 Section 1 of the Anti-Coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. The Anti-Coup. Supporters of political democracy, human rights and social justice have good reasons to be alarmed about coup d'etat. These abrupt seizures of the state apparatus have occurred with great frequency in recent decades. Coups have overthrown established constitutional democratic systems of government, halted movement towards greater democracy, and have imposed brutal and oppressive regimes. Coup d'etat are one of the main ways in which new dictatorships are established. Coups may also precipitate civil wars and international crises. Coups remain a major unsolved defense problem. A coup d'etat is a rapid seizure of physical and political control of the state apparatus by illegal action of a conspiratorial group backed by the threat or use of violence. The members of the previous government are deposed against their will. Initially, the coup group rapidly occupies the centres of command, decision making and administration, replacing the previous chief executive and top officials with persons, military or civilian, of their choice. Eventually, they go in control of the whole state apparatus. Successful coups are usually completed quickly, at most, within 48 hours. Coup d'etat have taken place in dozens of countries in nearly every region of the world in recent decades, including in Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Liberia, Chile, Fiji, Greece, Libya, Laos, Guatemala, Argentina, Grenada, Poland and the Soviet Union. Coups have been very widespread in Africa in the post-colonial independent countries. The first of these was a military coup which ousted Kwame Nekroma as president of Ghana in 1966. There were five coups in Thailand between 1951 and 1976, making the growth of a democracy difficult. In Libya, Mohama Qaddafi took power as a result of a 1969 military coup. The Eland government in Chile was deposed by a military coup in 1973. The 1964 military coup in Brazil brought in a repressive military regime that ruled for years. In Guatemala, the 1982 coup was followed by another coup which eventually placed retired General Rios Mott in charge. The 1981 declaration of emergency and installation of General Dzerelski as president in Poland to repress the Solidarity Independent Labour Union, as well as the failed hardline coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991 are among the best known examples in recent decades. Coups and coup attempts continue. Some writers have commented that coup d'etat, not elections, have been the most frequent means for changing governments. And that for post-colonial Africa, the military coup has, in effect, become the institutionalised method for changing governments. It has been suggested that coups are now occurring with less frequency than previously, but also that this decline may be short-lived, and that even when a coup has been avoided for many years, a country may remain vulnerable. Massive efforts and sums of money are regularly devoted to prepare to resist foreign aggression. Yet virtually nothing is done to prepare societies to deal with the defence problem of coup d'etat despite their frequency in world politics. Serious consideration of anti-coup defence is long overdue. Section 2 of the Anti-Coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Lynette Calkins. The Anti-Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. How Coups Operate Seizure of the actual political machinery of command and administration will often begin by action against top personnel of the previous government, and seizure of government buildings and offices, military and police headquarters, and control centres for communications and transportation. Coups normally operate very quickly, often within a few hours, and therefore secret conspiratorial planning is important. Coups are most often conducted by a critical part of the military forces, acting alone or in alliance with political cliques, intelligence organisations, domestic or foreign, or police forces. Sometimes, coups have been executive usurpations. An established head of state, president or prime minister for example, falsely claiming an emergency, acts to suspend a constitutional government and establish a dictatorship. Sometimes, coups have been led by a dictatorial political party with or without its own paramilitary forces. Coups may also be initiated by a section of the ruling elite backed by other groups. If the coup is to succeed, it is important that non-participants in the coup be supportive, remain passive, or be made ineffective. Because of its minority and conspiratorial nature, a coup is the opposite of a mass popular revolution, although pooches may call their action a revolution. The group initiating the coup usually intends to use the power of the section of the state which it already controls, or over which it expects at first to gain control against the other sections in order to gain complete control of the state. Often the other sections readily capitulate. They may do this in face of perceived overwhelming forces supporting the coup. They may also capitulate because they do not strongly support the established government, have active sympathy for the pooches, or feel helpless not knowing what else they can do. The usurpers normally intend to maintain order and to keep the bureaucracy, civil service, military forces, local government, and police intact, at least for the time being, but to bring them under their command. The new government imposed by a military coup may be fully military, partially military, or fully civilian in personnel. The combined power of the state under the usurpers can then, if necessary, be applied against the rest of the society to extend and consolidate the control of the whole country. End of section 2 Section 3 of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, the anti-coup, by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. When are coups likely to occur? In some countries, an internal coup is unthinkable, as in Norway and Switzerland, for example. Some conditions tend to impede coups. Where democratic constitutional procedures exist, are respected, and provide for peaceful, institutionalized means to resolve internal conflicts, to change governments, and to hold government officials accountable, a coup d'etat will be less likely. If the groups capable of conducting a coup, as the army, believe in democratic processes and respect the limits that have been placed on their authority, they are unlikely to attempt a coup. They may instead exert self-restraint, believing that it would be wrong to stage a coup. The social structure of the society is also influential in determining whether a coup d'etat is likely to happen. Where the civil, non-state institutions of the society are strong and democratically controlled, and military institutions and anti-democratic political parties are in comparison weaker, a coup is not likely to occur. Where the society works together in a relative harmony, a coup is not likely. That situation, however, is rare, and is not required to prevent a coup. If the internal problems are at least of limited severity and can be dealt with by institutionalized and other peaceful procedures, a coup is less likely, or if acute conflicts are present but are conducted non-violently instead of by internal violence, the stage will not be set for a coup by a group that promises to end internal violence and to restore law and order. Where politicians seek to serve the society and avoid corruption, one justification for a coup will be removed. On the other hand, when those conditions are not present, the society may be vulnerable to coups. The roots of democratic political systems may be shallow or eroded. The government may be seen as illegitimate and there may be widespread dissatisfaction with its performance. Perhaps it may be charged with incompetence, corruption or indecisiveness in times of crisis. Confidence in the capacity of democratic procedures to remedy the situation may be widely lacking and in some cases there may be no agreed procedures for succession of governments. The civil non-state institutions of the society, voluntary institutions of many types, political parties, independent educational institutions, religious bodies, trade unions and many other types, may be weak or nearly non-existent. Also, the general population may lack significant participation in the political system. Consequently, there would be no groups and institutions capable of opposing a seizure of the state apparatus. The society may have very serious internal problems associated with violence. Serious social unrest, acute economic problems, sharp political conflicts or internal violence and assassinations may make the major parts of the society willing to accept a new strong government which promises to act to restore order and to end the crisis. Unfavorable economic conditions interacting with political factors may make a society vulnerable to coups and it has been argued that the lack of diversification in exports and excessive dependency on a variable international market for exports can create conditions in which a coup is likely. At times, individuals, powerful groups, a dictatorial party or a military clique may simply lust for power and domination with or without the guise of noble objectives. Such conditions do not necessarily produce a coup, however. Even when conditions for a coup may be favorable and the potential putchists lack self-restraint, they may not make the attempt because it would likely fail. This propensity to failure may derive from several sources. Important sections of the military personnel, the police and the civil servants, as well as lower levels of government may be viewed as unsupportive of a coup and likely to resist the attempt. The independent institutions of the society may be inclined to oppose the coup and are strong enough to act powerfully against it. The ability of these possible opponents of a coup to act powerfully against a coup attempt can significantly influence the decision of potential coup makers about whether to make the attempt or not. If a society is likely to resist firmly an attempted takeover, a coup is less likely to occur. Those who attempt a coup must be able to assume that once they have seized power they will encounter a minimal resistance from the bureaucracy and the populace. In societies where the masses are politically mobilized, involved and powerful, this assumption cannot be made. And section three. Section four of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Lynette Colkins. The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Support for coups. The basic prerequisite of a coup is that the Puchas' organizational and repressive forces are believed to be more powerful than the other institutions and forces of the society. In short, civil society is weaker than the military forces. Indeed, in many countries, the military forces have been in recent decades expanded to be by far the strongest institution of the whole society. These military forces have often been turned against the very society and population on which their existence has depended and which they were supposed to defend. Such a military coup is more likely if the soldiers are more loyal to their officers than they are to the democratic government. If the coup is instead an executive usurpation, sometimes called a self coup, it is necessary that the combined governmental civil bodies and military forces assisting the takeover are more powerful than the civil institutions of the society. Instead, the coup may be one conducted by a disciplined political party with its own paramilitary forces. The party supporters may also at times operate from key ministries in a coalition government or with support from significant sections of the military and police. To succeed, that party must be more able to act than our other sections of the society which might oppose the takeover. In some situations, agents of a foreign government may assist internal political or military groups in carrying out a coup. In past coups, supporters of political freedoms have often been silent and have passively submitted. This does not mean that when a coup attempt succeeds that the general population favored it. In many cases, the population may be actually opposed but does not know what to do. A civil war against the military forces and their allies, a war which Democrats would certainly lose, has understandably inspired few. Believers in constitutional procedures and social justice have usually not known how else a coup backed by the military forces could be defeated. Without serious preparations for an anti-coup defense, a lasting democratic system is very doubtful in many countries, especially in those with a history of coups. Even in countries that have achieved a relatively democratic political situation, anti-coup measures are important despite public statements of innocent intentions by those individuals and groups that are capable of conducting a coup. End of section four. Section five of the anti-coup. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, the anti-coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Attempts to prevent coups. Obviously, it is better to have prevented coup attempts from occurring than it is to have to defend against them. One important issue, therefore, is how coups can be prevented and blocked. In many constitutional democracies, it has been assumed that if the constitution and the laws prohibit coups, then the democracy is safe. That is demonstrably not true, as too many countries have discovered to their peril. Democracies with constitutional provisions or laws against attempts to seize control of the state by coups have themselves been victims of coups. Such legal prohibitions should exist, but many times they have failed to block coups. Coups are in fact always conducted by groups which are quite willing to violate constitutional legal barriers to their intended actions. This does not mean that such constitutional and legal provisions are harmful, but that they are insufficient. Means of enforcing them are clearly needed. Persons and groups willing to push aside or murder executive officials in order to install themselves as rulers find no problem in violating existing constitutional or legal barriers to their action. Military groups determined to save the nation or to establish their own dominance will not be seriously impeded by a legal barrier. Disciplined political parties that see themselves to be the saviours of the people and the makers of a future ideal society may respect no barriers to their taking state power in order to implement their mission. Efforts to remove justifiable grievances in the society are also needed, but they too are insufficient. Such grievances may genuinely motivate potential putschists or may be merely excuses for a coup which is attempted for less honourable motives. International condemnation and sanctions are also unlikely to deter determined putschists. It is naive to expect that international influences will be able to prevent or unseat an internal takeover. At best they may support a strong indigenous capacity to block attempted usurpations. At other times certain international influences may support the coup or even be a main force in its instigation as for example has the United States government been in several cases. Obviously then something more is required. Strong barriers to coup d'etat. This essay will argue that these barriers can be erected within the country by a prepared anti-coup defence policy. This policy would not only have the potential of defeating coups it could also serve as a potential deterrent to these attacks rooted in the capacity for effective defence. Because coups have so often been successful populations are often unlikely to think that effective anti-coup barriers can be erected. The confusion and sense of powerlessness which often accompany coups have been aggravated by the population's absence of planning preparations and training to block coups. When the coup is commonly backed by the military forces the supposed defenders of the society against which there can be no military power applied the anguish and despair of the population increases. End section 5 Section 6 of the anti-coup This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Lynette Calkins The Anti-Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Coups have been defeated The problem of how to block coups d'etat would seem insoluble except for the important fact that sometimes coups have been defeated Despite often disadvantageous conditions civilians have at times been able to block illegal seizures of state power These cases have been remarkable Sometimes coups fail because non-cooperation and defiance break the intended link between the physical control of government facilities and the political control of the state Civil servants, bureaucrats, military groupings and other state employees at times steadfastly refused to cooperate with Poochists denying control of the state apparatus Coups have also been imperiled by severance of the link between control of the central state machinery and control of the society including independent social institutions local governments and the population as a whole Poochists have also narrowly assumed that dominance of state structures equals political and social control However, without the submission of all these sections of the society the coup leadership cannot become a lasting government The defeat of the attempted hardline takeover in the former Soviet Union in August 1991 is one relatively recent case of mass non-cooperation against a coup Prominent earlier cases of successful anti-coup defense occurred in Germany in 1920 against the Cap Pooch which threatened the new Weimar Republic and in France in 1961 against the Alger's Generals Revolt which aimed to keep Algeria French by ousting the De Gaulle-Debrah government In these three cases and a few others the coups were blocked by internal non-violent resistance Only occasionally as during the 1991 coup in the Soviet Union has serious supportive international diplomatic and economic action been threatened or taken Germany 1920 On 12 March 1920 unofficial frackcorp units of ex-soldiers and civilians occupied Berlin in a coup against the Weimar Republic organized by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp and Lieutenant General Walter von Lüttwitz The coup aimed to establish an authoritarian regime of experts The small German army remained quote neutral close quote The legal democratic government under President Friedrich Ebert fled Though not well prepared the coup might well have succeeded but there been no resistance The legal government proclaimed that all citizens should obey only it and that the provinces should refuse all cooperation with the Kapp group After a workers strike against the coup broke out in Berlin a proclamation calling for a general strike was issued under the names of President Ebert and social democratic ministers though without their official approval The Kappists were quickly met by large scale non-cooperation by civilian servants and conservative government bureaucrats among others Qualified persons refused to accept ministerial posts in the new regime Kappist repression was harsh and some strikers were shot to death However the strength of the non-cooperation grew and a general strike paralyzed Berlin The Rachsbank refused funds to the usurpers In 2017 the Berlin Security Police demanded Kapp's resignation He fled to Sweden the same day Many of his aides left Berlin in civilian clothes and Ludwigs resigned The Freikorps then marched out of Berlin killing and wounding protesting civilians as they did so The coup was defeated by the combined action of workers, civil servants, bureaucrats and the general population They refused the popular and administrative cooperation that the usurpers required The Weimar Republic survived to face other grave internal problems The financial costs of the resistance to the attempted coup were modest and an estimated several hundred persons had been killed and others were wounded by the Kappists France 1961 French President Charles de Gaulle in early April indicated that he was abandoning the attempt to keep Algeria French In response on the night of 21 through 22 April rebelling French military units in Algeria seized control of the capital city of Algiers and nearby key points However the coup there could only succeed by replacing the legal government in Paris On 23 April the political parties and trade unions in France held mass meetings and called for a one hour general strike That night de Gaulle broadcast a speech heard also in Algeria urging people to defy and disobey the rebels ordering the use of all means to bring them down I forbid every Frenchman and in the first place every soldier to carry out any of their orders Prime Minister de Gaulle warned of an airborne attack from Algiers However, instead of ordering military action he called upon the general population to act As soon as the sirens sound go there to the airports by foot or by car to convince the mistaken soldiers of their huge error Copies of de Gaulle's speech were duplicated and widely distributed by the population and loyal French soldiers in Algeria de Gaulle later declared From then on the revolt met with a passive resistance on the spot which became hourly more explicit On 24 April 10 million workers took part in the symbolic general strike At airfields people prepared vehicles to be placed on runways to block the landing of planes A financial and shipping blockade was imposed on Algeria Loyal French troops in Algeria acted to undermine the rebels Two-thirds of the transport planes and many fighter jets were flown out of Algeria while other pilots blocked airfields or pretended mechanical failures Army soldiers simply stayed in their barracks There were many cases of deliberate inefficiency with orders and files lost and communication and transportation delayed Civil servants hid documents and withdrew On 25 April de Gaulle broadcast an order to loyal troops to fire at the rebels but there was no need The coup had already been fatally undermined The rebel leaders resolved to call off the attempted coup and during the night of 25-26 April the parachute regiment originally seized Algiers withdrew from the city There were a few casualties probably three killed and several wounded in Algeria and Paris The attack on the de Gaulle government had been defeated by defiance and disillusion The Soviet Union, 1991 On 18 August 1991 in an effort to block the radical decentralization of power in the Soviet Union a group of hard-line Soviet officials detained Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and demanded that he turn over all executive powers to his vice-president Gorbachev refused The self-declared state committee for the state of emergency composed of, among others the Soviet vice-president, prime minister defense minister, chairman of the KGB and interior minister declared a six-month state of emergency Opposition newspapers were banned political parties suspended except the Communist Party and demonstrations forbidden The junta's first decree asserted the primacy of the Soviet Constitution over those of the republics and mandated adherence to all orders of the emergency committee It appeared that the junta had the entire military forces of the Soviet Union at their disposal Armored divisions and paratroops were deployed throughout Moscow In the Baltics, pro-ku forces seized telephone, radio, and television facilities and blockaded key ports Armored assault units outside Leningrad began to move on the city In Moscow, tens of thousands of people gathered spontaneously in the streets to denounce the ku In a dramatic show of defiance Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin called upon a hostile tank and denounced the Puchist's actions as a, quote, rightist, reactionary, anti-constitutional ku Quote, quote Yeltsin proclaimed, quote, all decisions and instructions of this committee to be unlawful, close, quote, and appealed to citizens to rebuff the Puchists and for servicemen not to take part in the ku Yeltsin concluded with an appeal for a, quote, universal limited strike, close, quote Later that day, Yeltsin ordered Army and KGB personnel within the Russian Republic to obey him, not the Puchists Thousands gathered in front of the Russian White House Parliament building to protect it from attack Barricades were erected Trolley buses and automobiles blocked the streets Although the call for a general strike went largely unheeded miners in the Kuzebas coal fields and near Sferdloch's did strike The Puchists decreed a special state of emergency in Moscow because of, quote, Rowley's street marches demonstrations and instances of instigation to riots, close, quote On the second night of the ku Resistance organizers pasted leaflets throughout the city's subway system calling for a mass demonstration in front of the White House the following day In Leningrad, 200,000 people rallied in response to Mayor Anatoly Solbchuk's call for, quote, the broadest constitutional resistance close, quote, to the Ku Tens of thousands in Moldavia blocked the streets to keep Soviet troops at bay Leaders of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan denounced the Ku A large rally in Minsk called for mass civil disobedience Lithuanian President Landsbergis appealed to citizens to surround the parliament building in Vilnius for protection from attack Emergency sessions of the parliaments of Latvia and Estonia declared full independence from the Soviet Union In Moscow, banned opposition newspapers secretly printed the common paper which called on citizens to resist A donated radio transmitter allowed the Russian government to broadcast resistance information across the nation through local relay stations The banned independent radio station Echo Moscow continued to broadcast carrying live speeches from an emergency session of the Russian parliament Although prohibited, Russian television technicians put their news programs on videotape and distributed them to 20 cities around the Soviet Union Officials in the state-controlled media refused cooperation with the Puchests The defiant speeches of Yeltsin and Sobchak were aired on the Nightly News Program which the emergency committee's KGB censor chose not to block Afterwards, the first deputy chairman of Soviet television, Valentin Ladzutkin received a call from interior minister Pugo Quote, you have disobeyed two orders You have given instructions to the people on where to go and what to do You will answer for this Defiant crowds swelled in front of the White House that night to protect the Russian government Concerted efforts were made to undermine the loyalty of the Puchests' forces Leaflets and food were distributed to soldiers Citizens pleaded with tank crews to switch sides Yeltsin urged discipline Quote, don't provoke the military The military has become a weapon in the hands of the Puchests Therefore, we should also support the military and maintain order and discipline in contact with them In several cases, entire military units deserted the Puchests Ten tanks in front of the White House turned their turrets away from the parliament building pledging to help defend it against attack Mutonies against the Puchests were reported at the Leningrad Naval Base and at a paratrooper training academy Units in the Far East refused to support the junta In the Russian Republic, local interior ministry police and KGB units declared loyalty to Yeltsin Defense Minister Yasov ordered the Tula Division to withdraw from its positions near the White House because of the troops' uncertain loyalty Interior Minister Pugo disbanded the Moscow police out of the fear of disloyalty to the Puchests In the afternoon of the second day of the coup the Puchests attempted to put together a new assault team to attack the Russian White House Army paratroops and interior ministry forces were to surround the White House clearing the way for an attack by the elite KGB Alpha Group The head of the Army's paratroops and the commander of the Soviet Air Force however refused to take part in the attack Hours before the planned attack the commander of the KGB Alpha Group stated that his forces would not take part Quote, there will be no attack I won't go against the people The following morning the Defense Board of the Soviet Union voted to withdraw the troops from Moscow Members of the Emergency Committee were subsequently arrested one committed suicide President Gorbachev returned to power casualties were low a total of five people were reported killed during the coup attempt The coup had been defeated mass public defiance and disobedience in the military thwarted the hard-liners attempt to return to authoritarian rule These three cases of successful resistance Germany in 1920 France in 1961 and Russia in 1991 established that successful defense against coups is possible Certainly there are other cases in which similar resistance did not succeed but the existence of successes establishes that under at least some conditions coups can be defeated End of Section 6 Recording by Lynette Calkins Monument, Colorado Section 7 of the Anti-Coup This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Anti-Coup defense Attention to how coup detours work and how they can be defeated teaches as much Together they show that there is no need to be passive and helpless in face of these blows against freedom and justice Defense can be waged by the attacked society itself The basic point of this essay is that a defense policy against coup detours is possible The essence of such a defense policy is twofold One that those who attack the constitutional system and intend to replace the elected government in the regime of their own choosing must be denied all legitimacy They have no moral or political right to become the government and two they must be denied all cooperation No one in the government or in the population should assist or obey them in any way In a coup d'etat the seizure of government buildings transportation and communication centres and key geographical points is not done for its own sake Rather the purpose of those seizures is to control the state apparatus and hence the country as a whole The putchists must secure that broad control if the coup is to be successful However, the seizure of such points does not by itself give the putchists the control they seek over the government and the society They will not initially control the population the political, economic or social organisations the governmental structures not even all of the military forces and the police Nor will the putchists be in a position immediately to accomplish any possible ideological objectives After military or paramilitary forces of occupied government buildings and key centres of communication and transportation a crucial period inevitably follows in which the putchists must establish and consolidate their control Even in the absence of resistance that control requires time and effort to achieve This need to consolidate control and the time it takes to affect this makes an effective defence by the society possible End Section 7 Section 8 of the Anti-Coup This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Lynette Colkins The Anti-Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins The Putchists Require Immediately after the coup is started the putchists require legitimacy that is, acceptance of their moral and political right or authority to rule endorsements by moral and religious leaders respected political personages and in some cases royalty or past officials will help them to gain that acceptance The putchists require that their control of the state apparatus be accepted by the persons and institutions in whom moral and legitimate political authority resides whether they are elected officials unofficial moral leaders or royalty The first basic principle of Anti-Coup defence is therefore to deny legitimacy to the putchists The putchists also require that the civilian leaders and population be supportive, confused or just passive The putchists additionally require the cooperation of specialists and advisors, bureaucrats and civil servants, administrators and judges in order to consolidate their control over the society Journalists and broadcasters, printers and technicians are required to do as they are told Police, prison officials and soldiers need to follow orders to make arrests, jail, protesters and execute people as commanded The putchists also require that a multitude of people who operate the political system, the society's institutions and the economy will passively submit and carry out their usual functions as modified by the putchists' orders and policies In short, in order to consolidate their control putchists require a significant degree of not only legitimacy but also cooperation from the society they intend to rule Few or none of these required acts of submission, cooperation and assistance may be fulfilled however They may be jeopardized by repudiation, non-cooperation and defiance Both the needed legitimacy and the essential cooperation are vulnerable All these groups and the general population may refuse to do as ordered The claims to legitimacy can be rejected The necessary cooperation, obedience and support can be denied The consolidation of the putchists' rule can thereby be blocked Even moderate opposition may force the attackers to make significant efforts to secure the needed acceptance, cooperation and support In a powerful anti-coup defense the population would prevent the attackers' control of the state apparatus and the country by massive and selective non-cooperation while maintaining their support for the legal government and its call to resist Strong determined and widespread repudiation non-cooperation and defiance of the coup by the society can block the putchists' objectives and defeat the coup The second basic principle of anti-coup defense is to resist the putchists with non-cooperation and defiance If both legitimacy and cooperation are denied the putch may die of political starvation This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Direct Defense of the Society Therefore, an anti-coup policy is focused on defense of the society by the society itself not on defensive points of geography nor even governmental buildings Geography and buildings are ultimately important to coup leaders only when possession is accompanied by human assistance Seizure of a school building, for example is of no use to someone seeking to control education without a functioning school including the cooperative pupils, teachers and administrators Occupation of a railroad yard gives no control over that piece of transportation if the railroad workers and managers are unwilling to operate the trains according to orders Control of a parliament building itself gives no control over the actual members of parliament or over the population as a whole which believes in parliamentary government Instead of attempting to provide constitutional defence by fighting over buildings and geographical points people actively defend their institutions societies and freedoms directly The priorities of action here are crucial insistence on abiding by constitutional procedures or the maintenance of a free press for example are of more direct importance to democracy than possession of a given street intersection or building It is of course true that sometimes certain sites and buildings have a special symbolic importance Civilian defenders may then want to attempt to block the seizure of these sites by placing their bodies between the attackers and buildings In 1991 for example both the Lithuanian parliament building and the Russian White House were so protected by people power One should not generalise too widely from these two cases however It should first be noted that a human barricade is not always realistic Under extreme weather conditions especially cold it would be virtually impossible for a human barricade composed of the same individuals to remain in position for very long Therefore it is important to remember that anti-coup defence is a defence of the society not of geographical points of buildings which the putchists are able to seize if they are willing to kill enough people If the putchists are uncertain of their own intentions and methods or if their troops are unwilling to kill many of the defenders then a defence by human barricades may be successful However a serious danger exists in attempts to defend key buildings or other sites by human barricades If, despite the defenders' efforts the building is successfully seized by the putchists the defenders and general population may become unjustifiably demoralised The defenders may then believe not that only the parliament building has been seized but the parliament itself has been destroyed The defenders and population may believe that the mere physical occupation of the former government headquarters has put the putchists in control Extreme care therefore must be used in formulating strategies and tactics for defence of buildings so that the defenders and population put the emphasis on defence of the constitutional system and the society's institutions themselves which can continue whatever the fate of the buildings The coup leaders cannot control the society's population institutions, organisations and government without the submission and cooperation of the population End Section 9 Section 10 of the Anti-Coup This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins The Need for Preparations In the three cases reviewed earlier the defence was improvised without the advantage of advanced planning and preparations It is surprising how powerful even improvised social action can be Inevitably, however, such unprepared resistance will be weaker than if careful plans had been laid for defence against such attacks Confusion, uncertainty as to what to do ineffectual or counterproductive protests and costly delays in taking resolute action can all potentially be avoided or reduced significantly by preparations Conversely, anti-coup defence by an assertive citizenry can be greatly strengthened by specific preparations and guidelines These guidelines would aim to prepare the citizenry and social institutions to offer collective resistance to any coup Such preparations would need to include both general guidelines for the defence and also designated responsibilities for members of particular population groups and institutions such as civil servants, religious leaders police, journalists, transportation employees and many others Such planning and preparations for anti-coup defence are possible Whether independent institutions of the society or the government with cooperation of non-governmental institutions and organisations initiate and carry out anti-coup defence will largely be determined by the political situation in the country and the degree of strength and vitality of the society End of section 10 Section 11 of the anti-coup This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins The Civilian Defenders Ames Under an anti-coup policy the resistors will aim to repudiate the putschists as illegitimate with no rightful claim to become the government Make the attack society unruly by the attackers Block the imposition of viable government by the putschists Maintain control and self-direction of their own society Make the institutions of the society into omnipresent resistance organisations against a crew Deny to the putschists any additional objectives Make the costs of the attack an attempted domination unacceptable Subvert the reliability and loyalty of the putchist troops and functionaries and induce them to desert their mutineous officers Encourage dissension and opposition among the putchist supporters Stimulate international opposition to the coup by diplomatic, economic and public opinion pressures against the attackers and achieve international support in communications, finances, food, diplomacy and other resources And section 11 Section 12 of the Anti-Coup This is a LibriVox Recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Chapter 12, Resistance, General and Organized Strategies of Anti-Coup defense might be grouped initially into two broad categories General and Organized While in advance of an attack a number of key points would be selected and identified to the general population as points at which the population should resist even in the absence of any specific instructions at the time from a leadership group This type of resistance is called General Resistance These points might include, for example efforts to promote the attackers regime as legitimate Attempts to remake or abolish the elected legislature Measures or remake the courts or impose a new constitution abridgments of freedom of speech and religion and efforts to control the society's independent institutions Infringement by the attackers on any of these points would be the population's signal to resist The advance provision of guidelines for general resistance would make wise resistance possible even if the legitimate officials or the initial defense leaders had been arrested or executed General resistance could also be practiced if the defense leaders' communications with the population had been blocked Organized resistance differs from general resistance in that the defenders act in accordance with a call or instructions from an anti-coup defense leadership group This group might consist of members of the legitimate government officials of the anti-coup defense planning body or person selected in some other way This leadership might, for example be comprised of representatives of voluntary organizations educational, civic, labor, religious, political, and others who have been informally accepted by the society whether or not their individual identities are publicly known Organized resistance would supplement not replace general resistance Often organized resistance would consist of acts focused on a specific event or would occur in a specific place or at a designated time Such resistance may take the form of specific acts of symbolic protest or resistance of which there are dozens of possible types Examples would include demonstrations short strikes, protest marches protest blackouts tolling of church bells defiant fly of national flags perhaps at half-mast organized letter-writing campaigns the simultaneous reading in religious services of official statements from religious leaders organized hunger strikes radio broadcasts from hidden transmitters and expressions of mourning either because of the brutalities by the attackers or acts of terrorism by one's own people Both general resistance and organized resistance are very important in defense struggles against coup d'etat The proportional roles of each will vary with the specific situation End of section 12 Section 13 of the Anti-Coup This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins The importance of strategy The general technique that has been most effective in anti-coup defense is non-violent struggle This avoids fighting the putschists with military weapons with which the usurpers usually have the advantage The non-violent technique also maximizes the power of the defenders vastly increases the possible number of resistors over those able and willing to use violence And, very importantly helps to undermine the morale and the reliability of the putchist soldiers The weapons or methods of non-violent struggle such as strikes boycotts types of political non-cooperation and mutiny are not to be applied randomly These methods should not be selected in accordance with the whims of individuals or in response to minor events nor should they be applied in a hodgepodge improvised or intuitive way These methods instead will be most effective if they are applied as component parts of a comprehensive carefully chosen strategy of anti-coup defense Attempting to provide defense without formulating a strategy for the struggle is full-hardy It is also potentially disastrous One of the major reasons for the failure of some past non-violent struggles has been the choice of a poor strategy or very often the neglect to develop any strategy at all Strategy is just as important in non-violent struggles as it is in military warfare There needs to be an overall plan for conducting the entire conflict This is called a grand strategy Within it individual strategies need to be formulated to achieve major objectives in the conflict or for use in broad phases of the struggle A strategy is a conception a general plan of how best to act in order to achieve one's objectives in a major phase of a conflict within the framework of the chosen grand strategy The aim is to use one's resources to maxim an advantage to obtain one's objective at minimum cost The chosen strategy determines whether, when and how to fight Within a strategy particular tactics plans for limited actions and individual methods specific forms of action are used to implement the strategy These actions are more limited in time than individual or specific issues in order to achieve intended, limited objectives Strategies for anti-coup defence need to be planned with much thought and extreme care The strategies need to draw upon the best available resources about strategic principles They also need to be based on knowledge of non-violent struggle the dynamics of coups the particular conflict situation and the strengths and weaknesses of both the defending population and the butchists Issues of strategy are more varied and complex than indicated here and readers facing strategic decisions are urged to consult more extensive discussions elsewhere End Section 13 Section 14 of the anti-coup This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Anti-Coup Weapons The selection of the most suitable methods of action is of vital importance The initial anti-coup strategy may use certain of the following non-violent weapons They stay at home by everyone paralysis of each part of the political system that the puchas attempt to seize persistent operation of uncontrolled parts of the political system courted to pre-attack policies and laws ignoring decrees and policies of the puchas filling streets with demonstrators conversely leaving the streets completely empty Massive subversion of the attackers troops and functionaries defiant publication of newspapers and broadcasts by radio and television with news of the attack and resistance a general strike and an economic shutdown by both workers and managers It is important to give primary responsibility in the defense struggle to those methods that directly counter the puchas initial objectives These objectives will be primarily related to achieving and consolidating control over the political system and undermining the opposition to the coup Economic aims are unlikely to be among the puchas initial objectives Economic objectives may be in some cases longer term aims such as to keep control of the economic system primarily in the hands of an existing elite or to use the state to take over control or ownership of the economic system Control of the economic system is seldom if ever an initial objective of a coup d'etat Therefore general strikes or economic shutdowns are rarely the most relevant and effective substantive resistance methods in anti-coup action Applied in short bursts they can however demonstrate the solidity of the will to resist When applied for an extended period however these economic weapons can imperil the capacity of the attack society to survive its own defense A general strike for example would usually be used only at the very beginning of the anti-coup defense to show the determination of the society to resist the attack or later in the struggle for some specified but limited purpose such as to protest extreme brutalities The general strike or an economic shutdown might also be used when it was thought that a massive and dramatic expression of resistance might strike a coup d'etat to the attack Much more important initially will be those specific methods that aim directly at the Puchas initial objectives These would be ones that repudiation of the Puchas claim to legitimacy Two, block their taking control of the political machinery of the state as by non-cooperation of civil servants police military forces lower levels of government etc Three, demonstrate the population's repudiation of the coup in its non-cooperation and disobedience against it Four, block the Puchas efforts to control the means of communication and instead maintain this through various means including print media and radio And five, defy the Puchas efforts to neutralize or control the independent institutions of the society If the means of defense cited here can be applied massively and effectively to achieve these aims the coup can only collapse And section 14 Section 15 of the anti-coup This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Guidelines for general resistance Guidelines for general resistance against coups can be formulated in advance of any possible coup Such guidelines would constitute basic elements for an effective anti-coup strategy instructing the population on how to resist These could include the following One, repudiate the coup and denounce its leaders as illegitimate meriting only rejection as a government The denunciation of the putschists as illegitimate should be supported by moral political and religious leaders officials and members and all of society's institutions including education the media and communications and national local regional and provincial governments and officials including heads of state refuse to give any legitimacy to the putschists by any means including efforts to negotiate a compromise between them and the legitimate political leaders Two, regard all decrees and orders from the putschists contradicting established law as illegal and refuse to obey them Three, keep all resistance strictly non-violent in order to make the anti-coup defence the most effective possible refuse to be provoked into violent or other imprudent action Four, refuse and disobey all attempts by the putschists to establish and extend controls over the governmental apparatus in society Five, non-cooperate with the putschists in all ways This applies to the general population all experts and technocrats all leaders of the previous governments and of political parties all branches of the central or federal governments state regional and local governments including their civil servants and bureaucrats key occupational and professional groups all staff of the media and communications all staff of transportation systems the police members and units of the military forces all judges and employees of the judicial system the staffs of all financial institutions both governmental and private and officers and members of all other institutions of the society Six, persist in maintaining the normal operations of the society in accordance with the pre-attack constitution laws and policies of the legitimate government and the society's independent institutions this should be continued until and unless the persons are physically removed from their workplaces offices and activity centres even then as far as possible continue normal operations from other locations this applies especially to officials and employees of all branches, departments and levels of government Seven, preserve the functioning of legitimate political and social organisations create backup organisations which may need to assume the function of organisations attacked or closed down by the putschists Eight, refuse to supply vital information to the putschists and their helpers for example where it will help remove road signs street names traffic signs, house numbers etc to impede the putschist's activities and protect people from arrest Nine, refuse to supply the putschists with needed supplies and equipment hiding these when appropriate Ten, engage in friendly creative communication with the functionaries and troops serving the putschists while continuing resistance explain to them the reasons for the defence struggle affirm the absence of any intended violence against them seek to undermine their reliability and try to induce them to be helpful to the defenders this help might take the forms of deliberate inefficiency and repression passing information to the defenders and in extremes to desertion with soldiers instead joining the defenders in non-violent struggle for freedom attempt to persuade soldiers and functionaries of the need instead to adhere to constitutional and legal procedures Eleven, refuse to assist the putschists in disseminating their propaganda Twelve, document in writing, sound and film the putschist's activities and repression preserve the documentation and also distribute the information widely to the defenders internationally and to the putschist's supporters and section fifteen section sixteen of the anti-coup this is a LibreBox recording our LibreBox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibreBox.org the anti-coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins treatment of the use of anti-coupers troops and functionaries very early in the coup the defenders would attempt to communicate with and to warn the putschists their functionaries and their troops about the population's hostility to the attack words and symbolic actions would be used to communicate the will to resist to show the type of defense that would be waged and to urge the putschist to withdraw the efforts would be made at all phases of the coup to undermine the loyalty of the putschist's individual soldiers and functionaries this would be relatively easier in anti-coup resistance than in cases of foreign invasion because the soldiers and functionaries would usually speak the same language as the resistors or at least a common language they both understood if this were not the case would still be possible in other ways such as the use of translated leaflets and slogans or linguistically skilled resistors or through the defender's behavior and symbols the putschist's soldiers would initially be informed that there will be resistance but that the resistance will be of a special type in this resistance the defense would indeed be directed against the attempt to seize control by the coup but would be conducted without harming the soldiers as individuals if this could be communicated the soldiers might be more likely to help the defending population in small ways to avoid brutalities and to mutiny at a crisis point than if the troops expected at any moment to be killed by snipers or bombs repeated demonstrations that there is no violent intent or threat toward the individual soldiers accompanied by clear resistance are very important this combination has the greatest chance of increasing the effectiveness of the anti-coup defense strong resistance without personal threat or violence may at least among some soldiers create or aggravate their morale problems the problems may be expressed in uncertain loyalties to the putschist's problems of maintaining self-respect while inflicting repression on nonviolent people and in the extremes disaffection and mutiny there can be no guarantee however that the putschist's troops will be favorably affected by the nonviolent discipline especially in the short run they may still perpetrate brutalities and kill nonviolent resistors such tragedies do not however mean the failure of the resistance instead given continued disciplined resistance brutalities can weaken the putschist's and strengthen the defense struggle as discussed in later sections end of section 16 section 17 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit although this anti-coup defense does not work by attacking the putschist's troops militarily some limited action affecting the troops would be taken even at the first stage of an attack if identified in time the deployment of the putschist's troops could be temporarily blocked by obstructionist activities on highways streets, airports railroads and the like the entry or movement of troops could be delayed by such means as refusal to operate the railroads blocking highways and airports with many abandoned automobiles and at times on streets and roads by human barricades although such obstructionist activities against the deployment of troops would only be effective briefly these actions would make clear to the individual soldiers that whatever they might have been told they were not welcome as troops of the coup the people will also urge the soldiers not to believe the coup leader's propaganda as other symbolic actions the people could wear mourning bands stage a stay at home conduct a limited general strike or defy curfews such actions would serve two purposes they would give notice to friend and foe that the coup will be firmly resisted at the same time the actions would help to build up the people's morale so as to discourage submission and collaboration with the putchists these actions however would be only a symbolic prelude to the later substantive resistance the following symbolic methods might be used to help communicate the population's will to resist to the putchists and their forces leaflets, letters radio and television broadcasts personal conversations newspapers, posters banners, diplomatic messages statements at regional and united nations meetings third party assistance painted messages and slogans and special types of demonstrations these means of communication and warning could be aimed at the attackers troops leaders the current and potential supporters of the coup end section 17 section 18 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Chapter 18 Facing Attack and Rejection In the first hours days and weeks after a coup to top is attempted it is extremely important to take quick and solid action to block the putchists from becoming accepted and from establishing effective control over the state apparatus and the society an immediate strategy of repudiation and rejection of the putchists and their attack is called for in order to defeat the coup quickly that strategy would combine repudiation of claims to legitimacy and rejection of cooperation it would include total or near total non-cooperation with the putchists and early defeat of the coup would make unnecessary a later long-term struggle with an entrenched and therefore much stronger oppressive regime because coup attempts are generally at their weakest point in the first hours and days it is vital that anti-coup defenders undertake immediate and resolute action against the attackers the defense must be broad and deep enough in the society to constitute a resolute repudiation of the putchists the attackers appeals for national unity meaning supporting them and to allow them time to prove their good intentions must be dismissed End of Section 18 Section 19 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins blocking control by the putchists politicians civil servants and judges by ignoring or defying the attackers illegal orders would keep the normal machinery of government and the courts out of the putchists control as happened in the German resistance to the cap putch in 1920 the legislature would never receive the putchists themselves nor comply with any orders or requests from them instead the legislature might continue sitting under the established constitution unless or until the members were actually physically removed by the putchists forces or the legislature could disperse after issuing a call for popular and governmental resistance to the coup the members of the legislature could then join the population in other aspects of the defense struggle neither the government treasury and private banks would provide money or credit to the putchists in 1920 for example the German Reich Bank refused money to the putchists declaring that the name of Dr. Kapp a main coup leader was not on the list of approved signers for the withdrawal of state funds the judiciary would declare the putchists and their helpers the court would continue to operate on the basis of pre-invasion laws in constitution they would refuse to give moral legal and repressive assistance to the attackers even if they had to close the courts order would then be maintained by social pressures solidarity and non-violent sanctions underground courts independent arptors could be used the putchists should be met with a blank refusal by the government bureaucracy and civil servants to carry out their instructions as occurred in the resistance to the capuch or the bureaucrats and civil servants might simply continue the old policies ignoring the putchist's orders and disrupting the implementation of new policies the police could be most effective when they brazenly defy the putchists refusing illegitimate instructions while attempting to continue their normal duties when under extreme duress they could fake compliance with the putchist's orders but by evasion and deliberate inefficiencies never implement them journalists and printers refusing to submit to the putchist's censorship would publish banned newspapers news sheets and other publications in large or many small editions broadcasters and technicians would broadcast resistance radio programs from hidden transmitters or from uncontrolled or even foreign territory for example President de Gaulle and Minister de Brie broadcast appeals from Paris aimed at French army conscripts and officers involved in the coup in Algeria calling on them to disobey their rebellious officers at the same time efforts should be made to persuade persons who are participating in the coup and especially those in lower ranks of the military or other organizations who are being ordered to support the coup that they should instead refuse to obey orders to carry out illegal activities where the dangers to such persons would be great they might take various types of evasive action or disappear into the general population rather than support the anti-constitutional dissipation in some past cases resistors to government oppression have actively attempted to befriend troops under hostile command to induce them to be mild on their oppression or even to join in the democratic resistance at times such efforts have succeeded resistors to coups need to be aware of such options and prepared to apply them the cumulative impact of such institutional non-cooperation is to prevent the coup leaders from controlling both the government and the society by blocking such control the defenders maintain and even increase their ability to continue long-term resistance should that be required in case the coup does not collapse quickly and section 19 section 20 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Define repression and intimidation Poochists facing strong and well-prepared anti-coup defense are likely to be seriously threatened and therefore may respond with repression to be a difficult time for the defenders and the whole population arrests imprisonment concentration camps shootings executions for example may take a heavy toll on the defenders however in themselves the repressive measures are not decisive unless they invoke fear and submissiveness in the defenders in fact the opponent's repression is evidence of the power of the nonviolent struggle and is no more reason for despair than if in a regular war the enemy shoots back wounding and killing one's own soldiers against an anti-coup defense repression may be used to crush resistance and also to instill fear the Chinese saying is kill the chicken to scare the monkey however as has occurred in numerous struggles if the resistors and population refuse to be intimidated into submission and passivity then the repression may fail nonviolent defiance often risks serious casualties but it seems to produce far fewer casualties than when both sides use violence at the same time persistence in nonviolent struggle contributes to much greater chance for success than if the resistors had chosen to fight a military-prepared opponent with violence the Puchests made demonstrate grave ruthlessness such as by killing the head of the state and other top political leaders this brutality may not only be done to frighten the population into acceptance of the coup such killings also create clear vacancies in government leadership which the Puchests aim to fill themselves therefore an important part of anti-coup preparations is to determine clearly the line of political succession minimally for several replacements end of section 20 section 21 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins the importance of nonviolent discipline recognising that violence undermines the dynamics and strength of nonviolent struggle the Puchests may often deliberately seek to provoke the resistors to use violence violence and plans to use violence may be falsely attributed to resistors repression particularly brutal repression may be intended to provoke the resistors into a violent response that other times agents provocateurs are placed within resistance groups to instigate or even commit acts of violence in order to support the charge that the resistors are using violence all these provocations to violence must be rebuffed if the defenders are not to undermine their own defence this anti-coup defence is based on the technique of nonviolent struggle a grand strategic requirement of nonviolent struggle is that courageous struggle must be combined with discipline see Gene Sharp the politics of nonviolent action pages 586 to 620 nothing is to be gained and a lot can be lost by the killing of young soldiers who have found themselves in the Puchet's army the perpetration of violence especially killings by the resistors helps to undermine nonviolent struggle in several ways resistance violence may help unite the Puchet's basic supporters and military forces against the anti-coup defenders in contrast the main defence strategy regarding such soldiers is to undermine their morale and to induce them to become unreliable and even to mutiny that aim is impossible to achieve when the soldiers are targets of resistance violence violence by the defenders will be used by the Puchet's to justify overwhelming repression which they wanted to use anyhow it will be used to claim that the Puchet's are saving the country from terrorism or civil war and are preserving war and order violence by the defenders may also weaken their own side as people may be less willing to support or employ violence then participate in a fully nonviolent resistance repression of defiant and disciplined nonviolent resistors can at times have the opposite effect to that intended by the repressor in this situation there is a strong tendency for the violent repression to react against the repressor's own power position this is the process called political jiu-jitsu repression against courageous but nonviolent resistors can harm the repressor's power position in several ways such repression and the impact of brutalities may at times help to increase the number of resistors among the defending population and increase their determination they may also sow doubts and reservations in the minds of the Puchet's troops and other supporters creating unease opposition and finally disaffection and resistance among the attacker's own population functionaries and military forces heavy repression against the nonviolent defenders may also arouse a stronger international opposition to the coup and mobilise international opinion and diplomatic and economic action against the Puchet's this process of political jiu-jitsu is a great help when it occurs however the strategy of the anti-coup defense should not depend upon it the strategy should instead concentrate primarily on the repudiation of the Puchet's and defy their attempts to gain control through massive non-cooperation and political defiance in summary maintenance of nonviolent resistant behaviour by the anti-coup defenders is likely to contribute to 1. winning sympathy and support 2. reducing casualties 3. inducing disaffection and mutiny of the opponent's troops 4. attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle and 5. winning wider support nonviolent discipline is a key factor in achieving these aims and section 21 section 22 of the anti-coup this is the LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins international support only occasionally as against the August 1991 Soviet coup as well as in opposition to the September 1991 coup in Haiti has serious support of international diplomatic and economic action been threatened or taken against coup d'etat however as the case in Haiti of international sanctions to restore president Aristide suggests successful defense against coups by largely international action may not be effective instead successful defense primarily depends on non-cooperation and defiance within the attacked country sometimes however international support can be influential in assisting anti-coup struggles governments could refuse diplomatic recognition of the poochists and declare a prohibition on economic aid as the United States and other countries did in reaction to the 1991 Soviet coup attempt such governments and societies could also provide technical and economic assistance publishing radio and television services and telecommunications support to the civilian defenders such measures could be planned in advance the non-violent and defiant character of this type of anti-coup defense may stimulate much international publicity and sympathy at times political sympathy may lead to diplomatic international economic pressures against the poochists in the defeat of the August 1991 attempted coup d'etat in the Soviet Union the internal actions especially reluctance of soldiers within the military to obey the poochist orders seem to have been much more important however the diplomatic pressures and threats of international economic action seem to have been a significant supplementary factor this case illustrates that under certain conditions international pressures can further weaken the poochists and strengthen the cause of the civilian defenders however there should be no romanticism that international public opinion or even international diplomatic and economic pressure can defeat a coup without determined and strong defense by the attacked society itself end of section 22 section 23 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins shifts in strategy by the civilian defenders may be required at certain points to counter new objectives of the attackers to correct for exposed weaknesses or unexpected strengths among the defenders and in order to maximize the impact of the defenders resistance based on denying legitimacy and refusing cooperation the coup leaders may soon discover that they are confronted by a comprehensive fighting force of the general population organized through its social institutions the putschists may at some point realize that they are unable to bring the society under their control and that the defense is strong enough to force them to call off the whole venture if this does not occur the defenders must intensify their efforts to undermine the attackers regime where the putschists control has already weakened significantly or appears likely to do so shortly it may be time for another intense application of the strategy of repudiation and rejection this may prove however to be simply another phase of the conflict instead by a strategy of concentrating resistance only at especially important issues or the total non-cooperation strategy may prove to be a final blow to the coup end section 23 section 24 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins a durable success success in anti-coup defense depends on several key factors these include among others the spirit of resistance the solidarity of the defending population the strength of the defending society the ability of the people to maintain resistance and non-violent discipline the strengths and weaknesses of the Puchas the choice of the Puchas strategy of attack and the wisdom of the defense strategies victory with the anti-coup defense will come only to those who have developed it into a refined and powerful political tool operating with a wise strategy as with military conflict genuine power capacity and defense strength are required in this type of defense defeat of the constitutional defenders is always possible just as defeat occurs in traditional war however there are strong signs that a determined people will have strong chances of achieving success with such an anti-coup defense and that with fewer casualties and less destruction then would accompany a military struggle and section 24 section 25 of the anti-coup is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins in case of need for long term defense if the anti-coup defense is not successful within days or a few weeks a new strategic situation will have been created the pushists will have probably succeeded in establishing a modicum of legitimacy, acceptance cooperation and control the conflict will then have been changed from a short term anti-coup defense to a longer term struggle against an established dictatorship for that rather different conflict situation only some suggestive lines of resistance can be outlined here see Jean Sharp from dictatorship to democracy a conceptual framework for liberation in that resistance a strategy of total non-cooperation with the new government would probably not be viable because of the need of the society to survive a longer term struggle instead a policy of concentrating resistance at various key points would be needed until a resulting change in the balance of forces merited an application of more widespread or total non-cooperation in order to bring final success a longer term defense strategy against an established dictatorship needs to focus on two main objectives first the attackers must be prevented from obtaining any other major objectives beyond the dictatorship itself if the dictators seek other forms of domination as economic, ideological or political then liberation plans need to concentrate on blocking these this produces a strategy of selective resistance sometimes called resistance at key points under a strategy of selective resistance people in various professions and occupations might resist only on crucial issues for example, the police while attempting to keep criminal elements from taking advantage of the situation might selectively refuse to locate and arrest democratic resistors perhaps warning people of impending arrests and repressive actions teachers would refuse to introduce the regime's propaganda into the schools workers and managers would use strikes, delays and obstructionism to impede exploitation of the country clergymen would continue to preach about the duty to refuse to help the dictators the second main objective of long-term defense is the protection of the autonomy of the society's institutions when quick success of the anti-co-resistance has not occurred the new dictators may attempt to control and silence various institutions of the society these attempts would especially focus on those institutions that have been involved in the earlier defense struggle such as the courts, schools unions, cultural groups professional societies religious institutions and the like if control over such institutions is achieved the future capacity of the society for resistance will be further weakened therefore the long-term democratic struggle must firmly resist any efforts of the invader to control the society's institutions such institutions are not only points of resistance they are also actual or potential resistance organizations which can act to defend the society from dictators and to restore the legitimate political system the strategy of selective resistance is cited here only to show that an initial failure to defeat a coup need not doom the society to long-term dictatorship however the main anti-coup defense should aim to block the usurpation fully and quickly well before the putchists have consolidated their control and section 25 section 26 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins collapsing the coup such a long-term defense against an established dictatorship may not be needed however the initial anti-coup defense struggle may well secede if the civilian defenders maintain their discipline and persist in their defiance and non-cooperation despite repression which may involve significant sections of the populace the putchists drive to achieve their aims can be frustrated and finally blocked the resistance of a prepared people and their institutions may finally prove to be too much for the coup leaders their objectives may be denied to them their effort to establish control over the society may have failed the coup attempt may have merely placed the putchists in a political hornet's nest the numbers of determined non-cooperating and disobedient defenders may steadily grow may become clear that the defiant defenders are headed for success a victory enhanced with new vitality and durability great care will then be needed and the transition back to the constitutional system especially if former political leaders have been killed by the putches were possible constitutionally leaders should be restored to their positions in the previous constitution and laws applied to be amended in the future where appropriate steps should be taken as soon as possible to begin correcting any legitimate problems and grievances that led to satisfy people to support the coup the society and government will also do well to consider carefully how the government's democratic qualities can be improved and section 26 section 27 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins deterring coup d'etat a well-prepared defence capacity against coup d'etat can constitute a formidable deterrence against would-be putchists when a society is known to have a well-prepared anti-coup defence would be usurpers anticipating at best a very hard struggle and at worst an ignominious defeat may well never even attempt a coup if would be putchists or even current government leaders know that if they do not abide by the constitutional limits on their authority the democratic will of society will be enforced by political defiance and non-cooperation then they may well decide to stay within their appropriate constitutional roles this deterrence capacity is completely dependent upon a credible capacity to wage effective resistance against coup d'etat hence the only way to prepare deterrence or internal usurpations is to lay the groundwork for strong non-cooperation and defiance against such attacks as in military defence no deterrence capacity is guaranteed to succeed attacks may nevertheless occur if the coup is attempted despite extensive preparations for resistance then this type of defence could defeat it effectively and potentially very quickly and restore constitutional government without the risk of civil war and section 27 section 28 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins promoting an anti-coup defence an early step toward this policy will need to be disseminated throughout the society of the concept of anti-coup defence and exploration of the forms of resistance that are most powerful in defending against usurpations in informational and educational program can be initiated by individuals and organizations even while the concept is quite new articles, newspaper reports public meetings, discussion groups radio, television panel discussions, speakers for various organizations pamphlets and books are among the means of communication and education which can be useful familiarity with the concept that coups can be successfully resisted through non-cooperation and defiance as a prerequisite for the needed, careful consideration and active support from the major civil institutions of the society and for organized preparations for such defence obviously consideration, adoption and implementation of this anti-coup defence should not expect support from cliques intent on potentially conducting a coup however the anti-coup policy will be strengthened if it receives transpartisan consideration support and participation a transpartisan approach would aim to incorporate people in groups with different convictions and political options in support of the development adoption and implementation of the anti-coup policy given such varied and wide-ranging considerations whether the population or the anti-coup policy will likely be stronger and more united and of section 28 section 29 of the anti-coup this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the anti-coup Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins adopting an anti-coup defence there are three main ways in which a strong anti-coup defence capacity can be adopted one through widespread dissemination throughout all levels of the society of knowledge and understanding of the grand strategy and broad forms of anti-coup resistance discussed two through the organisation of the institutions of civil society so that they are prepared to confront and resist such an attack and three through constitutional and legal changes and organisational efforts within the governmental structure so that it will not be at the disposal of putschists ideally three of these ways should be applied in sequence or some combination depending on what is possible or most feasible at the time in the particular situation however it is possible to begin the process of education and consideration without certainty as to what will be the final manner of adoption and implementation end section 29