 Hang under the thought, because I want to play off this, what you've talked about, about doing damage. Just say, for instance, in a hypothetical world in some other parallel universe, that Trump is not re-elected for another term. How much of the damage that John's talking about, how much of that damage is going to be permanent, or maybe at least long term? And how much can be recovered by the next president, whoever that might be, within a very short period of time? I think that Joseph is right, I think there is a continuity in American politics, it's quite obvious, and that Trump's particular style makes us forget it, but there is a continuity in American politics. I agree that the great change is the abandonment of neo-conservatism in the United States. This doctrine considers that justice, or democracy, is more important than peace. That's it. Today, we've come back to the materialism of the Mediterranean or the Kisingerian. Peace is the most important thing. I think that there is legacy, as they say in English, of Trump's legacy that will remain very important. It's still the first that he said, he said to Davos, and no one had said it before him. Not a president of the European Commission had said it, not an American president had said it. He said it extremely clearly, and it's the first to have said it. The Chinese have stopped stealing technology, it's very important. And he has a bipartisan support on it, and we've had, until Trump, we've had American presidents who have been extremely, in English, complacent, extremely indulgent in China's war, including Obama. I just want to remind you that when Xi Jinping came to the United States in a press conference, he was asked about the fact that the Chinese had captured the receipts of the Paracels and Spartles islands in the Mediterranean Sea. And Xi Jinping answered publicly, yes, but he promised that he would never militarize these islands. Today, we have Chinese strategic bombers with large pistols and missiles on six or seven of these islands that are in international law, terra-en-oulious, those that belong to no one, and China doesn't recognize, which still claims to be attached to the multilateralists, they don't recognize the authority or the decision of the permanent arbitration court on the possession of this maritime China. So that's going to be, in my opinion, the main heritage of Trump. His foreign policy, and it's extremely simple, and it was said, it's all his foreign policy, and it remains 55 weeks before the election, it's going to be turned to what can make me succeed. My argumentation, I am Trump, my argumentation in the eyes of an American electorate who is not the most sophisticated in the world, you have to recognize him. He is very simple. He said, he will say, thanks to me, before we entered, like in a mill in America, with me, it's over, even if it's not true, no matter what, the feeling, because when politics doesn't count the truth, it's the feeling, people say, yes, it's true, it's true that he protected the borders, he fought a clandestine immigration. Then he will say, my detractors for the electoral campaign, we say, it's true, you have a lot of articles in the New York Times, such as Glitz and Haute, which explained that if Trump was elected, it would be an absolute disaster for the American economy. No, never, the situation has been better, it has been better for the disadvantaged classes, for the blacks and the Hispanics, who have never known better salaries and have never known better jobs. And... John Carter shaking his head, yes, I think he's... I agree with him, I understand, I agree with him. No, but it's the campaign he's going to do, you have to be realistic. But it's the reality. And the third thing, so it means I was a good minister of the interior, I was a good minister of the economy. There is one last thing left for him, he has to show that he was a good minister of foreign affairs, and that's why he's looking for a deal, something that is media, that can be sold, because obviously the appearance is all in Trumpism. And then, there's Iran, that's why he was tempted by Macron's proposal to New York, there's Korea, but indeed in the execution he wasn't very good and I'm not sure that Koreans really want a deal, he needs something, maybe he wants to get it with China, but he also needs the day of the election to say, look, and I'm also a great diplomat, and I think it will suffice if he manages to meet these three conditions. I think it can suffice to do so. Again, I mean, if you believe in the poll, and so far ahead of the election, 55 weeks, 55 weeks, but there's one element on which is always better is doing well for the economy. The Americans, the majority of the Americans said is doing well for the economy and the job situation has improved. Now, I agree with you, he needs something else, he needs something more, is he going to get it? That's a big question. The reality is that, and again, the question is not so much whether he's going to get reelected on his own merit. The question to me is more, and we touch on that, and I agree with you. I think Biden is toast, as we said in America, for a vital reason. I don't think it has to do with the story of his surviving son or anything. I think it has to do with the perception that when people, somebody said yesterday, you need to be 80 years old to be President of the United States now, and I think it's a very good comment. It used to be true for China, now it's unfortunately true for the United States. So we are in a situation, the people, it was true in 2016, it's not just in the United States. Unfortunately, in modern democracies, we don't vote for someone, we vote against someone. When I voted in 2016, I make no, it's not a secret, I said it publicly, I voted against Trump, and I voted against Hillary Clinton, and I voted for a candidate who had no chance of getting elected, but got 4 million votes, Gary Johnson. My point is that in 2016, 7 million Americans voted for somebody else than Clinton or Trump. This time, the question is going to be, we don't like Trump, we don't like his tweets, and I hear it all the time from my Republican friends. But at the same time, they'll look, who's going to be the nominee of the Democratic Party? Too early to say, Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders are the hot problem, I wish him well. Elizabeth Warren has a good chance of being the nominee. And the Pocahontas, as you said, and the rest is going to come out. And it's going to be an easy campaign, and Trump can be extremely nasty, and he will be very nasty, and he will get a lot of support for that. So I'm not saying it's going to work, but the reality is at the end of the day, people are not going to vote for somebody, they're going to vote against someone, and they will say, what's worse, having 4 more years with damaging consequences? I agree, that's real, and that could be serious. At the same time, do we want Medicare for All, or do we want the Green New Deal? Which is something totally crazy. I believe in the environment, but the Green New Deal, if you have not read about it, please study it. We've got to bring Moto into this. Let me just come back to your original question, whether there's going to be a changing international system with or without Trump. Now, first we have to remember, when Mr. Trump started the trade war with China, the main issue was the trade deficit and tariffs, and protection of some industries. But now, the much more important issue you just mentioned, the intellectual property or forced technology transfer, and so not only just Mr. Trump, many people in the United States are critical against China, so that may take some more time. And then the big question is, when China entered the WTO in 2001, the size of the Chinese economy was only 1 over 10 of the present size. So in the last 10 years, China has become very, very big, and the question is, can these two big economies coexist under the present umbrella of the WTO? And this seems to be very difficult. So not only the behavior change of China and the United States, which may be necessary for convergence, but we have to think about more realistic international system. Unfortunately, we don't know every very clear picture, but that is exactly the point. I mean, to remember, when you have some kind of globalization, then you need some kind of change of the system in order to sustain the system. I want to try something that's a little bit of a surprise for you, because I hadn't briefed you on any of this, but I think one of the things I'd like to ask you, because you're all very highly placed in your various societies and political systems, what do you think your prime minister or president, what do you think that the people around them, the foreign ministers and whatnot, find the most annoying about Mr. Trump? And maybe at the same time, the thing they find most agreeable about dealing with Mr. Trump. John, why don't we start with you? Do you have any ideas? Okay, well, the first thing I'd say is that in terms of the British relationship with America, as Joseph would say, 90% of it is unchanged. The only thing that gets changed are things that touch the White House. And as most of us know who have worked in government, actually relatively few issues go to the head of government. Most of them are sorted out at bureaucratic or institutional, departmental level. Certainly the intelligence cooperation between Britain and America hasn't changed at all, despite Trump's unreliability on intelligence and his degree of disregard or contempt for America's intelligence agencies. So life goes on, and heads of government, they dominate the media. You guys got lovely stories out of Trump, but actually life does go on as normal. And the great thing, in many ways, if you want to do regular business with the United States, keep it away from heads of government, keep it away from Trump. But unreliable would be one of the words you would think of, though. Well, he's unpredictable. He has, he takes decisions based on prejudices and preconceived ideas. He doesn't try to educate himself. Now, Obama was the opposite extreme. He educated himself so much that he didn't take decisions. But Trump, you get decisions instantly without caring what the, really, what the consequences of them are. It's just gut instinct as to what his base is going to welcome. Now, what about Xi? What do you think he finds, the people around him, what do they find most annoying about Mr. Trump? Let me first back to the question you asked, with or without Trump, is anything changing in terms of relations between China and the U.S.? I don't think it will be a substantial change without Trump. As many people say in the past two days, there's a fundamental difference between these two countries. So only thing may be changing is the focus may be changing from trade to maybe human rights, or the style will be changing. The substantial tension, I guess, will be persistent for a long, long time. That's my thing. For Chinese side, I don't think they are very much interested in internal politics in the United States, because that's something nothing to do with us. Of course, doesn't mean they don't look closely. Because this trade deal, as you said, is going to support Trump electorally and domestically. Yeah, they look closely, but nothing to do for China in these kind of things. Can I just add a point on the trade deal? My sense in American politics is that there's a trade-off for Trump and the Republicans as to whether you go for a short-term benefit of selling soybeans to China, or whether you can position yourself politically as being tough on China. And I think Trump is much more comfortable being tough on China in the debate over the next year than he is getting some short-term economic kick, because he doesn't need that short-term economic kick. What he doesn't want is for a Democratic candidate, and whoever it may be, it's far too early, I think, to say who the Democratic candidate is going to be. He doesn't want to be outflanked and looked as though he's soft on China, because that would be electorally damaging for him, including in his own base. I mean, except that, as we've been talking about, he is taking a short-term gain on the agricultural deal, because that's... He wants a pulse, not only a one. But he's giving up on fundamental change of China, because it's not a Chinese economy, because it's not attainable, so he's just going for fiddling with the balance of payments and the trade deficit, which will make him look good. Let me shift a little bit to the discussion. It is quite clear that Trump is the bull in the China shop, and he's a pretty bad bull because the normal bull doesn't know what he's doing, because it's very weight and strength that he demolishes. Trump loves to demolish the store. He loves to demolish and deconstruct. The global system in the United States built 70 years ago and kept maintaining, which served American interests, and it served the interests of others too. So here he is rampaging through the China store, demolishing stuff, and what puzzles me is how come there is so little reaction on the part of the rest of the world? Probably if somebody unhinges the system and exerts brutal power, you would have balance of power behavior. The rest of the world would gang up against the bull to tame him. How come this is not happening? That's a good question, and you see this accommodation being made, and we talk about bilateral agreements as opposed to multilateral organizations and that sort of thing, but there hasn't been that much pushback on a multilateral level. Yesterday, certainly we're not army-rearming. No, the share of GDP devoted to defense is actually going down again. Are the three great powers, France, Britain, and Germany doing something to take up the slack? Well, last year the mighty German U-boat force, consisting of six U-boats, had six out of operation. And so you can go on and on and on. This is what puzzles me. Why aren't, I mean, Europe, 500 million people, a GDP bigger than China's, enormous resources, how come, maybe you guys can tell me, how come Europe doesn't create a counterweight to this raging bull? There's one answer to that, Joseph. Okay, of course there are probably many. One is that many of the issues that Trump and Lighthizer have raised with the Chinese are actually shared by Europeans. The unlevel playing field for foreign businesses in China, the end of the state subsidies for Chinese enterprises, the rapacious demands for technology transfer or for buying up technology. So many of the issues which Trump in his clumsy, rather brutal way is addressing. So he's our leader. Well, but he's not a leader we're comfortable with because we don't agree with his tactics. We don't agree with the damage he's doing to the world trade system. But we do agree with many of the specifics he's raising about China. Just as we, you know, a lot of us agree with his pressures on Germany and Italy and other European countries to raise their defence spending. So he fastens on to some relevant issues. And then he would naturally have support if only he sought that support, but he alienates that support because of the way he goes about it. It's just not about China. It's about tons of other things. For instance, freedom of navigation in the Gulf. So apparently he doesn't pay that much attention to it. He accepts one provocation after another from Tehran. And do we see the French and the Brits and the Germans mount the flotilla to protect freedom of the seas in the Gulf? Well, that is happening to a certain extent. There are British and French ships there. Because I see that. Do you know how many major surface combatants the two countries have? About two dozen each. Well, they used to have 250. But it doesn't take much to deter an Iranian attack on a commercial. We've seen that happen. For example? Before we get to John Claude, Reneau is here. We don't like to stifle his comments because... No, very, very, very... To answer Joseph, if the Europeans don't react to what you call Trump's brutality, it's because they also, in space and in time, model a little more brutal than Donald Trump. So in space, I don't know if we can say that Putin is not a little more brutal than Donald Trump. I don't know if we can say that Xi Jinping is more brutal than Donald Trump. And in space and in time, they still have the example of George W. Bush who was more brutal than Donald Trump. So that, in my opinion, is the reason why they don't react. But don't forget, and we said it, that in fact, Trump invites Europeans to react. Because who said before you, before Joseph, there was someone who said to the Europeans to re-arm themselves, it's Donald Trump. So if you want, here's the answer to your question. Why do Europeans react so little? Okay, very quickly because we're getting down into this. No, this can be very quick. On these more fundamental issues with China, I think I mentioned it the other day during Q&A session, the Cyprus process, which is the Council for Foreign Investment in the United States, which is the... All the agencies getting together and approving acquisition by Chinese companies and other parts of the world, but mostly Chinese, has been very, very strictly reinforced, strengthened, and so on and so forth. And to the point that now many transactions don't even try to be approved because they know they won't get approved. So this is a way to protect some of the American intellectual properties against China. My point, Jean-Claude, is the same has happened in Britain, the same has happened in France and Germany. The European Union is producing a regulation to do very much what Cyprus is doing. And Japan has produced the most rigorous regulations, more rigorous than the United States, to prevent Chinese ownership of even a small proportion of Japanese technology companies. But Jean, to answer on this, Jean, the problem is the fact those initiatives are not coordinated, unfortunately, are not coordinated. And we would be more efficient if we were coordinated. And I take the blame for the Americans. That is my point about it. The damage that Trump has done to alliances is that you've ended up with a fragmented response to this problem rather than a concerted response to it.