 Coming in 1862, President Lincoln was getting impatient. In both the Eastern and Western theaters, his generals were dithering. They each had their own excuses for why they were not attacking the Confederates. So on January 27th, President Lincoln, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, issued his first general order. The Redis follows, quote, Ordered that the 22nd day of February 1862 be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces, that especially the Army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the Army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the Army in Flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico be ready for a movement on that day, that all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given, that the heads of departments, and especially the secretaries of war and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general in chief with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order, end quote. With this order, Lincoln was saying that his generals had better take action by the end of February, whether they wanted to or not. It's pretty clear that his priority was the Eastern forces, the Army around Fort Monroe and the Army of the Potomac, but he did include the Army in Flotilla at Cairo. In his directive, although Lincoln didn't know it yet, it was from the forces at Cairo that Lincoln would find a general willing to act. That man, of course, was Ulysses S. Grant. I'm Chris Calton, and this is the Mises Institute Podcast Historical Controversies. We've just finished our look at the incredible story of the Battle of the Iron Clads. Before we move into today's episode, I want to give a brief itinerary for how I am tentatively planning to tackle the war now that things are starting to heat up. Just to give you a little window into how I work on this podcast. When I started this season on the Civil War, I put together a spreadsheet of all the Civil War battles, including all the minor ones that nobody ever talks about, ordered by the dates that they took place, just so I can keep track of what I'm mentioning and what I'm omitting, if I think it's not interesting or relevant enough. I like to highlight the battles that I think are significant. I also created spreadsheets that group these battles into their various campaigns and theaters of the war, which is mostly how I'm organizing the chronology. I want to talk about the significant battles in rough chronological order, and the small battles that make up the campaigns around them have a lot of overlap on the timeline. I tend to be a pretty heavy outliner when I work on projects like this, so I use the spreadsheet to help me outline the military side of the story, and I've been reviewing and adjusting it lately trying to revise my outline for the war. What I noticed, which never really occurred to me before, was that 1862 is arguably the busiest year of the war in terms of military campaigns. Later events tend to overshadow a lot of the stuff that takes place in 1862, like Gettysburg and Vicksburg and the March to the Sea. But when looking at my spreadsheet and the battles that I highlighted as significant, I noticed that there are more in 1862 than any other year. Since I tend to organize my narrative by the campaigns rather than the battles themselves, I counted 13 important campaigns that I plan to talk about for 1862, and that's not including the Dakota War or the Missouri Guerrilla Warfare that I'd like to include as well. In order to maintain some continuity of characters and tell the stories in ways that I think will be digestible and compelling, I've decided to do a few things that are quite a bit different than the way most histories of the Civil War are organized. First I'm going to focus, for the time, exclusively on the military campaigns up to about mid-1863. I've divided this part of the series into three phases, the first of which we'll look at the Western Theater up to the Siege of Corinth, which will introduce us to Ulysses S. Grant and William DeCumseh Sherman. Then we will turn to the Eastern Theater up to the Battle of Chancellorsville, which will focus on Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, and this obviously includes some of the most important campaigns of the war, such as the Peninsula Campaign in the Battle of Antietam. And the third phase is going to focus on Vicksburg, returning us to the Western Theater, pretty much picking up where we left off after the Siege of Corinth and following the events through the capture of Vicksburg. Somewhere in there, probably between phases two and three, I intend to throw in other events that typically get left out entirely, like the Dakota War, for example. Obviously all of this is subject to adjustment as I move on, but that's my tentative plan so far. Once we finish the Siege of Vicksburg, I plan to break away from the military history and the easy chronology for a time and look at domestic, economic, and political history that takes place throughout the war. So that means I'll be coming back to talk about the Emancipation Proclamation much later than most narratives would. The economics of both countries I'll talk about as well, the domestic policies and prisoners of war before returning back to the military campaigns to finish off the war through 1865. So for those who prefer military history, you should be happy because we are going to get a great deal of that for a while. For those who prefer political or economic history, which frankly is my preference, I'm not a big military history guy. So for those of you like me, it might be a while until we get to those fascinating stories about the draft riots and bread riots and all of the government economic interventions that took place on both sides, but it'll be good to know the military events that influenced a lot of that stuff. And even though my interest isn't really for military campaigns and big battles, these stories are far from boring. So with all that aside, for now we are going to look at the Western operations that took place in the first half of 1862, and this is where we see what are arguably the most important strategic battles in securing the Union victory in the war, even though nobody realized it at the time. It's also where we see the rise of prominence of Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman. After all of this, we'll turn to Stonewall Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and Robert E. Lee's standoff with George McClellan and the Peninsula Campaign. So here in the first half of 1862, we find the most well-known generals in the Civil War earned their fame. In today's episode, we will begin looking at Ulysses S. Grant's first real victories in the war, which will culminate in the capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donaldson. When the Civil War broke out, Ulysses S. Grant wasn't exactly the paragon of success. He graduated from West Point in the middle of his class. He fought in the Mexican-American War and performed well enough to be promoted for gallantry. But after the war, he was stationed in a remote area in the Northwest where he was bored, and while there, he developed a reputation for being an alcoholic, a reputation he would never shake even after earning fame during the Civil War. After he resigned from the army, he turned to farming, but he wasn't very good at it, so he followed in his father's footsteps to become a tanner, but he wasn't very good at that either. But when the Civil War broke out, Grant was in a good position. He was a West Point graduate who had actual combat experience, something that was particularly rare in the North since the majority of West Pointers and Mexican war veterans joined the Confederacy. Each state was allowed to appoint a certain number of its own residents to officers' positions, and Grant was given the rank of Brigadier General by Ohio Congressman Elihu Washburn, largely because the congressman was friends with Grant's family, so he was throwing Grant a bone. Worried about Grant's reputation as a drunkard, Washburn assigned John Rawlings to Grant's staff to keep tabs on him. Grant was put in charge of the District of Southeast Missouri, which was part of the Department of the West. If you remember my episodes on the operations to control Missouri, this took place when John C. Framont was in charge of the department, though Grant's boss during the more important events would be Framont's replacement, Henry Halleck, who wasn't very confident in Grant. For his headquarters, Grant selected the city of Cairo, Illinois. This was a strategic location because of the waterways Grant was looking at. Cairo was next to Kentucky, and it was also where the Ohio River connected with the Mississippi, so kind of like railroad junctions. This was an important area for the transport of goods. At the time that Grant was doing all this, Kentucky was still a wild card, and the Union was worried that if it went to the Confederacy, control of the Ohio River could be jeopardized. Again, a lot of my previous episodes give some background to all this, and the Kentucky episode I did makes it clear that Kentucky was never in much danger of going to the Confederacy, but the Union didn't know this at the time, so it was still a concern. So the rivers here are important, and everybody on both sides knew it. Railroads, of course, were an important means of transporting men and goods, which is why railroad junctions were highly valued as the Battle of Bull Run over the Manassas Railroad Junction illustrates. But waterways were still important for transportation as well, as railroads had not yet made them obsolete. So the Mississippi River was the major concern, and the Union Anaconda Plan included the Mississippi River as part of the strategy of strangling the Confederacy. If the North could gain control of the Mississippi, it could cut the western part of the Confederacy, which was a major source of food, from the eastern part, which was the major source of troops. The Ohio River was seen as important to defend as long as Kentucky was a wildcard. But two rivers that connected to the Ohio are also important, and that's the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Although they aren't the major waterways that the Mississippi is, they still served as important gateways that connected the deep south, and commerce depended on them. The Cumberland River runs through Nashville, and the Tennessee River runs south into Alabama and connects to other smaller waterways, such as Duck River. So we don't always think about the strategic value of these rivers that aren't the Mississippi, especially today in which trade isn't so dependent on rivers, but at that time these were vital to the Confederacy, and both the North and the South knew it. To handle these operations, the Union needed to build a naval force that could operate on the waterways. I've already talked about the efforts by Gideon Wells to build an ocean fleet, but rivers were different. They were shallow, so they could only accommodate smaller boats that wouldn't sit so deeply in the waters. The Union Navy also had essentially nothing that would constitute a military vessel for rivers at the outset of the war. But as soon as Wells took office, they started working on their 90-day gun boats I've talked about in other episodes, and many of these gun boats were designed for rivers. I'm not going to spend as much time talking about the so called Brownwater Navy, referring to the Brown River water, but I'll very briefly describe what was built. The first three ships were purchased from merchants. These were the Conestoga, the Lexington, and the Tyler. Because they were procured by an army man without any real knowledge of what he was buying, the Navy sent an architect named Samuel Pooke to decide what they were worth. He gave his number, and the boats were purchased for a total of $62,000, which is about 30 grand less than it cost to build them. So for those of you who are economics people, this is a good example on the part of the merchants about how minimizing losses is part of maximizing profits, and also how events such as government policies, and in this case war, can affect entrepreneurial judgments about the future. The merchants built them anticipating peacetime commerce, but when the war broke out, river traffic had slowed down a great deal, businesses suffered, and the merchants were willing to sell their ships at a loss to recover a portion of the investment made, so the army got a bargain on these ships. The Tyler, it is interesting enough to mention, was actually named after President John Tyler, who was still alive. He would die shortly in 1862, but Tyler was at this point advocating Southern secession. So the army thought the name was inappropriate for a Union ship. They renamed the ship the Taylor, but pretty much everybody still referred to it as the Tyler, even in official documents. These three ships were river steamers, and they were hastily adapted to gunboats by adding cannons to them. The engines were lowered so that they stayed below the waterline of the ship to offer better protection, and the ships were armored with timber, giving them the name timber clads. Samuel Pooke also helped design a new class of riverboats, which came to be known as the Cairo class gunboats, also known as city class boats. These were the Cairo, the Carin de Lette, the Cincinnati, the Louisville, the Mound City, the St. Louis, and the Pittsburgh. These boats were actually plated with iron, so they were ironclad gunboats. In the previous episode, we talked about the two iron warships that the respective navies produced, where the Confederate Merrimack, or the CSS Virginia, was an ironplated wooden ship, and the Union Monitor was a fully iron ship. The Merrimack was North America's first ironclad warship, and the Monitor was the world's first iron warship, but these smaller ironclad gunboats were put to the waters even before the Merrimack. They would also resemble the Merrimack in that they had submerged holes and angled armored trusses sitting above the waterline where the cannons could fire. The exposed trusses looked to people like turtle shells, and the boats earned the nickname Pooke's Turtles. One final boat was the Essex. This boat was purchased by General Framont for $20,000, and he sent it up to join the other boats in the Brownwater Navy, where Pooke's Turtles were newly built ships. The Essex was modified into an ironclad gunboat. So these ships together formed the Union's Western Flutilla, and Captain Andrew Hole Foot was put in charge of them. In the coming campaign, Foot would be Grant's counterpart in the Navy. On the Confederate side, the Department of the West, officially called Department Number Two, was under the command of Leonidas Polk, and the counterpart of John C. Framont. And just as Framont was replaced by Halak before the crucial events, Polk was replaced by Albert Sidney Johnston, the brother of Joseph Johnston. But both Polk and Johnston oversaw some of the defensive preparations that took place around these important riverways. When it became clear that Kentucky was not going to join the Confederacy, though at first it remained ostensibly neutral, which will prove important in the development of the coming events, Tennessee became concerned about their own portions of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. At the Tennessee-Kentucky borders, these two rivers run parallel to each other, and they were only 12 miles apart. Shortly after they moved into Tennessee, the Cumberland River shoots east, while the Tennessee River shoots south, giving access to two wildly different areas of the Confederacy from what was essentially the same entry point at the Kentucky-Tennessee border. To defend against this, the governor of Tennessee, Isham Harris, sent the state's attorney, who had also served as a Brigadier General in the Army, to fortify the two rivers at the border. His name was Daniel Donaldson. The first site that he selected to fortify was the point on the Cumberland River, where it started to shoot eastward. So this is right at the corner of where the two rivers diverge. This is also right next to the Tennessee city of Dover. Donaldson also worked with an army engineer named Bushrod Johnson, who would be an active participant in the defense of this fort. The fort they were constructing was named Fort Donaldson after Daniel Donaldson, who selected the site for it. Next, Donaldson and Johnson went to the Tennessee River to see about fortifying it as well. Because the rivers were so close together when they entered the state, the pair decided that the best thing to do was construct them close together in the interior land between the two rivers. So Donaldson was constructed on the western bank of the Cumberland River, and the new fort was built on the eastern bank of the Tennessee River. This way, if troops needed to move between the forts, they wouldn't have to cross either river to do so. The site for the second fort was selected only 12 miles away from Fort Donaldson. With the scarcity of troops in the west, this was an economical decision that would allow a single garrison to essentially defend both forts because they can move between them easily. However, it would also mean that if the garrison had to retreat, they could only really do so in one direction. The second fort was named Fort Henry after Gustavus Henry, who is currently serving as Tennessee's senator in the Confederate government. But the work on these forts was slow. They weren't very high on Jefferson Davis's list of priorities. His concern was understandably the forts on the Mississippi River. These forts also got the better supply of cannons and ammunition, so Henry and Donaldson were slowly constructed and poorly equipped. When Johnston took over for Polk, there was a lot of debate over which areas were the most important to defend. This meant a combination of guesswork about where the Union was most likely to attack and strategic considerations about the most important areas, and a lot of this centered on neutral Kentucky. So there's some interesting stuff here that I actually wish I knew when I did my Kentucky episode. I almost didn't do an episode on Kentucky at all because there really aren't any good books written on it, and there are a few old history books that I couldn't get my hands on to say whether they're good or not, but that's it. But I definitely would have included some of the interesting tidbits that I've learned in some recent readings that involve Kentucky. This involves two characters that play a big role in the battles of Forts Henry and Donaldson. Brigadier General Gideon Pillow and Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner. These are both Confederate generals. I talked a little bit about Buckner in the Kentucky episode as a Confederate general who invaded Kentucky from Nashville. The background that I didn't have was that Buckner was a Kentucky resident who originally tried to uphold Kentucky's neutrality and keep both Union and Confederate forces out of the state. But when he realized that Kentucky was not going to join the Confederacy, he went to Nashville to join the Confederacy himself. I did mention in the Kentucky episode that the Union violated Kentucky's neutrality by setting up Camp Dick Robinson, and I mentioned that Leonidas Polk occupied two Kentucky cities in response to this. By the way, I reviewed my script for that episode when writing this one, and I realized that I worded this portion poorly. In the context of my explanation, I think I may have made it sound like Polk was a Union officer occupying Kentucky cities rather than a Confederate officer who violated Kentucky's neutrality in response to the Union first violating Kentucky's neutrality. These are the kind of slip-ups that are inevitable in projects like this where, because I have to write a full episode every week, there's no real time for adequate review like you would typically have for a published book or something. And I've made a few similar mistakes in other episodes that either ICOT or listeners have pointed out to me. If you do catch any details I screw up on like this, please let me know because I do maintain a running list of corrections and qualifications that you can access at mesis.org, and I've included this qualification on there as well. But anyway, I just wanted to clarify that returning to the issue of the Confederate occupation of Kentucky, there's more to that story that is relevant here. One of the cities Polk sent the Confederate troops to occupy was Columbus, Kentucky, and this occupation was carried out by Brigadier General Gideon Pillow, a native of Tennessee. So now Pillow and Buckner both held the same rank of Brigadier General in the Confederate Army and were serving under Leonidas Polk and later Albert Sidney Johnston. They would also be stationed at Fort Henry and Donaldson together, but these guys weren't fond of each other. In 1856 Pillow ran for Senate and during the campaign he talked about his Mexican war exploits. Pillow was rivals with Winfield Scott who he regularly criticized during the Senate race. But Winfield Scott was Buckner's hero and when Pillow attacked Scott Buckner wrote a series of scathing editorials that essentially depicted Pillow as a pompous idiot. So Buckner and Pillow by 1861 now on the same side of a war hated each other. This tension will play an important role in the coming story as well. Pillow's occupation of Columbus also took place right around the time that Johnston was on his way to replace Polk. So he basically inherited this problem. The invasion of Kentucky by the Confederacy that I mentioned in the Kentucky episode which was led by Buckner from Nashville was Johnston's response to this occupation under the reasoning that even though Polk made the wrong decision in violating the state's neutrality the damage was done and the Confederacy now had to consider the strategic vulnerabilities in Kentucky. The Confederate occupation of Kentucky was justified on the grounds that the Union violated Kentucky's neutrality first but the Confederate violation was bolder since they occupied two cities Columbus and Paducah. This gave Grant the opportunity he already wanted which was to plan an invasion of the Confederacy from Kentucky. So even before this Grant wanted to use Kentucky the way Germany wanted to use Belgium in World War I moved through the neutral country to attack the enemy. The day after Pillow entered Columbus Grant responded by sending two regiments of men to take over occupation of Paducah from the Confederates which was easy to do since the handful of Confederates there evacuated as soon as they saw all the Union troops coming in. Paducah sat on the Kentucky-Tennessee border and connected to the Tennessee River. This is one of those occasions by the way that maps would be incredibly helpful if this weren't a podcast. Columbus the Kentucky city that Pillow occupied was just south of Cairo where Grant was. Cairo and Columbus were both on the Mississippi River and Grant now had men positioned to invade Tennessee on the Tennessee River. The Confederate officer that had been in Paducah was Lloyd Tillman and not long after he and his company of soldiers handed Paducah to Grant with no resistance Tillman would end up in command of Fort Henry. The Union forces in Paducah were put under the command of Brigadier General Charles Smith who had once been one of Grant's West Point instructors and Halleck, Grant's superior, thought Smith should have had Grant's job. If Smith felt any resentment at being under the command of a man who was only a toddler when Smith graduated from West Point he didn't show it. Instead he confronted the elephant in the room right away telling Grant General I am now a subordinate. I know a soldier's duty. Pray fill no awkwardness whatever about our new relations. As they fought together during the war Smith would remain a loyal subordinate as well as a mentor for the commander who was once his student. So now the Union and Confederacy were racing to occupy Kentucky and both sides were trying to figure out where they needed to amass their troops. On the Mississippi side was Cairo, Illinois, Grant's headquarters where he had about 20,000 men under him. Just south of Cairo is Columbus, Kentucky where Leonidas Polk who stayed on as one of Johnston's subordinate officers was stationed with roughly 12,000 men. The Confederacy saw Columbus as the priority area expecting that the Union would invade there first since it sat on the Mississippi. Johnston set up his headquarter in an odd place, Bowling Green, Kentucky. This wasn't just odd because it was an ostensibly neutral but effectively Union City but it was also the edge of his area of command. Typically the commander of a department would select a more central location for his headquarters where he get direct operations in the area effectively and not have to worry about immediate invasion. I don't know why he selected Bowling Green though but he had 15,000 troops with him. Another reason it was odd that Johnston was in Bowling Green himself was because he thought it was going to be attacked by Union General Don Carlos Buell who was in Lexington, Kentucky with about 45,000 troops. Johnston in fact falsely believed that Buell had 80,000 troops so he picked his headquarters a city. So he picked for his headquarters a city that he believed was going to be invaded by a much larger army. Tactically this seems to be a really inexplicable decision. It was a city that the Confederacy understandably wanted to control because it had an important railroad junction but it makes little sense for the department commander to use it as his headquarters. But because Bowling Green and Columbus were seen as the vulnerable and strategically prioritized area they got the bulk of the Confederacy's Western resources. One other city is important and that's Belmont, Missouri which was just on the other side of the Mississippi from Columbus. In November Grant took five regiments of soldiers and attacked a Confederate camp there. Confederates were caught by surprise and fled. The Union soldiers immediately took to looting the camp which displeased Grant so he ordered it burned to stop their looting aside from taking militarily useful spoils such as a pair of cannons, a few horses, and some Confederate prisoners. While the Union soldiers were busy looting and destroying the camp the Confederates regrouped and counter-attacked driving the Yankees back to their boats. The Battle of Belmont was a minor affair but it served to validate the notion that Columbus was a target for the Union deserving higher priority in Confederate resources than for Henry and Donaldson. After the coming battles were over various people would try to take credit for the plan to capture Fort Henry and Donaldson and we don't exactly know who it originally came from though it's possible that a number of people recognized their strategic value and vulnerability independently of each other. The first person on record as having advocated the plan was an army engineer Colonel Charles Whittlesey who sent a message to General Hallick on November 20th 1861 that suggested moving up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers which would open the routes to Nashville in the deeper south and force the Confederates out of Columbus and Bowling Green Kentucky. It seems that General Buell also recognized the strategic potential sending a similar message not long after Whittlesey's. Hallick of course claimed credit for the plan and William to comes to Sherman at least supported him in this. Sherman's account makes Hallick appear to be the wise teacher schooling the young officers Sherman and Hallick's chief of staff George Washington Coulom who is also present. In his memoir Sherman writes quote General Hallick had a map on his table with a large pencil in his hand and asked where is the rubble line? Coulom drew the pencil through Bowling Green, Fort Stonelson and Henry and Columbus Kentucky that is their line said Hallick now where is the proper place to break it? And either Coulom or I said naturally the center. Hallick drew a line perpendicular to the other near its middle and it coincided nearly with the general course of the Tennessee river and he said that's the true line of operations. This occurred more than a month before General Grant began the movement and as he was subject to General Hallick's orders I have always given Hallick the full credit for that movement which was skillful, successful and extremely rich in military results end quote. By the time Sherman wrote this he was far more famous than Hallick and there's no reason for him to have fabricated or embellished the story to Hallick's benefit so we can assume it's reasonably true but as far as I know Sherman was not aware of the messages Hallick had already received from subordinates observing these insights so in fairness to Hallick he does deserve credit for at least recognizing the soundness of the recommendations of his subordinates which he could have ignored but it is doubtful that he came up with the plan himself though he apparently had no issue taking credit for it. It does seem that Grant himself had also already recognized the value of attacking along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers though it isn't clear if this was his original insight either but when Grant was pushing to advance Hallick kept denying him permission as I've already mentioned Hallick didn't have a great deal of faith in Grant and he wanted Charles Smith to replace him it isn't that Hallick hated Grant or thought he was entirely incompetent but he did believe Grant was rash and overly aggressive in contrast with the conservative Hallick who preferred slow deliberate operations to bold and risky ones Grant it seems was the one who recognized the benefit of using the Navy as part of the plan though The other people advocating the plan were all Army officers like Grant so they seem to have been considering land-based assaults Grant wanted to conduct a joint operation where the gunboats attacked from the water while the Army attacked from the land when Grant met with Captain Andrew Foot the two men agreed and Foot's acceptance of Grant's idea added credibility since Foot was at this point the more trusted military man On January 28th after Grant had repeatedly been denied request to advance Captain Foot wrote to Hallick Grant and myself are of the opinion that Fort Henry on the Tennessee River can be carried with four ironclad gunboats and troops to permanently occupy Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready? On the same day Grant sent Hallick a similar message With permission I will take Fort Henry on the Tennessee and establish and hold a large camp there On the 29th he pushed Hallick even more with a follow-up message If this is not done soon there is but little doubt that the defenses of both the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers will be materially strengthened The advantages of this move are as perceptible to the general commanding as to myself therefore further statements are unnecessary Hallick knew that what they were saying was correct Grant and Foot both agreed to the plan and Foot's credibility gave Hallick more confidence than he had in Grant alone But these messages also came on the two days after Lincoln issued his general order that I introduced the episode with which effectively told Hallick that he was going to have to act soon anyway The time for delay was over On January 30th Hallick sent a telegram to Washington that read General Grant and Commodore Foot will be ordered to immediately advance and reduce and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and also to cut the railroad between Dover and Paris Then Hallick sent the order to Grant Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry I will send you written instructions by mail end quote In the first volume of the book Grant Rises in the West Kenneth Williams calls this quote one of the most important dispatches of the war end quote It would be a long time before people realized exactly why this order was so phenomenally significant But it would begin with the capture of Fort Henry which we will look at in the next episode Historical Controversies Historical Controversies is a production of the Ludwig von Mises Institute If you would like to support the show please subscribe on iTunes, Google Play, or Stitcher and leave a positive review You can also support the show financially by donating at Mises.org slash Support HC If you would like to explore the rest of our content please visit Mises.org That's M-I-S-E-S dot O-R-G