 Thank you. Well, it's a great pleasure to be here. This is such an important topic. So I want to begin by making a strong claim, which is that for wealthy countries, it's impossible to sufficiently decarbonize without getting onto a path of work time reduction. Why is this true? Well, first, I think when I use the word sufficiently, I mean it both in terms of existing targets for emissions reductions and also global equity issues. So I think we need to be thinking about roughly 10% reductions in wealthy countries in greenhouse gas emissions annually, which is an enormous, enormous task to get that level of reduction. It's a really inordinate amount of reducing but is fair in terms of historic emissions as well as differentiated capacities for emissions largely due to income inequalities between global north and south. So the first point really is to say that energy system transformation, which is an absolutely obviously necessary part of decarbonization, energy system transformation, that is the shift to clean renewable energy is not enough to achieve these emission reductions if energy demand is growing. And that's been a big part of the problem, which is that we've had a technological approach to energy system transformation, but not an approach to control energy demand. And that's where we really need to focus and that's where working hours comes in. So the key issue is a series of relationships, the relationship between work hours and GDP, and then the relationship between GDP and emissions. And so I want to go through those separately. Let me start with GDP emissions link. So the first point to make is that the relationship between GDP or output and emissions remains strong, especially in some countries. And especially when we include what we call the offshoring of emissions or the offshoring of carbon through trade. So the fact that Europe and North America have reduced their emissions in part by importing increasingly dirty high carbon embodied products and exporting lower carbon embodied products. So the national accounts are really not the way to look at this. You need to do what we call consumption accounting, which includes the exports and imports of the countries. So that's the first point. The second point is that this crucial relationship of GDP to emissions is not moving in the direction that the sort of mainstream discourse or the people who are thinking this is primarily a technological or an energy system problem have been arguing for. And that is so-called decoupling. So the delinking of GDP and emissions. All of the sort of mainstream strategies of green growth, for example, or a very technologically centered approach to emissions reductions, which is what we have seen in most countries until recently where that that finally begins to open up that that sort of stranglehold on policy and the political discourse, that decoupling is not happening to any significant extent. So a recent review of all the decoupling studies just found there's no significant evidence of robust decoupling, meaning that emissions and GDP are still linked so that if we are in a growing, you know, an environment of GDP growth, it means we're also in an environment of emissions growth, everything else equal. And so what we have with GDP expansion is basically a factor pulling us in the other direction and eroding or eating away or undermining all the gains that we're making by the energy transformations that are certainly happening and happening, you know, at a relatively good rate in a number of countries. So moving off fossil fuels onto non-fossil sources of energy. A recent estimate from 2017 is that we need 2.5 times more GDP per ton of material resources than for each unit of GDP. We still need 2.6 times material resources, which gives us no pathway to even a two degree warming, much less 1.5 via a pure decoupling path. There's another really important point here from the research, which is increasingly renewables are looking like they contribute to increased energy demand rather than just substituting for fossil fuels. There's often an unspoken assumption in the debate that you'll get a one to one substitution when you add renewables. But in fact, what's happening is you get expansion of energy demand. And so renewables are not undermining emissions to the extent that many people had hoped. So this is a bitter pill I know, but we really have to accept that we've got to control the demand for energy, period. We cannot grow without emitting yet. So we've really got to slow down that growth and reduce energy demand. Okay. So how do we do that? And what does that mean about hours of work? So let's assume that we are able to get a political consensus or for whatever reason, we get to a point of roughly stable GDP. So we're not expanding GDP in real terms. And I'm talking, I'm talking only about real terms, not prices. So there will be price changes and so forth. But what is, let's say we're in a, we're in a, that's slower, no growth, GDP situation. What does that mean about hours of work? So, and why am I arguing that it implies we need to reduce hours of work? So the first thing we need to think about is the productivity work time, GDP relationship. Economies are typically generating ongoing productivity increases. If GDP is not expanding, then productivity growth can either create unemployment or reduce hours of work. I mean, in fact, both of those are unemployment is a reduced hours of work outcome, but it's just not a good way to do it. The inevitable, so what is happening then is for a given level of output, we can produce it with fewer hours of work, firms will hire those, will only employ those fewer hours of work. And so there's going to be reduced work time in one way or another. Now, of course, if we do it in a, in an intentional way, it's going to be very different than just creating unemployment among a growing number of people. A side point we may want to get into this in the discussion is that robotization, artificial intelligence, etc., likely accelerates this trend because it raises labor saving productivity, because it creates labor saving productivity growth. And, and that's something that we have to deal with even outside of the, the emissions reduction context. So what we want to think about is a kind of forward looking program in which we take productivity increases and translate them into shorter hours of work. So we finance a shorter hour of work program through productivity growth. Now, let me just turn for a minute to the existing research on emissions and, and working hours. And I've, I've been looking at this for a number of years. My first modeling on this was done in 2013. And what we find, and there's now a pretty growing literature on this, mostly from sociologists, but also economists, what we find is that in virtually all the studies working hours are correlated. They are positively correlated with carbon emissions. So countries with higher working hours have higher carbon emissions over time as working hours rise, carbon emission rises, carbon emissions rise and vice versa. So lower hours are associated with lower emissions. And this is true across countries. I've done analyses for the United States looking across US States where we're also finding that there are some studies at the household level, which also suggests that households who work longer hours have higher carbon emissions holding things constant. And there are sort of two big dimensions of this. One is the one I started talking about, which is the GDP relationship. And I've called this the scale effect, and it has to do with the size of the economy or the scale of the economy. So more higher working hours, all things equal gives you a larger size economy. That additional production creates more emissions. It's a really simple story in that sense. The composition effect occurs at the household level. And what that argues basically is that households who are more time stressed, who have longer hours of work, all other things equal, have higher emissions because typically the use of high carbon activities tends to be time saving. So transportation is the most important of these. The faster you want to get somewhere, the more carbon you have to use. Time stressed households tend to want to do things more quickly. And it's also true that certain kinds of sustainable act behaviors and practices are more time consuming than less sustainable versions of them. So more and more research showing this relationship between hours of work and emissions. Just a couple of minutes left. So I want to make a couple of two more points. The first one is another way of thinking about this is if you want to control emissions, if you want to get those robust emissions reductions that I started with at 10% a year say, you're going to have to keep purchasing power out of the economy. Because if you give people money, they will spend it. There are strong social pressures for upscaling consumption. Consumption is something that people value. And much of the sort of sustainable consumption community in some countries, my own especially the United States, I think has approached people with a sort of moralistic approach saying save the planet, consume less. And I think this is not a successful strategy. Appealing to people's environmental sense or their moral sense. They're just asking them not to spend money that they have. It just doesn't accord with a lot of evidence we have about the way our economies work. I think if we want to move households and individuals to lower consumption, which ultimately lower material consumption, or even just stable consumption, we've got to do it through a different kind of configuration. And that is by giving people time rather than money. And if we do that, Will or Beata may talk about this. There's a strong quality of life argument for doing that, but asking people to sacrifice by spending less doesn't work. So what we want to do is kind of reconfigure the way the economy works. And rather than have what I call the work and spend cycle in which productivity growth gets more or less automatically translated into more income, more hours of work, hours of work, income spending, we want to break that link between productivity growth and output expansion. And so you want to build in mechanisms that take that productivity growth and translate it into hours, shorter hours of work. That's really key. In the post-war period, there were labor contracts which explicitly tied wages to productivity growth. What we could do now is explicitly tie shorter hours to productivity growth so that we get a structural mechanism, a kind of automatic mechanism for driving down hours of work rather than expanding output. So how do we do it? I think that Will and Beata will, you know, may talk about this more. The four-day work week, of course, is a very popular option. But I also would argue that we need a kind of diverse approach that gives people more choice in how to take shorter hours of work. In contrast to what we had historically, which was a common schedule, moving through reduced hours of work. So first reduced Sunday work, then reduced Saturday work, then reduced nighttime work. I also think there are important legal protections, new time rights that states can grant to people. As for example, the Netherlands has done with a right to work less within the job that you have. One of the important findings of economic research in the United States is that if people want to work less, typically they have to change jobs and they'll typically have to go to less desirable jobs. So giving people a right to work less within the job that they have, which is something that's enshrined in Dutch law now, is really important. And finally, high-income professionals are one group that does desire trade-offs between money and time, and we want to design policies that give people that right. So last point here, because I've run out of time, there's another really important connection that I've worked on in my own modeling, and my students and colleagues are also doing more work on this. And that is to bring in the role of inequality, because one of the things we find is that, number one, more unequal societies have longer hours of work, all other things equal. And number two, at higher levels of inequality, the work-time emissions connection turns out to actually be stronger. So a robust policy of work-time reduction should also include robust policies to reduce inequality, and that will actually have all-on effects for reducing hours of work. So thank you.