 Hello, my name is Monty Johnson. I teach philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. And this is the second part of my lecture on Aristotle's politics, Book 3. This part on political justice and claims to rule and on kingship and the rule of law. Now, to remind you of the overall structure of Book 3, as we discussed in the last lecture, Aristotle defined the state and the citizen. And he also distinguished between various kinds of constitution or government on the basis of the fact that the citizens could be divided into different classes. For example, the rich and the poor, the few and the many. And then the offices and the responsibilities for deliberation and judicial administration could be allocated either not at all a little bit or entirely to these various classes resulting in different kinds of constitution or government. In chapters 9 to 13 of Book 3, Aristotle discusses the issue of political justice and the definition of equality according to these different kinds of constitution or government, and thus the claims that they make to rule, their claims to rule being based on a concept of political justice and a specific definition of equality. After establishing the general claims to rule, Aristotle then begins to consider in detail, in more detail, the specific claims to rule of the various kinds of constitution, and he begins with kingship and soul rule. And his discussion of kingship and soul rule leads to a discussion in general of the rule of law and to what extent the rule of one good person should be compared to the rule of good laws. It's not until Book 4 that Aristotle discusses in detail the concepts of political justice and equality, and thus claims to rule for democracies and oligarchies, but here he discusses kingship. Now, the immediate distinction he makes between conceptions of justice are according to the democratic and oligarchic conceptions of justice. The democratic concept of justice is simpler, and here we're talking about distribution, distributive justice, that is if we have some finite resource like money or political offices, and we're distributing it to people, we could do so on the basis of equality. Assume that all of the people are equal, say they equally have status as free people, so we treat them as equals. And then when we're just writing how much money or political power to distribute to them, we would distribute to them equal amounts. And again, that resource could be anything from a distribution of food or meat at the table to a distribution of money on the basis of the work or investments contributed to it, or the in amount of land or whatever. The point is that in a democratic concept you have a kind of absolute notion of equality where each person, each of the first terms is treated as equal, and thus the amounts distributed are assumed to be equal. To put it into a formula, since A and B citizens are equal to each other, their distributions C and D should be equal. I contrast this with an oligarchic concept of distributive justice, which assumes that equality should apply to people who are equals, but inequality should apply to people who are unequals. So assume that A and B are equal in one respect, for example, free status, but unequal in some other respect. So for example, suppose A is greater than B because A contributed 99 times more of an investment than B, then it's said to be just that to A and B would be distributed unequal amounts of the profit. So since C contributed more than D by a ratio of 99 to 1, it would be just to distribute 99% of the profits to C and only 1% to D proportional to their inequality. And we could extend this to political distributions of political power offices or whatever, and we could assume inequality on the basis of the number of factors, for example, wealth. So again, A and B might be equal because they're both of free born status, but suppose that A is quite a bit richer than B. And then on an oligarchic concept of justice, the person with more wealth contributes more to the society, and so to them should be distributed more political power or more political offices. And so A being greater than B with respect to wealth, the distribution of political offices to A, that is C should be greater than D. So Aristotle claims that a result of this comparison is that it's clear that everybody agrees that justice is a kind of equality. Democrats and oligarchs both treat justice as a kind of equality, but they differ in whether they emphasize this absolute equality where all the terms are equal. So the distribution should be equal, a so-called democratic concept of justice or whether we have this other kind of equality, which he calls proportional equality. An oligarchic concept of justice where unequal amounts are given to unequals, and though to equals, equal amounts would be given. Now, Aristotle at this point digresses somewhat to discuss the point to clarify a point that the end of the state is not just survival. It is life. The state is a community that exists and suffices for life, and that's the definition of the state. But the end of the state is not mere survival or sufficiency for life, but is instead the good life. If the end of the state were mere survival, then other groups that merely survive like animals or slaves would and could constitute states. But if the end of the end of the state were just security from injustice, then alliances and packs of mutual defense would constitute states. And if the end of the state were just exchange or trade and mutual commerce, then trade agreements and trade packs would constitute states. But none of these things actually constitute states because none of them have the actual end of the state. So here's how Aristotle defends and defines the end of the state. Quote, it is clearer than that a state is not a mere society having a common place established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot exist, but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being. For the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it, and the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and an honorable life. So again, the state comes into existence merely to support and suffice for the survival, but it continues to exist for bringing about a certain end, and that end is the happy and honorable life. Now, of course, there's the question, what is the happy and honorable life, and different forms of constitution are presumably designed to answer to those different conceptions. But in general, the conclusion, he says, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions and not mere companionship. Hence, they who contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it than those who have the same or greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political value, or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue. From what has been said, it will clearly be seen that all the partisans of different forms of government speak of a part of justice only. So in the complete picture, freeborn status, wealth and virtue are all important factors in the determination of justice and equality among the citizens, and it is wrong to emphasize, for example, only status as Democrats do, or wealth as the oligarchs do. And they emphasize it in the terms on the basis of which their concept of equality and political justice is based. So again, Democrats think that all of those that have free status are equal and so should receive equal distributions, while oligarchs think that merely being equal on the basis of free status does not ensure and should not ensure equal distribution. But for example, if there is a difference of wealth, then there should be a greater distribution to the wealthy of political office. But Aristotle says both of these systems and both of these concepts of justice leave out the most important thing, which is virtue. And we know that virtue and nobility is important and should be factored into not just what distributions we get, but who we consider to be equal to whom. And we know that that is important because of the end of the state, because the state exists in a way to bring about not just life, but a happy and honorable life. So there's no obvious answer to the question, just the immediate question, who should hold supreme power in the state? Should it be the many poor, for example, as in a democracy, they may make poor decisions because of their lack of education and virtue, and they may govern for their own sake and not for that of the common good. So it's not so it's not immediately obvious or immediately clear or axiomatic that just because they are the majority, they should govern. We have to take into account how they would make decisions. And again, how they would not only possess education and virtue, but promote education and virtue, since that is the end of the state. Perhaps it seems that the few rich should rule. After all, they contribute the most to society with their riches, and they're the most virtuous and educated. But they may, as Aristotle puts it, rob and plunder the people. And again, they may govern for their own sake, that is, for the sake of the rich and help the rich get richer and so forth, and not govern for the sake of the common good. So they may oppress or persecute the poor. So what about just letting the few virtuous people govern? This is the idea behind so-called aristocracy. Aristotle thinks this probably would be a good idea, but then really very few or almost no people would be in a position to rule because there are so few people that actually possess virtue. And thus you will have very few rulers, perhaps in some cases just a sole ruler and a king. And so you will have many subjects, many people that are ruled. And when you have many people ruled and such a disbalance of political power, the many will resent it and support revolution. And this is the problem with just taking one best man and having sole rule or monarchy. This has all the problems of oligarchy and aristocracy, but to a worse degree. So we can't seem to let either the many, the few, or a single person have supreme power. It's not clear who then should have supreme power. Now, here are some reasons to think that the majority should have supreme power instead of the few. And Aristotle's reasons for this are crucial because they are the basis for a claim to rule for democracy. And even though Aristotle thinks that democracy in and of itself is a corrupt form of government, he provides the best possible reasoning for this kind of government. So he says that because of a phenomenon which we could call relevant expertise aggregation, having many people contribute to decision making results in better decisions. As he puts it, quote, the many of whom each individual is but an ordinary person when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good. If regarded not individually, but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence. And when they meet together, they become in a manner one man who has many feet and hands and senses. That is a figure of their mind and disposition. Hence, the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry. For some understand one part and some another and among them they understand the whole. So that's the end of the quote. But the comparisons are interesting. Potlucks are better than when a single person has to cook all of the food and better because you get a greater variety. And each person brings the dish that they're best at making so you have several very good dishes. And so people bring different skills and different abilities and different virtues to the decision making in a democratic society. And if we're talking about judges of music, some people might just listen to one critic who they think is very good. But a lot of people will take what most people vote. This is why pop music is so popular or think about the metacritic phenomenon. You look at how many people give positive ratings to things and you assume any one of those people might be flawed. But if thousands of people are giving that a four star rating, then that probably means it's pretty good. And again, individually, you might think they're poor judges of character, but they all have some skills and these skills get aggregated to improve their group decision making. Furthermore, Aristotle argues that you a diversity of economic viewpoints like taking into consideration the views of both the poor and the rich will produce the best decision making. He says, quote, when they meet together, their perceptions are quite good enough and combined with the better class they are useful to the state just as impure food when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the pure would be. But each individual left to himself forms an imperfect judgment. And he also says that a third reason the majority should have supreme power instead of the few is simply the disaffected masses problems. So the problems with allowing many people some power are less difficult than those of not allowing them any power for a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies. So you co-opt them into your state so that they feel loyalty towards the state, but that requires actually extending them some modicum of political power. Now, the main objection to democracy and objection we find, for example, in Plato is called the expertise objection. And the idea is that only experts in a given domain can rightly decide about that domain. So for example, we don't poll everyone about how to treat a certain disease, but we ask physicians if we're talking about disease and we don't ask physicians or the general public about geometry problems. We ask mathematicians and we rely on pilots when the issue is safety and navigation. We don't ask the general mass of people. So why would we let in expert people decide in the political domain, especially when there are very specialized and expert decisions to be made? And of course, the first answer to this is what we've just been discussing, the idea of relevant expertise aggregation, even though individual opinion may be worse than expert opinion aggregated individual opinions may nevertheless be superior to a single or a few expert opinions. And second, Aristotle makes an independent argument that in some cases, in experts are superior to experts in making decisions and making judgments. So we consider expert producers worse judges of their own products in the case of, for example, cooks, who we think are worse judges than the guests of tastiness of meals, or builders are worse judges than the owners or stewards of the of houses, as far as the comfortableness and convenience of them. And so possibly political experts are worse judges than normal citizens when it comes to the performance of the state. And so each of those arguments addresses the idea that experts are the only ones that should be making decisions in the state. Another objection has it that authority in higher functions is rightly assigned to superior people, expert people, or just accomplished people, experienced people, whatever. And since the offices of the state are the highest functions in society, these highest offices should be assigned to superior people. And the answer to it is, as with the expertise objection, the authority doesn't reside in the individual judge or the individual senator, but in the court or the assembly of which judges and senators are but apart. The Senate and courts consist of a multitude of people. And so their authority must consist of a multitude, not an individual. And if property is the source of authority, even the property of the multitude, if you add it up is more than the property of an individual person. So the authority rests with the multitude, even on the oligarchic criterion of wealth when aggregation is taken into consideration. So the general lesson is that the rule of law ought to be supreme and is supreme, and experts are needed only when the law must be adapted or applied to particular cases. Quote, laws when good should be supreme, and the magistrate or magistrate should regulate those matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing all particulars. Now this brings us to the claims to rule. All people think that justice is a sort of equality. We've already discussed that the question is equality of what presumably not equality of just any good or any quality. For example, height or complexion are not relevant. Those equality of height is not relevant, for example, to how much distribution of wealth or welfare or political power one should be given, nor is having a better complexion or having better physical fitness. But why not? Well, Aristotle probes this issue with an example of a flute player, or rather when a number of flute players are equal in their art, there's no reason why those of them who are better born, for example, should have better flutes given to them, for they will not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior artist. End of quote, so we won't distribute better flutes to flute players that have more wealth or better ancestors, that's what he means by being better born. Instead, we give the best flutes to the person who is superior at playing flutes. Okay, so we're going to be looking for qualities that are relevant to flute playing when we're making a distribution of flutes. And there are many incommensurable qualities, as I've already mentioned, height, complexion, flute playing, and speed, for example, are all different qualities that people have in unequal amounts. And it doesn't matter if the flute player is a slow runner, or if the sprinter is a bad flute player for that matter, if we're distributing awards for flute playing or running. And there's no common unit on the basis of which these various kinds of qualities could be compared. So when we apply this general point to politics, we see that not every claim of equality is relevant to the claim to office. So having equal height, being equally fast, or having equal flute playing ability are irrelevant to who should have political office. But which quality then is relevant? The rival claims of candidates for office can only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state, Aristotle claims. So what are the elements which enter into the composition of a state? Well, there are both necessary and sufficient elements that is necessary and sufficient conditions for a claim to political office. So, quoting, the noble or free born or rich may with good reason claim office for holders of office must be free men and taxpayers. A state can no more be composed entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valor are equally so. For without the former qualities, a state cannot exist at all. But without the latter, not well. And quote, if the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it would seem that all or some at least of these claims are just. But if we take into account a good life, then as I've already said, education and virtue have superior claims. So, none of the claims to rule are strictly speaking right or answer the question who should be given political power and especially political superiority. As Aristotle says, those who are equal in one thing ought not to have an equal share in all, nor ought those who are unequal in one thing to have an unequal share in all. It is certain that all forms of government which rest on either of these principles are perversions. So, of course, he has in mind in the first case, Democrats who think that being equal with regard to free status, they ought to have an equal share in everything. And in the second case, oligarchs who think that being unequal with respect to wealth means that they should be unequal in everything, including shares of political power or office. So, some claim that since they're of equal free status, they should have an equal share in political office. Those are the Democrats. Others, the claim that being unequal with respect to their ancestry or nobility, they should have an unequal share in political office. Others think that these are the oligarchs being unequal in respect of wealth, they should have an unequal share in political office. Still, others and in response to these claim that being unequal with respect to virtue, for example, having greater courage or greater wisdom, they should have an unequal share in political office. But in response to all of these, the original ones, the Democrats may again claim that since you could aggregate all of the wealth or all the strength or all the virtue, by means of that, they, the majority, would have the most wealth or strength of virtue. And so again, they should have the greatest share of political office and so it should be equal. So, these contradictory considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in subjection to them are strictly right. So, none of the prima facie claims to legitimately hold political power are in and of themselves right according to Aristotle. Now, how does he answer this problem? Well, his answer is that the relevant kind of equality applying to a claim to rule depends on the kind of constitution that we're talking about. So, what is just or right is to be interpreted in the sense of what is equal, of course, for everyone. And that which is right in the sense of being equal is to be considered with reference to the advantage of the state and the common good of the citizens. And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed. He differs under different forms of government, but in the best state, he is one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue. So, that's an important point that Aristotle makes here in book 3 chapter 13 about the best state in the best state. They will those who hold political power will not only govern but will take turn also being governed and that the goal or end of their government will be a life of virtue. And that the equality that we are seeking is equality in virtue. But equality of free status unrights underwrites an equal claim to political office in a democracy merely holding that free status. That's enough to establish equality and a basis even for a distributive justice, of course, of equal amounts, but that is because everybody is treated as as an equal. In an oligarchy, wealth is what's key to equality in claims of rule or thus based on wealth and wealth is used to justify unequal distributions of political power and other scarce resources. In an aristocracy, it's virtue. That is, those who are unequal with respect to virtue may claim an unequal amount of political power or authority. And Aristotle makes it clear his preference for an aristocracy, those of greater wisdom and of greater moral virtues should be given more role and more power. But he says consider the following possibility. If, however, there is some one person or more than one, although not enough to make up the full complement of a state whose virtue is so preeminent that the virtues or the political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs. He or they can no longer be regarded as part of a state for justice will not be done to the superior if he is reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in virtue and in political capacity. Such a one may truly be deemed a God among men. We have to imagine as a kind of thought experiment that we have a bunch of people more or less equal, but there is among us some one person who we all acknowledge and there's no question is preeminently more virtuous than us. So we treat him like a kind of God. Now, in that case, there are two possibilities. I mean, that person can't remain on a level of equality with us. So one possibility is to remove him from the state voting to expel or exile that predominant person. And Aristotle discusses at length the dangers of this archaic device and points out that it doesn't really make sense in the case of predominance of virtue because then you end up ostracizing the best people in society. When used against someone who's preminent in virtue, what's to be done with him? Mankind will not say that such a one is to be expelled and exiled. On the other hand, he ought not to be a subject. That would be as if mankind should claim a rule of Rezus dividing his offices among them. The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler according to what seems to be the order of nature and that men like him should be kings in their state for life. So in this thought experiment, again, we concede and we agree we're all pretty much equal except for one person so preeminent in power and ability and virtue. That means they're completely just, completely courageous, completely temperate everything you could want so much better that we just have to acknowledge their God like abilities and for our own good. They would legitimize their authority, recognize their legitimate claim to rule and that and only that would be the basis for kingship. I mean, as Aristotle makes the example and as I've just stated it, it's clear this doesn't happen very often and might not ever happen, might not have ever have happened. But theoretically, if it did happen, this would support a claim of rule to kingship. Now, as it is, Aristotle recognizes several different kinds of kingship and says, let's see whether in order to be a well governed state or country should be under the rule of a king or under some other form of government and whether monarchy, which literally means sole rule, although it's good for some may not be bad for others. Now the chief kinds of kingship are chief priesthoods as an agent, or as Aristotle says, heroic times. These were over voluntary subjects. This originally included power over absolutely everything. So kind of absolute kingship. Later it was limited to certain functions, especially that of general judge and head priest. Another kind of kingship hereditary despotism as exist existed in Aristotle's day. He says among barbarians hereditary despotism is according to law and not a tyranny because the subjects he thinks are so acquiescent. Aristotle thinks it a racial feature of Asians that they're acquiescent. Therefore, they agree to give despotic power to a ruler, the king of Persia, for example. And thus this isn't a tyranny. This is a kingship because they recognize his preeminence. Another kind of kingship, a dictatorship or elective tyranny as formerly was common in Greece. Again, it's according to law, but it's not hereditary. And although the rule is despotic, the acquiescence of the subjects distinguishes it from the corrupt form of tyranny. Another kind is just general ship for life as exists in Sparta, where you have a hereditary and perpetual general ship. Now Aristotle also says there is theoretically a kind of kingship that we all naturally employ in household management. So this isn't technically on a political level, but we apply this political model in the metaphorical government of our households. So the head of the household has disposal of all household matters just like a king has disposal of all political matters. As household management is the kingly rule of a house. So kingly rule is the household management of a city or of a nation or even he says of many nations that analogy gets expanded in treatments and in discussions of how husbands relate to wives, how fathers relate to children, how masters relate to slaves, because all of those are household or economic interrelationships. But the kind of political power that Aristotle thinks most appropriate in that domain is kingship. So again, kingship is important in his purposes, even though he thinks it's rarely or ever justified in terms of its claim to rule since that kind of equality really doesn't exist very often. Still, it does exist often in a sub political or economic sphere where this kind of equality is very natural and treated as natural. Now Aristotle raises the question whether it's better to be ruled by the best king or by the best laws. He says that the Spartan general ship for life is the least powerful kind of kingship and the absolute kingship of the archaic Greek form was the most powerful. Other kinds of actually existing kingships in his survey of constitutions in Greece are found to basically lie somewhere between those two extremes. And he treats them, discusses them and some in details, including giving historic details about these kinds of kingship and also discusses general issues related to them beginning with the question of whether it's better to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. Now on the side of the best man is the argument that he can better adapt to the particular circumstances and you don't have this just rigid written law which you have to interpret and so forth. Instead, you have a kind of decisive individual to make the decision on the side of the law. However, are the following arguments which Aristotle clearly thinks are much stronger. First is that the many are better judges than any individual, even if they are inferior as individuals to that individual. When we aggregate all of their relevant expertise, we find them to be better judges. They are less corruptible than any individual. And further, if laws are framed by several good men as in an aristocracy, then the laws will have an aggregate virtue that's much greater than any individual. So the answer to whether it's better to be ruled by the best king or the best laws is that it's always better to be ruled by the best laws. Now in chapter 15, Aristotle gives a kind of archaic history or prehistory of kingships as constitutions and the first as kingships as the beginning of constitutional types and then the evolution of the other constitutional types out of kingships. So at the first stage, there just are kingships because when cities are small, the number of eminently virtuous men was few as was those who could bestow benefits on others. And so you naturally just had few of those virtuous people and so kingships were quite legitimate and naturally came into existence. But at the second stage, you got constitutional governments because as cities grew, the number of virtuous men increased and their tolerance for soul rule or monarchy decreased. And so they set up a constitution to figure out how to share power and take turns ruling and being ruled. In the third stage, you get oligarchies because the ruling class ended up deteriorating morally and enriching themselves from the public treasury, thus making riches the paths to honor and everybody becomes focused on enriching themselves. This leads in the fourth stage to tyrannies and democracies because the greed of the oligarchs continues to grow, but it also diminishes their numbers. So fewer and fewer become richer and richer, but they're kind of dying off. But or the wealth is becoming consolidated in fewer and fewer people, which ends up strengthening the relative power of the collective masses, who then as Aristotle puts it, set upon their masters and establish democracies. Now Aristotle says that since cities have increased in size, no other form of government appears to be any longer even easy to establish. So he thinks these are the kinds and all other constitutional kinds will be forms of these and he does discuss as many sub kinds and sub forms of each of them. But these are the ones that have appeared in history and the cycles keep returning to these kinds. Now Aristotle wants to make clear that he's though he described that one hypothetical condition under which a kingship might be justified. In general, he is against the idea of monarchy or soul rule and is rather in favor of the rule of law. And here's the prima facie argument he makes now absolute monarchy or soul rule or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all the citizens in a city that consists of equals is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature. It's argued that those who are by nature equals must have the same natural right and worth and that for unequals to have an unequal share to have an equal share or for equals to have an uneven share in the offices of the state is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to have the same food and clothing. Therefore it is thought to be just that among equals everyone be ruled as well as rule and therefore that all should have their turn. We thus arrive at law for an order of succession implies law and the rule of law it is argued is preferable to that of any individual. Now Aristotle does not put explain the origin of that dense and complex argument for the rule of law. It is the clearest and most ancient expression of it, but he suggests that some other people have put that argument forward. He also lists several additional arguments which are apparently his own or perhaps borrowed from the same source. He says even if it were better for an individual to govern the individual should be considered merely a guardian and minister of the law, not as their own individual person. And the law is better than a ruler, especially a sole ruler because the law is unaffected by the passions that can can pervert even the best rulers. And even if an individuals were superior to a written law, he could not be superior to the customary unwritten law, which has so much experience and common sense behind it. Also the scale of administrative work exceeds any individuals capacities, so any government in fact has to involve a multitude of people, and so needs to be governed on the basis of understood objective laws and not just individual subjective considerations. Finally, the fact that some things can and others cannot be comprehended under the law is the origin of the dispute about whether the best man or best law should rule. But having many judges is superior to one for applying the law to circumstances. So again the relevant expertise aggregation argument gets applied here. Quote, it would surely seem strange that a person should see better with two eyes and hear better with two ears or act better with two hands or feet than many with many. Indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make themselves many eyes and ears and hands and feet. So kings even preeminently predominant kings who are superior in virtue in every way still employ other ministers in order to have other perspectives. And this is an indication that soul rule is not really advantageous, but instead what is needed is rule of law. So the question arises whether soul rule is ever justified. Aristotle says, quote, where men are alike and equal, it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be the Lord of all. Whether there are laws or whether there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law, neither should a good man be Lord over good men, nor a bad man over bad, nor even if he excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule unless in a particular case at which I have already hinted and to which I will once more recur. So again, Aristotle basically thinks that most people are fairly equal and that one of these other forms of government makes sense because it's just so rare and hard to believe that one person could be so preeminently superior that a kingship would be justified. But he says, when a whole family or some individual happens to be so preeminent in virtue as to surpass all others, then it is just that they should be the royal family and supreme overall. And that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation. For as I said before, to give them authority is not only agreeable to that ground of right which the founders of all states, whether aristocratic, oligarchic, or even democratic are accustomed to put forward. For these all recognize the claim of excellence, although not the same excellence, but accords with the principle already laid down. For surely it would not be right to kill or ostracize or exile such a person or require that he should take his turn in being governed. The whole is naturally superior to the part and he who has this preeminence is in the relation of a whole to a part. But if so, the only alternative is that he should have the supreme power and that mankind should obey him, not in turn, but always. So Aristotle seems to hold that various kinds of constitution are best suited to various kinds of people. And what he means by kinds of people seems to be conceived along racial lines. So Greeks are a certain kind of people and they should be governed in a certain way and barbarian races of Europe and Asia should be governed in other ways. And there are details to be worked out about this and in another book, book seven in one of the later chapters, he does discuss some of these details. But he seems to hold that some races actually do produce individuals that so predominate in virtue among their peers that they are naturally worthy of soul rule in those circumstances. Of course, this power is limited to soul rule over that race's subjects and Aristotle never discusses the possibility of extending this power beyond a single city or a single race or a single nation. But he does think that though rare, this is a phenomenon that does actually make sense. So that rather nuanced conclusion having been reached, Aristotle reaches the overall conclusion of the book and it's a conclusion about the best state. He says, quote, we maintain that the true forms of government are three, and that the best must be that which is administered by the best, and in which there is one man or a whole family or many persons excelling all the others together in virtue. And both rulers and subjects are fitted the one to rule the other to be ruled in such a manner as to attain the most eligible life. Now, furthermore, we showed at the commencement of our inquiry that the virtue of the good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state. Now, as we saw in another discussion of book three chapter four of the politics, Aristotle generally argues that the virtue of the good man is not the same as the virtue of the citizen. And that is basically because virtues of citizens differ in different states. So virtue of the citizen democracy is free born status virtue of the citizen in an oligarchy is wealth virtue of the good man in an aristocracy is good birth or high virtue or whatever in a kingship again predominant virtue. But the ethical virtues that apply to the good man some kind of general justice is not any one of those things certainly not anything like just having a free status or having a degree of wealth. So generally those are not the same and in most states and with most constitutions they are not the same. But with the perfect state you as as the quotation at 1276 B 35 and following shows in the perfect state theoretically, you could have every, you could imagine a condition where every adult citizen is fully developed into perfect virtue. And this coincides with the overall end of the state in bringing about the true kind of virtuous happiness. And Aristotle says that clearly in the same manner and by the same means through which a man becomes truly good, he will frame a state that is to be ruled by an aristocracy or by a king and the same education and same habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a statesman or a king. So he thinks that again the analysis of kingship and in fact of aristocracy is important because it shows us how we should educate people even if they are to occupy other kinds of constitutions that are themselves inferior such as oligarchies or democracies. But having arrived at these conclusions here in book three, we must proceed to speak of the perfect state and describe how it comes into being and is established and this appears to set up a discussion of aristocracy since he's just discussed kingship and indicated its extreme rarity. Now what comes next in book four is a discussion of details about oligarchy and democracy and the general constitutional form of government and the ideal state and its description doesn't come until our books seven or eight. So some have thought that actually book seven and eight should come next come after three as opposed to book four and then you would have a book four coming after what is traditionally book eight. But I will in the next lecture in this series discuss book four so that we can round out the rest of the discussion of how of the claims to rule of the other kinds of Constitution, how their concepts of equality are justified and applied and thus what kind of state and what kind of citizen belong to each. Thank you.