 Chapter 3. Democracy in America Volume 1. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Anna Simon. Democracy in America Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville, translated by Henry Reeve. Chapter 3. Social Conditions of the Anglo-Americans Chapter 7. A social condition is commonly the result of circumstances. Sometimes of laws, often are still of these two causes united. But wherever it exists, it may justly be considered as the source of almost all the laws, the usages and the ideas which regulate the conduct of nations. Whatever it does not produce, it modifies. It is therefore necessary, if we would become acquainted with the legislation and the manners of a nation, to begin by the study of its social condition. The striking characteristic of the social condition of the Anglo-Americans in its essential democracy, the first immigrants of New England, their equality, aristocratic laws introduced in the south, a period of the revolution, change in the law of dissent, effects produced by this change. Democracy carried to its utmost limits in the new states of the West, equality of education. Many important observations suggest themselves upon the social condition of the Anglo-Americans, but there is one which takes precedence of all the rest. The social condition of the Americans is eminently democratic. This was its character at the foundation of the colonies, and is still more strongly marked at the present day. I have stated in the preceding chapter that great equality existed among the immigrants who settled on the shores of New England. The germ of aristocracy was never planted in that part of the Union. The only influence which obtained there was that of intellect. The people were used to reverence certain names as the emblems of knowledge and virtue. Some of their fellow citizens acquired a power over the rest which might truly have been called aristocratic if it had been capable of transmission from father to son. This was the state of things to the east of the Hudson. To the south-west of that river, and in the direction of the Florida's, the case was different. In most of the states situated to the south-west of the Hudson, some great English proprietors had settled, who had imported with them aristocratic principles and the English law of dissent. I have explained the reasons why it was impossible ever to establish a powerful aristocracy in America. These reasons existed with less force to the south-west of the Hudson. In the south, one man, aided by slaves, could cultivate a great extent of country. It was therefore common to see rich-landed proprietors. But their influence was not altogether aristocratic, as that term is understood in Europe, since they possessed no privileges. And the cultivation of their estates being carried on by slaves, they had no tenants depending on them, and consequently no patronage. Still, the great proprietors south of the Hudson constituted a superior class, having ideas and tastes of its own, and forming the center of political action. This kind of aristocracy sympathized with the body of the people, whose passions and interests it easily embraced. But it was too weak and too short-lived to excite either love or hatred for itself. This was the class which headed the insurrection in the south, and furnished the best leaders of the American Revolution. At the period of which we are now speaking, society was shaken to its center. The people, in whose name the struggle had taken place, conceived the desire of exercising the authority which it had acquired. Its democratic tendencies were awakened, and having thrown off the yoke of the mother country, it aspired to independence of every kind. The influence of individuals gradually ceased to be felt, and custom and law united together to produce the same result. But the law of dissent was the last step to equality. I am surprised that ancient and modern jurists have not attributed to this law a greater influence on human affairs. It is true that these laws belonged to civil affairs, but they ought nevertheless to be placed at the head of all political institutions. For, whilst political laws are only the symbol of a nation's condition, they exercise an incredible influence upon its social state. They have, moreover, a sure and uniform manner of operating upon society, affecting as it were generations yet unborn. Through their means, man acquires a kind of preternatural power over the future lot of his fellow creatures. When the legislator has regulated the law of inheritance, he may rest from his labor. The machine once put in motion will go on for ages and advance as if self-guided towards a given point. When framed in a particular manner, this law unites, draws together, and vests property and power in a few hands. Its tendency is clearly aristocratic. On opposite principles, its action is still more rapid. It divides, distributes, and disperses both property and power. Alarmed by the rapidity of its progress, those who despair of arresting its motion endeavor to obstruct it by difficulties and impediments. They vainly seek to counteract its effect by contrary efforts, but it gradually reduces or destroys every obstacle until by its incessant activity. The bulwarks of the influence of wealth are ground down to the fine and shifting sand which is the basis of democracy. When the law of inheritance permits, still more when it decrees, the equal division of a father's property amongst all his children, its effects are of two kinds. It is important to distinguish them from each other, although they tend to the same end. In virtue of the law of partable inheritance, the death of every proprietor brings about a kind of revolution in property. Not only do his possessions change hands, but their very nature is altered, since they are parceled into shares which become smaller and smaller at each division. This is the direct, and as it were, the physical effect of the law. It follows then that in countries where equality of inheritance is established by law, property, and especially landed property, must have a tendency to perpetual diminution. The effects, however, of such legislation would only be perceptible after a lapse of time if the law was abandoned to its own working. For supposing the family to consist of two children, and in a country peopled as France is, the average number is not above three. These children sharing amongst them the fortune of both parents would not be poorer than their father or mother. But the law of equal division exercises its influence not merely upon the property itself, but it affects the minds of the heirs, and brings their passions into play. These indirect consequences tend powerfully to the destruction of large fortunes, and especially of large domains. Among nations whose law of descent is founded upon the right of primogeniture, landed estates often pass from generation to generation without undergoing division, the consequence of which is that family feeling is to a certain degree incorporated with the estate. The family represents the estate, the estate, the family, whose name, together with its origin, its glory, its power, and its virtues, is thus perpetuated in an imperishable memorial of the past and a sure pledge of the future. When the equal partition of property is established by law, the intimate connection is destroyed between family feeling and the preservation of the paternal estate. The property ceases to represent the family, for as it must inevitably be divided after one or two generations, it has evidently a constant tendency to diminish, and must in the end be completely dispersed. The sons of the great landed proprietor, if they are few in number, or if fortune befriends them, may indeed entertain the hope of being as wealthy as their father, but not that of possessing the same property as he did. The riches must necessarily be composed of elements different from his. Now, from the moment that you divest the landowner of that interest in the preservation of his estate, which he derives from association, from tradition, and from family pride, you may be certain that sooner or later he will dispose of it, for there is a strong pecuniary interest in favor of selling, as floating capital produces higher interest than real property, and is more readily available to gratify the passions of the moment. Great landed estates which have once been divided never come together again, for the small proprietor draws from his land a better revenue in proportion than the large owner does from his, and of course he sells it at a higher rate. The calculations of gain, therefore, which decide the rich man to sell his domain, will still more powerfully influence him against buying small estates to unite them into a large one. What is called family pride is often founded upon an illusion of self-love. A man wishes to perpetuate and immortalize himself, as it were, in his great-grandchildren. Where the esprit de famille ceases to act, individual selfishness comes into play. When the idea of family becomes vague, indeterminate, and uncertain, a man thinks of his present convenience. He provides for the establishment of a succeeding generation and no more. Either a man gives up the idea of perpetuating his family, or at any rate he seeks to accomplish it by other means than that of a landed estate. Thus not only does the law of partable inheritance render it difficult for families to preserve their ancestral domains entire, but it deprives them of the inclination to attempt it, and compels them in some measure to cooperate with the law in their own extinction. The law of equal distribution proceeds by two methods. By acting upon things, it acts upon persons. By influencing persons, it affects things. By these means the law succeeds in striking at the root of landed property, and dispersing rapidly both families and fortunes. Most certainly it is not for us Frenchmen of the 19th century who daily witness the political and social changes which the law of partition is bringing to pass to question its influence. It is perpetually conspicuous in our country overthrowing the walls of our dwellings and removing the landmarks of our fields. But although it has produced great effects in France, much still remains for it to do. Our recollections, opinions, and habits present powerful obstacles to its progress. In the United States it has nearly completed its work of destruction and there we can best study its results. The English laws concerning the transmission of property were abolished in almost all the states at the time of the revolution. The law of entail was so modified as not to interrupt the free circulation of property. The first generation having passed away, the states began to be parceled out and the change became more and more rapid with the progress of time. At this moment, after a lapse of a little more than 60 years, the aspect of society is totally altered. The families of the great landed proprietors are almost all commingled with the general mass. In the state of New York, which formerly contained many of these, there are but two who still keep their heads above the stream and they must shortly disappear. The sons of these opulent citizens are become merchants, lawyers, or physicians. Most of them have lapsed into obscurity. The last trace of hereditary ranks and distinctions is destroyed. The law of partition has reduced all to one level. I do not mean that there is any deficiency of wealthy individuals in the United States. I know of no country indeed where the love of money has taken stronger hold on the affections of men and where the profounder contempt is expressed for the theory of the permanent equality of property. But wealth circulates with inconceivable rapidity and experience shows that it is rare to find two succeeding generations in the full enjoyment of it. This picture, which may perhaps be thought to be overcharged, still gives a very imperfect idea of what is taking place in the new states of the West and Southwest. At the end of the last century, a few bold adventurers began to penetrate into the valleys of the Mississippi and the mass of the population very soon began to move in that direction. Communities unheard of, till then, were seen to emerge from the wilds. States whose names were not in existence a few years before claimed their place in the American Union. And in the Western settlements we may behold democracy arrived at its utmost extreme. In these states, founded offhand and, as it were, by chance, the inhabitants are but of yesterday. Scarcely known to one another, the nearest neighbors are ignorant of each other's history. In this part of the American continent, therefore, the population has not experienced the influence of great names in great wealth, nor even that of the natural aristocracy of knowledge and virtue. None are there to wield that respectable power which men willingly grant to the remembrance of a life spent in doing good before their eyes. The new states of the West are already inhabited, but society has no existence among them. It is not only the fortunes of men which are equal in America, even their requirements partake in some degree of the same uniformity. I do not believe that there is a country in the world where, in proportion to the population, there are so few uninstructed and, at the same time, so few learned individuals. Primary instruction is within the reach of everybody. Superior instruction is scarcely to be obtained by any. This is not surprising. It is in fact the necessary consequence of what we have advanced above. Almost all the Americans are in easy circumstances and can therefore obtain the first elements of human knowledge. In America, there are comparatively few who are rich enough to live without a profession. Every profession requires an apprenticeship which limits the time of instruction to the early years of life. At 15, they enter upon their calling and thus their education ends at the age when hours begins. Whatever is done afterwards is with a view to some special and lucrative object. A science is taken up as a measure of business and the only branch of it which is attended to is such as a midst of an immediate practical application. In America, most of the rich men were formally poor. Most of those who now enjoy leisure were absorbed in business during their youth. The consequence of which is that when they might have had a taste for study, they had no time for it. And when time is at their disposal, they have no longer the inclination. There is no class then in America in which the taste for intellectual pleasures is transmitted with hereditary fortune and leisure and by which the labours of the intellect are held in honour. Accordingly, there is an equal want of desire and the power of application to these objects. A middle standard is fixed in America for human knowledge. All approaches near to it as they can. Some as they rise, others as they descend. Of course, an immense multitude of persons are to be found who entertain the same number of ideas on religion, history, science, political economy, legislation and government. The gifts of intellect proceed directly from God and men cannot prevent their unequal distribution. But in consequence of the state of things which we have here represented, it happens that although the capacities of men are widely different as the Creator has doubtless intended they should be, they are submitted to the same method of treatment. In America, the aristocratic element has always been feeble from its birth and if at the present day it is not actually destroyed, it is at any rate so completely disabled that we can scarcely assign to it any degree of influence in the cause of affairs. The democratic principle on the contrary has gained so much strength by time, by events and by legislation as to have become not only predominant but all powerful. There is no family or corporate authority and it is rare to find even the influence of individual character enjoy any durability. America then exhibits in her social state a most extraordinary phenomenon. Men are there seen on a greater equality in point of fortune and intellect or in other words more equal in their strength than in any other country of the world or in any age which history has preserved the remembrance. Political consequences of the social condition of the Anglo-Americans. The political consequences of such a social condition as this are easily deducible. It is impossible to believe that equality will not eventually find its way into the political world as it does everywhere else. To conceive of men remaining forever unequal upon one single point yet equal on all others is impossible. They must come in the end to be equal upon all. Now I know of only two methods of establishing equality in the political world. Every citizen must be put in possession of his rights or rights must be granted to no one. For nations which are arrived at the same stage of social existence as the Anglo-Americans it is therefore very difficult to discover a medium between the sovereignty of all and the absolute power of one man and it would be vain to deny that the social condition which I have been describing is equally liable to each of these consequences. There is in fact a manly and lawful passion for equality which excites men to wish all to be powerful and honoured. This passion tends to elevate the humble to the rank of the great but there exists also in the human heart a depraved taste for equality which impels the weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level and reduces men to prefer equality and slavery to inequality with freedom. Not that those nations whose social condition is democratic naturally despise liberty. On the contrary they have an instinctive love of it but liberty is not the chief and constant object of their desires. Equality is their idol. They make rapid and sudden efforts to obtain liberty and if they miss their aim resign themselves to their disappointment but nothing can satisfy them except equality and rather than lose it they resolve to perish. On the other hand in a state where the citizens are nearly on an equality it becomes difficult for them to preserve their independence against the aggressions of power. No one among them being strong enough to engage in the struggle with advantage nothing but a general combination can protect their liberty and such a union is not always to be found. From the same social position then nations may derive one or the other of two great political results. These results are extremely different from each other but they may both proceed from the same cause. The Anglo-Americans are the first nations who having been exposed to this formidable alternative have been happy enough to escape the dominion of absolute power. They have been allowed by their circumstances, their origin, their intelligence and especially by their moral feeling to establish and maintain the sovereignty of the people. End of chapter 3. Democracy in America Chapter 4 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville. Translated by Henry Reeve. Section 5. Chapter 4. The Principle of the Sovereignty of the People in America Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be discussed it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people that we must begin. The principle of the sovereignty of the people which is to be found more or less at the bottom of almost all human institutions generally remains concealed from view. It is obeyed without being recognized or if for a moment it be brought to light it is hastily cast back into the gloom of the sanctuary. The will of the nation is one of those expressions which have been most profusely abused by the wily and the despotic of every age. To the eyes of some it has been represented by the venal suffrages of a few of the satellites of power to others by the votes of a timid or an interested minority and some have even discovered it in the silence of a people on the supposition that the fact of submission established the right of command. In America the principle of the sovereignty of the people is not either barren or concealed as it is with some other nations. It is recognized by the customs and proclaimed by the laws it spreads freely and arrives without impediment at its remote consequences. If there be a country in the world where the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated where it can be studied in its application to the affairs of society and where its dangers and its advantages may be foreseen that country is assuredly America. I have already observed that from their origin the sovereignty of the people was the fundamental principle of the greater number of British colonies in America. It was far however from then exercising as much influence on the government of society as it now does. Two obstacles the one external the other internal checked its invasive progress. It could not ostensibly disclose itself in the laws of the colonies which were still constrained to obey the mother country. It was therefore obliged to spread secretly and to gain ground in the provincial assemblies and especially in the townships. American society was not yet prepared to adopt it with all its consequences. The intelligence of New England and the wealth of the country to the south of the Hudson as I have shown in the preceding chapter long exercised a sort of aristocratic influence which tended to retain the exercise of social authority in the hands of a few. The public functionaries were not universally elected and the citizens were not all of them electors. The electoral franchise was everywhere placed within certain limits and made dependent on a certain qualification which was exceedingly low in the north and more considerable in the south. The American Revolution broke out and the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people which had been nurtured in the townships and municipalities took possession of the state. Every class was enlisted in its cause. Battles were fought and victories obtained for it until it became the law of laws. A no less rapid change was affected in the interior of society where the law of dissent completed the abolition of local influences. At the very time when this consequence of the laws and of the revolution was apparent to every eye victory was irrevocably pronounced in favor of the democratic cause. All power was, in fact, in its hands and resistance was no longer possible. The higher orders submitted without a murmur and without a struggle to an evil which was then forced inevitable. The ordinary fact of falling powers awaited them. Each of their several members followed his own interests and as it was impossible to ring the power from the hands of a people which they did not detest sufficiently to brave their only aim was to secure its goodwill at any price. The most democratic laws were consequently voted by the very men whose interests they impaired and thus altogether the higher classes did not excite the passions of the people against their order. They accelerated the triumph of the new state of things so that by a singular change the democratic impulse was found to be most irresistible in the very states where the aristocracy had the firmest hold. The state of Maryland which had been founded by men of rank was the first to proclaim universal suffrage and to introduce the most democratic forms into the conduct of its government. When a nation modifies the elective qualification it may be easily foreseen that sooner or later that qualification will be entirely abolished. There is no more invariable rule in the history of society. The further electoral rights are extended the greater is the need of extending them for after each concession the strength of democracy increases and its demands increase with its strength. The ambition of those who are below the appointed rate is irritated in exact proportion to the great number of those who are above it. The exception at last becomes the rule. Concession follows concession and no stop can be made short of universal suffrage. At the present day the principle of the sovereignty of the people has acquired in the United States all the practical development which the imagination can conceive. It is unencumbered by those fictions which have been thrown over it in other countries and it appears in every possible form according to the exigency of the occasion. Sometimes the laws are made by the people in a body as it Athens and sometimes its representatives chosen by universal suffrage transact business in its name and almost under its immediate control. In some countries a power exists which though it is in degree foreign to the social body directs it and forces it to pursue a certain track. In others the ruling force is divided being partly within and partly without the ranks of the people. But nothing of the kind is to be seen in the United States. There society governs itself for itself. All power centers in its bosom and scarcely an individual is to be met with who would venture to conceive or still less to express the idea of seeking it elsewhere. The nation participates in the making of its laws by the choice of its legislatures and in the execution of them by the choice of the agents of the executive government. It may almost be said to govern itself so feeble and so restricted is the share left to the administration. So little do the authorities forget their popular origin and the power from which they emanate. End of Section 5 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Democracy in America Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville translated by Henry Reeve Chapter 5 Necessity of Examining the Conditions of the States, Part 1 Necessity of Examining the Condition of the States before that of the Union at Large It is proposed to examine in the following chapter what is the form of government established in America on the principle of the sovereignty of the people? What are its resources, its hindrances, its advantages, and its dangers? The first difficulty which presents itself arises from the complex nature of the Constitution of the United States which consists of two distinct social structures connected and, as it were, encased one within the other. Two governments completely separate and almost independent the one fulfilling the ordinary duties and responding to the daily and indefinite calls of a community the other circumscribed within certain limits and only exercising an exceptional authority over the general interests of the country. In short, there are 24 small sovereign nations whose agglomeration constitutes the body of the Union. To examine the Union before we have studied the States would be to adopt a method filled with obstacles. The form of the federal government of the United States was the last which was adopted and it is in fact nothing more than a modification or a summary of those Republican principles which were current in the whole community before it existed and independently of its existence. Moreover, the federal government is, as I have just observed, the exception. The government of the States is the rule. The author who shall attempt to exhibit the picture as a whole before he had explained its details would necessarily fall into obscurity and repetition. The great political principles which govern American society at this day undoubtedly took their origin and their growth in the State. It is therefore necessary to become acquainted with the State in order to possess a clue to the remainder. The States which at present compose the American Union all present the same features as far as regards the external aspect of their institutions. Their political or administrative existence is centered in three focuses of action which may not in aptly be compared to the different nervous centers which convey motion to the human body. The township is the lowest in order, then the county, and last the State and I propose to devote the following chapter to the examination of these three divisions. The American system of townships and municipal bodies, why the author begins the examination of the political institutions with the township, its existence in all nations, difficulty of establishing and preserving municipal independence, its importance, why the author has selected the township system of New England as the main topic of his discussion. It is not undesignedly that I begin this subject with the township. The village or township is the only association which is so perfectly natural that wherever a number of men are collected it seems to constitute itself. The town or tithing as the smallest division of a community must necessarily exist in all nations. Whatever their laws and customs may be. If man makes monarchies and establishes republics, the first association of mankind seems constituted by the hand of God. But although the existence of the township is co-evil with that of men, its liberties are not the less rarely respected and easily destroyed. A nation is always able to establish great political assemblies because it habitually contains a certain number of individuals fitted by their talents, if not by their habits, for the direction of affairs. The township is, on the contrary, composed of co-ser materials which are less easily fashioned by the legislature. The difficulties which attend the consolidation of its independence rather augment than diminish with the increasing enlightenment of the people. A highly civilized community spurns the attempts of a local independence, and its dependence is disgusted at its numerous blunders and is apt to despair of success before the experiment is completed. Again, no immunities are so ill-protected from the encroachments of the supreme power as those of municipal bodies in general. They are unable to struggle, single-handed, against a strong or an enterprising government, and they cannot defend their cause with success unless it be identified with the customs of the nation and the public opinion. Thus until the independence of townships is amalgamated with the manners of a people, it is easily destroyed, and it is only after a long existence in the laws that it can be thus amalgamated. Municipal freedom is not the fruit of human device. It is rarely created, but it is, as it were, secretly and spontaneously engendered in the midst of a semi-barbarous state of society. The constant action of the laws and the national habits, peculiar circumstances, and above all, time, may consolidate it, but there is certainly no nation on the continent of Europe which has experienced its advantages. Nevertheless, local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science. They bring it within the people's reach. They teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty. The transient passions and the interests of an hour, or the chance of circumstances, may have created the external forms of independence, but the despotic tendency which has been repelled will, sooner or later, inevitably reappear on the surface. In order to explain to the reader the general principles on which the political organization of the counties and townships of the United States rests, I have thought it expedient to choose one of the states of New England as an example, to examine the mechanism of its constitution, and then to cast a general glance over the country. The township and the county are not organized in the same manner in every part of the Union. It is, however, easy to perceive that the same principles have guided the formation of both of them throughout the Union. I am inclined to believe that these principles have been carried further in New England than elsewhere, and consequently that they offer greater facilities to the observations of a stranger. The institutions of New England form a complete and regular whole. They have received the sanction of time, they have the support of the laws, and the still stronger support of the manners of the community over which they exercise the most prodigious influence. They consequently deserve our attention on every account. Limits of the Township The township of New England is a division which stands between the Commune and the Canton of France, and which corresponds in general to the English tithing or town. Its average population is from two to three thousand, so that, on the one hand, the interests of its inhabitants are not likely to conflict, and on the other, men capable of conducting its affairs are always to be found among its citizens. Authorities of the Township in New England The people the source of all power here is elsewhere, manages its own affairs, no corporation, the greater part of the authority vested in the hands of the Selectmen, how the Selectmen act, town meeting, enumeration of the public officers of the Township, obligatory and remunerated functions. In the Township, as well as everywhere else, the people is the only source of power, but in no stage of government does the body of citizens exercise a more immediate influence. In America, the people is a master whose extinguishes demand obedience to the utmost limits of possibility. In New England, the majority acts by representatives in the conduct of the public business of the state. But if such an arrangement be necessary in general affairs, in the Townships where the legislative and administrative actions of the government is in more immediate contact with the subject, the system of representation is not adopted. There is no corporation, but the body of electors after having designated its magistrates directs them in everything that exceeds the simple and ordinary executive business of the state. This state of things is so contrary to our ideas and so different from our customs that it is necessary for me to adduce some examples to explain it thoroughly. The public duties in the Township are extremely numerous and minutely divided as we shall see further on, but the larger proportion of administrative power is vested in the hands of a small number of individuals called the select men. The general laws of the state impose a certain number of obligations on the select men, which they may fulfill without the authorization of the body they represent, but which they can only neglect on their own responsibility. The laws of the state obliges them, for instance, to draw up the list of electors in their townships, and if they omit this part of their functions they are guilty of a misdemeanor. In all the affairs, however, which are determined by the town meeting, the select men are the organs of the popular mandate, as in France the mayor executes the degree of the municipal council. They usually act upon their own responsibility and merely put in practice principles which have been previously recognized by the majority. But if any change is to be introduced in the existing state of things, or if they wish to undertake any new enterprise, they are obliged to refer to the source of their power. If, for instance, a school is to be established, the select men convoke the whole body of the electors on a certain day at an appointed place. They explain the urgency of the case, they give their opinion on the means of satisfying it, on the probable expense, and the site which seems to be most favorable. The meeting is consulted on these several points. It adopts the principle, marks out the site, votes the rate, and confides the execution of its resolution to the select men. The select men have alone the right of calling a town meeting, but they may be requested to do so. If ten citizens are desirous of submitting a new project to the ascent of the township, they may demand a general convocation of the inhabitants. The select men are obliged to comply, but they have only the right of presiding at the meeting. The select men are elected every year in the month of April or May. The town meeting chooses at the same time a number of other municipal magistrates who are entrusted with important administrative functions. The assessors rate the township, the collectors receive the rate. A constable is appointed to keep the peace to watch the streets and to forward the execution of the laws. The town clerk records all the town votes, orders, grants, births, deaths, and marriages. The treasurer keeps the funds. The overseer of the poor performs the difficult task of superintending the action of the poor laws. Committeemen are appointed to attend to the schools and to public instruction. And the road surveyors, who take care of the greater thoroughfares of the township, complete the list of the principal functionaries. They are, however, still further subdivided, and amongst the municipal officers are to be found parish commissioners who audit the expenses of public worship, different classes of inspectors, some of whom are to direct the citizens in case of fire, tithing men, listers, hay wards, chimney viewers, fence viewers to maintain the bounds of property, timber measureers, and sealers of weights and measures. There are 19 principal officers in a township. Every inhabitant is constrained on the pain of being fined to undertake these different functions, which, however, are almost all paid in order that the poorer citizens may be able to give up their time without loss. In general, the American system is not to grant a fixed salary to its functionaries. Every service has its price, and they are remunerated in proportion to what they have done. Existence of the Township Every one the best judge of his own interest, corollary of the principal of the sovereignty of the people, application of those doctrines in the townships of America, the township of New England is sovereign in all that concerns itself alone, subject to the state in all other matters, bond of the township and the state, in France the government lends its agent to the commune, in America the reverse occurs. I have already observed that the principal of the sovereignty of the people governs the whole political system of the Anglo-Americans. Every page of this book will afford new instances of the same doctrine. In the nations by which the sovereignty of the people is recognized, every individual possesses an equal share of power and participates alike in the government of the state. Every individual is, therefore, supposed to be as well informed and virtuous and as strong as any of his fellow citizens. He obeys the government, not because he is inferior to the authorities which conduct it, or that he is less capable than his neighbor of governing himself, but because he acknowledges the utility of an association with his fellow men, and because he knows that no such association can exist without a regulating force. If he be a subject in all that concerns the mutual relations of citizens, he is free and responsible to God alone for all that concerns himself. Hence arises the maxim that everyone is the best in the sole judge of his own private interest, and that society has no right to control a man's actions, unless they are prejudicial to the common wheel, or unless the common wheel demands his cooperation. This doctrine is universally admitted in the United States. I shall hereafter examine the general influence which it exercises on the ordinary actions of life. I am now speaking of the nature of municipal bodies. The township, taken as a whole, and in relation to the government of the country, may be looked upon as an individual to whom the theory I have just alluded to is applied. Municipal independence is therefore a natural consequence of the principle of the sovereignty of the people in the United States. All the American republics recognize it more or less, but circumstances have peculiarly favored its growth in New England. In this part of the Union, the impulsion of political activity was given in the townships, and it may almost be said that each of them originally formed an independent nation. When the kings of England asserted their supremacy, they were contented to assume the central power of the state. The townships of New England remained as they were before, and although they are now subject to the state, they were at first scarcely dependent upon it. It is important to remember that they have not been invested with privileges, but that they have, on the contrary, forfeited a portion of their independence to the state. The townships are only subordinate to the state in those interests which I shall term social, as they are common to all the citizens. They are independent in all that concerns themselves, and amongst the inhabitants of New England I believe that not a man is to be found who would acknowledge that the state has any right to interfere in their local interests. The towns of New England buy and sell, sue or are sued, augment or diminish their rates without the slightest opposition on the part of the administrative authority of the state. They are bound, however, to comply with the demands of the community. If the state is in need of money, a town can neither give nor withhold the supplies. If the state projects a road, the township cannot refuse to let it cross its territory. If a police regulation is made by the state, it must be enforced by the town. A uniform system of instruction is organized all over the country, and every town is bound to establish the schools which the law ordains. In speaking of the administration of the United States, I shall have occasion to point out the means by which the townships are compelled to obey in these different cases. I here merely show the existence of the obligation. Strict as this obligation is, the government of the state imposes it in principle only, and in its performance the township resumes all its independent rights. Thus taxes are voted by the state, but they are levied and collected by the township. The existence of a school is obligatory, but the township bills, pays, and super intends it. In France, the state collector receives the local imposts. In America, the town collector receives the taxes of the state. Thus the French government lends its agents to the commune. In America, the township is the agent of the government. This fact alone shows the extent of the differences which exist between the two nations. Public Spirit of the Townships of New England How the township of New England wins the affection of its inhabitants. Difficulty of creating local public spirit in Europe. The rights and duties of the American township favorable to it. Characteristics of home in the United States. Manifestations of public spirit in New England. Its happy effects. In America, not only do municipal bodies exist, but they are kept alive and supported by public spirit. The township of New England possesses two advantages which infallibly secure the attentive interests of mankind. Namely, independence and authority. Its fear is indeed small and limited, but within that sphere its action is unrestrained and its independence gives it a real importance which its extent and population may not always ensure. It is to be remembered that the affections of men generally lie on the side of authority. Patriotism is not durable in a conquered nation. The New Englander is attached to his township, not only because he was born in it, but because it constitutes a social body of which he is a member. And whose government claims and deserves the exercise of his sagacity. In Europe the absence of local public spirit is a frequent subject of regret to those who are in power. Everyone agrees that there is no sure guarantee of order and tranquility, and yet nothing is more difficult to create. If the municipal bodies were made powerful and independent, the authorities of the nation might be disunited and the peace of the country endangered. Yet without power and independence, a town may contain good subjects, but it can have no active citizens. Another important fact is that the township of New England is so constituted as to excite the warmest of human affections without arousing the ambitious passions of the heart of man. The officers of the country are not elected, and their authority is very limited. Even the state is only a second-rate community whose tranquil and obscure administration offers no inducements sufficient to draw men away from the circle of their interests into the turmoil of public affairs. The federal government confers power and honor on the men who conduct it, but these individuals can never be very numerous. The high station of the presidency can only be reached at an advanced period of life, and the other federal functionaries are generally men who have been favored by fortune or distinguished in some other career. Such cannot be the permanent aim of the ambitious, but the township serves as a center for the desire of public esteem, the want of exciting interests, and the taste for authority and popularity in the midst of the ordinary relations of life, and the passions which commonly embroil society change their character when they find events so near the domestic hearth and the family circle. In the American states, power has been disseminated with admirable skill for the purpose of interesting the greatest possible number of persons in the common wheel. Independently of the electors who are from time to time called into action, the body politic is divided into innumerable functionaries and officers, who all, in their several spheres, represent the same powerful whole in whose name they act. The local administration thus affords an unfailing source of profit and interest to a vast number of individuals. The American system, which divides the local authority among so many citizens, does not scruple to multiply the functions of the town officers. For in the United States it is believed, and with truth, that patriotism is a kind of devotion which is strengthened by ritual observance. In this manner, the activity of the township is continually perceptible. It is daily manifested in the fulfillment of a duty or the exercise of a right, and a constant, though gentle, motion is thus kept up in society which animates without disturbing it. The American attaches himself to his home as the Mountaineer clings to his hills because the characteristic features of his country are there more distinctly marked than elsewhere. The existence of the townships of New England is, in general, a happy one. Their government is suited to their taste, and chosen by themselves. In the midst of the profound peace and general comfort which reign in America the commotions of municipal discord are infrequent. The conduct of local business is easy. The political education of the people has long been complete, say rather that it was complete when the people first set foot upon the soil. In New England no tradition exists of a distinction of ranks. No portion of the community is tempted to oppress the remainder, and the abuses which may injure isolated individuals are forgotten in the general contentment which prevails. If the government is defective it would no doubt be easy to point out its deficiencies. The fact that it really emanates from those it governs, and that it acts either ill or well, casts the protecting spell of a parental pride over its faults. No term of comparison disturbs the satisfaction of the citizen. England formerly governed the mass of the colonies, but the people was always sovereign in the township where its rule is not only an ancient, but a primitive state. The native of New England is attached to his township because it is independent and free. His cooperation in its affairs ensures his attachment to its interests. The well-being it affords him secures his affection, and its welfare is the aim of his ambition and of his future exertions. He takes apart in every occurrence in the place. He practices the art of government in the small sphere within his reach. He accustoms himself to those forms which alone can ensure the steady progress of liberty. He imbibes their spirit, he acquires a taste for order, comprehends the union or the balance of powers, and collects clear practical notions on the nature of his duties and the extent of his rights. The Counties of New England The division of the Counties in America has considerable analogy with that of the Arlandies-Mont of France. The limits of the counties are down, and the various districts which they contain have no necessary connection, no common tradition or natural sympathy. Their object is simply to facilitate the administration of justice. The extent of the township was too small to contain a system of judicial institutions. Each county has, however, a court of justice, a sheriff to execute its decrees, and a prison for criminals. There are certain wants which are the townships of a county. It is therefore natural that they should be satisfied by a central authority. In the state of Massachusetts this authority is vested in the hands of several magistrates who are appointed by the governor of the state with the advice of his counsel. The officers of the county have only a limited and occasional authority which is applicable to certain predetermined cases. The state and the township possess a requisite to conduct public business. The budget of the county is drawn up by its officers and is voted by the legislature but there is no assembly which directly or indirectly represents the county. It has, therefore, properly speaking, no political existence. Administration in New England Administration not perceived in America. Why? The Europeans believe that liberty is promoted by depriving the social interests of its rights. The Americans, by dividing its exercise. Almost all the administration can find to the township and divide it amongst the town officers. No trace of an administrative body to be perceived either in the township or above it. The reason of this. How it happens that the administration of the state is uniform. Who is empowered to enforce the obedience of the township and the county to the law? The introduction of judicial power to the administration. Consequence of the extension of the elective principle to all functionaries. The justice of the peace in New England by whom appointed, county officer, ensures the administration of the townships, court of sessions, its actions, right of inspection and indictment disseminated like the other administrative functions, informers encouraged by the division of fines. Nothing is more striking to a European traveler in the United States to be termed the government or the administration. Written laws exist in America and one sees that they are daily executed but although everything is in motion the hand which gives the impulse to the social machine can nowhere be discovered. Nevertheless, as all peoples are obliged to have recourse to certain grammatical forms which are the foundation of human language, in order to express their thoughts, so all communities are obliged to have their existence by submitting to a certain dose of authority without which they fall prey to anarchy. This authority may be distributed in several ways but it must always exist somewhere. There are two methods of diminishing the force of authority in a nation. The first is to weaken the supreme power in its very principle by forbidding or preventing society from acting in its own defense under certain circumstances. The second manner is what is generally termed in Europe to lay the foundations of freedom. The second manner of diminishing the influence of authority does not consist in stripping society of any of its rights, nor in paralyzing its effects but in distributing the exercise of its privileges in various hands and in multiplying functionaries to each of whom the degree of power necessary for him to perform his duty is entrusted. The third method of diminishing the force of authority in a nation is to weaken the influence whom this distribution of social powers might lead to anarchy but in itself it is not anarchical. The action of authority is indeed thus rendered less irresistible and less perilous but it is not totally suppressed. The revolution of the United States was the result of a mature and dignified taste for freedom but its course was marked on the contrary by an attachment to whatever was lawful and orderly. It was never assumed in the United States that the citizen of a free country has a right to do whatever he pleases. On the contrary, social obligations were there imposed upon him more various than anywhere else. No idea was ever entertained of attacking the principles or of contesting the rights of society but the exercise of its authority was divided to the end that the office might be powerful and the officer insignificant and that the community should be at once regulated and free. In no country in the world does the law hold so absolute a language as in America and in no country is the right of applying it vested in so many hands. The administrative power in the United States presents nothing either central or hierarchical in its constitution that is passing unperceived. The power exists but its representative is not to be perceived. We have already seen that the independent townships of New England protect their own private interests and the municipal magistrates are the persons to whom the execution of the laws of the state is most frequently entrusted. Besides the general laws the state sometimes passes general police regulations but more commonly the townships justices of the peace regulate the minor details of social life according to the necessities of the different localities and promulgate such enactments as concern the health of the community and the peace as well as morality of the citizens. Lastly these municipal magistrates provide of their own accord and without any delegated powers for those unforeseen emergencies which frequently occur in society. It results from what we have seen that in the state of Massachusetts the administrative authority is almost entirely restricted to the township but that it is distributed among a great number of individuals. In the French commune there is properly but one official functionary namely the mayor and in New England we have seen that there are nineteen. These nineteen functionaries do not in general depend upon one another. The law carefully prescribes a circle of action to each of these magistrates and within that circle they have an entire right to perform their functions independently of any other authority. Above the township scarcely any trace of a series of official dignitaries is to be found. It sometimes happens that the county officers alter a decision of the townships or town magistrates but in general the authorities of the county have no right to interfere with the authorities of the township except in such matters as concern and concern. The magistrates of the township as well as those of the county are bound to communicate their acts to the central government in a very small number of predetermined cases but the central government is not represented by an individual whose business it is to publish police regulations and ordinances enforcing the execution of the laws to keep up a regular communication with the officers of the township and the county to inspect their actions or to reprimand their faults. There is no point which serves as a center to the radii of the administration. End of Chapter 5 Part 1 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Democracy in America Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville translated by Henry Reeb Chapter 5 Necessity of Examining the Condition of the States Part 2 What then is the uniform plan on which the government is conducted and how is the compliance of the counties and their magistrates or the townships and their officers enforced? In the states of New England the legislative authority embraces more subjects than it does in France. The legislator penetrates to the very core of the administration. As to the most minute details the same enactment prescribes the principle and the method of its application and thus imposes a multitude of strict and rigorously defined obligations on the secondary functionaries of the state. The consequence of this is that if all the secondary functionaries of the administration conform to the law, society in all its branches proceeds with the greatest uniformity. The difficulty remains of compelling the secondary functionaries of the administration to conform to the law. It may be affirmed that in general society has only two methods of enforcing the execution of the laws at its disposal. A discretionary power may be entrusted to a superior functionary of directing all the others and of cashiering them in case of disobedience or the courts of justice may be authorized to inflict judicial penalties on the offender but these two methods are not always available. Instead of directing a civil officer presupposes that of cashiering him if he does not obey orders and of rewarding him by promotion if he fulfills his duties with propriety. But an elected magistrate can neither be cashiered nor promoted. All elective functions are inalienable until their term is expired. In fact the elected magistrate has nothing either to expect or to fear from his constituents and when all public officers are filled by ballot there can be no evidence of official dignities because the double right of commanding and of enforcing obedience can never be vested in the same individual and because the power of issuing an order can never be joined to that of inflicting a punishment or bestowing a reward. The communities therefore in which the secondary functionaries of the government are elected are perforce obliged to make great use of judicial penalties as a means of administration. This is not evident at first sight however our app to look upon the institution of elected functionaries as one concession and the subjection of the elected magistrate to the judges of the land as another. They are equally averse to both these innovations and as they are more pressingly solicited to grant the former than the latter they accede to the election of the magistrate and leave him independent of the judicial power. Nevertheless the second of these measures is the only thing that can possibly counterbalance the first and it will be found that an elective authority which is not subject to judicial power will sooner or later either elude all control or be destroyed. The courts of justice are the only possible medium between the central power and the administrative bodies. They alone can compel the elected functionaries to obey without violating the rights of the elector. The extension of judicial power in the political world ought therefore to be in the exact ratio of the extension of elective offices. If these two institutions do not go hand in hand the state must fall into anarchy or into subjection. It has always been remarkable that habits of legal business do not render men apt to the exercise of administrative authority. The Americans have borrowed from the English, their fathers, the idea of an institution which is unknown upon the continent of Europe. I allude to that of the justices of the peace. The justice of the peace is a sort of so terminate between the magistrate and the man of the world, between the civil officer and the judge. A justice of the peace is a well-informed citizen, though he is not necessarily versed in the knowledge of the laws. His office simply obliges him to execute the police regulations of society, a task in which good sense and integrity are of more avail than legal science. The justice introduces into the administration a certain taste for established forms and publicity which renders him a most unserviceable instrument of despotism and, on the other hand, he is not blinded by those superstitions which render legal officers unfit members of a government. The Americans have adopted the system of the English justices of the peace, but they have deprived it of that aristocratic character which is discernible in the mother country. The governor of Massachusetts appoints a certain number of justices of the peace in every county, whose functions have been used for 37 years. He further designates three individuals from amongst the whole body of justices who form in each county what is called the Court of Sessions. The justices take a personal share in public business. They are sometimes entrusted with administrative functions in conjunction with elected officers. They sometimes constitute a tribunal before which the magistrates summarily prosecute a refractory citizen or the citizens inform them. But it is in the Court of Sessions that they exercise their most important functions. This Court meets twice a year in the county town. In Massachusetts it is empowered to enforce the obedience of the greater number of public officers. It must be observed that, in the state of Massachusetts, the Court of Sessions is at the same time at administrative body, properly so-called, and a political tribunal. It has been asserted that the county of Massachusetts presides over that small number of affairs which, as they concern several townships or all the townships of the county in common, cannot be entrusted to any one of them in particular. In all that concerns county business the duties of the Court of Sessions are purely administrative. And if, in its investigations, it occasionally borrows the form of judicial procedure, it is only with a view to its own information or as a guarantee to the community but when the administration of the township is brought before it, it always acts as a judicial body, and in some few cases as an official assembly. The first difficulty is to procure the obedience of an authority as entirely independent of the general laws of the state as the township is. We have stated that assessors are annually named by the town meetings to levy the taxes. If a township attempts to evade the payment of the taxes by neglecting to name its assessors the Court of Sessions condemns it to a heavy penalty. The fine is levied on each of the inhabitants and the sheriff of the county who is the officer of justice executes the mandate. Thus it is that in the United States the authority of the government is mysteriously concealed under the forms of a judicial sentence. And its influence is at the same time fortified by that irresistible power with which men have invested the formalities of law. These proceedings are easy to follow and understand. The demands made upon a township are in general plain inaccurately defined. They consist in a simple fact without any complication or in a principle without its application in detail. But the difficulty arises when it is not the obedience of a township but that of the town officer which is to be enforced. All the reprehensible actions of which a public functionary may be guilty are reducible to the following heads. He may execute the law He may neglect to execute the law He may do what the law enjoins him not to do. The last two violations of duty can alone come under the cognizance of a tribunal. A positive and appreciable fact is the indispensable foundation of an action at law. Thus if the selectmen omit to fulfill the legal formalities usual at town elections they may be condemned to pay a fine but when the public officer performs his duty without ability and he obeys the letter of the law without zeal or energy he is at least beyond the reach of judicial interference. The court of sessions even when it is invested with its official powers is in this case unable to compel him to a more satisfactory obedience. The fear of removal is the only check to those quasi offenses and as the court of sessions does not originate the town authorities it cannot remove functionaries whom it does not appoint. Moreover a perpetual investigation would be necessary to convict the officer of negligence or lukewarmness and the court of sessions sits but twice a year and then only judges such offenses as are brought before its notice. The only security of that active and enlightened obedience which a court of justice cannot impose upon public officers lies in the possibility of their arbitrary removal. In France this security is sought for in powers exercised by the heads of the administration. In America it is sought for the example of election. Thus to recapitulate in a few words what I have been showing if a public officer in New England commits a crime in the exercise of his functions the ordinary courts of justice are always called upon to pass sentence upon him. If he commits a fault in his official capacity a purely administrative tribunal is empowered to punish him and if the affair is important or urgent the judge supplies the omission of the functionary. Lastly if the same individual is guilty of one of those intangible offenses of which human justice has no cognizance he annually appears before a tribunal from which there is no appeal which can at once reduce him to insignificance and deprive him of his charge. This system undoubtedly possesses great advantages but its execution is attended with a practical difficulty which it is important to point out. I have already observed that the administrative tribunal which is called the court of sessions has no right of inspection over the town officers. It can only interfere when the conduct of a magistrate is specially brought under its notice and this is the delicate part of the system. The Americans of New England are unacquainted with the office of public prosecutor in the court of sessions and it may readily be perceived that it could not have been established without great difficulty. If an accusing magistrate had merely been appointed in the chief town of each county and if he had been unassisted by agents in the townships he would not have been better acquainted with what was going on in the county than the members of the court of sessions. But to appoint agents in each township would have been to center in his person the most formidable of powers that of a judicial administration. Moreover laws are the children of habit and nothing of the kind exists in the legislation of England. The Americans have therefore divided the offices of inspection and of prosecution as well as all the other functions of the administration. Grand jurors are bound by the law to apprise the court to which they belong of all the misdemeanors which may have been committed in their county. There are certain great offenses which are officially prosecuted by the states but more frequently the task of punishing delinquents devolves upon the fiscal officer whose province it is to receive the fine. Thus the treasurer of the township is charged with the prosecution of such administrative offenses as fall under his notice. But a more special appeal is made by American legislation to the private interest of the citizen and this great principle is constantly to be met with in studying the laws of the United States. American legislators are more apt to give men credit for intelligence than for honesty and they rely not a little on personal cupidity for the execution of the laws. When an individual is really and sensibly injured by an administrative abuse it is natural that his personal interest should induce him to prosecute but if illegal formality be required which however advantageous to the community is of small importance to individuals plaintiffs may be less easily found and thus by a tacit agreement the laws may fall into disuse. Reduced by their system to this extremity the Americans are obliged to encourage informers by bestowing on them a portion of the penalty in certain cases and to ensure the execution of the laws by the dangerous expedient of degrading the morals of the people. The only administrative authority above the county magistrates is, properly speaking, that of the government. General remarks on the administration of the United States differences of the states of the union in their system of administration activity and perfection of the local authorities decreases towards the south. Power of the magistrate increases that of the minister diminishes. Administration passes from the township to the county states of New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania principles of administration applicable to the whole union election of public officers and inalienability of their functions absence of graduation of ranks introduction of judicial resources into the administration. I have already premised that after having examined the constitution of the township in the county of New England in detail I should take a general view of the remainder of the union. Townships and a local activity exist in every state but in no part of the confederation is a township to be met with precisely similar to those of New England. The more we descend toward the south the less active does the business of the township or parish become. The number of magistrates of functions and of rights decreases. The population exercises a less immediate influence on affairs. Town meetings are less frequent and the subjects of debate less numerous. The power of the elected magistrate is augmented and that of the elector diminished, whilst the public spirit of the local communities is less awakened and less influential. These differences may be perceived to a certain extent in the state of New York. They are very sensible in Pennsylvania but they become less striking as we advance to the northwest. The majority of immigrants who settle in the northwestern states are natives of New England and they carry the habits of their mother country with them into that which they adopt. A township in Ohio is by no means dissimilar from a township in Massachusetts. We have seen that in Massachusetts the main spring of public administration lies in the township. It forms the common center of the interests and affection of the citizens. But this ceases to be the case as we descend to states in which knowledge is less generally diffused and where the township consequently offers fewer guarantees of a wise and active administration. As we leave New England therefore we find that the importance of the town is gradually transferred to the county which becomes the center of administration and the intermediate power between the government and the citizen. In Massachusetts the business of the county is conducted by the court of sessions which is composed of a quorum named by the governor and his council but the county has no representative assembly and its voted by the national legislature. In the great state of New York on the contrary and in those of Ohio and Pennsylvania the inhabitants of each county choose a certain number of representatives who constitute the assembly of the county. The county assembly has the right of taxing the inhabitants to a certain extent and in this respect it enjoys the privileges of a real legislative body. At the same time it exercises an executive power in the county frequently directs the administration of the townships and restricts their authority within much narrower bounds than in Massachusetts. Such are the principle differences which the systems of county and town administration present in the federal states were at my intention to examine the provisions of American law minutely I should have to point out still further differences in the executive details of the several communities. But what I have already said may suffice to show the general principles on which the administration of the United States rests. These principles are differently applied their consequences are more or less numerous in various localities but they are always substantially the same. The laws differ and their outward features change but their character does not vary. If the township and the county are not everywhere constituted in the same manner it is at least true that in the United States the county and the township are always responsible namely that everyone is the best judge of what concerns himself alone and the most proper person to supply his private wants. The township and the county are therefore bound to take care of their special interests. The state governs but it does not interfere with their administration. Exceptions to this rule may be met with but not a contrary principle. The first consequence of this doctrine has been to cause all the magistrates to be chosen either citizens. As the officers are everywhere elected or appointed for a certain period it has been impossible to establish the rules of a dependent series of authorities. There are almost as many independent functionaries as there are functions and the executive power is disseminated in a multitude of hands. Hence arose the indispensable necessity of introducing the control of the courts of justice over the administration and the system of pecuniary penalties by which the secondary bodies are constrained to obey the laws. This system obtains from one end of the union to the other. The power of punishing the misconduct of public offices or of performing the part of the executive in urgent cases has not, however, been bestowed on the same judges in all the states. The Anglo-Americans derive the institution of justices of the peace from the common source but although it exists in all the states it is not always turned to the same use. The justices of the peace everywhere participate in the administration of the townships and the counties either as public officers or as the judges of public misdemeanors. But in most of the states the more important classes of public offenses come under the cognizance of ordinary tribunals. The election of public officers or the inalienability of their functions, the absence of a graduation of powers and the introduction of a judicial control over the secondary branches of the state, are the universal characteristics of the American system from Maine to the Florida's. In some states and that of New York has advanced most in this direction, traces of a centralized administration begin to be discernible. In the state of New York the officers of the central government exercise in certain cases a sort of inspection or control over the secondary bodies. At other times they constitute a court of appeal for the decision of affairs. In the state of New York judicial penalties are less used than in other parts as a means of administration and the right of prosecuting the offenses of public officers is vested in fewer hands. The same tendency is faintly observable in some other states, but in general the prominent feature of the administration in the United States is the successive local independence of the state. I have now described the townships in the administration, it now remains for me in government. This is ground and may pass over rapidly without fear of being misunderstood, for all I have to say is to be found in written forms of the various constitutions which are easily to be procured. These constitutions rest upon a simple and rational theory, their forms have been adopted by all constitutional nations and are become familiar to us. In this place therefore it is only necessary for me to give a short analysis. I shall endeavor afterwards to pass judgment upon what I have to describe. End of Chapter 5 Part 2 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Democracy in America Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville translated by Henry Reeb Chapter 5 Necessity of Examining the Condition of the States Part 3 Legislative Power The State Division of the Legislative Body into two Houses Senate House of Representatives Different Functions of these two Bodies The Legislative Power of the State is vested in two assemblies, the first of which generally bears the name of the Senate. The Senate is commonly a legislative body but it sometimes becomes an executive and judicial one. It takes apart in the government in several ways according to the Constitution of the different states, but it is in the nomination of public functionaries that it most commonly assumes an executive power. It partakes of judicial power in the trial of certain political offenses and sometimes also in the decision of certain civil cases. The number of its members is always small. The other branch of the legislature which is usually called the House of Representatives has no share whatever in the administration and only takes apart in the judicial power in as much as public functionaries before the Senate. The members of the two Houses are nearly everywhere subject to the same conditions of election. They are chosen in the same manner and by the same citizens. The only difference which exists between them is that the term for which the Senate is chosen is in general longer than that of the House of Representatives. The latter seldom remain in office longer than a year. The former usually sit two or three years. By granting to the Senators the privilege of being chosen for several years and being renewed seriatim, the law takes care to preserve in the legislative body a nucleus of men already accustomed to public business and capable of exercising a salutary influence upon the junior members. The Americans plainly did not desire by the separation of the legislative body into two branches to make one House hereditary and the other elective, one aristocratic and the other democratic. It was not their object to create in the one a bulwark to power whilst the other represented the interests and passions of the people. The only advantages which result from the present constitution of the United States are the division of the legislative power and the consequent check upon political assemblies with the creation of a tribunal of appeal for the revision of the laws. Time and experience however have convinced the Americans that if these are its only advantages, the division of the legislative power is still a principle of the greatest necessity. Pennsylvania was the only one of the United States which at first attempted to establish a single House of Assembly by the principle of the sovereignty of the people as to have a concurred in the measure, but the Pennsylvanians were soon obliged to change the law and to create two houses. Thus the principle of the division of the legislative power was finally established and its necessity may be hence forward regarded as a demonstrated truth. This theory, which was nearly unknown to the republics of antiquity which was introduced into the world almost by accident like so many other great truths and misunderstood by several modern nations, is at length become an axiom in the political science of the present age. Executive power of the state office of governor in an American state the place he occupies in relation to the legislature, his rights and his duties, his dependence on the people. The executive power of the state may with truth be said to be represented by the governor although he enjoys but a portion of its rights. The supreme magistrate under the title of governor is the official moderator and counselor of the legislature. He is armed with a veto or suspensive power which allows him to stop or at least to retard its movements at pleasure. He is the once of the country before the legislative body and points out the means which he thinks may be usefully employed in providing for them. He is the natural executor of its decrees in all the undertakings which interest the nation at large. In the absence of the legislature the governor is bound to take all necessary steps to guard the state against violent shocks and unforeseen dangers. The whole military power of the state is at the disposal of the governor. He is the commander of the militia and head of the armed forces. When the authority which is by general consent awarded to the laws is disregarded the governor puts himself at the head of the armed forces of the state to quell resistance and to restore order. Lastly the governor takes no share in the administration of townships and counties except it be indirectly in the nomination of justices of the peace which nomination to cancel. The governor is an elected magistrate and is generally chosen for one or two years only so that he always continues to be strictly dependent upon the majority who returned him. Political effects of the system of local administration in the United States. Necessary distinction between the general centralization of government and the centralization of the local administration. Local administration not centralized in the United States. Great general centralization of the government. Some bad consequences resulting to the United States from the local administration. Administrative advantages attending this order of things. The power which conducts the government is less regular, less enlightened, less learned, but much greater than in Europe. Political advantage of this order of things. In the United States the interests of the country are everywhere kept in view. Support given to the government by the community. Provincial institutions more necessary in proportion as the social condition becomes more democratic. Reason of this. Centralization has become a word of general and daily use without any precise meaning being attached to it. Nevertheless there exist two distinct kinds of centralization which it is necessary to discriminate with accuracy. Certain interests are common in all parts of a nation such as the enactment of its general laws and the maintenance of its foreign relations. Other interests are peculiar to certain parts of the nation such for interests as the business of two different townships. When the power which directs the general interest is centered in one place or vested in the same persons it constitutes a central government. In like manner the power of directing partial or local interest when brought together into one place is what may be termed a central administration. Upon some points these two kinds of centralization coalesce. But by classifying the objects which fall more particularly within the province of each of them they may be easily distinguished. It is evident that a central government acquires immense power when united to administrative centralization. Thus combined it accustoms men to set their own will habitually and completely aside. Not only for once or upon one point but in every respect and at all times. Not only therefore does this union of power subdue them compulsorily, but it affects them in the ordinary habits of life and influences each individual first separately and then collectively. These two kinds of centralization mutually assist and attract each other but they must not be supposed to be inseparable. It is impossible to imagine a more completely central government at which existed in France under Louis XIV. When the same individual was the author and the interpreter of the laws and the representative of France at home and abroad he was justified in asserting that the state was identified with his person. Nevertheless the administration was much less centralized under Louis XIV than it is at the present day. In England the centralization of the government is carried to great perfection. The state has the compact vigor of command and by the sole act of its will it puts immense engines in motion and wields or collects the efforts of its authority. Indeed I cannot conceive that a nation can enjoy a secure or prosperous existence without a powerful centralization of government but I am of opinion that a central administration enterrates the nations in which it exists by incessantly diminishing their public spirit. If such an administration succeeds in condensing at a given moment at a given point all the disposable resources of a people it impairs at least the renewal of those resources. It may ensure a victory in the hour of strife but it gradually relaxes the sinews of strength. It may contribute admirably to the transient greatness of a man but it cannot ensure the durable prosperity of a nation. If we pay proper attention we shall find that whenever it is said that a state cannot act because it has no central point it is the centralization of the government in which it is deficient. It is frequently asserted and we are prepared to assent to the proposition that the German Empire was never able to bring all its powers into action. But the reason was that the state was never able to enforce obedience to its general laws because the several members of that great body always claimed the right or found the means of refusing their cooperation to the representatives of the common authority. This is the reason why the government is so concerned about the affairs which concerned the mass of the people. In other words because there was no centralization of government. This same remark is applicable to the Middle Ages. The cause of all the confusion of feudal society was that the control not only of local but of general interests was divided amongst a thousand hands and broken up in a thousand years. We have shown that in the United States no central administration and no dependent series of public functionaries exist. Local authority has been carried to lengths which no European nation could endure without great inconvenience and which has even produced some disadvantageous consequences in America. But in the United States the centralization of the government is complete and it would be easy to prove that the national power is more compact than it has ever been in the old nations not only is there but one legislative body in each state not only does there exist but one source of political authority but district assemblies and county courts have not in general been multiplied lest they should be tempted to exceed their administrative duties and interfere with the government. In America the legislature of each state is supreme nothing can impede its authority neither privileges nor local immunities nor personal influence nor even the empire of reason it represents that majority which claims to be the sole organ of reason its own determination is therefore the only limit to this action In juxtaposition to it and under its immediate control is the representative of the executive power whose duty it is to constrain the refractories to submit by superior force The only symptom of weakness lies in certain details of the action of the government. The American republics have no standing armies in the state a discontented minority but as no minority has yet been reduced to declare open war the necessity of an army has not been felt the state usually employs the officers of the township or the county to deal with the citizen thus for instance in New England the assessor fixes the rate of taxes the collector receives them the town treasurer transmits the amount to the public treasury and the disputes which may arise in the courts of justice this method of collecting taxes is slow as well as inconvenient and it would prove a perpetual hindrance to a government whose pecuniary demands were large it is desirable that in whatever materially affects its existence the government should be served by officers of its own appointed by itself removable at pleasure and accustomed to rapid methods of proceeding but it will always be easy for the central government organized as it is in America in two and more efficacious modes of action proportioned to its wants the absence of a central government will not then as has often been asserted prove the destruction of the republics of the new world far from supposing that the American governments are not sufficiently centralized I shall prove hereafter that they are too much so the legislative bodies daily encroach upon the authority of the government and their tendency like that of the French convention is to appropriate it entirely to themselves under these circumstances the social power is constantly changing hands because it is subordinate to the power of the people which is too apt to forget the maximum wisdom and foresight in the consciousness of its strength hence the rises its danger and thus its vigor and not its impotence which will probably be the cause of its ultimate destruction the system of local administration has several different effects in America the Americans seem to me to have outstepped the limits of sound policy in isolating the administration of the government for order even in second rate affairs is a matter of national importance as the state has no administrative functionaries of its own stationed on different points of its territory to whom it can give a common impulse the consequence is that it rarely attempts to issue any general police regulations the want of these regulations is severely felt and is frequently observed by Europeans the appearance of disorder which prevails on the surface leads him at first to imagine that society is in a state of anarchy nor does he perceive his mistake till he has gone deeper into the subject certain undertakings are of importance to the whole state but they cannot be put in execution because there is no national administration to direct them abandoned to the exertions of the towns or counties under the care of elected or temporary agents they lead to no result or at least to no durable benefit the partisans of centralization in Europe are want to maintain that the government directs the affairs of each locality better than the citizens could do it for themselves this may be true when the central power is enlightened and when the local districts are ignorant when it is as alert as they are slow when it is accustomed to act and they to obey but this double tendency must augment with the increase of centralization and that the readiness of the one and the incapacity of the others must become more and more prominent but I deny that such is the case when the people is as enlightened as awake to his interest and as accustomed to reflect on them as the Americans are I am persuaded on the contrary that in this case the collective strength of the citizens will always conduce more efficaciously to the public welfare than the authority of the government it is difficult to point out with certainty the means of arousing the sleeping population and of giving it passions and knowledge which it does not possess it is I am well aware an arduous task to persuade men to busy themselves about their own affairs and it would frequently be easier to interest them in the punctilios of court etiquette than in the repairs of their common dwelling but whenever a central administration affects to supersede a person's most interested I am inclined to suppose that it is either misled or desirous to mislead however enlightening and however skillful a central power may be it cannot of itself embrace all the details of the existence of a great nation such vigilance exceeds the powers of man and when it attempts to create and set in motion so many complicated springs it must submit to a very imperfect result or consume itself in bootless efforts centralization succeeds more easily indeed in subjecting the external actions of men to a certain uniformity which at least commands our regard independently of the objects to which it is applied like those devotees who worship the statue and forget the deity it represents centralization in parts without difficulty and admirable regularity to the routine of business provides for the details of the social police with sagacity represses the smallest disorder and the most petty misdemeanors maintains society in a status quo alike secure from improvement and decline and perpetuates a drowsy precision in the conduct of affairs which is hailed by the heads of the administration as a sign of perfect order and public tranquility in short it excels more in prevention than in action it's forced deserts it when society is to be disturbed or accelerated in its course and if once the cooperation of private citizens is necessary to the furtherance of its measures the secret of its impotence is disclosed even whilst it invokes their assistance it is on the condition that they shall act exactly as much as the government chooses and exactly in the manner it appoints they are to take charge of the details without aspiring to guide the system they are to work in a dark and subordinate sphere and only to judge the acts in which they have themselves cooperated by their results these however are not conditions in which the alliance of the human will is to be obtained its carriage must be free and its actions responsible or such is the constitution of man the citizen had rather remain a passive spectator than a dependent actor in schemes with which he is unacquainted it is undeniable that the want of those uniform regulations which control the conduct of every inhabitant of France is not infrequently felt in the United States gross instances of social indifference are to be met with and from time to time disgraceful blemishes are to be seen in complete contrast with the surrounding civilization useful undertakings which cannot succeed without perpetual attention and rigorous exactitude are very frequently abandoned in the end for in America as well as in other countries the people is subject to sudden impulses and momentary exertions the European who is accustomed to find a functionary always at hand to interfere with the undertakings has some difficulty in accustoming himself to the complex mechanisms of the administration of the townships in general it may be affirmed that the lesser details of the police which render life easy and comfortable are neglected in America but that the essential guarantees of man in society are as strong there as elsewhere in America the power which conducts the government is far less regular less enlightened and less learned but an undrid fold more authoritative than in Europe in no country in the world do the citizens make such exertions for the common wheel and I am acquainted with no people which has established schools as numerous and as efficacious places of public worship better suited to the wants of the inhabitants or roads kept in better repair uniformity or permanence of design the minute arrangements of details and the perfection of an ingenious administration must not be sought for in the United States but it will be easy to find on the other hand the symptoms of a power which if it is somewhat barbarous is at least robust and of an existence which is checkered with accidents indeed but cheered at the same time by animation and effort granting for an instant that the villages and counties of the United States would be more usefully governed by a remote authority which they had never seen than by functionaries taken from the midst of them admitting for the sake that the country would be more secure and that the resources of society better employed if the whole administration centered in a single arm still the political advantages which the Americans derived from their system would induce me to prefer it to the contrary plan it profits me but little after all that a vigilant authority should protect the tranquility of my pleasures and constantly avert all dangers from my path without my care or my concern if the same authority is the absolute mistress of my liberty and of my life and if it so monopolizes all the energy of existence that when it languishes everything languishes around it that when it sleeps everything must sleep that when it dies the state itself must perish in certain countries of Europe the natives consider themselves as a kind of settlers indifferent to the fate of the spot upon which they live the greatest changes are affected without their concurrence and this chance may have apprised them of the event without their knowledge nay more the citizen is unconcerned as to the condition of his village the police of his street the repairs of the church or of the parsonage for he looks upon all these things as unconnected with himself and as the property of a powerful stranger whom he calls the government he has only a life interest in these possessions and he entertains no notions of ownership or of improvement this want of interest in his own affairs goes so far that if his own safety or that of his children is endangered instead of trying to avert the peril he will fold his arms and wait till the nation comes to his assistance this same individual who has so completely sacrificed his own free will has no natural propensity to obedience he cowers is true before the pettiest officer but he braves the law with the spirit of a conquered foe as soon as its superior force is removed his oscillations between servitude and license are perpetual when a nation has arrived at this state it must either change its customs and its laws or perish the source of public virtue is dry and though it may contain subjects the race of citizens is extinct such communities are a natural parade of foreign conquests and if they do not disappear from the scene of life it is because they are surrounded by other nations similar or inferior to themselves it is because the instinctive feeling of their country's claim still exists in their hearts and because an involuntary pride in the name it bears or a vague reminiscence of its bygone fame suffices to give them the impulse of self-preservation nor can the prodigious exertions made by tribes in the defense of a country to which they did not belong be adduced in favor of such a system for it will be found that in these cases their main incitement was religion since the glory or the prosperity of the nation were become parts of their faith and in defending the country they inhabited they defended that holy city of which they were all citizens the turkish tribes have never taken an active share in the conduct of the affairs of society but they accomplished dependist enterprises as long as the victories of the sultan were the triumphs of the Mohammed and faith in the present age they are in rapid decay because their religion is departing and despotism only remains Montesquieu who attributed to absolute power and authority peculiar to itself did it as I conceived an undeserved honor for despotism taken by itself can produce no durable results on close inspection we shall find that religion and not fear has ever been the cause of the long-lived prosperity of an absolute government whatever exertions may be made no true power but it should be noted among men which does not depend on the free union of their inclinations and patriotism and religion are the only two motives in the world which can permanently direct the whole of a body politic to one end laws cannot succeed in rekindling the ardor of an extinguished faith but men may be interested in the fate of their country by the laws by this influence the vague impulsive patriotism which never abandons the human heart and if it be connected with the thoughts the passions and the daily habits of life it may be consolidated into a durable and rational sentiment let it not be said that the time for the experiment is already passed for the old age of nations is not like the old age of men and every fresh generation is a new people ready for the care of the legislature it is not the administrative but the political effects of the local system that most admire in America in the united states the interests of the country are everywhere kept in view they are an object of solicitude to the people of the whole union and every citizen is as warmly attached to them as if they were his own he takes pride in the glory of his nation he boasts of its success to which he conceives himself to have contributed and he rejoices in the general prosperity by which he profits the feeling he entertains toward his analogous to that which unites him to his family and it is by a kind of egotism that he interests himself in the welfare of his country the european generally submits to a public officer because he represents a superior force but to an American he represents a right in America it may be said that no one renders obedience to a man but to justice and to law if the opinion which the citizen entertains of himself is exaggerated it is at least salutary he unhesitatingly confides in his own powers which appear to him to be all sufficient when a private individual meditates and undertaking however directly connected it may be with the welfare of society he never thinks of soliciting the cooperation of the government but he publishes his plan offers to execute it himself courts the assistance of other individuals and struggles manfully against all obstacles undoubtedly he is often less successful than the state might have been in his position but in the end the sum of these private undertakings far exceeds all that the government could have done as the administrative authority is within the reach of the citizens whom it in some degree represents it excites neither their jealousy nor their hatred as its resources are limited everyone feels that he must not rely solely on its assistance thus when the administration thinks fit to interfere it is not abandoned to itself as in Europe the duties of the private citizens are not supposed to have lapsed because the state assists in their fulfillment but everyone is ready on the contrary to guide and to support it this action of individual exertions joined to that of the public authorities frequently performs with the most energetic central administration would be unable to execute it would be easy to adduce several facts in proof of what I advance but I had rather give only one with which I am more thoroughly acquainted in America the means which the authorities have at their disposal for the discovery of crimes and the arrest of criminals are few the state police does not exist and passports are unknown the criminal police of the United States cannot be compared to that of France the magistrates and public prosecutors are not numerous and the examinations of prisoners are rapid and oral nevertheless in no country does crime more rarely elude punishment the reason is that everyone conceives himself to be interested in furnishing evidence of the act committed and in stopping the delinquent during my stay in the United States I witnessed the spontaneous formation of committees for the pursuit and prosecution of a man who had committed a great crime in a certain county in Europe a criminal is an unhappy being who is struggling for his life for the future of justice whilst the population is merely a spectator of the conflict in America he has looked upon as an enemy of the human race and the whole of mankind is against him I believe that provincial institutions are useful to all nations but nowhere do they appear to me to be more indispensable than amongst the democratic people in an aristocracy order can always be maintained in the midst of liberty and as the rulers have a great deal of first-rate consideration in like manner an aristocracy protects the people from the excesses of despotism because it always possesses an organized power ready to resist a despot but a democracy without provincial institutions has no security against these evils how can a populace unaccustomed to freedom in small concerns learn to use it temperately in great affairs what resistance can be offered to tyranny in a country where every private individual is impotent and where the citizens are united by no common tie those who dread the license of the mob and those who fear the rule of absolute power alike to desire the progressive growth of provincial liberties on the other hand I am convinced that democratic nations are most exposed to fall beneath the yoke of a central administration for several reasons amongst which is the following the constant tendency of these nations is to concentrate all the strength of the government in the hands of the only power which directly represents the people because beyond the people nothing is to be perceived but a mass of equal individuals confounded together but when the same power is already in possession of all the attributes of the government it can scarcely refrain from penetrating into the details of the administration and an opportunity of doing so is sure to present itself in the end as was the case in France in the French Revolution there were some pulses in opposite directions which must never be confounded the one was favorable to liberty the other to despotism under the ancient monarchy the king was the sole author of the laws and below the power of the sovereign certain vestiges of provincial institutions half destroyed were still distinguishable these provincial institutions were incoherent ill-compacted and frequently absurd in the hands of the aristocracy they had sometimes been converted into instruments of oppression the revolution declared itself the enemy of royalty and of provincial institutions at the same time it confounded all that had preceded it the spotic power and the checks to its abuses in indiscriminate hatred and its tendency was at once to overthrow and decentralize this double character of the French Revolution is a fact which has been adroitly handled by the friends of absolute power can they be accused of laboring in the cause of despotism when they are defending that central administration which was one of the great innovations of the revolution in this manner popularity may be conciliated with hostility to the rights of the people and the secret slave of tyranny may be the professed admirer of freedom I have visited the two nations in which the system of provincial liberty has been most perfectly established and I have listened to the opinions of different parties in those countries in America I met with men who secretly aspired to destroy the democratic institutions of the union in England I found others who attacked the aristocracy openly but I know of no one who does not regard provincial independence as a great benefit in both countries I have heard a thousand different causes assigned for the evils of the state but the local system was never mentioned amongst them I have heard citizens attribute the power and prosperity of their country to a multitude of reasons but they all place the advantages of local institutions in the foremost rank am I to suppose that when men who are naturally so divided on religious opinions and on political theories agree on one point and that one of which they have daily experience they are all in error the only nations which deny the utility of provincial liberties are those which have fewest of them in other words those who are unacquainted with the institution and only persons who pass a censure upon it End of chapter 5 part 3