 Good afternoon. My name is Steve Hadley and in my capacity as chair of the Board of Directors of the US Institute of Peace I'm particularly pleased to welcome you to this afternoon's event for a discussion of the findings and recommendations of the Congressionally mandated bipartisan Afghanistan study group USIP was directed by Congress to facilitate the Afghan study group Which formally launched in April of last year We were very honored to play this convening role USIP was founded by Congress in 1984 and Charged with the mission of reducing mitigating and resolving violent conflicts abroad We do so as an independent nonpartisan National Institute Linking training and analysis research and policy and direct action in support of those working on the front lines of violent conflict around the world As the Afghan government and the Taliban continue to engage in very fragile peace negotiations and As US troops draw down The efforts of the Afghanistan study group could not be more relevant or timely The ASG is extremely fortunate to be chaired by former senator from New Hampshire Kelly Iot Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joe Dunford and former USIP president Nancy Lindborg Having served as one of the 15 members of the study group I can attest to just how much the group benefited from the leadership dedication and experience of these chairs Later in the program You will also have an opportunity to submit questions directly to the three chairs through the chat function on the USIP event page And now I'm delighted to turn it over to senator Iot who will provide some initial framing for Marx senator Thank you so much Steve I want to thank you for your leadership of the board of the Institute of Peace and also for your membership on the ASG It's been an honor for me to co-chair this effort with general Joe Dunford and Nancy Lindborg and the amount of time that they and the other members have put into this Really is a testament to the importance that we all hold for a good result in Afghanistan I want to just recognize the members that worked on the ASG because they really represent a Broad group of people with tremendous expertise We were blessed to have on our our commission on Nisha Biswall Jim Dobbin ambassador Jim Dobbins senator Joe Donnelly Michelle Flournoy Sue Gordon Ambassador Mark Green Mark Grossman Steve Hadley David Miliband Lisa Monaco Megan O'Sullivan and general Curtis Gapparotti We're extremely grateful for their time their knowledge and the effort that both they and we also had a superb team of 2016 year advisors that helped give us input and guidance with our work Their expertise spans a range of areas security diplomacy politics economic aid Humanitarian aid democratic institutions counterterrorism civil society and human rights The advisors were exceedingly generous with their time expertise. They wrote papers Drafted scenarios answered specific questions and commented on a number of the drafts before we came to our final report While their own individual views might differ from the conclusions in the report The time and knowledge that they devoted to this process is a testimony in its own way to the mark that Afghanistan has left on America The report also benefited from 40 Consultations involving 60 individuals that are all stakeholders in Afghanistan These included US officials and former officials Afghan officials Afghan members of civil society in the private sector regional stakeholders allied partners multilateral organizations as well as academics activists and others all the consultations we did We did virtually obviously we would have loved the opportunity to visit Afghanistan itself But that was not possible with the pandemic But the ASG is deeply grateful For the time that they took in speaking to us and we've continued to reach out To various sectors and Afghan society. I also want to say thank you to in particular the civil society It was very generous with its time. I also want to acknowledge the advice provided by US IP's team of experts on Afghanistan in the region They their knowledge is deep their expertise invaluable And they really helped us support Support our efforts and the deliberations of the group. I'd want to personally thank Michael Phalan scott smith And andrew dr. Andrew wilder In particular for the efforts that they put in this and there are many others that assisted them in this effort Uh, as Steve Hadley has already mentioned We came together based on a law that was passed in december of 2019 That really brought to the institute of peace this mandate To consider the implications of a peace settlement or the failure to reach a settlement On us policy resources and commitments in afghanistan A key challenge that we faced was how to make recommendations in a year that presented many moving targets and changes When the asg held its first plenary in april of 2020 The u.s. Taliban agreement had been reached on february 29 But the afghan presidential election had not yet been resolved During our plenary sessions in may june and july the intra-party afghan Negotiations that were supposed to begin in march still had not begun And the u.s. Had at that point reduced its military footprint beyond its july commitment of 8600 down to 4500 When the asg met in october there were media reports that the administration wanted a total us troop withdrawal from afghanistan By the end of the year and now we are down to 2500 troops us troops, but there are still many nato troops in afghanistan as well The asg mandate specifically excluded making recommendations on the substance of the negotiations themselves But over time there was a convergence between What the group had to to come together to release its recommendations And also some of the inconclusiveness we saw at the time in the talks We therefore felt that we had to provide some recommendations on how the negotiations should continue on in the future Including a recommendation on the need to reduce violence levels to allow Negotiations the opportunity and the chance of success This report is a consensus document And while not all members agree with every single sentence or specific recommendation The overall conclusions are a product of the consensus of the group and unanimity on those conclusions I would now like to turn this over. Let me just say that this As we are having this discussion today and we release our report With the biden administration a new administration coming into office There is an obviously coming up the Defense nato meeting in february and where we find ourselves in afghanistan We are at a very very important juncture for afghanistan And I think I speak for all of the members of of our group That we have a strong commitment that we would like to see Success in afghanistan and peace for the afghan people With that, I would like to turn this over to general joe dumper former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff It was very honored to co-chair this effort with him and nancy limber Hey, thanks so much senator and and I just want to echo your comments about the ast members Senior advisors and the usip team. It's it's really been a privilege to be part of that talented group And uh, and to watch their commitment over the course of 10 months and to be with you and And nancy is as co-chairs and this study has been an extraordinary experience I i'm going to outline the key judgments that are found in our report And uh, and then walk through quickly the recommendations that we make inside the report But before I do that, I want to just hit some of the overarching themes That that are contained in the report The first one is the need for a clearly defined and articulated end state for us engagement in afghanistan And we propose such an end state you'll find it in the report and that end state really is foundational to our recommendations Secondly, we believe it's very important for the united states to make clear Our commitment to the government cobble and the values represented in the current constitution Clarity and predictability is important to our afghan partners But it's also important to our nato allies and partners who have worked on us work with us on afghanistan for the last two decades Third we identify the importance of full alignment across the united states government with regard to policies practices and messaging And we place a particularly strong emphasis on our recommendations on regional diplomacy And we provide some quite detailed recommendations in that regard And most importantly we believe this peace process Ongoing should be viewed as a way of achieving our national interests And we should be careful not to view it as an end in itself Our focus should be on addressing or achieving our national interests in afghanistan and within the region And for that reason we place a very strong emphasis on our report on conditionality The senator mentioned our 60 consultations with key stakeholders As well as the expertise of the afghan study group members the senior advisors and others who contributed And and from those engagements we drew conclusions in four main areas the security environment stability of the afghan state The dynamic within the region and then we drew some specific judgments about the afghan peace negotiation itself And i think it's important for me to talk about those before we go into the recommendations because They truly are the framework within which we approach the problem And those judgments led directly to the conclusions that we made in our in our recommendations First with regard to security Some people will point to afghanistan today and talk about a diminished threat In our judgment that diminished threat is directly attributable to the u.s. train and supported afghan forces in the continued presence of u.s. military forces We believe that a u.s. withdrawal will provide the terrorists an opportunity to reconstitute In our judgment that reconstitution will take place within about 18 to 36 months And that comes from the expertise that we took took advantage of through the study We also conclude You'll be no surprise to those who have followed afghanistan that the afghan forces are highly dependent on us funding and operational support And they'll continue to be uh for some time to come And finally we judge with regard to security that the probability of civil war is high In the wake of a precipitous withdrawal by the united states With regard to stability of the state our analysis and recommendations were very much informed by the Fragility study group that was conducted in large part by usip along with karnag institute and senas And as many of you know that resulted in the fragile state act and our judgment Afghanistan meets the definition of a fragile state But importantly we conclude that the governing institutions in afghanistan can continue to function effectively Provided we they get continued support And then with regard to the region we think perhaps the most important judgments that we offer Concern the opportunity we see to enhance our regional and broader international diplomacy In support of both the afghan peace negotiation as well as an eventual peace agreement And and while we're not here to talk about what took place in the past or or or review what the previous Administration did in a large number of our engagements The lack of a robust regional diplomacy was highlighted And so we felt compelled to address that in our report And there does appear to be an end state that would satisfy all the stakeholders. And so while the members of the asg Certainly are appreciative of the challenges of pulling together a region In developing some consensus in the region We did in our engagements find the foundational elements of what that consensus might look like And those elements include an afghanistan that's at peace with its neighbors One that doesn't allow its territory to be used by it for attacks on others One that's not a venue for proxy warfare One that's not a source of mass migration or illicit narcotics and one that's interconnected with the region In our engagements, we found that pakistan china russia india and even iran all would agree on those key points again Not understating the difficulty of taking that foundation and building a regional consensus But the elements are there to build upon and finally with regard to the afghan peace negotiations themselves One we determined that our military presence and continued diplomatic engagement underpins the afghan peace negotiation We appreciate that the process is likely to be drawn out And we advocate for continued support to afghan state institutions throughout the process And finally our engagements highlighted that we don't believe the taliban Are meeting the conditionality of the february 2020 agreement And and we looked at that in three areas one the progress towards a peace agreement Secondly a genuine and broad reduction in violence And third the demonstrated will and capacity to prevent al-qaeda in isis from using afghanistan as a platform for terrorism And we were informed on that last judgment both by the un report in a recent us treasury report that both highlighted the continued relationship Between the taliban and al-qaeda and the benefit that al-qaeda derives from that relationship But we also emphasize as much as we have highlighted the the taliban's Failure to meet the conditions of the 2020 agreement We also highlight the need for the current afghan government to support the process and participate In the peace negotiation in good faith Moving to our approach and the recommendations One thing I would highlight and they're available in our report is that we did We went to this looking at all the various pathways available to the new administration to pursue And and we felt that was important and we took that as an applied task early on In our deliberations in in the report We highlight what we believe to be all of the potential pathways the administration could take Along with the probability of success in a likely outcome at the end of five years associated with those with those pathways And I think if you look at those that will also help you to understand why we came to the recommendations that we did Finally we made every effort to give this challenge a fresh look and we believe that the way that we've integrated Our security our diplomatic and our assistance recommendations Does in fact provide new opportunities even as we advocate leveraging the ongoing afghan peace negotiation And without understating the challenges the group is compelled by the argument that there is an opportunity Perhaps even an historic opportunity with the ongoing afghan peace negotiations to more move towards peace in afghanistan and certainly We're unable to identify any period since 2001 with the prospects for such a peace agreement Or were higher and and again that's with a fully realistic appreciation for the challenges that remain ahead So we believe we should take advantage Of the opening but but take advantage of the opening in a way that guarantees our mutual counterterrorism interests Does in the war does allow our troops to come home But also while serving us interests and preserving the gains of the afghan people over the last two decades And we think we need to look at all of those elements when we actually determine what success looks like At the same time we think our reduced presence has signaled to both parties That the united states patience and resources are limited and they have to negotiate in good faith And they have to take advantage of the opportunity as it currently exists And i'll close with a with a brief review of the recommendations I mentioned earlier how much we emphasize the end state And we do argue in our first recommendation that a clear end state needs to be Established we propose one for the new administration for consideration And the emphasis of the end state we propose is that we have an afghanistan that can sufficiently control its borders To prevent harboring terrorists or accept international assistance to do so Our second recommendation is to reinforce the conditionality of the final troop withdrawal and as i highlighted earlier The conditions that we drew from the february 2020 agreement that include the reduction in violence that included Breaking the relationship with al-qaeda That include participating in the peace process and driving towards an agreement are all part of that And again, we address both our expectations of the taliban and the expectations of the afghan government Third, we believe it's critical to clarify u.s. Commitment to afghanistan The ambiguity about our commitment future resourcing in the in the degree that that we insist on conditionality Or the question about whether we would insist on conditionality has really exacerbated Unhelpful hedging behavior in afghanistan and the region and we think the only way to address This hedging behavior is with clear clarity on our future commitment and that's commitment both for The core institutions of afghanistan and the support that they will require support for civil society in afghanistan As a separate issue the humanitarian support that afghanistan will continue to need and then obviously the security assistance In predictable levels of fiscal support and combat support to the afghan forces and we make very specific recommendations Both with regard to support to the core institutions as well as support to the afghan forces in our in our report Fourth we address and i mentioned earlier how important we think diplomacy is we address the importance of a concerted diplomatic effort In support of the afghan peace negotiations and we offer a number of considerations They include a third party mediator perhaps the united nations the continued need for a full-time us negotiator Support for what has been characterized the five nation facilitation group and for those not closely tracking at those countries of germany indonesia norway qatar in usbekistan And finally the importance of close consultations with our nato allies and partners again who have been with us since the beginning And finally we address the need to design an overarching diplomatic strategy that eventually will move from the diplomacy Needed to advance the afghan peace negotiation to the diplomacy necessary to achieve integration for afghanistan in the region Over the long term and with that i'll turn it over to our third co-chair Nancy lindberg Who closed it out and then and then david will go to you and and we'll start the question answer period. So nancy over to you Great. Thank you general dunford for that comprehensive lay down I'll just note that u.s. Institute of peace has a long history of convening non and bipartisan Problem-solving groups through commissions and study groups to really tackle tough foreign policy challenges And afghanistan certainly qualifies as that And when congress charged usip with forming this study group We were very very fortunate to be able to secure the participation and leadership of senator iat And general dunford. So I add my thanks to them once again As well as to the entire usip team and I want to underscore that this call for a negotiated peace that ends the war and allows the troops to come home with honor Really represents a new approach and it represents As you heard for the first time a very clear goal of a negotiated peace agreement That secures our interests and preserves many of the gains realized by the people of afghanistan And it's not a negotiation for the cover of a rapid or time-based withdrawal and that is a Significant and important difference in approach It also as general dunford noted This clarity of a of a goal would enable us to truly align our messaging our policies and our practices across security diplomatic and assistance efforts Hopefully in ways that we haven't been able to do in the past previously. We've had multiple goals that often lead to conflict undercutting our messaging and our policies and It constricting our ability to have the kind of progress that we seek The Conditionality is important not just as you heard from general dunford in respect to the peace agreement but also in how we provide the assistance that The corruption that exists within the afghan state continues to spark grievances that are exploited by the taliban So we need to focus our development assistance on those core issues of state fragility in alignment With the global fragility act, which is bipartisan piece of legislation that passed in december 2019 And it provides a roadmap for addressing some of these core issues of state fragility that Left on address so often result in the kinds of conflict and violent extremism that we see in afghanistan And to do this assistance in alignment with other donors with the kinds of conditionalities that were laid down in the janeva 2020 donor conference I wanted just add also the importance of signaling and planning for the kind of post peace agreement assistance That will be absolutely critical if there is the kind of piece that we hope for and envision Uh That will be the time to continue to do that kind of support too often We see that peace agreements are seen as the end when we know they're only the beginning of a continued longer Road ahead I'll just close by saying as we note in the report we have approached this effort with all due humility This is a this is a tough challenge Lots and lots of people have struggled with this for the last 20 years And yet we believe there's a new moment and a new opportunity to to negotiate a more durable peace Um, I will close by noting that this report is dedicated To the members of our military and the american civilians who have served in afghanistan Especially those who have been wounded and those who have lost their lives over the past 19 years We remember our allies and our partners who worked fought and died alongside us Including many afghans themselves and we very much bear in mind The sacrifices made by afghans who continue to suffer immeasurably And they are the ones who will benefit the most If if a piece is in fact within our reach and able to be achieved by the recommendations in this report And with that i'm Delighted to be able to turn it over to our moderator for The conversation ahead David Ignatius is a well known american journalist And um novelist who is also an editor and a columnist at the washington post He's well versed in the issues around afghanistan and so many of the Uh, most critical foreign policy issues that we all wrestle with. Thank you, david for joining us. It's always a pleasure to have you Uh, and I will turn it over to you So my thanks to nancy linborg and to gentle dunford and senator iott Um, not simply for their remarks today in introducing the report but for the seriousness of the process that they've embarked on um This report is about something that I think every member of our audience and People around the country believe in which is keeping faith with the commitment that we've made the sacrifices That we've made and keeping faith by making good decisions about what to do in the future so Just on behalf of all the people who will be reading this report and thinking about your recommendations I want to express my my thanks I'd like to ask some basic questions that I think the country has uh about this our longest war And that are going to appropriately Be part of the response to the to the submission of your of your recommendations I'm going to ask each of these and ask If each of the three co-chairs would briefly like to respond Then I just want to note to our audience that In about 30 minutes, we're going to turn to you for your questions So please Through the chat function if you could send those they'll be collated and sent to me and then i'll be able to direct those To the three co-chairs on on your behalf Let me start with the most basic question for the the three of you And that is whether the end state that you have Described in your report Which speaks about an independent democratic sovereign afghanistan Is realistic That has obviously been the goal of u.s policy now for several decades And it has not been satisfactorily obtainable even with the enormous commitment of resources Blood and treasure that we Put in Why do you think that this end state? Is realistic now when it hasn't been achieved for so many years? Perhaps I could ask scenario to start and then general dunford and then net silenberg Thank you, david Let me let me just I would say this I do think It is achievable Is it easy? No, but one of the things we're really struck by With all the consultations that we did Is what has happened over the last two decades with civil society in afghanistan? um at the afghanistan today while it continues to have many many challenges that we know of and Much that needs to be done within for example the afghan government with respect to corruption and obviously the violence from the taliban So many in afghanistan have embraced civil society, whether it's free press Uh, the whether it's the rights of women education Things that would not have happened In decades ago in afghanistan and that that will not First of all, I don't think we can go backwards on that and I actually think that the afghan people Will not want to go backwards on that piece Uh, that said, um, that's why we just define the end state the way we did Uh, it is not without challenges The peace process is key. It has to be obviously an agreement That is inclusive in the government. Um, and one that has challenges in terms of people giving up on There they're sort of status quo views of afghanistan to move forward But I think that end state is one that can be achieved. Is it going to be cheese be achieved overnight? No, um, is it one though that is a work in progress that I think they can get to with support after a peace agreement Is brokered because as the general dumper said the the peace agreement itself Will not be the end. There will have to be support from the international community To help continue to help afghanistan with their institutions and with support for The government that will go forward after the peace agreement General Dunford, let me turn to you and ask essentially the same question Is is this end state realistic if this was possible? Wouldn't it have happened already? Yeah, David, it's a fair question. And I think first of all, it's important For the audience to know where the end state came from We spent quite a bit of time Early in our deliberations looking at our national interests in afghanistan and in the region And and we affirm those national interests With with the legislators who charted the study to make sure that this is what what our focus should be And admittedly david, I would tell you that our orientation in the group was How to achieve our national interests let less weather to achieve our national interests Having said that I I agree with With the senator in terms of the possibility and and your fair is a fair question to say Well, look, you've you've been here 19 years. We haven't done it. Why now Can we do what we haven't been able to do 19 years? And what we are really emphasizing in the report is to take advantage of the afghan peace negotiation That is what is different today To take advantage of what appears to be increase in convergence in the region about what afghanistan should look like That is what's different today and the opportunity that we have now As a new administration comes in with an agreement established in february february 2020 to build on the foundation of that agreement And that's an important element of our report as well We're not suggesting to walk away from the work that has been done since february 2020 We're suggesting that we now look at it clear-eyed build upon that work Provide clarity where there may be some understandable ambiguity as in the early day negotiation But by by clarifying the end state Leveraging the consensus that's growing in the region and more importantly reinforcing the ongoing afghan peace negotiation We we uh, we believe this is a there's an opportunity to achieve that end state and and david Here's the other side of the coin Um, as i mentioned and i think all of us have talked about we looked at every other pathway available to the new administration We looked at every other pathway And this pathway that we propose that is taking advantage of the afghan peace negotiation Running our diplomatic approach being more targeted in the support that we provided afghanistan When we look at the probability of success in a five-year period and the probability of achieving Something that looks like that end state in a five-year period the prospects are much higher By taking advantage of the opportunity that exists today than it does by walking away. Here's what we know if we walk away Uh, we'll lead behind chaos if not civil war If we take advantage of the opportunity right we have right now Then there is at least a prospect of achieving that end state even as we recognize how difficult it will be but but again, uh I think it's fair to say That the way that we propose the integration uh of the u.s. Government The way that we propose clarity of commitment addresses some issues that have existed for eight or ten years and uh, and and david we both know How uh, I used to describe it as the wide 2k effect Where every year The afghan people wondered would the international community be supporting them after the 30 31st of december fill in the year 2010 2011 2012 Which is why we talk so much about messaging why we talk so much about integration why we talk so much about clarity Why we talk so much about diplomacy. That's what's different Let me turn this to to nancy lindberg for her her comments again about the end state and the Whether it's realistic and and nancy. I want to add one additional Uh point I I'd ask you to clarify When you talk about an end state of a democratic, uh, afghanistan Should the parties in afghanistan understand that the united states expectation and goal As it negotiates with the taliban for a final peace agreement Is something that we could describe as a kind of a coalition government In in cobble, I mean is that what's on offer to the taliban in effect? And is that what the government of president ghani needs to understand? Is is part of what we're seeking could you respond to that directly? To the first question, uh about is it realistic? I I would just underscore that this is a different Opportunity and the challenge is to organize ourselves to take advantage of that opportunity and I would add that Um, you know, not only is it different because we have the negotiated peace framework, but there is a different level and type of civil society that now exists that provides Uh a demand for peace. They are constituents for peace and they are also in a position to hold The current and subsequent governments more accountable But you need to stop the violence and it takes a very long time to build a state or to rebuild a state And you've got to stop the fighting and the violence first as to what a subsequent agreement results in in the specifics We haven't dictated that other than an expectation that it will continue to adhere to the core values and principles of the afghan constitution and I would I would submit that that is the core expectation of many people within afghanistan Uh, it will I I think it will be impossible to Pull back to roll back the many gains that have been made over the last 20 years and the and the hopes and expectations of the people of afghanistan Thank you. So I'd like to to ask a second question again Asking each of you in turn starting with senator out to respond to this That is whether our current force posture Which has been reduced to 2,500 and is Essentially intended to be a ct force is sustainable There are many people who follow afghanistan carefully who would argue that that number isn't appropriate It's it's not enough to really provide for a strong ct presence It's not enough to do the training and sustainment of the afghan national security forces It's just not A sustainable viable number and so I'm wondering whether you think Some adjustment in that number back towards the level that we had earlier 5,000 to 8,000 let's say Uh, it makes sense Senator why don't you begin that and then each of the others on this question of of troop numbers and whether what we've got really works Well, thank you, david. Uh, let me just say that Uh, first of all The as you know, uh, we were at 4,500 And now we're at 2,500 Based on the the withdrawal that was made of 2000 at the end of the year We we did consultations with You know leaders within our government In in the military just to get a sense at the time we're at 4,500 And the opinion was then that that was that was really the number that was needed to achieve What we needed to achieve on our counter terrorism goals and then support for the afghan forces With a new administration here the bide administration that's I assume one of the questions that they're going to have to resolve And speaking with our military leaders to decide Is that the right number 2,500 and let me just mention That uh, there are twice as many nato forces that are there right now so 2,500 us forces and approximately 5,000 NATO forces, which of course, you know that ratio has changed now that nato is twice as many as ours So so we haven't made a conclusion on the adequacy of the 2,500 We assume that will be one of the questions That the biden administration will have to sort through What we have made a conclusion on is it's important as we look at that may deadline That the conditions of the agreement have not been met and therefore The the reduction in violence the really if you think about The also the ability to contain terrorist groups and Thinking about our national interests there and so in making in in making that decision the biden administration They're going to have to sess the troop levels. So we didn't Come up with a particular number. We we know the administration will consult with our military leadership On that and our nato partners with the february meeting Coming up but nato. I think it's really going to be a decision point for them because nato is going to be expecting uh really some some insight from the us and some guidance at that point in february General dunford what's what's your thought about a sustainable meaningful Level of the u.s. Military presence Yes, so david what I want You know, like first of all everything that the senator said is is consistent with how I think about this So I won't repeat that but I'll build upon Um, I think it's important for us to highlight first what the u.s presence says it currently is does Number one it does provide a physical manifestation of u.s. Commitment And it does provide a foundation upon which the afghan peace negotiation is ongoing. So We did conclude that some u.s presence was critical and uh and at the 2500 level right now We can I think state would agree of certainty that There's no question that we remain committed We've got 2500 americans in afghanistan and there's no question that that makes a difference Even in doha our diplomatic engagement or military engagement as I mentioned earlier was critical So as the senator said, um The bite administration is going to have to make a decision and of course what I'll do is kind of frame that So there's really two missions right there's the support for the afghan security forces And then there's the specific counterterrorism capability And there is no doubt that the force at 2500 can do less The force at 2500 can do less than the force at 4500 And we were told in our deliberations in the fall that 4500 at the time given the conditions direct association with the conditions That the the force at 4500 was about as low as you go So I think that it's it's now going to be time for general miller and general mckinsey General milley and the secretary of defense To take a look at and articulate The risk to those two missions the risk to supporting the afghan national defense security forces In the context of the conditions that are on the ground You know share that with the president say this is how much risk we have at 2500 This is how much risk we could buy down at 4500 read This is how much more we could do for the afghan forces This is how much more capable it would be In securing afghanistan and then they'll make a decision and and then also Assess whether or not we have sufficient forces there to address our own ct interests And I don't mean to suggest that those are completely separate right the very complementary Missions but we allocate forces differently to those to those two missions So it I in my view it's not a question of can we do the job or can we not do the job? It's a question of What is the risk associated at various levels of troop levels? And is that risk acceptable to the president in the context of the environment in afghanistan But also in the context of competing demands, but as the senator said We really didn't want the report to be about specific troop numbers We think that the administration will make a decision as to what they think the appropriate level of resourcing will be Uh Certainly u.s. Military presence is a part of of uh of our commitment there But we thought that there's been kind of an undue emphasis on troop numbers In the past and we didn't want our message of this broader approach Particularly with an emphasis on diplomacy within the region to be lost in a discussion about 2,540 500 or 5,000 because what's most important for our success in afghanistan Is not the difference between 2,500 and 4,500. We will not have a higher degree of success Strategic success between 2,500 and 4,500 there may be some risk associated with the difference between those two numbers But because we have 4,500 doesn't significantly increase the overall probability of our success Anywhere near as much as the other efforts and initiatives that we've outlined in the report If I could ask you to take up the same question, I think the the simple point would be There there are many people and it appeared that that our military leadership In its recommendation to remain at 4,500 were among those people who thought that The the lower number simply was not sustainable. It was not a force that could achieve Much more than the symbolic american presence Is there a way that you can address that I don't want to draw you into numbers game but address the fundamentals of that critique I mean, I think general dunford pretty clearly outlined. It's it's a question of of your risk tolerance against the mission What I would simply add is the importance of clarifying that Especially to the american public that this is no longer about fighting an endless war this is about pursuing a negotiated peace and Aligning a constellation of efforts towards that very clearly articulated objective and so the the the specific numbers I think become Something that will need to evolve against the task, but it's All in support of a negotiated peace agreement. It is the fundamental of our recommendation Hey, david, if I could just come back just one more time just to make sure what we're saying is clear Look, we believe that the appropriate level of military forces on the ground Is necessary to be successful and I think what we're really saying is that that in and of itself Is not going to lead to success or failure We know this we've had as many as 100,000 us forces on the ground and we haven't brought this to a successful end And so we do believe that the administration is going to have to review the levels on the ground But we think that the the leadership that's dealing with the problem right now Is is more uniquely capable of determining the specific number We do acknowledge that this is an issue the administration needs to look at We do acknowledge that force levels below 4500 incur a greater degree of risk What we don't believe is that the group was uniquely capable of determining the specific number That would be necessary in the context of all of our other initiatives So we just we just want the troop numbers to be in perspective. Thanks So I have a third I'll say skeptical question for the three of you that I think is the kind of thing that the readers of the reporter are are are going to be asking and that is Looking into the future and I don't mean 10 years from now. I mean a few months There's every expectation that when the fighting season resumes As it does every spring that the Taliban forces are likely to continue to press forward and that the pressure on the government in Kabul as Difficult as it's been may get worse and There are some careful analysts who worry that as that fighting season as that new Taliban offensive Accelerates Afghanistan may look even more like a civil war than it than it has recently So I'd like to ask each of each of you uh In a in a situation where Afghanistan doesn't see a diminution of violence but an increase Which many people think is is likely in coming months and where the conditions don't resemble A democratic sovereign and stable afghanistan, but a country deeper in civil war What is your recommendation about what u.s policy should be senator? Well, david let's thinking about We considered a number of pathways uh beyond the one that we recommended and let's just start to with uh, first of all where we are now And the may first deadline I think first of all, uh The we recommend in it that because the conditions have not been met met because there is Continues to be too much violence on the ground uh that The administration obviously work with partners regional actors as well NATO to renegotiate that may first withdraw all deadline and to come to some agreement there because One sure way as we found in our report When we looked at these alternative pathways to create a civil war is for us to precipitously withdraw As of May 1st, uh with these conditions not met That that would undermine the possibility for peace So looking at our piece of this it is Our hope is is that they'll be able to negotiate the extension Of the made deadline because there haven't been conditions met not just on the talban But on many sides that need to be met Uh for us to go forward with the peace process I also think we can't overlook Um what the taliban hopes to achieve Because what they hope to achieve is actually beyond military domination in afghanistan If the taliban hopes to have any role in the afghanistan government, uh, they also Need to be recognized in some way Uh, particularly by the international community by, uh, the Actors in the region And most of the actors in the region, even though who have been supportive of the taliban they really aren't They don't want afghanistan to fall into a chaotic civil war because it's not in their interests either Taliban also knows that if they want, uh to govern afghanistan going forward They're going to need international support as well in terms of financial or to be in part of some government um a negotiated peace so While I completely understand and we understand and we outlined in our report that there is risk associated With not withdrawing on may 1st. Um in terms of additional violence We also believe that if we do withdraw we're going to end up in a position where there will be a civil war Uh where our national interests will not be met and where the peace process itself will be undermined So it's our hope also that our I'll call for additional regional diplomacy And much more vigorous regional diplomacy will also help As you know, many of the regional actors can have an influence on the taliban And where it is our hope that we can engage them further too so that the may 1st Peace doesn't become a position where there is a greater eruption of violence Thank you the general general dufford as we think about um trying to Negotiate an extension of that may 1 withdrawal date for the reasons that the senator just outlined pretty clearly What would be your um Thoughts about the parameters in that negotiation and also if you have any comment On How you think the us net's partners should respond? if this heightened fighting season Violence from the taliban prediction that i made earlier is proves correct. What should we do about it? Yeah, david first of all, I think if uh, if you and i are in kabul right now We would say that those conditions have already arrived And so we wouldn't be looking towards the fighting season if we look at At the level of violence in kabul and we look at the targeted assassinations We look at the skilled workers that have been killed members of civil society The taliban are clearly now using that activity to build leverage And and I think what's really important building on the senator's comments is if we think of The taliban as using this violence for leverage And we think that we will respond in a military way So that we can you know respond to that leverage I actually don't think will be successful But if we look at this in terms of overall pressure on the taliban to include taliban, you know From those countries that have traditionally had a relationship with the taliban and supported the taliban Again going back to where there's consensus And we are able diplomatically to have the taliban Understand that there'll be no relief of the sanctions If they continue violence, there'll be no legitimacy for the taliban movement if they continue violence There'll be no resources for any future afghanistan that they hope to be a part of If they continue the path of violence So I think this gets it's really related to that previous question is that This is not a military problem. It's a much broader strategic problem that has a military dimension In the military dimension today, I would argue is important. It's critical. It's foundational to the peace negotiation But it is not The vehicle that we will have available to us for success in and of itself And that's that's really what's important for people to understand. So If we're not able to do what we just described then I I would argue that we won't be successful But but successful come from putting pressure on the taliban diplomatically Focusing on those things that we have identified in the report as leveraged. These are things that taliban want We know what they're doing To use violence to advance themselves in the in the negotiation And this is why we argue for the conditions-based approach In clarity not only from the united states. This can't be us pressure on the taliban or afghan government On the pressure on the taliban. This has got to be regional and international pressure on the taliban And we have to clearly identify those things the taliban cares about In making clear to them that they will not achieve those Through the path of violence to the to the second question about how do we address the one-may deadline? In our deliberations, I think we were compelled mostly by The argument that goes like this. We signed an agreement in february of 2020 We lost a lot of time as the government and cobble was formed We lost time as we looked through and worked through the detention issue We then have these conditions that haven't been met And while regional actors are uniformly supportive of the united states eventually leaving the region There is no one we have identified the date that wants the united states to leave precipitously With the conditions that are likely to result in a precipitous withdrawal So we think one of the most important things we can do is have a unified message to the taliban About this one-may deadline and even as the united states affirms this commitment to the broad agreement of february 2020 We now make it clear that there are very specific conditions Metrics of success that are associated with those conditions that have to be met in order for us to withdraw And we very much don't offer whether that'll be three months from now six months from now or a year from now We are suggesting going to a full conditions-based approach again The administration has an opportunity there is an opportunity with new administration To reset the negotiation Provide clarity where there is currently ambiguity Into into solicit greater support which could result in greater leverage and pressure On both the taliban and the afghan government to participate in good faith with the afghan peace negotiation Mr. Lindborg Since I traveled Afghanistan and pakistan with the late richard holbrook I've been hearing about the crucial need for greater regional diplomatic Pressure and clear diplomatic strategy. It's a mantra from year to year Uh, why is this version of that uh, that call Uh, going to be different. What what what new uh element would make regional diplomacy Pressure on afghanistan's neighbors any more successful this time than it's been in the past Well, I would call out a couple of elements that general dunford noted and one is there is a growing regional consensus That they want us troops to depart And there has been some evidence that we are willing to do that But there's also a regional consensus that it is nobody's interest To have a destabilized afghanistan that is plunged back into civil war and becomes a haven for Violent extremists and and terrorists that will bedevil any number of the region regional countries We have seen that there's been a coming together particularly pakistan in the early days played a really very helpful role and so it's building on that and uh helping to really work at the forefront of this effort in a very active regional diplomatic strategy that holds everyone together and collectively Makes it clear to the taliban but as well as to the afghan government that this is a serious opportunity You need to lean in you need to Be accountable for the core conditions on all sides And this is our best shot Uh, and I would just underscore what senator ayat said that we looked very carefully at a number of alternative pathways and the report contains options For potential consideration including what would happen if we did just withdraw at the may deadline and the considered judgment of all those a part of this effort concluded that that would surely lead To even higher levels of violence and a civil war And so this is What we believe building on different conditions with the existence of this framework An afghanistan 20 years later with a renewed revitalized civil society With a regional consensus that has developed that we have this opportunity David I just want to read sir Didn't ask you made And that is this Even to the to the skeptics in the audience and and I understand why they may be that way and As always you ask hard questions, but they're fair they're fair questions But even to the skeptic in the audience Here's what I would say is we know With a high degree of certainty what will happen if we leave on one may We know what will happen And we know what the prospects are benchmarked against our national interests and the people of afghanistan So we know that We also know that there are facts on the ground that are different today We've talked about those nancy just highlighted the regional consensus But the fact is there are two parties meeting in doha as we speak So this is this is a fact on the ground that that is available And so our argument, uh, even to the skeptics would be Look, uh, you can wash your hands of it Look at the appendix we describe in vivid detail what will occur should you should that be the course of action you select There are in fact facts on the ground that are different with them when richard holbrook was was the senior the s-wrap And and the critical one is that there is however nascent and afghan peace negotiation ongoing And so what we're what we're suggesting is that we have no regret factor About doing everything we possibly can to take advantage of this opportunity And we're talking about a matter of months Uh, it will be able to determine whether or not there is a fact a pathway forward That can be built upon the current afghan peace negotiation But we know walking away we can't achieve our national interests and that'll be a very important decision for President biden to make Were he to choose to do that? Well, I that's well and clearly said by each of you in summarizing the conclusions and Thank you for responding directly to to my Questions We have some excellent Questions from the members of our audience and I want to encourage people who want to join in that conversation to send your questions and Be added to the list. I'm going to Ask Each panel who wants to to respond to the Uh questions that I'm going to pose And or you can leave them aside the first is a good one because it goes to Our ally and expectations of our ally and the question is is this I'll just read it From the chat What is the risk that a continued u.s military presence after may? Which you've urged will signal to president Ashraf Ghani that he can once again try to monopolize power And sideline his rivals triggering a political crisis. Could each of you take that on please? Senator Yeah, I would I would say this One of the key provisions In our findings is the importance of conditionality And that conditionality isn't just based on the conditionality for the Taliban The conditionality in our support for the peace process goes to the afghan government as well And so if anything I would think first of all It's important as we did in our report to reiterate that we do support the afghan government But we also are going to hold them accountable as well in terms of issues they we know that they need to address including Corruption and that is a very important piece of the government's conditionality That said, you know president ghani has expressed support for the peace process We've had the opportunity to brief him On this report he and his team seem to take this very seriously And in addition to that I think if nothing Where we are now with our troop levels It's clear that we would be prepared to withdraw And so to me that that sends a message to the afghan government That you know our our role in afghanistan is certainly One that we're going to be looking at to make sure people meet their conditions And in addition that we're also going to be there to protect Our national interests and so I think that is going to be important that as we go forward that Everyone is held accountable So that we can really support this peace process to get an outcome that makes sense General dunford perhaps you could speak as well to this question of the conditionality as it applies To president ghani and the government not just conditionality for the taliban, but but for them as well What is it that they have to do if they want to expect continued american support? First of all David going back to the to the individual's question What's the risk that continued presence? You know would be seen by President ghani or others as Indicative of unlimited u.s. Support right so I would just point to the risk is low I think today that someone could look at the political dynamic in the united states A level of resourcing of u.s. Military forces in afghanistan and draw from that that u.s Commitment is unlimited and not in and not bound by conditions So that would be a that would not be a risk that somebody would be taken that would be a gamble And so I think that I would give credit to the leadership and cobble I think they have a better appreciation of of us political dynamic than to make a conclusion that Because we would leave forces there past the first of may that our support is unlimited And with regard to the conditionality I think that much as we have focused on the 2020 agreement february 2020 agreement with the taliban I think the same holds true For the afghan government and what we have to expect to see is the afghan government in good faith Trying to work through the afghan peace negotiations Putting the level of effort in there sending the right people To represent the government to try to come to the right Try to come to the right answers and so Um Again, uh, david I would simply answer the question by saying The risk would seem to me low that someone that someone could assume that president biden and the u.s. Congress Have infinite patience in afghanistan They wouldn't be reading the washington post where they to draw that conclusion I think that's a that's a fair bet Ms. Lindbergh what what what else one could one say about ways to encourage president ghani's and his government to be Operating a less corrupt More open more inclusive way going forward Which is one of the core conditions, uh We would posit for an eventual more successful more stable afghanistan given the role of the Corruption in creating the kind of grievances that are exploited by the taliban And what we recommend is that the assistance Program really follow the roadmap that's laid out in the december 2019 global fragility act And there's some in the report very specific recommendations about focusing on some of The most essential state institutions because we know that The government Institutions are highly dependent on external aid That we partner and align quite closely with the other donor countries so that we have Adopted similar conditions and expectations around accountability and inclusion Of course state institutions and some of this was laid out in the geneva 2020 donor conference So we already have the opportunity for partnering and aligning against the kind of agenda that You know president ghani Hopefully is being given some additional tools that he can use to help the government Operate in a less corrupt way We know there are deep divisions. This is a very challenging environment but We as part of a donor Collaborative effort can be more clear that this is one of our primary goals And as we've said in the past And as was detailed in a 2015 usip report In the past some of our Other lines of effort have in fact undermined the ability to build a more legitimate less corrupt state And so when we're all aligned on a clear And agreed upon goal There's a much better opportunity to make progress particularly on these core issues of fragility And I would also just note that So my last visit to afghanistan was just about a year and a half ago And i've been going there for 20 years and was able to meet with a very broad cross-section of students and civil society and faith leaders in both jalalabad and qawbel and i was struck by The difference in their thirst for peace And I do think that you know, I want to underscore the importance of afghan civil society That they are asking they are demanding a voice. They are demanding a more peaceful country and I you know the The tragic thing is that Too many of these leaders are being assassinated as general dunford noted But they they constitute an important voice that I think neither the government nor the taliban will be able Uh to ignore Thank you I have a question from gordy lubold from the wall street journal with whom I've traveled Many times to afghanistan. I'm sure familiar to our our co-chairs And gordy asks maybe general dunford Could lead off in his response to this and then others join if they if they want Can you expand specifically on Whether there should be a role for u.s troops in afghanistan afghanistan going forward? I think that means beyond The piece of ruin we're seeking and what should it be? How important is this? One of the chairs said they'd also considered what happens If peace talks fail And what would their plan be? Be u.s policy-wise if there is no deal if the if the goal you're seeking doesn't happen tell nunford Yeah, thanks david and like you have traveled with gordon many times and spent many hours in conversations with him So gordon. Thanks. Thanks for the question Look, I think that on that on that question about the role for troops going forward is two issues number one that's going to have to be a decision between the united states And the in the new government of afghanistan Uh, and it will certainly be based on conditions and what that force may look like is going to be very much informed by the conditions That are going to exist as the peace process is being implemented So I think it's very difficult to talk about the size or the specific capabilities in that force I do think that uh, it would be if you ask me if it would be in u.s interests For us to have a counterterrorism presence in a region long term Would that assist in uh advancing u.s interest would it provide a degree of stability in the region and so forth You could make a clear argument that that would be the case But I think again the size the scope the capabilities that force and in fact the very legitimacy that force being there is Going to have to be something that is addressed as the peace process matures and Gordon is that or david does that get at the question Yes, I think it does there was another part to to what gordon asked and was So, you know, if if if plan a doesn't work And we have a civil war and we have a freewheeling of you know Kind of crack up of the of the state in the in the region What is plan b here if you have you thought i'm sure you thought about this Is there any you'd offer That would help us think about that sure and I do think there's there's a lot of room between The plan doesn't work in civil war. I want to emphasize that first So we don't go automatically to civil war if the if the ongoing peace process should come apart In our report, we do identify other pathways that could be followed and in our judgment The the first one would be to take a look at what is necessary to reset conditions to begin political negotiations perhaps in the future and And we talk about the specific actions that could be taken to reset conditions So our first pathway, I think that we would and we we really did take a look at these both in terms of discrete choices, but also A sequence of actions that could be taken so to the audience in response to Gordon's question if if Somehow the peace negotiations that are ongoing would come apart And the administration made a judgment that the national interest that we've articulated in the report are still Our national interests in the Biden administration And they're going to resource against those national interests We would argue for actions to be taken diplomatically politically and with support to reset conditions So that we can pursue a peace negotiation in the future that would be the first first path way we'd recommend Would any of the other co-chairs like to respond to the gordon liberal question that I asked or should I move on to others? I think you should go on others. I think Okay So senator I got one that that has as senator written all over it that is What role do you foresee for congress? Regarding the u.s. Approach and let me broaden that We have a deep Frustration Impatience in congress. It's palpable and so In addition asking what role do you foresee for congress? How would you speak to to members of congress? Who say man, this is this has been going on too. I just you want me to sign on for another stand I'm not sure I want to but how would you answer that? Yeah, I first of all, I think there is an important role for congress I mean, we wouldn't even have undertaken this study But for the fact that there were leaders in congress that thought it was important enough For us to take a look at this including People like senator Graham senator lehi. So it was bipartisan Those who supported this study effort And as I think about the role for congress, obviously All the appropriations have to come through congress. So They're going to have to decide with recommendations made by the administration What kind of support we provide for afghanistan going forward? So congress always has a very important role In foreign policy in that regard In addition to that, you know, there have been many members I can tell you from my own time in the senate traveling to afghanistan Who have a deep commitment to afghanistan Have traveled there many times Have not only met With the leadership of afghanistan, but most importantly with the afghan people themselves And our troops that have been stationed there and I would say to the members of congress who Are saying and understandably so the american people Want us to come want our troops to come home and that is of course a very important natural Feeling to want to take care of the problems in our own country And not worry about what happens elsewhere But as the general set up front in our recommendations, our national interests are still quite present in afghanistan Because of the efforts of our troops in working with the afghan national forces and those who have sacrificed so much in afghanistan We have really pressed back the the the threat to our country on the terrorism front And that's been because of our efforts But if we were to just sort of wash our hands from this whole thing Based on our review and from the experts that we consulted with beyond our group and our expertise that we have That terror threat would be reconstituted within 18 to 36 months And that means not only thinking about The country itself, but also the region and the importance of the region itself So we have national interests in afghanistan And we also have an interest in afghanistan Of respecting the sacrifices that have been made in afghanistan And to just walk away and let it go into chaos In my view would not be one that would Honor the commitments we've made in afghanistan and those who have sacrificed so much So we're at this moment. It is a moment in time Where there is a peace talk a peace agreement possibility there where you actually have parties talking to each other that had not talked to each other in the past And so for us to just walk away from that moment to me I would say to my former colleagues in congress This is one we need to give an opportunity to a chance to So that we can protect our own country and our national interests But also honor the sacrifices of all who have given given too much And and so much to afghanistan on behalf of our country and the afghan people Of course who have also sacrificed and lost so much in the in these conflicts Thank you. I have a question that would be appropriate for dancy lindmore given her experience at usip and and and in the years before that Maintaining a consistent whole of the u.s. Government approach For the long game has been a challenge in the past. That's pretty mildly What is your confidence that this can be sustained in the future? Well, I have an increased confidence Because of the concerted effort to learn some of those lessons And over the past decade there has been I think a A greater realization that we Need to align across our various Efforts security diplomatic and development in order to accomplish any of our goals and to quote Senator coons at the passage of the global fragility act when you have a really tough game You don't want to have one part of your team playing football another playing cricket and another playing soccer You want them all to be playing the same the same game? And so we do have the new global fragility act legislation Which which was bipartisan and built on a lot of lessons from the development and diplomacy and security communities It's matched by similar lessons and new approaches in a number of our Donor partners as well as some of the multilateral institutions. So I really think there has been concerted learning and concerted efforts part of it is Recognizing the importance of each of those lines of effort Sometimes people think of development efforts as just a giant wallet. You need to Understand the discipline of development and understand the ways in which that can be the most effective And push and pull that into the shared goal of in this instance Enabling a more sustained and durable peace in Afghanistan. So I'm hopeful I'm hopeful because I think if we you know, we do have some new Ingredients some new as general Dunford said facts on the ground and and a much larger New frame around understanding this challenge not just in Afghanistan, but in any number of fragile states I just would add a moderators comment that for as long as I've been covering foreign policy Whole of government Approaches to anything really or a function of the effectiveness of the national security council process and that process has been in my Judgment unusually weak By the last few years and if it can be strengthened the possibility of genuinely coordinating policy A lot of the ones you suggest would be would be greater I have a question for for general Dunford Which goes to one of the most interesting intelligence issues And military as well in the in the months years ahead What risk does the islamic state? course on province Iskp as we're calling it these days opposed to afghanistan security And to the afghan peace process. We have a peace process with the taliban is not with isis k or islamic state course on What about them and general Dunford if I could add one additional question I can remember hearing from general miller and others the idea that perhaps down the road The taliban might see us as a in effect Kind of invisible partner in dealing with their adversary With whom they were in competition for support in areas of afghanistan namely isis k That doesn't seem to have worked out as well as people might have thought What what's your judgment about whether that Group Isis k iskp is is is growing is is providing a greater threat to the process or not So so david's a fair question and and with the caveat that i'm about a year from having read Classified reports about the intel threat in afghanistan It seems to me that isis k is a very real threat It's currently I think the sufficient pressure of being put on isis right now by u.s forces afghan forces To keep it at bay, but it is absolutely a threat that could grow if it's unchecked and and I and I do think that one of the arguments for not allowing afghanistan to descend in chaos We focus a lot on al-qaeda, but as we all know with many Region that pose a threat Not really to the united states, but certainly to regional security. So In my view And I and I think this is again mostly I have access Access today to the things that other people read in the newspaper and so forth But it looks to me like isis is still a threat There have certainly been some recent attacks attributed to isis But overall the combination of u.s forces and afghan national defense security forces have been able to keep isis at bay I think you could argue and and we do in a report. We mentioned isis as well that Among the many other negative second and third order effects that would result in a precipitous u.s Rural the opportunity for isis to grow as well and and let's keep in mind that from a us perspective It's not just isis inside of afghanistan It's isis as part of a trans regional threat That extends from west africa to southeast asia and we certainly saw the potential If unchecked of isis in 2014 in 2015 until we had our effective response inside of syria and iraq So it's certainly a threat that we ought not to underestimate and it just again highlights What the senator spoke about a minute ago in terms of u.s interest and why Should you know it answers the question to the american people? Why should we care? It's merely one of the other reasons albeit a very important one of why we should care about what goes on and I think we all know that Coruscant itself has a Psychological importance to extremist groups that transcends whatever physical capabilities they have in any given time Which makes it all the more important that we address it in south asia Do any of our other co-chairs have any comments about the isis k issue? Yeah, I would A little bit building on the previous question as well as what general dunford just said I think we also understand that That's another Foundation for why we understand this is not fundamentally a military solution That especially as we come up on the 20th anniversary of 9 11. We see that These kinds of terrorist groups are thriving in the most fragile of states and so in order to Close that in afghanistan The solution is not only a military one It's but most importantly a diplomatic one and using our assistance instruments to enable the state to become less fragile more inclusive and more accountable and That's true for afghanistan. It's true in some of these other areas across the sahel Etc, but it's why we care about what happens in afghanistan And why we think there's an opportunity to really do things differently and make and enable a different outcome So we're nearing the four o'clock hour, which is the time at which our session is scheduled to end And rather than go through another round of questions. I think it's a good time for me uh again on on on behalf of the audience watching today and People who will read the report to thank the co-chairs for the enormous work that they've Obviously put into this report and also for the Care that they've taken in trying to answer the hardest questions I've tried to post some of them as as I know people will will want to To ask hard questions of you But but I think the your willingness in our conversation and in the report itself to to look them square in the eye Is is one of the most helpful things? So let me let me thank each of the co-chairs. Thanks Steve Hadley For hosting us and I think it's my task unless Steve wants to come back on to thank everybody for joining us today And encourage you to read the report itself and look at its conclusions. Thanks to everyone Thank you, David. Thank you. Thank you, David. Thank you all for being on today