 Book 4, sections 1 through 4 of Politics by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Anna Simon. Politics by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Joed. Book 4, section 1. In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of any subject and do not come into being in a fragmentary way, it is the province of a single art or science to consider all that pertains to a single subject. For example, the art of gymnastics considers not only the suitableness of different modes of training to different bodies, but what sort is absolutely the best? 1. For the absolutely best must suit that which is by nature best and best furnished with the means of life. And also, what common form of training is adapted to the great majority of men fall. And if a man does not desire the best habit of body or the greatest skill in gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer or the teacher of gymnastics should be able to impart any lower degree of either. 3. The same principle equally holds in medicine and shipbuilding and the making of clothes and in the arts generally. Hence, it is obvious that government too is the subject of a single science which has to consider what government is best and of what sort it must be to be most in accordance with our aspirations if there were no external impediment and also what kind of government is adapted to particular states. For the best is often unattainable and therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted not only with one, that which is best in the abstract, but also with two, that which is best relatively to circumstances. We should be able further to say how a state may be constituted under any given conditions. 3. Both how it is originally formed and when formed, how it may be longest preserved. The supposed state being so far from having the best constitution that it is unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the best. Neither is it the best under the circumstances, but of an inferior type. He ought moreover to know for the form of government which is best suited to states in general. For political writers, although they have excellent ideas, are often impractical. We should consider not only what form of government is best, but also what is possible and what is easily attainable by all. There are some who would have none but the most perfect. For this, many natural advantages are required. Others, again, speak of a more attainable form, and although they reject the constitution in which they are living, they extol someone in particular, for example the Lesser Demonian. Any change of government which has to be introduced should be one which men, starting from their existing constitutions, will be both willing and able to adopt, since there is quite as much trouble in the reformation of an old constitution as in the establishment of a new one, just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn. And therefore, in addition to the qualifications of the statesmen already mentioned, he should be able to find remedies for the defects of existing constitutions as has been said before. This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of government there are. It is often supposed that there is only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy, but this is a mistake, and in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many ways they are combined. The same political insight will enable a man to know which laws are the best and which are suited to different constitutions, for the laws are and ought to be relative to the constitution and not the constitution to the laws. A constitution is the organization of offices in a state and determines what is to be the governing body and what is the end of each community. But laws are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitution. They are the rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state and proceed against offenders, so that we must know the varieties and the number of varieties of each form of government, if only with a view to making laws. For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies or to all democracies, since there is certainly more than one form, both of democracy and of oligarchy. Section 2 In our original discussion about governments, we divided them into three true forms, kingly rule, aristocracy and constitutional government, and three corresponding perversions, tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. Of kingly rule and of aristocracy, we have already spoken, for the inquiry into the perfect state is the same thing with the discussion of the two forms thus named, since both imply a principle virtue provided with external means. We have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the latter should be established. In what follows, we have to describe the so-called constitutional government, which bears the common name of all constitutions, and the other forms, tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. It is obvious which of the three perversions is the worst and which is the next in badness. That which is the perversion of the first and most divine is necessarily the worst. And just as a royal rule, if not a mere name, must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king, so tyranny, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily the farthest removed from all well constituted form. Oligarchy is a little better, for it is a long way from aristocracy, and democracy is the most tolerable of the three. A writer who preceded me has already made these distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as mine, for he lays down the principle that when all the constitutions are good, the oligarchy and the rest being virtues, democracy is the worst, but the best when all are bad. Whereas we maintain that they are in any case defective, and that one oligarchy is not to be accounted better than another, but only less bad. Not to pursue this question further at present, let us begin by determining, one, how many varieties of constitution there are, since of democracy and oligarchy there are several. Two, what constitution is the most generally acceptable, and what is eligible in the next degree after the perfect state? And besides this, what other there is, which is aristocratical and well constituted, and at the same time adapted to states in general? Three, of the other forms of government to whom each is suited, for democracy may meet the needs of some better than oligarchy, and conversely. In the next place, four, we have to consider in what manner a man ought to proceed who desires to establish someone among these various forms, whether of democracy or of oligarchy. And lastly, five, having briefly discussed these subjects to the best of our power, we will endeavour to ascertain the modes of ruin and preservation both of constitutions generally and of each separately, and to what causes there to be attributed. Section three. The reason why there are many forms of government is that every state contains many elements. In the first place, we see that all states are made up of families, and in the multitude of citizens, there must be some rich and some poor, and some in a middle condition. The rich are heavy-armed and the poor not. Of the common people, some are husbandmen, and some traders, and some artisans. There are also among the notables differences of wealth and property, for example, in the number of horses which they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are rich. And therefore, in all times, the cities whose strength lay in their cavalry were oligarchies, and they used cavalry in wars against their neighbours, as was the practice of the Eritreans and Calcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the river Meander and of other peoples in Asia. Besides differences of wealth, there are differences of rank and merit, and there are some other elements which were mentioned by us when in treating of aristocracy we enumerated the essentials of a state. Of these elements, sometimes all, sometimes the lesser, and sometimes the greater number, have a share in the government. It is evident then that there must be many forms of government, differing in kind, since the parts of which they are composed differ from each other in kind. For a constitution is an organisation of offices, which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess, for example, the rich or the poor, or according to some principle of equality which includes both. There must therefore be as many forms of government as there are modes of arranging the offices, according to the superiorities and differences of the parts of the state. There are generally thought to be two principle forms, as men say of the winds that there are but two, north and south, and that the rest of them are only variations of these, so of governments there are said to be only two forms, democracy and oligarchy. For aristocracy is considered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being the rule of a few, and the so-called constitutional government to be really a democracy, just as among the winds we make the west a variation of the north, and the east of the south wind. Similarly, of musical modes there are said to be two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian. The other arrangements of the scale are comprehended under one or other of these two. About forms of government this is a very favourite notion, but in either case the better and more exact way is to distinguish, as I have done, the one or two which are true forms and to regard the others as perversions, whether of the most perfectly atempered mode or of the best form of government. We may compare the severer and more overpowering modes to the oligarchical forms and the more relaxed and gentler ones to the democratic. It must not be assumed, as some are fond of saying, that democracy is simply that form of government in which the greater number are sovereign, for in oligarchies, and indeed in every government, the majority rules. Nor again is oligarchy that form of government in which a few are sovereign. Suppose the whole population of a city to be 1,300, and that of these 1,000 are rich and do not allow the remaining 300 who are poor but free and in all other respects there equals a share of the government. No one will say that this is a democracy. In like manner, if the poor were few and the masters of the rich who outnumber them, no one would ever call such a government in which the rich majority have no share of office an oligarchy. Therefore we should rather say that democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers and oligarchy in which the rich. It is only an accident that the free are the many and the rich are the few. Otherwise a government in which the offices were given according to the stature as is said to be the case in Ethiopia or according to beauty would be an oligarchy. For the number of tall or good-looking man is small and yet oligarchy and democracy are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of wealth and freedom. Both of them contain many other elements and therefore we must carry our analysis further and say that the government is not a democracy in which the free men, being few in number rule over the many who are not free as at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and at Thera. For in each of these states the nobles who are also the earliest settlers were held in chief honor although they were but a few out of many. Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government because they exceed in number as is the case formally at Colophon where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed of large property before the Lydian war. But the form of government is a democracy when the free who are also poor and the majority govern and an oligarchy when the rich and the noble govern they being at the same time few in number. I have said that there are many forms of government and have explained to what causes the varieties due why there are more than those already mentioned but they are and once they arise I will now proceed to consider starting from the principle already admitted which is that every state consists not of one but of many parts. If we were going to speak of the different species of animals we should first of all determine the organs which are indispensable to every animal as for example some organs of sense and the instruments of receiving and digesting food such as the mouth and the stomach besides organs of locomotion. Assuming now that there are only so many kinds of organs but that there may be differences in them I mean different kinds of mouths and stomachs and perceptive and locomotive organs the possible combinations of these differences will necessarily furnish many varieties of animals for animals cannot be the same which have different kinds of mouths or of ears and when all the combinations are exhausted there will be as many sorts of animals as there are combinations of the necessary organs the same then is true of the forms of government which have been described states as I have repeatedly said are composed not of one but of many elements one element is the food producing class who are called husbandmen a second the class of mechanics who practice the arts without which a city cannot exist of these arts some are absolutely necessary others contribute to luxury or to the grace of life the third class is that of traders and by traders I mean those who are engaged in buying and selling whether in commerce or in retail trade a fourth class is that of the serfs or laborers the warriors make up the fifth class and they are as necessary as any of the others if the country is not to be the slave of every invader for how can a state which has any title to the name be of a slavish nature the state is independent and self-sufficing but a slave is the reverse of independent hence we see that this subject though ingeniously has not been satisfactorily treated in the republic Socrates says that a state is made up of four sorts of people who are absolutely necessary these are a weaver, a husbandman a shoemaker and a builder afterwards finding that they are not enough he adds a smith and again a herdsman to look after the necessary animals then a merchant and then a retail trader all these together form the complement of the first state as if a state were established merely to supply the necessaries of life rather than for the sake of the good or stood equally in need of shoemakers and of husbandmen but he does not admit into the state a military class until the country has increased in size and is beginning to encroach on its neighbour's land whereupon they go to war yet even amongst his four original citizens or whatever be the number of those whom he associates in the state there must be someone who will dispense justice and determine what is just and as the soul may be said to be more truly part of an animal than the body so the higher parts of states that is to say the warrior class the class engaged in the administration of justice and that engaged in double liberation which is a special business of political common sense these are more essential to the state than the parts which minister to the necessaries of life whether there are several functions are the functions of different citizens or of the same for it may often happen that the same persons are both warriors and husbandmen is immaterial to the argument the higher as well as the lower elements are to be equally considered parts of the state and if so the military element at any rate must be included there are also the wealthy who minister to the state with their property these form the seventh class the eighth class is that of magistrates and of officers for the state cannot exist without rulers and therefore some must be able to take office and to serve the state either always or in turn there only remains the class of those who deliberate and who judge between disputants we were just now distinguishing them if presence of all these elements and their fair and equitable organization is necessary to states then there must also be persons who have the ability of statesmen different functions appear to be often combined in the same individual for example the warrior may also be a husbandman or an artisan or again the counselor a judge and all claim to possess political ability and think that they are quite competent to fill most offices but the same persons cannot be rich and poor at the same time for this reason the rich and the poor are regarded in a special sense as parts of a state again because the rich are generally few in number while the poor are many they appear to be antagonistic and as the one or the other prevails they form the government hence arises the common opinion that there are two kinds of government democracy and oligarchy I've already explained that there are many forms of constitution and to what causes the variety is due let me now show that there are different forms both of democracy and oligarchy as will indeed be evident from what has proceeded for both in the common people and in the notables various classes are included of the common people one class are husbandmen another artisans and traitors who are employed in buying and selling another are the seafaring class whether engaged in war or in trade as ferrymen or as fishermen in many places any one of these classes forms quite a large population for example fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium crews of triremes at Athens merchant seamen at Ajaina and Caius ferrymen at Tenedos to the classes already mentioned may be added day laborers and those who own to their needy circumstances have no leisure or those who are not of free birth on both sides and there may be other classes as well the notables again may be divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue education and similar differences of forms of democracy first comes that which is said to be based strictly on equality in such a democracy the law says that it is just for the poor to have no more advantage than the rich and that neither should be masters but both equal for if liberty and equality as is thought by some are chiefly to be found in democracy they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost and since the people are the majority and the opinion of the majority is decisive such a government must necessarily be a democracy here then is one sort of democracy there is another in which the magistrates are elected according to a certain property qualification but a low one he who has the required amount of property has a share in the government but he who loses his property loses his rights another kind is that in which all the citizens who are under no disqualification share in the government but still the law is supreme in another everybody if he be only a citizen is admitted to the government but the law is supreme as before a fifth form of democracy in other respects the same is that in which not the law but the multitude have the supreme power and supersede the law by their decrees this is a state of affairs brought about by the demagogues foreign democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens hold the first place and there are no demagogues but where the laws are not supreme their demagogues spring up for the people becomes a monarch and is many in one and the many have the power in their hands not as individuals but collectively Homer says that it is not good to have a rule of many but whether he means this corporate rule or the rule of many individuals is uncertain at all events this sort of democracy which is now a monarch and no longer under the control of law seeks to exercise monarchical sway and grows into a despot the flatterer is held in honor this sort of democracy being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy the spirit of both is the same and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens the decrees of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other both have great power the flatterer with the tyrant the demagogue with democracies of the kind which we are describing the demagogues make the decrees of the people overwrite the laws by referring all things to the popular assembly and therefore they grow great because the people have all things in their hands and they hold in their hands the vote of the people who are too ready to listen to them further those who have any complaint to bring against the magistrates say that the people be judges the people are too happy to accept the invitation and so the authority of every office is undermined such democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all for where the laws have no authority there is no constitution the law ought to be supreme over all and the magistrates should judge of particulars and only this should be considered a constitution so that if democracy be a real form of government the sort of system in which all things are regulated by decrees is clearly not even a democracy in the true sense of the word for the creeds relate only to particulars these then are the different kinds of democracy end of book 4 sections 1 through 4 book 4 sections 5 through 10 of politics by Aristotle this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Simon politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Joad book 4 section 5 of other Gargys too there are different kinds one where the property qualification for office is such that the poor although they form the majority have no share in the government yet he who acquires a qualification may obtain a share another sort is when there is a qualification for office but a high one and the vacancies in the governing body are fired by co-optation if the election is made out of all the qualified persons a constitution of this kind inclines to an aristocracy if out of a privileged class to an oligarchy another sort of oligarchy is when the son succeeds the father there is a fourth form likewise hereditary in which the magistrates are supreme and not the law among oligarchies this is what tyranny is among monarchies and the last mentioned form of democracy among democracies and in fact this sort of oligarchy receives the name of a dynasty or rule of powerful families these are the different sorts of oligarchies and democracies it should however be remembered that in many states the constitution which is established by law although not democratic owing to the education and habits of the people may be administered democratically and conversely in other states the established constitution may incline to democracy but may be administered in an oligarchical spirit this most often happens after a revolution for governments do not change at once at first the dominant party are content with encroaching a little upon their opponents the laws which existed previously continue in force but the authors of the revolution have the power in their hands Section 6 from what has been already said we may safely infer that there are so many different kinds of democracies and of oligarchies for it is evident that either all the classes whom we mentioned must share in the government or some only and not others when the class of husbandmen those who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power the government is administered according to law for the citizens being compelled to live by their labour have no leisure and so they set up the authority of the law and attend assemblies only when necessary they all obtain a share in the government when they have acquired the qualification which is fixed by the law the absolute exclusion of any class would be a step towards oligarchy hence all who have acquired the property of qualification are admitted to a share in the constitution but leisure cannot be provided for them unless there are revenues to support them this is one sort of democracy and these are the causes which give birth to it another kind is based on the distinction which naturally comes next in order in this everyone to whose birth there is no objection is eligible but actually shares in the government only if he can find leisure hence in such a democracy the supreme power is vested in the laws because the state has no means of paying the citizens a third kind is when all free men have a right to share in the government but do not actually share for the reason which has been already given so that in this form again the law must rule a fourth kind of democracy is that which comes latest in the history of states in our own day when cities have far outgrown their original size and their revenues have increased all the citizens have a place in the government through the great preponderance of the multitude and they all including the poor who receive pay and therefore have leisure to exercise their rights share in the administration indeed when they are paid the common people have the most leisure for they are not hindered by the care of their property which often fetters the rich who are thereby prevented from taking part in the assembly or in the courts and so the state is governed by the poor who are majority and not by the laws so many kinds of democracies there are and they grow out of these necessary causes of oligarchies one form is that in which the majority of the citizens have some property but not very much and this is the first form which allows to anyone who obtains the required amount the right of sharing in the government the sharers in the government being a numerous body it follows that the law must govern and not individuals for in proportion as they are further removed from a monarchical form of government and in respect of property have neither so much as to be able to live without attending to business nor so little as to need state support they must admit the rule of law and not claim to rule themselves but if the man of property in the state are fewer than in the former case and own more property there arises a second form of oligarchy for the stronger they are the more power they claim and having this object in view they themselves select those of the other classes who are to be admitted to the government but not being as yet strong enough to rule without the law they make the law represent their wishes when this power is intensified by a further diminution of their numbers and increase of their property there arises a third and further state of oligarchy in which the governing class keep the offices in their own hands and the law ordains that the son shall succeed the father when, again, the rulers have great wealth and numerous friends this sort of family despotism approaches a monarchy individuals rule and not the law this is the fourth sort of oligarchy and is analogous to the last sort of democracy Section 7 there are still two forms besides democracy and oligarchy one of them is universally recognized and included among the four principle forms of government which are said to be one, monarchy two, oligarchy three, democracy and four, the so-called aristocracy or government of the best but there is also a fifth which retains the generic name of polity or constitutional government this is not common and therefore has not been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the different kinds of government like Plato in their books about the state they recognize four only the term aristocracy is rightly applied to the form of government which is described in the first part of our treatise for that only can be rightly called aristocracy which is a government formed of the best man absolutely and not merely of men who are good when tried by any given standard in the perfect state the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government but there are some states differing from oligarchies and also differing from the so-called polity or constitutional government these are termed aristocracies and in them the magistrates are certainly chosen both according to their wealth and according to their merit such a form of government differs from each of the two just now mentioned and is termed an aristocracy or indeed in states which do not make virtue the aim of the community man of merit and reputation for virtue may be found and so where a government has regard to wealth, virtue and numbers as at Carthage that is aristocracy and also where it has regard only to two out of the three as a lesser demon to virtue and numbers and the two principles of democracy and virtue temper each other there are these two forms of aristocracy in addition to the first and perfect state and there is a third form vis the constitutions which incline more than the so-called polity towards oligarchy section 8 I have yet to speak of the so-called polity and of tyranny I put them in this order not because a polity or constitutional government is to be regarded as a perversion any more than the above mentioned aristocracies the truth is that they all fall short of the most perfect form of government and so they are reckoned among perversions and the really perverted forms are perversions of these as I said in the original discussion last of all I will speak of tyranny which I placed last in this series because I am inquiring into the constitutions of states and this is the very reverse of a constitution having explained why I have adopted this order I will proceed to consider constitutional government which in nature will be clearer now that oligarchy and democracy have been defined for polity or constitutional government may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy but the term is usually applied to those forms of government which incline towards democracy and the term aristocracy to those which incline towards oligarchy because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth moreover the rich possess the external advantages the want of which is a temptation to crime and hence they are called noblemen and gentlemen and in as much as aristocracy seeks to give predominance to the best of the citizens people say also of oligarchies that they are composed of noblemen and gentlemen now it appears to be an impossible thing that the state which is governed not by the best citizens but by the worst should be well governed and equally impossible and the state which is ill governed should be governed by the best but we must remember that good laws if they are not obeyed do not constitute good government hence there are two parts of good government one is the actual obedience of citizens to the laws the other part is the goodness of the laws which they obey they may obey bad laws as well as good and there may be a further subdivision they may obey either the best laws which are attainable to them the distribution of offices according to merit is a special characteristic of aristocracy for the principle of an aristocracy is virtue as wealth is of an oligarchy and freedom of a democracy in all of them there of course exists the right of the majority and whatever seems good to the majority of those who share in the government has authority now in most states the form called polity exists for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich who commonly take the place of the noble but as there are three grounds on which man claim an equal share in the government freedom wealth and virtue for the fourth or good birth is the result of the two last being only ancient wealth and virtue it is clear that the mixture of the two elements that is to say of the rich and poor is to be called a polity or constitutional government and the union of the three is to be called aristocracy or the government of the best and more than any other form of government except the true and ideal has a right to this name thus far I've shown the existence of forms of states other than monarchy, democracy and oligarchy and what they are and in what aristocracies differ from one another and polities from aristocracies that the two letter are not very unlike is obvious section 9 next we have to consider how by the side of oligarchy and democracy the so called polity or constitutional government springs up and how it should be organized the nature of it will be at once understood from a comparison of oligarchy and democracy we must ascertain their different characteristics and taking a portion from each put the two together like the parts of an indenture now there are three modes in which fusions of government may be affected in the first mode we must combine the laws made by both governments say concerning the administration of justice in oligarchies they impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as judges and to the poor they give no pay but in democracies they give pay to the poor and do not find the rich now one the union of these two modes is a common or middle term between them and is therefore characteristic of constitutional government for it is a combination of both this is one mode of uniting the two elements or two a mean may be taken between the enactments of the two thus democracies require no property qualification or only a small one from members of the assembly oligarchies a high one here neither of these is the common term but a mean between them three there is a third mode in which something is borrowed from the oligarchical and something from the democratical principle for example the appointment of magistrates by lot is thought to be democratical and the election of them oligarchical democratical again when there is no property qualification oligarchical when there is in the aristocratical or constitutional state one element will be taken from each from oligarchy the principle of electing to offices from democracy the disregard of qualification such are the various modes of combination there is a true union of oligarchy and democracy when the same state may be termed either democracy or an oligarchy those who use both names evidently feel that the fusion is complete such a fusion there is also in the mean for both extremes appear in it the lessedemonian constitution for example is often described as a democracy because it has many democratical features in the first place the youth receive a democratical education for the sons of the poor are brought up with the sons of the rich who are educated in such a manner as to make it possible for the sons of the poor to be educated by them a similar equality prevails in the following period of life and when the citizens are grown up to manhood the same rule is observed there is no distinction between the rich and poor in like manner they all have the same food at their public tables and the rich wear only such clothing as any poor man can afford again the people elect to one of the two greatest offices of state and in the other they share for they elect the senators and share in the fruity by others the spartan constitution is said to be an oligarchy because it has many oligarchical elements that all offices are filled by election and none by lot is one of these oligarchical characteristics that the power of inflicting death or banishment rests with a few persons is another and there are others in a well attempted polity there should appear to be both elements and yet neither also the government should rely on itself and not on foreign aid and on itself not through the good will of a majority they might be equally well disposed when there is a vicious form of government but through the general willingness of all classes in the state to maintain the constitution enough of the manner in which a constitutional government and in which the so called aristocracies ought to be framed section 10 of the nature of tyranny I have still to speak in order that it may have its place in our inquiry since even tyranny is reckoned by us to be a form of government although there is not much to be said about it I have already in the former part of this treatise discussed royalty or kingship according to the most usual meaning of the term and considered whether it is or is not advantageous to states and what kind of royalty should be established and from what source and how when speaking of royalty we also spoke of two forms of tyranny which are both according to law and therefore easily pass into royalty among barbarians there are elected monarchs who exercise a despotic power despotic rulers were also elected in ancient hellas called asemnids or dictators these monarchies when compared with one another exhibit certain differences and they are as I said before royal in so far as the monarch rules according to law over willing subjects but they are tyrannical in so far as he is despotic and rules according to his own fancy there is also a third kind of tyranny which is the most typical form and is the counterpart of the perfect monarchy this tyranny is just that arbitrary power of an individual which is responsible to no one and governs all alike whether equals or better with a view to its own advantage not to that of its subjects and therefore against their will no freemen if he can escape it and you are such a government the kinds of tyranny are such and so many and for the reasons which I have given end of book 4 sections 5 through 10 book 4 sections 11 through 13 of politics by Aristotle this is a liberfox recording all liberfox recordings are in the public domain for more information with the volunteer please visit liberfox.org recording by Anna Simon politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Joed book 4 section 11 we have now to inquire what is the best constitution for most states and the best life for most men neither assuming a standard of virtue which is above ordinary persons nor an education which is exceptionally favoured by nature and circumstances nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration only but having regard to the life in which the majority are able to share and to the form of government which states in general can attain as to those aristocracies as they are called of which we were just now speaking they either lie beyond the possibilities of the greater number of states or they approximate to the so called constitutional government and therefore need no separate discussion and in fact the conclusion at which we arrive respecting all these forms rests upon the same grounds for if what was said in the ethics is true that a happy life is the life according to virtue lived without impediment and that virtue is a mean then the life which is in a mean and in the mean attainable by everyone must be the best and the same principles of virtue and vice are characteristic of cities and of constitutions for the constitution is in a figure the life of the city now in all states there are three elements one class is very rich another very poor and a third in a mean it is admitted that moderation and the mean are best and therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation for in that condition of life men are most ready to follow rational principle but he who greatly excels in beauty strength, birth or wealth and the other hand who is very poor or very weak or very much disgraced finds it difficult to follow rational principle of these two the one sword grow into violent and great criminals the others into rogues and petty rascals and two sorts of offenses correspond to them the one committed from violence the other from roguery again the middle class is least likely to shrink from rule or to be over ambitious for it both of which are injuries to the state again those who have too much of the goods of fortune strength, wealth, friends and the like are neither willing nor able to submit to authority the evil begins at home for when they are boys by reason of the luxury in which they are brought up they never learn even at school the habit of obedience on the other hand the very poor who are in the opposite extreme are too degraded the middle class cannot obey and can only rule despotically the other knows not how to command and must be ruled like slaves thus arises a city not of free men but of masters and slaves the one despising the other envying and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states than this for good fellowship springs from friendship when men are at enmity with one another they would rather not even share the same path but a city ought to be composed as far as possible of equals and similars and these are generally the middle classes where for the city which is composed of middle class citizens is necessarily best constituted in respect of the elements of which we say the fabric of the state naturally consists and this is the class of citizens which is most secure in a state for they do not, like the poor covet their neighbors goods nor do others covet theirs as the poor covet the goods of the rich and as they neither plot against others nor are themselves plotted against they pass through life safely wisely then did facilities pray many things are best in the mean I desire to be of a middle condition in my city thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class and that those states are likely to be well administered in which the middle class is large and stronger if possible than both the other classes or at any rate than either singly for the addition of the middle class turns to scale and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property for where some possess much and the others nothing there may arise an extreme democracy or a pure oligarchy a tyranny may grow out of either extreme either out of the most rampant democracy or out of an oligarchy but it is not so likely to revise out of the middle constitutions and those akin to them I will explain the reason of this hereafter when I speak of the revolutions of states the mean condition of states is clearly best for no other is free from faction and where the middle class is large there are least likely to be factions and dissensions for a similar reason large states are less liable to faction than small ones because in them the middle class is large whereas in small states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor and to leave nothing in the middle and democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in the government for when there is no middle class who greatly exceed in number troubles arise and the states soon comes soon end a proof of the superiority of the middle class is that the best legislators have been of a middle condition for example Solon as his own verse testify and Lysurgus for he was not a king and Carondas and almost all legislators these considerations will help us to understand why most governments are either democratical or hierarchical the reason is that the middle class is seldom numerous in them and whichever party whether the rich or the common people transgresses the mean and predominates draws the constitution its own way and thus arises either oligarchy or democracy there is another reason the poor and the rich quarrel with one another and whichever side gets the better instead of establishing a just or popular government there is the prize of victory and the one party sets up a democracy and the other an oligarchy further both the parties which had the supremacy in Hellas looked only to the interest of their own form of government and established in states the one democracies and the other oligarchies they thought of their own advantage of the public not at all for these reasons the middle form of government has rarely if ever existed and among very few only one man alone of all who ever ruled in Hellas was induced to give this middle constitution to states but it has now become a habit among the citizens of states not even to care about equality all men are seeking for dominion or if conquered are willing to submit what then is the best form of government and what makes it the best is evident and of other institutions since we say that there are many kinds of democracy and many of oligarchy it is not difficult to see which has the first and which the second or any other place in the order of excellence now that we have determined which is the best for that which is nearest to the best must of necessity be better and that which is furthest from it worse if we are judging absolutely and not relatively to given conditions I say relatively to given conditions since a particular government may be preferable but another form may be better for some people section 12 we have now to consider what and what kind of government is suitable to what and what kind of man I may begin by assuming as a general principle common to all governments that the portion of the state which desires the permanence of the constitution ought to be stronger than that which desires reverse now every city is composed of quality and quantity by quality I mean freedom wealth education good birth and by quantity superiority of numbers quality may exist in one of the classes which make up the state and quantity in the other for example the meanly born may be more in number than the well born or the poor than the rich yet they may not so much exceed in quantity as for example short in quality and therefore there must be comparison of quantity and quality where the number of the poor is more than proportion to the wealth of the rich there will naturally be a democracy faring and form with the sort of people who compose it in each case if for example the husband man exceed in number the first form of the democracy will then arise if the artisans and labouring class the last and so with the intermediate forms but where the rich and the notables exceed in quality more than they fall short in quantity there olacarchy arises similarly assuming various forms according to the kind of superiority possessed by the olacarchs the legislator should always include the middle class in his government if he makes his laws olacarchical to the middle class let him look if he makes them democratical he should equally by his laws try to attach this class to the state there only can the government ever be stable where the middle class exceeds one or both of the others and in that case there will be no fear that the rich will unite with the poor against the rulers for neither of them will ever be willing to serve the other and if they look for some form of government more suitable to both they will find none better than this for the rich and the poor will never consent to rule and turn because they mistrust one another the arbiter is always the one trusted and he who is in the middle is an arbiter the more perfect the mixture of the political elements the more lasting will be the constitution many even of those who desire to form aristocratic governments make a mistake not only in giving too much power to the rich but in attempting to overreach the people there comes a time when out of a false good there arises a true evil since the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the constitution than those of the people section 13 the devices by which oligarchies deceive the people are 5 in number they relate to 1. the assembly 2. the magistracies 3. the courts of law 4. the use of arms 5. gymnastic exercises 1. the assemblies are thrown open to all but either the rich only are fined for non-attendance or a much larger fine is inflicted upon them 2. to the magistracies those who are qualified by property cannot decline office upon oath but the poor may 3. in the law courts the rich and the rich only are fined if they do not serve the poor are let off with impunity or as in the laws of corandas the fine is inflicted on the rich and a smaller one on the poor in some states all citizens who have registered themselves are allowed to attend the assembly and to try causes but if after registration they do not attend either in the assembly or at the courts heavy fines are imposed upon them the intention is that through fear of the fines they may avoid registering themselves and then they cannot sit in the law courts or in the assembly the possession of alms and five gymnastic exercises they legislate in a similar spirit for the poor are not obliged to have alms but the rich are fined for not having them and in like manner no penalty is inflicted on the poor for non-attendance at that gymnasium and consequently having nothing to fear they do not attend whereas the rich are liable to a fine and therefore they take care to attend these are the devices of olacarchical legislators and in democracies they have counter devices they pay the poor for attending the assemblies and the law courts and they inflict no penalty on the rich for non-attendance it is obvious that he who duly mix the two principles should combine the practice of both and provide that the poor should be paid to attend and the rich find if they do not attend for then all will take part if there is no such combination power will be in the hands of one party only the government should be confined to those who carry alms as to the property qualification no absolute rule can be laid down but we must see what is the highest qualification sufficiently comprehensive to secure that the number of those who have the rights of citizens exceeds the number of those excluded even if they have no share in office the poor provided only that they are not outraged or deprived of their property will be quiet enough but to secure a gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy thing since the ruling class is not always humane and in time of war the poor are apt to hesitate unless they are fed when fed they are willing enough to fight in some states the government is vested not only in those who are actually serving but also in those who have served among the malians for example the governing body consisted of the latter while the magistrates were chosen from those actually on service and the earliest government which existed among the hellenes after the overthrow of the kingly power grew up out of the warrior class and was originally taken from the knights for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry indeed without discipline infantry are useless and in ancient times there was no military knowledge or tactics and therefore the strength of armies lay in their cavalry but when cities increased and heavy armed grew in strength more had a share in the government and this is the reason why the states which we call constitutional governments have been hitherto called democracies ancient constitutions as might be expected were oligarchical and royal their population being small they had no considerable middle class the people were weak in numbers and organization and were therefore more contented to be governed I have explained why there are various forms of government and why there are more than is generally supposed for democracy as well as other constitutions has more than one form also what their differences are and whence they arise and what is the best form of government speaking generally and to whom the various forms of government are best suited all this has now been explained end of book 4 sections 11 through 13 book 4 sections 14 through 16 of politics by Aristotle this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Simon politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Joe it book 4 section 14 having thus gained an appropriate basis of a discussion we will proceed to speak of the points which follow next in order we will consider the subject not only in general but with reference to particular constitutions all constitutions have three elements concerning which the good law giver has to regard what is expedient for each constitution when they are well ordered the constitution is well ordered they differ from one another constitutions differ there is one element which deliberates about public affairs secondly, two that concerned with the magistrates the question being what they should be over what they should exercise authority and what should be the mode of electing to them and thirdly three, that which has judicial power the deliberative element has authority in matters of war and peace making and unmaking alliances it passes laws inflicts death, exile confiscation elects magistrates and audits their accounts these powers must be assigned either all to all the citizens or all to some of them for example to one or more magistracies or different causes to different magistracies or some of them to all and others of them only to some that all things should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy this is the sort of equality which the people desire but there are various ways in which all may share in the government they may deliberate not all in one body but by turns as in the constitution of teleclass the malesian there are other constitutions in which the boards of magistrates meet and deliberate but come into office by turns and are elected out of the tribes and the very smallest divisions of the state until everyone has obtained office in his turn the citizens on the other hand are assembled only for the purposes of legislation and to consult about the constitution and to hear the edicts of the magistrates in another variety of democracy the citizens form one assembly but meet only to elect magistrates to pass laws to advise about war and peace and to make scrutinies other matters are referred severally to special magistrates who are elected by vote or by lot out of all the citizens or again the citizens meet about election to offices and about scrutinies and deliberate concerning war or alliances while other matters are administered by the magistrates who as far as is possible are elected by vote I am speaking of those magistracies in which special knowledge is required a fourth form of democracy is when all the citizens meet to deliberate about everything and the magistrates decide nothing but only make the preliminary inquiries and that is the way in which the last and worst form of democracy corresponding as we maintain to the close family oligarchy and to tyranny is at present administered all these modes are democratical on the other hand that some should deliberate about all this oligarchical this again is a mode which like the democratical has many forms when the deliberative class being elected out of those who have a moderate qualification are numerous and they respect and obey the prohibitions of the law without altering it and anyone who has the required qualification shares in the government then just because of this moderation the oligarchy inclines towards polity but when only selected individuals and not the whole people share in the deliberations of the state although as in the former case they observe the law the government is a pure oligarchy or again when those who have the power of the liberation are self elected and son succeeds father and they and not the laws are supreme the government is of necessity oligarchical where again particular persons have authority in particular matters for example when the whole people decide about peace and war and whole scrutinies and magistrates regulate everything else and they are elected by vote there the government is an aristocracy and if some questions are decided by magistrates elected by vote and others by magistrates elected by lot either absolutely or out of select candidates or elected partly by vote partly by lot these practices are partly characteristic of an aristocratic government and partly of a pure constitutional government these are the various forms of the deliberative body they correspond to the various forms of government and the government of each state is administered according to one or other of the principles which have been laid down now it is for the interest of democracy according to the most prevalent notion of it I'm speaking of that extreme form of democracy in which the people are supreme even over the laws with a few to better deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting courts of law for in oligarchies the rich who are wanted to be judges are compelled to attend under pain of a fine whereas in democracies the poor are paid to attend and this practice of oligarchies should be adopted by democracies in their public assemblies for they will advise better if they all deliberate together the people with the notables and the notables with the people it is also a good plan that those who deliberate by lot in equal numbers out of the different classes and that if the people greatly exceed in number those who have political training pay should not be given to all but only to as many as would balance the number of the notables whether the number in excess should be eliminated by lot but in oligarchies either certain persons should be co-opted from the mass or a class of officers should be appointed such as exist in some states who are termed probuli by the law and the citizens should occupy themselves exclusively with methods on which these have previously deliberated for so the people will have a share in the deliberations of the state but will not be able to disturb the principles of the constitution again in oligarchies either the people ought to accept the measures of the government or not to pass anything contrary to them or if all are allowed to share in council the decision should rest with the magistrates the opposite of what is done in constitutional governments should be the rule in oligarchies the veto of the majority should be final their assent not final but the proposal should be referred back to the magistrates whereas in constitutional governments they take the contrary course the few have the negative not the affirmative power the affirmation of everything rests with the multitude these then are our conclusions respecting the deliberative that is the supreme element in states section 15 next we will proceed to consider the distribution of offices these two being a part of politics concerning which many questions arise what shall their number be over what shall they preside and what shall be their duration sometimes they last for six months sometimes for less sometimes they are annual while in other cases offices are held shall they be for life or for a long term of years or if for a short term only shall the same persons hold them over and over again or once only also about the appointment to them from whom are they to be chosen and by whom and how we should first be in a position to say what are the possible varieties of them and then we may proceed to determine which are suited to different forms of government but what are to be included in the term offices that is a question not quite so easily answered for a political community requires many offices and not everyone who is chosen by vote or by lot is to be regarded as a ruler in the first place there are the priests who must be distinguished from political offices masses of choruses and heralds even ambassadors are elected by vote some duties of superintendents again are political extending either to all the citizens in a single sphere of action like the office of the general who superintends them when they are in the field or to a section of them only like the inspectorships of women or of youth other offices are concerned with household management like that of the corn measures who exist in many states and are elected offices there are also menial offices which the rich have executed by their slaves speaking generally those are to be called offices to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain measures and of judging and commanding especially the last for the command is the special duty of a magistrate but the question is not of any importance in practice no one has ever brought into court the meaning of the word although such problems have a speculative interest what kinds of offices and how many are necessary to the existence of a state and which if not necessary yet conduced to its well-being are much more important considerations affecting all constitutions but more especially small states for in great states it is possible and indeed necessary that every office should have a special function where the citizens are numerous many may hold office and so it happens that some offices a man holds a second time only after a long interval and others he holds once only every work is better than which receives the soul and not the divided attention of the worker but in small states it is necessary to combine many offices in a few hands since the small number of citizens does not admit of many holding office for who will there be to succeed them and yet small states at times require the same offices and laws as large ones the difference is that the one want them often the others only after long intervals hence there is no reason why the care of many offices should not be imposed on the same person for they will not interfere with each other when the population is small offices should be like the spits which also serve to hold a lamp we must first ascertain how many mattresses are necessary in every state and also how many are not exactly necessary but are nevertheless useful and then there will be no difficulty in understanding what offices can be combined in one we should also know over which matters several local tribunals are to have jurisdiction and in which authority should be centralised for example should one person keep order in the market and another in some other place or should the same person be responsible everywhere again should offices be divided according to the subject with which they deal or according to the persons with whom they deal should one person see to good order in general or one look after the boys another after the women and so on further under different constitutions should the magistrates be the same or different for example in democracy, olacarchy, aristocracy, monarchy should there be the same magistrates although they are elected not out of equal or similar classes of citizens but differently under different constitutions in aristocracies for example they are chosen from the educated in olacarchies from the wealthy and in democracies from the free or are there certain differences in the offices answering to them as well and may the same be suitable to some but different offices to others for in some states it may be convenient that the same office should have a more extensive in other states a narrower sphere special offices are peculiar to certain forms of government for example that of probuli which is not a democratic office although a buil or council is there must be some body of men whose duty is to prepare measures for the people in order that they may not be diverted from their business when these are few in number the state inclines to an olacarchy or rather the probuli must always be few and are therefore an olacarchical element but when both institutions exist in a state the probuli are a check on the council for the counsellors is a democratic element but the probuli are olacarchical even the power of the council disappears when democracy has taken that extreme form in which the people themselves are always meeting and deliberating about everything this is the case when the members of the assembly receive abundant pay for they have nothing to do and are always holding assemblies and deciding everything for themselves a magistracy which controls the boys or the women or any similar office or aristocracy rather than to a democracy for how can the magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going out of those neither is it an olacarchical office for the wives of the olacarchs are too fine to be controlled enough of these matters I will now inquire into appointments to offices the varieties depend on three terms and the combinations of these give all possible modes first who appoints secondly from whom and thirdly how each of these three admits of three varieties capital A all the citizens or capital B only some appoint either one the magistrates are chosen out of all or two out of some who are distinguished either by property qualification or by birth or merit or for some special reason as at Megara only those were eligible who would return from exile and fought together against the democracy they may be appointed either A by vote or B by lot again these several varieties may be coupled I mean that capital C some officers may be elected by some others by all and three some again out of some and others out of all and C some by vote and others by lot each variety of these terms admits of four modes for either capital A one A all may appoint from all by vote or capital A one B all from all by lot or capital A two A all from some by vote or capital A two B all from some by lot and from all either by sections as for example by tribes and wards and frateries capital all the citizens have been gone through or the citizens may be in all cases eligible indiscriminately or again capital A one C capital A two C to some officers in the one way to some and the other again if it is only some that appoint they may do so either capital B one A from all by vote or capital B one B from all by lot or capital B two A from some by vote or capital B two B from some by lot or to some officers in the one way to others in the other i.e. capital B one C from all to some officers by vote to some by lot and capital B two capital C from some to some officers by vote to some by lot thus the modes that arise apart from two capital C three out of the three couplings number 12 of these systems two are popular that all should appoint from all capital A one A by vote or capital A one B by lot or capital A one C by both that all should not appoint at once but should appoint from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by both or appoint to some officers from all by both meaning to some officers by lot to others by vote is characteristic of a polity and capital B one C that some should appoint from all to some officers by vote to others by lot is also characteristic of a polity but more on the carcical than the former method and capital A three A B C capital B three A B C to appoint from both to some officers from all to others from some is characteristic of a polity with a leaning towards aristocracy that capital B two some should appoint from some is a carcical even capital B two B that some should appoint from some by lot and if this does not actually occur it is nonetheless a carcical in character or capital B two capital C that some should appoint from some by both capital B one A that some should appoint from all and capital A two A that all should appoint from some by vote is aristocratic these are the different modes of constituting magistrates and these correspond to different forms of government which are proper to which or how they ought to be established will be evident when we determine the nature of their powers by powers I mean such powers as magistrate exercises of the revenue or in defence of the country for there are various kinds of power the power of the general for example is not the same with that which regulates contracts in the market section sixteen of the three parts of government the judicial remains to be considered and this we shall divide on the same principle there are three points on which the varieties of law courts depend the persons from whom they are appointed the methods which they are concerned and the manner of their appointment I mean one are the judges taken from all or from some only two how many kinds of law courts are there three are the judges chosen by vote or by lot first let me determine how many kinds of law courts there are there are eight in number one is the court of audits or scrutinies a second takes cognizance of ordinary offences against the state a third is concerned with treason against the constitution the fourth determines disputes respecting penalties whether raised by magistrates or by private persons the fifth decides the most important civil cases the sixth tries cases of homicide which are of various kinds a. premeditated b. involuntary c. cases in which the guild is confessed but the justice is disputed and there may be a fourth court d. in which murderers who are fled from justice are tried after their return such as the court of freato is said to be at Athens but cases of this sort rarely happen at all even in large cities the different kinds of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different courts seven there are courts for strangers of these there are two subdivisions a. for the settlement of their disputes with one another b. for the settlement of disputes between them and the citizens and besides all these there must be eight courts for small suits about sums of a drachma up to five drachmas or a little more which have to be determined but they do not require many judges nothing more need to be said of these small suits nor of the courts for homicide or for strangers I would rather speak of political cases which when mismanaged create division and disturbances in constitutions now if all the citizens judge in all the different cases which I have distinguished they may be appointed by vote or by lot or sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote or when a single class of causes are tried the judges who decide them may be appointed some by vote and some by lot these then are the four modes of appointing judges from the whole people and they will be likewise four modes if they are elected from a part only for they may be appointed from some by vote and in judge in all causes or they may be appointed from some by lot and judge in all causes or they may be elected in some cases by vote and in some cases taken by lot or some courts even when judging the same causes may be composed of members some appointed by vote and some by lot these modes then as was said answer to those previously mentioned once more the modes of appointment may be combined I mean that some may be chosen out of the whole people others out of some some out of both for example the same tribunal may be composed of some who are elected out of all and of others who are elected out of some either by vote or by lot or by both in how many forms law can be established has now be considered the first form is that in which the judges are taken from all the citizens and in which all causes are tried is democratical the second which is composed of a few only who try all causes or the carcical the third in which some courts are taken from all classes and some from certain classes only aristocratical and constitutional and of book 4 sections 14 through 16 book 5 sections 1 through 4 of politics by Aristotle this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Leon Meyer politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book 5 sections 1 through 4 1 the design which we propose to ourselves is now nearly completed next in order follow the causes of revolution in states how many and of what nature they are what modes of destruction applied to particular states and out of what and into what they mostly change also what are the modes of preservation in states generally or in a particular state and by what means each state may be best preserved these questions remain to be considered in the first place we must assume as our starting point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and proportionate equality although mankind fail attaining them as I have already explained democracy for example arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects because men are equally free they claim to be absolutely equal oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal being unequal that is in property they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely the democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things while the oligarchs under the idea that they are unequal claim too much which is one form of inequality all these forms of government have a kind of justice but tried by an absolute standard they are faulty therefore both parties whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas stir up revolution those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so there is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy investors here then so to speak are open the very springs and fountains of revolution and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments the one affecting the constitution when men seek to change from an existing form into some other for example from democracy into oligarchy and from oligarchy into democracy or from either of them into constitutional government or aristocracy and conversely constitution when without disturbing the form of government whether oligarchy or monarchy or any other they try to get the administration into their own hands further there is a question of degree in oligarchy for example may become more or less oligarchical and a democracy more or less democratical and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained or the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution only for example the establishment or overthrow of a particular office as at Sparta it is said that Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy in king posenius the efferalty at epidamnes too the change was partial for instead of phyloarchs or heads of tribes a council was appointed but to this day the magistrates are the only members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the helii when an election takes place and the office of the single archon was another oligarchical feature everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution but in inequality in which there is no proportion for instance a perpetual monarchy among equals and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion now equality is of two kinds numerical and proportional by the first I mean sameness or equality in number or size by the second equality of ratios for example the excess of three over two is numerically equal to the excess of two over one whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one for two is the same part of four that one is of two namely the half as I was saying before men agree that justice and the abstract is proportion but they differ in that something that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in all hence there are two principal forms of government democracy and oligarchy for good birth and virtue are rare but wealth and numbers are more common in what city shall we find a hundred persons of good birth and a virtue whereas the rich everywhere abound that a state should be ordered simply and wholly according to either kind of equality is not a good thing the proof is the fact that such forms of government never last they are originally based on a mistake and as they begin badly cannot fail to end badly the inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed numerical in some cases and proportionate in others still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy for in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people but in democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs no dissention worth mentioning arises among the people themselves and we may further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government section two in considering how dissensions and political revolutions arise we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect constitutions generally they may said to be three in number and we have now to give an outline of each we want to know one what is the feeling two what are the motives of those who make them three when arise political disturbances and quarrels the universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has already been mentioned vis the desire of equality when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves or again the desire of inequality and superiority when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferior may and may not be just inferior's revolt in order that they may be equal and equals that they may be superior such is the state of mind which creates revolutions the motives for making them are the desire of gain and honor or the fear of dishonor and loss the authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonor for themselves or their friends the causes and reasons of revolutions whereby men are themselves affected and about the things which I have mentioned viewed in one way may be regarded as seven and in another as more than seven two of them have already been noticed but they act in a different manner for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honor not as in the case which I have just opposed in order to obtain them for themselves but at seeing others justly or unjustly engrossing them other causes are insolence excessive predominance contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness neglect about trifles dissimilarity of elements what share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions and how they work is plain enough when the magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public it is evident again what an influence honor exerts and how it is a cause of revolution men who are themselves dishonored and who see others obtaining honors rise in rebellion the honor or dishonor when undeserved is unjust and just when awarded according to merit again superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the state and the power of the government this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy or a family oligarchy and therefore in some places as at Athens and Argos they have recourse to ostracism but how much better to provide from the first that there should be no such preeminent individuals instead of letting them come into existence and then finding remedy another cause of revolution is fear either men have committed wrong and are afraid of punishment or they are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemy thus at Rhodes the notables conspired against the people through fear the suits that were brought against them contempt is also a cause of insurrection and revolution for example in oligarchies when those who have no share in the state of the majority they revolt because they think that they are the stronger or again in democracies the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state at Thebes for example where after the battle of Inofida the bad administration of the democracy led to its ruin at Megara the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat occasioned by disorder and anarchy and at Syracuse the democracy aroused contempt before the tyranny at Rhodes before the insurrection political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase in any part of the state for as a body is made up of many members and every member ought to grow in proportion that symmetry may be preserved but loses its nature at the foot before cubits long and the rest of the body too spans and should the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as a quantity even take the form of another animal even so a state has many parts of which some one may often grow imperceptibly for example the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states and this disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident as a torrentum from a defeat in which many of the notables were slain in a battle with the eapygians just after the persian war the constitutional government in consequence becoming a democracy or as was the case at Argos where the Argyves after their army had been cut to pieces on the seventh day of the month by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian were compelled to admit to citizen some of their per Eesai and at Athens when after frequent debates of their infantry at the time of the Peloponnesian war the notables were reduced in number because the soldiers had to be taken from the role of citizens revolutions arise from this cause for example in democracies as in other forms of government but not just so great an extent when the rich grow numerous or properties increase the form of government changes into an oligarchy or a government of families forms of government also change sometimes even without revolution owing to election contests as at Haria where instead of electing their magistrates they took them by lot because the electors were in the habit or owing to carelessness when disloyal persons are allowed to find their way into the highest offices as at Aureum where upon the accession of Heracliodorus to office the oligarchy was overthrown and changed by him into a constitutional and democratical government again the revolution may be facilitated by the slightness of the change I mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the constitution through neglect of a small matter at Embracia for instance the qualification for office small at first was eventually reduced to nothing for the Embraciats thought that a small qualification was much the same as none at all another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at once acquire a common spirit for a state is not the growth of a day anymore than it grows out of a multitude brought together by accident hence the reception of strangers and colonies either at the time of their foundation or afterwards has generally produced revolution for example the Achaeans who joined the Trezynians in the foundation of Cyborus becoming later the more numerous expelled them hence the curse fell upon Cyborus at Theriae the Cyborites quarreled with their fellow colonists thinking that the land belonged to them they wanted too much of it and were driven out at Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy and were expelled by force of arms the people of Antissa who had received the Chaean exiles thought with them and drove them out and the Zancleans after having received the Samians were driven by them out of their own city the citizens of Apollonia on the Eucsain after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists had a revolution the Syracuseans after the expulsion of their tyrants having admitted strangers and mercenaries to the rights of citizenship quarreled by the people of Amphipolis having received Calcydian colonists were nearly all expelled by them now in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated because as I said before they are equals and have not an equal share and in democracies the notables revolt because they are not equals and yet have only an equal share again the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state for example the Caetians at Clasamany did not agree with the people of the island and the people of Colophon quarreled with the Notians and Athens too the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than those who live in the city for just as in war the impediment of a ditch though ever so small may break a regiment so every cause of difference however slight makes a breach in a city the greatest opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice next comes that of wealth and poverty and there are other antagonistic elements greater or less of which one is the difference of place in revolutions the occasions may be trifling but great interests are at stake even trifles are most important when they concern the rulers as was the case of old at Syracuse and constitution was once changed by a love quarrel of two young men who were in the government the story is that while one of them was away from home his beloved was gained over by his companion and he to revenge himself seduce the other's wife they then drew ruling class into their quarrel and so split all the people into portions we learn from this story that we should be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men the mistake lies in the beginning as the proverb says well begun as half done so an error at the beginning though quite small bears the same ratio to the errors in the other parts in general when the notables quarrel the whole city is involved as happened in Hasdia after the Persian war the occasion was the division of an inheritance one of two brothers refused to give an account of their father's property and the treasure which he had found so the poor of the two quarreled with him and enlisted in his cause the popular party the other who was very rich the wealthy classes at Delphi again a quarrel about a marriage was the beginning of all the troubles which followed in this case the bridegroom fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen came to the bride and went away without taking her where upon her relations thinking that they were insulted by him put some of the sacred treasure among his offerings while he was sacrificing and then slew him pretending that he had been robbing the temple Admitolini too a dispute about heiresses was the beginning of many misfortunes and led to the war with the Athenians in which Paches took their city a wealthy citizen named Tomophanes left two daughters Dexander another citizen wanted to obtain them for his sons but he was rejected in a suit where upon he stirred up a revolution and instigated the Athenians of whom he was proxenous to interfere a similar quarrel about an heiress arose at Phosas between Naceus the father of Nacin and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus this was the beginning of the sacred war a marriage quarrel was also the cause of a change in the government of Epidamnes a certain man betrothed his daughter to a person whose father having been made a magistrate find the father of the girl and the latter, stung by the insult conspired with unenfranchised classes to overthrow the state governments also changed into oligarchy or into democracy or into a constitutional government because the magistrates or some other section of the state increase in power or renown thus at Athens the reputation gained by the court of the Areopagus in the Persian war seemed to tighten the reins of government on the other hand in the city of Salamis which was gained by the common people who served in the fleet and won for the Athenians the empire due to the command of the sea strengthened the democracy at Argos the notables having distinguished themselves against the last demonians in the battle of Mantania attempted to put down the democracy at Syracuse the people having been the chief authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians changed the constitutional government into democracy at Salsis the people uniting with the notables killed folksus the tyrant and then seized the government at Embracia the people in like manner having joined with the conspirators and expelling the tyrant periander transferred the government to themselves and generally it should be remembered that those who have secured power to the state whether private citizens or magistrates or tribes or any other part or section of the state are apt to cause revolutions for either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion or they themselves in their pride of superiority are unwilling to remain on a level with others revolutions also break out when opposite parties for example the rich and the people are equally balanced and there is little or no middle class for if either party were manifestly superior the other would not risk an attack upon them and for this reason those who are eminent in virtue usually do not stir up insurrections always being a minority such are the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable revolutions are affected in two ways by force and by fraud force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or afterwards fraud again is of two kinds for one sometimes the citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a change of government and afterwards they are held in subjection against their will this was what happened in the case of the 400 who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the lacedemonians and having cheated the people still endeavored to retain the government two in other cases the people are persuaded at first and afterwards by a repetition of the persuasion their goodwill and allegiance are retained the revolutions which affect constitutions generally spring from the above mentioned causes end of book five sections one through four book five sections five through seven of politics by Aristotle this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Leon Meyer politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Jowett book five sections five through seven five and now taking each constitution separately we must see what follows from the principles already laid down revolutions and democracies are generally caused by the intimbrance of demagogues who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies or coming forward in public stir up the people against them the truth of this remark is proved by a variety of examples at cost the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose and the notables combined at roads the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude but prevented them from making good to the tryerarchs which had been expended by them and they in consequence of the suits which were brought against them were compelled to combine and put down the democracy the democracy at Heraklia was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues which drove out the notables who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy much in the same manner the democracy at Megara was overturned there the demagogues drove out the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property at length the exiles becoming numerous returned and engaging in defeating the people established the oligarchy the same thing happened with the democracy of Saimi which was overthrown by Thrasymachus and we may observe that in most states the changes have been of this character for sometimes the demagogues in order to carry favor with the people wrong the notables and so force them to combine either they make a division of their property or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate of old the demagogue was also a general and then democracies changed into tyrannies most of the ancient tyrants were originally demagogues they are not so now but they were then and the reason is that they were generals not orators for oratory had not yet come into fashion whereas in our day when the art of rhetoric has made such progress the orators lead the people but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power at any rate instances to the contrary are few and slight tyrannies were more common formerly than now for this reason also that great power was placed in the hands of individuals thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytinas who had supreme authority in many important matters moreover in those days when cities were not large the people dwelt in the fields busy at their work and their chiefs if they possessed any military talent seized the opportunity and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny thus at Athens Pisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain the tyrannies at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy which he had found by the riverside where they had put them to grays and land not their own Dionysius again was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphneus and the rich his enmity to the notables one for him the confidence of the people changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy for where there is a popular election of the magistrates and no property qualification the aspirants for office get hold of the people and contrive at last even to set them above the laws a more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes and not the whole people to elect the magistrates these are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies six there are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies one, first oligarchs oppress the people for then anybody is good enough to be their champion especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy as Ligdemus at Naxos who afterwards came to be tyrant but revolutions which commence outside the governing class may be further subdivided sometimes when the government is very exclusive the revolution is brought about by persons of the wealthy class who were excluded as happened at Masalia in other cities those who had no share in the government created a disturbance until first the elder brothers and then the younger were admitted for in some places father and son in others elder and younger brothers do not hold office together at Masalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional government but at Istras ended in a democracy and at Heraklia was enlarged to 600 at Nidos the oligarchy underwent a considerable change for the notables fell out among themselves because only a few shared in the government there existed among them the rule already mentioned that father and son not hold office together and if there were several brothers only the eldest was admitted the people took advantage of the quarrel and choosing one of the notables to be their leader attacked and conquer the oligarchs who were divided and always a source of weakness the city of Eritrea two in old times was ruled and ruled well by the facility but the people took offense at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the constitution two of internal causes of revolutions and oligarchies one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs which leads them to play the demagogue now the oligarchal demagogue is of two sorts he practices upon the oligarchs themselves for although the oligarchy are quite a small number there may be a demagogue among them as at Athens Caraclies's party won power by courting the 30 that of Frenicus by courting the 400 or B the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the people this was the case at Larissa where the guardians of the citizens endeavored to gain over the people because they were elected by them by the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are elected as at Abidas not by the class to which they belong but by the heavy armed or by the people although they may be required to have a high qualification or to be members of a political club or again where the law courts are composed of persons outside the government the oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a decision in their own favor and so they changed the constitution at Heraclia in Pontus again oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them for then those who desire equal rights are compelled to call in the people changes in the oligarchy also occur when the oligarchs waste their private property by extravagant living for then they want to innovate and either try to make themselves tyrants or install someone else in the tyranny as Haparnus did Dionysius at Syracuse and as at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus introduced Calcydian colonists and when they arrived stirred them up against the rich for a like reason in Aginia the person who carried on the negotiation with Caris endeavored to revolutionize the state sometimes a party among the oligarchs tried directly to create a political change sometimes they robbed the treasury and then either the thieves or as happened at Apollonia in Pontus those who resist them in their thieving quarrel with the rulers but an oligarchy which is at unity with itself is not easily destroyed from within of this we may see an example at Pharsalis for there although the rulers are few in number they govern a large city because they have a good understanding among themselves oligarchies again are overthrown when another oligarchy is created within the original one that is to say the whole governing body is small and yet they do not all share in the highest offices thus at Elis the governing body was a small senate and very few ever found their way into it because the senators were only 90 in number and were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the last demonian elders oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in war and in peace in war because not being able to trust the people the oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant as Timophanes did at Corinth or if there are more generals than one they make themselves into a company of tyrants sometimes the oligarchs fearing this danger give the people a share in the government because their services are necessary to them and in time of peace from mutual distrust the two parties hand over the defense of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two factions who often ends the master of both this happened at Larissa when Samos the Iluid had the government and at Abytes in the days of Aphiades in the political clubs revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another of quarrels about marriages I have already mentioned some instances another occurred at Eritrea where Diagarus overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a marriage a revolution at Heraclia and another at Thebes both arose out of decisions of law courts upon a charge of adultery in both cases the punishment was just but executed in the spirit of party at Heraclia upon Eurytean and at Thebes upon Archaus for their enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the Agara many oligarchies have been destroyed by some members of the ruling class taking offense at their excess of despotism for example the oligarchy at Naitis and at Chaius changes of constitutional governments and also of oligarchies which limit the office of counselor judge or other magistrate to persons having a certain money qualification often occur by accident the qualification may have been originally fixed according to the circumstances of the time in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only or in a constitutional government the middle class but after a time of prosperity whether arising from peace or some other good fortune the same property becomes many times as valuable and then everybody participates in every office this happens sometimes gradually and insensibly and sometimes quickly these are the causes of changes and revolutions in oligarchies we must remark generally both of democracies and oligarchies that they sometimes change not into the opposite forms of government but only into another variety of the same class I mean to say from those forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated by law into those which are arbitrary and conversely 7 in aristocracies revolutions are stirred up in a few only share in the honors of the state a cause which has already been shown to affect oligarchies for an aristocracy is a sort of oligarchy and like an oligarchy is the government of a few although few not for the same reason hence the two are often confounded and revolutions will be most likely to happen and must happen when the mass of the people are of the high spirited kind and have a notion that they are as good as their rulers thus it lasts a demon the so-called Parthenii who were the illegitimate sons of the Spartan peers attempted revolution and being detected were sent away to colonize Tarentum again revolutions occur when great men who are at least of equal merit are dishonored by those higher in office as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta or when a brave man is excluded from the honors of the state like Synodon who conspired against the Spartans in the reign of a Geseleus or again when some are very poor and others very rich a state of society which is most often the result of war as at Lassa demon in the days of the Messinian war this is proved from the poem of Tertius entitled Good Order for he speaks of certain citizens who are ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of the land again revolutions arise when an individual who is great and might be greater wants to rule alone as at Lassa demon, Pausanias who was general in the Persian war were like Hanno at Carthage constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself the cause of the downfall is in the former the ill mingling of the two elements democracy and oligarchy the latter of the three elements democracy oligarchy and virtue but especially democracy and oligarchy for to combine these is the endeavor of constitutional governments and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like game but differ from polities in the mode of combination and some of them are more and some less permanent those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies and those which incline to democracy and therefore the latter are the safer of the two for the greater the number the greater the strength and when men are equal they are contented but the rich, if the constitution gives them power are apt to be insolent and avaricious and in general whichever way the constitution inclines in that direction it changes as either party gains strength a constitutional government becoming a democracy an aristocracy and oligarchy but the process may be reversed an aristocracy may change into democracy this happens when the poor under the idea that they are being wronged force the constitution to take an opposite form in like manner constitutional governments change into oligarchies the only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion and for every man to enjoy his own what I have just mentioned actually happened at Theorie I the qualification for office at first high was therefore reduced and the magistrates increased a number the notables had previously acquired the whole of the land contrary to law for the government tended to oligarchy and they were able to encroach but the people who had been trained by war soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs until those who had had too much gave up their land again since all aristocratical governments had the oligarchy the notables are apt to be grasping thus at las edemen where property tends to pass into few hands the notables can do too much as they like and they were allowed to marry whom they please the city of low cry was ruined by a marriage connection with Dionysius but such a thing could never have happened in a democracy or in a well balanced aristocracy I have already remarked that in all states revolutions are occasioned by trifles in aristocracies above all they are of a gradual and in perceptible nature the citizens begin by giving up some part of the constitution and so with greater ease the government changed something else which is a little more important until they have undermined the whole fabric of the state at theory eye there was a law that general should only be re-elected after an interval of 5 years and some young men who are popular with the soldiers of the guard of military prowess despising the magistrates in thinking that they would easily gain their purpose wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual commands for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to elect them where upon the magistrates who had charged these matters and who are called counselors at first determined to resist but they afterwards consented thinking that if only this one law was changed no further inroad of the constitution but other changes soon followed which they in vain attempted to oppose and the state passed into the hands of the revolutionists who established a dynastic oligarchy all constitutions are overthrown either from within or from without the latter when there is some government close at hand having an opposite interest or at a distance but powerful this was exemplified in the old times of the Athenians and Elacidemonians the Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies and the Lacedemonians the democracies I have now explained what are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions and states end of book 5 sections 5 through 7