 CHAPTER 1 SUBJECT OF THE FIRST BOOK Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many a one believes himself the master of others, and yet he is a greater slave than they. How has this change come about? I do not know. What can render it legitimate? I believe that I can settle this question. If I considered only force and the results that proceed from it, I should say that so long as a people is compelled to obey and does obey, it does well. But that, so soon as it can shake off the oak, and does shake it off, it does better, for if men recover their freedom by virtue of the same right by which it was taken away, either they are justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for depriving them of it. But the social order is a sacred right, which serves as a foundation for all others. This right, however, does not come from nature. It is, therefore, based on conventions. The question is to know what these conventions are. Before coming to that, I must establish what I have just laid down. End of Chapter 1, Book 1 This common liberty is a consequence of man's nature. This first law is to attend to his own preservation. His first cares are those which he owes to himself. And as soon as he comes to years of discretion, being sole judge of the means adapted for his own preservation, he becomes his own master. The family is, then, if you will, the primitive model of political societies. The chief is the analogue of the father, while the people represent the children, and all being born free and equal alienate the liberty only for their own advantage. The whole difference is that, in the family, the father's love for his children repays him for the care that he bestows upon them, while, in the state, the pleasure of ruling makes up for the chief's slack of love for his people. Grotius denies that all human authorities established for the benefit of the governed, and he cites slavery as an instance. His invariable mode of reasoning is to establish right by fact. A juster method might be employed, but none more favourable to tyrants. It is doubtful, then, according to Grotius, whether the human race belongs to a hundred men, or whether these hundred men belong to the human race. And he appears throughout his book to incline to the former opinion, which is also that of Hobbes. In this way, we have mankind divided like herds of cattle, each of which has a master who looks after it in order to devour it. Just as a herdsman is superior in nature to his herd, so chiefs, who are the herdsmen of men, are superior in nature to their people. Thus, according to Philo's account, the emperor Caligula reasoned, inferring truly enough from this analogy that kings are gods, or that men are brutes. The reasoning of Caligula is tantamount to that of Hobbes and Grotius. Aristotle, before them all, had likewise said that men are not naturally equal, but that some are born for slavery, and others for dominion. Aristotle was right, but he mistook the effect for the cause. Every man born in slavery is born for slavery, nothing is more certain. Slaves lose everything in their bonds, even the desire to escape from them. They love their servitude, as the companions of Ulysses love their brutishness. If, then, there are slaves by nature, it is because there have been slaves contrary to nature. The first slaves were made such by force, their cowardice kept them in bondage. I have said nothing about King Adam, nor about Emperor Noah, the father of three great monarchs who shared the universe, like the children of Saturn with whom they are supposed to be identical. I hope that my moderation will give satisfaction, for, as I am a direct descendant of one of these princes, and perhaps of the eldest branch, how do I know, whether, by examination of titles, I might not find myself the lawful king of the human race? Be that, as it may, it cannot be denied that Adam was sovereign of the world, as Robinson was of his island, so long as he was its sole inhabitant. And it was an agreeable feature of that empire that the monarch, secure on his throne, had nothing to fear from rebellions, or wars, or conspirators. End of Chapter 2. First Book, Chapter 3 of the Social Contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rosa. First Book, Third Chapter. The Right of the Strongest. The strongest man is never strong enough to be all-waste master, unless he transforms his power into right and obedience into duty. Hence, the right of the strongest, a right apparently assumed in irony and really established in principle. But will this phrase never be explained to us? Forge is a physical power. I do not see what morality can result from its effects. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will. It is at most an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty? Let us assume for a moment this pretended right. I say that nothing results from it, but inexplicable nonsense. For, if force constitutes right, the effect changes with the cause, and any force which overcomes the first succeeds towards rights. As soon as men can disobey with impunity, they may do so legitimately. And since the strongest is always in the right, the only thing is to act in such a way that one may be the strongest. But what sort of a right is it that perishes when force ceases? If it is necessary to obey by compulsion, there is no need to obey from duty. And if men are no longer forced to obey, obligation is at an end. We see then that this word right adds nothing to force. It here means nothing at all. Obey the powers that be, if that means yields to force, the percept is good but superfluous. I reply that it will never be violated. All power comes from God, I admit, but every disease comes from Him too. Does it follow that we are prohibited from calling in a physician? If a brigand should surprise me in the recesses of a wood, am I bound not only to give up my purpose when forced, but am I also morally bound to do so when I might conceal it? For, in effect, the pistol which he holds is a superior force. Let us agree, then, that might does not make right, and that we are bound to obey none but lawful authorities. Thus my original question ever recurs. End of Chapter 3 Book 1 Chapter 4 of the Social Contract This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, the Social Contract, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Book 1, Chapter 4. Slavery Since no man has any natural authority over his fellow men. And since force is not the source of right, conventions remain as the basis of all lawful authority among men. If an individual, says Grosius, can alienate his liberty and become the slave of a master, why should not a whole people be able to alienate theirs and become the subject to a king? In this there are many equivocal terms requiring explanation. But let us confine ourselves to the word alienate. To alienate is to give or sell. Now, a man who becomes another slave does not give himself. He sells himself, at the very least for his subsistence. But why does a nation sell itself? So far from a king supplying his subjects with their subsistence, he draws his from them. And according to Rabelé, a king does not live on a little. Do subjects then give up their persons on condition that their property also be taken? I do not see what is left for them to keep. It will be said that the despot secures to his subjects civil peace. Be it so. But what do they gain by that, if the wars which his ambition brings upon them, together with his insatiable greed and the vexations of his administration, harass them more than their own dissentions would? What do they gain by it if this tranquility is itself one of their miseries? Men live tranquilly also in dungeons. Is that enough to make them contented there? The Greeks confined in the cave of the Cyclops lived peacefully until their turn came to be devoured. To say that a man gives himself for nothing is to say what is absurd and inconceivable. Such an act is illegitimate and invalid, for the simple reason that he who performs it is not in his right mind. To say the same thing of a whole nation is to suppose a nation of fools, and madness does not confer rights. Even if each person could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children. They are born free men. Their liberty belongs to them, and no one has a right to dispose of it except themselves. Before they have come to years of discretion, the Father can, in their name, stipulate conditions for their preservation and welfare, but not surrender them irrevocably and unconditionally, for such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature and exceeds the rights of paternity. In order, then, that an arbitrary government might be legitimate, it would be necessary that the people in each generation should have the option of accepting or rejecting it, but in that case such a government would no longer be arbitrary. To renounce one's liberty is to renounce one's quality as a man, the rights and also the duties of humanity. For him who renounces everything, there is no possible compensation. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man's nature, for to take away all freedom from his will is to take away all morality from his actions. In short, a convention which stipulates absolute authority on the one side, and unlimited obedience on the other, is vain and contradictory. Is it not clear that we are under no obligations whatsoever toward a man from whom we have a right to demand everything? And does not this single condition, without equivalent, without exchange, involve the nullity of the act? For what right would my slave have against me, since all that he has belongs to me? His rights being mine, this right of me against myself, is a meaningless phrase. Grosius and others derive from war another origin for the pretended right of slavery. The victor having, according to them, the right of slaying the vanquished, the latter may purchase his life at the cost of his freedom, an agreement so much the more legitimate that it turns to the advantage of both. But it is manifest that this pretended right of slaying the vanquished in no way results from the state of war. Men are not naturally enemies, if only for the reason that, living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations sufficiently durable to constitute a state of peace or a state of war. It is the relation of things and not of men which constitutes war, and since the state of war cannot arise from simple personal relations, but only from real relations, private war, war between man and man, cannot exist either in the state of nature, where there is no settled ownership, or in the social state where everything is under the authority of the laws. Private combats, duels, and encounters are acts which do not constitute a state of war, and with regard to the private wars authorized by the establishments of Louis IX, King of France, and suspended by the peace of God, there were abuses of the feudal government, an absurd system if ever there was one, contrary both to the principles of natural right and to all sound government. War, then, is not a relation between man and man, but a relation between state and state, in which individuals are enemies only by accident, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers, not as members of the Fatherland, but as its defenders. In short, each state can have as enemies only other states and not individual men, in as much as it is impossible to fix any true relation between things of different kinds. This principle is also conformable to the established maxims of all ages and to the invariable practice of all civilized nations. The declarations of war are not so much warnings to the powers as to their subjects. The foreigner, whether king or nation or private person, that robs, slays, or detains subjects without declaring war against the government, is not an enemy, but a brigand. Even in open war, a just prince, while he rightly takes possession of all that belongs to the state and an enemy's country, respects the person and property of individuals. He respects the rights on which his own are based. The aim of war being the destruction of the hostile state, we have a right to slay its defenders so long as they have arms in their hands, but as soon as they lay them down and surrender, ceasing to be enemies or instruments of the enemy, they become again simply men, and no one has any further right over their lives. Sometimes it is possible to destroy the state without killing a single one of its members, but war confers no right except what is necessary to its end. These are not the principles of grossness. They are not based on the authority of poets, but are derived from the nature of things, and are founded on reason. With regard to the right of conquest, it has no other foundation than the law of the strongest. If war does not confer on the victor the right of slaying the vanquished, this right, which he does not possess, cannot be the foundation of a right to enslave them. If we have a right to slay an enemy, only when it is impossible to enslave him, the right to enslave him is not derived from the right to kill him. It is therefore an iniquitous bargain to make him purchase his life over which the victor has no right at the cost of his liberty. In establishing the right of life and death upon the right of slavery, and the right of slavery upon the right of life and death, is it not manifest that one falls into a vicious circle? Even if we grant this terrible right of killing everybody, I say that a slave made in war, or a concord nation, is under no obligation at all to a master, except to obey him so far as compelled. In taking an equivalent for his life, the victor has conferred no favor on the slave. Instead of killing him unprofitably, he has destroyed him for his own advantage. Far then, from having acquired over him any authority in addition to that of force, the state of war subsists between them as before. Their relation even is the effect of it, and the exercise of the rights of war supposes that there is no treaty of peace. They have made a convention. Be it so, but this convention, far from terminating the state of war, supposes its continuance. Thus, in whatever way we regard things, the right of slavery is invalid, not only because it is illegitimate, but because it is absurd and meaningless. These terms, slavery and right, are contradictory and mutually exclusive. Whether addressed by a man to a man, or by a man to a nation, such a speech as this will always be equally foolish. I make an agreement with you, wholly at your expense and wholly for my benefit, and I shall observe it as long as I please, while you also shall observe it as long as I please. End of Chapter 4. Book 1, Chapter 5 of the Social Contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Justin Tovar. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Book 1, Chapter 5. That is always necessary to go back to a first convention. If I should concede all that I have so far refuted, those who favor despotism would be no farther advanced. There will always be a great difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society. When isolated men, however numerous they may be, are subjected one after another to a single person, this seems to me only a case of master and slaves, not of a nation and its chief, they form, if you will, an aggregation, but not an association. For they have neither public property nor a body politic. Such a man, had he enslaved half the world, is never anything but an individual. His interest, separated from that of the rest, is never anything but a private interest. If he dies, his empire after him, is left disconnected and disunited as an oak dissolves and becomes a heap of ashes after the fire has consumed it. A nation, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. According to Grotius, then, a nation is a nation before it gives itself to a king. This gift itself is a civil act, and presupposes a public resolution. Consequently, before examining the act by which a nation becomes a nation, it would be proper to examine the act by which a nation becomes a nation. For this act, being necessarily anterior to the other, is the real foundation of the society. In fact, if there were no anterior convention where, unless the election were unanimous, would be the obligation upon the minority to submit to the decision of the majority, and wence to the hundred who desire a master, derive the right to vote on behalf of ten who do not desire one. The law of the plurality of votes is itself established by convention and presupposes unanimity once at least. End of chapter five, recording by Justin Tovar, Justin Tovar.voice123.com. Book one, chapter six of the social contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Justin Tovar, the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, book one, chapter six, The Social Pact. I assume that men have reached the point at which the obstacles that endanger their preservation in the state of nature overcome by their resistance, the forces with which each individual can exert with a view to maintaining himself in that state. Then this primitive condition cannot longer subsist and the human race would perish unless it changed its mode of existence. Now as men cannot create any new forces but only combine and direct those that exist, they have no other means of self preservation than to form by aggregation a sum of forces which may overcome the resistance, to put them in action by a single motive power and to make them work in concert. This sum of forces can be produced only by the combination of many, but the strength and freedom of each man being the chief instruments of his preservation. How can he pledge them without injuring himself and without neglecting the cares which he owes to himself? This difficulty applied to my subject may be expressed in these terms. To find a form of association which may defend and protect with the whole force of the community, the person and property of every associate and by means of which coalescing with all may nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before. Such is the fundamental problem of which the social contract furnishes the solution. The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would render them vain and ineffectual. So that although they have never perhaps been formally enunciated, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized until the social pact being violated, each man would gains his original rights and recovers his natural liberty while losing the conventional liberty for which he renounced it. These clauses rightly understood are reducible to one only. These, the total alienation to the whole community of each associate with all his rights. Four, in the first place, since each gives himself up entirely, the conditions are equal for all and the conditions being equal for all, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others. Further, the alienation being made without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be and an individual associate can no longer claim anything. Four, if any rights were left to individuals, since there would be no common superior who could judge between them in the public, each being on some point his own judge would soon claim to be so on all. The state of nature would still subsist and the association would necessarily become tyrannical or useless. In short, each giving himself to all gives himself to nobody and as there is not one associate over whom we do not acquire the same rights which we concede to him over ourselves, we gain the equivalent of all that we lose and more power to preserve what we have. If then, we set aside what is not of the essence of the social contract, we shall find that it is reducible to the following terms. Each of us puts in common his person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general will and in return we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole. Fourth win, instead of the individual personalities of all the contracting parties, this act of association produces a moral and collective body which is composed of as many members as the assembly has voices and which he receives from the same act its unity, its common self, more, its life and its will. This public person which is thus formed by the union of all the individual members formally took the name city and now takes that of republic or body politic which is called by its members state when it is passive, sovereign when it is active, power when it is compared to similar bodies. With regard to the associates they take collectively the name of people and are called individually citizens as participating in the sovereign power and subjects as subjected to the laws of the state but these terms are often confused and mistaken one for another. It is sufficient to know how to distinguish them when they are used with complete precision. End of Chapter 6. Recording by Justin Tobar JustinTobar.voice123.com First book Chapter 7 of The Social Contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. First book Chapter 7 The Sovereign. We see from this formula that the act of association contains a reciprocal engagement between the public and individuals and that every individual contracting so to speak with himself is engaged in a double relation namely as a member of the sovereign toward individuals and as a member of the state toward the sovereign but we cannot apply here the maxim of civil law that no one is bound by engagements made with himself for there is a great difference between being bound to oneself and to a whole of which one forms part. We must further observe that the public resolution which can bind all subjects to the sovereign in consequence of the two different relations under which each of them is regarded cannot for a contrary reason bind the sovereign to itself and that accordingly it is contrary to the nature of the body politic for the sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot transgress. As it can only be considered under one and the same relation it is in the position of an individual contracting with himself once we see that there is not nor can be any kind of fundamental law binding upon the body of the people not even the social contract. This does not imply that such a body cannot perfectly well enter into engagements with others in what does not derogate from this contract for with regard to foreigners it becomes a simple being an individual but the body politic or sovereign deriving its existence only from the sanctity of the contract can never bind itself even to others in anything that derogates from the original act such as alienation of some portion of itself or submission to another sovereign. To violate the act by which it exists would be to annihilate itself and what is nothing produces nothing. So soon as the multitude is thus united in one body it is impossible to injure one of the members without attacking the body still less to injure the body without the members feeling the effects. Thus duty and interest alike oblige the two contracting parties to give mutual assistance and the men themselves should seek to combine in this twofold relationship all the advantages which are attendant on it. Now the sovereign being formed only of the individuals that compose it neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs consequently the sovereign power needs no guarantee toward its subjects because it is impossible that the body should wish to injure all its members and we shall see hereafter that it can injure no one as an individual. The sovereign for the simple reason that it is so is always everything that it ought to be. But this is not the case as regards the relation of subjects to the sovereign which notwithstanding the common interest would have no security for the performance of their engagements unless it found means to ensure their fidelity. Indeed every individual may as a man have a particular will contrary to or divergent from the general will which he has as a citizen. His private interest may prompt him quite differently from the common interest his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution the loss of which will be less harmful to others than the payment of it will be burdensome to him. And regarding the moral person that constitutes the state as an imaginary being because it is not a man he would be willing to enjoy the rights of a citizen without being willing to fulfill the duties of a subject. The progress of such injustice would bring about the ruin of the body politic. In order then that the social pact may not be a vain formulary it tacitly includes this engagement which can alone give force to the others that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body which means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free for such is the condition which uniting every citizen to his native land guarantees him from all personal dependence a condition that ensures the control and working of the political machine and alone renders legitimate civil engagements which without it would be absurd and tyrannical and subject to the most enormous abuses end of chapter seven first book chapter eight of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau first book chapter eight the civil state the passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change by substituting in his conduct justice for instinct and by giving his actions the moral quality that they previously lacked it is only when the voice of duty succeeds physical impulse and law succeeds appetite that man who till then had regarded only himself sees that he is obliged to act on other principles and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations although in this state he is deprived of many advantages that he derives from nature he acquires equally great ones in return his faculties are exercised and developed his ideas are expanded his feelings are ennobled his whole soul is exalted to such a degree that if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him below that from which he has emerged he ought to bless without seizing the happy moment that released him from it forever and transformed him from a stupid and ignorant animal into an intelligent being and a man let us reduce this whole balance to terms easy to compare what man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to anything which tempts him and which he is able to attain what he gains is civil liberty and property in all that he possesses in order that we may not be mistaken about these compensations we must clearly distinguish natural liberty which is limited only by the powers of the individual from civil liberty which is limited by the general will and possession which is nothing but the result of force or the right of first occupancy from property which can be based only on positive title besides the preceding we might add to the acquisitions of the civil state moral freedom which alone renders man truly master of himself for the impulse of mere appetite is slavery while obedience to a self-prescribed law is liberty but i have already said too much on this head and the philosophical meaning of the term liberty does not belong to my present subject end of chapter eight first book chapter nine of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org first book of the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau chapter nine real property every member of the community at the moment of its formation gives himself up to it just as he actually is himself and all his powers of which the property that he possesses forms part by this act possession does not change its nature when it changes hands and become property and those of the sovereign but as the powers of the state are incomparably greater than those of an individual public possession is also in fact more secure and more irrevocable without being more legitimate at least in respect of foreigners for the state with regard to its members is owner of all their property by the social contract which in the state serves as the basis of all rights but with regard to other powers it is owner only by the right of first occupancy which it derives from individuals the right of first occupancy although more real than that of the strongest becomes a true right only after the establishment of that of property every man has by nature a right to all that is necessary to him but the positive act which makes him proprietor of certain property excludes him from all the residue his portion having been allotted he ought to confine himself to it and he has no further right to the undivided property that is why the right of first occupancy so weak in the state of nature is respected by every member of a state in this right men regard not so much what belongs to others as what does not belong to themselves in order to legalize the right of first occupancy over any domain whatsoever the following conditions are in general necessary first the land must not yet be inhabited by anyone secondly a man must occupy only the area required for his subsistence thirdly he must take possession of it not by an empty ceremony but by labor and cultivation the only mark of ownership which in default of legal title ought to be respected by others indeed if we accord the right of first occupancy to necessity and labor do we not extend it as far as it can go is it impossible to assign limits to this right will the mere setting foot on common ground be sufficient to give an immediate claim to the ownership of it will the power of driving away other men from it for a moment suffice to deprive them forever of the right of returning to it how can a man or a people take possession of an immense territory and rob the whole human race of it except by a punishable user-patient since other men are deprived of the place of residence and the sustenance which nature gives to them in common when Nunez Balboa on the seashore took possession of the pacific ocean and of the whole of south america in the name of the crown of castile was this sufficient to dispossess all the inhabitants and exclude from it all the princes in the world on this supposition such ceremonies might have been multiplied vainly enough and the catholic king in his cabinet might by a single stroke have taken possession of the whole world only cutting off afterward from his empire what was previously occupied by other princes we perceive how the lands of individuals united and contiguous become public territory and how the right of sovereignty extending itself from the subjects to the land which they occupy becomes at once real and personal which places the possessors in greater dependence and makes their own powers a guarantee for their fidelity an advantage which ancient monarchs do not appear to have clearly perceived for calling themselves only kings of the persians or sythians or Macedonians they seem to have regarded themselves as chiefs of men rather than as owners of countries monarchs of today call themselves more cleverly kings of France, Spain, England etc in thus holding the land they are quite sure of holding its inhabitants the peculiarity of this alienation is that the community in receiving the property of individuals so far from robbing them of it only assures them lawful possession and changes user-patient into true right enjoyment into ownership also the possessors being considered as depositaries of the public property and their rights being respected by all the members of the state as well as maintained by all its power against foreigners they have as it were by a transfer advantageous to the public and still more to themselves acquired all that they have given up a paradox which is easily explained by distinguishing between the rights which the sovereign and the proprietor have over the same property as we shall see hereafter it may also happen that men begin to unite before they possess anything and that afterward occupying territory sufficient for all they enjoy it in common or share it among themselves either equally or in proportions fixed by the sovereign in whatever way this acquisition is made the right which every individual has over his own property is always subordinate to the right which the community has overall otherwise there would be no stability in the social union and no real force in the exercise of sovereignty i shall close this chapter and this book with a remark which ought to serve as a basis for the whole social system it is that instead of destroying natural equality the fundamental pact on the contrary substitutes a moral and lawful equality for the physical inequality which nature imposed upon men so that although unequal in strength or intellect they all become equal by convention and legal right end of chapter nine end of book one book two chapter one of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book two chapter one that sovereignty is inalienable the first and most important consequence of the principles above established is that the general will alone can direct the forces of the state according to the object of its institution which is the common good for if the opposition of private interests has rendered necessary the establishment of societies the agreement of these same interests has rendered it possible that which is common to these different interests forms the social bond and unless there were some point in which all interests agree no society could exist now it is solely with regard to this common interest that the society should be governed i say then that sovereignty being nothing but the exercise of the general will can never be alienated and that the sovereign power which is only a collective being can be represented by itself alone power indeed can be transmitted but not will in fact it is not impossible that a particular will should agree on some point with the general will it is at least impossible that this agreement should be lasting and constant for the particular will naturally tends to preferences and the general will to equality it is still more impossible to have a security for this agreement even though it should always exist it would not be a result of art but of chance the sovereign may indeed say i will now what a certain man wills or at least what he says that he wills but he cannot say what that man wills tomorrow i shall also will since it is absurd that the will should bind itself as regards the future and since it is not incumbent on any will to consent to anything contrary to the welfare of the being that wills if then the nation simply promises to obey it dissolves itself by that act and loses its character as a people the moment there is a master there is no longer a sovereign and forthwith the body politic is destroyed this does not imply that the orders of the chiefs cannot pass for decisions of the general will so long as the sovereign free to oppose them refrains from doing so in such a case the consent of the people should be inferred from the universal silence this will be explained at greater length end of chapter one recording by shenna sir fresno california book 2 chapter 2 of the social contract this is a labor box recording all labor box recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libruvox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book 2 chapter 2 that sovereignty is indivisible for the same reason that sovereignty is inalienable it is indivisible for the will is either general or it is not it is either that of the body of the people or that of only abortion in the first case this declared will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law in the second case it is only a particular will or an act of majesty it is at most a decree but our publicists being unable to divide sovereignty in its principle divide it in its object they divide it into force and will into legislative power and executive power into rights of taxation of justice and of war into internal administration and power of treating with foreigners sometimes confounding all these departments and sometimes separating them they make the sovereign a fantastic being forms of connected parts it is as if they compose the man of several bodies one with eyes another with arms another with feet and nothing else the japanese conjurers it is said cut up a child before the eyes of the spectators then throwing all its limbs in the air they make the child come down again alive and whole such almost are the juggler's tricks of our publicists after dismembering the social body by deception worthy of the fair they recombine its parts nobody knows how this error arises from their not having formed exact notions about the sovereign authority and from their taking as parts of this authority but their only emanations from it thus for example the acts of declaring war and making peace have been regarded as acts of sovereignty which is not the case since neither of them is a law but only an application of the law a particular act which determines the case of the law as will be clearly seen when the idea attached to the word law is fixed by following out the other divisions in the same way it would be found that whenever the sovereignty appears divided we are mistaken in our opposition and that the rights which are taken as parts of that sovereignty are also coordinate to it and always supposed supreme wills of which these rights are merely executive it would be impossible to describe the great obscurity in which this want of precision has involved the conclusions of writers on the subject of political right when they have endeavour to decide upon their respective rights of kings and peoples on the principles that they had established everyone can see in chapters three and four of the first book of grogius how that learned man and his translator barbara became entangled and embarrassed in their for fear of saying too much or not saying enough according to their views and so offending the interests that they had to conciliate grogius having taken refuge in france through discontent with his own country and wishing to pay court to lubi the third team to whom his book is dedicated spares no pains to the spoil the people of all their rights and in the most artful manner bestowed them on kings this also would clearly have been the inclination of barbara who dedicated his translation to the king of england george the first but unfortunately the expulsion of james the second which he calls an abdication forced him to be reserved and to equivocate and evade in order not to make william appear a usurper if these two writers had adopted true principles all difficulties would have been removed and they would have been always consistent but they would have spoken the truth with regret and would have paid court only to the people truth however does not lead to fortune and the people confer neither embassies nor professorships nor pensions end of chapter two recording by shenna ser fresno california book two chapter three of the social contract this is a librebox recording all librebox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit librebox.org the social contract by Jean Jacques Rousseau book two chapter three whether the general will can err it follows from what precedes that the general will is always right and always tends to the public advantage but it does not follow that the resolutions of the people have always the same rectitude men always desire their own good but do not always discern it the people are never corrupted though often deceived and it is only then that they seem to will what is evil there is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will the latter regards only the common interest while the former has regard to private interests and is merely a sum of particular wills but take away from the same wills the pluses and minuses which cancel one another and the general will remains as the sum of the differences if the people come to a resolution when adequately informed and without any communication among the citizens the general will would always result from the great number of slight differences and the resolution would always be good but when factions partial associations are formed to the detriment of the whole society the will of each of this association becomes general with reference to its members and particular with reference to the state it may then be said that there are no longer as many voters as there are men but only as many voters as there are associations the differences become less numerous and yield a less general result lastly when one of these associations becomes so great that it predominates over all the rest you no longer have as the result a sum of small differences but a single difference there is then no longer a general will and the opinion which prevails is only a particular opinion it is important then in order to have a clear declaration of the general will that there should be no partial association in the state and that every citizen should express only his own opinion such was the unique and sublime institution of the great lycurgus but if there are partial associations it is necessary to multiply their number and prevent inequality as saloon numa and service did these are the only proper precautions for ensuring that the general will may always be enlightened and that the people may not be deceived end of chapter three recording by shenna sear fresno california book two chapter four of the social contract this is a liberal wax recording all liberal wax recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book two chapter four the limits of the sovereign power if the state or city is nothing but a moral person the life of which consists in the union of its members and if the most important of its cares is that of self-preservation it needs a universal and compulsive force to move and dispose every part in the money most expedient for the whole as nature gives every man an absolute power over all his limbs the social pact gives the body politic an absolute power over all its members and it is this same power which when directed by the general will bears as i said the name of sovereignty but besides the public person we have to consider the private persons who compose it and whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it the question then is to distinguish clearly between the respective rights of the citizens and of the sovereign as well as between the duties which the former have to fulfill in their capacity as subjects and the natural rights which they ought to enjoy in their character as men it is admitted that whatever part of his power property and liberty each one elunates by the social compact is only that part of the whole of which they use is important to the community but we must also admit that the sovereign alone is judge of what is important all the services that the citizen can render to the state he owes to it as soon as the sovereign demands them but the sovereign on its part cannot impose on its subjects any burden which is useless to the community it cannot even wish to do so for by the law of reason just as by the law of nature nothing is done without a cause the engagements which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without also working for ourselves why is the general will always right and why do all invariably decide the prosperity of each unless it is because there is no one but appropriates to himself this word each and thinks of himself in voting on behalf of all this proves that the quality of rights and the notion of justice that it produces are derived from the preference which each gives to himself and consequently from man's nature that the general will to be truly such should be so in its object as well as in its essence that it ought to proceed from all in order to be applicable to all and that it loses its natural rectitude when it tends to some individual and the terminate object because in that case judging of what is unknown to us we have no true principle of equity to guide us indeed so soon as a particular fact or right is in question with regard to a point which has not been regulated by an anterior general convention the matter becomes contentious it is a process in which the private persons interested are one of the parties and the public the other but in which I perceive neither the law which must be followed nor the judge who should decide it would be ridiculous in such a case to wish to refer the matter for an express decision of the general will which can be nothing but the decision of one of the parties and which consequently is for the other party only a will that is foreign partial and inclined on such an occasion to injustice as well as liable to error therefore just as a particular will cannot represent the general will the general will in turn changes its nature when it has a particular end and cannot as general decide about either a person or a fact when the people of Athens for instance elected or deposed their chiefs decreed owners to one in post penalties on another and by multitudes of particular decrees exercised indiscriminately all the functions of government the people no longer had any general will properly so-called they no longer acted as a sovereign power but as magistrates this will appear contrary to common ideas but I must be allowed time to expound my own from this we must understand that what generalizes the will is not so much the number of voices as the common interest which unites them for under this system each necessarily submits to the conditions which he imposes on others an admirable union of interest and justice which gives to the deliberations of the community a spirit of equity that seems to disappear in the discussion of any private affair for want of a common interest to unite and identify the ruling principle of the judge with that of the party by whatever path we return to our principle we always arrive at the same conclusion namely that the social compact establishes among the citizens such an equality that they all pledge themselves under the same conditions and ought all to enjoy the same rights thus by the nature of the compact every act of sovereignty that is every authentic act of the general will binds our favors equally all the citizens so that the sovereign knows only the body of the nation and distinguishes none of those that compose it what then is an act of sovereignty properly so-called it is not an agreement between a superior and an inferior but an agreement of the body with each of its members a lawful agreement because it has the social contract as its foundation equitable because it is common to all useful because it can have no other object than the general welfare and stable because it has the public force and the supreme power as a guarantee so long as the subjects submit only to such conventions they obey no one but simply their own will and to ask how far their respective rights of the sovereign and citizens extend is to ask up to what point the latter can make engagements among themselves each with all and all with each thus we see that the sovereign power wholly absolute wholly sacred and wholly inviolable as it is does not and cannot pass the limits of general conventions and that every man can fully dispose of what is left to him of his property and liberty by these conventions so that the sovereign never has a right to burden one subject more than another because then the matter becomes particular and his power is no longer competent these distinctions once admitted so untrue is it that in the social contract there is on the part of individuals any real renunciation that their situation as a result of this contract is in reality preferable to what it was before and that instead of an alienation they have only made an advantageous exchange of an uncertain and precarious mode of existence for a better and more assured one of natural independence for liberty of the power to injure others for their own safety and of their strength which others might overcome for a right which the social union renders inviolable their lives also which they have devoted to the state are continually protected by it and in exposing their lives for its defense what do they do but restore what they have received from it what do they do but what they would do more frequently and with more risk in the state of nature when engaging in inevitable struggles they would defend at the peril of their lives their means of preservation all have to fight for their country in case of need it is true but then no one ever has to fight for himself do we not gain more over by incurring for what ensures our safety a part of the risks that we should have to incur for ourselves individually as soon as we were deprived of it end of chapter four recording by Shena Sear, personal california second book chapter five of the social contract this is a liprevox recording all liprevox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liprevox.org recording by avaii in march 2010 the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau second book fifth chapter the right of life and death it may be asked how individuals who have no right to dispose of their own lives can transmit to the sovereign this right which they do not possess the question appears hard to solve only because it is badly stated every man has a right to risk his own life in order to preserve it has it ever been said that one who throws himself out of a window to escape from a fire is guilty of suicide has this crime indeed ever been imputed to a man who perishes in a storm although unembarking he was not ignorant of the danger the social treaty has as its end the preservation of the contracting parties he who desires the end desires also the means and some risks even some losses are inseparable from these means he who is willing to preserve his life at the expense of others ought also to give it up for them when necessary now the citizen is not a judge of the peril to which the law requires that he should expose himself and when the prince has said to him it is expedient for the state that you should die he ought to die since it is only on this condition that he has lived in security up to that time and since his life is no longer merely a gift of nature but a conditional gift of the state the penalty of death inflicted on criminals may be regarded almost from the same point of view it is in order not to be the victim of an assassin that a man consents to die if he becomes one in this treaty far from disposing of his own life he thinks only of securing it and it is not to be supposed that any of the contracting parties contemplates at a time being hanged moreover every evildoer who attacks social rights becomes by his crimes a rebel and a traitor to his country by violating its laws he ceases to be a member of it and even makes war upon it then the preservation of the state is incompatible with his own one of the two must perish and when a guilty man is executed it is less as a citizen than as an enemy the proceedings and the judgment are the proofs and the declaration that he has broken the social treaty and consequently that he is no longer a member of the state now as he has acknowledged himself to be such at least by his residents he ought to be cut off from it by exile as a violator of the compact or by death as a public enemy for such an enemy is not a moral person he is simply a man and this is a case in which the right of war is to slay the vanquished but it will be said the condemnation of a criminal is a particular act granted but this condemnation does not belong to the sovereign it is a right which that power can confer though itself unable to exercise it all my ideas are connected but i could not expound them all at once again the frequency of capital punishments is always a sign of weakness or indolence in the government there is no man so worthless that he cannot be made good for something we have a right to kill even for example's sake only those who cannot be preserved without danger as regards the right to pardon or to exempt a guilty man from the penalty imposed by the law and inflicted by the judge it belongs only to a power which is above both the judge and the law that is to say the sovereign still it's right in this is not very plain and the occasions for exercising it are very rare in a well-governed state there are few punishments not because many pardons are granted but because there are few criminals the multitude of crimes ensures impunity when the state is decaying under the roman republic neither the senate nor the consuls attempted to grant pardons the people even did not grant any although they sometimes revoked their own judgments frequent pardons proclaim that crimes will soon need them no longer and everyone sees to what that leads but i feel my heart murmuring and restraining my pen let us leave these questions to be discussed by the just man who has not erred and who never needed pardon himself end of chapter five book two chapter six of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book two chapter six the law by the social compact we have given existence and life to the body politic the question now is to endow it with movement and will by legislation for the original act by which this body is formed and consolidated determines nothing in addition as to what it must do for its own preservation what is right and comfortable to order is such by the nature of things and independently of human conventions all justice comes from God he alone is the source of it but could we receive it directly from so lofty a source we should need neither government nor laws without doubt there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone but this justice in order to be admitted among us should be reciprocal regarding things from a human standpoint the laws of justice are an operative among men for want of a natural sanction they only bring good to the wicked and evil to the just when the latter observe them with everyone and no one observes them in return conventions and laws then are necessary to couple rights with duties and apply justice to its object in the state of nature where everything is in common I owe nothing to those to whom I have promised nothing I recognize as belonging to others only what is useless to me this is not the case in the civil state in which all rights are determined by law but then finally what is law so long as men are content to attach to this word only metaphysical ideas they will continue to argue without being understood and when they have stated what a law of nature is they will know no better what a law of the state is I've already said that there's no general will with reference to a particular object in fact this particular object is either in the state or outside of it if it is outside of the state a will which is foreign to it is not general in relation to it and if it is within the state it forms part of it then there is formed between the whole and its part a relation which makes of it two separate beings of which the part is one and the whole less this same part is the other but the whole less one part is not the whole and so long as the relation subsists there is no longer any whole but two unequal parts once it follows that the will of the one is no longer general in relation to the other but when the whole people decree concerning the whole people they consider themselves alone and if a relation is then constituted it's between the whole object under one point of view and the whole object under another point of view without any division at all then the matter respecting which the decree is general like the will that decrees it is this act that I call a law when I say that the object of the laws is always general I mean that the law considers subjects collectively and actions as abstract never a man as an individual nor a particular action thus the law may indeed decree that there shall be privileges but cannot confer them on any person by name the law can create several classes of citizens and even assign the qualifications which shall entitle them to rank in these classes but it cannot nominate such and such persons to be admitted to them it can establish a royal government and a hereditary succession but cannot elect a king or appoint a royal family in a word no function which has reference to an individual object appertained to the legislative power from this standpoint we see immediately that it is no longer necessary to ask whose office it is to make laws since they are acts of the general will nor whether the prince is above the laws since he is a member of the state nor whether the law can be unjust since no one is unjust to himself nor how we are free and yet subject to the laws since the laws are only registers of our wills we see further that since law combines the universality of the will with the universality of the object whatever any man prescribes on his own authority is not a law and whatever the sovereign itself prescribes respecting a particular object is not a law but a decree not an act of sovereignty but of magistracy I therefore call any state a republic which is governed by laws under whatever form of administration it may be for then only does the public interest predominate and the common wealth count for something every legitimate government is republican I will explain here after what government is laws are properly only the condition of civil association the people being subject to the laws should be the authors of them it concerns only the associates to determine the condition of association but how will they be determined will it be by a common agreement by a sudden inspiration has the body politic an organ up for expressing its will who will give it the foresight necessary to frame its acts and publish them at the outset or how shall it declare them in the hour of need how would a blind multitude which often knows not what it wishes because it rarely knows what is good for it executive itself an enterprise so great so difficult as a system of legislation of themselves the people always desire what is good but do not always discern it the general will is not always right but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened it may be made to see objects as they are sometimes as they ought to appear it must be shown the good path that it is seeking and guarded from the seduction of private interests it must be made to observe closely times and places and to balance the attraction of immediate and palpable advantages against the danger of remote and concealed evils individuals see the good which they reject the public desires the good which they do not see all alike have need for guides the former must be compelled to conform to their wills to their reason the people must be taught to know what they require then from the public enlightenment results the union of the understanding and the will in the social body and from the close cooperation of the parts and lastly the maximum power of the whole hence arises the need of a legislator end of chapter six second book chapter seven of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Simon the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau second book chapter seven the legislator in order to discover the rules of association that are most suitable to nations a superior intelligence would be necessary who could see all the passions of men without experiencing any of them who would have no affinity with our nature and yet know it thoroughly whose happiness would not depend on us and who would nevertheless be quite willing to interest himself in ours and lastly one who storing up for himself with the progress of time a far-off glory in the future could labor in one age and enjoy in another gods would be necessary to give laws to man the same argument that Caligula adduced as to fact played to put forward with regard to right in order to give an idea of the civil or royal man whom he is inquest of in his work the statesman but if it is true that a great prince is a rare man what will a great legislator be the first is only to follow the model which the other has to frame the letter is the machination who invents the machine the former is only the workman who puts it in readiness and works it in the birth of societies says Montesquieu quote it is the chiefs of the republics who frame the institutions and afterward it is the institutions which mold the chiefs of the republics end quote he who dares undertake to give institutions to a nation ought to feel himself capable as it were of changing human nature of transforming every individual who in himself is a complete independent whole into part of a greater whole from which he receives in some manner his life and his being of altering men's constitution in order to strengthen it of substituting a social and moral existence for the independent and physical existence which we have all received from nature in a word it is necessary to deprive man of his native powers in order to endow him with some which are alien to him and of which he cannot make use without the aid of other people the more thoroughly those natural powers are deadened and destroyed the greater and more durable are the acquired powers the more solid and perfect also are the institutions so that if every citizen is nothing and can be nothing except in combination with all the rest and if the force acquired by the whole be equal or superior to the sum of the natural forces of all the individuals we may say that legislation is at the highest point of perfection which it can attain legislator is in all respects an extraordinary man in the state if you ought to be so by his genius he is not less so by his office it is not majesty nor sovereignty this office which constitutes the republic does not enter into its constitution it is a special and superior office having nothing in common with human government for if he who rules man ought not to control legislation he who controls legislation ought not to rule man otherwise his laws being ministers of his passions would often serve only to perpetrate his acts of injustice he would never be able to prevent private interests from corrupting the sacredness of his work when like Kurgus gave laws to his country he began by abdicating his royalty it was the practice of the majority of the greek towns to entrust the foreigners the framing of their laws the modern republics of italy often imitated this usage that of Geneva did the same and found it advantageous Rome at her most glorious epoch saw all the crimes of tyranny spring up in her bosom and saw herself on the verge of destruction though uniting in the same hands legislative authority and sovereign power yet the digum verse themselves never arrogated the right to pass any law on their sole authority nothing that we propose to you they said to the people can pass into law without your consent Romans be yourself the authors of the laws which are to secure your happiness he who frames laws then has or ought to have no legislative right and the people themselves cannot even if they wished divest themselves of this incommunicable right because according to the fundamental compact it is only the general will that binds individuals and we can never be sure that a particular will is conformable to the general will until it has been submitted to the free votes of the people i've said this already but it is not useless to repeat it thus we find simultaneously in the work of legislation two things that seem incompatible an enterprise surprising human powers and to execute it an authority that is a mere nothing another difficulty deserves attention wise men who want to speak to the vulgar in their own language instead of in a popular way will not be understood now there are a thousand kinds of ideas which it is impossible to translate into the language of the people views very general and objects very remote are alike beyond its reach and each individual approving of no other plan of government than that which promotes his own interests does not readily perceive the benefits that he is to derive from the continual deprivations which good laws impose in order that a newly formed nation might approve sound maxims of politics and observe the fundamental rules of state policy it would be necessary that the effect should become the cause that the social spirit which should be the work of the institution should preside over the institution itself and that men should be prior to the laws what they ought to become by means of them since then the legislator cannot employ either force or reasoning he must needs have recourse to an authority of a different order which can compel without violence and persuade without convincing it is this which in all ages has constrained the founders of nations to resort to the intervention of heaven and to give the gods the credit for their own wisdom it ordered that the nations subjected to the laws of the state as to those of nature and recognizing the same power in the formation of man and in that of the state might obey willingly and bear submissively the yoke of the public welfare the legislator puts into the mouths of the immortals that sublime reason which soars beyond the reach of common man in order that he may win over by divine authority those whom human prudence could not move but it does not belong to every man to make the gods his oracles nor to be believed when he proclaims himself their interpreter the great soul of the legislator is the real miracle which must give proof of his mission any man can engrave tables of stone or bribe and oracle or pretend secret intercourse with some divinity or train a bird to speak in his ear or find some other clumsy means to impose on the people he who is acquainted with such means only will perchance be able to assemble a crowd of foolish persons but he will never found an empire and his extravagant work will speedily perish with him empty deceptions formed by the transient bond it is only wisdom that makes it lasting the jewish law which still endures and that of the child of ishmael which for ten centuries has ruled half the world still bear witness today to the great man who dictated them and while proud philosophy or blind party spirit sees in them nothing but fortunate imposters the true statesmen admires in their systems the great and powerful genius which directs durable institutions it is not necessary from all this to infer with warperton that politics and religion have among us a common aim but only that in the origin of nations one serves as an instrument of the other end of chapter seven book two second book chapter eight of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau second book chapter eight the people as an architect before erecting a large edifice examines and tests the soil in order to see whether it can support the weight so a wise law giver does not begin by drawing applause that are good in themselves but considers first whether the people for whom he designs them are fit to endure them it is on this account that Plato refused to legislate for the archadians and sirenians knowing that these two peoples were rich and could not tolerate equality and it is on this account that good laws and worthless men were to be found in Crete for minors had only disciplined a people steeped in vice a thousand nations that have flourished on the earth could never have borne good laws and even those that might have done so could have succeeded for only a very short period of their whole duration the majority of nations as well as of men are tractable only in their youth they become incorrigible as they grow old when once customs are established and prejudices have taken root it is a perilous and futile enterprise to try and reform them for the people cannot even endure that their evils should be touched with a view to their removal like those stupid and cowardly patients that shudder at the sight of a physician but just as some diseases unhinge men's minds and deprive them of all remembrance of the past so we sometimes find during the existence of states epochs of violence in which revolutions produce an influence upon nations such as certain crises produced upon individuals in which horror of the past supplies the place of forgetfulness and in which the state inflamed by civil wars springs forth so to speak from its ashes and regains the vigor of youth in issuing from the arms of death such was Sparta in the time of Lycurgus such was Rome after the tarquins and such among us moderns were Holland and Switzerland after the expulsion of their tyrants but these events are rare they are exceptions the explanation of which is always found in the particular constitution of the accepted state they could not even happen twice with the same nation for it may render itself free so long as it is merely barbers but can no longer do so when the resources of the state are exhausted then commotions may destroy it without revolutions being able to restore it and as soon as its chains are broken it falls in pieces and ceases to exist henceforward it requires a master and not a deliverer free nations remember this maxim liberty may be acquired but never recovered youth is not infancy there is for nations as for men a period of youth or if you will of maturity which they must await before they are subjected to laws but it is not always easy to discern when a people is mature and if the time is anticipated the labor is abortive one nation is governable from its origin another is not so at the end of 10 centuries the Russians will never be really civilized because they have been civilized too early peter had an imitative genius he had not the true genius that creates and produces anything from nothing some of his measures were beneficial but the majority were ill timed he saw that his people were barbarous but he did not see that they were unripe for civilization he wished to civilize them when it was necessary only to discipline them he wished to produce at once Germans or English men when he should have begun by making russians he prevented his subjects from ever becoming what they might have been by persuading them that they were what they were not it is in this way that a french tutor trains his pupil to shine for a moment in childhood and then to be forever a non-entity the russian empire will desire to subjugate europe and will itself be subjugated the daughters its subjects or neighbors will become its masters and ours this revolution appears to be inevitable all the kings of europe are working in concert to accelerate it end of chapter eight recording by iswa in belgium in april 2010 second book chapter nine of the social contract this is a Librebox recording all Librebox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit Librebox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau second book chapter nine the people continued as nature has set limits to the stature of a properly formed man outside which it produces only giants and dwarves so likewise with regard to the best constitution of a state there are limits to its possible extent so that it may be neither too great to enable it to be well governed nor too small to enable it to maintain itself single-handed there is in everybody politic a maximum of force which it cannot exceed which is often diminished as the state is aggrandized the more the social bond is extended the more it is weakened and in general a small state is proportionally stronger than a large one a thousand reasons demonstrate the truth of this maxim in the first place administration becomes more difficult at great distances as a weight becomes heavier at the end of a longer lever it also becomes more burdensome in proportion as its parts are multiplied for every town has first its own administration for which the people pay every district has its administration still paid for by the people next every province then the superior governments the satrapies the vice royalties which must be paid for more dearly as we ascend and always at the cost of the unfortunate people lastly comes the supreme administration which overwhelms everything so many additional burdens perpetually exhaust the subjects and far from being better governed by all these different orders they are much worse governed than if they had but a single superior meanwhile hardly any resources remain for cases of emergency and when it is necessary to have recourse to them the state trembles on the brink of ruin nor is this all not only has the government less vigor and activity in enforcing observance of the laws in putting a stop to vexations in reforming abuses and in forestalling seditious enterprises which may be entered upon in distant places but the people have less affection for their chiefs whom they never see for their country which is in their eyes like the world and for their fellow citizens most of whom are strangers to them the same laws cannot be suitable to so many different provinces which have different customs and different climates and cannot tolerate the same form of government different laws beget only trouble and confusion among the nations which living under the same chiefs and in constant communication mingle or intermarry with one another and when subjected to other usages never know whether their patrimony is really theirs talents are hidden virtues ignored vices unpunished in that multitude of men unknown to one another whom the seat of the supreme administration gathers together in one place the chiefs overwhelmed with business see nothing themselves clerks rule the state in a word the measures that must be taken to maintain the general authority which so many officers at a distance wish to evade or impose upon absorb all the public attention no regard for the welfare of the people remains and scarcely any for their defense in time of need and thus a body too huge for its constitution sinks and perishes crushed by its own weight on the other hand the state must secure a certain foundation that it may possess stability and resist the shocks which it will infallibly experience as well as sustain the efforts which it will be forced to make in order to maintain itself for all nations have a kind of centrifugal force by which they continually act one against another and tend to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors like the vortices of Descartes thus the weak are in danger of being quickly swallowed up and none can preserve itself long except by putting itself in a kind of equilibrium with all which renders the compression almost equal everywhere hence we see that there are reasons for expansion and reasons for contraction and it is not the least of a statesman's talents to find the proportion between the two which is most advantages for the preservation of the state we may say in general that the former being only external and relative ought to be subordinated to the others which are internal and absolute a healthy and strong constitution is the first thing to be sought and we should rely more on the vigor that springs from a good government than on the resources furnished by an extensive territory states have however been constituted in such a way that the necessity of making conquests entered into their very constitution and in order to maintain themselves they were forced to enlarge themselves continually perhaps they rejoiced greatly at this happy necessity which nevertheless revealed to them with the limit of their greatness the inevitable moment of their fall end of chapter nine recording by eswa in belgium in april 2010 second book chapter 10 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau second book chapter 10 the people continued a body politic may be measured in two ways that is by the extent of its territory and by the number of its people and there is between these two modes of measurement a suitable relation according to which the state may be assigned its true dimensions it is the man that constitute the state and it is the soil that sustains the man the due relation then is that the land should suffice for the maintenance of its inhabitants and that there should be as many inhabitants as the land can sustain in this proportion is found the maximum power of a given number of people for if there is too much land the care of it is burdensome the cultivation inadequate and the produce superfluous and this is the proximate cause of defensive wars if there is not enough land the state is at the mercy of its neighbors for the additional quantity and this is the proximate cause of offensive wars any nation which has by its position only the alternative between commerce and war is weak in itself it is dependent on its neighbors and on events it has only a short and precarious existence it conquers and changes its situation or it is conquered and reduced to nothing it can preserve its freedom only by virtue of being small or great it is impossible to express numerically a fixed ratio between the extent of land and the number of men which are reciprocally sufficient on account of the differences that are found in the quality of the soil in its degrees of fertility in the nature of its products and in the influence of climate as well as on account of those which we observe in the constitutions of the inhabitants of whom some consume little in a fertile country while others consume much on an unfruitful soil further attention must be paid to the greater or less fecundity of the women to the conditions of the country whether more or less favorable to the population and to the numbers which the legislator may hope to draw the ether by his institutions so that an opinion should be based not on what is seen but on what is foreseen while the actual state of the people should be less observed than that which it ought naturally to attain in short there are a thousand occasions on which the particular accidents of situation require or permit that more territory than appears necessary should be taken up thus men will spread out a good deal in a mountainous country where the natural productions that is woods and pastures require less labor where experienced teachers that women are more fecund than in the plains and where with an extensive inclined surface there is only a small horizontal base which alone should count for vegetation on the other hand people may inhabit a smaller place on the seashore even among rocks and sands that are almost barren because fishing can in great measure supply the deficiency in the productions of the earth because men ought to be more concentrated in order to repel pirates and because further it is easier to relieve the country by means of colonies of the inhabitants with which it is overburdened in order to establish a nation it is necessary to add to these conditions one which cannot supply the place of any other but without which they are all useless it is that the people should enjoy abundance and peace for the time of a state's formation is like that of forming soldiers in a square the time when the body is least capable of resistance and most easy to destroy resistance would be greater in a state of absolute disorder than at a moment of fermentation when each is occupied with his own position and not with the common danger should a war a famine or a sedition supervene at this critical period the state is inevitably overthrown many governments indeed may be established during such storms but then it is these very governments that destroy the state usurpers always bring about or select troublesome times for passing undercover of the public agitation destructive laws which the people would never adopt when so be minded the choice of the moment for the establishment of a government is one of the surest marks for distinguishing the work of the legislator from that of the tyrant what nation then is adapted for legislation that which is already united by some bond of interest origin or convention but has not yet borne the real yoke of the laws that which has neither customs nor superstitions firmly rooted that which has no fear of being overwhelmed by a sudden invasion but which without entering into the disputes of its neighbors can single-handed resist either of them or aid one in repelling the other that in which every member can be known by all and in which there is no necessity to lay on a man a greater burden than a man can bear that which can subsist without other nations and without which every other nation can subsist that which is neither rich nor poor and self-sufficing lastly that which combines the stability of an old nation with the docility of a new one the work of legislation is rendered arduous not so much by what must be established as by what must be destroyed and that which makes success so rare is the impossibility of finding the simplicity of nature conjoint with the necessities of society all these conditions it is true are with difficulty combined hence few well constituted states are seen there is still one country in europe capable of legislation it is the island of korsica the courage and firmness which that brave nation has exhibited in recovering and defending its freedom would well deserve that some wise man should teach it how to preserve it i have some presentiment that this small island will one day astonish europe end of chapter 10 recording by iswa in belgium in march 2010 second book chapter 11 of the social contract this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org recording by daniel wotkins the social contract by john jack russo second book chapter 11 the different systems of legislation if we ask precisely where in consists the greatest good of all which ought to be the aim of every system of legislation we shall find that it is summed up in two principal objects liberty and equality liberty because any individual dependence is so much force withdrawn from the body of the state equality because liberty cannot subsist without it i have already said what civil liberty is with regard to equality we must not understand by this word that the degrees of power and wealth should be absolutely the same but that as the power it should fall short of all violence and never be exercised except by virtue of station and of the laws while as to wealth no citizen should be rich enough to be able to buy another and unpoor enough to be forced to sell himself which supposes on the part of the great moderation in property and influence and on the part of ordinary citizens repression of avarice and covetousness it is said that this equality is a chimera of speculation which cannot exist in practical affairs but if the abuse is inevitable does it follow that it is unnecessary even to regulate it it is precisely because the force of circumstances is ever tending to destroy equality that the force of legislation should always tend to maintain it but these general objects of every good institution ought to be modified in each country by the relations which arise both from the local situation and from the character of the inhabitants and it is with reference to these relations that we must assign to each nation a particular system of institutions which shall be the best not perhaps in itself but for the state for which it is designed for instance if the soil is unfruitful and barren or the country too confined for its inhabitants turn your attention to arts and manufacturers and exchange their products for the provisions that you require on the other hand if you occupy rich plains and fertile slopes if in a productive region you are in need of inhabitants bestow all your cares on agriculture which multiplies men and drives out the arts which would only end in depopulating the country by gathering together in a few spots the few inhabitants that the land possesses if you occupy extensive inconvenient coasts cover the sea with vessels and foster commerce and navigation you will have a short and brilliant existence if the sea on your coast spades only rocks that are almost inaccessible remain fish eating barbarians you will leave more peaceful perhaps better and certainly happier lives in a word besides the maxims common to wall each nation contains within itself some cause which influences it in a particular way and renders its legislation suitable for it alone thus the Hebrews in ancient times and the Arabs more recently had religion as their chief object the Athenians literature Carthage and Tyre commerce roads navigation Sparta war Rome Valor the author of the spirit of laws has shown in a multitude of instances by what arts the legislator directs his institutions towards each of these objects what renders the constitution of a state really solid and durable is the observance of expediency in such a way that natural relations and the laws always coincide that are only serving as it were to secure support and rectify the former but if the legislator mistaken in his object takes a principle different from that which springs from the nature of things if the one tends to servitude the other to liberty the one to riches the other to population the one to peace the other to conquests we shall see the laws imperceptibly weakened and the constitution impaired and the state will be ceaselessly agitated until it is destroyed or changed an invincible nature has resumed her sway end of chapter 11 second book chapter 12 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Daniel Watkins the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau second book chapter 12 division of the laws in order that everything may be duly regulated and the best possible form given to the Commonwealth there are various relations to be considered first the action of the whole body acting on itself that is the relation of the whole to the whole or of the sovereign to the state and this relation is composed of that of the intermediate terms as we shall see hereafter the laws governing this relation bear the name of political laws and are also called fundamental laws not without some reason if they are wise ones for if in every state there is only one good method of regulating it the people which has discovered it ought to adhere to it but if the established order is bad why should we regard as fundamental laws which prevent it from being good besides in any case a nation is always at liberty to change its laws even the best for if it likes to injure itself who has a right to prevent it from doing so the second relation is that of the members with one another or with the body as a whole and this relation should in respect of the first be as small and in respect of the second as great as possible so that every citizen may be perfectly independent of all the rest and in absolute dependence on the state and this is always affected by the same means but it is only the power of the state that secures the freedom of its members it is from this second relation that civil laws arise we may consider a third kind of relation between the individual man and the law viz that of punishable disobedience and this gives rise to the establishment of criminal laws which at bottom are not so much a particular species of laws as the sanction of all the others to these three kinds of laws is added a fourth the most important of all which is graven neither on marble nor on brass but in the hearts of the citizens a law which creates the real constitution of the state which requires new strength daily which when other laws grow obsolete or pass away revives them or supplies their place preserves the people in the spirit of their institutions and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that of authority i speak of manners customs and above all of opinion a province unknown to our politicians but one on which the success of all the rest depends a province with which the great legislator was occupied in private while he appears to confine himself to particular regulations that are merely the arching of the vault of which manners soar to develop form at length the immovable keystone of these different classes political laws which constitute the form of government alone relate to my subject end of chapter 12 end of second book third book chapter one of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book chapter one third book before speaking of the different forms of government let us try to fix the precise meaning of that word which has not yet been very clearly explained chapter one government in general i warn the reader that this chapter must be read carefully and that i do not know the art of making myself intelligible to those that will not be attentive every free action has two causes concurring to produce it the one moral that is to say the will which determines the act the other physical that is to say the power which executes it when i walk toward an object i must first will to go to it in the second place my feet must carry me to it should a paralytic wish to run or an active man not wish to do so both will remain where they are the body politic has the same motive powers in it likewise force and will are distinguished the letter under the name of legislative power the former under the name of executive power nothing is or ought to be done in it without their cooperation we have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people and can belong to it alone on the other hand it is easy to see from the principles already established that the executive power cannot belong to the people generally as legislative or sovereign because that power is exerted only in particular acts which are not within the province of the law nor consequently within that of the sovereign all the acts of which must be laws the public force then requires a suitable agent to concentrate it and put it in action according to the directions of the general will to serve as a means of communication between the state and the sovereign to effect in some manner in the public person what the union of soul and body effects in a man this is in the state the function of the government improperly confounded with the sovereign of which it is only the minister what then is the government an intermediate body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual correspondence charged with the execution of the laws and with the maintenance of liberty both civil and political the members of this body are called magistrates or kings that is governors and the body as a whole bears the name of prince those therefore who maintain that the act by which a people submits to its chiefs is not a contract are quite right it is absolutely nothing but a commission an employment in which as simple officers of the sovereign they exercise in its name the power of which it has made them depositaries and which it can limit modify and resume when it pleases the alienation of such a right being incompatible with the nature of the social body is contrary to the object of the association consequently i give the name government or supreme administration to the legitimate exercise of the executive power and that of prince or magistrate to the man or body charged with that administration it is in the government that have found the intermediate powers the relations of which constitute the relation of the whole to the whole or of the sovereign to the state this last relation can be represented by that of the extremes of a continued proportion of which the mean proportional is the government the government receives from the sovereign the commands which it gives to the people and in order that the state may be in stable equilibrium it is necessary everything being balanced that there should be equality between the product or the power of the government taken by itself and the product or the power of the citizens who are sovereign in the one aspect and subjects in the other further we could not alter any of the three terms without at once destroying the proportion if the sovereign wishes to govern or if the magistrate wishes to legislate or if the subjects refuse to obey disorder succeeds order force and will no longer act in concert and the state being dissolved falls into despotism or anarchy lastly as there is but one mean proportional between each relation there is only one good government possible in a state but as a thousand events may change the relations of a people not only may different governments be good for different peoples but for the same people at different times to try and give an idea of the different relations that may exist between these two extremes i will take for an example the number of the people as a relation most easy to express let us suppose that the state is composed of 10 000 citizens the sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a body but every private person in his capacity of subject is considered as an individual therefore the sovereign is to the subject as 10 000 is to one that is each member of the state has as his share only one ten thousandth part of the sovereign authority although he is entirely subjected to it if the nation consists of a hundred thousand men the position of the subjects does not change and each alike is subjected to the whole authority of the laws while his vote reduced to one hundred thousandth has ten times less influence in their enactment the subject then always remaining a unit the proportional power of the sovereign increases in the ratio of the number of the citizens when it follows that the more the state is enlarged the more does liberty diminish when i say that the proportional power increases i mean that it is farther removed from equality therefore the greater the ratio is in the geometrical sense the less is the ratio in the common expectation in the former the ratio considered according to quantity is measured by the exponent and in the other considered according to identity it is estimated by the similarity now the less the particular wills correspond with the general will that is customs with laws the more should the repressive power be increased the government then in order to be effective should be relatively stronger in proportion as the people are more numerous on the other hand as the aggrandizement of the state gives the depositaries of the public authority more temptations and more opportunities to abuse their power the more force should the government have to restrain the people and the more should the sovereign have in its turn to restrain the government i do not speak here of absolute force but of the relative force of the different parts of the state it follows from this double ratio that the continued proportion between the sovereign the prince and the people is not an arbitrary idea but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic it follows further that one of the extremes that is to say the people as subject being fixed and represented by unity whenever the double ratio increases or diminishes the single ratio increases or diminishes in like manner and consequently the middle term is changed this shows that there is no unique and absolute constitution of government but that there may be as many governments different in nature as there are states different in size if for the sake of turning this system to ridicule it should be said that in order to find this mean proportional and form the body of the government it is according to me only necessary to take the square root of the number of the people i should answer that i take that number here only as an example that the ratios of which i speak are not measured only by the number of men but in general by the quantity of action which results from the combination of multitudes of causes that moreover if for the purpose of expressing myself in fewer words i borrow for a moment geometrical terms i am nevertheless aware that geometrical precision has no place in moral quantities the government is on a small scale what the body politic which includes it is on a large scale it is a moral person in doubt with certain faculties active like the sovereign passive like the state and it can be resolved into other similar relations from which arises as a consequence a new proportion and yet another within this according to the order of the magistracies until we come to an indivisible middle term that is to a single chief or supreme magistrate who may be represented in the middle of this progression as unity between the series of fractions and that of the whole numbers without embarrassing ourselves with this multiplication of terms let us be content to consider the government as a new body in the state distinct from the people and from the sovereign and intermediate between the two there is this essential difference between those two bodies that the state exists by itself while the government exists only through the sovereign thus the dominant will of the princes or ought to be only the general will or the law its force is only the public force concentrated in itself so soon as it wishes to perform of itself some absolute and independent act the connection of the whole begins to be relaxed if lastly the prince should chance to have a particular will more reactive than that of the sovereign and if to enforce obedience to this particular will it should employ the public force which is in its hands in such a manner that there would be so to speak two sovereigns the one de jure and the other de facto the social union would immediately disappear and the body politic would be dissolved further in order that the body of the government may have an existence a real life to distinguish it from the body of the state in order that all its members may be able to act in concert and fulfill the object for which it is instituted a particular personality is necessary to it a feeling common to its members a force a will of its own tending to its preservation this individual existence supposes assemblies councils a power of deliberating and resolving rights titles and privileges which belong to the prince exclusively and which render the position of the magistrate more honorable in proportion as it is more adious the difficulty lies in the method of disposing within the whole this subordinate whole in such a way that it may not weaken the general constitution in strengthening its own that its particular force intended for its own preservation may always be kept distinct from the public force designed for the preservation of the state and in a world that it may always be ready to sacrifice the government to the people and not the people to the government moreover although the artificial body of the government is the work of another artificial body and has in some respects only a derivative and subordinate existence that does not prevent it from acting with more or less vigor or celerity from enjoying so to speak more or less robust health lastly without directly departing from the object for which it was instituted it may deviate from it more or less according to the manner in which it is constituted from all these differences arise the different relations which the government must have with the body of the state so as to accord with the accidental and particular relations by which the state itself is modified for often the government that is best in itself will become the most vicious unless its relations are changed so as to meet the defects of the body politic to which it belongs end of chapter one third book chapter two of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book chapter two the principle which constitutes the different forms of government to explain the general cause of these differences i must here distinguish the prince from the government as i before distinguished the state from the sovereign the body of the magistracy may be composed of a greater or less number of members we said that the ratio of the sovereign to the subjects was so much greater as the people were more numerous and by an evident analogy we can say the same of the government with regard to the magistrates now the total force of the government being always that of the state does not vary once it follows that the more it employs this force on its own members the less remains for operating upon the whole people consequently the more numerous the magistrates are the weaker is the government as this maxim is fundamental let us endeavor to explain it more clearly we can distinguish in the person of the magistrate three worlds essentially different first the will peculiar to the individual which tends only to his personal advantage secondly the common will of the magistrates which has reference solely to the advantage of the prince and which may be called the corporate will being general in relation to the government and particular in relation to the state of which the government forms part in the third place the will of the people or the sovereign will which is general both in relation to the state considered as the whole and in relation to the government considered as part of the whole in a perfect system of legislation the particular or individual will should be inoperative the corporate will proper to the government quite subordinate and consequently the general or sovereign will always dominant and the sole rule of all the rest on the other hand according to the natural order these different wills become more active in proportion as they are concentrated thus the general will is always the weakest the corporate will has the second rank and the particular will the first of all so that in the government each member is firstly himself next a magistrate and then a citizen a gradation directly opposed to that which the social order requires but suppose that the whole government is in the hands of a single man then the particular will and the corporate will are perfectly united and consequently the letter is in the highest possible degree of intensity now as it is on the degree of will that the exertion of force depends and as the absolute power of the government does not vary it follows that the most active government is that of a single person on the other hand let us unite the government with the legislative authority let us make the sovereign the prince and all the citizens magistrates then the corporate will confounded with the general will will have no more activity than the letter and will leave the particular will in all its force thus the government always with the same absolute force will be at its minimum of relative force or activity these relations are incontestable and other considerations serve still further to confirm them we see for example that each magistrate is more active in his body than each citizen is in his and that consequently the particular will has much more influence in the acts of government than in those of the sovereign for every magistrate is almost always charged with some function of government whereas each citizen taken by himself has no function of sovereignty besides the more a state extends the more is its real force increased although it does not increase in proportion to its extent but while the state remains the same it is useless to multiply magistrates for the government acquires no greater real force in as much as this force is that of the state the quantity of which is always uniform thus the relative force or activity of the government diminishes without its absolute or real force being able to increase it is certain more over that the dispatch of business is retarded in proportion as more people are charged with it that in laying too much stress on prudence we leave too little to fortune that opportunities are allowed to pass by and that owing to excessive deliberation the fruits of deliberation are often lost i have just shown that the government is weakened in proportion to the multiplication of magistrates and i have before demonstrated that the more numerous the people are the more wrought the repressive force to be increased whence it follows that the ratio between the magistrates and the government ought to be inversely as the ratio between the subjects and the sovereign that is the more the state is enlarged the more should the government contract so that the number of chiefs should diminish in proportion as the number of the people is increased but i speak here only of the relative force of the government and not of its rectitude on the other hand the more numerous the magistracy is the more does the corporate will approach the general will whereas under a single magistrate this same corporate will is as i have said only a particular will thus what is lost on one side can be gained on the other and the art of the legislator consists of knowing how to fix the point where the force and will of the government always in reciprocal proportion are combined in the ratio most advantageous to the state end of chapter two book three chapter three of the social contract this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by Anna Simon the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book three chapter three classification of governments we have seen in the previous chapter why the different kinds or forms of government are distinguished by the number of members that compose them it remains to be seen in the present chapter how this division is made the sovereign may in the first place commit the charge of the government to the whole people and to the greater part of the people in such a way that there may be more citizens who are magistrates than simple individual citizens we call this form of government democracy or it may confine the government to a small number so that there may be more ordinary citizens than magistrates and this form bears the name of aristocracy lastly it may concentrate the whole government in the hands of a single magistrate from whom all the rest derive their power this third form is the most common and is called monarchy or royal government we should remark that all these forms or at least the first two admit of degrees and may indeed have a considerable range for democracy may embrace the whole people or be limited to a half aristocracy in its turn may restrict itself from a half of the people to the smallest number indeterminately royalty even is susceptible of some division sparta by its constitution always had two kings and in the roman empire there were as many as eight emperors at once without it being possible to say that the empire was divided thus there is a point at which each form of government blends with the next and we see that under three denominations only the government is really susceptible of as many different forms as a state has citizens what is more this same government being in certain respects capable of subdivision into other parts one administered in one way another in another there may result from combinations of these three forms a multitude of mixed forms each of which can be multiplied by all the simple forms in all ages there has been much discussion about the best form of government without consideration of the fact that each of them is the best in certain cases and the worst in others if in the different states the number of the supreme magistrates should be in inverse ratio to that of citizens it follows that in general democratic government is suitable to small states aristocracy to those of moderate size and monarchy to large ones and this rule follows immediately from the principle but how is it possible to estimate the multitude of circumstances which may furnish exceptions end of chapter 3 book 3 book 3 chapter 4 of the social contract this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by Anna Simon the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book chapter 4 democracy he that makes the law knows better than anyone how it should be executed and interpreted it would seem then that there could be no better constitution than one in which the executive power is united with the legislative but it is that very circumstance which makes a democratic government inadequate in certain respects because things which ought to be distinguished are not and because the prince and the sovereign being the same person only form as it were a government without government it is not expedient that he who makes the laws should execute them nor that the body of the people should divert its attention from general considerations in order to bestow it on particular objects nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests on public affairs and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator which is the infallible result of the pursuit of private interests for when the status changed in its substance all reform becomes impossible a people which would never abuse the government would likewise never abuse its independence a people which always governed well would not need to be governed taking the term in its strict sense there never has existed and never will exist any true democracy it is contrary to the natural order that the majority should govern and that the minority should be governed it is impossible to imagine that the people should remain in perpetual assembly to attend to public affairs and it is easily apparent that commissions could not be established for that purpose without the form of administration being changed in fact i think i can lay down as a principle that when the functions of government are shared among several magistracies the least number is acquired sooner or later the greatest authority if only on account of the facility in transacting business which naturally leads them on to that moreover how many things difficult to combine does not this government presuppose first a very small state in which the people may be readily assembled and in which every citizen can easily know all the rest secondly great simplicity of manners which prevents a multiplicity of affairs and thorny discussions next considerable equality in rank and fortune without which equality in rights and authority could not long subsist lastly little or no luxury for luxury is either the effect of wealth or renders it necessary it corrupts both the rich and the poor the former by possession the letter by covetousness it betrays the country to a feminacy and vanity it deprives the state of all its citizens in order to subject them one to another and all to opinion that is why a famous author has assigned virtue as the principle of a republic for all these conditions could not subsist without virtue but through not making the necessary distinctions this brilliant genius has often lacked precision and sometimes clearness and has not seen the sovereign authority being everywhere the same the same principle ought to have a place in every well constituted state in a greater or less degree it is true according to the form of government let us add that there is no government so subject to civil wars and internal agitation as a democratic or popular because there is none which tends so strongly and so constantly to change its form none which demands more vigilance and courage to be maintained in its own form it is especially in this constitution that the citizen should arm himself with strength and steadfastness and say every day of his life from the bottom of his heart what a virtuous palatine said in the diet of poland malo percolosum libertatum come quietum servicium if there were a nation of gods it would be governed democratically so perfect a government is unsuited to men end of chapter four book three book three chapter five of the social contract this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by Anna Simon the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book chapter five aristocracy we have here two moral persons quite distinct that is the government and the sovereign and consequently two general wills the one having reference to all the citizens the other only to the members of the administration thus although the government can regulate its internal policy as it pleases it can never speak to the people except in the name of the sovereign that is in the name of the people themselves this must never be forgotten the earliest societies were aristocratically governed the heads of families deliberated among themselves about public affairs the young men yielded readily to the authority of experience hence the names priests elders senate geronses the savages of north america are still governed in this way at the present time and are very well governed but in proportion as the inequality due to institutions prevailed over natural inequality wealth or power was preferred to age and aristocracy became elective finally the power transmitted with the father's property to the children rendering the family's petition made the government hereditary and there were senators only 20 years old there are then three kinds of aristocracy natural elective and hereditary the first is only suitable for simple nations the third is the worst of all governments the second is the best it is aristocracy properly so-called besides the advantage of the distinction between the two powers aristocracy has that of the choice of its members for in a popular government all the citizens are born magistrates but this one limits them to a small number and they become magistrates by election only a method by which property intelligence experience and all other grounds of preference and public esteem are so many fresh guarantees that men will be wisely governed further assemblies are more easily convoked affairs are better discussed and are dispatched with greater order and diligence while the credit of the state is better maintained abroad by venerable senators than by an unknown or despised multitude in a word it is the best and most natural order of things that the wisest should govern the multitude when we are sure that they will govern it for its advantage and not for their own we should not uselessly multiply means nor do with twenty thousand men what a hundred chosen men can do still better but we must observe that the corporate interest begins here to direct the public force in a less degree according to the rule of the general will and that another inevitable propensity deprives the laws of a part of the executive power with regard to special experiences a state must not be so small nor are people so simple and upright the execution of the laws should follow immediately upon the public will as in a good democracy nor again must a nation be so large that the chief man who are dispersed in order to govern it can set up a sovereign's each in his own province and begin by making themselves independent so as at last to become masters but if aristocracy requires a few virtues less than popular government it requires also others that are peculiarly its own such as moderation among the rich and contentment among the poor for a rigorous equality would seem to be out of place in it and was not even observed in sparta besides if this form of government compels with a certain inequality of fortune it is expedient in general that the administration of public affairs should be entrusted to those that are best able to devote their whole time to it but not as Aristotle maintains that the rich should always be preferred on the contrary it is important that an opposite choice should sometimes teach the people that there are immense personal merits reasons for preference more important than wealth end of chapter five book three book three chapter six of the social contract this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by Anasimham the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book chapter six monarchy we have hitherto considered the prince as a moral and collective person united by the force of the laws and as a depository of the executive power in the state we have now to consider this power concentrated in the hands of a natural person of a real man who alone has a right to dispose of it according to the laws he is what is called a monarch or a king quite the reverse of the other forms of administration in which a collective being represents an individual in this one an individual represents a collective being so that the moral unity that constitutes it is at the same time a physical unity in which all the powers that the law combines in the other with so much effort are combined naturally thus the will of the people the will of the prince the public force of the state and the particular force of the government all obey the same mode of power all the springs of the machine are in the same hand everything works for the same end there are no opposite movements that counteract one another and no kind of constitution can be imagined in which a more considerable action is produced with less effort archimedes quietly seated on the shore and launching without difficulty a large vessel represents to me a skillful monarch governing from his cabinet his vast states and while he appears motionless setting everything in motion but if there is no government which has more vigor there is none in which the particular will has more sway and more easily governs others everything works for the same end that is true but this end is not the public welfare and the very power of the administration turns continually to the prejudice of the state kings wish to be absolute and from afar man cry to them and the best way to become so is to make themselves beloved by their people this maxim is very fine and also very true in certain respects unfortunately it will always be ridiculed in courts power which springs from the affections of the people is doubtless the greatest but it is precarious and conditional princess will never be satisfied with it the best kings wish to have the power of being wicked if they please without seizing to be masters a political preacher will tell them in vain that the strength of the people being their own it is their greatest interest that the people should be flourishing numerous and formidable they know very well that that is not true their personal interest is in the first place that the people should be weak and miserable and should never be able to resist them supposing all the subjects always perfectly submissive i admit that it would then be the princess interest that the people should be powerful in order that this power being his own might render him formidable to his neighbors but as this interest is only secondary and subordinate and as the two suppositions are incompatible it is natural that princes should always give preference to the maxim which is most immediately useful to them it is this that samuel strongly represented to the hebros it is this that macchiavelli clearly demonstrated while pretending to give lessons to kings he gave great ones to peoples the prince of macchiavelli is the book of republicans we are found by general considerations that monarchy is suited only to large states and we shall find this again by examining monarchy itself the more numerous the public administrative body is the more it is the ratio the prince of the subjects diminish and approach equality so that this ratio is unity or equality even in democracy this same ratio increases in proportion if the government contracts and is at its maximum when the government is in the hands of a single person then the distance between the prince and the people is too great and the state lacks cohesion in order to unify it then intermediate orders princes grandees and nobles are required to fill them now nothing at all of this kind is proper for a small state which would be ruined by all these orders but if it is difficult for a great state to be well governed it is much more so for it to be well governed by a single man and everyone knows what happens when the king appoints deputies one essential and inevitable defect which will always render a monarchical government inferior to a republican one is that in the letter the public voice hardly ever raises to the highest posts any but enlightened and capable man who fill them honorably whereas those who succeed in monarchies are most frequently only petty mischief makers petty naïves petty intrigers whose petty talents which enable them to attain high posts in courts only serve to show the public their ineptitude as soon as they have attained them the people are much less mistaken about their choice than the princes and a man of real merit is almost as rare in a royal ministry as a fool at the head of a republican government therefore when by some fortunate chance one of these born rulers takes the helm of affairs in a monarchy almost wrecked by such a fine set of ministers it is quite astonishing what resources he finds and his accession to power forms an epoch in a country in order that a monarchical state might be well governed it would be necessary that its greatness or extent should be proportioned to the abilities of him that governs it is easier to conquer than to rule with the sufficient lever the world may be moved by a finger but as supported the shoulders of hercules are required however small the state may be the prince is almost always too small for it when on the contrary it happens the state is too small for its chief which is very rare it is still badly governed because the chief always pursuing his own great designs forgets the interests of the people and renders them no less unhappy by the abuse of his transcendent abilities than an inferior chief by his lack of talent it would be necessary so to speak that a kingdom should be enlarged or contracted in every reign according to the capacity of the prince whereas the talents of a senate having more definite limits the state may have permanent boundaries and the administration prosper equally well the most obvious inconvenience of the government of a single person is the lack of that uninterrupted succession which forms in the two others a continuous connection one king being dead another is necessary elections leave dangerous intervals they are stormy and unless the citizens are of a disinterestedness an integrity which this government hardly admits of intrigue and corruption intermingle with it it would be hard for a man to whom the state has been sold not to sell it in his turn and indemnify himself out of the helpless for the money which the powerful have extorted from him sooner or later everything becomes venal under such an administration and the peace which is then enjoyed under a king is worse than a disorder of an interregnum what has been done to prevent these evils crowns have been made hereditary in certain families and an order of succession has been established which prevents any dispute on the demise of kings that is to say the inconvenience of regencies being substituted for that of elections an appearance of tranquility has been preferred to a wise administration and men prefer to risk having as their chiefs children monsters and imbeciles rather than have a dispute about the choice of good kings they have not considered that in thus exposing themselves to the risk of this alternative they put almost all the chances against themselves that was a very sensible answer of the uniseous the younger to whom his father in reproaching him with it is honorable action said have I set you the example in this ah replied the son your father was not a king all things conspired to deprive of justice and reason a man brought up to govern others much trouble is taken so it is said to teach young princes the art of reigning this education does not appear to profit them it would be better to begin by teaching them the art of obeying the greatest kings that history has celebrated were not trained to rule that is a science which men are never less masters of than after excessive study of it and it is better acquired by obeying than by ruling a result of this want of cohesion is the instability of royal government which being regulated sometimes on one plan sometimes on another according to the character of the reigning prince or that of the persons who reign for him cannot long pursue a fixed aim for a consistent cause of conduct a variableness which always makes the state fluctuate between maxim and maxim project and project and which does not exist in other governments where the prince is always the same so we see that in general if there is more cunning in a court there is more wisdom in a senate and that republics pursue their ends by more steadfast and regular methods whereas every revolution in a royal ministry produces one in the state the maxim common to all ministers and to almost all kings being to reverse in every respect the acts of their predecessors from this same want of cohesion is obtained the solution of a sophism very familiar to royal politicians this is not only to compare civil government with domestic government and the prince with the father of a family an error already refuted but further to ascribe freely to this magistrate all the virtues which he might have occasion for and always to suppose that the prince is what he ought to be on which supposition royal government is manifestly preferable to every other because it is incontestably the strongest and because it only lacks a corporate will more conformable to the general will to be also the best but if according to Plato a king by nature is so rare a personage how many times will nature and fortune conspire to crown him and if the royal education necessarily corrupts those who receive it what should be expected from a succession of men trained to rule it is then a voluntary self-deception to confuse royal government with that of a good king to see what this government is in itself we must consider it under incapable or wicked princes for such will come to the throne or the throne will make them such these difficulties have not escaped our authors but they have not been embarrassed by them the remedy they say is to obey without murmuring God gives bad kings in his wrath and we must endure them as chastisements of heaven such talk is doubtless edifying but I am inclined to think it would be more appropriate in a pulpit than in a book on politics what should we say of a physician who promises miracles and whose whole art consists in exhorting the sick man to be patient we know well that when we have a bad government it must be endured the question is to find a good one End of book 3 chapter 6 book 3 chapter 7 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book 3 chapter 7 mixed governments properly speaking there is no simple government a single chief must have subordinate magistrates a popular government must have a head thus in the partition of the executive power there's always a gradation from the greater number to the less with this difference that sometimes the majority depends on the minority and sometimes the minority on the majority sometimes there is an equal division either when the constituent parts are immutable dependents as in the government of England or when the authority of each part is independent but imperfect as in Poland this latter form is bad because there is no unity in the government and the state lacks cohesion is a simpler mixed government the better a question much debated among publicists and one to which the same answer must be made that I have before made about every form of government the simple government is the better in itself for the reason that it is simple but when the executive power is not sufficiently dependent on the legislative that is when there is a greater proportion between the prince and the sovereign than between the people and the prince this want of proportion must be remedied by dividing the government for then all its parts have no less authority over the subjects and their division renders them all together less strong against the sovereign the same inconvenience is also provided against by the establishment of intermediate magistrates who leaving the government in its entirety only serve to balance the two powers and maintain their respective rights then the government is not mixed but temperate the opposite inconvenience can be remedied by similar means and when the government is too lax tribunals may be erected to concentrate it that is customary in all democracies in the first case the government is divided in order to weaken it and in the second in order to strengthen it for the maximum of strength and also of weakness is found in simple governments while the mixed forms give a medium strength end of chapter seven recording by Shana Sear Fresno California book three chapter eight of the social contract this is a labor box recording all labor box recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book three chapter eight that every form of government is not fit for every country liberty not being a fruit of all climates is not within the reach of all peoples the more we consider this principle established by Montesquieu the more do we perceive its truth the more it is contested the greater opportunity is given to establish it by new proofs in all the governments of the world the public person consumes but produces nothing once then comes the substance it consumes from the labor of its members it is the superfluity of individuals that supplies the necessaries of the public hence it follows that the civil state can subsist only so long as men's labor produces more than they need now this excess is not the same in all countries of the world in several it is considerable in others moderate in others nothing in others a minus quantity this proportion depends on the fertility due to climate on the kind of labor which the soul requires on the nature of its products on the physical strength of its inhabitants on the greater or less consumption that is necessary to them and on several other like proportions of which it is composed on the other hand all governments are not of the same nature there are some more or less wasteful and the differences are based on this other principle that the further the public contributions are removed from their source the more burdensome they are we must not measure this burden by the amount of the imposts but by the distance they have to traverse in order to return to the hands from which they have come when this circulation is prompt and well established it matters not whether little or much is paid the people are always rich and the finances are always prosperous on the other hand however little the people may contribute if this little does not revert to them they are soon exhausted by constantly giving the state is never rich and the people are always in beggary it follows from this that the more the distance between the people and the government is increased the more burdensome do the tributes become therefore in the democracy the people are least encumbered in an aristocracy they are more so and in a monarchy they bear the greatest weight monarchy then is suited only to wealthy nations aristocracy to states moderate both in wealth and size democracy to small and poor states indeed the more we reflect on it the more do we find in this the difference between free and monarchical states in the first everything is used for the common advantage in the others public and private resources are reciprocal and the former are increased by the diminution of the latter lastly instead of governing subjects in order to make them happy the sputism renders them miserable in order to govern them there are then in every climate natural causes by which we can assign the form of government which is adapted to the nature of the climate and even say what kind of inhabitants the country should have unfruitful and barren places where the produce does not repay the labor ought to remain uncotivated and deserted or should only be people by savages places where men's soil yields only bear necessities ought to be inhabited by barbarous nations in them any polity would be an impossibility places where the excess of the produce over the labor is moderate are suitable for free nations those in which abundant and fertile soil yields much produce for little labor are willing to be governed monarchically in order that the superfluity of the subjects may be consumed by the luxuries of the prince for it is better that this excess should be absorbed by the government than squandered by private persons there are exceptions i know but these exceptions themselves confirm the rule in that sooner or later they produce revolutions which restore things to their natural order we should always distinguish general laws from the particular causes which may modify their effects if the whole south should be covered with republics and the whole north with the spastic states it would not be less true that through the influence of climate despotism is suitable to warm countries barbarism to cold countries and a good quality to intermediate regions i see however that while the principle is admitted its application may be disputed it will be said that some cold countries are very fertile and some southern ones very unfruitful but this is a difficulty only for those who do not examine the matter in all its relations it is necessary as i have already said to reckon those connected with labor resources consumption etc let us suppose that the produce of two districts equaling area is in the ratio of five to ten if the inhabitants of the former consume four and those of the latter nine parts the surplus produce of the first will be one fifth and that of the second one tenth the ratio between these two surpluses being then inversely as that of the produce of each the district which shields only five will give a surplus double that of the district which produces ten but it is not a question of double produce and i do not think that anyone there in general plays the fertility of cold countries even on an equality with that of warm countries let us however assume this equality let us if you will put england in the scales with sicily and poland with egypt more to the south we shall have africa in india more to the north we shall have nothing for this equality in produce what the difference in the cultivation in sicily it is only necessary to scratch the soil in england what care is needed to till it but where more exertion is required to yield the same produce the surplus must necessarily be very small consider besides this that the same number of men consume much less in warm countries the climate demands that people should be temperate in order to be healthy europeans who want to live as at home all die of dysentery and dyspepsia we are says chardon carnivorous beasts wolves in comparison with asiatics some attribute the temperance of the persians to the fact that their country is scantily cultivated i believe on the contrary that their country is not very abundant in provisions because inhabitants need very little if their fragility he continues resulted from the poverty of the country it would be only the poor who would eat little whereas it is the people generally and more or less would be consumed in each province according to the fertility of the country whereas the same of stem useness is found throughout the kingdom they prided themselves greatly on their mode of living saying that it is only necessary to look at their complexions to see how much superior they are to those of christians indeed the complexions of the persians are smooth they have beautiful skins delicate and clear all the complexions of their subjects the armenians who live in european fashion are rough and blotched and their bodies are coarse and heavy the nearer we approach the equator the less to the people live upon they eat scarcely any meat rice maize couscous millet cassava are their ordinary foods there are in india millions of men whose diet does not cost a half penny a day we see even in europe palpable differences in appetite between northern and southern nations a spanyard will live for eight days on a german's dinner in countries where men are most voracious luxury is directed to matters of consumption in england it is displayed in a table loaded with meats in italy you are regaled with sugar and flowers again luxury in dress present similar differences in climates where the changes of the seasons are sudden and violent garments are better and simpler in those where people dress only for ornament splendor is more sought after than utility for clothes themselves are a luxury at naples you will see men every day walking to pocilipal with cold embroidered coats and no stockings it is the same with regard to buildings everything is sacrificed to magnificence when there is nothing to fear from injury by the atmosphere in paris and in london people must be warmly and comfortably housed in madrid they have superb drawing rooms but no windows that shut while they sleep in mere closets the foods are much more substantial and nutritious in warm countries this is a third difference which cannot fail to influence the second why do people eat so many vegetables in italy because they are good nourishing and of excellent flavor in france where they are grown only on water they are not nourishing and count almost for nothing on the table they do not however occupy less ground and they cost at least as much labor to cultivate it is found by experience that the weeds of barberry inferior in other respects the dose of france yield much more flower and that dose of france in their turn yield more than the weeds of the north when we may infer that a similar gradation is observable generally in the same direction from the equator to the pole now is it not a manifest disadvantage to have in an equal quantity of produce a smaller quantity of nutrient to all these different considerations i may add one which springs from and strengthens them it is that warm countries have less need of inhabitants than cold countries but would be able to maintain a greater number hence a double surplus is produced always to the advantage of despotism the greater the surface occupied by the same number of inhabitants the more difficult the rebellions become because measures cannot be concerted promptly and secretly and because it is always easy for the government to discover the plants and cut off communications but a more closely packed and numerous population is the less power has a government to usurp the sovereignty the chiefs deliberate as securely in their cabinets as the prince in his council and the multitude assemble in the squares as quickly as the troops in their quarters the advantage 10 of a tyrannical government lies in this that it acts at great distances by help of the points of support which it procures its power increases with the distance like that of levers that of the people on the other hand acts only when concentrated it evaporates and disappears as it extends like the effect of powders scattered on the ground which takes fire only green by green the least populous countries are thus the best adapted for tyranny while beasts reign only in deserts end of chapter eight recording by shenna sear personal california book three chapter nine of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean Jacques Rousseau book three chapter nine the marks of a good government when then it is asked absolutely which is the best government an insoluble and likewise indeterminate question is propounded or if you will it has as many correct solutions as there are possible combinations in the absolute and relative positions of the nations but if it were asked by what sign it can be known whether a given people is well or ill governed that would be a different matter and the question of fact might be determined it is however not settled because everyone wishes to decide in his own way subjects extoll the public tranquility citizens the liberty of individuals the former prefer security of possessions the latter that of persons the former are of opinion that the best government is the most severe the latter maintain that it is the mildest the one party wish that crimes should be punished and the other that they should be prevented the one party think it well to be feared by their neighbors the other party prefer to be unacquainted with them the one party are satisfied when money circulates the other party demand that the people should have bread even though there should be agreement on this and other similar points would further progress be made since moral quantities lack a precise mode of measurement even if people were in accord about the sign how could they be so about the valuation of it for my part i'm always astonished that people fail to recognize a sign so simple or that they should have the insincerity not to agree about it what is the object of political association it is the preservation and prosperity of its members and what is the surest sign that they are preserved in prosperous it is their number and population do not then go and seek elsewhere for design so much discussed all other things being equal the government under which without external aids without naturalizations and without colonies the citizens increase and multiply most is infallibly the best that under which a people diminishes and decays is the worst statisticians it is now your business reckon measure compare end of chapter nine recording by shenna ser personal california book three chapter ten of the social contract this is a liberbox recording all liberbox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book three chapter 10 the abuse of the government and its tendency to degenerate as the particular will acts incessantly against the general will so the government makes a continual effort against the sovereignty the more this effort is increased the more is the constitution altered and as there is here no other corporate will which by resisting that of the prince may produce equilibrium with it it must happen sooner or later that the prince at length oppresses the sovereign and violates the social treaty therein is the inherent and inevitable vice which from the birth of the body politic tends without intermission to destroy it just as old age and death at length destroy the human body there are two general ways by which a government degenerates these when it contracts or when the state is dissolved the government contracts when it passes from the majority to the minority that is from democracy to aristocracy and from aristocracy to royalty that is its natural tendency if it retrograded from the minority to the majority it might be said to relax but this inverse progress is impossible in reality the government never changes its form except when its exhausted energy leaves it too weak to preserve itself and if it becomes still more relaxed as it extends its force will be annihilated and it will no longer subsist we must therefore concentrate the energy as it dwindles otherwise the state which it sustains will fall into ruin the dissolution of the state may occur in two ways firstly when the prince no longer administers the state in accordance with the laws and affects a usurpation of the sovereign power then a remarkable change takes place the state and not the government contracts i mean that the state dissolves and that another is formed within it which is composed only of the members of the government and which is to the rest of the people nothing more than their master and their tyrant so that as soon as the government usurps the sovereignty the social compact is broken and all the ordinary citizens rightfully regaining their natural liberty are forced but not morally bound to obey the same thing occurs also when the members of the government usurp separately the power which they ought to exercise only collectively which is no less a violation of the laws and occasions still greater disorder then there are so to speak as many princes as magistrates and the state not less divided in the government perishes or changes its form when the state is broken up the abuse of the government whatever it may be takes the common name of anarchy to distinguish democracy degenerates into oculocracy aristocracy into oligarchy i should add the royalty degenerates into tyranny but his last word is equivocal and requires explanation in the vulgar sense a tyrant is a king who governs with violence and without regard to justice and the laws in the strict sense a tyrant is a private person who arrogates to himself the royal authority without having a right to it it is in the sense that the greeks understood the word tyrant they bestowed it indifferently on good and bad princess whose authority was not legitimate that's tyrant and usurper are two words perfectly synonymous to give different names to different things i call the usurper of royal authority a tyrant and the usurper of sovereign power a despot the tyrant is he who contrived to the laws takes upon himself to govern according to the laws the despot is he who sets himself above the laws themselves thus the tyrant cannot be a despot but the despot is always a tyrant end of chapter 10 recording by shenna serres no california book three chapter 11 of the social contract this is a liberal box recording all liberal box recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liberal box dot org the social contract by john jack russell book three chapter 11 the dissolution of the body politic such is the natural and inevitable tendency of the best constituted governments if sparta and rom have perished what state can hope to endure forever if we wish to form a durable constitution let us then not dream of making it eternal in order to succeed we must not attempt the impossible nor flatter ourselves that we are giving to the work of men as stability which human things do not admit off the body politic as well as the human body begins to die from its birth and bears in itself the causes of its own destruction but both may have a constitution more or less robust and fitted to preserve them a longer or shorter time the constitution of man is the work of nature that of the state is the work of art it does not rest with men to prolong their lives it has rest with them to prolong that of the state as far as possible by giving it the best constitution practicable the best constituted will come to an end but not so soon as another unless some unpersoned accident brings about its premature destruction the principle of political life is in the sovereign authority the legislative power is the heart of the state the executive power is its brain giving movement to all the parts the brain may be paralyzed and yet the individual may live a man remains an imbecile in lives but so soon as the heart ceases its functions the animal dies it is not by loss that the state subsists but by the legislative power the law of yesterday is not binding today but tacit consent is presumed from silence and the sovereign is supposed to confirm continually the laws which it does not abrogate when able to do so whatever it has once declared that it wills it wills always unless the declaration is revoked why then do people show so much respect for ancient laws it is on account of their antiquity we must believe that it is only the excellence of the ancient laws which has enabled them to be so long preserved unless the sovereign has recognized them as constantly salutary it would have revoked them a thousand times that is why far from being weakened the laws are ever acquiring fresh vigour in every well constituted state the prejudice in favor of antiquity renders them more venerable every day while wherever laws are weakened as they grow old this fact proves that there is no longer any legislative power and that the state no longer lives end of chapter 11 recording by Shana Sear Pressnell California third book chapter 12 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book 12th chapter how the sovereign authority is maintained the sovereign having no other force than the legislative power acts only through the laws and the laws being nothing but authentic acts of the general will the sovereign can act only when the people are assembled the people assembled it will be said what a chimera it is a chimera today but it was not so two thousand years ago have men changed their nature the limits of the possible immoral things are less narrow than we think it is our weaknesses our vices our prejudices that contract them sordid souls do not believe in great men vile slaves smile with a mocking air at the word liberty from what has been done let us consider what can be done i shall not speak of the ancient republics of Greece but the roman republic was it seems to me a great state and the city of rome a great city the last census in rome showed that there were four hundred thousand citizens bearing arms and the last enumeration of the empire showed more than four million citizens without reckoning subjects foreigners women children and slaves what a difficulty we might suppose there would be in assembling frequently the enormous population of the capital and its environs yet few weeks past without the roman people being assembled even several times not only did they exercise the rights of sovereignty but a part of the functions of government they discussed certain affairs and judged certain causes and in the public assembly the whole people were almost as often magistrates as citizens by going back to the early times of nations we should find that the majority of the ancient governments even monarchical ones like those of the Macedonians and the Franks had similar councils be that as it may this single incontestable fact solves all difficulties inference from the actual to the possible appears to me sound end of book three chapter twelve third book chapter thirteen of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book thirteenth chapter how the sovereign authority is maintained continued it is not sufficient that the assembled people should have once fixed the constitution of the state by giving their sanction to a body of laws it is not sufficient that they should have established a perpetual government or that they should have once for all provided for the election of magistrates besides the extraordinary assemblies which unforeseen events may require it is necessary that there should be fixed and periodical ones which nothing can abolish or prorogue so that on the appointed day the people are rightfully convoked by the law without needing for that purpose any formal summons but accepting these assemblies which are lawful by their date alone every assembly of the people that has not been convoked by the magistrates appointed for that duty and according to the prescribed forms ought to be regarded as unlawful and all that is done in it as invalid because even the order to assemble ought to emanate from the law as for the more or less frequent meetings of the lawful assemblies they depend on so many considerations that no precise rules can be given about them only it may be said generally that the more force a government has the more frequently should the sovereign display itself this I shall be told may be good for a single city but what is to be done when the state comprises many cities will the sovereign authority be divided or must it be concentrated in a single city and render subject all the rest I answer that neither alternative is necessary in the first place the sovereign authority is simple and undivided and we cannot divide it without destroying it in the second place a city no more than a nation can be lawfully subject to another because the essence of the body politic consists in the union of obedience and liberty and these words subject and sovereign are correlatives the notion underlying them being expressed in the one word citizen I answer further that it is always unable to combine several towns into a single state and in desiring to affect such a union we must not flatter ourselves that we should avoid the natural consequences of it the abuses of great states cannot be brought as an objection against a man who only desires small ones but how can small states be endowed with sufficient force to resist great ones just as in the same way when the Greek towns of old resisted the great king and as more recently Holland and Switzerland have resisted the house of Austria if however the state cannot be reduced to proper limits one resource still remains it is not to allow any capital but to make the government sit alternately in each town and also to assemble in them by turns the estates of the country people the territory uniformly extend the same rights everywhere spread everywhere abundance of life in this way the state will become at once the strongest and the best governed that may be possible remember that the walls of the towns are formed solely of the remains of houses in the country for every palace that I see rising in the capital I seem to see a whole rural district laid in ruins end of book 3 chapter 13 third book chapter 14 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Crusoe third book 14th chapter how the sovereign authority is maintained continued so soon as the people are lawfully assembled as a sovereign body the whole jurisdiction of the government ceases the executive power is suspended and the person of the meanest citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the First Magistrate because where the represented are there is no longer any representative most of the tumults that arose in Rome in the continuity proceeded from ignorance or neglect of this rule the consuls were then only presidents of the people and the tribunes simply orders the senate had no power at all these intervals of suspension in which the prince recognizes or ought to recognize the presence of a superior have always been dreaded by that power and these assemblies of the people which are the shield of the body politic in the curb of the government have in all ages been the terror of the chief men hence such men are never wanting insolitude objections obstacles and promises in the endeavor to make the citizens disgusted with the assemblies when the latter are apparitious cowardly pusillanimous and more desirous of repose than a freedom they do not long hold out against the repeated efforts of the government and thus as the resisting force constantly increases the sovereign authority at last disappears and most of the states decay and perish before their time but between the sovereign authority in the arbitrary government there is sometimes introduced an intermediate power of which I must speak end of book 3 chapter 14 third book chapter 15 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Crusoe third book 15th chapter deputies or representatives so soon as the service of the state ceases to be the principal business of the citizens and they prefer to render aid with their purses rather than their persons the state is already on the brink of ruin is it necessary to march to battle they pay troops and remain at home is it necessary to go to the council they elect deputies and remain at home as a result of indolence and wealth they at length have soldiers to enslave their country and representatives to sell it it is the bustle of commerce and of the arts it is the greedy pursuit of gain it is a feminancy and love of comforts that commute personal services for money men sacrifice a portion of their profit in order to increase it at their ease give money and soon you will have chains that word finance is a slave's word it is unknown among citizens in a country that is really free the citizens do everything with their hands and nothing with money far from paying for exemption from their duties they would pay to perform them themselves i am far removed from ordinary ideas i believe that statute labor le corvet is less repugnant to liberty than taxation is the better constituted a state is the more do public affairs outweigh private ones in the minds of the citizens there is indeed a much smaller number of private affairs because the amount of the general prosperity furnishes a more considerable portion to that of each individual and less remains to be sought by individual exertions in a well-conducted city state everyone hastens to the assemblies while under a bad government no one cares to move a step in order to attend them because no one takes an interest in the proceedings since it is foreseen that the general will will not prevail and so at last private concerns become all absorbing good laws pave the way for better ones bad laws lead to worse ones as soon as anyone says of the affairs of the state of what importance are they to me we must consider that the state is lost the decline of patriotism the active pursuit of private interests the vast size of states conquests and the abuses of government have suggested the plan of deputies or representatives of the people in the assemblies of the nation it is this which in certain countries they dare to call the third estate thus the private interest of two orders is put in the first and second rank the public interest only in the third sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated it consists essentially in the general will and the will cannot be represented it is the same or it is different there is no medium the deputies of the people then are not and cannot be its representatives they are only commissioners and can conclude nothing definitively every law which the people in person have not ratified is invalid it is not a law the english nation thinks that it is free but is greatly mistaken for it is so only during the election of members of parliament as soon as they are elected it is enslaved and counts for nothing the use which it makes of the brief moments of freedom renders the loss of liberty well deserved the idea of representatives is modern it comes to us from feudal government that absurd and iniquitous government under which mankind is degraded in the name of man dishonored in the republics and even in the monarchies of antiquity the people never had representatives they did not know the word it is very singular that in rome where the tribunes were so sacred it was not even imagined that they could usurp the functions of the people and in the midst of so great a multitude they never attempted to pass of their own accord a single plebiscitem we may judge however of the embarrassment which the crowd sometimes caused from what occurred in the time of the grouchy when a part of the citizens gave their votes on the housetops but where right and liberty are all in all inconveniences are nothing in that wise nation everything was estimated at a true value it allowed the lickers to do with the tribunes had not dared to do and was not afraid that the lickers would want to represent it to explain however in what manner the tribunes sometimes represented it it is sufficient to understand how the government represents the sovereign the law being nothing but the declaration of the general will it is clear that in their legislative capacity the people cannot be represented but they can and should be represented in the executive power which is only force applied to law this shows that very few nations would upon careful examination be found to have laws be that as it may it is certain that the tribunes having no share in the executive power could never represent the Roman people by right of their office but only by encroaching on the rights of the senate among the Greeks whatever the people had to do they did themselves they were constantly assembled in the public place they lived in a mild climate and they were not ever issues slaves performed the manual labor the people's great business was liberty not having the same advantages how are you to preserve the same rights your more rigorous climates give you more wants for six months in a year the public place is untenable and your horse voices cannot be heard in the open air you care more for gain than for liberty and you fear slavery far less than you do misery footnote to adopt in cold countries the effeminency and luxuriousness of orientals is to be willing to assume their chains and to submit to them even more necessarily than they do and footnote what is liberty maintained only with the help of slavery perhaps extremes meet everything which is not according to nature has its inconveniences and civil society more than all the rest there are circumstances so unfortunate that people can preserve their freedom only at the expense of that of others and the citizen cannot be completely free except when the slave is enslaved to the utmost such was the position of sparta as for you modern nations you have no slaves but you are slaves you pay for their freedom with your own in vain do you boast of this preference I find in it more cowardice than of humanity I do not mean by all this that slaves are necessary and that the right of slavery is lawful since I have proved the contrary I only mention the reasons why modern nations who believe themselves free have representatives and why ancient nations had none be that as it may as soon as a nation appoints representatives it is no longer free it no longer exists after very careful consideration I do not see that it is possible hence forward for the sovereign to preserve among us the exercise of its rights unless the state is very small but if it is very small will it not be subjugated no I shall show hereafter how the external power of a great nation can be combined with the convenient polity and good order of small state end of book three chapter fifteen third book chapter sixteen of the social contract this is a Librebox recording all Librebox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit Librebox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Crusoe third book sixteenth chapter that the institution of the government is not a contract the legislative power being once well established the question is to establish also the executive power for this latter which operates only by particular acts not being of the essence of the other is naturally separated from it if it were possible that the sovereign considered as such should have the executive power law in fact would be so confounded that it could no longer be known what is law and what is not and the body politic thus perverted would soon become a prey to the violence against which it was instituted the citizens being all equal by the social contract all can prescribe what all ought to do while no one has a right to demand that another should do what he will not do himself now it is properly this right indispensable to make the body politic live and move which the sovereign gives to the prince in establishing the government several have pretended that the instrument in this establishment is a contract between the people and the chiefs whom they set over themselves a contract by which it is stipulated between the two parties on what conditions the one binds itself to rule the other to obey it will be agreed I'm sure that this is a strange method of contracting but let us see whether such a position is tenable first the supreme authority can no more be modified than alienated to limit it is to destroy it it is observed and contradictory that the sovereign should acknowledge a superior to bind itself to obey a master is to regain full liberty further it is evident that this contract of the people with such or such persons is a particular act whence it follows that the contract cannot be a law nor an act of sovereignty and that consequently it is unlawful moreover we see that the contracting parties themselves would be under the law of nature alone and without any security for the performance of their reciprocal engagements which is in every way repugnant to the civil state he who possesses the power being always capable of executing it we might as well give the name contract to the act of a man who should say to another I give you all my property on condition that you restore me what you please there is but one contract in the state that of association and this of itself excludes any other no public contract can be conceived which would not be a violation of the first end of book three chapter sixteen third book chapter seventeen of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book seventeenth chapter the institution of the government under what general notion then must be included the act by which the government is instituted I shall observe first that this act is complex or composed of two others vis the establishment of the law and the execution of the law by the first the sovereign determines that there shall be a governing body established in such or such a form and it is clear that this act is a law by the second the people nominate the chiefs who will be entrusted with the government when established now this nomination being a particular act is not a second law but only a consequence of the first and a function of the government the difficulty is to understand how there can be an active government before the government exists and how the people who are only sovereign or subjects can in certain circumstances become the prince or the magistrates here however is disclosed one of those astonishing properties of the body politic by which it reconciles operations apparently contradictory for this is affected by a sudden conversion of sovereignty into democracy in such a manner that without any perceptible change and merely by a new relation of all to all the citizens having become magistrates pass from general acts to particular acts and from the law to the execution of it this change of relation is not a subtlety of speculation without example in practice it occurs every day in the Parliament of England in which the lower house on certain occasions resolves itself into grand committee in order to discuss business better and thus becomes a simple commission instead of the sovereign court that it was the moment before in this way it afterwards reports to itself as the House of Commons what it has just decided in grand committee such as the advantage peculiar to a democratic government that it can be established in fact by a simple act of the general will and after this the provisional government remains in power should that be the form adopted or establishes in the name of the sovereign the government prescribed by the law and thus everything is according to rule it is impossible to institute the government in any other way that is legitimate without renouncing the principles here to force established end of book three chapter seventeen third book chapter eighteen of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book eighteenth chapter means of preventing usurpations of the government from these explanations it follows in confirmation of chapter sixteen that the act which institutes the government is not a contract but a law that the depositaries of the executive power are not the masters of the people but its officers that the people can appoint them and dismiss them at pleasure that for them it is not a question of contracting but of obeying and that in undertaking the functions which the state imposes on them they simply fulfill their duty as citizens without having in any way of right to discuss the conditions when therefore it happens that the people institute a hereditary government whether monarchical in family or aristocratic in one order of citizens it is not an engagement that they make but a provisional form which they give to the administration until they please to regulate it differently it is true that such changes are always dangerous and that the established government must never be touched except when it becomes incompatible with the public good but this circumspection is a maximum of policy not a rule of right and the state is no more bound to leave the civil authority to its chief men than the military authority to its generals moreover it is true that in such a case all the formalities requisite to distinguish a regular and lawful act from a seditious tumult and the will of a whole people from the clamors of affection cannot be too carefully observed it is especially in this case that only such concession should be made as cannot in strict justice be refused and from this obligation also the prince derives a great advantage in preserving its power in spite of the people without there being able to say that it has usurped the power for while appearing to exercise nothing but its rights it may very easily extend them and under pretext of maintaining the public peace obstruct the assemblies designed to reestablish good order so that it takes advantage of a silence which it prevents from being broken or of irregularities which it causes to be committed so as to assume in its favor the approbation of those whom fear renders silent and punish those that dare to speak it is in this way that the December's having at first been elected for one year and then kept in office for another year attempted to retain their power in perpetuity by no longer permitting the committee to assemble and it is by this easy method that all governments in the world when once invested with the public force usurp sooner or later the sovereign authority the periodical assemblies of which I have spoken before are fitted to prevent or postpone this evil especially when they need no formal convocation for then the prince cannot interfere with them without openly proclaiming itself a violator of the laws and an enemy of the state these assemblies which have as their object the maintenance of the social treaty ought always to be opened with two propositions which no one should be able to suppress and which should pass separately by vote the first whether it pleases the sovereign to maintain the present form of government the second whether it pleases the people to leave the administration to those at present entrusted with it I presuppose here what I believe that I have proved fizz that there is in the state no fundamental law which cannot be revoked not even the social compact for if all the citizens assembled in order to break this compact by a solemn agreement no one can doubt that it would be quite legitimately broken Grosius even thinks that each man can renounce the state of which he is a member and regain his natural freedom in his property by quitting the country now it would be absurd if all the citizens combined should be unable to do what each of them can do separately it must be clearly understood that no one should leave in order to evade his duty and relieve himself from serving his country at a moment when it needs him flight in that case would be criminal and punishable it would no longer be retirement but desertion end of book three chapter eighteen and a book fourth book chapter one of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau fourth book first chapter that the general will is indestructible so long as a number of men in combination are considered as a single body they have but one will which relates to the common preservation and to the general well-being in such a case all the forces of the state are vigorous and simple and its principles are clear and luminous it has no confused and conflicting interests the common good is everywhere plainly manifest and only good sense is required to perceive it peace union inequality are foes to political subtleties upright and simple minded men are hard to deceive because of their simplicity allurements and refined pretext do not impose upon them they are not even cunning enough to be dupes when in the happiest nation in the world we see troops of peasants regulating the affairs of the state under an oak and always acting wisely can we refrain from despising the refinements of other nations who make themselves illustrious and wretched with so much art and mystery a state thus governed needs very few laws and insofar as it becomes necessary to promulgate new ones this necessity is universally recognized the first man to propose them only gives expression to what all have previously felt and neither factions nor eloquence will be needed to pass into law what everyone has already resolved to do so soon as he is sure that the rest will act as he does what deceives reasoners is that seeing only states that are ill constituted from the beginning they are impressed with the impossibility of maintaining such a policy in those states they laugh to think of all the follies to which a cunning name and insinuating speaker can persuade the people of Paris or London they know not that Cromwell would have been put in irons by the people of Bern and the Duke of Beaufort imprisoned by the Genovese but when the social bond begins to be relaxed and the state weakened when private interests begin to make themselves felt and small associations to exercise an influence on the state the common interest is injuriously affected and finds adversaries unanimity no longer reigns in the voting the general will is no longer the will of all opposition and disputes arise and the best counsel does not pass uncontested lastly when the state on the verge of ruin no longer subsists except in a vain and illusory form when the social bond is broken in all hearts when the basest interest shelters itself impudently under the sacred name of the public welfare the general will becomes dumb all under the guidance of secret motives no more express their opinions as citizens than if the state had never existed and under the name of laws they deceitfully pass unjust decrees which have only private interest as their end does it follow from this that the general will is destroyed or corrupted no it is always constant unalterable and pure but it is subordinated to others which get the better of it each detaching his own interest from the common interest sees clearly that he cannot completely separate it but his share in the injury done to the state appears to him as nothing in comparison with the exclusive advantage which he aims at appropriating to himself this particular advantage being accepted he desires the general welfare for his own interest quite as strongly as any other even in selling his vote for money he does not extinguish in himself the general will but eludes it the fault that he commits is to change the state of the question and to answer something different from what he was asked so that instead of saying by a vote it is beneficial to the state he says it is beneficial to a certain man or a certain party that such or such emotion should pass thus the law public order in assemblies is not so much to maintain in them the general will as to ensure that it shall always be consulted and always respond I might in this place make many reflections on the simple right of voting in every act of sovereignty a right which nothing can take away from the citizens and on that of speaking proposing dividing and discussing which the government is always very careful to leave to its members only but this important matter would require a separate treatise and I cannot say everything in this one end of book four chapter one fourth book chapter two of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau fourth book second chapter voting we see from the previous chapter that the manner in which public affairs are managed may give a sufficiently trustworthy indication of the character and health of the body politic the more that harmony reigns in the assemblies that is the more that voting approaches unanimity the more also is the general will predominant but long discussions dissensions and uproar proclaim the ascendancy of private interests and the decline of the state this is not so clearly apparent when two or more orders enter into its constitution as in Rome the patricians and plebeians whose quarrels often disturb the comatia even in the palmiest days of the republic but this exception is more apparent than real for at that time by a vice inherent in the body politic there were so to speak two states in one what is not true of the two together is true of each separately and indeed even in the most stormy times the plebiscite of the people when the senate did not interfere with them always passed peaceably and by a large majority of votes the citizens having but one interest the people had but one will at the other extremity of the circle unanimity returns that is when the citizens fallen into slavery have no longer either liberty or will then fear and flattery change votes and acclimations men no longer deliberate but adore or curse such was the disgraceful motives speaking in the senate under the emperors sometimes it was done with ridiculous precautions tacitus observes that under author the senators in overwhelming vitelius with excretions affected to make at the same time a frightful noise in order that if he happened to become master he might not know what each of them had said from these different considerations are deduced the principles by which we should regulate the method of counting votes and of comparing opinions according as the general will is more or less easy to ascertain and the state more or less degenerate there is but one law which by its nature requires unanimous consent that is the social compact for civil association is the most voluntary act in the world every man being born free and master of himself no one can under any pretext whatever enslave him without his assent to decide that the son of a slave is born a slave is to decide that he is not born a man if then at the time of the social compact there are opponents of it their opposition does not invalidate the contract but only prevents them from being included in it they are foreigners among citizens when the state is established consent lies in residence to dwell in the territory is to submit to the sovereignty this must always be understood to relate to a free state for otherwise family property want of an asylum necessity or violence may detain an inhabitant in a country against his will and then his residence alone no longer supposes his consent to the contract or to the violation of it accepting this original contract the vote of the majority always binds all the rest this being a result of the contract itself but it will be asked how a man can be free and yet forced to conform to wills which are not his own how our opponents free and yet subject to laws they have not consented to I reply that the question is wrongly put the citizen consents to all the laws even to those which are passed in spite of him and even to those which punish him when he dares to violate any of them the unvarying will of all the members of the state is the general will it is through that that they are citizens and free when a law is proposed in the assembly of the people what is asked of them is not exactly whether they approve the proposition or reject it but whether it is conformable or not to the general will which is their own each one in giving his vote expresses his opinion there upon and from the counting of the votes is obtained the declaration of the general will when therefore the opinion opposed to my own prevails that simply shows that I was mistaken and that what I considered to be the general will was not so had my private opinion prevailed I should have done something other than I wished and in that case I should not have been free this supposes it is true that all the marks of the general will are still in the majority when they cease to be so whatever side we take there is no longer any liberty in showing before how particular wills were substituted for general wills in public resolutions I have sufficiently indicated the means practicable for preventing this abuse I will speak of it again hereafter with regard to the proportional number of votes for declaring this will I have also laid down the principles according to which it may be determined the difference of a single vote destroys unanimity but between unanimity and equality there are many unequal divisions at each of which this number can be fixed according to the condition and requirements of the body politic two general principles may serve to regulate these proportions the one that the more important and weighty the resolutions the nearer should the opinion which prevails approach unanimity the other that the greater the dispatch requisite in the matter under discussion the more should we restrict the prescribed difference in the division of opinions in resolutions which must be come to immediately the majority of a single vote should suffice the first of these principles appears more suitable to laws the second to affairs be that as it may it is by their combination that are established the best proportions which can be assigned for the decision of a majority end of book four chapter two fourth book chapter three of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Grousseau fourth book third chapter elections with regard to the elections of the prince and the magistrates which are as I have said complex acts there are two modes of procedure viz choice and lot both have been employed in different republics and a very complicated mixture of the two is seen even now in the election of the doge of Venice election by lot says Montesquieu is of the nature of democracy I agree but how is it so the lot he continues is a mode of election which mortifies no one it leaves every citizen a reasonable hope of serving his country but these are not the reasons if we are mindful that the election of the chiefs is a function of government and not of sovereignty we shall see why the method of election by lot is more in the nature of democracy in which the administration is by so much the better as its acts are less multiplied in every true democracy the magistracy is not a boon but an onerous charge which cannot fairly be imposed on one individual rather than on another the law alone can impose this burden on the person on whom the lot falls for then the conditions being equal for all and the choice not being dependent on any human will there is no particular application to alter the universality of the law in an aristocracy the prince chooses the prince the government is maintained by itself and voting is rightly established the instance of the election of the doge of Venice far from destroying this distinction confirms it this composite form is suitable in a mixed government for it is an error to take the government of Venice as a true aristocracy if the people have no share in the government the nobles themselves are numerous a multitude of poor Barna votes never come near any magistracy and have for their nobility only the empty title of excellency and the right to attend the great council this great council being as numerous as our general council at Geneva it's illustrious members have no more privileges than our simple citizens Citoyen it is certain that setting aside the extreme disparity of the two republics the burgesses la bourgeoisie of Geneva exactly correspond to the Venetian order of patricians our natives natifs and residents habitant represent the citizens and people of Venice our peasants represent the subject of the mainland in short in whatever way we consider this republic apart from its size its government is no more aristocratic than ours the whole difference is that having no chief for life we have not the same need for election by lot elections by lot would have few drawbacks in a true democracy in which all being equal as well in character and ability as in sentiments and fortune the choice would become almost indifferent but I have already said that there is no true democracy when choice and lot are combined the first should be employed to fill the posts that require peculiar talents such as military appointments the other is suitable for those in which good sense justice and integrity are sufficient such as judicial offices because in a well constituted state these qualities are common to all the citizens neither lot nor voting has any place in a monarchical government the monarch being by right soul prince and soul magistrate the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him alone when the Abbe de Saint Pierre proposed to multiply the councils of the king of France and to elect the members of them by ballot he did not see that he was proposing to change the form of government it would remain for me to speak of the method for recording and collecting votes in the assembly of the people but perhaps the history of the roman policy in that respect will explain more clearly all the principles which I might be able to establish it is not unworthy of a judicious reader to see in some detail how public and private affairs were dealt with in a council of two hundred thousand men end of book four chapter three book four chapter four of the social contract this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau book four chapter four the roman commission we have no very trustworthy records of the early times of Rome there is even great probability that most of the things which have been handed down are fables and in general the most instructive part of the annals of nations which is the history of their institution is the most effective experience every day teaches us from what causes spring the revolutions of empires but as nations are no longer in process of formation we have scarcely anything but conjectures to explain how they have been formed the customs which are found established at least testified that these customs had a beginning of the traditions that go back to these origins those which the greatest authorities countenance and which the strongest reasons confirm ought to pass as the most undoubted these are the principles which i've tried to follow in inquiring how the freest and most powerful nation in the world exercised its supreme power after the foundation of Rome the growing republic that is the army of the founder composed of albans sabines and foreigners was divided into three classes which from this division took the name of tribes each of these tribes was divided into ten curiae and each curiae into date curiae at the head of which were placed curians and date curians besides this a body of 100 horsemen or knights called a centuria was drawn from each tribe once we see that these divisions not very necessary in a town were at first only military but it seems that an instinct of greatness induced the little town of Rome from the first to adopt a polity suitable to the capital of the world from this first division and inconvenience soon resulted the tribe of the albans and that of the sabines remaining always in the same condition while that of the foreigners increased continually through perpetual accessions the last soon outnumbered the two others the remedy which servius found for this dangerous abuse was to change the mode of division and for the division by races which he'd abolished to substitute another derived from the districts of the city occupied by each tribe instead of three tribes be made four each of which occupied one of the hills of Rome and bore its name thus in remedying the existing inequality he also prevented it for the future and in order that this might be a division not only of localities but of men he prohibited the inhabitants of one quarter from removing into another which prevented the races from being mingled he also doubled the three old centuria of Calvary and added twelve others to them but still under the old names a simple and judicious means by which he affected a distinction between the body of knights and that of the people without making the latter murmur to these four urban tribes servius added fifteen others called rural tribes because they were formed of inhabitants of the country divided into so many cantons afterward as many new ones were formed and the roman people were at length divided into thirty five tribes a number which remained fixed until the close of the republic from this distinction between the urban and the rural tribes resulted in effect worthy of notice because there is no other instance of it and because Rome owed to it both the preservation of her manners and the growth of her empire it might be supposed that the urban tribes soon irrigated to themselves the power and the honors and were ready to disparage the rural tribes it was quite the reverse we know the taste of the old romans for a country life this taste they derived from their wise founder who united with liberty rural and military works and relegated so to speak to the towns arts trades intrigue wealth and slavery thus every imminent man that Rome had being a dweller in the fields and a tiller of the soil it was customary to seek in the country only for the defenders of the republic thus every imminent man that Rome had being a dweller in the fields and the tiller of the soil it was customary to seek in the country only for the defenders of the republic this condition being that of the worthiest patricians was honored by everyone the simple and laborious life of villagers was preferred to the lax and indolent life of the burgesses of Rome and many who would have been only wretched proletarians in the city became as laborers in the fields respected citizens it is not without reason said vero that our high-minded ancestors established in the village the nursery of those hardy and valiant men who defended them in time of war and sustained them in time of peace plenty says positively that the rural tribes were honored because of the men that composed them while the worthless whom it was desired to disgrace were transferred as a mark of ignominy into the urban tribes the sabine apius cloudius having come to settle in Rome was there loaded with honors and enrolled in a rural tribe which afterward took the name of his family lastly all the freedmen entered the urban tribes never the rural and during the whole of the republic there is not a single example of any of these freedmen attaining a magistracy although they had become citizens this maximum was excellent but was pushed so far that it linked the change and certainly an abuse in government resulted from it first the censors after having long irrigated the right of transferring citizens arbitrarily from one tribe to another allowed the majority to be enrolled in whichever they pleased a permission which certainly was in no way advantageous and took away one of the greatest resources of the censorship further since the great and powerful all enrolled themselves in the rural tribes while the freedmen who had become citizens remained with the populace in the urban ones the tribes in general had no longer any district or territory but all were so undermined that it was impossible to distinguish the members of each except by the registers so that the idea of the word tribe passed us from the real to the personal or rather became almost a camera moreover it came about that the urban tribes being close at hand were often the most powerful in the commissia and sold the state to those who stooped to buy the votes of the mob of which they were composed with regard to the curiae the founder having formed tin in each tribe the whole roman people at that time enclosed in the walls of the city consisted of 30 curiae each of which had its temples its gods its officers its priests and its festivals called compitalia resembling the Paganalia which the rural tribes had afterward in the new division of sirius the number 30 being incapable of equal distribution into four tribes he was unwilling to touch them and the curiae being independent of the tribes became another division of the inhabitants of Rome but there was no question of curiae either in the rural tribes or in the people composing them because the tribes having become a purely civil institution and another mode of living troops having been introduced the military divisions of Romulus were found superfluous thus although every citizen was enrolled in a tribe it was far from being the case that each was enrolled in a curiae sirius made yet a third division which had no relation to the two proceeding but became by its effects the most important of all he distributed the whole roman people into six classes which he distinguished not by the place of residence nor by the men but by property so that the first classes were filled with rich men the last with poor men and the intermediate ones with those who enjoyed a moderate fortune these six classes were subdivided into 193 other bodies called centuriae and these bodies were so distributed that the first class alone comprised more than a half and the last formed only one it thus happened that the class least numerous in men had most centuriae and that the last entire class was counted as only one subdivision although it alone contained more than a half of the inhabitants of Rome in order that the people might not so clearly discern the consequences of this last form sirius affected to give it a military aspect he introduced in the second class two centuriae of armorers and two of makers of instruments of war in the fourth in each class except the last he distinguished the young and the old that is to say those who were obliged to bear arms and those who were exempted by law and account of age a distinction which more than that of property gave rise to the necessity of frequently repeating the census or enumeration finally he required that the assembly should be held in the campus marshes and that all who were qualified for service by age should gather there with their arms the reason why he did not follow in the last class the same division into seniors and juniors is that the honor of bearing arms for the country was not granted to the populace of which it was composed it was necessary to have homes in order to obtain the right of defending them and out of those innumerable troops of beggars with which the armies of kings nowadays glitter there is perhaps not one but would have been driven with scorn from a roman cohort when soldiers were defenders of liberty yet again there was in the last class a distinction between the proletarii and those who were called capitae sincei the former not altogether destitute at least applied citizens to the state sometimes even soldiers in pressing need as for those who had nothing at all and could only be counted by heads they were regarded as altogether unimportant and marius was the first who condescended to enroll them without deciding here whether this third enumeration was good or bad in itself i think i may affirm that nothing but the simple manners of the early romans their disinterestedness their taste for agriculture their contempt for commerce and for the art in pursuit of gain could have rendered it practicable in what modern nation would rapacious greed restlessness of spirit intrigue continual changes of residents and the perpetual revolutions of fortune have allowed such an institution to endure for 20 years without the whole state being subverted it is indeed necessary to observe carefully that morality and the censorship more powerful than this institution corrected its imperfections in Rome and that many a rich man was relegated to the class of the poor for making too much display of his wealth from all this we may easily understand why mention is scarcely ever made of more than five classes although there were really six the sixth which furnished neither soldiers to the army nor voters to the campus marshals and which was almost useless in the republic rarely counted as anything such were the different divisions of the roman people let us see now what effect they produced in the assemblies these assemblies lawfully convened were called commissia they were usually held in the forum of Rome or in the campus marshals and were distinguished as commissia chirata commissia sin chirata and commissia tributa in accordance with that one of the three forms by which they were regulated the commissia chirata were founded by romulus the commissia sin chirata by serbius and the commissia tributa by the tribunes of the people no law received sanction no magistrate was elected except in the commissia and as there was no citizen who was not enrolled in a curia in a sin chirata or in a tribe it follows that no citizen was excluded from the right of voting and that the roman people were truly sovereign de jure and de facto in order that the commissia might be lawfully assembled and that what was done in them might have the force of law three conditions were necessary the first that the body or magistrate which convoked them should be invested with the necessary authority for that purpose the second that the assembly should be held on one of the days permitted by law the third that the auguries should be favorable the reason for the first regulation need not be explained the second is a matter of police thus it was not permitted to hold the commissia on feast days and market days when the country people coming to roman business had no leisure to pass the day in the place of assembly by the third the senate kept in check of proud and turbulent people and seasonably tempered the ardor of seditious tribunes but the latter found more than one means of freeing themselves from this constraint laws in the election of chiefs were not the only points submitted for the decision of the commissia the roman people having usurped the most important functions of government the fate of europe may be said to have been determined in their assemblies this variety of subjects gave scope for the different forms which these assemblies took according to the matters which had to be decided to judge of these different forms it is sufficient to compare them romulus in instituting the curiae desired to restrain the senate by means of the people and the people by means of the senate while ruling equally overall he therefore gave the people by this form all the authority of numbers in order to balance that of power and wealth which he left to the patricians but according to the spirit of a monarchy he left still more advantage to the patricians through the influence of their clients in securing a plurality of votes this admirable institution of patrons and clients was a masterpiece of policy and humanity without which the patrician order so opposed to the spirit of a republic could not have subsisted roman alone has had the honor of giving to the world such a fine institution from which they're never resulted in the abuse and which notwithstanding has never been followed since the form of the assembly of the curiae subsisted under the kings down to serbius and since the reign of the last tarkin is not considered legitimate the royal laws were on this account generally distinguished by the names of legis curiate under the republic the assembly of the curiae always limited to the four urban tribes and containing only the roman populace did not correspond either with the senate which was at the head of the patricians or with the tribunes who although plebeians were at the head of the middle-class citizens it therefore fell into disrepute and its degradation was such that its 30 assembled lictors did what the commissia curiata ought to have done the commissia sin curiata was so favorable to the aristocracy that we do not at first see why the senate did not always prevail in the commissia which bore that name and by which the consuls, censors and other curule magistrates were elected indeed of the 193's centurie which formed the six classes of the whole roman people the first class comprising 98 and the votes being counted only by the centurie this first class alone outnumbered in votes all the others when all these centurie were in agreement the recording of votes was even discontinued what the minority had decided passed for a decision of the multitude and we may say that in the commissia sin curiata affairs were regulated rather by the majority of crowns ecu than of votes but this excessive power was moderated in two ways first the tribunes usually and a great number of plebeians always being in the class of the rich balance the influence of the patricians in this first class the second means consisted in this that instead of making the centurie vote according to their order which would have caused the first class to begin always one of them was drawn by lot and proceeded alone to the election after which all the centurie being summoned on another day according to their rank renewed the election and usually confirmed it thus the power of example was taken away from rank to be given to lot according to the principle of democracy from this practice resulted yet another advantage the citizens from the country had time between the two elections to gain information about the merits of the candidate provisionally chosen and so record their votes with knowledge of the case but under the pretense of dispatch this practice came to be abolished and the two elections took place on the same day the commissia tributa were properly the council of the roman people they were convoked only by the tribunes and then the tribunes were elected and passed their plebiscita not only had the senate no status in them it had not even a right to attend and being compelled to obey laws on which they could not vote the senators were in this respect less free than the meanest citizens this injustice was altogether in politic and alone suffice to invalidate the decrees of a body to which all the citizens were not admitted if all the patricians had taken part in these commissia according to the rights which they had as citizens having become in that case simple individuals they would have scarcely influenced a form in which votes were counted by the head and in which the meanest proletarian had as much power as the chief of the senate we see then that besides the order which resulted from these different divisions for the collection of the votes of so great a people these divisions were not reduced to forms of material in themselves but that each had results corresponding with the purposes for which it was chosen without entering upon this in greater detail it follows from the preceding explanations that the commissia tributa were more favorable to popular government and the commissia sinteriata to aristocracy with regard to the commissia curiata in which the roman populace alone formed the majority as they served only to favor tyranny and evil designs they deserve to fall into discredit the seditious themselves refraining from a means which would too plainly reveal their projects it is certain that the full majesty of the roman people was found only in the commissia sinteriata which were alone complete seeing that the rural tribes were absent from the commissia curiata and the senate and the patricians from the commissia tributa the mode of collecting the votes among the early romans was as simple as their manners although still less simple than in sparta each gave his vote with a loud voice and a recording officer duly registered it a majority of votes in each tribe determined the suffrage of the tribe a majority of votes among the tribes determined the suffrage of the people and so with the curiace sinteriae this was a good practice so long as probity prevailed among the citizens and everyone was ashamed to record his vote publicly for an unjust measure or an unworthy man but when the people were corrupted and the votes were bought it was expedient that they should be given secretly in order to restrain purchasers by distrust and give naves an opportunity of not being traitors i know that cicero blames this change and tributes to it in part the fall of the republic but although i feel the weight which cicero's authority ought to have in this matter i cannot adopt his opinion on the contrary i think that through not making sufficient changes of this kind the downfall of the state was hastened as the regimen of healthy persons is unfit for invalids so we should not desire to govern a corrupt people by the laws which suit a good nation nothing supports this maximum better than the duration of the republic of venez only the semblance of which now exists solely because its laws are suitable to none but worthless men tablets therefore were distributed to the citizens by means of which each could vote without his decision being known new formalities were also established for the collection of tablets the counting of votes the comparison of numbers etc but this did not prevent suspicions as to the fidelity of the officer's charge with these duties at length edicts were framed the multitude of which proves their uselessness toward the closing years they were often compelled to resort to extraordinary expedience in order to supply the defects of the laws sometimes prodigies were feigned but this method which might impose on the people did not impose on those who govern them sometimes an assembly was hastily summoned before the candidates had had time to canvas sometimes a whole sitting was consumed in talking when it was seen that the people having been won over were ready to pass a bad resolution but at last ambition evaded everything and it seems incredible that in the midst of so many abuses this great nation by favor of its ancient institutions did not cease to elect magistrates to pass laws to judge causes and to dispatch public and private affairs with almost as much facility as the senate itself could have done end of chapter four fourth book chapter five of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Daniel Watkins the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau fourth book chapter five The Tribune Ship when an exact relation cannot be established among the constituent parts of the state or when indestructible causes are incessantly changing their relations a special magistracy is instituted which is not incorporated with the others but which replaces each term in its true relation forming a connection or middle term either between the prince and the people or between the prince and the sovereign or if necessary between both at once this body which i shall call The Tribune Ship is the guardian of the laws and of the legislative power it sometimes serves to protect the sovereign against the government as the tribunes of the people did in Rome sometimes to support the government against the people as the council of 10 now does in Venice and sometimes to maintain an equilibrium among all parts as the ethos did in Sparta The Tribune Ship is not a constituent part of the state and should have no share in the legislative or the executive power but it is in this very circumstance that its own power is greatest for while unable to do anything it can prevent everything it is more sacred and more venerated as defender of the laws than the prince that executes them and the sovereign that enacts them this was very clearly seen in Rome when those proud patricians who always despise the people as a whole were forced to bow before a simple officer of the people who had neither auspices nor jurisdiction The Tribune Ship, wisely moderated, is the strongest support of a good constitution but if its power be ever so little in excess it overthrows everything. Weakness is not natural to it and provided it has some power it is never less than it should be it degenerates into tyranny when it usurps the executive power of which it is only the moderator and when it wishes to make the laws which it should only defend the enormous power of the ethos which was without danger so long as Sparta preserved her morality accelerated the corruption when it had begun the blood of Aegis slain by these tyrants was avenged by his successor but the crime and the punishment of the ethos are like hasten the fall of the republic and after clear menace Sparta was no longer of any account. Rome again perished in the same way and the excessive power of the tribunes usurped by degrees served at last with the aid of laws framed on behalf of liberty as a shield for the emperors who destroyed her. As for the council of Ten in Venice it is a tribunal of blood horrible both to the patricians and to the people and far from resolutely defending the laws it has only served since their degradation for striking secret blows which men dare not remark. The tribune ship like the government is weakened by the multiplication of its members when the tribunes of the roman people at first to a number and afterward five wish to double this number the senate allowed them to do so being quite sure of controlling some by means of others which did not fail to happen the best means of preventing the usurpations of such a formidable body a means of which no government has hitherto availed itself would be not to make this body permanent but to fix intervals during which it should remain suspended these intervals which should not be long enough to allow abuses time to become established can be fixed by law in such a manner that it may be easy to shorten them in case of need by means of extraordinary commissions this method appears to me free from objection because as i have said the tribune ship forming no part of the constitution can be removed without detriment and it seems to me efficacious because a magistrate newly established does not start with the power that his predecessor had but with that which the law gives him. End of chapter five fourth book chapter six of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Daniel Watkins the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau fourth book chapter six the dictatorship the inflexibility of the laws which prevents them from being adapted to emergencies may in certain cases render them pernicious and thereby cause the ruin of the state in a time of crisis the order and tidiness of the forms require a space of time which circumstances sometimes do not allow a thousand cases may arise for which the legislator has not provided and to perceive that everything cannot be foreseen is a very needful kind of foresight we must therefore not desire to establish political institutions so firmly as to take away the power of suspending their effects even Sparta allowed her laws to sleep but only the greatest dangers can outweigh that of changing the public order and the sacred power of the laws should never be interfered with except when the safety of the country is at stake in these rare and obvious cases the public security is provided for by a special act which entrusts the care of it to the most worthy man this commission can be conferred in two ways according to the nature of the danger if an increase in the activity of the government suffices to remedy this evil we may concentrate it in one or two of its members in that case it is not the authority of the laws which has changed but only the form of their administration but if the danger is such that the formal process of law is an obstacle to our security a supreme head is nominated who may silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority in such a case the general will is not doubtful and it is clear that the primary intention of the people is that the state should not perish in this way the suspension of the legislative power does not involve its abolition the magistrate who silences it can make it speak he dominates it without having power to represent it he can do everything but make laws the first method was employed by the roman senate when it charged the consuls by a consecrated formula to provide for the safety of the republic the second was adopted when one of the two consuls nominated a dictator a usage of which alba had furnished the president to roam at the beginning of the republic they very often had recourse to the dictatorship because the state had not yet a sufficiently firm foundation to be able to maintain itself by the vigor of its constitution alone public morality rendering superfluous at that time many precautions that would have been necessary at another time there was no fear either that a dictator would abuse his authority or that he would attempt to retain it beyond the term on the contrary it seemed that so great a power must be a burden to him who was invested with it such haste did he make to divest himself of it as if to take the place of the laws were an office too arduous and too dangerous therefore it is the danger not its abuse but of its degradation that makes me blame the indiscreet use of this supreme magistracy in early times for while it was freely used at elections at dedications and in purely formal matters there was reason to fear that it would become less formidable in case of need and that the people would grow accustomed to regard as an empty title that which was only employed in empty ceremonies toward the close of the republic the romans having become more circumspect used the dictatorship sparingly with as little reason as they had formally been prodigal of it it was easy to see that their fear was ill-founded that the weakness of the capital then constituted its security against the magistrates whom it had within it that a dictator could in certain cases defend the public liberty without ever being able to assail it and that the chains of rome would not be forged in rome itself but in her armies the slight resistance which marius made against sila and pompy against Caesar showed clearly what might be looked for from the authority within against the force without this error caused them to commit great mistakes such for example was that of not appointing a dictator in the cataline affair for as it was only a question of the interior of the city or at most of some province of italy a dictator with the unlimited authority that the laws gave him would have easily broken up the conspiracy which was suppressed only by a combination of happy accidents such as human prudence could not have foreseen instead of that the senate was content to entrust all its power to the consuls whence it happened that Cicero in order to act effectively was constrained to exceed his authority in a material point and that although the first transports of joy caused his conduct to be approved he was afterward justly called to account for the blood of citizens shared contrary to the laws a reproach which could not have been brought against the dictator but the consul's eloquence won over everybody and he himself although a roman preferred his own glory to his country's good and sought not so much the most certain and legitimate means of saving the state as the way to secure the whole credit of this affair therefore he was justly honored as the liberator of Rome and justly punished as a violator of the laws however brilliant his recall may have been it was certainly a pardon moreover in whatever way this important commission may be conferred it is important to fix its duration at a very short term which can never be prolonged in the crises which cause it to be established the state is soon destroyed or saved and the urgent need having passed away the dictatorship becomes tyrannical or useless in Rome the dictators held office for six months only and the majority abdicated before the end of this term had the term been longer they would perhaps have been tempted to prolong it still further as the dissenters did their term of one year the dictator only had time to provide for the necessity which had led to his election he had no time to think of other projects end of chapter six fourth book chapter seven of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Daniel Watkins the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau fourth book chapter seven the censorship just as the declaration of the general will is made by the law the declaration of public opinion is made by the censorship public opinion is a kind of law of which the censor is minister and which he only applies to particular cases in the manner of the prince the censorial tribunal then far from being the arbiter of the opinion of the people only declares it and so soon as it departs from this position its decisions are fruitless and ineffectual it is useless to distinguish the character of a nation from the objects of its esteem for all these things depend on the same principle and are necessarily intermixed in all the nations of the world it is not nature but opinion which decides the choice of their pleasures reform men's opinions and their manners will be purified of themselves people always like what is becoming or what they judge to be so but it is in this judgment that they make mistakes the question then is to guide their judgment he who judges of manners judges of honor and he who judges of honor takes his law from opinion the opinions of a nation spring from its constitution although the law does not regulate morality it is legislation that gives it birth and when legislation becomes impaired morality degenerates but then the judgment of the censors will not do what the power of the laws has failed to do it follows from this that the censorship may be useful to preserve morality never to restore it institute censors while the laws are vigorous so soon as they have lost their power all is over nothing that is lawful has any force when the law sees to have any the censorship supports morality by preventing opinions from being corrupted by preserving their integrity through wise applications sometimes even by fixing them when they are still uncertain the use of seconds in jewels carried to a mad extreme in the kingdom of france was abolished by these simple words in an edict of the king as for those who have the cowardice to appoint seconds this judgment anticipating that of the public immediately decided it but when the same edicts wanted to declare that it was also cowardice to fight a jewel which is very true but contrary to common opinion the public ridiculed this decision on which its judgment was already formed i've said elsewhere that his public opinion is not subject to constraint there should be no vestige of this in the tribunal established to represent it we cannot admire too much the art with which this force wholly lost among the moderns was set in operation among the romans and still better among the lacedemonians a man of bad character having brought forward a good measure in the council of sparta the ethos without regarding him caused the same measure to be proposed by a virtuous citizen what an honor for the one what a stigma for the other without praise or blame being given to either certain drunkards from samos defiled the tribunal of the ethos on the morrow a public edict granted permission to the samians to be filthy a real punishment would have been less severe than such impunity when sparta pronounced what was or was not honorable greece made no appeal from her decisions end of chapter seven book four chapter eight of the social contract this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org the social contract by jan jack russo book four chapter eight civil religion man had at first no kings except the gods and no government but a theocracy they reasoned like caligula and at that time they reasoned rightly a long period is needed to change men's sentiments and ideas in order that they may resolve to take a fellow man as a master and flatter themselves that all will be well from the single circumstance that a god was placed at the head of every political society it followed that there were as many gods as nations two nations four into each other and almost always hostile could not long acknowledge the same master two armies engaged in battle with each other could not obey the same leader thus from national divisions resulted polytheism and from this theological and civil intolerance which are by nature the same as will be shown hereafter the fancy of the greeks that they recognize their own gods among barbarous nations arose from there regarding themselves as the natural sovereigns of those nations but in our days that is a very ridiculous kind of erudition which turns on the identity of the gods of different nations as if malloc saturn and chronos could be the same god as if the ball of the Phoenicians the Zeus of the Greeks and the Jupiter of the latins could be the same as if there could be anything in common among imaginary beings bearing different names but if it is asked why under paganism when every state had its worship and its gods there were no wars of religion i answered that it was for the same reason that each state having its peculiar form of worship as well as its own government did not distinguish its gods from its laws political warfare was also religious the departments of the gods were so to speak fixed by the limits of the nations the god of one nation had no right over other nations the gods of the pagans were not jealous gods they shared among them the empire of the world even moses and the Hebrew nation sometimes countenance this idea by speaking of the god of israel it is true that they regarded as not the gods of the Canaanites prescribed nations devoted to destruction whose country they were to occupy but see how they spoke of the divinities of the neighboring nations whom they were forbidden to attack the possession of what belongs to chamos your god said jeff though to the ammonites is it not lawfully your due by the same title we possess the lands which are conquering god has acquired in this it seems to me there was a well recognized parody between the rites of chamos and those of the god of israel but when the jews subjected to the kings of babelan and afterward to the kings of syria obstinately refused to acknowledge any other god than their own this refusal being regarded as a rebellion against the conqueror drew upon them the persecutions which we read of in their history and of which no other instance appears before christianity every religion then being exclusively attached to the laws of the state which prescribed it there was no other way of converting a nation than to subdue it and no other missionaries than conquerors and the obligation to change their form of worship being the law imposed on the vanquished it was necessary to begin by conquering before speaking of conversions far from men fighting for the gods it was as in homer the gods who fought for men each sued for victory from his own god and paid for it with new altars the romans before attacking a place summoned its gods to abandon it and when they left to the tyrantines their exasperated gods it was because they then regarded these gods as subjected to their own and forced to pay them homage they left to vanquish their gods as they left them their laws a crown for the capital on jupiter was often the only tribute they imposed at last the romans having extended their worship in their laws with their empire and having themselves often adopted those of the vanquished the nations of this vast empire since the right of citizenship was granted to all found insensibly that they had multitudes of gods and religions almost the same everywhere and this is why paganism was at length known in the world as only a single religion it was in these circumstances that jesus came to establish on earth a spiritual kingdom which separating the religious from the political system destroyed the unity of the state and caused the intestine divisions which have never ceased to agitate christian nations now this new idea of a kingdom in the other world having never been able to enter the mind of the pagans they always regarded christians as actual rebels who under cover of a hypocritical submission only sought an opportunity to make themselves independent and supreme and to usurp by cunning the authority which in their weakness they pretend to respect this was the cause of persecutions what the pagans had feared came to pass then everything changed its aspect the humble christians altered their tone and soon this pretended kingdom of the other world became under a visible chief the most violent despotism in this world as however there have always been a prince and civil laws a perpetual conflict of jurisdiction has resulted from this double power which has rendered any good polity impossible in christian states and no one has ever succeeded in understanding whether he was bound to obey the ruler or the priest many nations however even in europe or on its outskirts wish to preserve or to reestablish the ancient system but without success the spirit of christianity prevailed over everything the sacred worship all was retained or regained its independence of the sovereign and without any necessary connection with the body of the state mohammad had very sound views he thoroughly unified his political system and so long as his form of government subsisted under his successors the caliphs the government was quite undivided and in that respect good but the Arabs having become flourishing learned polished effeminate and indolent were subjugated by the barbarians and then the division between the two powers began again although it may be less apparent among the mohammadans than among the christians the division nevertheless exists especially in the sect of ali and there are states such as persia in which it is still seen among us the kings of england have established themselves as heads of the church and the stars have done the same but by means of this title they have made themselves its ministers rather than its rulers they've acquired not so much the right of changing it as the power of maintaining it they are not its legislators but only its princes wherever the clergy form a corporation they are masters and legislators in their own country there are then two powers two sovereigns in england and in russia just as elsewhere of all christian authors the philosopher hobs is the only one who has clearly seen the evil and its remedy and who has dared to propose a reunion of the heads of the eagle and the complete restoration of political unity without which no state or government will ever be well constituted but he ought to have seen that the domineering spirit of christianity was incompatible with the system and that the interest of the priest would always be stronger than that of the state it is not so much what is horrible and false in his political theory as what is just and true that has rendered it odious i believe that by developing historical facts from this point of view the opposite opinions of bail and warburton might easily be refuted the former of these maintains that no religion is useful to the body politic the latter on the other hand asserts that christianity is its strongest support to the first it might be proved that no state was ever founded without religion serving as its basis and to the second that the christian law is more injurious than useful to a firm constitution of the state in order to succeed in making myself understood i need only give a little more precision to the exceedingly vague ideas about religion in its relation to my subject religion considered with reference to society which is either general or particular may also be divided into two kinds vis the religion of the man and that of the citizen the first without temples without altars without rights limited to the purely internal worship of the supreme god and to the internal duties of morality is the pure and simple religion of the gospel the true theism and what may be called the natural divine law the other inscribed in a single country gives to it its gods its peculiar and tutelary patrons it has its dogmas its rights its external worship prescribed by the laws outside the single nation which observes it everything is for it infidel foreign and barbarous it extends the duties and rights of men only as far as its altars such were all the religions of early nations to which may be given the name of the divine law civil or positive there is a third and more extravagant kind of religion which giving them in two sets of laws two chiefs two countries imposes on them contradictory duties and prevents them from being at once devout men and citizens such is the religion of the llamas such is that of the japanese such is roman christianity this may be called the religion of the priest the results from it a kind of mixed and unsocial law which has no name considered politically these three kinds of religion all have their defects the third is so evidently bad that it would be a waste of time to stop and prove this whatever destroys social unity is good for nothing all institutions which put a man in contradiction with himself are worthless the second is good so far as it combines divine worship with love for the laws and by making their country the object of the citizen's adoration teaches them that to serve the state is to serve the guardian deity it is a kind of theocracy in which there ought to be no pontiff but the prince no other priest than the magistrates then to die for one's country is to suffer martyrdom to violate the laws is to be impious and to subject a guilty man to public execration is to devote him to the wrath of the gods but it is evil in so far as being based on error and falsehood it deceives men renders them credulous and superstitious and obscures the true worship of the deity with vain ceremonial it is evil again when becoming exclusive in tyrannical it makes a nation sanguinarian intolerance so that it thirsts after nothing but murder and massacre and believes that it is performing a holy action in killing whosoever does not acknowledge its gods this puts such a nation in a natural state of war with all others which is very prejudicial to its own safety there remains then the religion of man or christianity not that of today but that of the gospel which is quite different by this holy sublime and pure religion men children of the same god all recognize one another as brethren and a social bond which unites them is not dissolved even at death but this religion having no particular relation with the body politic leaves to the laws only the force that they derive from themselves without adding to them any other and thereby one of the great bonds of the particular society remains ineffective what is more far from attaching the hearts of citizens to the state it detaches them from it and from all earthly things i know of nothing more contrary to the social spirit we are told that a nation of true christians would form the most perfect society conceivable in this supposition i see only one great difficulty that a society of true christians would be no longer a society of men i say even that this supposed society with all its perfection would be neither the strongest nor the most durable by virtue of its perfection it would lack cohesion its perfection indeed would be its destroying vice each man would perform his duty the people would be obedient to the laws the chief men would be just and moderate and the magistrates upright and incorruptible the soldiers would despise death there would be neither vanity nor luxury all this is very good but let us look further christianity is an entirely spiritual religion concerned solely with heavenly things the christian's country is not of this world he does his duty it is true but he does it with a profound indifference as to the good or ill success of his endeavors provided that he has nothing to reproach himself with it matters little to him whether all goes well or ill here below if the state is flourishing he scarcely dares to enjoy the public felicity he fears to take a pride in the glory of his country if the state declines he blesses the hand of god which lies heavy on his people in order that the society might be peaceable and harmony maintained it would be necessary for all citizens without exception to be equally good christians but if unfortunately there happens to be in it a single ambitious man a single hypocrite a catalanine or a cromwell for example such a man will certainly obtain an advantage over his pious compatriots christian charity does not suffer men readily to think ill of their neighbors as soon as a man is found by cunning the art of imposing on them and securing to himself a share in the public authority he is invested with dignity god wills that he should be reverenced soon he exercises dominion god wills that he should be obeyed the depository of this power abuses it this is the rod with which god punishes his children they would have scruples about driving out the usurper it would be necessary to disturb the public peace to employ violence to shed blood all this illicords with the meekness of the christian and after all does it matter whether they are free or enslaved in this veil of woes the essential thing is to reach paradise and resignation is but one means the more toward that some foreign war comes on the citizens march to battle without anxiety none of them think of flight they do their duty but without an ardent desire for victory they know better how to die than to conquer what matters it whether they are the victors or the vanquished does not providence know better than they what is needful for them conceive what an advantage a bold impetuous enthusiastic enemy can derive from the stoical indifference set against them those noble peoples who are consumed with a burning love of glory and of country suppose your christian republic opposed to sparta or roam the pious christians will be beaten crushed destroyed before they have time to collect themselves or they will owe their safety only to the contempt which the enemy may conceive for them to my mind that was a noble oath of the soldiers of fabius they did not swear to die or to conquer they swore to return as conquerors and kept their oath never would christians have done such a thing they would have believed that they were tempting god but i am mistaken in speaking of a christian republic each of these two words excludes the other christianity preaches only servitude and dependence its spirit is too favorable to tyranny for the latter not to profit by it always true christians are made to be slaves they know it and are hardly aroused by it this short life has too little value in their eyes christian troops are excellent we are told i deny it let them show me any that are such for my part i know of no christian troops the crusades will be cited without disputing the valor of the crusaders i shall observe that far from being christians they were soldiers of the priest citizens of the church they fought for their spiritual country which the church had somehow rendered temporal properly regarded this brings us back to paganism as the gospel does not establish a national religion any sacred war is impossible among christians under the pagan emperors christian soldiers were brave all christian authors affirm it and i believe it there was a rivalry of honor against the pagan troops as soon as the emperors became christians this rivalry no longer subsisted and when the cross had driven out the eagle all the roman valor disappeared but setting aside political considerations let us return to the subject of right and determine principles on this important point the right which the social pact gives to the sovereign over its subjects does not as i have said pass the limits of public utility subjects then own no account of their opinions to the sovereign except so far as those opinions are of moment to the community now it is very important for the state that every citizen should have a religion which may make him delight in his duties but the dogmas of this religion concern neither the state nor its members except so far as they affect morality and the duties which he who professes it is bound to perform toward others each may have in addition such opinions as he pleases without its being the business of the sovereign to know them for as he has no jurisdiction in the other world the destiny of his subjects in the life to come whatever it may be is not his affair provided they are good citizens in this life there is however a purely civil profession of faith the articles of which it is the duty of the sovereign to determine not exactly as dogmas of religion but as sentiments of sociability without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject without having power to compel anyone to believe them the sovereign may banish from the state whoever does not believe them it may banish him not as impious but as unsociable as incapable of sincerely loving law and justice and sacrificing at need his life to his duty but if anyone after publicly acknowledging these dogmas behaves like an unbeliever in them he should be punished with death he's committed the greatest of crimes he has lied before the laws the dogmas of civil religion ought to be simple few in number stated with precision and without explanations or commentaries the existence of the deity powerful wise beneficent prescient and bountiful the life to come the happiness of the just the punishment of the wicked the sanctity of the social contract and of the laws these are the positive dogmas as for the negative dogmas i limit them to one only that is intolerance it belongs to the creeds which we have excluded those who distinguish civil intolerance from theological intolerance are in my opinion mistaken these two kinds of intolerance are inseparable it is impossible to live at peace with people whom we believe to be damned to love them would be to hate god who punishes them it is absolutely necessary to reclaim them or to punish them wherever theological intolerance is allowed it cannot but have some effect in civil life and as soon as it has any the sovereign is no longer sovereign even in secular affairs from that time the priests of the real masters the kings are only their officers now that there is and can be no longer any exclusive national religion we should tolerate all those which tolerate others so far as their dogmas have nothing contrary to the duties of a citizen but whosoever dares to say outside the church no salvation ought to be driven from the state unless the state be the church and the prince be the pontiff such a dogma is proper only in a theocratic government in any other it is pernicious the reason for which Henry the fourth is said to have embraced the romish religion ought to have made any honorable man renounce it especially any prince who knew how to reason end of chapter eight fourth book chapter nine of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Daniel Watkins the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau fourth book chapter nine conclusion after laying down the principles of political right and attempting to establish the state on its foundations it would remain to strengthen it in its external relations which would comprise the law of nations commerce the right of war and conquests public rights alliances negotiations treaties etc but all this forms a new subject too vast for my limited scope I ought always to have confined myself to a narrow sphere end of chapter nine end of fourth book end of the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau