 I thought it would be interesting to take a look, building on some of the discussion in the morning sessions on this particular law and management scheme compared to other ones. Because there are other examples out there, but I think for a lot of us that are heavily engaged in fisheries management, we just think there's one way to do things, and maybe there isn't, and maybe there's some lessons that can be learned from that. So that's the charge of this panel, and again, I'm just going to quickly introduce our moderator and the panelists, and then turn them loose. Same format. They each have 15 minutes, and we'll open it up to some questions, and we've asked each of them to answer a common question, too, regarding a particular aspect from a natural resource management scheme that they would recommend importing into U.S. fisheries management. So our moderator to my left is Associate Professor Michael Berger here at Roger Williams University School of Law. He teaches environmental and marine law topics here, graduated from Columbia University School of Law. Prior to his academic career, and I didn't know this, but this is great because I love reading people's bios that you think you know and you find out new things about. So Michael has a journalism background, was a writer for the American lawyer and a freelance writer and editor, also served as an environmental attorney in the Office of Corporate Counsel for the City of New York. Next to him is John Duff, who's Associate Professor, Graduate Programs Director at Environmental Earth and Ocean Sciences Department at UMass Boston. John received his JD from Suffolk University Law School in Boston, and his LLM from the Law and Marine Affairs program at University of Washington. And also I didn't know this. He has degrees in Business from University of Lowell and Journalism from University of Mississippi. So I didn't plan that, it just happened. John has extensive experience in marine law, working in other law programs at other law schools. His work has earned him a Fulbright Senior Fellowship, and he focuses on a lot of issues regarding natural resources assemblages, technology, public policy, is very engaged in a lot of the discussions up here in New England right now about marine spatial planning. Next to John is Lo Schiffer. She's General Counsel for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. I never say all the words, I just say no all the time. So she's no as Chief Legal Officer and is also a Policy Advisor to the Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmospheric. She has extensive experience in environmental law through work in the federal sector, private practice and non-profit organizations as well. And she also is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center. And next to Lo is Morgan Gopnik, currently a Consultant and Ph Candidate from Duke University. And in that capacity she serves as a consultant for foundations, associations and non-profit organizations in ocean management topics. Previously, she worked as the Director of Ocean Studies Board at the National Academy in Sciences, left that position to take a nice lightweight job as the Senior Advisor to the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, where she had a little something to do with this report that came out not too long ago. I got to know Morgan when we both spent time working for the Ocean Conservancy, and now she's decided to go back to school and get even more smarter. And next to Morgan is our one foray into international law. We had a lot of discussions at the Planning Committee about how far afield we could take this. And I restrained a few people, Josh, who wanted to go farther afield. And we certainly could. But two days was really all I had the stomach for this time. See the next symposium, we can focus on international Christian Law. There certainly are interesting aspects of that. We thought what would be most interesting and relevant, particularly to a New England area law school and a New England East Coast audience primarily, would be a look at our neighbors to the north in Canada. So we're very fortunate to have Phil Saunders here, Associate Professor at Dalhousie University School of Law, is cross-appointed to the School of Resource and Environmental Studies and a research fellow at the Center for Foreign Policy Studies. He's done extensive international work and also recently just stepped down after five years tenure as the Dean of the Law School up there in Nova Scotia. So thank you to our panel, and turn it over. And John, let you kick it off. I want to thank Susan Farrity and Roger Williams for inviting me here today. Not so much to give this talk, but to actually catch up with some folks who I haven't seen in years. So it's good to see you all once again. And perhaps I'll come to these more often, given that this is a good convening place. My goal today is not to enlighten you with any deep philosophical understandings. I don't have any. I'm hoping that, in fact, you may have some, and that I'm hoping I may be able to provoke you to have some by asking you to consider fisheries management outside of fisheries management. That is to consider American history in general and our relationship as Americans with natural resources and at least a cursory overview of a set of natural resource systems that we have employed over time that may prompt you to think about concepts, principles, or models or aspects of those things that could be taken from those systems and integrated into fisheries management. So to do all this, I need to start with some basic American concepts, things that are near and dear to every American's heart. And I was thinking, well, what are the most important basic American concepts that we ought to consider in any discussion? And the one that came to mind and was certainly highlighted this week with the elections was the American concept of outrage. Yes, we've all got a constitutional right to be outraged, you see. And it's best if you're an American to be outraged against other people. And we saw this, well, we can be outraged with one another, and that shows up as well, too. But it's best to be outraged against others. And it was an illusion to the fact that in 1976 we established the Magnus Net because we wanted to kick the foreigners out. So there we were. We were outraged. We wanted to do something. We wanted to kick people out. Well, it turns out that we're outraged all the time. And this is, in fact, this is a quote by American leadership against a British CEO. But in fact, this is not a charge leveled against Tony Hayward of BP, but this was a charge leveled by other American leaders against another British CEO. And that was King George III, the CEO of GB, not BP, all right? And in fact, it resides in this document, the very founding document of the United States. And in political discussions this year, there has been a lot of talk about founding documents and how we ought to go back to our basic principles. So let's all go back to basic principles and get outraged about people plundering our resources and our seas and the fact that our lives are connected to both of these things. It's there from day one of the United States of America. All right. Well, there are other American principles. I don't want to say that that's our exclusive principle, certainly a good primary one to employ, but not the only one that we have at our disposal. But another principle that I've heard a lot about over time, and again this year, is the fact that we need to engage in fiscal responsibility. We have to go back to market principles. The government should not be involved. The market has a role. So in fact, there was another great American document published in 1776. And the great thing about being an American is you can actually claim ownership over everything even if it doesn't reside in the United States. So here's the other publication, all right? The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, a Scottish writer. But he talks about the market. And if you look over the globe, I can't think of another country that claims to employ market principles as a basis of its society more than the United States does. So here we have two sets of principles. Our resources, not to be plundered by anyone else. And in fact, we ought to be employing market principles. Two principles that came out in 1776 we've talked about, and they are relevant in this discussion about fisheries management or any commons resource within the United States. So here we go. Finally I get to the title of the talk, which I just wanted to make a literative and I struggled with it and it came up with this really clumsy thing. So I'm talking about cod, coals, cows and conifers, of course. I could have gone on with continental shelves and carrots and all these other types of things and the list goes on. If in fact I write the article, maybe you'll see all these things show up there. But I wanted to talk a little bit about the impetus that is the beginning, the reasoning that we engage in these natural resource systems, the apparatus at the basic level, at the statutory level. And then the blurb says I'm going to talk about status and I will, but it wouldn't fit neatly on this so I'm just going to go on and on and on when I get to the status of any one of these. So basically, why do we need fisheries management? They're our fish, they're our fisheries. We said that. Declaration of Independence. Our coast kicked them out, claimed them. In fact, there's a great vignette portrayed in David McCullough's book about when John Adams goes to visit the king after the end of the Revolutionary War and he is fighting with the king of England about the rights and ownership aspects of American proximity to fisheries in the Atlantic. So they're our fish, they're our fisheries and in fact the Magnuson Act I thought was a bicentennial celebration, you know, 1976. I thought, let's kick someone out again. So they're our fish, they're our fisheries and it turns out that this is a seafood production statute that we want to capture this fisheries for ourselves and that we want to produce fish to eat for Americans and after some leftover maybe we'll sell it to some other folks. So the apparatus basically is the Magnuson, Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act and its subsequent amendments. I want to go through the impetus and apparatus of all four and then I'll go across to the status and some of the market principles of each of these things as I move along. So Cull, here's the great deep philosophical thinking about Cull. We have Cull, we need it, let's use it and then late into our Cull management system we said we'd like to protect the environment. Now you can see the qualified language I used there. We're not going to protect the environment, we must protect the environment. We'd like to protect the environment and there are some amendments to our federal Cull leasing management schemes that move in the direction of being better towards the environment but perhaps not as good as we ought to be. Alright, cows, why are cows important? Well of course, allowing people to graze their cows on open federal land was one of the ways in which we moved to settle the west. Give away land, the Homestead Act did this, grazing privileges and grazing access did this for quite some time and in fact, quite frankly, we didn't care if anyone was using them, we just wanted there to be someone using some of these grazing lands. So we had the Taylor Grazing Act and then some late 20th century amendments to it, Federal Public Lands Management Act and then finally again here's this concept of ecosystem responsibility or environmental responsibility coming in very late into a management scheme via the Public Range Lands Improvement Act. And then finally the forest, the origin of the forest service was in fact articulated such that we wanted to maintain and manage a steady supply of timber. So this has been about seafood production, energy production, settling the west and timber production. This was a very production oriented set of management systems that we were engaged in. Alright, now I'm going to leave it here because I would be cluttering up the PowerPoint presentation if I put up all of the status aspects that I wanted to talk about. But I want to touch on at least a few components of market principles to look at the market status of each of the four things that I've talked about here recently. And in markets there are a whole host of factors that you can consider but the ones that I want you to think about today are pricing systems within markets, externalities for anyone who's taken law and economics or just basic economics, understanding that management systems have external implications that ought to be recaptured into the market system so that we can move towards actual or true pricing of a given use of services. And then finally another important market component or factor and that is the quantitative accounting aspect of markets. How do you know if markets work if you can't keep track of what is being transacted and what the actual quantitative values are that are engaged there? So I'm going to talk a little bit about payment systems, externalities via my brief examination of user restoration requirements and then some market critiques that have come up. So if you look at the Magnuson Act, if you look at fisheries and you look for payment systems that is where users of the system pay the federal government for accessing them, you see virtually no payment systems. I say virtually no because if you read deep enough into the Magnuson Act and you get to the section on IFQs, you see a provision within the IFQ description that says IFQ management systems, not all fishery management systems but IFQ management systems must have industry, government relationships such that there is cost sharing involved. If we're going to allow market principles to be employed and allow a market to take place and effectively create a market where transactions take place to the benefit of the private users, where the prices actually manifest themselves to the benefit of private users, then in fact those users ought to be paying part of the management system. And there are three ways that you can do this under the IFQ terms and those three approaches are user fees and the only place that I think I see user fees are in the halbit and sable fishing areas up in the North Pacific. The other ways are quota set asides that is where the government doesn't give away all of the allocations but retains some and then transforms them into money by placing them onto the market. And then a principle known as devolution of services where the National Marine Fishery Service would effectively say don't pay us to manage it, you manage it yourselves. We will in fact devolve the management responsibilities to you. So the payment systems are very slight if existent at all in the Magnuson Act. User restoration requirements, this goes to the aspect of externalities and actually solving a market failure. I really don't see any user restoration requirements that exist within the Magnuson Act. There are responsibilities placed on National Marine Fisheries for keeping track of what's going on and maintaining and protecting and conserving certain places. But it's difficult to actually see the direct explicit role of the users in the restoration of fishery areas. Finally, market critiques, I'm not an economist so I look to other people who do write about market evaluation of certain types of natural resource systems. In the easiest place I would suggest if you were examining some of these issues would be the government accountability office, the GAO, and to a lesser degree but in a more narrative form in the Congressional Research Service reports. And when you look at those, particularly regarding this one place where there are payment systems for IFQ systems, a 2004 report by the GAO indicated that even when they were required to have user contributions to IFQ management systems, they were only found to exist in the halibut and sable fish fishery. They didn't exist in other ITQ systems such as the surf clam and ocean cohog or the wreckfish industries. So if we go down to coal and we look at these same market factors or principles in terms of pricing, there are a whole host of pricing or user fee aspects to coal leasing. There are competitive leasing payment systems that are required. There are restoration and impact mitigation and mitigation requirements in place, including requirements that coal miners post bond or financial guarantees, that can be put forward towards recovering areas used for coal. Now, the market critique of this is while we've got both of those requirements, they don't seem to actually pay for everything they're supposed to do. Thanks. It turns out that, in fact, we don't get enough of the financial guarantees so that coal mining areas are put back into anything close to their original state after their mind. And that, in fact, there are significant coal leases that are being given to private users at below market value. So if we go to cows, there are, in fact, payment systems for grazing cows. Grazing permits on federal land as of 2004, that's one of the latest reports I saw, there was a comprehensive report indicated that it was $1.43 per animal unit month. So I'll just go ahead because I know everyone here knows what an animal unit month. No, an animal unit month basically is the amount that one cow-calf pair can forage in one month. So the estimate is if you're doing this, you have to pay $1.43. Well, the GAO and some other economists looked at this and said, you know what, this doesn't even come close to what it would cost to actually graze. Because if you look at the private market, it's up about $13 on the AUM. So we were in order of magnitude off. We're charging about 10% of what actually cost to manage one of these types of things. The externalities are addressed to some degree in that there is the ability maintained to close overgrazed areas. And then briefly on forest, we've got forest timber sale harvesting leases that go on. They are effectively, most of many of them are effectively at below cost. And again, GAO and others have looked at these management systems and determined that there are significant below cost timber sales going on. Well, obviously, Congress would do something if they're aware of this. Well, it turns out that Congress has been aware of this for about 20 years and has not introduced, has drafted some bills. But the bills never seem to make it out of committee. So we've got some recognition of some market critiques. So now that I have 12 seconds left, I want to at least actually go beyond what I suggested I would talk about and talk about. I actually, I wanted to talk about the status of these systems in terms of state voice as well, because I think this is important. So in some systems, I won't go through them case by case, but in some systems, states have a voice in the federal management system. We heard the fact this morning that state marine resource managers, fisheries managers have a role on the fishery management councils. I think it's very, it's interesting and important to look at what those rules are. But to keep in mind that these are federal systems. We need to accommodate the voice of the states because they are impacted and have a role and a relationship with them. But you've got to look at other ways that states can have a voice. So with that, I think I will end, given the timing. Thank you. No PowerPoint. You have to pay attention. So, all right, this is what I'm going to talk about. There's going to be a little bit of overlap, but not a lot with the last talk. I'm going to talk about Magnuson, which I'm assuming you all now know enough about, two other natural resource statutes, two pollution statutes, and a comparison of them on six topics. So this is truly the cliff notes, but it's going to be fast. All right, you've heard how Magnuson works. For the resource statutes, I'm going to talk about Flipma, which you just heard a little bit about, which is the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 and the National Forest Management Act, which you also heard a little bit about. Flipma is a statute that was passed in 1976 to bring together the myriads of public land statutes that had been passed over many years. And it's the Organic Act for the Bureau of Land Management and Agency in the Interior Department. Under Flipma, BLM lands are managed. They're essentially the lands nobody wanted of our vast Federal Reserve of lands. Now, let's spill my water. That would be part of the course. And in the lower 48 states, it's nearly 100 million acres of land and another 86 million acres in Alaska. It's huge amounts of land. The theory of the statute is to manage it for multiple use. This is not dissimilar to what you've heard with regard to Magnuson. With an emphasis historically on grazing and mining and in recent years, there's also been attention paid to a National Landscape Conservation System, which includes wilderness areas, national monuments and areas of critical environmental concern. BLM manages the surface and the subsurface. The statute requires inventories of the land. It is a planning process that's done at the local level and then at the state level, but with federal overlay. And there is public opportunity for public participation. So that's sort of the cliff notes of how the Bureau of Land Management works to allocate resources and plan. Secondly, the National Forest Management Act where indeed the Forest Service does pay attention to timber, but actually the original 1897 Act, which continues, says that national forests are established to improve and protect the forest and for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows and to furnish a continuous supply of timber. It also is a multiple use statute. It's had its ups and downs over the years, but basically when it was amended in 1976, it was amended to require a planning process. That planning process has been controversial, which is done at the forest level, but also there's input from the regional level of forests and then from the National Forest Service. I hope you're coming to notice that these are all done within the government with a lot of opportunity for public outreach. The third statute that I'll mention is the Clean Water Act. This is a statute. Many of us know what was originally the modern statute was originally enacted in 1972. It's been extensively amended. The general idea of it, it's complicated, but the core of it is that there's nobody can discharge from a point source that is putting your pipe out into the river into a water of the United States without a permit and then it has an elaborate permitting scheme and regulations. There also are regulations of wetlands and to a lesser extent of nonpoint sources. That's all the runoff that we have. It's a federal plan and a federal statute, but states may get delegation of the federal program with federal oversight of that program continued if the state plan meets a set of specific requirements in the statute, which essentially means that the state plan is equivalent in protection of the federal plan. The Supreme Court in a 2007 case said that the program has to be delegated if the state meets the plan. No discretion by the EPA and therefore there isn't a requirement for compliance with the Endangered Species Act. There also is some obligation to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act. That's important because it gives the public a chance for input, but not so much for the clean water. Finally, I'll mention the Clean Air Act. That's another one of these complicated statutes, but the gist of it is national ambient air quality standards are set. Those are federal standards that are health-based for general pollutants. The big discussion now is are we going to add greenhouse gases to the existing six pollutants for which we're regulated. They're regulated. The feds set these ambient air quality standards, and then they say to the states, you please come up with a plan. They classify areas as either meeting those standards or not. That's called entertainment or non-attainment. And then it's up to the states to come up with a state implementation plan, either to retain if they're in attainment or to get themselves into attainment if they're not in attainment. And then the feds have to, the EPA has to look at and decide whether it's going to approve those state plans. Okay, you said, what is common to all of these statutes and indeed to both natural resource and pollution statutes generally as far as I'm concerned is that these are all our nation's natural resources, including our air and our water, and they belong to all of us. They really are public goods and public resources. And so as we think about how we're making decisions about them, it's helpful to think about is that how I want my resources managed. Okay, we now have four regulatory frameworks that are regulatory. How do we compare them and what can we learn about fisheries management from them? First, every one of these statutes has been amended over the years to become more detailed. So you saw this morning, I think, from Eldon Greenberger from somebody, the numbers of how the statutes got more complicated over the years. They got longer, they got more provisions, they got more regulations. That is true of every one of the statutes that I have just mentioned. And an idea of it is the Clean Air Act, which started out in 1970, saying basically we're going to clean up the air and it now is at least a 200 page in the U.S. Code Statute that in much more detail and with much more particulars basically says we're going to clean up the air. But it's the general pattern of these statutes. They start out with very ambitious goals for short terms and then it turns out to be a little more complicated than they think. The Forest Management Act started in 1897 and now we have the 1976 version of it and FLIPMA similarly was an effort to pull together the statutes. So they're all longer and more complicated. Secondly, in all of them, the work is not all done in Washington D.C. at the headquarters of the agency. You've heard the Magnuson pattern, which is basically to give authority to management councils. I think they are indeed, as was mentioned this morning, unique in the sense that they are comprised not of federal, state and local officials, but indeed of a lot of private people and private interests too. And that the pattern under Magnuson then is the fishery management councils come up with fishery management plans and they are reviewed by NOAA. But NOAA, the only thing NOAA can do is say that the plan does or doesn't meet the law. It's quite explicit. There's no authority in NOAA to say you could do it a better way. There's no authority in NOAA to say we really don't think that's such a good idea of the way that you're doing it. NOAA can participate at the council stage, to be sure. But at the end of the day, once the council sends the plans to Washington, it's a vote on the specific topic of does it comply with the law. That is different from the other statutes. The Clean Water Act, as I mentioned, the state may have a delegated program. The delegated program happens only if the state plan is essentially similar to the federal plan. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has to evaluate whether the state implementation plan will effectively get you to this rather complicated set of standards and procedures. Both of those statutes are called cooperative federalism and the cooperation is between the federal government and the state government. Again, there's a lot of opportunity for public input, but they're government pieces and the delegation keeps a significant federal role, including the federal ability in the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act to continue to do enforcement, even as the state has authority to do enforcement. For FLIPMA and NIFMA, which is the BLM statute and the Forest Service statute, there is involvement of the public, but the work of the planning and the implementation is done by the federal government, sometimes in cooperation with the state government, but in general by the federal government, first at the local level of the federal unit and then sometimes for FLIPMA at the state, the state BLM agents have authority and for the Forest Service, it's the regional foresters and then Washington. I point this out because it's different from that. It's quite different from Magnuson where the delegation is to private people rather than to federal or state agencies. What about the planning component of these statutes? Magnuson establishes federal guidelines for planning and then they're implemented by the councils. The guidelines you heard extensively about this morning, they're quite detailed and they build in this tension that is they are both protect and use the resource. That is essentially similar to the Forest statute and the Bureau of Land Management statute, all of which are multiple, both of which are multiple use statutes and therefore build in some of the same tensions of protect on the one hand and exploit on the other and I think there are lessons from those statutes in Magnuson that when general guidance is given which may be contradictory, it becomes much more difficult to implement and you get tend to get much more disagreement on the ground among the different people who have different points of view about what should be done. And as I've noted, planning under the Forest Management Act, those plans are done at the forest level, under the Forest Act it's done at the forest level and then at the regional forester level, there's public participation, not in the decision making, but in the opportunity for public comment. So the planning processes, all of these statutes have Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, it's the delegation component. So the Natural Resource Statutes have planning processes, the Air and Water Act have procedures to involve the states and delegate to the states which are in their way similar to planning processes but except for Magnuson, the involvement is again a government involvement. Now what about public process? How can the public put its two cents in? For virtually all of these statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act provides an opportunity and one of the features that hasn't been mentioned of the 2006, 2007 amendments of Magnuson is specified that essentially the process for intersection of Magnuson and the National Environmental Policy Act need to be improved and paid attention to and no is in the process of doing that. That's very important because it gives the opportunity for the public, including the public who can't sit on the councils, as was mentioned this morning, to have input into what are the decisions that the councils are making, not decision making authority, but input. Under all of the other statutes, there is similarly an opportunity for public input in the planning process for the Forest Statute and the BLM Statute and through either the federal regulatory process or the state procedures for the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. Now that brings us to enforcement. How does enforcement compare? And this is the one place where I think there are significant lessons to be learned and would be one thing I would import, I'm gonna make it, one thing I would import from the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act into Magnuson is what I would call a modern enforcement package. Magnuson has enforcement authorities that are limited to civil administrative enforcement and through the use of a statute called the LACI Act and some other provisions to criminal enforcement. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act all provide a modern enforcement package which is civil administrative enforcement, court administrative enforcement with the possibility for injunctions if people are in violating the law. Criminal enforcement and the opportunity for citizen suits. A citizen can go and say you're violating the Clean Water Act, you're exceeding your discharge levels, I the citizen can bring a suit against you to get you to enforce that. Magnuson does not have an analog provision. For the public land statutes, they also have enforcement statutes. Enforcement, while it is done, has been less visible under those statutes and both of them have the more limited authorities of civil administrative and to some extent, depending on what you do criminal authorities. And finally, I wanna very briefly mention how these all compare for allocation of resources and the only reason I picked this topic because it was really covered by the prior speaker is that today, NOAA is announcing its cat shares policy which you will hear about much more extensively tomorrow from my colleague Eric Schwab. But I wanna mention that that's one way of allocating fisheries resources but we have other allocation schemes in the Air Act, for instance, an allocation system that's embedded in that statute is a cap and trade system for sulfur dioxide that's been in place in the statutes since 1990 for power plants. And in the BLM and forest service statutes, we have timber sales or mineral leasing procedures and so opportunities for people to bid on and then give a share of what they make from that exploitation of resources to the government. So there's a range of allocation schemes and again we can learn from those is there some, how that compares to what's being done in Magnuson and with that, I will stop. I'm scared of this thing, I'm scared I'm going to scream. I don't think I can keep up with John's entertainment value. So I'm very glad to be here. Josh Eagle originally invited me with Susan allowing him to do this crazy thing. I'm quite different in my background and my perspectives and my training from a lot of the people in this room. The work I've done over my career and now in the research I'm doing are much more within a social science policy analysis tradition, not a legal tradition. How does this thing work? So I'm not gonna cite case law, I'm not gonna talk about statutes. So just relax, it'll be okay, you'll be okay for 15 minutes not hearing anything like that. I have been married for 30 years to a Department of Justice litigator so I know how you people think. So the theme of my work over the last few years has been spatial planning, obviously marine spatial planning because I'm a marine policy person. And I'm gonna start by just giving you a really quick history of marine spatial planning over the last few years and how I got interested in it. No, there we go. If this thing works. So when I worked with the US commission on ocean policy, marine spatial planning, we didn't even talk about it. We pretty much followed a traditional sector by sector kind of analysis, although the commission called for ecosystem-based management. In fact, the chapters, if I'm sure all of you have read cover to cover the commission report are fisheries and non-point source pollution and they're fairly traditional chapters and marine spatial planning was not even on the radar screen at the time. But there was one recommendation in there. I should have double checked this this morning. I think it's recommendation 6.6, but I'd have to check that. It says something very general about the US should consider planning multiple uses in a, you know, together in a broader context. Very vague, no one really paid too much attention to it. But I was intrigued by that one recommendation and wanted to follow up on that idea. And I went to a conference in Paris in late 2000, in 2007, now I'm confusing myself on the timeline, about marine spatial planning in Europe. It was being done. They had made a lot of progress already and I was, this is fantastic, this is exciting, how come we're not talking about anything like this in the US? Came back and held a meeting here in early 2008 of marine policy experts in DC. And we talked a bit about marine spatial planning and I went around the table, there were maybe 15 people in the room, and said, do you think marine spatial planning might happen in the States? And if so, how long would it take before we got there? And the guesses were, you know, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years, it's new fangled, it's gonna be a long way before we get there. And then things kind of went crazy and took off. We got the Massachusetts Oceans Act, where they started doing planning in Massachusetts. Rhode Island decided to do ocean planning. Then in, we got the Ocean Task Force in 2009, created by executive order that specifically said, look at marine spatial planning. Massachusetts finished their plan, Rhode Island finished their plan, and just this year we've had the recommendations from that task force adopted by executive order saying, we're moving ahead with marine spatial planning, we're gonna do it regionally, and there's some specifics, but it's still pretty vague. To me, that's a tremendously quick timeline for moving from, I don't know, maybe it makes sense to, okay, let's go ahead and do it. And frankly, even though I was one of the early proponents, I'm a little bit nervous myself. Are we really ready to do this? Do we know enough to do it? How are we gonna move ahead? So, I'll put this up just because I think it's kind of neat. I was looking at it yesterday, slightly tangential, but I think it's interesting to note how much money the Moor Foundation has put into this issue. $30 million since their first grant, and all this stuff happened. So, one has to wonder how much that affected the whole discussion. So, what I decided to do at my extremely advanced age with two kids in college, decided to go back to school myself so that I could really do some more serious research about what we know about spatial planning. And one of the things I decided to look at is what kind of analogies exist out there. So, the premises of my work are that there are similarities between oceans and public lands, it's public space, supposed to be managed for the public good, there's some kind of public trust, although I guess there are legal arguments about what public trust means in this case. There are resource units being extracted that are part of broader systems, so I think there's similarities. And another basic premise is that all resources, extractable resources are actually part of broader ecosystems. So, if you give me those two premises. Then I said, okay, well, what can we learn? We've had 100 years of managing public lands and extracting resources in some ways more advanced. We've had more experience, we're closer to it. Is there something we can learn as we go ahead and manage oceans so we don't make the same mistakes? Cause I don't think anyone would say we've done a fantastic job managing the public lands, so maybe we could at least avoid making the same mistakes again. I'm still at a relatively early stage in my research. So far I'm looking mostly at national forests, but as everyone has mentioned here, there's also issues on BLM lands and park services that I'll look at as I go along. So let's just look really quickly at the evolution of forest management over time. And again, all of this in my mind is trying to say, okay, where are we in ocean management that's kind of similar and what can we learn? So the goals of forest management policy, again, some of this has been said already, started out being very much exploitation oriented. We wanna get out there and get as much timber as we can. This is we're building our country. Moved into a sort of more multiple use perspective with the Multiple Use Sustainable Yield Act in 1960, which told the Forest Service to start balancing, and that's a big word to talk about, balancing timber extraction with recreation, watershed and wildlife. And as part of that balancing act, they were supposed to achieve sustainable harvests and those two words, balance and sustainable yield, I think are really, really important in all these systems and are gonna be important in the ocean. But then the next stage was planning. The National Forest Management Act in 1976 required forest management plans for all national forests, and that was gonna include all these different uses, plus it also added wilderness in there, which hadn't been in the 1960 act. So then the action has to be compatible with the plan that you come up with. And there's an interesting quote, Charles Wilkinson in 1996 who was talking about Nifma, evolution of Nifma said, any corporation who owned 200 million acres of land would engage in elaborate and extensive planning. It seems kind of obvious to me in hindsight that you needed to have some plan, but again, the tricky words, balance, sustainable yield, to have a plan you need a goal. So how do you set the goal to make the plan? Because depending on what your goals are, the plan could be very different. And then I think there's also been an evolution in process that kind of tracks in some ways the goals, but I think can be separated as well. So it starts out being a very top-down management process. The whole myth of scientific management that we were just gonna leave this to the experts and the agencies, they were gonna do a scientific job. They were gonna basically treat it like a tree farm. They were gonna figure out what the maximum yield was and they were gonna do it all for us. 1933, Robert Marshall writing 33 said, the Forest Service is doing an excellent scientific job and his primary recommendation is we should just give more land to them. They did such a fantastic job, we should give a lot of land to them to manage because they could get us the maximum yield. And then we moved from that to, as the environmental movement was growing, public lands issues became more of a national issue instead of just a Western resource issue and more formal processes and NEPA and APA and all those things came into being and the public was supposed to give their input. But primarily it was a kind of one way, we'll listen to your input, but it was never quite clear what happened with your input or what was being done with your input. And you at the same time then had an era of litigation and media wars and lobbying and funding campaigns. So although there was some formal public input, it led to a huge just conflictual arena. Again, all these things are subject of a lot of dispute and are nothing as as simple as I'm making it obviously, as is always the case. I don't know if you can even see the bottom of the slide there from where you are. And then I'd say the most recent phase in the 1990s is moving towards collaborative decision making. People were getting sick of the endless fighting that was getting nowhere, everything was in court, nothing was happening. And in a number of places, some strange bedfellows got together and said maybe there's another way we can do this. Let's work together on the plans, let's do something more collaborative. Adversarial processes, even when they work, have social costs. So even when, if everyone thinks that the fight it out adversarial process is working, it leaves long-term damage in communities often. So there's an extensive literature on collaboration that I'm not going into at all but it has been absolutely fascinating to read. A lot of case studies of when it works and when it doesn't work. And of course, as one would expect, the answer is that sometimes it doesn't, sometimes it doesn't and you have to know when to go for it. I'm just gonna run through this slide because I wanna get to the last slide. But so some of the lessons we've learned, resources are part of ecosystems. Scientific knowledge is not the same as policy judgment and you have to be really, really careful to separate those two things. And I think we've done a poor job of that in the ocean in general, both with fishery management and with MPAs, Marine Spatial, Marine Protected Areas, I think have really confused science and policy judgment. Meaningful public participation matters and that's, again, I would make the case that that should go up to true collaborative processes including community people and managers and that you have to plan. You have to have some kind of proactive spatial planning when you're managing a public resource that's open to a lot of different users. So my last slide, just to answer the question, I'll jump the gun on the question that the panel was supposed to answer, which was, if you can import one rule from another natural resource regime into fisheries management, what would it be? And my answer is that we need to put fisheries management within a broader ecosystem context and the way to do that is through proactive spatial planning of marine areas and that's a really gonna be a hard thing to do and it's gonna require major change in the way people think about these things but I think it's important. And boy, there's a million other things I would have liked to talk about and I hope we can talk about them in questions and over the breaks, thanks. Thank you very much. And I'd like to thank the organizers for inviting me. I'm also thanking the US Homeland Security officials for letting me in, which was a close call. I was, for the first time when going to an academic conference was asked whether I was going to be paid and thinking they might know what an academic conference was like, I said, well no, but they have promised me free parking and a complimentary green card and. Remembering immediately that they're not trained in a sense of humor. So I did make it. Yes. I should have remembered that. The, what I'm gonna talk a little bit about is comparison only with the Canadian Fisheries Management System, I don't really consider myself so much an expert most of the time in Canadian Fisheries Law. I'm more involved in international law, which is a very large part of Canadian Fisheries Management concerns because of the placement of some of our key fisheries as straddling stocks on the East Coast and anadromous species that are subject to capture on the high seas on the West Coast. The international part of the puzzle has been a big one for us, but we have our own concerns. I wanna talk a little bit about Canadian approaches compared to the experience under Magnus and Stevens, which I think is reflective of fundamental differences between the two legal systems and the legislative and judicial traditions of the two countries. Remembering that the parliamentary system under which we in Canada operate means that the government of the day controls the legislature. Government of the day led by the prime minister sitting in the legislature, passes the legislation, and they tend to prefer, once they're in power, large scope of discretionary powers, not surprisingly. The Fisheries Act, the Canadian Fisheries Act at the federal level, which we're gonna talk about in a moment, has a grand total of 87 sections and 49 pages in both official languages. It gives you an idea. Now, if you try to imagine for the last couple of years that Barack Obama essentially would have sat in legislature a few times a week with the combined powers of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid. I'm just frightening thought in some ways. That's a fundamental difference, and it's a fundamental difference in how the government sees the structure of legislation. There is far less effort on the part of the legislature to control the actions of the executive, which is a fundamental trait of American legislation for good reason, because every time they draft legislation and the executive tries to get around it, and you redraft and you get it right, that's not a concern of Canadian parliaments because they are the ones who will be executing the legislation. We have to keep that in mind. These fundamental differences are often forgotten. I was reminded a little bit this morning when I saw a senator, a very capable, accomplished man and operating in a chamber that has a lot of power. People meet senators from Canada and they might be quite impressed. Actually, senators there are an upper house. They have no power. They were appointed until age of 75 by the prime minister with a pension. They have essentially been party hacks, fundraisers, failed candidates in parliamentary elections, and it's colloquially known as the Wittless Protection Program. But, well, there are some fundamental differences. I'm gonna talk a little bit about the common law position. Yes, sorry, probably shouldn't say that. The common law position, constitutional jurisdiction over fisheries in Canada and the legislative and regulatory regime and how that affects how we go about fisheries management. Now, starting with the position, we're dealing with three oceans, seven million square kilometers of jurisdiction without having added our outer continental shelf claim yet, although it's in process and it probably looks about like that. And this one, of course, is much disputed, not much on the West Coast. We're out beyond 350 nautical miles under the Law of the Sea Convention in some parts of the East Coast. These are very substantial resources for the Canadian government, but it's one that has never been terribly well-regulated. I just want to start very quickly on the common law position, leaving aside Quebec with its civil law tradition. Under the common law in Canada, Magna Carta did establish a public right of fishing and that still exists. But the fundamental point of the Magna Carta was that the public right of fishing can be removed or limited in any way by any explicit act of the legislature as opposed to the executive. So if the legislature decides to act, and remember the legislature is controlled by the executive, then that's that. It can be removed. And that removes any possibility of challenge in most cases. We have no public trust doctrine that didn't emerge in our legal system as it did in the US in the 1800s, which eliminates potential challenges. Under that doctrine, should the legislature act in a way contrary to a public trust? It also means that it was a closed list of rights. You don't get to add new uses, the ones that were in the Magna Carta are the ones that you're stuck with. And you don't get to have derivatives coming off it as you did with the public trust doctrine. These are fundamental limitations on what can be challenged and what can't be challenged by industry, by interested citizens, by NGOs, whatever. And I'll see you're George III and raise you a King John here. Constitutional jurisdiction, very briefly, slightly different, although some of the heads of power are similar to the bases, as I understand them in the US. The Constitution Act of 1867, which was actually the British North America Act of 1867 at the time. So we were defined as everything that was left after the unpleasantness of the late 1700s. And the Constitution Act defines jurisdictions in two fundamental ways, legislative and proprietary. The legislative jurisdiction over fisheries is tied up in the federal jurisdiction over seacoast and inland fisheries. We've had a series of very interesting cases through the middle part of the 20th century on what's a fishery, it doesn't mean fish, it means a fishery as an enterprise and everything that is associated with it. There are some powers under treaties and foreign affairs, although we had a difficulty that any treaty signed up until the 1930s was an empire treaty and they're under different categories. But leaving that aside, the foreign affairs power brings some legislative jurisdiction. But the proprietary jurisdiction means that all areas outside of the provinces are fully federal. So there, the federal government owns the fish, owns the jurisdiction and can do what they want. There are marine waters that are provincial, they're not all defined, which makes it nicely complicated. Some of them are defined on a definitional basis, bays and harbors that were part of the province at the time of confederation and we don't know which ones all of those are. But fundamentally what it means is that you've got a pretty much a unitary fisheries management system for marine fisheries. There have been a lot of compromises on the inland freshwater fisheries. The provinces retain proprietary rights inside the provinces but subject to federal legislative power even over those fisheries. So the federal government can manage, i.e. legislate with respect to fisheries even where they're owned by the provinces. And that includes any effects outside the provinces and I understand there are similar provisions in US law. So if they do something that pollutes the water outside, for example, that can be a federal interference. Now, within that constitutional jurisdiction, and remember, most of our constitutional jurisdiction and constitutional law for the better part of the first 100 years of Canadian confederation was about what the provinces got and what the federal government got. It was divisions of power between the two levels of government. We didn't have Bill of Rights. We got a Charter of Rights in 1982. Prior to that, the saying always was that US constitutional law was about whether the government could oppress you. And Canadian constitutional law was about which government could oppress you. And that pretty much summed it up with fisheries jurisdiction as well. The Fisheries Act, introduced in 1868 and not amended recently, but it has been a number of times, was broad and brief, as I describe it, and I mentioned the length of it. Little or no direction on management or allocation policy consistent with our legislative tradition and the drafting techniques. So general prohibition on licensed fishing coupled with a very broad power to regulate in the hands of the minister, which means the minister acting as a part of the cabinet. And I put all of this up there. I don't need all of it, obviously, but I think it's useful. The governor and council, which is our governor general, who is the personal representative of the queen in Canada, like I said, we didn't do outrage very well. We just sort of lived in this passive aggressive relationship for a hundred years. So technically it's still the governor and council, which means the cabinet, may make regulations for carrying out the purposes and provisions of this act. Boom. These regulations don't have to go back to parliament. You just make them under cabinet. Without restricting the generality of that, can make regulations for the proper management and control of seacoast and inland fisheries, respecting conservation and protection, and then there's a list of other things like enforcement. That's a huge amount of power when you take it that way. And with virtually no criteria or standards by which you have to exercise it. The regulations made under the Fisheries Act, they're quite a number, but even they don't cover everything that the department does by way of fisheries management. They have regulations on licensing requirements, gear restrictions, closed seasons, zones and fishing, all the sort of stuff you'd expect to see in a fisheries management system. But you don't, for example, see criteria for setting quotas, which we have, or setting individual quotas or individual transferable quotas, which some of them sort of are the enterprise allocations, or allocating within the fisheries. Those things aren't dealt with by legislation or regulation. They're largely developed under the general ministerial power and policies that are made under that, which makes it very difficult, again, to challenge. And we don't get a lot of litigation around our fisheries management decisions because you generally lose if you try. Now, from 1977, when we declared our 200-mile zone, and it was the same in Canada, it was throw the foreigners out. This is for us. And so we promptly proceeded to destroy one of the greatest fisheries ever known on the planet in the cod fishery on the Grand Banks. From 1977 to, I'd say, up until the early 1990s, the pattern was expansion of the fisheries. The fisheries in places like Newfoundland, based on the exclusive economic zone, became the employer of last resort. There were huge subsidies for vessels with expected consequences. Thousands of people entering the fishery who had never been in the fishery before and who 10 years later were talking about it as if they'd been there for five generations. This was a massive expansion with predictable results. It was an economic driver as well, how it was treated. Part of the reason for that is the bad side of discretion. Government scientists knew what was happening, by and large, they had a good idea. They offered their advice. The minister, having been lobbied, would ignore the advice and the quotas would be set higher and higher to meet the requirements of the expanded industry. The result was the Northern Cod collapse and other fisheries as well. Others were more successful and continued to be profitable. But at that time, you saw what I would put as the good side of the discretion. A minister who I never thought would do it, he was from Newfoundland and he essentially put paid to any future political career. John Crosby announced a moratorium. He shut the fishery down, put thousands of people out of work the stroke of a pen, which puts politically suicide, but he did it. And that became the basis for a bit of a rejuvenation in the management process. 1993, you had the establishment of the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council, Government Industry Academics, purely advisory, not like the regional fisheries councils, but it did set ground fish quotas, which were mostly followed, contrary to the earlier period. And a new mandate for strategic and policy advice which has come on since. Yep, it'll be fine. I'd like also just to point quickly to policies. Much of the management and allocation effort is under policies, which the minister may use as a basis for exercising powers. So we have now a sustainable fisheries framework from 2009, which has a decision making framework for precautionary approach, impact on habitat and application of this policy through integrated fisheries management plans, which sounds sort of like what the fisheries councils do, but they're not. They're a consultative exercise, but they're chaired and driven and finalized by government. They set out the status, the management issues, the quotas and allocation, and they may even extend to project agreements with gear sectors and others. But the fundamental point, which I'll put on the last one, is just to point to this little bit of wording that is a mandatory requirement under the template for integrated fisheries management plans in different sectors. The IFMP is not a legally binding instrument right up front. Does not feather the minister's discretionary powers. The minister can modify any provision of the IFMP if they wish. So forget about standards and criteria as bind the secretary under Magnus and Stevens. This makes it clear these are intended as guidance and the ministry is not going to give up those powers. So in brief, and I think I'm just getting into the two, there have been improvements. We have now more detailed policy guidance for departmental officials than we've ever had in the past, I think, and more transparent than it's ever been in the past. But those documents are still guidance, they're not law. And it rests in the end on these broad and very discretionary powers of a minister advised by bureaucrats. There are positives to that. It can be very creative and civil servants can come up with good things to do. It can be productive versus what would be the slow pace of legislative change if you'd have to do everything through the legislation. On the other side, you can have a lack of transparency if a minister decides to go that way, the possibility of political influence and industry lobbying in particular, and the lack of any opportunity to challenge the decisions. If I were to try and answer the question that was put to us at the outset, I think it would be somewhere along what a colleague of mine refers to as Goldilocks law. So it's not too much, not too hot, not too cold. Is it somewhere in between our incredible deference to authority and your fundamental distrust of government and our aversion to litigation and the possibility that it's emerging as a national sport. Somewhere between those two, I think is the possibility for a healthy concern for what the civil service or the bureaucrats are up to, while at the same time allowing them the ability to get on with the job without constantly looking over their shoulder to see if they're the subject of the next major challenge. I'll stop there, thank you. Okay, well I think we already have two answers from the panelists to the question that we asked you all to address in advance, but I think we should give John and Mo as a chance to give a straight answer as well. So the question for everybody's, to remind everybody is if you were able to import a legal rule or regulatory mechanism from another natural resources regime into US fisheries management, what would it be and why? So John, why don't we start with you? My response to that question and the way it's phrased is, I'm sorry, I can't. I would take a legal mechanism from another field of law and that would be actually two fields of law, that is business organizations, specifically corporate law and SEC regulations combined with some principles of trust administration. And basically what I would call for are a set of generally accepted accounting principles that need to be applied to pretty much any natural resource management system that we have in the United States, which would in turn inform a trustee, fiduciary responsibility and liability set of principles. We don't have either of those things. I think they work well in private industry and in the administration of trust and I think they would do a world of good if we applied those same principles to these very valuable trust resources that we've been talking about. Well I would import from the pollution statutes what I call a modern enforcement package. That is an enforcement menu that includes civil administrative, including monetary penalties and permit sanctions or the analog civil court with the opportunity for both penalties and injunctive relief, criminal enforcement and citizen suit opportunities. For that, there was a ton of material obviously that was covered in a broad range of federal statutes that were remarkably successfully clamped into 15 minute presentation. And so your efforts on that front are much appreciated. Let's open it up to questions from the audience and as with this morning, I'll just repeat the question for the recording after you ask it before we turn it over to the panelists for a response. Yes, I'll go. I have a comment. Lois, it seems to me that Congress enacted the magazine Seasons Act in 1976. It had before what you call models of the modern system between Water Act and the United States Act. And made a pretty considerate decision, A, that criminal penalties in particular were not appropriate for fishery violations. And B, that a citizen suit provision was not necessary for enforcement of fishery regulations. Are you suggesting that Congress would be considerate of those conditions? I am of course speaking for myself and not for the administration. And I think that the Magnuson tools are limited. And also the statute's been amended since then, so you could strengthen your argument by saying Congress hasn't seemed to change it since. But I think that it is, yes, I'm saying that I think I would change it. I am speaking for me. I'm not speaking for null or the administration. I was wondering if you, so Marie's mission planning to report what scale do you think bring up the state scale, do you think that would be scaled up, be scaled up, or do you think it's better at the more state or local scale? Just to, yeah, go ahead. The question was, what's the appropriate scale for marine spatial planning? The states who have been looking at it are of course only planning for state waters. So very close to the coast. The recent executive order calling for marine spatial planning throughout the EZ and breaks the country up into, how many is it, seven zones? I can't remember exactly the number. Some of that. Seven regions, and the idea is that the regions, all the states within that region, all the federal agencies that are applicable to that region, federal tribes, and then there'd be public input and everything they plan on a regional basis. My guess is that that is too large. Those zones all the way up to 200 are just kind of, it's too much and the interests are too diverse. I think they're probably gonna have to break it back down into smaller subregions. And that is based in part on experience that we've had with planning other kinds of public areas. I have a follow-up question. You've got states who are like state-of-the-art, do you think they need to be like, are there any states that are standardized so that their plans can be implemented or is that not really important? So the question is, should there be some sort of standardization of the data sets for inclusion in state-level marine spatial planning? The states that have done planning so far have depended largely on national data sets. They've gathered some data themselves in addition, primarily on things like wind power and wind resources, which is gonna be less relevant further, I'm sure. But most of the data sets are national anyway. So there will be some issues about harmonizing across borders between different states, and we already have a little bit of that with Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and it's gonna be happening again whenever you have an intersection. In Europe, where a lot of countries crammed into a small space, they had serious issues with that, so Belgium planned their waters and Germany planned their waters and a bunch of the other states in the area, and you'd have a boundary, an ocean boundary, and on one side would be a protected area, and on the other side of the boundary would be a dredging zone or something, and they've had to do a lot of work to harmonize across borders. I don't see that, because it's so early in the process, so few states have done anything. I don't think that's gonna be a big barrier. Yes, I really wouldn't want no fisheries. I have a question for John. We kind of talked earlier how fisheries seems to be one of the only natural resources that we can give out. Fishmen don't necessarily pay like they do with oil or oil and gas numbers. Every time we talk about a catch-share program in fisheries, the word privatization somehow jumps out. Do we run into some of our arguments when you're talking about land uses, or is, you know, harvesting in the national forests? I mean, is it, it's essentially the same thing. Is there a big problem in the product, you know, in those land uses, or? I think there's a... Sure. The question is, are there similar concerns about privatization in the allocation of resources in these other, in other public resource management regimes? Right, and I think there are a range of public responses to any public resource management system that effectively gives or subsidizes private enterprise by transferring interest in rights and public resources. So I would suggest that, or my observation is that there is less outcry or concern when the rationale is articulated clearly as to why we are giving them out at no cost or below cost. And then when there's less outcry when there is an acknowledged or observed return on the use of that. So if you think of oil and gas revenue from offshore development, the second largest class of contribution to the United States federal treasury comes from oil and gas revenue from federal land. There's a significant return there. But, you know, I would suggest, you know, I tell my students, but don't fall into the trap of thinking, well that's a market approach because you've got to further the economic analysis and say whether or not it's inappropriate. We're getting our fair return on this type of thing. Because as I suggested in my observation in the presentation, most of our federal resource management systems are giving away some or all of the value in the resources. The other side of that would be, are there non-monetary benefits that we were seeking to acquire from those systems? So when it was settling the west, we knew we were giving it away. But the payoff was, in fact, settlement of the west. When we allow below-cost use, it's because we want to secure access to certain types of resource inventories, whether it's coal for energy or timber for building those types of things. I would add to that. We also are not particularly transparent about the accounting. And that is particularly true for timber where the hidden subsidies are somewhat breathtaking. And I'll give you one example. I mean, at least until relatively recently, and I don't know if it's actually continues to be true, if you bid on a timber, you were a company, you bid on a timber sale and you said, we'll pay the government X dollars a log for the timber that we're taking. You were then allowed to include in that that it will cost us $100 to build the road and the federal government would deduct that $100 from what you had to pay them under your bid. It is also true that if it then actually cost you $50 to build the road, they still deducted $100. So it took a while for me to figure that out. But I think there are all kinds of hidden subsidies like that, and at a minimum, it ought to be that it's quite transparent what people are actually getting by way of a federal or a state benefit for that matter to. And we're very untransparent about that. We'll be in time for one more question. Yes. Yes. Steve Bollett, attorney from the Washington, Massachusetts. I'm not sure I should direct this to you, but it's a more general question. And we're getting questions, waiting for resources, living resources to oil and gas rates and timber, all of which are tended to the real estate that they're on. I am not aware that under the, that the U.S. has taken a total ownership of everything within the EEZ, which could also mean everything that passes through the EEZ. These are moving, working resources. At times they are in state waters. Does that mean they're the property of the state? And when they move outside of the EEZ, are they then some type of international or unknown property? I'm concerned about hearing that you're equating maritime resources with land rights. And I don't think that's correct. I do not think the U.S. has exerted that type of authority over the ocean. The Constitution does give us, reserve certain federal navigation servitude, but I am not aware of any statute or constitutional construction that gives us the nation those rights over the ocean. So the question roughly restated for the record is there due to the fundamentally different nature of moving in resources as mobile resources that move in and out of jurisdictions, is the analogy and the analysis that would compare and contrast these land-based resources to them after it and adequate? John, you had a response. I do have a response. They are not the same as those resources that are attached to the land. And as a result, and in fact, they're treated differently for that reason, they're not claimed to be proprietary interests. But the United States did in 1976 claim them to be of a particular interest to the U.S. such that we closed out the rest of the global community from accessing them. We didn't claim title to them. We still employed a rule of capture that said that only those people who employ their labor, introduce their labor into the effort to acquire them could effectively claim title to them. But we changed the class of people who had access to them. And as a result, we layered onto those fisheries in those areas a legal, a national, a federal legal interest that makes them at least a parallel resource to some of the other types of resources that we were talking about. Still awesome. Yeah, just two things to add from our experience. One, we approached that problem in Canada's Oceans Act, which is another piece of legislation that sets out different jurisdictional claims. And in claiming the sovereign rights that the law of the sea grants to the coastal state, they put in a provision as well saying all of these sovereign rights that we claim in international law, those belong to the federal government, the federal crown. So they put it in domestic legislation as a way of forestalling any claim like that. And second, our experience has been, I don't know what it's been like in the US, that it's been the property rights that have formed around quotas, licenses, and the like that have been most important. So we're still on the rule of capture. But the quotas themselves have been the subject of property rights of a type. The fact that you've got a quota, the fact that you have a lobster license, you can sell that for a couple hundred thousand dollars. And we've had a recent decision in federal court that says that those things, licenses, and quotas can be taken over by a receiver in bankruptcy, for example, as one of the assets that it isn't just personal to the individual as a license, it's acquired some kind of characteristic as property. Not the fish, but that entitlement to a certain amount of fish. Well, I think we are out of time at this panel. So thanks so much to our panel. We're gonna take our break. We'll be back at 3.15, it's about 20ish minutes.