 So, as I say, I gave the invitation to this as a deliberate provocation. The smiley face is missing off the end of the title. But what I said, or what I was told you guys would be interested in, is sort of an overview of what's happening and where we are, I suppose, particularly from a very Eurocentric perspective, but nonetheless we'll broaden out towards the end with some of the bigger questions that are out there and available for conversation. So let's ponder those images for a minute. I mean, we all know what an existential crisis is. We all know that the European Union and Europe more generally faces several existential crises at different levels. Existential crises internally and existential crises externally. Externally, you know, the top left-hand corner there, we've got the little green men who showed up in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and who are still there. We have terrorism threats in all our major capitals, collapse of the Euro, the rise of populist, stroke fascist, stroke neo-nazi groups all over Europe and in governments and we have, of course, Brexit. So clearly what's happening is different and clearly what's happening is challenging and potentially threatening. The only thing I would say in respect of that agenda and while acknowledging its existentiality is the fact that, you know, 20 years ago when I was a research director here and living across the road, you know, we were worried about global nuclear holocaust. So in terms of scale, we told every generation Alice challenges and these are challenges but they're manageable challenges and they're not perhaps quite as overwhelming perhaps as the Cold War was. But nonetheless, they do pose very, very substantial challenges to the way we think, the way we act and indeed the way of life that we share and we want to pass on to our kids. So if we look at Europe's security environment, just starting where we are and then we can expand outwards. I mean, obviously we have external, all kinds of external dynamics. You have what are called the arcs of instability to the east and to the south of which you know a lot and there's no need to go into any particular detail. We have terrorism, what people call Islamic fundamentalism, whatever words you choose to use. We have an Atlantic Alliance which is facing its own existential threats. We have a U.S. president who is called an obsolete who doesn't really understand in any basic level what the Alliance is and how it works which is a quite serious charge laid the feet of any U.S. president. We have China in Africa. We have China in the Pacific. We have things happening in the Pacific with respect, for example, with respect to the South China Sea which are very threatening in terms of global trade, in terms of global mobility, in terms of sovereignty, in terms of interstate relations in that region of the world. And if that wasn't enough, we have an internal existential threat and challenges. Brexit, in terms of European security and defence, is arguably a negative out of positive, negative in terms of we're losing actual capacity to do things in the feeble security defence which the British Army Armed Forces gave to Europe. But we're losing an actor from Europe which traditionally said no to further European integration in the feeble security defence. It's sort of a cure its egg on the security defence front, the prospect of Brexit. But it's essentially, it's serious because it's seen as, you know, the first and the dominoes of collapse of the European Union, you know, according to Nigel Farage and all of his friends. We have Turkey which has taken a fundamentally different term geopolitically in the last 10 to 12 years which poses some substantial challenges, not just to NATO but also to the European Union and Turkey's European vocation. And I remember again many years ago having a very vigorous debate with Lucinda Crichton and the current Taoiseach who was then sort of a bright spanking new for Nigel TD in which of the three of us I was the only one arguing in favour of Turkish members of the European Union saying that this was a unnecessary challenge for Europe to resolve between sort of the Western liberal world and the Islamic world in the same way that the original European communities resolved the ancient tension between France and Germany and both Lucinda and Leo disagreed very vehemently with that. But again, maybe they were right in retrospect. We have within the European Union now illiberal regimes in Poland and Hungary. I mean, illiberal to the extent that they challenged the very basic fundamental norms of what European democracy is about, talking about illiberal democracy and doing things in the case of Poland which strike the fundamentals of the law-driven society, the law-driven democracy. And then we have political extremism, populism in many member states and you know the parties, you know the list. The only thing I'd say is don't look at the events, don't look at the individual elections, don't look at the national fronts collapse in the parliamentary elections in France, don't look at the low poll ratings of the AFD in Germany, look at the trend. And the trend is very ethical towards liberal democracy. The trend is that parties that ten years ago would have laughed off the stage are challenging for government, are challenging for presidencies, are challenging for senior coalition posts. So yes they've had knockbacks, yes they've had setbacks, but that trend is still a powerful trend and one that needs an answer. So there you have it. That's my graphic summation of where Europe is at the moment. Is that an Australian drain or is that a northern hemisphere drain? I'm not sure. And on top of that we have this. So it would be bad enough if Europe was facing these challenges and it's essentially on the internal and the external field if we could trust our allies and particularly our major allies today so we can't. This man is loose on the world and he has brought people into his administration which basically any decent human being wouldn't give a house rule. But they're in the White House, they have a hand on policy and they're trying to do things which as I say are fundamentally antithetical to a liberal democratic vision of where the world ought and should be going. So is Trump an existential threat himself? Is a not unreasonable question. A not unreasonable question. Now yes he said, you know, may it was obsolete or he said it was partially obsolete and then he kind of changed his mind and then he didn't when he was in Europe reiterate the Article 5 Security Guarantee and he didn't reiterate the Article 5 Security Guarantee deliberately. The speech was written, the paragraph was there, the defence secretary had signed off on it and he didn't read it. He did it deliberately. He has characterised NATO in terms of the way he understands NATO it's basically like the mafia because you have to pay him protection money. This is his characterization of the NATO Alliance and the Article 5 Security Guarantee. If you don't give me money, I won't protect you. This is what he has said and I'm not paraphrasing it. He has said that Germany owes the United States money for its defence. That is garbage but that is what he sees NATO's function as. A mafia like racketeering operation and this allegedly is a responsible adult never mind president of the United States. And he has and those many of the people around him have a fundamental antipathy not just to the European Union as an institution, as an organisation but to the values which underpin it. You look at people like Steve Bannon you look at his writings he is fundamentally opposed to the kinds of values which the European Union says it represents. The kinds of people he has surrounded himself with the kind of think tanks associated with his agenda like the Heritage Foundation again, fundamentally antithetical to everything the European Union stands for in terms of trade in terms of economy, in terms of diplomacy in terms of politics. Thus far, we have not seen any fundamental shift in policy in other words our friend is tweeting in the small hours of the morning but the fundamental of US foreign policy in terms of their expression by cabinet ministers has not thus far changed. Thus far. We've always had a rally between Europe and NATO about burden sharing I mean burden sharing was an issue back when I was in short pants and people were talking about the Atlantic Alliance the Americans were putting more money in than the Europeans and the counter argument was yes but the Europeans are on the front line we are the ones that your short range nuclear missiles are going to be vaporising we are also the ones that are maintaining large standing armies based on conscription so the cost benefit analysis should over time equal out that's not the case now obviously the United States is funding upwards of 75% of the Atlantic Alliance and that is not justifiable under any reasonable definition and the Europeans have got to pull their hands out of their pockets or other orifices and do what is necessary to sustain their own security and defence and we are not and that is a serious issue that does need to be addressed the way I would like to characterise it with some of my graduate students is the metaphor of the adolescent that Europe in a sense needed to grow up and take charge of its own future and take charge of its own security and defence but if you extend that metaphor of the lazy adolescent in the house and we have been there and some of us it is not that long ago and for some of us it is longer ago what happens to the lazy adolescent when the parent goes batshit crazy I mean if the United States is the parent in this relationship and Europe is the adolescent the adult goes batshit crazy what do you do well one thing you can do one strategy is you can argue you can cajole you can engage and that in a sense is what Angela Merkel is doing she is trying to deal with him seriously and engage with him and convince him and tell him what the Atlantic Alliance is about and what it does and how it works that is one strategy another strategy is you rely on your aunts and uncles they are the ones who come in and put the food on the table and pay the rent and keep the lights on you know your parent is in a drunken super in the corner you know so you rely on the aunts and uncles and we have seen that strategy too because a lot of people talk about the adult in the room the defense secretary, Mad Dog Madness don't get excited over the name he is an adult in the room national security team head of the joint chiefs these are sensible serious people that can be trusted in a crisis and in an emergency but Trump is still the president he still has that capacity to do the things that he can do which can result simply from an erroneous or ill-advised tweet the third strategy as far as the adolescence is concerned is not to engage and try to control the parent not to rely on the aunts and uncles but actually to get a job and get out and that maybe is the point of which Europe is now that is what is at least on paper beginning to happen I will come back to that later Europe is beginning to see that it needs to take control of its own destiny you have the famous beer hall speech from Angela Merkel there a few weeks back where she said with respect to both Britain and the United States Europe needs to look to its own devices we need to look to our own laurels we need to see and define and extend and pursue our own futures and maybe that is the point at which we are at but again we need to think that through particularly in respect to this country and where it goes so then we have this again I just love the graphics of the Russian bear picking off the individual European stars one by one and if you are in the Baltics this isn't a laugh this is serious because what happened in Ukraine could so easily happen in almost any of the three Baltic countries you get a political party starting to push on the language rights, the nationality rights the citizenship rights we want dual citizenship have a few protests, get a few people beaten up have some more civil strife come on suddenly the Russians are all about Russian nationals, Russian speakers in these countries being oppressed peacekeepers where they are going to come from UN is enacting, we will send in some Russian troops and maybe we will just send lots of cash lots of money and more volunteers to help defend Russians in Baltic states or elsewhere so that scenario that isn't far away for those member states of the European Union and those member states of the European Union and the European Union has problems in this respect because the European Union does not defend itself the European Union has no function in the territorial defense of its own members no function, that's NATO's job and we've already seen what a bang up job NATO is doing about it just a minute you might also argue and some of my colleagues critics would make this argument very powerfully in fact that the European Union doesn't even deliver substantial added value to the security defense of its member states you know what does the European Union add to our security defense what does the European Union add to Polish security defense what is the added value of anything that the European Union is doing in the field of security defense for its members now what the Union will come back at and is quite good at is that third bullet the European Union has an international social worker you don't mean that in a demeaning professional sense social workers because they do critical work but social workers are not police officers and social workers are not soldiers social workers have a particular role and a particular function and the European Union does that quite well prevention, management and resolution of conflicts it can be quite good it has a whole range of tools in its kickbox that NATO hasn't got that the UN hasn't got that the OSC hasn't got and if we get our act together if there is a coherent and joined up thinking on what the European Union does in the world it can marshal those resources and have a success and we've seen successes we've seen successes in Burma we've seen successes in East Timor we've seen some successes in Africa you know there have been successes but there have also been successes when things come together in work and the European Union also has a declared set of normative ambitions now yes these can be seen as risible you can put your cynical eyeglasses on and say who doesn't say this but the Union sets itself up as a defender of human rights justice, sustainable development etc etc etc and when you set yourself up like that you know that people are going to take part so there's a certain connection between if you set yourself up rhetorically to do something you're going to have to at least try to follow through so at least the European Union is aiming in the right direction whatever criticism you might have about how effective it is at it now I have colleagues who would turn that on and say in fact from a proper Marxian Gramsci perspective the European Union is nothing more than another set of metropolitan elites defending class interests at home in abroad ok we can have that conversation in the Q&A after but the Union sets itself up as this great liberal behemoth and defender so where are we now in terms of Europe's response to these existential challenges internal external and with respect to Brexit and Trump to be fair to her and I was there the month before she launched it I was in the room when she launched it Mogherini launched the EU Global Strategy within hours of Brexit happening and she was strongly advised both by Member State and some of her advisors to hold off the whole geopolitical map had changed this was not the time to be talking about fanciful notions about European global strategies etc etc this was the time to sit back take stock, reassess and then return she said no because the strategy's right was right yesterday the strategy we write tomorrow it's right today so she went forward with it she set forth a vision now there's a whole conversation about the nature of that vision and if you're interested we could talk more about it you know in a sense you might say it's less global and less universal and if you put your happy glasses on you can say it's more targeted you can say that the global strategy is less ambitious it doesn't set up these great global ambitions for itself you might say that means it's a little bit more measured a little bit more tailored, a little bit more realistic another criticism of the global strategy has been it's been it's been less universalist in its ambitions and again you can say that's because the EU is off to suit its measure and what's striking is that she said at the launch and she said subsequently when talking about the strategy that for her in looking at all of the existential challenges and she did specify that the existential challenges the union faced were not just external she said some very tough things about internal challenges although she didn't mention member states she said specifically that the union could not afford the union could not afford people inside the tent trying to cut the tempo but she identified security defense as one area of huge opportunity potential she described it in a couple of places informally as even low hanging fruit that there was such popular support for the union to do more in the field of security defense there was such an opportunity to take advantage of greater cooperation and integration that this was an area where real achievement could be made quite quickly she had multiple if you'll remember in the immediate aftermath of brexit you had Czech presidents and prime ministers talking about European armies and we had German proposals and we had Italian prime ministers talking about security compact I mean there was a lot of buzz around security defense in the immediate aftermath of brexit a lot more ambition for Europe in light of not just brexit but also what would seem to be coming with respect to Trump and so in some if you're fond of Venn diagrams we set here that Margarine identified in the area of security defense policy now I'm not going to go through that list but that is not an insubstantial list of stuff that's happening in the field of European security defense before we even talk about the union's broader external relations in terms of trade and development in just the hardcore area of security defense which is my bailiwick or my sand pit we're going to re-engineer battle groups we're going to start funding European military missions from the center rather than let the costs fall where they may amongst the member states there's actual cash on the table you know several 90 million in the short term upwards of 500 million annually thereafter for research for development for developing equipment and bringing equipment into play in terms of European security defense and it's badly needed I mean you know we ran out of helicopters for the Chad mission and we ran out of Ukrainian helicopters that weren't licensed to carry troops that's how bad it got so there are very fundamental gaps in terms of basic military kit that need to be filled and again if you've got a pot of 500 million a year sitting in the commission you can be damn sure that member states are going to start queuing up to get at that pot and the conditions of that pot are that these programs and these projects all have to be collaborative they all have to be based to the member states and we may get this so called PESCO permanent structure cooperation in the area of security defense there are at least 12 to 14 member states actively interested I have yet to find out whether R&D is or not all we can hear from Irish ministers is the fact that it's voluntary and we'll see but it may well happen and if it does happen that's a serious policy question for Irish policy makers are we in or are we out and in the context of Brexit are there more special deals more marginalization more distance from the European center are we going to cut another thread in our European relationship by saying oh no we're going to opt out of anything to do seriously with security defense and as I say there's cash money involved here and they're even willing to bend budgetary rules so in terms of European economic governance they're even willing to bend the rules if you want to spend more on defense they'll bend the rules that you spend more on defense and it won't count against your budget deficit because of the situation of six packs, two packs and the other thing you're having yourself so they seem to be serious there's cash money on the table there's ambition, there are new structures the question is whether the member states either as small groups or collectively will go for it and the mood music as I've described externally and internally or at least externally is we need to do more of this together and if we can't carry all 27 together we can at least go ahead 15, 16 but there are bigger questions and this is the last slide, you're delighted here which all of which each of which we can spend an hour on which is why I said this was only a brief introduction we've got an issue with globalization I mean you guys are literally and metaphorically the children of globalization your expectations are global your limitations, your ambitions are global there are many and you will know them because they'll be in your families there are many people that globalization has passed by for whom globalization is not just a dirty word it's the reason why they lost their job why they can't get another job why they can't get a decent education why they can't have the house that their parents had and you're facing that because the kind of lifestyle that you're looking at is very often not of the same standard that your parents had and you rather fancy knowing why the hell not what's going on why can't I have the same expectations in the one salary household that my parents had 20, 30, 40 years ago so we have to look at globalization's discontent costs and benefits and it's not good enough for political parties to tell us we are where we are so don't question it or there is no alternative so don't question it because that in a sense and this is not my area this is why politics is having a problem because political parties are not offering choices they're offering different shades of the same kinds of politics and austerity politics that anybody else is offering and with that you have the rise of extremes on the right and left of parties that say I'm going to tear the house down because you don't care if you have no vested interests in the house you don't care if it's torn down so you will go to the extreme right or the extreme left or you will be captured by identity politics or xenophobia or racism that goes with it for the European Union there are big questions where does it go for global partnerships China is committed now on the environmental agenda so is it legitimate for the European Union to partner up with an authoritarian regime that literally kills its political opponents has no meaningful justice system no meaningful rule of law is it legitimate for the European Union with all of its normative baggage about democracy and human rights etc but to say hey China will give you a pass on that as long as you'll protect the trees with us is that a fair calculation is global climate change such a big threat that you know everything else does have to be put in the corner while we deal with that huge metaphysical and existential challenge the other question I have to ask what the European Union can manage itself you know how does the Polish government get away with undermining its own constitution how does a Hungarian prime minister get away with trying to throttle civil society at its core closing down universities how does that happen in a European Union member state how does the European Union allow that to happen in a European Union member state contrary wise of course what right does the European Union to say anything of how it goes on in a European member state with its full political sovereignty they don't just question mark what's going on we don't know and you can package all of this into sort of the big the biggest existential question about a global threat basically to liberal order in Europe and there are people who celebrate that threat and they are called Steve Bannon and they are called Nigel Farage because for them that cosmopolitan liberality that focus on human rights etc that is an anathema to their core identity politics the kind of identity politics that we saw previously the 16th and 17th centuries so is there a fight back under way you know possibly like a few of you in the room I cheered hardly when Monsieur Macron won and was thrilled that he won on the scale that he won and was thrilled with his parliamentary majority but how long has he got he has a window there's no doubt but few people vote relatively fewer people voted in these French parliamentary elections than have voted in previous rounds he's got a shot he's got a chance but if he screws up Marine is there she's a member of the assembly national the front national is still there the next presidential election he could be turfed out and she could be in Merkel has made a success so far of her cross to other Europeans and to other refugees to come to Germany that there was a safe harbor and she hasn't paid a political price and that is an incredibly important historical lesson but will she carry it through will we see atrocities in Germany will those atrocities turn into more radicalized politics again you know things are going in the right direction but a reverse is always possible Germany is still fetishizing austerity politics you know with our two-packs and our six-packs and our economic governance you know thou shalt not spend and frankly if you're Greece you can starve so that we can maintain the decencies of the euro and a hard currency and the austerity politics that we have built around it and Greek citizens are suffering as a result and suffering in hard real tangible terms and what's the union going to do about it is there a new consulation of forces can Macron bring Merkel on side with the British going out is there a possibility of a new dispensation I think there is but it is only a window because if there is a fight back there's a long battle yet to be won