 Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Stephen Flanagan. I'm Senior Vice President and Henry A. Kisinger Chair here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And it's a pleasure to welcome all of you here this afternoon on the eve of President Obama's first trip to Europe and indeed a trip that will see a two-day stop in Turkey. So we're quite excited to be able to chat with you today about this work that's been underway here for the last year at the Center with the number of my colleagues that are right before you here today in a distinguished senior advisory group to try to look in a systematic way at Turkey's changing internal dynamics, its political and social dynamics, and how those are evolving and how it's affecting Turkey's worldview and Turkey's relations with all of its neighbors. We've drawn together experts with backgrounds on Turkey, on Europe, on Russia-Eurasia, on the Middle East, and on energy issues, and to try to come to some kind of an assessment of where US-Turkish relations are headed. We wanted to look at not just Turkey from the perspective of Washington, but to look at it from various vantage points around the region and various points even within Turkey itself. And our goal was to try to identify the key challenges to US-Turkish relations in the coming years and also to propose a new strategic framework that could both ensure the renewal of this vital alliance relationship, but also to ensure its management over the next decade. And before I begin, I do want to take a moment, though, to recognize a number of guests in the audience. First of all, Ambassador Nabi Senshoi of the Ambassador to Washington of the Turkish Republic. We want to thank him and all of his colleagues here in Washington, but also those in the foreign ministry and other parts of the government for their openness and willingness to engage in a dialogue with us as we pursue this work. And secondly, I also want to recognize Ambassador Ross Wilson, who served very ably as Ambassador of the United States of America to Turkey from 2005 to 2008 and who was very helpful to us along with the number of his colleagues in the embassy and also on the Turkish desk in the State Department and other parts of the government to ensure also that we had a full understanding of what the state of US policy was and how efforts had been underway even in the last several years to put the US-Turkish relationship back on a steady footing. And Ambassador Wilson and his colleagues deserve a great deal of credit for that as well in the previous administration. But as we undertook this work over the last year, we really benefited tremendously from the advice and counsel of a sage group of senior advisors, co-chaired by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and General Brent Scowcroft, including a number of other distinguished former officials and military leaders. And we are really grateful for the significant commitment of time and intellect that they gave to this effort for their strategic vision, which is really what we were mostly after, their wisdom, but also their patience in the conduct of our work, which was sometimes a bit slow in coming. But we really wanted to get this right. And I hope, excuse me, pardon me, my voice went a little skittish today. We hope that it reflects some of those insights, but I just want to be clear that these distinguished gentlemen did not exercise editorial control. We alone are responsible for the content. So any complaints directed at us, please, not at these two fine co-chairs and other members of the group. So I'm going to welcome to the podium to make some brief opening remarks, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Scowcroft. But before I do, I also want to recognize two other members of the advisory group who are in the audience. First of all, Ambassador James H. Holmes, who is now a president, of course, and CEO of the American Turkish Council and also served as deputy chief of mission in Ankara and Ambassador to Latvia, as well as a number of other positions in the State Department. And Ambassador James Jamerson, a former deputy commander of the US European Command, who is now with Lucky Martin, but who is also another great counsel to us, and we appreciate his views. Three members of the group could not make it today, and I do want to just also thank them in absentia. First of all, Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, former ambassador to Turkey, also a senior fellow now at the Century Foundation. And the honorable John McLaughlin, former deputy director of national intelligence, and now a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. All of them really provided us with invaluable assistance. So let me turn now, first of all, to Dr. Brzezinski, who I might add, and it's no longer a state secret who just celebrated his, since we celebrated his 80th birthday here this time last year, celebrated his 81st birthday on Saturday, Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much, Steve. Thank you very much for mentioning my birthday. Thank you very much for mentioning us 1 plus 8. For that reason, I jumped up those stairs, Obama-like. I'm going to be very brief. This report is important in its own right, but it's made doubly important by the fact that the President of the United States is about to visit Turkey. So I've just jotted down for myself 10 reasons. Why, in my view, Turkey is really important to us. It is important in general. One, it is true and tried ally of the United States. Secondly, it is a Jewish strategically key member of NATO. Three, it is an EU candidate. Four, it is a Muslim democracy. Five, it is a stabilizing factor in the region. Six, it is a constructive partner with Israel. Seven, it is a positive influence on Iran. Eight, it is an example for the Turkic-speaking countries of the former Soviet Union. Nine, it is an intermediary between Azerbaijan and Armenia. And 10, it is a vital link in Europe's efforts to diversify its dependence on energy. So in all these ways, it really is an important country. And therefore, the strategic relationship which our colleagues discussed with it is of enormous importance both to us and it should be our hope to the Turks as well. Thank you, General Scowcroft. I won't mention his age. I've learned. I am capable of learning. Thank you, Steve. It's a joy to be associated with such a young colleague. And as usual, we're sort of the Bobsy twins now around town. He said everything that needs to be said. Let me just point out that these 10 reasons for importance have always been around. But our relationship with Turkey has gone through several different evolutions. For the first sort of 50 years, we were good NATO allies. They were one of our strongest NATO allies. And the relationship was almost entirely military. For the end of the Cold War, that began to change. But there wasn't anything that picked up really on the military right away. Then came Iraq and the difficulty we had with US troops going through Turkey and so on. And that started as sort of a downturn. And at the same time, the world was becoming more complicated. And the domestic situation inside Turkey was becoming more complicated. So all of these mean that what's big put up is why we need to worry about it. What you're going to hear this afternoon is how complicated much of it is now to sort our way through the problems that have arisen and maintain the importance of Turkey to us. They did a great job. We bear no responsibility nor credit for what they've done. Thank you very much. Thank you, General Scowcroft. Now, I'd like to, before introducing my colleagues, who will discuss some of the elements of their work, I just want to set a little bit of a context. Excuse me. We began this project, as I mentioned, about a year ago. And we were very conscious of there's a rich array of literature and many studies out there on US-Turkey relations. And we wanted to draw on that first before we proceeded. And what we felt that was our somewhat value added to this process and a unique element of what we were trying to do was also to look at Turkey from these other perspectives from how are other countries also looking at Turkey? And how did Turkey play in the various discussions within, particularly the energy community, about its role as an energy hub? So we brought together this kind of perspective, as well as drawing on some of the very good work and some of the individuals represented even in this room today who have thought long and hard about Turkey. But we felt that this was a unique contribution we could bring by bringing together the perspectives of some of our colleagues who aren't Turkish experts. And indeed, our senior advisory group, well, many of them know Turkey quite well. We also wanted others who would provide some additional strategic perspective on Turkey's importance and Turkey's changing role in the world. We moved then to a fairly extensive field research. We held over 2 dozen roundtables here in Washington and elsewhere around the world, interviews with over 130 journalists, government officials, military officers, scholars, and business and civic leaders in the United States, Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe. And so we have tried to bring all of this experience to bear. We also were very fortunate to engage in a cooperative venture, although somewhat in parallel with the Ankara-based research organization TEPAV, which is linked to the Turkish Chambers of Commerce TUB, and has been an ongoing partner of CSIS in a variety of other studies, particularly under Bulent Ali Reza's Turkey project here for over 15 years. And they have undertaken a parallel review, which on the Turkish side, looking at the US-Turkish relationship, and that will be presented in Ankara next month. And so we're very pleased to have had that partnership and the benefits of those insights. Now, just a word about context. We proceeded from the assumption that, and I think it was borne out in the context of our research, that the United States and Turkey have a convergent strategic interest by and large, that both countries have enduring interest and stability in the Middle East in countering terrorism and extremism, in sustaining an open global economy, in securing energy flows, advancing the stability and sovereignty of states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in maintaining productive relations with Europe. That said, mistrust and suspicion in recent years, much of it related to the war in Iraq and its aftermath, have clouded this sense of convergence and sometimes complicated cooperation. There have also been fundamental changes in Turkey's domestic situation and neighborhood that have altered how Turks perceive and pursue their interests. And US, global and regional priorities, have also shifted, of course, since 2001. So these differing political and geo-strategic situations will, on occasion, we think, lead the two countries to pursue distinct and even sometimes divergent policies, and relations may be somewhat unpredictable. But keeping the relationship on course, we think, will require a careful management and a high-level attention by both governments. And it looks as if, certainly, by all sides of it, some of the first steps the Obama administration has taken, several phone calls, phone calls already to the president and prime minister in Turkey. Secretary Clinton's visit, Ambassador Mitchell's visit, and now, of course, the visit of the president, all suggest that this is moving towards some kind of this kind of level of engagement, which we think is going to be essential to keep this relationship on course. So with that context set, let me turn now to several of my project colleagues in this effort. First of all, beginning with Bulent Ali-Riza, who I mentioned, has been director and senior associate of the Turkey project here for over 15 years. And he will focus on Turkey's internal dynamics, will then turn to Haim Malka, who's deputy director and fellow at the CSIS Middle East program to discuss Turkey's relations with the Middle East and US-Turkish coordination on policy in the Middle East. Then to Edward Chow, who is a senior associate in the Energy and National Security Program here at CSIS, to talk about Turkey's project prospects, excuse me, as an energy bridge and US-Turkish policy coordination in that area. And then lastly, I will come back to some of our other specific recommendations about US-Turkish relations and also the Turkey-Russia-Turkey-EU relationship, that in the absence of two of our colleagues who unfortunately couldn't be here with us today, Andrew Kutchins, who is senior fellow and director of the CSIS Russia-Erasia program, and Julianne Smith, who's senior fellow and director of the CSIS Europe program until just last week when she moved over to the Department of Defense. Lastly, I do want to also recognize, first of all, my indispensable wingman in this effort, Samuel Brandon, who's senior fellow in the International Security Program, who served as deputy director of this initiative, and also two contributing authors, Ian Lesser, who is a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, who contributed a very insightful piece on Cyprus, and Alexandros Peterson from the Atlantic Council of the United States, who also worked with Andrew Kutchins on the Russia-Eurasia analysis. So let me now turn to Bulent Alireza. Thanks. I'll also like to underline Sam's importance to this whole project because Sam began his CSIS career at the Turkey project. And then after stint at the DOD came back to work with Steve. And frankly, that insight that he had into both Turkey and the way in which the US government functions was indispensable to the project. Good luck at the DOD, Sam. OK. I guess I had the most interesting and the most difficult chapter to write because look at the title, Turkey's Changing Dynamics. By its nature, these change constantly and it's difficult to describe, let alone to predict, to look into the future. But I tried to do justice to the task that was given to me. And frankly, I think the report was vindicated by the local election results in which we were able to predict some of the trends that have actually influenced the election results. I've only got a few minutes, so let me touch on the five, six different sections, hopefully with a view to wetting your appetite so you read the whole report. We begin with Akk and the secular system. The ruling party in the local elections has suffered a reverse for the first time since it came into power in November 2002. Until then, it was an upward trajectory. It remains to be seen how it would react to its first reverse. It still has more higher percentage than the next two parties, the two opposition parties combined. It was able to retain the mayoral races in Ankara and Istanbul, so it's not going to be replaced anytime soon. Nonetheless, there is now for the first time a question mark over the Akk domination of Turkish politics. Those questions were raised in the paper. Akk has this origins in the Islamist movement, but from the very outset, this party said that it was not Islamist unlike the Islamist predecessors that were closed down. It tried to work within the Turkish secular system. The constitutional framework in which it governed remained secular, and that led to tensions, most notably in 2007, when the Constitution Court almost closed the ruling party down to ban it, which would have been unprecedented. Those tensions are not going to wait because, frankly, what we're still waiting for is a compromise that will allow for the greater religiosity in Turkish society to live comfortably within a constitutional framework that still remains secular. What about the growing religiosity that I go into in the chapter? Undoubtedly, Turkey is visibly more religious than it was. It still remains secular. So there are tensions that are inherent in this, most notably with respect to the headscarf ban. Here is a government composed of people whose mothers, wives, and daughters cover, unable to convert its majority into a legislative decision to reverse what the women folk regard as well as many of their supporters regard as unacceptable, unacceptably onerous restrictions. So that manifests the kind of tensions in society irrespective of when the AKP, what happens to it and what its political future is, Turkey will remain a religious country. And whoever replaces the AKP eventually, and somebody will at some stage, will have to come to terms with the fact that this is a country which is secular, but its people are religious. What about the Turkish military? Clearly, you cannot discuss Turkish politics without discussing the role of the Turkish military. That's another cause of the tensions inherent in Turkish society. After all, there have been four military interventions of one kind over another in the past 50 years. Turkish military still remains largely autonomous. It still exercises influence far beyond the purely national security area. There seems to have been an easing of tensions which after the 2003-2004 period when, as we now read, there were apparently the discussion within the high ranks of the TGS as to replacing the elected government through extra parliamentary means of one form or another. And then 2007, when the TGS, the Turkish General Staff, opposed publicly the election of the elected to the presidency. Those tensions seem to have abated somewhat. Nonetheless, the Turkish civilian military relationship does not conform to the Western, accepted Western model. Turkey is unique in that sense. If Turkey were to join the EU, clearly, that would have to be changed. That's not the case, and the Turkish military remains a very important component of the overall equation. The Kurdish conundrum, as we called it in the piece. But look at the results yesterday. The DETP, which is facing closure for separatism, like its predecessors, managed to win overwhelming victories in the Iraq and other provinces in the Southeast, which is, I think, the Kurdish, although Turkey has been grappling with and successfully defeating PKK terrorism and, therefore, the threat of Kurdish separatism or literally tearing the Southeast and provinces away from Turkey and setting up an independent republic, nonetheless, the causes of the disaffection that leads to volunteers joining the PKK or people supporting the DETP confirm that there is a problem with a group that has not been assimilated that does not feel satisfied with the steps that have been taken to deal with its grievances. I think Turkey will not break up because of the Kurdish issue, but nonetheless, the Kurdish question that has been addressed both by the prime minister as well as by the current chief of staff as one that cannot be solved by purely military means will be a future in Turkish politics. The economic difficulties. That was one of the more interesting issues to deal with because, frankly, it's impossible to understand what's going on in Turkey without referring to the economic situation. The current party came into office through its electoral victory in November 2002 that out of great deal to the economic difficulties, the economic crisis of 2000-2001. It's reverse in the local elections is undoubtedly due to the global economic crisis, which is finally beginning to hit Turkey. If you look at the growth projections by the IMF, what they're actually projecting for Turkey is a negative growth for the first time, whereas the budget that the government adopted is envisioned as a growth of 4%. I mean, clearly, something is awry. And what's awry is that the process of globalization that Turkey enthusiastically supported, including during the past six years of the current government, its integration into the global economy is now making Turkey suffer because of what we may call reverse globalization. Clearly, the kind of funds that were available before to go into emerging markets is not going to be there. And what you're seeing is the stock market less than half of what it was, unemployment rising, and whichever government is in office is clearly going to pay the price. And this government is certainly doing it. Now, Turkey possesses great advantages, location, young labor force, a very vibrant business community, and surely will pick up before many other countries. But nonetheless, the current government's attempts to minimize the economic difficulties, its delay in going for an IMF deal that might have provided some degree of confidence to the international financial community is likely to prove costly. Looking ahead a little bit, excuse me, my mouth went dry today, is clearly the economic situation. If the economic crisis hits Turkey harder than the current government and it supports hope, then frankly, all bets are off. We'll have to see how much it changes the domestic political situation. The most important external factor is, of course, the future of the EU process. Turkey has finally begun accession negotiations. It's got a number of difficulties in that process. The reform process in Turkey was tied to EU accession. And if that were to stop, then frankly, again, as I said, it's going to affect Turkish domestic politics. With that, I think I'll stop and I want we can deal with the US-Turkish relationship in the Q&A session. Great. Thank you very much, Bulan. Haim Malka for the perspectives on Turkish relations of the Middle East. Thank you, Stephen. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to participate in this incredibly enlightening project. I learned a lot from all of my colleagues, from Sam, from you, and from the advisory group as well. I have to take issue with one thing that Bulan said. I think I definitely had the most interesting and the most difficult chapter to write on this in looking at the Middle East. I don't think you can really look at the Middle East today without taking account of Turkey and Turkish diplomacy in the region today. And in many ways, the Middle East will be the test case for US-Turkey cooperation for the foreseeable future. I think the Middle East is an arena where many of our most crucial national security issues for both the United States and for Turkey overlap. Turkey is intimately tied to the future of Iraq, and it will shape in some way what Iraq will look like. As a member of the United States of the UN Security Council, Turkey will also play a greater role in the debate over Iran and Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons program. And Turkey's activism, renewed activism and commitment in the region has made it a pivotal player. I think we all agree on that. And the report clearly shows that. And it can be a real potential asset to the United States. The US can benefit greatly from Turkey's soft influence and efforts to stabilize the region, as well as its mediation efforts, which we've seen. But at the same time, I think we need to acknowledge that Turkey's activism and regional diplomacy has the potential to create tension with the United States as well over different policies and different policy outcomes. And how we manage that tension that's going to arise in the next couple of years will have a significant impact on the success of US-Turkish cooperation moving forward across a wide range of issues, even beyond the Middle East. So I think the challenge for the US and Turkey now is really to define the space where Turkey's diplomacy can be mutually beneficial and complementary to the United States rather than competitive. The benefits are clear, and we've seen them over the last few years. Dr. Brzynski, I think in number five, mentioned that Turkey is a force for stability. And I think that's incredibly important. We've seen Turkey play an active role helping to push forward the status of forces agreement between the US and Iraq. We've seen Turkey using its influence with Sunni tribes in Iraq as a force for stability and is helping the security situation over the last couple of years. Turkey has a wide range of diplomatic contacts and has been useful and important as a regional mediator. We saw that through the facilitation of four rounds of Israeli-Syrian indirect negotiations and a potentially fifth round of negotiations as well. And I think Turkey can be a trusted interlocutor for the United States with a range of countries and a range of actors, including Iran. More broadly, Turkey and the US have many similar interests in the region, especially in terms of Iraqi stability, in terms of promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace and preventing a nuclear Iran. But again, at the same time, we have to recognize that there are different priorities, different strategies, and possibly different desired outcomes on a range of these issues. There are certainly different perceptions between the United States and Turkey over the nature of Iran's nuclear program. There are certainly different priorities and perhaps desired outcomes over the future of the Kurdish region in Iraq and the status of Kirkuk. Another potentially dangerous issue is the Palestinian question, which has caused a lot of tension recently, a lot of public tension. And this is an arena where Turkey seeks to play a more active role. But again, Turkey has a very different perspective on the Palestinian question the United States does. It has a very different strategy that has recognized the Hamas government. It wants to play a more active role in internal Palestinian dialogue and efforts to reconcile Palestinian factions. But this is a very crowded field of mediators. We have the Qataris playing a role. The Egyptians are also playing an active role. And so it's important to find the right space for Turkey to play a constructive role there. I think neither Turkey nor the United States can afford to hold any of these issues as a litmus test or hold any of these issues hostage to the relationship, be it Iran or the Palestinian issue. And I think in thinking through and trying to define Turkey's role in regional diplomacy, we have to ask some difficult questions. We have to be pragmatic about what assets Turkey actually brings to the table. It clearly has leverage in Iraq and the Kurdish region. It has economic and political clout there. It can convene parties and facilitate negotiations, as we saw in the Israeli-Syrian example. It can certainly deliver messages, diplomatic messages, as a go-between. But I think we have to acknowledge as well that having access to regional players doesn't necessarily mean that there is influence over those regional actors. And we have to be realistic about that. There's a question mark whether Turkey has the kind of leverage over Iran, Syria, or the Hamas leadership to actually change the behavior of any of those governments or actors. And as the United States is more willing to engage some of these actors like Iran and Syria, I think it changes the nature of Turkey's own mediation role. So I think it's extremely vital to U.S. and Turkish interests that we can coordinate closely with Turkey in Middle East diplomacy. And I think asking these tough questions is in no way questioning Turkey's ability or its role, but acknowledging that we do have differences. And I think acknowledging those differences will actually help both Turkey and the U.S. define our roles moving forward more clearly, and it will ultimately strengthen the level of cooperation across a range of mutual interests. Thank you. Great, thank you very much, Hyde. And now for a review on the Energy Bridge challenges and opportunities from Edward Chow. Thank you, Steve. As you have indicated, and as our senior advisors have already articulated, the United States has a full and complex agenda with Turkey and a very complicated set of relationships. And since the collapse of the Soviet Union for almost 20 years, energy has often been added to that agenda and has become an important factor. In many ways, that had worked in the 1990s. Part of my contention is that the 1990s are not easily replayed. That some of the lessons that can be drawn from the convergence of American and U.S. interests in Central Asia, for example, U.S. and Turkish interests are no longer play out exactly the same way. I mean, for example, today Turkey has a much different relationship with Russia than it did in the 1990s. It has a different set of relationships with Iran than it did then. And so I often wonder whether there is a over promise sometimes of saying that energy is an asset that can be used in U.S.-Turkish building on U.S.-Turkish relationship and whether a lowering of expectations and being more realistic in our assessment on how much can be done and how soon things can be done would be worthwhile. Some of you know that I come from the energy business and tend to think of the industry as a business. And in the energy business, what's important is geology, geology, geology. Well, in Turkey's case, if you don't have geology, what's important is location, location, location, which Turkey certainly has in all respects. It's an important transit country. It is already an important transit country. It's a transit country that has half a dozen projects already on its soil. It has pipeline capacity of over 3 million barrels per day. Not to speak of the 2.5, 3 million barrels per day that passes through the Bosphorus every day. It has four major gas pipelines on its soil, transiting as well as importing gas for Turkey. It also has an important liquefied natural gas import facility. So to say that something needs to be done to build Turkey as an energy bridge is to perhaps discount that it is already a very important transit country. But transit projects take a long, long time to put together. They easily take three to five years. If everything goes smoothly, more commonly, it takes five to seven years gestation between before a major pipeline is built. Certain other things are important, sequencing of projects. One does not build a pipeline without the upstream capacity to fill the pipeline. So therefore transit countries generally don't build pipelines before production is available. Who has the primary financial stake in the success of a transit project, a pipeline, for example, is also an important factor in the ultimate success of transit projects. Generally speaking, they are the major oil producers. Sometimes in gas, often in gas, is also the major gas consumers as well. So if you look at Turkey's situation today, in order to build on its already quite substantial transit capacity, the first challenge is to increase upstream capacity, particularly in Central Asia. And here, foremost, the first, I would say, Azerbaijan, the further gas development in Azerbaijan is an area that Turkey and the United States can be working together. We ought to see Turkey's potential demand for that gas as an important asset, rather than as a detriment to transiting gas to Europe. And even more important, but longer term, is the underdevelopment of gas in Turkmenistan and the fact that that country is currently still not open to major Western oil and gas investments so that there will be companies there with the interest of moving volumes west rather than moving them north to Russia, south to Iran, or east to China. Those are things that is number one, in my mind, in terms of priority, if one wants to strengthen Turkey's role as a transit provider. The other important element is to build on the existing infrastructure so that the sunk capital is fully utilized. There's underutilized capacity in the Kirkuk to Jehan pipeline. The Baku to Plesi Jehan pipeline can be increased in capacity. That capital, the major capital investments already sunk. Volumes can be increased. As Turkey's reputation improves and confidence in the international industry in Turkey as a reliable transit partner increases, additional infrastructure may be built, but over time. And here, my last pitch is to say a call for quiet diplomacy on the part of the United States, something that perhaps we're not as good at as we should be. Since these things take a long time, they are not quick fixes. They're not very elegant foreign policy tools by and large. There is the temptation of getting in the ring with Vladimir Putin, with much louder action on winning transit deals. And there, I think it's a mistake. It is like trying to play hockey in the home rank of the Russian team when we don't have skates and we don't have sticks. The Russians are willing to do suboptimal economic projects. They have the oil and gas. They have the money for now to subsidize pipelines. Western governments, generally speaking, do not subsidize oil and gas transit projects. And unless we are willing and able to do that, it is better to work on our strengths, which has to do with making sure that the Central Asian producers, in particular, continue to have economic autonomy and political independence in their own region, that, therefore, alternative supply routes are important to them. Turkey is an important factor there. The lesson that is often not sufficiently learned from the Baku Tbilisi Jehan experience is that Baku Subtsa got built first, that the smaller projects demonstrate the viability of a route, and more volumes will follow when smaller projects get done first. So you score by not swinging for home runs by trying to string a bunch of singles together. That's what the risk management of the oil industry would generally call for, and therefore, a quiet American diplomacy talking to Turkey about areas of interest that are where we converge, but need not be identical, I think is an important thought that I want to leave behind for US policymakers. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ed. And Ed really played a great role in educating all of us about the economics of energy and the geopolitics of it as well. But let me now just briefly touch on a bit about Turkey's changing relations with the European Union and with Russia and some of its neighbors in Eurasia, and then briefly close with some thoughts on managing the US-Turkish relationship, and then should leave us with a good 30 minutes for your comments and discussion. So please bear with me. Excuse me, with regard to Turkey and Europe, and this is drawing on Julian Smith's good work on this, we point out that the EU and Turkey are really at a critical juncture in the relationship. Well, both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to the accession process. Progress has been fitful, of course, and a large amount of fatigue and concerns about Turkey's political and social direction have deepened and abiding reticence among a number of European leaders in the press and public about whether Turkey should and could ever be a full member of the Union. And there's growing frustration about the pace of the talks in Turkey and about Europe's willingness to ultimately really offer EU membership, and this led to, I think, a certain amount of diminished commitment on the part of Turkish officials and the public to undertake the necessary reforms. Now, that said, it is indeed true that the Turkish government has recently appointed Egemen Baj for a close advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan as the senior official dealing with the EU, and certainly there's still a lot of energy and commitment there, but I think we have to look at the actual steps in reform and the progress in reform and also the lagging interest in the EU, which really reflects not so much even anything that Turkey and Perse is doing, but as much as a bit of enlargement fatigue and the post-Lizban fatigue as well kicking in on that, not to mention, obviously, the global economic crisis. So it is a challenging period, but nonetheless, Turkey is facing a specific deadline this year in late 2009 during the Swedish presidency due to some commitments that were made under a 2005 protocol to open its ports and airports to the Republic of Cyprus, and this had to do with the accession of Cyprus to the European Union at the time, the Republic of Cyprus, and other efforts to advance and normalization of relations to that process. And given that there really hasn't been a signal yet from the Turkish government on the part of a new approach towards Cyprus, and I'll touch a little bit briefly on the uncertain prospects for a resolution of the Cypriot problem between the two communities on the island, it seems as if this could be a bit of a bump on the road, and indeed, some countries or even in Europe I think would like to use this as at least an immediate pretext for further suspension of the negotiation or blocking off other chapters in the accession discussions and some of which are already blocked due to Cyprus differences, eight of them in fact. And one of the big problems we notice that while the EU member governments are somewhat divided, the Nordics and some of the Northern European countries, the British are more supportive, other European leaders are much more outspoken and ranging from tepid to outright opposition, and there really isn't any clear champion within the European Union for the Turkish cause. This notion that has been advanced by some European politicians of privileged partnership we think is a rather ill-defined alternative to EU membership which would certainly be seen as a rejection by the Turks and would undermine support for reform and engagement with the West in Turkey. As Ed pointed out a little bit, the Turkish government has had limited success. One of the key things that of course should make Turkey a rather appealing partner is its role as an energy bridge, as Ed pointed out and for a variety of reasons, the Turks have had limited success in leveraging that card in the relationship despite several disruptions of gas deliveries, obviously this in the last few years between Ukraine and Russia. The EU governments are certainly more interested in finding alternatives and developing the Southern corridor but there are still some doubts about internal Turkish policies and even differences within EU governments about which are various alternative routes to support. So that has limited Turkey's leverage in that. So what we argue is that it would be very damaging if the accession discussions with Turkey were to fail in the near term. The consequences we think would be very severe and widespread to Turkey's relationship not only with Europe but also with the United States and its other NATO allies. It could accelerate the growth of nationalists and their liberal political forces in Turkey which would be counter to US interests and it might even lead to some more obstructionist policies on the part of the Turkish government with regard to NATO-EU cooperation some of which has been undertaken in recent years because of differences over Cyprus's role within the European security and defense policy. But I think that you could also see Turkey really shifting and further acceleration of its efforts to look for other partners, other partners in the world not only in its immediate neighborhood but even farther afield in East Asia and elsewhere. So what we suggest is that perhaps the best one can hope for in some ways and is to remain committed to the long-term accession process but that hope that perhaps over the next 10 to 15 years as the consequences that Europe itself is developing in a multi-speed way that there are varied levels of political economic integration. Not everyone is obviously a member of the European Union, not everyone is a member of the European security and defense policy. There is sort of a variable geometry that's already emerging within the European Union and that perhaps that kind of a variable mix of engagement could provide a soft landing for a somewhat truncated Turkish accession process. In other words, even if it doesn't adhere to all of the hierarchy, particularly if it's not the odd man out in that relationship which indeed it isn't even today as it tries to move forward on several chapters of the hierarchy communitaire of the European Union. On Cyprus, we touched on and Ian Lesser did a wonderful contribution to feature on Cyprus, drawing on long experience in this area, both on Cyprus and your Turkish relations as well. He points out that Cyprus really, for which had been so much of a flash point and a focal point of the US Turkish relationship and of relations with Greece and the whole region has become really less central to the strategic environment. But the situation on the island is still a little bit uncertain and the prospects for a settlement remain unclear. And this still has significant implications for the US Turkish relations and for really a blossoming detente and cooperation between Greece and Turkey which has been moving forward quite smartly. The current leadership on the island we feel and a number of other colleagues here also have studied the Bulent and others have studied Cyprus feel that indeed the current relationships between the two leaders between Tala and Christophius are probably as good as they've ever been since the non-plan of 2004 which almost began to solve this problem. But after months of talks, it still seems that significant differences over power sharing and other issues persist. And it's not clear that this current favorable climate can persist indefinitely. So what do we suggest here again? Our call is for cautious US diplomacy that quiet but consistent US engagement with European governments is probably the most effective way to continue to advance Turkey's accession discussions. It's not, as a number of the US diplomats in the room know, it's never a welcome. The various US demarches about Turkish membership are not usually very welcome but I do think that's still a firm and we as a group felt that a firm in steady support for Turkish membership and continued efforts to try to support that and to support some of the reforms in Turkey that are essential to that process are a useful and valuable step. With regard to Turkey's EU membership and also in terms of helping to sort out the NATO-EU relationship, we think that one of the most helpful steps that Washington could take is to try to overcome and is some of the differences on the island of Cyprus itself. And here we think that solving the Cyprus problem and at least moving forward on some kind of a settlement between the two communities could be very helpful to both enhancing NATO-EU relations and also, of course, in advancing Turkey's relationship with the EU. There is, of course, now a special UN envoy, Alexander Downer, the former Australian Prime Minister who's actively engaged in these discussions. And what we suggest is that perhaps the US could also designate a senior diplomat to work closely with Mr. Downer but also with the Greek government, with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and to put sort of steady and concerted pressure on all the parties, really, on the EU to end economic isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on the Turkish government to take some reciprocal steps to open, to normalize relations with Nicosia, consistent with its commitments, and also on the Greek government to try to put some pressure on the Turkish Cypriot government to move forward and put behind some of these issues that are really otherwise stymieing important developments within the building of Europe whole and free and at peace with one another. Let me just touch briefly on Russia. The Russia-Turkish rapprochement is really an historic development that was spotlighted in really stark terms in the aftermath of the Georgia War. But what Andrew Cutchins and Alexander Peterson point out is that actually the growing Turkish-Russia rapprochement was really building even much earlier, particularly on growing trade and investment energy ties over the past decade, as well as a very strong personal relationship between the Prime Minister Erdogan and Prime Minister Putin. Turkey's evolving sense of its national interest and its strategy that's been articulated by the Turkish Prime Minister's advisor Davidollo of zero problems along its borders has also been to a certain amount of balancing, of more explicit balancing in relations between Russia and its NATO allies. But I think Turkish officials pointed out to us clearly and I do think that as we looked at the record, it did show that Turkey is approaching Russia with a certain wariness, a proper wariness, I think, and that it remains firmly tied to its Euro-Atlantic moorings, but that Turkey's geostrategic position is such that it has to take into account these changing relations, this changing geostrategic reality, and its energy dependence on Russia and its efforts to try to also promote stability in the Caucasus and the Black Sea and how it goes about doing that in the most effective way as an area that there are some differences between the United States and Turkey. We also just mentioned briefly, and we can come back to this discussion about the Caucasus and the Black Sea in discussion, we do mention also Turkey's interest in Central Asia, which of course there was a great flowering of that interest and great hopes of the Pan-Turkic ideas surfacing and having greater impact in Central Asia, but the fact is that the realities of transit to Russia, other kinds of historical ties and limited resources have not led to this great wellspring, but there is another opportunity, I think, on the horizon and particularly for President Obama's trip and his focus now on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that is that Turkey has provided, provided, of course, significant military support to the International Security Assistance Mission, the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan, along with valuable soft power assets and resources on a bilateral basis to support stabilization development of Afghanistan. Turkey also has a very strong relationship with Pakistan historically, that has had undertaken some initiatives to bring the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan together to form more constructive relationship, and so we think that Turkey should also be looked to in this context as a way in which it could provide additional support to that process and particularly with regard to engagement in Pakistan. We think that the Obama administration should support Turkey's proposal for creating a Caucasus stability and cooperation platform, that I think this has some real potential to helping to resolve some of the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus region and that Turkey can play an important role as an intermediary, and of course we also recognize the historic developments that underway and the potential that's there in Turkey's effort to normalize relationship with Armenia. So let me just touch briefly and truly a two-minute drill since my partners have already red carded me to stop, and we are at the five o'clock hour, excuse me, about the main framework for the relationship. We think that an Obama administration initiative that would seek to engage the Turkish government in articulating a positive common agenda for strategic cooperation would be very well received, and indeed the harbinger of this and the recognition of this was indeed shown during Secretary Clinton's visit, which unfortunately came before we finished this report, but we were thinking along the same lines, I have to say the notion that we should build on indeed, the document that was agreed to in 2006 during Ambassador Wilson's tenure in Ankara and the so-called shared vision and structured dialogue, which was a very good document in terms of articulating a sense of common goals and visions, and it did make some progress in advancing interest in a couple of areas, but this is something that we think, and of course there's always a tendency in any new administration to do anything but what the other guys did, and so I think we salute, I salute as someone who's worked in government the Clinton administration for not kicking this aside and saying, well, we'll come up with our own strategy or our own framework. I think this framework has real merit in one that obviously the Turkish government has embraced and one that could be further defined and elaborate, and so what we suggest is that you could augment this and give it real energy and dynamism by having periodic high-level policy dialogue and an action agenda with some specific timelines to advance cooperation and manage policy differences. This could be supported by working groups of various kinds charged with monitoring implementation of some of these areas. So we think the positive agenda, as you've already seen in some of the comments that my colleagues should focus on, first of all, long-term stabilization of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, expansion of trade and investment in military-to-military cooperation and promoting Turkey's EU membership. Now the agenda we think should also include some areas where cooperation will have great impact and our interests are broadly similar but there are still some policy differences we have to be quite candid. But these could be, cooperation in this area could be managed if we have a steady process and those areas that we think include policy towards Russia, towards Armenia and Greece, development of the southern corridor routes for Caspian energy resources and fostering an Israeli-Palestinian settlement and dealing with the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and also in Cyprus. Now there are several areas that we do note that there are some more fundamental and potential policy differences that will need to be carefully managed and that is, first of all, deals with increasing Russian assertiveness in the Black Sea and along its periphery on energy and trade relations with Iran, on slowing Iran's nuclear program and safeguarding democracy and the rule of law within Turkey itself. These are all delicate and sensitive issues. We think that there are a number of mechanisms that could be developed to enhance Turkish-U.S. economic relationship. We think the scope for a more robust soft-power relationship and indeed the administration has already signaled its interest in beginning some further educational exchange but we think other person-to-person exchanges, cultural exchanges and also some kind of a more systematic engagement between the Turkish Grand National Assembly and U.S. counterparts. There are some exchanges but we think perhaps that could be more routinized. And last but not least, we didn't duck the very difficult issue that is before the Congress even right now, the question which we think would create a great uncertainty in the future of the U.S.-Turkish relationship and that is the Armenian genocide resolution. My personal view and the view of, I think, most of my colleagues is that if President Obama takes no action to prevent congressional enactment of this resolution, House Resolution 252, or endorses the measure or uses the word genocide himself in discussing this situation that happened at the end of the Ottoman Empire and the atrocities and terrible loss of life that took place in that end of war and end of empire period, the Turkish response would be harsh and would trigger a prolonged breach in the relationship. We suggest that rather than trying to legislate history, the United States Congress and the international community should provide maximum encouragement and support to the diplomatic rapprochement being pursued by the governments of Turkey and Armenia as well as to the emerging regional cooperation. We think in that regard too that a joint historical commission could be helpful to that process and we encourage the parties to pursue that approach. So ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. We've tried to cover a lot of terrain and a very complicated relationship. As my colleague said, we look forward to your comments and questions. Thank you. We have some microphones if I could just ask you to raise your hand and identify yourself when you are approached by someone. Yes, yes, Stanley Kober. Stanley Kober with the Kato Institute. One subject that has not been mentioned and it may be to-no is the selection of the new Secretary General of NATO. And from what I understand, there's been concern expressed in Turkey because he is from Denmark and the association with the Danish cartoons and I've seen very little discussion. I don't know how seriously to take this but I wonder if one or two of the panelists might be able to address that. I guess the default option. I think this is still an, I stand you're quite right. I think this is still an unfolding issue. Prime Minister Rasmussen did, one of the concerns that have been out there that Prime Minister Rasmussen was somewhat reticent. When the cartoon episode erupted, he was somewhat reticent to take an offer of Turkish support to try to begin perhaps in a dialogue and among Danes and other. He was more robust in defending free speech unless in sort of suggesting that perhaps some dialogue between the Muslim communities in Denmark and elsewhere in Europe and Muslim countries and to Turkey. So that was seen as a bit of a front. Obviously, Turkey is, as I understand it, somewhat concerned about the fact that Raj TV is still housed in Denmark, the Kurdish TV station which is seen as an affiliate of the PKK. There are other concerns that have been out there about Rasmussen's outspoken opposition to Turkish full membership in the EU. So I don't know that if this is going to become a crisis, I think there's active diplomatic discussions underway right now. As far as I know, and if Ambassador Sensei wants to, I could let him articulate the Turkish government's position right now, but as far as I know, the Turkish government officially has not raised its complete opposition to Mr. Rasmussen. The Turkish government is still considering the pros and cons of different candidates to this position. So we've made it clear that this is nothing personal as far as Prime Minister Rasmussen is concerned, but there are certain messages that the election of a new Secretary General is going to project to the whole world and especially to the Islamic world. And that is why the Turkish Prime Minister and the leadership has really voiced some of these concerns. But so far, no decision has been taken and discussions are going on. That's all I can say at this point. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Thank you for clarifying that. Just as a hand in the back, excuse me. Right in the, on the far side there. Hi, my name is Zahar. My name is Zahar Hassanoff. I'm a reporter from Azerbaijan. It's on, it's on. I wanna ask you a question about reopening border between Armenia and Turkey, which is expected somewhere in the middle of April. That's the rumors which we have so far. And don't you think that this kind of action will create or will leave Azerbaijan with no chance but uses military forces to overtake Nagorno-Karabakh? And second, with population of 80% of Shia Muslims, Azerbaijan going to look rather than on Tehran or Moscow rather than on Ankara in its political future. So what's your thought about that? Yeah, I'll take a crack at this. I mean, look, I know you, you asked this question before when you came to a meeting that we had. And I know, no, and I respect, now I respect your views as an Assyrian and your concern about the opening of the border. Frankly, if it was easy, Turkey would have opened that border long ago. The Armenian lobby is convinced that the only reason that Turkey's doing this is to ward off the danger of the adoption of the resolution. I think Turkey does genuinely want to have a better relationship with Armenia, but also recognizes that it cannot take the step bilaterally without taking Azerbaijan into account. When advisor Davutoglu was here, he mentioned the Azerbaijan is an important factor in the equation. I think you have reason to be concerned because Azerbaijan will undoubtedly be affected, but I don't think that Turkey will take any step without taking into account your country. Alex Olaferes with the American Hellenic Institute. Do you agree as a gesture that Turkey should withdraw its estimated 43,000 Turkish troops from the island of Cyprus as a strong gesture that they are very serious on unifying the island since this occupation, this illegal military occupation has been continuously condemned by UN resolutions? I think that's more than a gesture, but maybe, Valent, would you like to, you know? I think... My name is Alisher Abidjanov. I'm from National University of Uzbekistan and I'm visiting fellow at John Hopkins right now. And as we've heard that Turkey is a real true ally of the United States in the east, and especially in the Middle East, and another true ally of the US is Israel. And, but relationships between these countries is not perfect, and even in Davos, in Switzerland, it shows very well. And what do you think how these contradictions between these two countries can affect to the relationships between two US-Turkey relations? Thank you. I guess that falls in the Middle East category. So are you asking the way I understood your question is how can the tension between Israel and Turkey be managed by the United States? Is that... Well, Israel has a strong relationship with the US, obviously, and it has a strong relationship with Turkey based on mutual interest, and that's been going on for several decades. There has been tension, obviously, and more public tension and fallout diplomatically and politically over the Gaza events, over the Lebanon War in 2006, and we've seen more of that, but I think that the foundation of Israeli-Turkish cooperation remains strong, and both the government of Turkey and the government of Israel have tried to downplay the differences and have tried to downplay the tension. If you've noticed, despite the rhetoric after the Davos incidents and throughout the Gaza War, no cooperation agreement, no diplomatic agreement or economic arrangement has been canceled or altered as a result of this political fallout. So I think it was maintained at a certain diplomatic level, but I think that is subsided. There still remains the potential for tension between Israel and Turkey, but I think both Turkey and Israel still see great interest in cooperation along a range of mutually beneficial interests and that relationship will endure despite the tension. Thank you, I'm Svante Cornell from the Central Asia Caucus Institute at Johns Hopkins. I'd like to ask a question. It may possibly be to Dr. Al-Irza. I think there's a short mention in your paper, which of course we haven't been able to read yet on this, but I wonder if you'd like to say something about the issues of freedom of speech in Turkey and the fact that the government has taken steps to take over or have businesses very close to itself, take over large media concerns in the country as well as impose a huge fine on the country's largest media outlet. Would you care to comment on that? I'm happy to. In fact, I go into this in the report and I talk about how the ruling party which supported and benefited from Turkey being a more open society has actually presided over a society becoming less open and some of the aspects of this process you have mentioned. I'd very much hope that the local election results are a warning shot across the bowser of this government that maybe all that it's been doing does not have the support of the Turkish people. And I didn't have enough time to go into touch on other than the most salient points of my presentation but I'm concerned about what the way things are going. This is an institution that hosted Prime Minister Erdogan when he was in opposition leader and he was pushing for an open society and an open media and criticizing some of the things that the previous government was doing for the same things to be happening in different ways but the end result being the same is I think very unfortunate. And I would very much hope that the government would ease up its pressure on the media because frankly without a free media then you cannot have an open society and the JDP, the Justice and Development Party, the AKPATI was a supporter of the open society and anything that's detrimental to that open society will be not just against its own interests but against the interests of the country. Thank you. Huzur from CNN, Turkey, this is for Mr. Haim Malika. You mentioned that the Turkish-Israeli relations are despite all the rhetoric are strong and sound. Can you elaborate on it a little bit because it seems like down on the bottom level on grassroots and public view it is probably worse than Turkey's resentment towards United States during a Bush era right now and one of the parties that advocated a more stronger action against Israel against some ground during the local elections. Don't you think it's a little harder to do anything between these two countries now? I think Turkish public opinion is probably wary and critical of the strong Turkish-Israeli relationship. It's increasingly difficult, more difficult for the AKP government to justify such strong relations with Israel, especially in times of crisis and heightened violence in the Middle East whether it be between Israel and Lebanon or Israel and Gaza and the Palestinians. So I think that issue is going to increasingly is going to complicate the Israeli-Turkish relationship and make it more difficult for Israel and Turkey to cooperate on a public level on high-profile issues like military cooperation of which Israel and Turkey have a very strong relationship. But at the same time, I'll reiterate what I said before that Israel and Turkey share very strong and concrete overlapping interests on a range of issues be they political, economic, or military. And I think those interests will endure and I think that the relationship will overcome the tension that arises despite the complexity of their relations. I'm Ali Aslan, Washington correspondent for Turkish Daily Zaman newspaper. I'm reading your report here and there is a sentence. Actually, there's a paragraph talking about the official dogma of the Turkish government which is camelism and camelists trying to restrict the power of elected governments to act outside its principles. And there's a sentence here which kind of confused me and a little surprised, frankly. And it says these strictures often called camelism maintained by the constitutional court and the Turkish general staff effectively prevent the emergence of an Islamist state in Turkey. So this sentence interestingly suggests as if there is a real danger of Islamist state in Turkey and also as if you are condoning those restrictions applied by the camelists. What is your, can you clarify that for me please? I think we were trying to describe there without taking sides in that debate but just describing what we think is the balance of power politically within Turkey today that you have those who feel that there is, that there are those certainly in among the traditional camelist elite who feel that there is a hidden agenda out there among or at least some of our supporters and that the strictures and the various threats that we've seen over the last several years in governmental crises have been to try to define those boundaries as Aak has tried to redefine what secularism means and what the Kamala's vision should mean and both the constitutional court and the general staff seeing themselves as guardians of that legacy have taken various steps to try to set bounds and limits but we don't think that we came out in general in our assessment and that we didn't think that Aak's agenda was hidden at all. We think that Aak has been very clear over the last seven years of my plus of government that it wants to allow for a redefinition of the secular model that was implemented but that it's not trying to move towards some kind of establishment of Sharia or any other sort of move in that direction. We think it simply wants to reflect the support that is definitely out there among the broader base of the population to allow more open expressions of piety in public life and that really is where we came out I think on that. I picked that up. Look, I tried to touch on this in my section too and you and I have talked about this in the past. Clearly, there are some tensions in Turkish society that can only be explained in terms of what I mentioned in my introduction which is that the constitutional framework is still vigorously, strictly secular and within it the people tend to be more religious, more devout and pushing the limits of what was previously acceptable to those who maintain the secular system, not least the TGS. And now we had a case in the Constitutional Court in which this party, the ruling party was defined as being the center of anti-secular activities and it only escaped being shut down by one vote. Before that, we had that confrontation with the TGS over the election to the presidency. These are not normal events that happen in a society that has achieved the compromise. That is acceptable, a consensus is the way I was looking for. Consensus that is acceptable to all parties that function within it. Now from the very outset, Mr. Agnewan has said that this party is not Islamist and nonetheless it was objectively defined as being Islamist and I use the word because you focus on that word in the text and determined to reverse the secular system. Now the secular system has survived. Mr. Agnewan and Ak have confirmed whenever they were questioned that they want to stay within this function, within the secular system, nonetheless, as we know from the very day that they took office in 2002, there had been people who were opposed to it in one form or another who said that ultimately what they wanted to do was to bring, reverse the secular system and set up an Islamist state. Now I know that we're going to have an Islamist state in Turkey. I don't think too many people want an Islamist state even if it could be done in Turkey. And I also think that the secular system needs to be revised, restructured to allow growing religiosity by its people. Are we anywhere near that consensus? I fear not, which is why I suspect that the kind of tensions that we've lived through before we may live again. Adil Bagheera from the U.S. Turkic Network. I have a question, I guess, for Ed Chow. I haven't read the entire report yet, obviously, but what are your predictions about the Nabucco pipeline? Because you've mentioned, obviously, the Nabucco a few times in the report. You've also mentioned that BTC and shown how it's been a success, but at the same time, it doesn't seem to be matched by either U.S. government or Western European governments in the case of Nabucco. And second question related to it is the current plans between Turkey and Russia to expand the blue stream pipeline and to basically double or even increase even by more than that the gas exports from Russia to Turkey. And therefore, basically rendering useless any other pipeline, any other gas pipeline to the region. Thank you. Okay, let me just see if there's one, I think we have time for one last question. Danny, behind you there, Ann Watkowski has a question. Let me ask it now, okay. Ann Watkowski, CSIS Senior Associate. You talked about Russian Turkish rapprochement at the same time, a certain wariness of Turkey toward Russia. Given these tensions, this is a question for Steve Flanagan. I wonder if you would care to venture a view on the prospects for Turkish flexibility with respect to possible solutions with respect to Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty implementation. Given especially that two of the key problems are Russia's continuing presence in Georgia contrary to its 1999 commitments at the Istanbul Summit and its desire to eliminate the flank limit of the treaty, which of course a fact is Russia's flexibility in its south, thanks. I spent a lot of effort in Caspian or in gas meetings not to utter the words Nabucco because I'm afraid of what I might say. It's a very challenging project. It's a long, long distance from upstream which would be in the Caspian across half a dozen essentially transit countries rather than ultimate consuming countries before you get to Austria. And it is the sort of project that in commercial terms one wouldn't want to try to build first. Building the more expensive project is not one you would do if you had the option, not to. So I'm much more interested in smaller projects that as I said, build on existing infrastructure as well as nearby markets. So I tend to think of filling up the south Caucasus gas pipeline as being the first priority for Turkey and Azerbaijan. As well as looking at smaller options such as the Turkish Greek connector and then going on to Italy as being the kind of projects that you can stage more easily with smaller capital investment. Now governments can subsidize whatever projects they want. Governments have the capability of doing that and whether European governments will ultimately do that or not remains to be seen but that's what would require if Nabucco is gonna be done anytime soon. The major problem is that there isn't sufficient gas coming out of the Caspian yet. And so in order to get 30 billion cubic meters worth of gas per year out of the Caspian requires a speedier full of development of the gas sector in Azerbaijan, particularly the next stage of Chakdini's too. The next stage of Chakdini's, the lower gas zones of the Azeri, Shirok, Ganeshli fields as well as what I said before Turkmenistan. And that's where we need to be working together to create the upstream opportunities for those flows to go west. And I think that that's what's important. The problem with Turkey talking about doubling blue stream too or Turkey receiving Russian offers to double blue stream is that it's the same molecules we're talking about for Nabucco. It's basically essentially Central Asian gas transiting Russia to go to Turkey as opposed to going through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey. So as you rightly said, blue stream too or South Stream for that matter which is another competing project. Are competing for the same Central Asian gas molecules to go to European markets as Nabucco. You know, it's a lot more complicated than it was during the days of the BTC because the whole idea of the BTC was an East West corridor that Turkey and the US cooperated on which avoided Russia. Now recently what you had was the Turkish energy minister who accompanied the Turkish president to Moscow and then before then the Turkish foreign minister saying that Nabucco could carry Russian gas quote unquote. Now that would defeat the object of the exercise because the whole point of Nabucco was that it would provide an alternative to Russian gas going from let's say Turkmenistan through Turkey all the way to Western Europe. And what really needs to be done is for the US, Russia and Turkey to talk about how it is that they can cooperate on these issues because now with the US talking about resetting the press and reset button with Russia, then maybe the US would be more willing to accommodate the Turkish-Russian relationship, the North-South access that is developed even when the East West corridor was being developed. So you cannot think in terms of Nabucco being a parallel project that US and Turkey will cooperate in in exactly the same way just as Ed said, without taking into account Russia and maybe this administration will do better with that than the previous one. And just quickly because unfortunately we do have to end promptly because of another event coming behind us with regard to Andrew Kosky's question on CFE, I have not discussed specifically with Turkish officials about their approach to the CFE renegotiating issue in any detail but my sense is that it will depend a lot on the context, obviously if there is some forward movement on normalization of relations with Armenia, other aspects of burgeoning new set of relationships if this caucus' stability and cooperation platform moves forward, there might be some prospect. I mean certainly, I mean I think as you know, I'm just better than I, I mean for both the Turks and the Norwegians I'm gonna be very concerned about the flank limitations and sort of unfettered allowance of this and of course even the first stumbling block it seems to me that has to be answered is the question of what to do about the Istanbul commitments that the Russians had to just to remove themselves from the base in what is now this independent Republic of Abbasia. So that's another stumbling block, what will be some of the provisions but I suspect there's not as, you know, it'll really depend a lot on the context but I think there's not as much anxiety perhaps as there once was although it's still out there about how the Russians might engage and use the removal of the treaty limits to engage in a further buildup and the potential for further intervention along this periphery so I think it's, it will be heavily dependent on how does the rest of the relationship is evolving because further actions against Georgia obviously would really imperil Turkey's interest and stability in the region and obviously in energy transit from the region so I think that's some of the markers but ladies and gentlemen I'm sorry my both of my voice is failing now and the time has run out but I wanna thank all of you for joining us I wanna thank again to our senior advisors and our two ambassadors for their interest and support in this work and lastly like any project of this nature a platoon of very able researchers and interns led by Kaylee Levitt but also including Denny Kamisey, Jessica Sims, Dan Brady and Liz Morehouse and several others who can't be mentioned in the time a lot but