 I'd like to welcome everyone to this very unique and timely event on China's potential role in Venezuela's political and humanitarian crisis. I'm Keith Mines, director for Latin America, the U.S. Institute of Peace, a publicly funded but independent institute whose core belief is that peace is possible more often than it is realized, and whose work combines analysis, field work, and convening to seek fresh solutions to the world's conflicts. I'm joined by Henry Tuggenhatt, a senior policy analyst on the USIP's China team, who will moderate our event today. And we're joined also by former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Tom Shannon, who will offer some concluding remarks, as well as a remarkable panel that Henry has assembled and will introduce in a few minutes. USIP is strongly committed to the proposition that at its core, the Venezuela conflict is political and any solution must focus on the political divides between the various parties inside Venezuela. We released a report yesterday with our partners at the Washington Office on Latin America with recommendations for a new round of negotiations between the parties. And we continue to work with all sides to support a structure and lineup incentives that would allow a negotiated end to the conflict. But the internal conflict in Venezuela has evolved to have a strong and essential geopolitical component as well in various countries for their own reasons have taken sides in the conflict. The relationship between China and Venezuela is complex and we hope to explore the roots of the relationship and the impediments to positive engagement on the political and humanitarian sides. We'll also explore the tension in the relationship between China and Venezuela. China has loaned more money to Venezuela than it has to any other country in the world, something over $60 billion. There's been tensions over failed infrastructure projects, embezzlement of funds, failed energy projects and the general dismay over the current Venezuelan economic model. Where do those tensions lead to places of productive engagement? The Venezuelan opposition has also sought to engage with the Chinese and shape the future of the relationship. So that's a lot and we should get started. We have a lot to cover in just 75 minutes. So I'm going to turn it over now to Henry Tubenheim to kick us off. Thanks, Henry. Thank you so much, Keith. And thank you so much to all the speakers for coming today. This is really the sort of event that could only happen on Zoom because every single one of our speakers is joining us from a different country today. So it's a real pleasure and unique opportunity to speak to you all at the same time about this huge topic. Our first speaker is going to be Matt Fertian and he actually published a special report for USIP on this very topic last September. So please take a look at that on the website if you get a chance. But Matt is a senior fellow, senior research fellow at Maiden University. And he was previously the director of the China in the developing world program at Carnegie Qinghua Center in Beijing. He's an established scholar on China and American relations. And I'd like to kick off with a question about your special report today. So, Matt, as we heard from Keith, this is a crisis that has gathered pace in recent years. And so I was wondering if you could tell us a little bit more from the research that you've been conducting on China, Venezuela, about how we got here and what the relationship between China and the Maduro and Travis government has been over the last two decades. Great. Thanks so much for having me, Henry. And I also want to say thanks to Jennifer Stotz and Patricia Kim at USIP for working with me on that report that came out last September. And it's great to be here with all the other panelists as well. So I'm going to mostly focus on a couple of the themes in my report from last year. And then the title of that was from overconfidence to uncertainty. So let me begin with the overconfidence part. And this focuses on the early 2000s. And the boom period in both economics and politics between China and Latin America and China and Venezuela. So on the economics side of the boom, the China-Venezuela relationship was really billed as the poster child for China's win-win rhetoric. And the basic background of this was a commodity boom much led by developments in China itself that really drove a great deal of new trade, especially of exports of raw materials from South America to China in the period from approximately 2003 to 2013. On the Venezuelan story was an extreme example of this with oil at the center of the relationship. Venezuela having the largest proven reserves of oil. And China having the greatest oil demand in the world. So the two came together during that period with a focus on oil. And the other key component of this is the loans for oil arrangements that really fueled this relationship. So a kind of Angola model for Latin America. So loans that were backed by commitments of oil sales. And so there a real steep increase in loans starting around 2007 from China to Venezuela for purchases of oil. And then the politics side of this also experienced a boom. We saw a real boom in the sort of diplomatic relationship between China and Latin America. Again, with the backing of the commodity boom. But really China focused or served as a new diplomatic and trade partner for the entire region. Again, with a lot of focus on South America. This was part of a longer trend of the revival really of China's third world or developing country diplomacy. Which it had revived around the 2000s. But really built on an experience that focused on Asia and Africa. Going back to the 1950s. But in the case of China and Venezuela. The relationship really focused on one individual, Hugo Chavez on the Venezuelan side who was looking for or to China as a new oil and diplomatic partner. And then on the Chinese side, it was the China Development Bank. Which was looking to South America and to Venezuela in particular for its global energy ambitions. And really Venezuela was its biggest bet at the time. And still continues to be a superlative in terms of the CDB loans to the region. And anywhere in the world. The real disappointing part of the relationship then began after the 2010s. This really focused on the time when Hugo Chavez became ill and then died. So period between 2011 and 2013. Relationship already had a variety of challenges and difficulties before then. But certainly after Maduro became president, things became much more difficult than they were even under Chavez. This was quickly followed then by the oil market crash around 2014. Which was all followed by both a combination of economic, political and social crisis that have just continued to deepen in the meantime. China started to slow its lending and then completely cut it off around 2016. But certainly after 2017, but has not abandoned diplomatic support for Maduro. And in the meantime, U.S. became increasingly wary of China's role in the region and in particular in Venezuela. And that leads us to where we are now a period of uncertainty and stasis. China has more or less had its head in the sand. Neither overtly criticizing Venezuela and the situation, nor offering as much support as, say, Russia. And this at the same time that there's growing global concern about the sustainability of China's development lending. So where we are now is back at the question of what can or should China do as we think about political solutions to the crisis. And I look forward to the discussion about that today. Thank you. Thank you so much, Matt. And that period from 2016 onwards is going to be particularly interesting to explore why China stopped lending and what that's meant for the relationship thereafter. I'm going to turn to Deputy Maria Barrios now who comes to us with a very unique perspective. She was elected to Venezuela's National Assembly in 2015 and she's a representative from Caracas. And from 2019 to January of this year, Deputy Barrios has acted as the vice president to the Venezuelan opposition's permanent committee for external relations. So Deputy Barrios, as someone who's worked with both the Juan Guaidó and Enrique Capriles teams, I was just wondering if you could tell us a little bit more about the view of the relationship with China from the opposition's perspective, in particular, what have been the most promising lines of communication with China so far and what role would you like to see China play or Chinese companies play? Thank you. Thank you very much. Hi, everyone. And nice to see you living in Caracas and keep the fight for the liberty and democracy future in Venezuela. Well, we recognize that China has been an important actor in the last 10 years for Venezuela, and especially for Chavismo. It has been precisely with them that they have maintained a relationship that seems to go beyond the commercial. We also consider what China means for the Latin American region currently in recent years, especially. We have increased its presence by executing a cooperation agenda and investment more so we see with the so-called diplomacy or backend diplomacy recently with a geopolitical scenario that has seen the future of Latin America but in Venezuela, especially. There are many statements that point to China as an actor that doesn't work between in the Venezuelan conflict except to warranties in the rest. That's its pragmatics. But it's also true that in recent years, we know there are any other Venezuelan interlocutors. China didn't even meet up with the 2015 National Assembly. It hasn't. So this certainly is a great challenge for the opposition. So let's look at the causes. First, polarization in Venezuela as part of political and humanitarian crisis that the country is going through generates a real climate of uncertainty for a life on both sides. This uncertainty increased the risks of those who have approached the bed of any political project, only a true claim of re-institutionalization in the country could make the change. That is why the importance of what may happen in the coming month in Venezuela. We speak of the importance of rescuing the vote as a democratic mechanism, of rescuing the power of the vote within a re-institutionalization scheme that allows us to work for the rescue of the institutions that allows us to agreements that enrich more stability on less polarization. After this, as long as its interests are respected. In Venezuela case, their interests has to do with all, with the ability to pay the debt that exists with China, but also with the possibilities that China can continue to invest in country in the future. We are sure that the relationship between China and Venezuela is not the only uncertain bilateral relationship, but we are differentiated by the geopolitical approach that both countries have for the region and for its future. And on the other hand, consider the statements that on one occasion the spokesman for the Minister for Foreign Affairs from China has suggested in the past. He said about the relationship between Beijing and Caracas and should not be undermined. It was in the context of 2019, perhaps showing his willingness to be able to have a meantime relations with a different government, always that ensures long payments in exchange for oil. Now, this different government cannot be the product of immediate of our maximalist policies. I mean, politics is not a matter of immediacy. In recent years, the discourse has informally been like this. Discourse like Maximilien's discourse about yes or yes, discourse about all or nothing. And that generates uncertainty, uncertainty for China and for any ally, ally of the regime or ally of the opposition. So China's pragmatism make it necessary to take into account its interests so that it can support resolution in Venezuela. Hence, we cannot expect that China will have a potential role in the process of institutionalization of the country without guarantees, without guarantees of compliance with the commitments that Venezuela has assumed in a legal framework. Up to now, China seems to be relative, comfortable with Maduro's government. Although it remains silent, it's also true that it doesn't turn its back on them. We don't see China as part of a process of dialogue or a process of agreements. China will surely be there when this agreement is guaranteed its interests. Finally, mind a while, Beijing will remain playing with however gives the greatest science of institutionality, power and stability. Let us remember that both its commercial interests, there will also be its geopolitical strategy for the region. For this reason, Venezuela is key. Thank you very much. Thank you, W. D. Erios, and thank you for the very sober view on the significance of the domestic political situation for the future engagement with China. I'm going to come back to a lot of what you said in the questions and answers, but for now, let's move to Meng Chi-Yuan, who is an assistant researcher on China-Latin America issues at Tsinghua University's Institute for International and Area Studies. She recently finished her PhD on China's political-economic engagements in Latin America, and she's calling to us from Beijing. Meng Chi, in your PhD research, I know that you largely focused on China-Argentina relations, but I know that you've also been working more broadly on China-Latin America strategic interests and political-economic engagement. And I was just wondering if you could tell us a little bit more about the view from Beijing and how Venezuela compares to China's other relationships in the Latin American region. Thanks to the host, Harry, and also my advisor, Matt, to invite me to participate. Actually, yesterday, I saw news that Maha Airlines, which is a Shanghai airline, and Venezuela Airlines launched a route from Guangzhou to Heron and Caracas, a weekly-based flight to facilitate exchange between China and Venezuela. So I suppose that the relationship between China and Venezuela is still going well. And for my talk, I would have to address three points. The first one is like, I want to mention the importance of China-Venezuela relationship. Matt mentioned in his paper, Venezuela and China by 2014, we had evaluated diplomatic ties to the level of comprehensive strategic partnership. The second highest among China's diplomatic partnership type. And in 2018, Maduro Suizi to China, he was public support of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and also signed the memorandum of understanding to participate in it. For China, the investment of this investment can bring the political returns like for Central Asia, I will not mention here. And in 2019, Venezuela is China's fourth largest source of oil imports and China's largest long commitment in the world. It is also China's fourth largest trading partner and the largest engineering project market in Latin America. China is also Venezuela's second largest trading partner, largest investor and largest creditor country. Then during the COVID time, China send medical supplies as oxygen concentrators to Venezuela as well as vaccines. Like on the May of 2014, the news this year, there was a rival of 1.3 million COVID-19 vaccines from China arriving in Venezuela. So I think that for the relationship among those like main stocks, we are still staying good. And this year also in the April 27th, the Chinese top legislator, Li Zhanshu, held a talk with the president of Venezuela's National Assembly, Jorge Rodriguez. We are the video link. And the two sides agreed to strengthen the exchanges and the cooperation between the legislative bodies. He also mentioned that no matter how the international and the regional situation changes, China will maintain its solidarity and the cooperation policy with Venezuela and support the country in exploring developmental path that suits its own national condition. So the importance of Venezuela to China is quite large. No matter what kind of political situation it's gonna be. And on the other hand, Malia that mentioned that China was staying silent for the political change of Venezuela. I think that for the, this is the second point that I want to address that for the Venezuela domestic issue, basically Chinese longstanding non-interference approach to foreign policy is the driven force behind his reluctance to join the public cause for political changes in Venezuela. This is like the first level of it. And the second level, in 2020 May, the president Xi Jinping at the meeting of the political bureau of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China, he first mentioned the concept is called the New York circulation development pattern. Now, this is the central of China's recent development policies. I mean, even in our academic areas, we are talking more about this dual circulation development pattern than the other ones. This strategy means an economic development pattern that takes domestic development as the main thing. With domestic and international development reinforcing each other, this policy was to rely on the internal circulation, making a domestic production, distribution and the conception as the engine for economic growth, which means in the other side, the Chinese expansion to the other countries or to Latin America, to Venezuela gonna be less that tight related as before. So even now, the Belt and Road Initiative policies stay a little bit in silence in our domestic discussions. Under this broader policy view, China is not putting that much of effort in expanding like getting the influence in Latin America or in other regions. For this one, I think it may be answered a little bit about how is the central government think about what we should do now. And for the third point, I want to address how is the Chinese Latin American research going now because we think that it's still important for not only for the Venezuelan studies, for all the Latin American studies that we are trying to have more the future understanding of it. Like during the 2010 to 2020, there are more than 50 institutes for Latin American studies like created in China, mostly in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, 16 of them are registered in the Ministry of Education as a research center and base. And but in China, we have only one peer reviewed journal for Latin American studies that we can publish on it, which is the Journal of Latin American Studies. This is created in 1979. And for the recent 20 years, there are around like 1,500 papers for the study of specific countries as like Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Cuba, Peru, Venezuela. In of these other papers, Venezuela has like papers has 23 of them, like we counted, which means that first, we want to study it, but maybe we have really few people or team or support for it. And in the next 10 years, China is going to publish a total of 50 books on historical culture and humanistic topics of Latin America. This is will be done by the Beijing University Publishing House and the central for China and Latin American studies. So it means that we have a history to study Latin America or Venezuela, but we have only really few people and team and resources. And in my institute, as Harry mentioned, I'm from Institute for International Area Studies of Tsinghua. We have our next year, the PhD recruiting plan for Venezuela studies because we found it's really essential and important. But we also put Venezuela and Colombia together because after we interviewing the past 10 years of students that they want to study Latin America, they will not choose Venezuela. First of the security issue that they cannot stay there for doing the two-year long-term field work. Second is that they are afraid of these connections between China and Latin America. So we are trying to attracting students to go to maybe Colombia and then they can travel to Venezuela to do the field work. So here are the three points I want to mention that first is that Venezuela is really important to China even during the COVID time or in the future. And second is that because of our traditional policies, non-interfering one and also now the dual circulation development pattern give us the less opportunity to go outside. And the third one is that in our academic areas we try to focus the more knowledge about Latin America and more knowledge about Venezuela. We are still studying. Thank you. Thank you very much Manchi, that was great. And I certainly want to hear more about how those relationships and those studies grows as you go on. I'm going to turn now to Adriana Abinur. We've got two more speakers who are going to be giving their opening remarks and then we'll switch over to the question and answers. But moving to Adriana. So Adriana is the co-founder and executive director of Plata Palmasipo which is an independent women-led institute based in Brazil and dedicated to issues of climate, governance and peace in Latin America. And Adriana Abinur is an expert on China-Latin America relations. She's calling to us from Rio this morning and she's also been following the tensions between Brazil and Venezuela over the migration flows over the last few years. And so based on that very unique combination of expertise I wanted to ask you Adriana about that. This is obviously a humanitarian crisis that has regional implications and Brazil is obviously one of Venezuela's most important neighbors. And we've got millions of refugees flowing across the northern borders. So I was wondering, could you tell us what the view from Brazil is in terms of what role China could play and how Brazil's relationship with China may address that? Sure. And thank you very much for the invitation to be part of this discussion. Hello from Rio de Janeiro. I wanted to start by saying that I'm very pleased to see this discussion move in the direction of peaceful resolution. Because at the beginning of the current government in Brazil of Jair Bolsonaro, the now ex-foreign minister was floating the idea of using Joraima, which is the main Amazon state that has been receiving Venezuelan refugees as a corridor for a hypothetical US military invasion of Venezuela. And at the time we were carrying out research in that part of the Amazon very alarmed because of course the regional spillover effects would be absolutely disastrous for the entire region. So thinking about not only China but the US in light of peaceful resolution of conflict is absolutely essential as a starting point. Now, South America, as you already know, is one of the regions in the world in which China comes into under increasing pressure to calibrate its foreign policy discourse of non-intervention and as Matt put it, this tendency to kind of keep its head buried in the sands with the fact that its presence and influence in the region has expanded and diversified so fast. Starting with trade and investment, but really moving into all other sectors and aspects of life. And so while China does not yet have a direct role in the humanitarian response to the refugee crisis that's coming out of Venezuelan, we know that according to UNHCR figures, 5.4 million Venezuelans have fled the country. Most of them are now found in other South American countries, primarily Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. So, you know, there is a growing expectation of positive constructive engagement by external actors. And of course, that includes China. So what I'm going to do is to say a little bit about China's changing role and stance with respect to refugee crisis more broadly because China's changing role in global governance is really relevant to this particular debate. It's not just about the geopolitics. And then I'll point out three areas where we believe there could be potential future engagement by China in this particular crisis. So when China, historically, when China engages with issues of refugees, it tends to focus, either be very standoffish or focus on the issue of whether China itself should have accept refugees. And for the most part, the response by Chinese actors has been no. But it's important to know that China is a signatory to, you know, main conventions around refugee and humanitarian crisis, and that includes 1951 refugee conventions, the Accompany Protocol. And even though China hasn't established its own mechanism for dealing with refugees in China, it kind of outsources that to UNHCR. In other regions, it's really interesting and relevant to observe that China actually has begun to engage very concretely with our refugee crisis, not yet in South America, but we'll look at that as an extension into a potential role. And what we can say is that, you know, just looking at Chinese media recently, we noticed that a lot of pieces have been emphasizing China's longstanding relationship with the UNHCR, but also noting that there's an acknowledgement of increasing expectations around China's role in humanitarian crisis, including international refugee relief. And the new institutions that have been established by China to deal with humanitarian crises through its South-South cooperation initiatives have already been engaging. So we've been mapping out some of these engagements for instance, the China International Development Cooperation Agency, I believe it's called in English, and the Associated South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, they are already engaging with a number of different initiatives. They provide education and shelter for refugee populations, their recent agreements between these institutions and UNHCR. For instance, to help refugees and other groups in Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan, especially in light of the pandemic and drawing on China's very long tradition of South-South cooperation and health, China has provided emergency supplies to Afghanistan, especially for refugees and returned displaced people, and it's also donated equipment to assist Palestinian refugees. So these are very important precedents to point out if we're trying to think of constructive engagement, even beyond the political level. So here are three areas in which we believe that China could play a more constructive role with respect specifically to the Venezuelan situation. The first one is through the UN system, and as I just mentioned, the new development institutions in China already have frameworks for cooperation and they have these precedents. So this could somewhat easily be extended to the South American context. Another mode of engagement would be at a regional level. Now, this is complicated by the fact that unfortunately, we're living through a moment here in South America in which regional arrangements and cooperation initiatives are either paralyzed due to political infighting, some of that has to do with Venezuela, of course, or lack of commitment. And so health cooperation, which historically has been very strong in our region, has completely choked, said to you as a US baseball phrase, in light of the pandemic, very little is going on. But China does have very good relationships with some of the regional arrangements, including the community of Latin America and Caribbean states. And so that's potentially an area that could be harnessed. If not at the political level right now, certainly at sort of the operational and logistical level. And then finally, I think we also have to think about Chinese investments in the region and our organization is carrying out analyses of Chinese investments that cut across the Amazon region, for instance, the railroad, massive railroad projects that are being planned and looking at the sustainability, social and climate dimensions of these major investments. And so if Chinese official foreign policy discourse underscores the need to stem the workflow of refugees and to help people return to their home countries by providing stability and development in those countries, I think we can say that these massive investment projects that are being planned throughout the region really have to comply better with social and environmental concerns. And so that's one of the fundamental considerations whether or not we're talking about countries that have incorporated themselves into the Belt and Road initiatives or as is the case of Brazil, that are negotiating specific initiatives. And this is absolutely crucial because we know that the type of massive scale and very fast infrastructure development that China has been carrying out can under certain circumstances also lead to massive displacement. This is an absolutely essential area. Now I'm going to close by saying that, you know, obviously Brazil at the moment is not the most focused on whether multilateral cooperation or bilateral cooperation. It really has shut its doors on a lot of its strategic partners that includes not only China, but also the neighboring countries. There have been some changes. The previous foreign minister has been replaced and the replacement, by the way, happened primarily because of the previous one's anti-China stance. And so there has been to some degree in certain parts a return to more traditional emphasis on negotiation of economic ties. But obviously we can't expect under the current government here for there to be any kind of major constructive engagement, whether with China or with Venezuela, at a political level. But we do have presidential elections coming up next year. So there could be a government change and that could constitute yet another channel for China to engage with the Venezuelan refugee crisis, whether through bilateral collaboration with Brazil or at a more regional level, if those channels are taken up again by major regional players. I'll stop here, but I'm looking forward to discussions. So, obrigado. Thank you very much, Adriana. That was fantastic. I mean, it's really interesting to hear about the social environmental considerations as well that you raised. I think they really matter. And I'm sure they'll come up in the questions, especially with regards to BRI and so forth. So thank you for that. Last speaker, but certainly not least, Joe Tucker is coming to, according to us from Cartoon in Sudan and he actually comes to this panel with a very unique perspective because he worked as a special, as a U.S. Special Envoy Sudan and South Sudan between 2009 and 2013, where he actually collaborated with Chinese counterparts at the peace process at the time. And so in particular, what's interesting about Joe's perspective is that he was working with the China National Petroleum Corporation and Chinese diplomats in South Sudan at the time. And of course, CNPC is also a very significant player in Venezuela and represents one of China's most important representations in the country. And so, Joe, I wanted to turn to you to ask you a little bit about what that experience was like in practice in terms of U.S.-China collaborations over a peace process. And in particular, I was interested about how those two institutions differed in how you engage with them because at the time China was very forthright that the CNPC actually ranked higher than the Chinese ambassador in negotiating the peace process and that was the same in Libya, of course, before. And so I was just wondering if you could tell us a little bit about the differences between those two institutions and what it was like as a U.S. representative to work over common goals towards a peace process. Thanks very much, Henry. And lest anyone think I was the special envoy, I just happened to work with the special envoy at the State Department. So just to give sort of an important minute of context, which is important here, is that this collaboration between U.S. and China took place really in the context of the implementation of Sudan's 2005 comprehensive peace agreement that ended along running civil war, as well as negotiations of issues between Sudan and South Sudan in the wake of South Sudan independence in 2011. And this, of course, was a very unique moment in time for all countries involved. China devoted substantial political energy with both sides to really ensure that its political and economic interests were protected, but this engagement was really not guaranteed. During the early years of this period, China really refrained from direct engagement with both sides on complicated issues, and that, of course, included tensions over the oil sector, which, of course, CNPC, as Henry noted, was heavily involved. And however, when it became clear that that peace really hinged on the timely conduct of a referendum on South Sudan's independence, the Sudan policies of the China and the U.S. actually converged. On the one hand, China saw a scenario in which a referendum could happen and be implemented in a relatively peaceful manner, thus ensuring uninterrupted oil production. An important caveat here is that production was indeed interrupted, but there's not time to go into that right now. On the other hand, the U.S. could see the successful holding of the referendum on time and really as a key part of the peace process reflecting the will of Southern Sudanese. Again, an important caveat here that the eruption of civil war in South Sudan in 2013 has caused a lot of reflection on this, on the conduct of negotiations, and there's not enough time to go into that here, but an important thing to mention. So negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan after this period were contentious, especially on agreement arrangements, including transit fees for the transit of Southern Sudanese oil to port Sudan on the Red Sea for export. The African Union and an African community engage both parties heavily on the need for an agreement on this, and Chinese officials, especially on the CNPC side, played an interesting, though, the quiet role into one particular aspect of these negotiations. Oil companies that were involved in a multinational pipeline consortium began to really engage both parties on the margin of talks sponsored by the African Union in Ethiopia. The unofficial leader of this group was a really, really dynamic head of CNPC in Sudan, a really good engager of all parties an interesting person in this context. He really articulated concerns of the companies about the situation, and on one occasion I remember very well formulated a proposal to try and break serious deadlock and really shuttle between both parties on sort of night and day as we witness in Ethiopia. This effort did not succeed, but was really a quiet attempt with the knowledge of Chinese officials in both Beijing and Sudan by really an empowered, I think it's appropriate word, Chinese actor to really try to shift the political situation to try and preserve not only economic interests, but create a more conducive situation for peace and finalizing these important range between the two countries. Again, this converged with U.S. interests and engagement, and a lot of this was discussed between U.S. and Chinese diplomats as well as with CNPC officials depending on the issue. There was a lot of good communication and flexibility on that side that I want to stress. So also it's important to know that this Chinese intervention was actually recognized by the international community in November 2011 of the Financial Times to go through an article to this and recognize China by saying, quote, it made a rare intervention. So this issue was engagement, again by diplomats and oil sector officials on what was fundamentally a problematic political issue making this intervention sort of all the more interesting. There are a number of other examples I won't bear into that much engagement between President Obama and then Chinese Vice President Xi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, then Secretary Clinton. And this was all amidst wider discussions between the special envoy from the U.S. and China and his staff on these issues. I also want to note here that the issue of the CNPC officials outweighing Chinese diplomats is interesting. Definitely needs further research. And in my experience, the following three things summarize this dynamic and Chinese engagement at this time. One, the timing of when respective actors actually engaged. Two, the need for great internal communication both within the Chinese side and between U.S. and China across the board. And third, being responsive quickly when openings arise. The intervention from CNPC in Ethiopia I was talking about happened over the course of a number of hours. And lastly, there were of course a lot of complexities involved. But I also want to mention an additional three things here that it was really important that mutual foreign policy interest between China and the U.S. aligned at this moment. That was absolutely critical. And in very many ways was unique and again, wasn't guaranteed. Two, the trying to engage on the widest possible range of issues so that issues of interest can sort of be aligned even if one party is focusing on an economic issue or a political issue. And lastly, really trying to ensure the broadest possible engagement at all levels among and between senior government officials, private sector representatives, embassies and even at the working level where I was. My counterparts on the staff of the Chinese Special Envoy and embassies and cartoon in Washington were really a pleasure to work with, I should add. So I'll leave it at that. Happy to answer questions and thanks for having me on what's a relatively obscure topic within the context of this discussion. So thank you. No, thank you. Your remarks are just so rich and valuable in the context of this conversation because of course there are so many parallels to be drawn between South Sudan and Venezuela in terms of U.S.-China engagements over the peace process and oil and of course, Matt Function eludes a lot of this in his paper. And I'd also like to follow up by saying thank you all so much for keeping your remarks so succinct because we've now got a really good time to dive into some questions and answers. So I'm going to start with a question about Taiwan. Taiwan has become increasingly engaged in Venezuela and the questioner asks what has that entailed and what are politics around recognition of Taiwan within Venezuela in opposition? And then how do you think this affects the Maduro government's relations with China? I might direct that question about Taiwan to Matt and to Marietta Bennett to begin with. I don't have much to say on this as I am unaware of what's going on between Taiwan and Venezuela at this point. Certainly the Taiwanese relationship with Latin American and Caribbean countries has been strained in the last few years as countries have changed diplomatic recognition and certainly this puts more weight or pressure on Taiwan to expand its possible interests where it can. One thing I do allude to in the paper is the sort of creative diplomacy that the opposition has been using in terms of reaching out to whatever partners it might be able to find to come up with creative solutions and it doesn't surprise me that those would also include Taiwan against this backdrop of decreasing official diplomatic recognition including from Central American and Caribbean countries. But I would hand it over to Marie Albert to talk about some of the specifics if she's aware of it. Marietta, could I invite you to share some remarks on Taiwan? Excuse me, can you repeat the question because I have a problem with my connection? This is Venezuela. Absolutely and please feel free to speak with your video off if it makes the connection better. But the question was, Taiwan has become increasingly engaged in Venezuela. What has that entailed and what are the politics around the recognition of Taiwan within the Venezuelan opposition? How do you think this affects the Maduro government's relations with China? Yeah, well, there are two points of view about this problem. Okay, if I couldn't say. The fourth is the last year National Assembly looking for a special August Taiwan held with insuance about against COVID, like masks, like alcohol and another medicines and on the other hand, China always fight with diplomacy in this case, especially no interval because I have the problem with Taiwan or Hong Kong and I don't want anybody in this participation in this. We're having some problems with your connection. I don't suppose you could try turning your video off and just making that last point one more time. Okay, I think we'll come back to a second because we're having some connection issues, but I'll just move on to the second question and I'll come back to you, Maria, but in a few seconds. So the second question we received is that is about China's investments and it's saying that China is currently taking measures to counter corruption among its own public and private sector companies. It's investments in relationships in Venezuela may be exposed to risks in this regard. How could this affect their approach to Venezuela and support for the re-institutional re-institutionalization process via dialogue with the opposition? Mengqi, I'd like to call on you and then Adriana as well to talk from your perspectives on economic implications. I actually started quite a few about the political engagement of China with Venezuela. My major area actually is about populism but I think that talking about the counter-corruption issues in the Chinese private sector may have an influence first in the Chinese economy and for the Chinese we actually talk with some state-owned companies, employees they work in Latin America some of them they work in Venezuela and their problem about how to do the collaborations between the staffers actually the corruption issues in Venezuela the Maduro government is quite serious for their perspective which they don't think that everything is going well and also the future projects they have a really serious concern about how it's going to be or where is the role it's going to be leading and for the second part actually it's like apart from the counter-corruption issues except for the working culture it's quite different so the Chinese economic engagement in Venezuela is also going to be a problem that to issue a more stable development in between these two countries and for the future view about how is the oppositions going to be the political oppositions in Venezuela are going to be working with the Chinese politics there are some diversities about how the Venezuela process are going to develop in the future in the academic usually the Chinese has a sympathy on the leftist government in Latin America from the Beijing University from Tsinghua University for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences the major group of the academy they have a sympathy on the left government so when you're talking about opposition in Venezuela they don't have that kind of equal view about what they are doing even for the counter-corruption issues or for the other political issues I think the main part of the Chinese government or any academic groups they are not going to be aligned with the oppositions I think that can be also a part of it thank you I see that this desire to address counter-corruption and broader implication of Chinese investments ties very smoothly in with the work on environmental and social implications of some of China's investments and so I was wondering if you could speak a little bit more about the institutional constraints that these Chinese companies are dealing with but also the extent to which they control and there are accountability mechanisms for the way that they engage in Venezuela and the region sure thank you for the question so we often hear umbrella statements about the Chinese model of investments in the region or across the developing world but what we have found in our research is that there is a very dynamic process of institutional learning where Chinese actors will come into a country here in South America and they will gradually change the way that they behave in response not only to local regulations but also the degree of knowledge that they gradually acquire about investing in that particular setting and I can speak more about the Brazilian context than the Venezuelan context but the relevance to corruption is also very important and we have a paper coming out through the Carnegie Endowment for Peace that looks at Chinese investments and railroads in the environmentally sensitive Sejado and Amazon regions is that they resort to a number of strategies over time and they include political dialogue at the highest levels and this in the case of Brazil happens because negotiations have to go through the federal government states as in the provincial level cannot negotiate independently of the federal government so there are political contacts but also joint mergers and acquisitions especially support companies so for instance engineering consulting companies that work on railways and this way they become better acquainted with the public auction processes and all of the other bureaucratic but also political discussions including sharp points taking place about for instance displacement of indigenous peoples and etc with respect to corruption obviously that also enters the equation in part because the whole corruption debate especially here in Brazil has acquired such a vast dimension we had the car wash probe and part of it the more debated one I think has to do with put ex-president Lula in prison and that was invalidated by a superior court but there was another aspect of it which had to do with the corruption practices of Brazil based transnational companies that were operating in other countries in the precise region that we're talking about including Venezuela so when we talk about foreign investments including Chinese investments in South America we also have to understand that this interacts with what's going on regionally but also internationally too to produce very different results so again we have to avoid umbrella statements about how investments for country extend to fuel corruption there is very there's a lot of variation even within a single sector in a particular country so it has to be looked at on a case by case basis thank you very much and that actually relates to another question that we've just received about who is actually in the driver's seat in China's Venezuela policy at this point is it energy, state-owned enterprises is it the banks, is it the state-form policy apparatus and I might go back to Matt for this question if that's okay great question and my honest answer is I don't know I would say that I stuck pretty strongly to my my claims my feeling that the CDB was the most important actor on the Chinese side you know in the case like the comparison with Sudan makes sense instead of the oil company it was the CDB the largest bank in the world that took a huge punt on Venezuela I don't know if that is still the case I still think that their additional interests are the largest in terms of the loan portfolio they're still incredibly important part of all of China's development finance that said some of the people who made the decisions originally during the Chavez area and we're doing the 5, 10 20 billion dollar loan tranches those people are now out and retired and some of this links up with some of the corruption potential for allegations of corruption charges being leveled I always thought there was potential for that in the case of the CDB and having that sort of Venezuela portfolio maybe taken away from them but I still think they have the largest stake as an actor in China that said I a comment on me not knowing it's now been a while since I've been able to be in the discussions that I used to be involved in that's when I worked in China when I was at Tsinghua University when I worked with Carnegie Tsinghua so much of what I knew came from those discussions on China Venezuela relations often behind closed doors during coffee breaks people coming up to me asking me what I thought even if they presented something different in the meeting and genuinely curious and I would say that it's a real one of the negative outcomes of what we can know as researchers but also government to government about what's going on one of the tragedies of the lack of linkages that we have now as researchers is the inability to know so that's a bit of a punt on this question that I really don't know but I feel that that's the sort of we need to have those kind of connections again to be able to as outside researchers be able to have more insight about who's who's in control thank you that was excellent and yeah I'd love to hear more about some of those behind the scenes conversations because I'm sure there's a lot more to be said based on your colleagues experience on this and I'd also like to come back to Joe a little bit about his expertise this might be a little abstract based on how you engage with Chinese counterparts in South Sudan but it's a great question and I'd like to punt it to you about China's perspective and what could be an attractive option to support in terms of negotiations design or model and what would allow them to exert constructive influence and protect their economic interests it's really a really a great question and you know of course I want to bear down on the point I made at the outset of my remarks is that it really really was an incredibly unique period in time that I you know I wonder if that could exist again that being said a key thing which I didn't really get into detail was that these negotiations on the sort of arrangements between Sudan and South Sudan in the wake of Watters independence were facilitated by the African Union and that's key here because that gave a certain I would say comfort level to everyone involved whether that was the UN system the US China countries like Norway, UK that have been associated with this because there was a real desire to substantively support the African Union through these negotiations and if another stakeholder another sort of maybe non-African regional block I wonder if China especially CNPC would have taken as proactive and helpful role I want to say my answer that would be no they wouldn't but I don't know the sort of inner workings of Chinese foreign policy and intervention coming on that but I think that was key here so what structure do a set of negotiations with a model what does that look like that would give Chinese actors the sort of the desire and the comfort to participate in that and when I mentioned this I think it was really remarkable that the head of CNPC the Chinese Embassy in both Ethiopia and Sudan really I think they felt comfortable in engaging with the US on these issues and engaging with the parties through the African Union because they didn't have to really get out too far ahead of this and I think that was key next really interesting I mean the need for the utmost flexibility in that design or model is a negotiation sort of went on you know from day to day schedules and really impossible to pin down sometimes there'd be days where they had to be on pause and then they'd sort of you know recover and move on and you just really had to be really hip to when you could engage and so in terms of a design and a model really having that flexibility and a couple of communication among the mediators the facilitators the parties themselves is really key and I commend the African Union we're really really trying hard on that front and inviting this this flexibility from all sides lastly and like this is the part of the response I think is less baked in my mind but I'll mention anyways is a division of labor I mean I think people realize that there were certain there was a range of topics that that were negotiated and you know I don't think the Chinese would have felt comfortable engaging on security arrangements on disputed border areas and that was fine the U.S. the Troika the U.N. the African Union knew you know which which set of actors was best suited to help with something that was key to so that design and that model absolutely has to take into account in a detailed way what particular dramatic areas can someone engage on because if you sort of messed it up and you sort of suggest that an actor work on a certain issue not comfortable with I think that that sort of can do a bit of harm so I'll leave it at that but happy to answer any follow-up thanks Henry thank you so much and we're just coming up to time so I'm going to turn back to Maria just quickly to see if we can get one minute remark on Taiwan if that's okay and then I'm going to turn it over to Mr. Shannon for his closing remarks thank you Henry and sorry again for my connection well yes in the last year there was a group of parliamentaries member of parliamentary who joined in the recognition of Taiwan about the policy like observatory in national general and WHO okay but we recognize the pragmatism of China is so so strong that happened the same point that in who the Taiwan keeps silent okay and China keep firm or strong in his position we we think that this situation just join China with government of Maduro and keep the position China to silent and to maintain the distance with the opposition in Venezuela thank you thank you for keeping it proof too that gives us just enough time to get some closing remarks from Ambassador Shannon thank you so much for joining us. Ambassador Shannon is a US diplomat who served as the under secretary of state political affairs from 2016 to 2018 in the US and from 2005 to 2009 he was assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs and from 2010 to 2013 he was the US ambassador to Brazil thank you very much Ambassador I'll turn it over to you thank you very much Henry and thank you Keith it's a great pleasure to be here at this event it's quite remarkable when you look across all the panelists and see where they're beaming in from and the remarkable things they've had to offer over the last hour or so for me at least it's been very informative and a rich discussion and I hope it begins to identify some paths forward when it comes to the role that China might be able to play in helping Venezuela address not only its humanitarian crisis but its political, economic and social crisis there are a few things that came out of this discussion which struck me as important some are obvious like the relationship between China and Venezuela is important to China and to Venezuela but also broadly in terms of China's relationship with Latin America not only as its largest loan portfolio but in many ways its largest political commitment I think China is understands how it manages its relationship with Venezuela as a bit of a bellwether for how it operates broadly in South America and Central America and the Caribbean and I think in this regard it's important to understand that China will not be driven out of Venezuela and it will not be talked out of Venezuela either unless there is an accommodation that protects Chinese interests and allows it to continue to operate easily in the rest of South America in pursuit of its national interests and this is important to understand because American foreign policy towards Venezuela has been one of isolation it's been one of attempting to prevent Venezuela from having the political connections, the economic and financial connections necessary for a government to survive but in a globalized world especially a world in which an economy the size of China has determined to play a role inside of Venezuela that kind of policy of isolation is not going to work what it has done however is handed to China and to others significant portions of the Venezuelan economy that historically had been connected to the United States and in this regard I'm talking about the energy side of the economy but there were other aspects of the conversation that were important the assertion that Chinese interest in Venezuela and in the region is not monolithic that there's a variety of bureaucratic interests that play here some of whom compete with each other and some of whom have different understandings and that these different views have to be mediated in Beijing and elsewhere but also the idea that Adriana presented that China's engagements are also shaped because and by the conditions that are imposed by the countries it's working with and this actually opens the door because it means that there are a variety of ways in which China can be engaged and a variety of ways in which it can be moved to play a more helpful role in addressing what's happening inside Venezuela but I was also struck by what Joseph Tucker spoke about because much of popular discussion and a relationship is shaped in terms of great power competition but what Joseph Tucker was talking about was great power collaboration and great power cooperation and I think in many ways the big challenge that we're going to face in the 21st century is not how the United States and China compete I think the big challenge is going to be how we cooperate and how we collaborate and how we find a way to keep the peace and ensure that together we can address significant problems political problems, diplomatic problems economic problems that be set not only our two countries but also the areas in which we live and as the United States and its partners look for ways to bring a degree of reconciliation to Venezuela to staunch the flow of refugees to create a more stable environment across South America and to generate the kind of economic growth necessary so that Venezuelan people can begin to be meaningful players in their own economy in their own politics and return to the kind of democracy and liberty that from our point of view has been a long standing tradition in Venezuela and needs to return to Venezuela in a significant fashion that China can play a significant role if its interests are understood and respected and if it's engaged in a meaningful way and in this regard the role of regional institutions and especially the UN I think can be very helpful and useful the extent to which we have attempted to block and prevent China from playing a significant role in regional institutions has actually limited what those institutions can do with China and is actually open to space and other Chinese institutions that have not been helped for US policy. This was an unintended consequence of US policy but one that I think should have been anticipated and in this regard I believe the United Nations can play a very important role at this point especially in addressing the refugee issues but going forward I would argue that the discussion today has identified several points of important interest certain points of knowledge and understanding that can be built upon to fashion a more coherent approach to China inside of Venezuela and a more coherent approach in helping China understand that its larger relationship in South America is at stake and can actually be enhanced if it can participate positively in finding a way out of the conundrum that is contemporary to Venezuela. Tom I want to thank you for your remarks and to all of the participants for your really incredible remarks today. This is one of I must say one of the most diverse and compelling panels that I think I've seen and that's not just to pat ourselves on the back but it was really remarkable I think to have these voices from all over the world and hitting this issue that is so central to the resolution of the crisis in Venezuela from so many different angles and USIP we continue to believe there is a peaceful negotiated way forward we are actively working on that and we'll continue to do so and this panel really contributed to some new ideas and new thinking on one key piece of that with the part that China could play in that negotiated way forward so thanks to all of you and for all of you that joined us today this will be on our website to go back and rewatch it and pick up all the things that might not have been clear and really appreciate everyone's remarks and participation and Tom again thank you for closing that out with those wrap up remarks thank you very much