I would say one and a half decades at least. And the, well, to be fair, we could say that there are similar forms of certain forms of patriotic education in Ukraine, like for example, the Poroskoye Siege, this Cossacks, there is a very strong kind of part of this in this kind of national imaginary. And I've heard about young people being very actively involved in various martial arts in this Cossack settings. And so I don't know much about this, but I think there might be similar things happening, but when we speak about Russia, I can see that there is also a very strong cult of the victory in the Second World War and perhaps the patriotic education connected with the cult of the victory creates a very dangerous combination and there are certain, we could call it the Christ of Militancy and some forms that reminds the 1930s and because youth in the 1930s and all over Europe was very much involved in various kind of militant camps and forms of activity. So I would say that, yeah, a certain problem there, but I guess, yes, the young people, they are one of these groups that can be influenced quite easily and that depends on these settings in which they are, I don't know if this is the answer, but it's certainly a war in tendency and obviously in the context of the current war, it appears as a very wrong direction that the Orthodox parishes who organized such camps were taken and this is unfortunately is the case. Thank you very much. Shall I invite the audience, have people without being here to share, please pause. I see that I think you have to please. Well, I actually think I should potentially hold off because my perspective is an Ethiopian perspective, but just to say that there is a really strong and really good opportunity here for different populations to find a route to peace through their faith and the fact that the co-religionists are fighting each other, I believe is untenable and eventually whether it's, I think it will speed us towards peaceful resolution, the fact that both of these wars, one civil, well, no, it's not, neither of them are described as wars by the states, by the Ethiopian state, it began at least as a special operation based on a legal issue, but also a threat of violence. And so this was just a defensive operation and for the Russians, it is, as it's been filtered through the Western press, is also described as a special operation. Now, I have followed the war, the conflict in Ethiopia incredibly carefully picking up on the internet, absolutely like a magpie, as many different reports, et cetera, on the situation where Tigray, the north of Ethiopia, is blockaded and there's a blackout. So we're not really sure quite the extent of the fratricide, but there are human rights reports. We know that horrific things have been perpetrated by orthodox against orthodox, but of course there are also Muslims involved, which means that it is not in any way shape or form a holy war. It is based on national disagreements of the idea of what it is to be Ethiopian and on the recalcitrance of the former regime and these faltering steps towards a commission for peaceful resolution, which is being formed in Ethiopia today. What I want to say is finally is that the view from afar, whether it's the view of what's happening in Ukraine and Russia or of Ethiopia has been said to be based on some sort of racial prejudice against Africa and I would say no, I would say as an Africanist I would say there is a fatigue about conflicts in Africa and that the Ukrainian situation is so much more a pivotal moment in global geopolitics that the reasons behind the immediacy of the reporting in Ukraine is partly because it speaks to the whole world in a way that the Ethiopian crisis doesn't. Yes, there's a blackout in Ethiopia, but we are in a completely different age where things are being recorded on people's telephones and just to say finally that in my magpie occupation of following the war as closely as I possibly can, it has amazed me how a terrible massacre in deep rural Ethiopia in my region, Amhara region, which is just the neighbouring region, which is also majority Orthodox from Tigray, the way it can be reported the day after with interviews of locals, local peasants who may or may not be literate, it's just we are in a completely different age of the way that we can zoom in on rape as a weapon whether it's in Ukraine or whether it's in Ethiopia. And so I feel that the fact that there is the threat of a kind of ideology of a holy war in the Ukrainian-Russian context is very different from the Ethiopian context, which is really is a political complex. Thank you, yes. It was actually, well, precisely what in my personal view, what just Gracie said about Ethiopia can be really said about this conflict as well. So I don't agree with those. Well, the ones mentioned that, well, it's presented in the holy war, it is justified, the orthodoxy justifies the war, or Russian orthodoxy justifies the war. No, it doesn't. And I want to emphasise once again, coming back to my presentation, when I show the website or main theme tank of those who are behind the ideology of the Russian world. And they are not just only the Orthodox there, they're Muslims, they're atheists, they're all sorts of people who are united and who are creating, promoting their ideology, ideology, ideology, political ideology, and political purposes. And the orthodoxy and ideology in the church has been instrumentalised, it's been used by those. So we need to really divide the church and through orthodox theology from that which is possibly presented as a petition of the church or so. And really what we see just openly see on the website, those who support the war from the Russian side, well, there are orthodox people there and many, but the ideology is not orthodox at all. It's a solid Stalinist theme, which adopted certain points all from the orthodox crowds that were, you know. Something happened. Russian world intervention. Russian, yes. Apologies, we lost you for a second. Thank you very much. I think you got an answer. Answer? Yes, hand raised. Thank you. So apologies, we lost you for a minute. We continue where we left it. I think Father Tifor was essentially saying that there are multiple ideologies at play and orthodox theology is really one of the under layers for some actors, but there's multiple other actors in the play field. Andrei, I think you wanted to make a contribution. Yes, I would like to say that in my view, it is a great mistake to call this war some kind of religious war or first inter-orthodox war of 21st century because you should understand that Russia is a very secular country with maybe five from not more than 10% of orthodox practitioners and with very small influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the politics. All the words about justification of this war, they are not religious if you will try to analyze for example, propaganda discourse in Russian media. They doesn't use, for example, the discourse of holy war, maybe someone arbitrary mention these words, but it is not a discourse of propaganda. They used something another, the discourse of denitification and so on. And you should understand it. And I think that we shouldn't make this mistake because the influence of Russian Orthodox Church on this is very small. On the other hand, I heard the father Tihon, who tried to make Russian Orthodox people white, but not a lot of priests, a lot of bishops, a lot of common believers of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia and outside Russia support this war and support ideologically, support their prayers and so on. And of course, significant part of Russian Orthodox Church is against the war, but we don't know how much, how much this number of people, because they are hidden, they are silent and so on. I would like to add. I can try, yes, Lars? I can take you back 120 years roughly in time and transport you to Western Europe. Central Europe as well, when the same conversation was actually not taking place, but after the First World War, it did take place, namely between the different Protestant countries in Europe where a very similar mixture of romantic nationalism and militarism and a distorted view of Christianity, but Protestant Christianity was being used in order to mobilize populations against each other. And the question was, now I can't remember who said it, but the impact of Alice, yeah, it was you. So what is the impact, the long-term impact of indoctrination on the youth when they incorporate essentially preparation for war into their own religious and, well, educational upbringing? Well, a little bit of optimism is that after the First World War, this was completely destroyed with the notable exception of those countries that were so ruined by the war, that they became the playground for very radical ideologies, thinking of Germany, for example, but also Romania, places that are very clear examples where radicalization can be true. But it does not necessarily mean that a whole generation is now predestined to go into war, because the children, they have their own mechanism of dealing with messages that come from above, they're being ignored. Yes, I'm speaking as a teacher and as the father of two children who are at school, they know precisely what comes from the teachers, they know how to manipulate this in their own ways. So, and of course they have their friends. So there is not no necessity for a very negative trajectory where this can move. But of course, my example that I mentioned led to the First World War, and that has been described as a fratricidal war as well. So we have to keep this in mind as well. I think there are some very important points. Because the trauma of war, the trauma, people will process it and heal in part, but it's not addressed because it will remain to divide people. So I think it's about, you know, the future really is not just about the moment today and also why it's what kind of future can we imagine as an orthodox community for the future if we will allow these divisions to define us. And I think, Alesseth, I've made a really important point about respectful disobedience. I think this is, I was just having a conversation with one of the members of the audience earlier that what is the role of the lady? And I think everyone touched on that. What is the role of the clergy on the ground, the lady, the theologians who don't have decision-making power within religious matters? What is our role? Shall we go back to, you know, reminding ourselves what discipleship means within our faith? Shall, is a skepticism perhaps a direction? So perhaps this is actually a moment for us to understand what we stand for as orthodox practitioners. And then use that as Elizabeth and as an opportunity within the world. Because I think Father Dragosh really referred to it to the worldliness. We've become worldly. As the Ethiopians like to say, alimaui, we became worldly. And the question is, is there another way of being orthodox in the world within today's world? So I want to apologize. I think something- Julie said, yes. Julie, is that the name? Just two quick points. I think what emerges from the last exchanges is also the need for some concrete work on tracking down attempts of the Moscow Patriarchate to come close to the definition of just war theory since 2000 when they published the social doctrine of the rationality of church. And there have been some pronouncements which can be formally conveyed. In that document they even used to cast in, it's a framework for that thing. But it was not a complete sort of formulation. So then we can see how this may have been used, exploited, countered in the current sort of polemical exchanges between the Russian and the Ukrainian clerical circles who've been working on that. And the second thing which emerges at the second interesting point that emerges from the discussion is as far as I remember, Serbian Orthodox Church was coaxing the same just war trap to which one can add sort of the bulk of the reconquista just for theory within which frame the bulk of the Orthodox Church is often a function since the late 19th century. In this case, I have to say while it was exploited to some extent by the leadership of the church and some theologians after the war, maybe what Natalia would suggest has happened, circles in the Orthodox Church revisited that sort of exploitation of Orthodox for that new sort of version of reconquista warfare, shall we say, and came out with a return to the patristic views. So on the smallest scale, this has already happened within, as I said, the bulk of the Orthodox. It will be really interesting to see whether that kind of development and tendency may also evolve along the lines that Natalia would and Andresis could suggest. So that's what they take from the discussion. I think Natalia or Iwina, I think it was really, right? Or Allison. Do we have a Natalia? Oh, Natalia, sorry, you said Natalia. You did? Natalia, right? Yeah. Sorry, I thought you said Natalia. We don't have a lot of discussion. Yeah, but, yes. So Natalia, do you want to, I wonder if you've heard that call? I kind of heard it. I have to admit my audio is not the best. So I was, was there a question that I didn't hear or? Can you hear me now? I think I can hear you now. Yeah. I was just saying that a similar, how to put it, reassessment of the use of war ideologies within Orthodox context has already happened in the Serbian Orthodox Church, following the walls of Yugoslav succession, which was followed by, as I said, reassessment of its use of just war theory on the basis of return to the patristic sort of attitudes to war and peace. So it will be interesting to see whether something which has already has happened on a smaller scale can now happen on a larger scale. Since obviously international orthodoxy is undergoing earthquake sort of some proportions currently. Yeah, no, that's a very good question. I admit, I don't really know a great deal about those developments in the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Orthodoxy is one of my weaknesses. I mostly focus on the Russian and Greek traditions, but yeah, that's actually, thank you for pointing me towards that. I would like to look at the Serbian tradition more and yes, it would be very interesting to see if similar things would develop in Ukrainian tradition. I would just say about the Ukrainian tradition, I think to bring it back to Andrei's original comments about contextual theology, right? I mean, something that does happen in the Ukrainian tradition is going to have to be different from how it might have happened in Serbia, but part of the theology of the cross that I had mentioned in my first comment is a parallel to that idea is this idea of theology from the cross. So theology from the perspective of those who have undergone these experiences of war and devastation. So that theology from the cross became of course an idea that fed into liberation theology. So it would be interesting for me to see if in the Ukrainian theological tradition we do get us the development of a strong theology from the cross, an Orthodox kind of liberation theology from out of that tradition and out of these experiences. And if so, I think that's definitely something that global Orthodox theology should want to elevate and bring to the forefront of our conversations moving forward. We ran out of time, I just realized we have been so lost and focused in conversation. I looked at the book and I thought, should I say something, but this is such a beautiful circle, that's why I didn't mind it. It turns out it took a month of private sessions of those that we have. And thank you before you close the session. I would just like to thank you once again that you were in the distance from America to the deepest Russia. Thank you very much for participating and you from the near circle. Because this is a very, if you just leave these discussions to politicians or to the media you don't get anywhere. It's they will go for the most eye catching and well, for the images that make news of the day and then they will be forgotten. What you say the fatigue of the war in Ethiopia. Why is it so much, is this conflict so much in the focus because it's in Europe. Let's face it. And historically it's of course a different matter because if you study the history of Europe it's the history of warfare in every corner. And that's why an institution like the European Union is such a wonderful thing because it actually abolishes war. But this brings it back into the limelight and it shows where the conflicts can actually be franticidal. Yes, in many ways. Yes. You mentioned Africa and Europe. Yes. In the religious conflict in Iraq in 2005-2008 where it's not just the same sects of Islam she answered this with each other, the criticism. But I think the question of minorities, the real minority, they were the original people of Iraq and she had one. We have the victims of that conflict. Absolutely. So they saw them as non-Muslims, they are unbelievers. I think of course that Christianity was much earlier than Islam. I mean, yeah, we should write it but because Ukraine is in Europe we are seeing the conflict. So these small conflicts in Ethiopia they seem to catch a bit of the news in the media and then disappear. And then you have the states government media in Russia so at the moment which is of course turning its attention into the war to the conflict as something to serve its own purposes. So wherever you look it's you get the distorted view so this is why I really, really wanted to say thank you for coming and for contributing. This is something I will never forget. This is a very moving experience. So thank you also for you in the distance. I will see you again at one of our locations. Yes. Thank you. And thank you too. All the way to come here for this occasion. It's a blessing and I'm learning. I'm not based in Russian Orthodoxy so it's a learning to me. And I think for us really the vision is to create an educational platform. We have so much to learn from each other. I think there are these imaginary constructed divisions but when we actually try to see each other at a human level and really understand them there might be a reason behind the rationalizations but if we start to understand that reason perhaps we'll find a common ground to start a dialogue. So really for us is to create a platform for education and sharing and we'll see with Lars if we can produce something subsequently maybe some keynotes from the conversations to exist along this video and then the video will be on the YouTube channel and the speakers and discussants will have an opportunity to review the video as well prior to its dissemination. So thank you all so much. Thank you to all for coming. It's been a pleasure and apologies for going over time. Thank you. Thank you to our digital participants. So I'm going to stop there for now. Thank you.