 Alright, well Professor Greg Feely, thank you very much for your presentation today at the Australia 360 Conference. I wanted to ask you about the importance of public opinion on shaping Australia's approach to Indonesia. What do you see as the benefits, but also perhaps some of the risks involved? This is a curious matter Andrew, because successive opinion polls, for example, such as those undertaken by Lowy, show that the Australian public is not particularly well informed about Indonesia, and in fact quite often is somewhat fearful about Indonesia's intentions towards Australia. Nonetheless, I think there's a general view that the Australian public wants there to be good relations between Australia and Indonesia, and they mark down governments that can't resolve bilateral problems. And so I think successive federal governments are very much aware of this, that the public wants initiatives that will help to keep the relationship on a sound footing. So this, the nature of Indonesian policymaking and public opinion is really a two-each sword. On the one hand, it can push the government towards having new initiatives, towards having a broader array of contacts with Indonesia, but on the other hand it can very quickly spook the government into taking, to reacting excessively to particular problems. The executions were one such issue earlier this year of the Bali 2. The most graphic example would be the live cattle export issue from a number of years ago, where the entire Labor caucus was frightened by the sheer level of public outrage about the inhumane slaughtering of animals in Indonesia, and they took this knee-jerk reaction to halt, unilaterally halt, live cattle exports. And that was an example where public opinion, weight of public opinion, had a very harmful effect not only on the immediate Australian-Indonesian relationship, but on our longer-term trade relations. We have paid a very heavy economic cost for that decision, and its ramifications continue to be felt between the two countries. And so I suppose a lot comes back to the government, that the government shouldn't be stampeded into taking quick and excessive responses to whatever issues arise, but on the other hand they should be broadly heedful of what Australian public opinion is, because that's one of the things that helps to create the goodwill that provides the basis for a strong relationship. You were just on a panel looking at Australia's regional relationships and trying to work out which are the most important and how to judge it. We sometimes hear politicians and scholars and commentators saying that Indonesia is Australia's most important relationship. Would you agree with that assessment and how should Indonesia fit into the kind of larger picture of Australian foreign policy? Indonesia is clearly important to Australia for a whole lot of reasons, strategic reasons, to some extent economic reasons, cultural reasons, diplomatic reasons. But I think it's a gross overstatement to say that Indonesia is the most important country in Australia's foreign affairs. The most important country is clearly the United States, and all of their countries in our region know that. So every time an Australian political leader says there is no more important country to Australia than Indonesia, that's likely to be viewed with understandable skepticism in Southeast Asia and in the South Pacific for that matter. Because most countries know that when it really comes down to it, Australian governments give ultimate priority to what the United States wants. Indeed it's one of the problems that Australia has in the region that we are seen to be still held captive in this kind of cold war environment where we side with the United States and we only pay lip service to the importance of our relations with other countries. So yes, Indonesia is an important country, but when Australia talks it up it has two negative consequences. The first is that the more critical minded people in the region, in countries like Indonesia, don't believe it. The other consequence is that more broadly a lot of people in policy making communities actually believe it and they think that this is saying that Indonesia is far more important than Australia and then they're more inclined to treat Australia in a condescending way or as a far less important country than what Indonesia is. And so this leads to hubris and can lead to Indonesia being rather disdainful of relations with Australia. So either way we lose out. And just finally, looking over the next 12 months, what do you see as the big changes and trends in the Australia-Indonesia relationship and the path of these countries? I expect that the Australian government, it's already happening, but the Australian government will be more measured in its statements about Indonesia. They'll continue to be quite generous with their aid allocations. They'll continue to make fairly heavy diplomatic commitments. We'll continue to see a lot of ministerial visits and the like, but I think they will pull back from some of the more effusive language that they have been using in recent years on both sides of the Abbott government, beforehand the Rudd and Gillard governments. But nonetheless they will want to show this ongoing commitment. They will want to signal the continuing importance of Indonesia to Australia. And so I don't think we'll see dramatic changes, but I think we will see a more toned down rhetoric and that's probably a good thing.