 Chapter 15 of Book 3 of Rhetorik. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Rhetorik by Aristotle, translated by Thomas Taylor. Chapter 15 of Book 3. With respect, however, to the disillusion of crimes objected by the opponent, one mode is derived from those things through which the ill-opinion of the audience may be removed. For it makes no difference whether this opinion arises from what is said or not, so that this mode is universal. Another mode consists in obviating such particulars as Ardubius, either by showing that the thing which is the subject of doubt does not exist, or that it is not noxious, or that it is not noxious to this person, or that it is not so pernicious as the opponent contends it to be, or that it is not unjust, or that it is not greatly so, or that it is not disgraceful, or that it is a thing of small consequence. Four things of this kind are the subjects of contention. And this mode was adopted by Iphicrates against Nausicrates, for he confessed that he did what he was accused by Nausicrates of having done, and that he did harm to the person, but did not act unjustly. Or he that has injured another may say that he has made him a compensation, so that if what he did was noxious, yet it was beautifully done, if painful, yet it was beneficial, or something else of the like kind may be said. Another mode consists in showing that the deed which is objected to as a crime was an error, or happened from misfortune, or from necessity. Thus Sophocles said, quote, that he trembled not, as his accuser said, that he might seem to be an old man, but from necessity, for he was not willingly 80 years of age, close quote. An excuse also may be made by asserting that the deed was not done with a view to that end it is said to have been done by the opponent. Thus he who is accused of having injured another person may say, quote, that it was not his intention to injure him, but that the injury was accidental, and that it would be just to hate him if the injury had been done by him voluntarily. Another mode consists in considering whether the opponent himself or some of his kindred have now, or formally, been involved in the crime which he objects to the defendant. Another mode consists in showing that those also are involved in the crime whom the opponent confesses not to be obnoxious to the accusation, as if the opponent should confess that this man, though he is an adulterer, is pure in his conduct, then this, and this man also will be pure. Another mode consists in showing that if the opponent has accused others falsely before, it is probable that he now falsely accuses the defendant, or if it is shown that those who are now accused have been at another time falsely accused, for then it is probable that now also they are falsely accused. In order likewise to remove a bad opinion, it may be said that the same persons who at another time have been suspected of a crime, though no one has accused them, have been found to be innocent. Another mode consists in reciprocally criminating the accuser, for if the accuser is unworthy of belief, it is absurd that his assertions should be credible. Another mode consists in showing that the present cause has been decided before, as Euripides does in the action against Higianotes, which is called Antidosis, who accused him as an impious person, for when he objected to Euripides, that in that verse of his, the tongue has sworn, but unsworn is the mind, he persuaded men to perjure themselves. Euripides replied, that his accuser acted unjustly in bringing decisions into a court of justice, which had formerly been made in the contest pertaining to Bacchus, for in that tribunal he had defended the verse and would again defend it if he was willing to accuse him in that place. Close quote. Another mode consists in reprobating false accusations, and in showing how great an evil Calumny is, and that it is also attended with the evil of producing other judicial processes. The place, however, which is derived from symbols is common to both, i.e. to him who accuses and to the Crimination. Thus Ulysses, in the tragedy called Toyser, quote, accuses Toyser as the friend of the Trojans, because he was allied to Priam. Close quote. For Hesion, the mother of Toyser, was the sister of Priam. But Toyser replied, quote, that his father, Telemann, was an enemy to Priam, and that he, Bracket, Toyser, close Bracket, did not discover to the Trojans the spies which the Greeks sent to Troy. Close quote. Another place pertains to the accuser, and consists in praising in a small degree, in order to blame afterwards more copiously. And if the opponent has performed any great deed, to mention it concisely, or having enumerated many of his good deeds, which do not pertain to the cause, to blame one of his actions, which does not pertain to it. But accusers of this kind are most artificial and unjust, for they endeavor to injure by good deeds, mingling them with one evil deed. It is common, however, to the accuser, and to him who dissolves the crime, since it is possible that the same thing may have been done for the sake of many things. It is common to the accuser, indeed, to represent the affair in the worst, but to him who dissolves the crime, to represent it in the best point of view. Thus it may be said, quote, that Diomed preferred Ulysses as his associate in the night adventure in Iliad 10, because he thought Ulysses to be the best of the Greeks. Close quote. Or it may be said, quote, that he did not prefer him for this reason, but because he alone was not his antagonist, as being a man of no consequence. Close quote. And thus much concerning accusation. Chapter 16. But narration in demonstrative orations is not continued, but distinguished in the parts. For it is necessary in demonstrative orations to enumerate those actions from which the oration is composed. For an oration of this kind is composed so as to be partly in artificial. Bracket, since the orator, is not the cause of any of the actions, close bracket, and partly artificial. This however, consists in showing either that the thing is, if it is incredible, or what the quality or quantity of it is, or in exhibiting all these. On this account, sometimes it is not requisite to narrate everything, because thus to demonstrate is adverse to facility of remembrance. Thus, for instance, it may be said, quote, that from these things it appears that he is a brave man, but from those a wise, or a just man. Close quote. And the one oration is more simple, i.e., the oration in which everything is narrated in a continued series without any confirmation and amplification. But the other, in which there is confirmation and amplification, is various and not elaborate. It is necessary, however, to call to mind things and persons known and celebrated, on which account the greater part of celebrated persons and things do not require narration. As if, for instance, you should be willing to praise Achilles, for all men are acquainted with his actions. But it is requisite to make use of these actions. But if you were willing to praise Chrissius, narration is necessary, for he is not known by many persons. At present, however, returations ridiculously say that narration should be rapid. Though, what a certain person said in reply to a baker who asked, quote, whether he wished that he should make soft or hard bread, close quote, may be applied to these. For his answer was, quote, is it not possible to make good bread so that it may be neither hard nor soft, but of a moderate condition? Close quote. For it is requisite, neither to make a long narration, as neither is it necessary to make a long exordium, nor to dwell on the credibility of what is narrated. Since here also, propriety consists, neither in rapidity, nor conciseness, but in mediocrity. But this is affected by narrating such things as render the affair manifest, or such things as induce the audience to believe that the thing has been done, or that the person has been hurt, or the injury has been committed, or that the transactions were of the magnitude which the orator wishes here to believe they were. Things, however, of a nature contrary to these, are to be adduced by the opponent. The orator likewise should insert in his narration such things as pertain to his own virtue, such as, quote, but I always admonish him to act justly, and not to desert his children, close quote, or he should insert in his narration such things as pertain to the depravity of another person, as in the above instance, quote, but he answered me that wherever he was he should have other children, close quote, which Herodotus in Utterp says was the answer of the Egyptians when they revolted from their king, or he should insert such things as are pleasing to the judges. To the defendant, however, narration is less necessary, but the subjects of controversies are whether a thing has been done or not, whether it is detrimental or not, whether it is unjust or not, and whether it is a thing of so much consequence or not. Hence the defendant must not dwell upon a thing that is acknowledged unless something is said in opposition to his statement of the affair. For then he must show that admitting the thing to have been done yet it was not unjust. Further still, it is necessary to narrate things which have not been done, as if they had been done, if they are calculated to produce commissuration or indignation. Examples of this are the fabulous narration of Ulysses to Alcinus, and again to Penelope, which is affected in 30 verses. Another example is that a phallus who contracted a very long poem which is called The Circle, and also the prologue of Euripides in his Enos. But it is necessary that the narration should be ethical, and this will be affected if we know what produces manners. One thing therefore which produces them is a manifestation of deliberate choice, and manners are good or bad from the quality which they possess. But deliberate choice is such as it is from the end. On this account, mathematical discussions are not ethical because they do not contain in themselves deliberate choice, for they have not that for the sake of which a thing is done, i.e. they do not consider the end. But this is the business of Socratic discussions. Let's consider things of this kind. The aeration also expresses manners which exhibits such things as are consequent to manners, such as quote that at the same time he said these things he went away, close quote. For this manifests audacity and rusticity of manners. The aeration likewise is rendered ethical by not speaking as if from a syllogistic process like returitions of the present day. But as if from deliberate intention as quote I have wished, close quote, and quote for this was the object of my deliberate choice since, though I should desire no emolument from it, it is a better thing, close quote. For the one, i.e. to speak as if from a syllogistic process is the province of a prudent man. But the other, i.e. to speak from deliberate intention of a good man. For it belongs to a prudent man to pursue what is beneficial. But to a good man to pursue what is beautiful in conduct. If, however, what you narrate is incredible, then the cause is to be explained. An example of which is from the antigone of Sophocles, quote that she was more anxiously concerned for her brother than for her husband or children. For she might repair the loss of her children by marrying again but her mother and father having descended to Hades she could never have another brother, close quote. But if you cannot assign the cause you may say, quote, that you are not ignorant, you relate what is incredible but that you are naturally disposed not to admit anything disgraceful, close quote. For mankind do not believe that any action is performed willingly except it is advantageous. Again, that the narration may be ethical, it is requisite that it should be pathetic. And this is affected by relating such things as are consequent to the passions which are known to the audience and which particularly relate either to the orator or his opponent, as, quote, but he departed looking after me, close quote. And as a shine says of Cradallus, quote that he hissed and clapped with his hands, close quote. For these things are adapted to persuade because these things which the audience know are symbols of what they do not know. Many things also of this kind may be assumed from Homer as in Odyssey 19, quote, then or her face that Beldum spread her hands, close quote. For those who begin to weep cover their eyes with their hands in the beginning of the oration, likewise, you should introduce yourself as a worthy and your opponent as an unworthy man that the audience may survey you and your opponent as such. But this should be done latently and that this may be easily accomplished, may be seen from those who announce anything to us. For concerning things of which we know nothing, we at the same time form a certain opinion of their truth or falsehood. In many places however it is necessary to narrate and sometimes not in the beginning of the oration. But in a popular oration there is no need of narration because no one makes a narration of future events. If however there should happen to be a narration in it, it will be of past events in order that by recalling them into the memory there may be a better consultation about such as our future going on this occasion accusation or praise. But then he who does this will not perform the office of a counselor. If however that which is narrated is incredible then you ought to promise the audience that you will immediately assign the cause of it and leave it to the audience to believe or not as they please. Thus Iocasta in the Oedipus of Carcinus, when she says something incredible in answer to him who asks her concerning his son always promises that she would prove the truth of what she had said and the iman of Sophocles employs the same art. Chapter 17 It is necessary however that credibility should be demonstrative but it is requisite to demonstrate bracket since controversy is respecting four things close bracket by inducing a demonstration of the controversial subject. Thus for instance, if it is controversial whether a thing has been done it is especially necessary in a judicial process to give a demonstration of this or if it is controversial whether this man has been injured or whether he has been injured to the extent alleged or whether justly or not and in a similar manner of the existence of the thing nor must we be ignorant that in this controversy alone one of the persons must necessarily be depraved for here ignorance is not the cause as if certain persons were disputing about justice so that this controversy but not others must be diligently discussed. But in demonstrative orations the amplification will for the most part consist in showing that actions have been beautiful and beneficial for it is necessary to believe in facts for demonstrations are seldom given of these things unless they are incredible or another person is supposed to be the cause of them in popular orations however it may be contended that a thing will not be or that what is advised will take place but that it is not just or it is not beneficial or that it is not of such great consequence it is likewise necessary to see whether the opponent has asserted anything false which does not pertain to the cause since from this as from a sign it may be inferred that he has also spoken falsely in other things examples however are indeed most adapted to popular orations but enthamemes to judicial orations for the former are conversant with the future so that examples must necessarily be derived from past events but judicial orations are conversant with things which exist or do not exist in which there is in a greater degree demonstration and necessity for that which has been done is attended with necessity enthamemes however must not be adduced in a continued series but must be mingled with other things more pleasant and easy since if this is not done they will be detrimental to each other for there is a boundary of quantity hence in Homer in Odyssey 4 Menelaus praises Pisastratus the son of Nestor for the mediocrity of his speech quote, dear youth you have said just as much as a wise man would have said for he does not praise him that he said such things but so much and no more nor must enthamemes be investigated in every subject for if this precept is not observed you will do that which some of those who philosophize do who syllogistically collect things more known and credible than the propositions from which they are deduced when likewise you wish to excite the passions do not introduce an enthamem i.e. abstain from argument for the enthamem will either expel the passion or will be introduced in vain for motions which exist at one and the same time expel each other and either destroy themselves or become imbecile nor when the oration is ethical is it proper at the same time to search for any enthamem for demonstration has neither the power of expressing manners nor deliberate choice sentences however must be used both in narration and confirmation for they are ethical as and i indeed entrusted him with this though i knew that it was not proper to believe in any man but if you wish to speak pathetically you may say and i do not repent though i have been injured for gain is with him but justice with me it is not without reason however that popular orations are more difficult than such as are judicial are conversant with the future but the judicial are conversant with the past which is scientifically known to diviners as epimenines the Cretan said for he did not predict about future events but about such past events as were immanifest in the law is an hypothesis in judicial orations but he who possesses the principle can more easily discover the demonstration popular orations likewise have not many digressions such for instance as a digression to the opponent either respecting himself or which may produce the pathetic but such orations admit these the least of all things unless they depart from their proper employment it is requisite therefore that he should digress who is in want of arguments in this method is adopted by the Athenian returitions and also by isocrates for giving counsel he accuses the Lacedemonians in his panagyric but in his oration concerning peace he accuses Charis in demonstrative orations however it is requisite to insert praise as an episode as isocrates does for he always introduces something which he may praise and Gorgias employed the same art who said quote that he should never be in want of an oration close quote for if he speaks of Achilles he praises Peleus afterwards Iacus and afterwards the God i.e. Jupiter the great grandfather of Achilles in a similar manner he praises the fortitude of Achilles he therefore who has demonstrations may speak both ethically and demonstratively but if you have not enthamemes and it is more adapted to a worthy man that he should appear to be a good man than that he should deliver an accurate oration of enthamemes however those which are adapted to confutation are more approved than those which are demonstrative because such things as produce confutation are evidently more syllogistic for contraries when placed by each other become more known arguments however the arguments employed against the opponent are not specifically different from those which we employ in our own defense but it pertains to credibility to dissolve some things by objection and others by syllogism it is also necessary both in consultation and in a judicial process that he who first pleads his cause should in the first place confirm his cause but afterwards should dissolve or extenuate the arguments but if the opposing arguments are many these must be first confuted as Calistratus did in the Messeniac assembly for he first refuted what his adversaries could say and then said what conduced to his own cause he however who speaks in the second place ought first to encounter the reasoning of his adversary dissolving it and syllogizing in opposition to it and especially if the arguments of his opponents have been approved for as the soul is not favorably disposed towards those who have been already accused of crimes after the same manner neither does it willingly attend to an oration if the opponent appears to have spoken well in order to prepare the mind of the auditor therefore to hear an oration it is necessary first to show that what the opponent has said is false hence the orator must fight against either all the arguments of his opponent or the greatest of them or those which are most approved or those which may be easily confuted and thus render his own arguments credible thus Hecuba in Euripides quote but first the goddesses I will assist for Juno etc. close quote for here Hecuba first confutes what was most infirm and thus much concerning confirmation but with respect to manners since for a man to say certain things about himself is either invidious or is attended with circumlocution or contradiction and to speak of another is attended either with slander or rusticity hence it is necessary to introduce another person speaking as Isocrates does in his oration against Philip and in his antidosis and as Arkeloches blames for he makes the father like Cambys say concerning his daughter in an iambic verse quote there is nothing which may not be expected to be done and nothing which will not be sworn to through money close quote and in another iambic the beginning of which is quote I care not for the riches of Gaijes close quote he introduces Karen the artist speaking thus also Eamon the son of Crian and the husband of Antigone in Sophocles while he supplicates his father Crian for the life of Antigone commemorates the praises of Antigone not from his own proper but from another person it is necessary also to change anthememes and sometimes to change them into sentences as quote it is requisite that those who are intelligent should form compacts with enemies when they are in prosperity for thus they will be attended with the greatest advantage but this is done anthemematically as follows quote for if it is then requisite to form compacts when they are most useful and replete with the most advantageous conditions it is also necessary that they should be made in prosperity close quote chapter 18 with respect to interrogation it is then especially seasonable to employ it when something is said by the opponent of such a nature that by the addition of one interrogation an absurdity will ensue thus Pericles asked Lampeau concerning the mysteries of Ceres who was called the savior goddess but Lampeau replied quote that it was unlawful for one who was uninitiated to hear them related close quote Pericles however again asked him quote if he knew these mysteries close quote and Lampeau replying that he did quote and how is this possible said Pericles since you are uninitiated close quote in the second place it is seasonable to employ interrogation when one of the premises from which something follows favorable to our cause is perspicuous but the other will be evidently granted by the opponent for then it is requisite to interrogate concerning such premise and immediately conclude without interrogating concerning the other premise which is perspicuous thus Socrates when Meletus accused him of not believing there were gods asked him whether he thought there was any such thing as a demonical nature and when Meletus acknowledged that he did Socrates also asked him whether demons were not either the sons of the gods or something divine but Meletus granting that they were is it possible therefore Socrates that anyone can believe that there are sons of the gods and yet that there are no gods further still interrogation may likewise be seasonably employed when we wish to show that the opponent contradicts himself or assert something paradoxical in the fourth place it may be opportunity employed when the opponent can only answer to what is said sophisticly by asserting that a certain thing is and is not or partly is and partly is not or in a certain respect is and in a certain respect is not for the auditors are disturbed by such answers and are dubious as to their meaning when however none of the above mentioned opportunities occur interrogation must not be employed for if it should happen that the opponent answers properly and deludes the interrogation he who interrogates will appear to be vanquished for many questions must not be asked on account of the imbecility of the mind of the auditor hence it is especially necessary that enthamemes should be contracted it is likewise requisite to reply to ambiguous questions by logically dividing and not speaking concisely but to things apparently true a solution must immediately be given with the answer before the opponent can add a second interrogation or syllogize for it is not difficult to foresee what he wishes to infer this however end the solutions i.e. the mode of avoiding and solving capsious interrogations will be manifest to us from the topics if the question also of the opponent produces a conclusion against us it will be opportune in the answer to assign the cause why it does so i.e. being asked by pisander whether he was of the opinion of the other senators that a dominion of 40 persons should be established he replied that he was and when he was asked again does not disappear to you to be a base thing he said it does have you therefore pisander replied given your assent to this base deed i have said sofa clays for no better measure could be adopted thus too that lackan who had been an aphorist or senator when he was desired to give an account of his conduct while he was in administration was asked by someone whether his colleagues appeared to him to have been justly condemned he replied they did but the other then said did not you also decree things together with them he acknowledged that he did quote is it not therefore just the other replied that you should be put to death quote by no means said lackan for they did these things having received money for doing them but i did not since my conduct was the result of my own judgment close quote hence neither is it proper to interrogate after the conclusion nor to interrogate concerning the conclusion itself unless much truth is contained in it with respect to ridicule however since it appears to possess a certain use in contests and it is necessary as gorgeous rightly said that the serious arguments of the opponent should be dissolved by laughter and his laughter by serious arguments we have shown in the poetic how many species of ridicule there are but of these species when indeed is adapted to a liberal man and another is not the orator therefore must assume that species of ridicule which is adapted to the occasion irony however is more liberal than scurrility for he who employs irony produces the ridiculous for his own sake but he who employs scurrility for the sake of another person chapter 19 epilogue however or is composed from four things from that which may cause the auditor to think well of the orator and ill of his opponent from amplification and extenuation from that which may excite the passions of the auditor and from recalling to the memory what has been said for it is natural after demonstration for the orator to show that what he has asserted is true and that what his opponent has said is false and thus to praise and blame and conciliate the good opinion of the audience but of two things it is requisite that the orator should direct his attention to one of them is either to show that he is good to the audience or that he is simply a worthy man and that his opponent is bad to the audience or that he is simply a bad man we have shown however what the places are from which things of this kind are to be derived vis whence it may be inferred that men are worthy or depraved in the next place it is requisite to amplify or extenuate according to nature what has now been demonstrated for it is necessary that it should be acknowledged a thing has been done if the orator intends to speak of its magnitude for the increase of bodies from pre-existent substances but we have already shown whence the places of amplification and extenuation are to be derived after these things however since it is evident what their quality and quantity are the orator should excite the passions of the auditor but these are pity and indignation anger and hatred envy, emulation and contention and we have before shown the places of these hence it remains that in the paration the orator should recall into the memory of the audience what has been before said but this is to be done in such a way as others improperly teach us to do in proems for that a thing may be easily understood they order us to repeat it frequently in proems indeed it is necessary to speak of the thing which is the subject of discussion that the audience should be ignorant what that is which is to be decided but here in paration the arguments which have been employed must be summarily repeated the beginning however of the paration should be quote that the orator has accomplished what he promised close quote so that he must then explain what those things are of which he has spoken and on what account they were discussed by him the repetition should be made from a comparison of what has been said by the opponent and it is requisite to compare either such things as have been said on the same subject both by the orator and his opponent or such things as have not been said by both of them on the same subject as quote and he indeed said this on the subject but I that and for these reasons close quote made from irony as quote for he said this but I that close quote and quote what would he have done if he had shown that those things were transacted and not these close quote or from interrogation as quote what has not been shown close quote or thus quote what has the opponent shown close quote either therefore the repetition thus made or it must be made from comparison or the orator must repeat in a natural order what he has said and again if he is so inclined he may repeat what his opponent has said that mode of diction however is adapted to the conclusion of the oration which is called disjunctive in order that it may be an epilogue and not an oration such as quote he said you have heard you are masters of the subject judge for yourselves close quote end of book 3 and end of rhetoric by Aristotle translated by Thomas Taylor recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards