 Good afternoon. I don't know if we can put Henry up on the screen if we can connect him. I'm Graham Allison, a professor at Harvard, where I became a graduate student more than five decades ago. And my professor was Henry Kissinger. And I've been learning from him every day until this day. With a brutal war raging in Ukraine and the risk of war over Taiwan rising in Asia, we're very fortunate today at Davos to have with us by Zoom a person uniquely qualified to give us a historical perspective on war. So Henry, at the ripe young age of 99, rapidly approaching your centennial birthday, which we're looking forward to, yours has been the most amazing life. Both in your own personal experience and in your research and writing and 19 books, the most recent of which was published last year on leadership, a great book, you've drilled down deeper on the challenges of war and peace than any other person I can identify. Born in Germany, five years after World War I, you escaped from Nazi rule and served in the US Army at the end of the war. After the war, became a student and then a professor at Harvard writing your first great book on the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna that created a century-long peace that followed. As a statesman, you played a pivotal role in ending the Vietnam War, in constructing détente with the Soviet Union that kept the Cold War cold, in establishing relations with China that helped bring the Cold War to a peaceful end. And in the decades since, you've continued thinking and writing about the challenges of building a peaceful world order. So this afternoon, we're going to start with the question of war in Ukraine. And after Henry said a few words about that, we'll turn to the risks of war in China. But Henry, let me be specific here. Last month, you wrote an article in Spectator recalling European leaders sleepwalking into a conflict none of them would have chosen if they had foreseen the war's end in 1918. You asked in that article whether the world now finds itself at a, quote, turning point in Ukraine as winter imposes a pause on large-scale military operations there. And then you say, quote, the time is approaching to build on the strategic changes that have already been accomplished and to integrate them into a new structure towards achieving peace through negotiation. So let me ask you to be more specific. I appreciate this introduction. I've made me proud of whatever professorial contribution I made to your later career. Last year, I made some observations here about how to conceive the end of the war in Ukraine. It was not fully understood what the intention was. And so let me repeat and expand on some of these principles. The war in Ukraine began with the invasion of a sovereign country. And the principle that this must not be a method of settling international disputes was established by NATO and strongly supported by the United States. And I have strongly supported the efforts to do so. We are now at a point when many of the objectives have already been achieved. It has been demonstrated that a conventional attack from Russia on Europe will find united resistance and that Russia probably does not have the capacity to overcome it by conventional means. So secondly, NATO has been expanded by the adherents of Finland and Sweden. And so the strategic objective has importantly been achieved. But the outcome of the war will involve also where various lands should be drawn in the process of preventing the war from escalating and causing damage beyond what existing levels. And so I proposed last year, and I think again, that a ceasefire along the lines of invasion is the reasonable outcome of the military actions but not necessarily the outcome of a later peace negotiation, which would be under ceasefire conditions. The United States has supported Ukrainian resistance and should continue to support and, if necessary, intensify its military support until the ceasefire line is either reached or accepted in some preliminary discussions. And another purpose of this is to keep the war from becoming a war against Russia itself, to keep Russia an opportunity to rejoin an international system. This may seem very hollow to nations that have been under Russian pressure for much of the Cold War period. But the new conditions that I have described may cause Russia to re-evaluate its historic position, which was an amalgam of an attraction to the culture of Europe and a fear of domination by Europe that to provide possibility to reassess that reliance on military, on reliance on military force, this is all the more important because the destruction of Russia as a state that can pursue its own policies will open up the vast area of its 11 time zones to internal conflict and to outside intervention at the time when there are 15,000 and more nuclear weapons on its territory. So this is why I believe dialogue with Russia while the war continues, an end of fighting when the pre-war line is reached and a continuing process of discussion by Europe, America, and at that point Russia about the later evolution while the conditions of sanctions and other pressures will be maintained until the final settlement is reached. I believe this is the way to prevent the war from escalating by raising issues beyond those that existed at the beginning of the war and making them subject to a continuation of military conflict. I want to express my admiration for the president of Ukraine and for the heroic conduct of the Ukrainian people when I asked them to participate in an effort which should be made by Europe and Ukraine together before this war. I was opposed to membership of Ukraine in NATO because I feared that it would start exactly the process that we are seeing now. Now that this process has reached this level, the idea of a neutral Ukraine under these conditions is no longer meaningful. And at the end of the process that I described, it ought to be guaranteed by NATO in whatever forms NATO can develop. But I believe Ukrainian membership in NATO would be an appropriate outcome. So we now hope that the courage of this period and the heroism of this period will be matched by a vision of a process which uses this time as a step towards a strengthening of Europe. An opening to Russia if it meets the required conditions to participate as a member in these European processes and as a fulfillment of the hopes which have characterized the evolution of Europe since the end of the war and fulfill the principles of America in bringing about a more peaceful world order. OK, thank you. There's about 20 pieces of nuance in that and that certainly does take a step beyond the spectator piece to clarify. So I think, as you said, you were going to say what you think, and I think we've had a chance to hear it. Before I drill down on that one, let me just turn to Asia since the time is short. You've been involved in the whole question of China and its role in the world, including its relation with the US since you and Nixon went to China to open relations with China. Now, a half century ago, when that began, if one of the clear irreconcilable differences among the parties at that time were the views about Taiwan, but in the Shanghai communique and in the framework of strategic ambiguity that you and Chow and Lai and Company wove, irreconcilables didn't turn out to be unmanageables. And somehow, the five decades since then have actually seen better increases in the lives and well-being of people on both sides of the straits than in any equivalent period in their history. So on the other hand, this situation is heating up, where you can see some political impulses in the US even calling for recognition of Taiwan as an independent country. Something that you've said and that I have written as well, I cannot imagine any Chinese leader abiding. So what about the Asian front and also from a historical perspective? When President Nixon began to move together with Chairman Mao towards progress in the American-Chinese relationship, there had been 162 negotiations about Taiwan in Warsaw, which ended very quickly on each occasion, because each side put forward the proposals that the other side would not accept. We began the process because we were convinced that the American people should be given a vision of peace that was not defined by the Vietnam War, but that showed prospects of constructive relationships developing even among societies that had ideologically substantial differences. China felt itself at the same time under pressure from Russia and considered it to its own advantage to open a dialogue with the United States. For five decades, this process operated effectively. The issue of Taiwan was put under arrangements under which the Taiwan could develop economically politically without the affirmation by the United States of a separate China. And the contribution that the United States made to the process was its affirmation that it understood the Chinese view on one China and that it would not challenge it. This process has been under pressure in recent weeks. The presidents of China and the United States have met to arrest the movement towards conflict and begun and created a basis for a dialogue. And I am delighted to see that my friend of two decades, Ziou, has expressed a vision at this meeting which outlines ways by which this process can be implemented. What this process needs, above all, is a deep conviction on both sides that it is not simply a tactical move but a necessity for our period. When the two technologically most advanced countries with capacities in artificial intelligence and nuclear destructiveness are engaged in a confrontation, in a military confrontation, the structure and stability and ultimately the survival of mankind is threatened. We each side should not look at these negotiations as a means of building on its assumed advantages over the other and in preparing for an expected showdown. In the first phase, such a goal is probably not achievable. In the first phase, a number of specific steps need to be taken on the more limited and concrete issues that confront us. And I notice with great pleasure that the Chinese side has lifted its insistence that every issue had to be negotiated simultaneously and that the United States has reciprocated by its own willingness to engage in specific steps like the conversations that will take place here between the WHO and Secretary Yellen and negotiations that are going on between the rentables in the climate issue in time. Each side needs to consider for itself how the threat to human survival of the destructiveness of weapons coupled with making them almost conscious in their application can be dealt with. It seems far from immediate negotiations, but it needs to be conducted first within each side and then between the two sides. If that can be achieved, we can live in a world of prosperity that has been against in recent decades without the threat of a kind of military action that can devastate humanity. The two countries will, of course, not talk about a bilateral domination of the world. The two countries have their allies and have their cultural preferences, but they need to do something that has never yet happened, a way of harmonizing the destiny of mankind in developing its non-destructive capabilities for the sake of peace, progress, and humanity. That vision can be put before us, but only if the leaders of both countries produce the conviction in their societies that it is not necessary and not act on the belief that they can find a way to destroy the others by the others inadvertence. The goals are clear. How to achieve it is a challenge to the domestic politics of each of our countries, but it is necessary and therefore should be pursued. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak. We've got about two and a half minutes left, so I saw Luca today. He sends you the warmest regards. I said, you were told me to tell him that you were coming to China soon. He said sooner rather than later. I said maybe April you were told me, but he said they'll welcome you with open arms. So that's his best regards. And he gave an excellent presentation at the Davos session, as you mentioned earlier today. But with one minute and 45 seconds left, if you were thinking about Taiwan, again the way you thought about it 50 years ago, any clues? No, I think it would be best if both sides prevented conduct that the other would interpret as an imminent showdown. That is that China should restrain its military buildup and the United States should avoid acting as if it was heading for a two-China solution under the guise of one China principles and in the interim while they are reflecting about how to implement this if both sides could cool and avoid threatening language vis-a-vis the other. It might create, it would create conditions in which a dialogue can be presumed. Well, thank you very much. So I'm sorry that our time has given up, given out for today, but for 99 years young, your mind is as sharp as ever. And I would say we're looking forward to the centennial and beyond. So let's say thank you very much to him.