 Mae'r cymhiliad i ddweud yn ymdweud ar gyfer 2019. Felly, rydyn ni'n ffordd yw'r cyfrannu'r ysgol. Anhygoel, oedd y cyfrannu'r cyfrannu ar y gyrdd, felly mae'n ddweud yw'r cyfrannu'r cyfrannu cyfrannu, a'r cyfrannu'r cyfrannu, a'r cyfrannu'r cyfrannu'r cyfrannu, cyfnod, o gael'r cyd-fodol gyda Llywodraeth Fydd wedi fydd ymddangosol, o gyfnod ymddangosol. Fy modd,NEw gollwni'n cyfnod i ddylo, sydd wedi'i ffodol cyfnod cyfnod cyfnod, ac mae gennymeth 5 gyfnodion gwch chi o'ch mynd ddau i'ch gael. Ac mae'n fydda i'r cyfnod yn allan o'r cyfnod, a wnaeth hynny'n wybod ein bod yn 20 oed, 4. OK. So, I think I'd just like to introduce Stephen Farrell, our speaker, our keynote speaker. So we're very pleased to have you here today Stephen. So Stephen Farrell is a professor of criminology at the School of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Nottingham. A post he took up in August 2022. He has held chairs in criminology at the universities of Derby and Chaffield prior to that, ac mae'n gweithio'r pwysig ar y ddiwedd yng Nghymru'r Seffield, Oxford a'r Keel. Roedd, cymdeithasol, oherwydd y byddwch yn cydwyd i gael y cyfnodau sydd gynhyrchu'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r cyfnodau cyfnodau cyfnodau, mae'n gweithio'r cwestiynau gwahanol yng Nghymru i'r cymdeithasol – ganddiwch gyda'r cydwydau i gwellion yng Nghymru, ac oedd yn rechydig a'r cymdeithasol gyda'r cyfnodau. Cyn rhaid? Gweithio. Rhaid i chi ddweud. Rhaid i chi ddweud yr hwn. Dyma yw'r cyfnodau sydd wedi gael y gweithio. Fel chi yma amdylch chi rydyn ni cemethau a ydi i chi rydyn ni'n gweithio'r cyfnodau arall, rydyn ni'n gweithio arall a edrych i chi'ch gweithio a yna, I'm going to have to remember to try and stay as close to the mark as I can because I have a bit of a wanderer. But what I'm going to talk to you about today is a project which is based on several different ESRC grants. The data that we used isn't traditionally crime survey data as you may conceive it. It's not necessarily all from Crime Survey for England and Wales or Scottish Crime and Justice Survey. It's based on longitudinal studies. So a lot of what I'm going to say then, but not all of it, will have some implications for criminal careers research, which I know is possibly not necessarily entirely your bag, but nevertheless there will be some links to what you're interested in. So alongside crime surveys, criminal careers research is one of the biggest areas of contemporary criminology. In fact, it's one of the biggest areas of criminology full stop. If we trace criminology right back to people measuring each other's head skulls, you are finding an attempt to work out why it is that some people commit crime and others don't. Now all of that over time has resulted in the body of knowledge that really focuses on individual level or in some cases familial or in some cases but very rarely community level processes and structures. What I'm going to do, in some respects, is to kind of critique that by way of evidence based from a different way of thinking about the way in which the world works. I'm just going to move this so I can see the screen more clearly. So that body of work hasn't really grappled with wider institutional processes. It's not particularly interested in political science, for example. And as I said a moment ago, the projects which I've been involved in over the last 10 years or so have attempted to not just explain crime trends, but also to explain engagement in crime at the individual level through a kind of a political science lens. And in so doing, this takes us away from individual or family level factors, but it can be increasingly behaviouralist and in some respects pathologising of the individuals who are involved in crime towards a consideration of macro level processes including policy and political debate. Now for those of you who are probably under the age of 40 and I would say that we were vastly outnumbered, people age 40 and above, this is who Margaret Thatcher was. Now she is either the country's saviour or she's the devil incarnate. Normally there are more people that go for the latter these days than the former. She was the first UK, she was the first female leader of the Conservative Party, she was the first female Prime Minister and still the longest despite all of his trust's efforts. And she was Prime Minister for just over 11 years. Her successor, who was a guy called John Major, who was for a while as well her finance minister, was then Prime Minister until 1997 and there came in on the landslide. Now, Thatcherism is just one of a number of new right political movements. In Australia we have Fraser and then Bob Hawke. In Canada, but much much more small sea conservative, we have Mulrooney. They didn't really do terribly much at all. Reaganomics of course, well known. My personal favourites though are from New Zealand. We have Roger Nomics, named after the finance minister. Both Fraser and in New Zealand, Roger Nomics and Ruth Richardson came after were Labour administrations. This isn't simply sort of, if you like, Tory bashing. Ruth Richardson was the Prime Minister after that. Her policies were so unpopular in New Zealand that they were known as Ruth Denizia, which I think is one of the best names for this kind of stuff that I've come across so far. What was all this about? Well, it was largely about cuts to government expenditure and quite severe cuts in some respects. Expenditure actually went up oddly because the benefit system has a lag to it, so it takes time to change the benefit system, which means primary legislation, and it took the Conservative Party a long time to get on top of the social security spend as a whole. So whilst as a whole it went up for individual claimants, it actually went down. There was a bigger pie, but there were more people eating at it if you want to follow that kind of analogy. We see reductions in taxation and the increasing acceptance of unemployment and the kind of almost dismissal of it. As I said a moment ago, cuts in social security and changes to social housing provision. So lots of houses, around about a quarter of families in the 1970s were living in what was referred to as a council house or local authority housing. They were quite popular. I grew up in one. My parents were professionals, the people next door were teachers and employed individuals. That's very different now if you go to many socially rented sectors, housing associations, et cetera, et cetera. The social nature of our social housing has changed quite dramatically in those 40 years. So that's a bit of background about Thatcherism SL. What were we interested in doing? Now there were not many countries in the world where you could actually do this and Britain is probably the only one where you could do what I'm about to show you that we did. We are going to look at two longitudinal studies that ran 12 years apart from one another and we are going to compare the impact of those policies unleashed by Thatcherism on their lives and their life courses. So if you don't know the two studies involved, I'll give you something of a little introduction to them. We have the earlier of the two, a cohort born in 1958 that is also known as the National Child Development Study. So you will see NCDS written up there at various points. The second group, which is known as the 1970 cohort, they were born in 1970. So that's a really easy one to remember. There was an earlier cohort, 1946 cohort, which was the evidential basis for the creation of the National Health Service in 1948. We're not touching that at all. So it's every child born in the UK in one week of April and one week of March. Unfortunately, none of the kids born in Northern Ireland are ever followed up unless they happen to have moved to one of the other countries in the UK. The Northern Ireland, I'm afraid, gets dropped almost immediately. Now, they're not technically nationally representative samples, but we can treat them as such because there's no evidence to suggest that they're not. It's assumed by the data collectors that they reached in excess of 98.5% of all live births in those two weeks. Now, unusually, where you get sample attrition, these samples actually grow. The reason that they grow is not because kids are cell dividing, but rather because the way in which people were relocated was using the school register. So children who had migrated in after the study was started are then picked up as part of that process. Oddly, you have whatever the opposite attrition is. You do, of course, have attrition as well. So there are the two cohorts. We are going to use the 58 cohort as the pre-thatcher generation. They are not strictly pre-thatcher because they were 21 when she came in, but 21 at that era is very different from 21. Now, these people, very many of them would have been through the compulsory education system, or all of them would have been through the compulsory education. Very few would have stayed on to tertiary education in that era. So they grew up in the 60s and 70s. Their lives would, of course, not have been unaffected by the changes in the 1980s because they would have been producing children at that age. The 1970 cohort, we are going to use as thatcher's children. And this cohort is particularly dear to me because I'm the same school year as they are. I was born late 69. They were born in April 1970. So they are, if you like, my school, what do you call them, not mates, but co-learners, I suppose, is the expression. So this is the model that we're going to use, which I appreciate you can't see for toffly. Up here we have the first cohort. So think of this as being the 58 cohort. They were born here. These are their ages. And here is the second cohort, which you can think of as being the 1970 cohort. This is the legislative and policy programme. This just says political ideas because this is about ideology as much as it is about policy. And our basic argument is that political ideas inform policy. Policy lands, but it lands at different points in different people's life courses because we're all members of different cohorts. And so what we're studying in effect is, do policy X affect these people? Did it come, if you like, too early in their lives to affect them or too late in their lives to affect them? This isn't particularly meant to be anything other than black lumps on the screen but if you like, you could think of it as the age crime curve. So are more people involved in crime in the second cohort as opposed to the first in this example. So one of the first things which we did was to look at the national level picture of shifts in housing policy and their impact on property crime in the socially rented and privately owned housing sectors. And here we did use crime survey and British social attitudes and actually also general household survey data. The general household survey asked questions about people breaking into your house sometime in the 1970s. And essentially what we're interested in is the impact of the 1980 right to buy legislation on the victimisation experiences of people living in the socially rented sector. So that was published in the BJC in about 2016. The second paper which was published in GeoForum in 2019 starts to use the two different cohorts that I've outlined for you. And what we're interested in is a thing that we're going to refer to as parental tenure trajectory. So this is in effect whether the parents of the kids we're interested in the parents of the cohort members either lived in houses that they owned or more accurately that the bank owned or they lived in socially rented sector housing which they bought or they lived in socially rented housing which they didn't buy. So that's parental tenure trajectory. There are of course other trajectories but we're just not interested in them. So we're looking at the extent to which those different trajectories at the parental level affected the life courses or the experiences of their children. So this is what we find for the National Child Development Study. Parental tenure trajectory has no impact on whether their children later experienced homelessness. None whatsoever. The groups were kind of equal in terms of their experiences of homelessness. Slightly more amongst those people who didn't buy their council houses but not to a level that was statistically significant. If you did experience homelessness though, you had other negative life outcomes. You also had an increased levels of contact with the criminal justice system and you had more violent victimisation. But none of this was triggered if you like by the choices which their parents made in the housing market. That's the 58 National Child Development Study. And that just summarises really what I've just said to you. And this is the story for the 1970 cohort. So these guys were born in 1970. The 1980 Housing Act is the first bit of legislation that introduces formally the right to buy existed previously in other ways which I can tell you about if you're really that interested. But the key thing here is that that parental tenure trajectory opens the door to experiences of homelessness particularly for those people whose parents didn't buy their council houses. And that is because those people who didn't buy their council houses tended to be from single-parent families typically headed by a female. Tended to be in areas with high levels of unemployment and unemployed themselves and tended to be living in large northern housing estates near or in urban or industrial innovations. That kind of changed the industrial economy is one of the things that will keep coming up again and again. So not only did the 1980 Housing Act, as we outlined in the first paper of the British Journal of Criminology, increase property crime in the socially rented sector in those housing estates at the time when those acts were being passed, because the 1980 Act was the first of something in the region of 8, 9, 10 or 11 of these housing acts. But also it seems to have had a legacy effect for the children of the people who were deciding whether they could buy their houses or not, their council houses are not, or realising that they couldn't do that. So we have a legacy effect in terms of policy impact that starts in the 1980s that is affecting these children well into their adulthood. Now one of the other things that we were interested in, which I've just alluded to, was the level of economic restructuring and the way in which that fell across the country, because that falls in a very uneven way. I want to show you a map. I'm going to do a bit of unpicking of this map. So this is a map of Britain. I hope you'll recognise that. And you'll see that there are four different shades of colour coding and there are these four bands. I'll tell you about those in a minute. What I want to do is explain what the colour coding is. So we did this twice. We did this for the 1958 cohort and this example is for the 1970 cohort. What we did for the county in which they were living, which is the lowest level of spatial unit we had available to us, for the county in which the child was living when they were very young, we took the nearest census data for the number of people employed in mining in that county. So for the 58 cohort, this is 1961 data. For the 70 cohort, it becomes 1971 data. And then we added to that percentage from the following cohort, so the 71 or the 81, the percentage of men of working age who were unemployed in the same county. So that is an attempt, if you like, probably very crude, but if anyone can think of a better way of doing it using census data, please tell me because we couldn't figure one out. A very crude way of trying to measure economic restructuring in a 10-year period when these kids were aged somewhere between 3 and 13 or 1 and 11 for the 70 cohort. And that was just depended as a raw figure to their records for the county they were living in. That's those four things there. So we grouped them into four bands on the interquartile range. So the lowest yellow, the kind of custody yellow, is down here in the southeast, predominantly. And that is the lowest level of economic restructuring. And the highest level is kind of, I think, quite nice, rusty, ready, I want to repeat this just a bit more near where I live, some of the colours in the autumn. That kind of colour is the greatest level of economic restructuring. You can see that there are four areas where you have a huge level of economic restructuring. South Wales, that's mainly coal and steel production and allied trades like locomotives, trains, marching yards, that sort of stuff. You've got what we refer to as Central Bell England, which is, of course, the industrial heartland north of Birmingham, and then up into... Well, that's the Humber and the Merseys somewhere around there. So that's that part of England. There you've got this northeast shoulder. Again, that's coal production, ships, all that sort of stuff. And steel, I guess, if you're talking about Middlesbrough. And then you've got Central Bell Scotland, where you've got shipbuilding, coal production, what else, steel, and lots and lots of trains moving all this heavy kit around. So that's how we measured economic restructuring, and that's what it looks like when you plot it on a map of the UK. Then what we tried to do, and again, you're not going to read this, so I will read it out. Sorry, I'm going to see it, so I'll read it out to you. This is our measure of economic restructuring. This is school alienation. This is whether the child was truanting when they were aged 16. This is whether they were offending at any point between 16 and 40. This is whether they were employed. And this is whether they were living with a partner, those two, both when they are 23. The black lines are statistically significant. The shaded or the less dominant lines are not statistically significant. This is the 58 cohort. And what that is essentially saying is that if you were living in a disadvantaged area, you were more likely to report school alienation. It was a series of questions that were asked. I think they were about six. You were also much more likely to report truancy if you were alienated from school. It's hardly surprising. If you don't like something, you don't turn up. And then if you were truanting when you were 16, you were much more likely to be truanting as an adult. Again, that kind of makes sense in criminal careers research. If you're living in a disadvantaged area, you were much less likely to be employed at 23. It kind of makes sense as well. If you were employed at 23, you were much less likely to be offending or put the other way around. If you're unemployed, you're much more likely to commit crime. Again, that kind of makes sense too. Living with a partner doesn't really seem to have any effects whatsoever, except that if you're employed, you're more likely to live with a partner. There we go. Great, lovely, fantastic. Only problem, model doesn't fit. At that point, most people don't get that stuff published because that's a null result. It's not data that's sufficiently reliable for you to publish. We published that because in some respects, we don't really care. What we care about is what happens next. This is the 1970 cohort. The thing in some respects to keep an eye on is this thing here. This is the SMC squared. That's your structural equation model equivalent of an R squared. For the previous 58 cohort, it's .03. 3%. For this lot, it's 11%. The paths are bigger. They're more statistically significant. Most crucially, this is the thing that does get it published. The model fits. Again, where kids were living, and the economic processes that were going on behind their backs, over the tops of their heads, was associated with feeling alienated from school, offending at 16, and then offending as an R. Interestingly, there's a slightly odd relationship between levels of economic restructuring and alienation from school. If you have a lot of economic restructuring, you have a lot of alienation. If you have no economic restructuring, you have less alienation. If you have just a little bit of economic restructuring, you have even less alienation. It's a slightly odd. The explanation that's being put forward by a sociologist called David Rafe, is that for kids that are living in areas where there's a bit of economic restructuring, but not very much, it doesn't really matter. It doesn't affect their level of truancy. As soon as it starts to tick up a bit, guess what? Kids aren't stupid. I know they don't tidy their... My kids don't tidy their bedrooms and are always doing the wrong thing. But generally speaking, kids aren't stupid. At some point, they might look around and think, out of Motherwell or Middlesbrough or Sheffield or wherever it is, I've actually got to engage in the school process. School is a way out. So some of these things that seem a bit anomalous at first, I think we can explain. But anyway, economic restructuring seems to be associated with alienation, truancy and offending again into their adulthood. This is data that's collected, circuit board data that's collected between 1986 and 2000. This is a long time after these processes start. What we then also did was to look at this in a more systematic way, but unfortunately at this point, we can't use the 58 cohort because they don't have the right questions. All of the data that we've looked at there, the questions we used that were asked of the kids were asked in an identical manner, exactly the same question, just asked of different people 12 years later, and asked of them at approximately the same age point, maybe one or two years slippage one way or the other. But effectively, they are substantively the same questions asked at pretty much substantively the same point in individuals' lives. In a paper we published in a journal called Politics and Society, we explored the extent to which economic restructuring affected people's offending generally using a much more expanded model. Now again, you're not going to say, this is the kind of discipline regime that the school was using. It's not whether the kids were disciplined themselves, but it was just whether their school was hitting them with rulers or a slipper as it was in my case, not really personally, but my school or a cane, those sorts of things, as opposed to warnings, letters homes to parents, detention, those sorts of things. So if you went to a school that was much more into physical punishment, you were much more likely to be alienated from school. Which isn't really our surprise, is it? If you don't like it and when you turn up, they hit you, you're just not going to go. I wouldn't. Alienation from school is again massively associated with being employed at the age of 26. This is a measure from the health visitor. Was the child on an at risk register? Okay. Yes or no. That's associated with offending at age 16. This is the child's report of the quality of their relationship with their parents. Again, it's a sort of one to five scale type thing. Then we have a quality of relationship with their partner if they have one or 23, I think that was. Then this is offending at the age of 30 in the year 2000. Again, the bold lines are statistically significant, the ones that aren't bold art. You can see that we have a path through here from school to work to crime and a path here from school to crime to more crime. Families don't really seem to play a big part in this story. Then what we did, having done all that, that's the kind of model that many people working in criminal careers research will expect, produce, be quite familiar to criminal careers researchers. What we then did over here was to add our old friend economic restructuring. So this is again that same measure that I was telling you about earlier from two census points or data from two census points. This again you can see produces statistically significant paths. There are five paths that we regressed area level economic change or economic restructuring on to school discipline processes, school alienation, offending itself at 16. Quality of relationship with parents and whether the toll is on the at risk register. The other statistically significant one. So whereas here we were talking about causes, and in some respects I guess the causes of the causes, here we are talking about the causes of the causes of the causes. So we are going back in terms of not just the explanatory variables but also in terms of time to look at the ways in which things deep in the past as it were are still shaping individuals' lives. So that says economic change 71 to 81 and that's data, self-report data from the year 2000. If you interviewed those guys they would not say the reason I'm injecting drugs or the reason I'm nicking stuff out of cars is because of a shift in macroeconomic policies undertaken in the 70s and 80s. They wouldn't. I have interviewed people that are kind of in that cohort and some of them do slack thature off but not all of them. A lot of this stuff is just processes that are happening way above their heads that they really, they may understand in a kind of intuitive sense, but they can't necessarily name or articulate them particularly clearly. So what we then did was to repeat that structural equation model four times by those four different areas. So although this is the interquartile range for each of these different counters we've got different values. So we broke those areas into four and we reran the model just for those areas. So okay it's a bit funny we are lumping this bit of Scotland in with this bit of Kent or Kent but we are taking them as a piece. Now that produces some quite interesting differences in structural equation models okay. There's one particularly interesting one which I'll just explain in a moment but this is essentially what we had. The SMC the equivalent of the R2 overall for the whole of the model, the whole country taking together is 0.27. When you look at places with the lowest level of economic restructuring so Hampshire where I grew up and sorry where I went to university almost nothing. The next levels if you like Kent and London a little bit higher and then similar again when you look at other places like Lancashire and Derbyshire which did have mines but also have quite rural areas but then when you look at the big kind of conurbations and those that were particularly affected by changes in the the degree to which we were lied on coal and were prepared to pay people to go and dig it out on the ground like South Yorkshire, like Nottinghamshire you see a very different picture okay. It's 0.7. Now what's really interesting about this I think is not simply that you get this variations by space in terms of the extent to which the model fits. You actually get slightly different models I'm not going to show you them because I don't have time but for this area Hampshire and Surrey you get a model whereby the only parts that are significant are these ones okay. This one here between offending at 16 and offending at 30 whatever it was which I think is interesting because it speaks to almost a cognitive behaviouralist explanation. So I'm a sociologist I'm becoming increasingly structuralist in my explanations and essentially what I'm showing you there is the time and space that's structural processes but for this place down here in the south all these places down here in the south the lowest level of economic restructuring it seems to be the individual level factors that are driving whether people are involved in crime. Now one of the great things that has never really been publicly outed is why cognitive behavioural therapies were so successful in places like Canada but less much less successful in places like England and Wales where they were tried. I would put forward the explanation that not only did Canada do CVT they also did social interventions and it's a country generally speaking a lower level of inequality as mentioned by the genicoe efficient. So it could be that in countries where you have a low level of economic inequality people who repeatedly offend are possibly doing that because there is a problem with the way in which they approach the world the way in which they approach relationships the way in which they deal with problems but in other places where you have a higher level of economic inequality the reasons that people commit crime may be because of associated degradations to institutions social norms and objective financial need okay So where does that leave us? This is my last slide except for one which has the references on it. So I think criminal careers researchers need to move away from individual level explanations and processes that means a different research design we have got very good at studying criminal careers in particular places so the Cambridge study of deviancy delinquency collected all of its data in south London. PADS plus collects all of its data in Puterborough. Edinburgh youth style well that's Edinburgh okay and there are numerous studies around the world Dunedin, Rochester lots in the US that collect them in particular places that means if that particular community hits skid row through economic change all of the kids in that area have the same if you like macroeconomic experience you don't have the level of spatial variation that we had in terms of comparing bits of Scotland and bits of Kent or places like that okay so national level data is what we need to unpack these processes more most of those studies are also single cohort so there is one Cambridge study. The boys were born in something like 1963 okay there's no follow up other than those of those individual boys since in terms of a repeated cohort Ditto PADS, Ditto Edinburgh Ditto pretty much any of the individual level longitudinal studies that there are of criminal careers they are pretty much all single cohorts although they do collect multiple cohorts it's a panel design which ratchets things up quickly so you don't really get the temporal variation in the same way but it's all still spatially concentrated so not only do we need to think differently we also need to think about the research designs much differently too but one question which in some respects haunts all of this is the extent to which I can say any of this globally outside the context of the study given how radical facturism was it was such a massive hit. The only country that got close to that I think would have been New Zealand and that's partly because they have a unique marvel system so we have a lower house and an upper house most democracies have something like that in New Zealand is one chamber so as soon as you have at least 50% of the MPs in that chamber you can kind of do what you like assuming you can get them to vote it through so New Zealand moved very fast hence Wajonomics, hence Ruthanasia so that begs another question who cares in some respects if this is something that happened at one point in time in one country on that I will leave you except to leave you there with all the references to the work I said ok thank you very much