 It's a real pleasure to welcome Sir Jeremy Fleming here today and we're going to hear from him in just a moment. A few observations from me just as we begin the National Security College is particularly proud to host this conversation here today. We've brought together a group not only of our students and alumni but also senior and distinguished friends and colleagues from across the national security community and I particularly note that we have Deputy Director General of the Office of National Intelligence here today and also Deputy Secretary of DEFAT. So Nina and Craig it's great for you and other APS colleagues to be with us. The mission of the college is kind of obvious to all of you and I won't belabor that now but it's fair to say that the times have never been more important for us. Really national capability uplift insecurity broadly defined to meet this horizon of risk and threat that Australia is facing that like-minded nations are facing across the world, democracies, nations in favour of a rules-based order of respect for the UN Charter among other things. But at the same time the ability of our nations to meet the challenge is really under question. It's really about marshal in the resources that we have in democratic frameworks to protect our interests into the future and that's where what many of us have studied for years is getting soberingly real. So I really look forward to hearing Sir Jeremy's remarks in this regard. The UK-Australia link is particularly interesting because of course we've recently seen news of the establishment of the College for National Security in the UK which gives the National Security College here a truly kindred institution to build our capabilities together. Just one final note for me on arrangements. The speech per se, the remarks will be on the record but as soon as Sir Jeremy has finished his opening remarks we'll ask our good friends from the ABC to leave the room and the Q&A that I will then moderate with all of you will be under the Chatham House rule. With that please join me in welcoming Sir Jeremy Fleming. Good morning. Thank you Rory for that introduction. It's great to see so many friends and colleagues here today and I hope you're here for more than just the good breakfast but it's lovely to see you. So thanks to the National Security College for hosting this event in this fabulous building or I think you called it the Martian Embassy and I can see why. I can't tell you how good it is to be back in Australia and especially to see you all in Canberra today. Now it's stating the obvious to point out that the world has changed a lot since my last visit. The pandemic, the profile and dominance of technology and cyber, the role of China, the end of the Afghan campaign and now of course Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Any one of those on their own I think would be viewed as a historic shift and taken together they add up to a period of generational upheaval. The economic, societal and geopolitical consequences are still playing out and we'll do for decades to come and that's obviously the case in the world of national security too. Here the threats we face and our approaches to their mitigation are changing really rapidly. There's much talk of the need to redesign a new global security architecture but my contention is that's already happening. It's already different and I know that you feel that here. This week's announcements of major increases in defence and intelligence spending show that Australia gets this new reality. So I'm in Canberra to talk about these themes and to understand how you're thinking about these challenges we face. But I'm also here because tomorrow marks ASD's 75th anniversary. Their history is long and it's illustrious and I know they played a major role in keeping Australia safe. I congratulate the generations who've delivered their critical mission and I thank them for their partnership. For at times like these it's more important than ever that we are that we stay together. We owe the people of ASD a debt for their service and we're humbled in GCHQ to be able to count on their friendship. Right I'm keen to leave plenty of time to have a conversation and for Rory to ask some questions but I'm going to press on with a few of these themes and have a stab at some of the implications for our sovereign and allied response. So firstly the pandemic. Of course we've a way to go until we declare it's over. The human costs are horrendous but the amazing work of the scientists and the medics leave us in a much better place. And the experience has helped us to learn some painful and I believe useful lessons about national security. Perhaps most importantly we now have a much better understanding of national resilience. Before 2020 who here would have realised that the global supply chain of face masks would be such a critical dependency. Or that a grounding of a container ship in the Suez would cause such chaos. Or even that semiconductor availability would be so fragile it would affect everything from smartphone to washing machine availability. The pandemics made it clear that we are interconnected and dependent in ways that we haven't fully understood. We've had to wake up to the reality of what that means for our economies and our security. And we've seen how vital technology is to stay connected. To keep our economies going and to change the way that we work even in the national security community. Yet it's also shown how vulnerable our nations are to cyber threats and how quickly our adversaries adapt to take advantage. The lesson is for me that our cyber security isn't good enough and we need to invest in making it better. Now the second area I want to talk about is Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Believe it or not it's only 36 days since Vladimir Putin launched an unprovoked and premeditated attack on Ukraine. It's been shocking in every sense of the word but it wasn't surprising. We've seen this strategy before. We saw the intelligence picture building and now we're seeing Putin trying to follow through on his plan but it is failing. And his plan B has been more barbarity against civilians and cities. It's clear that he plays by different moral and legal rules. Far too many Ukrainians and Russians have already lost their lives and beyond this toll many many more have had their lives shattered. The UN estimate is that in just over a month more than 10 million people have already fled their homes. It's a humanitarian crisis that need never have happened and it's not over yet. That said it increasingly looks like Putin has massively misjudged the situation. It's clear he's misjudged the resistance of the Ukrainian people. He underestimated the strength of the coalition his actions would galvanize. He underplayed the economic consequences of the sanctions regime and he overestimated the abilities of his military to secure a rapid victory. We've seen Russian soldiers short of weapons and morale refusing to carry out orders sabotaging their own equipment and even accidentally shooting down their own aircraft. And even though we believe Putin's advisors are afraid to tell him the truth. What's going on and the extent of these misjudgments must be crystal clear to the regime. This week the Russian MOD stated publicly that they will drastically reduce combat operations around Kiev and a city in the north. It looked like they had been forced to make a significant change. But then they proceeded to launch attacks in both those places. Mixed messages or deliberate misinformation will have to see how it unfolds. But in any event it all adds up to the strategic miscalculation that our leaders warned Putin it would be. It's become his personal war with the cost being paid by innocent people in Ukraine and increasingly by ordinary Russians too. The great irony is of course that through his actions Putin has brought upon himself exactly what he was trying to avoid. A Ukraine with a renewed sense of nationhood. A NATO that is more united than ever. And a global coalition of nations that condemn his actions. Just over a month in it's far too early to confidently draw out all the implications of this crisis. But I'm going to outline a few aspects of this that really stand out to me. So I'm going to start with the prominence of the information front. Russia wrote the hybrid warfare book. State media, online media and agents of influence are all used to obfuscate motivations and justify military actions. We've seen them use this playbook in Syria and many other theatres. Their aim is to promulgate disinformation. To sow mistrust in the evidence and to amplify false narratives. It's also to make sure that the real picture of what's going on doesn't get exposed inside Russia. And that's where the most dangerous disinformation war is being waged. We know Putin's campaign is beset by problems. Lomeral, logistical failures and high Russian casualty numbers. Their commander control is in chaos. We've seen Putin lie to his own people in their attempt to hide military incompetence. And all of that means that he seeks brutal control of the media and access to the internet. He seeks the closing down of opposition voices. And he's making heavy investment in their propaganda and covert responses. But here again it's clear that he's miscalculated. President Zelensky's information operation has shown itself to be extremely effective. It's agile, multi-platform, multi-media and extremely well-tailored to different audiences. One only has to look at the way that Ukraine's flag, a field of sunflowers under a sky of blue. To see it flying everywhere, including outside GCHQ, to see how well the message has landed. And it's a message supported by information campaigns all over the world. In the UK it's focused in a new government information cell, which identifies and counters Kremlin disinformation targeted at the UK and other international audiences. It brings together expertise from across government to challenge false narratives. It deals in facts, not falsehoods, making sure that the truth is told well. Now increasingly, many of those truths come from intelligence. It is already a remarkable feature of this conflict. Just how much intelligence has been so quickly declassified to get ahead of Putin's actions. From the warnings of the war to the intelligence on false flag operations designed to provide a fake premise to the invasion and more recently to the Russian plans to falsely claim Ukrainian use of banned chemical weapons. On this and many other subjects, deeply secret intelligence has been released to make sure that the truth is heard. At this pace and scale, it really is unprecedented. In my view, intelligence is only worth collecting if we use it. So I unreservedly welcome this development. Of course, other aspects of this confrontation play out in cyberspace. There's been much commentary expressing surprise that we haven't seen the Russians deploy a major cyber attack as part of their campaign. I think a lot of this misses the point. While some people look for cyber Pearl Harbors, it was never our understanding that a catastrophic cyber attack was central to Russian's use of offensive cyber or to their military doctrine. To think otherwise, misjudges how cyber has an effect in military campaigns. And that's not to see that we haven't seen cyber in this conflict. We have and lots of it. So at the National Cyber Security Centre, part of GCHQ, we've seen sustained intent from Russia to disrupt Ukrainian government and military systems. We've seen what looks like some spillover from activity affecting surrounding countries. And we've certainly seen indications which suggest Russia's cyber actors are looking for targets in the countries that oppose their actions. So just as we pay tribute to the Ukraine military's brave actions, we should pay tribute to Ukrainian cyber security, too. We and other allies will continue to support them in shoring up their defences. And at home, we will do all we can to make sure that business and government urgently follow through on their plans to improve basic levels of cyber resilience. I know your ACSE is doing exactly the same here in Australia. Now my third observation of this conflict is the extent to which non-state actors are involved and have a say, therefore, in its outcome. Some of this is on the battlefields inside Ukraine. It's clear Russia is using mercenaries and foreign fighters to augment its forces. This includes the Wagner Group, which has been active in Ukraine since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. The group works as a shadow branch of the Russian military, providing implausible deniability for risk-gear operations. Recently, we've seen that Wagner is looking to move up a gear. We understand that the group is now prepared to send large numbers of personnel into Ukraine to fight alongside the Russians. They're looking at relocating forces from other conflicts and recruiting new fighters to bolster their numbers. These soldiers are likely to be used as cannon fodder to try to limit Russian military losses. But it's not just in the military sphere that we see the influence and potential of other actors. We've seen cyber hacking and ransomware groups pledging allegiance to both sides. We've seen businesses all over the world distance themselves from the Russian economy. We've seen technology providers step up to make sure that Ukraine can stay connected or to address disinformation. And it's all making the space very complicated. And in some ways, way beyond the control of governments. It's another reminder of the interconnectedness of the world today. And as no single entity holds the whole solution, it highlights the need for global institutions effectively working in coalition. Now Putin's aggression has certainly galvanized NATO. The war has triggered an unprecedented international response. 141 countries condemned it at the UN General Assembly. All over Europe, countries are overturning decades long approaches to defence policy, investing more, too. And further afield, including in this region, countries like Australia and Japan are leaning in. But it's also showing in stark relief those countries that choose to either support Putin or abstain from making a choice. And those choices will affect the global order and our national securities for decades to come. And of course, here in this region, the most concerning issues relate to the choices China makes as it thinks about its interests in the longer term. Now Russia's position on this is clear. It's made a strategic choice to align with China as China has become more powerful and in direct opposition to the United States. In the current crisis, Russia sees China as a supplier of weapons, as a provider of technology, a market for its hydrocarbons and as a means to circumvent sanctions. And we know that both presidents Xi and Putin place great value on their personal relationship. But Xi's calculus is more nuanced. He's not publicly condemned the invasion, presumably calculating that it helps him to oppose the US. And with an eye on retaking Taiwan, China doesn't want to do anything which may constrain its ability to move in the future. But it's also the case that China believes Russia will provide additional impetus and support to its digital markets and its technology plans. We can see China is seizing the opportunity to purchase cheap hydrocarbons from Russia at the moment to meet its needs to. But there are risks to them both and arguably more for China. In being too closely aligned. Russia understands that longer term, China will become increasingly strong militarily and economically. Some of their interests conflict. Russia could be squeezed out of the equation. And it's equally clear that a China that wants to set the rules of the road, the norms for a new global governance is not well served by close alliance with a regime that willfully and illegally ignores them all. Now, this comes into particularly sharp focus when we think about the future of technology ecosystems and the norms and governance that guide their use. And for me, this is as much about values as it is about the technology. And of course, both are vital to the competitive edge of a country. And that's why it's also increasingly the focus for geopolitical competition. Historically, tech development was largely driven and owned by the West. Shared values amongst involved nations meant industry standards for emerging technologies tended to be global. Investment in technology bought status, wealth and security. Today we are in a different era. We can see that significant technology leadership is moving east. It's causing a conflict of interests, of values, where prosperity and security are at stake. And obviously China is a sophisticated player in all of this. It has increasing ambition to project its influence beyond its borders. And a proven interest in our commercial secrets. But it also has a competing vision for the future of cyberspace. And it's increasingly influential in the debate around international rules and standards. January is bringing all elements of state power to control influence design and dominate technology. If you like the cyber and the fiber. Now, as I've said previously, without action, it's increasingly apparent that the key technologies on which we all rely for security and prosperity won't be shaped and controlled by the West in the future. If we don't act with our allies, with our partners, and with the private sector, we will see undemocratic values as the default for vast swathes of future tech and the standards that govern it. There is no doubt that democratic nations are facing a moment of reckoning. Now, these are all really big themes. And they have big stakes. And whether we're building on the lessons from the pandemic, understanding the implications of Russia's invasion, or grappling with the implications of China's rise, it's clear we must step up. There are many ways for us to do that. And it seems to me that two things are very important. The first is that we have to find new ways to collaborate and cooperate with partners. For those of us in national security, that's about ensuring the health of existing relationships. It's about securing our alliances, like the Five Eyes, NATO, and in this region, ASEAN. And it's about working with businesses in new and truly collaborative ways. And to do this, we need to make sure that our counteroffer, to states who haven't yet decided which way they should jump, is persuasive and coherent. And too often, it's not. And the second is that whatever we do, we must make sure that we stay true to our values. Those that have made our systems and democracies so successful, and will do so in the future. Now, I spoke at the beginning about how against the backdrop of historic shifts, a new global security architecture was emerging. And all of this change will take decades to resolve. But what I can be clear on now is that how we approach these challenges will be as important as what our response is. And all of us in this room today must play our part in following that through. Thank you.