 Just in order to save time and be efficient, I would like to begin on time. So again, welcome back to a panel that is, fortunately, I will say, on a much less dramatic issue than the first one. But nevertheless, I think an important one, because it's for central banks, for academia, all the things that relate to how to interact independent authorities with the legislator, with the ones that have the political responsibility of making the rules, it's quite important. And I will say that in the very complex construction that is the European Union, and yesterday we had an echo of this complexity, these matters that could be seen as technical and soft, because it's a lot about use of soft law, are in fact the oil that can make this complex structure work in the most efficient way, because complexity, of course, is this issue is to be able to perform efficiently the functions that you are doing that. And this is why I just wanted, before I introduce the members of the panel, just to say why for the ECB, and in particular for the part of the ECB I am working it, which is the banking supervision part, I am a member of the Board of Supervisors that was created with the Banking Union, it is in fact an extremely important issue, this issue about how we can interact with the ones that make the rules. And particularly for banking supervision, because when you, if you compare with my colleagues on the monetary side, on the monetary side you have received very, very difficult task, which is monetary stability and financial stability in the whole of the monetary union, but this is not applying a law, this is essentially a task, you have some legal means to do it, which is settling interest rates, but it's not essentially applying a law on a day-to-day basis. So here the issue is how to interact with the general policies, its policy interaction between someone that has an independent policy task and the others that have the general policy task in the European Union. With banking supervision we are in a quite different situation, because from a legal point of view our task is just applying a law, we are there to be the guardians of the law. I will not say it's true, I mean that's the thing of supervision is not to just rule by the book. Supervision is also a task and this is why it is, in my opinion of course biased, very good that it is integrated in a central bank, it is because also all about financial stability. I mean we are applying the law but with a purpose, the real purpose is doing that. We have some colleagues by the way that are making the history of supervision in the United States that are saying, I have a very interesting idea that supervision is about owning the responsibility for some parts of the financial stability issue. And if now there is a trend to give more autonomy, more independence to the supervisors, it's because of that. Because we want to have an autonomous owning of responsibility in these matters of supervision, in order to be supervision is a tool for the task also. And this resembles monetary policy. But again the dimension of applying law is much more pregnant for us. I will say, well we are in the process of doing our animal report on banking supervision, but so the number is not exact, but we are applying more than 3,500 decisions a year. I'm speaking about legal decisions, not only for instance fit and proper applications in the banks, authorizations for banks, so it's a lot. So really our day job is also to see the articles of the law and applying them on a way that is conducive to our mission. So the way the frameworks are done are essential for our mission. But, and in this, by the way, it's a bit different that what's in the national law, we have no regulatory powers at all. And even not the powers of trying to make convergence on the application of regulation, because these are done by the European Banking Authority or colleagues. We are very close to them, but we are not. So in fact we are maybe an example, maybe the more pure example of a pure supervisor that has only been transferred essential supervisory tools, but very few regulatory tools. In fact, when you look at what says the SSM regulation, it says you can only use the regulatory tools to organize your supervisory functions. The regulation is pure. So the material, the substance of what we supervise, we have no power to define it. Legal power to define it. Day to day life makes it a very, very essential role for us. So it's clear that for us it's particularly important to be, to have some place where to say to the people that are doing the rules what we think, what we can take from our experience, what we think is conducive to really efficient delivery of our mission. And so that's why we are very, very, I will say, eager contributors to ECB opinions and all the other instruments that we have. And just as a matter of introduction, I would say why it is so important? It is because this is the occasion to do both two things at the same time. First, to deliver a message. The message is about the adequacy of this piece of legislation to the whole task, to the mission that we have to preserve financial stability. But it is also, and it will not surprise you because we are in the European complex, a European message, how to do it in a way that fosters integration in Europe because this is what we are paid for, to foster the integration of the markets in the EU and in the banking union in particular. And this is not easy because we have a complex structure. The second point is to be technically constructive for the co-legislators because precisely the co-legislator structures are those who have not the experience of supervision. We are the supervisors. I think it's very important to be even detailed and technically precise in our contribution. So maybe that explains why our contributions, of course, cannot be read very easily because they are very technical in its nature. But it's always a way to try to have a constructive interaction with the regulatory fund. And this constructive interaction is a key for the efficiency of the whole. So if I take the three last happens that work on it, just to give you an example, we had the opinion on the banking package. The banking package was the core of our task. It is the directive and regulation that defines what we are supposed to implement. So of course this was an extraordinary important piece of legislation for us. It was a transposition of what they had negotiated at the Basel Committee. By the way, interestingly enough, the Basel Committee, of course, is rather the supervisors themselves give a proposal to the ones that have the legal power to make the rules to say this we think will be a nice rule. So of course here the first message that we delivered to the European co-legislator was we think the banking package should be as faithful as possible to the international Basel agreement. The Basel agreement was an agreement among supervisors. Then we can perfectly think that the legislator can have other ideas and do other things and take into account specificities. But it is a role to explain why. As supervisors we thought that was a good thing and why we thought it is an essential thing in an industry like banking that is a worldwide industry that have already been for more than 100 years worldwide industry to preserve the public good of consistent international regulation is a key for stability and for supervision. That was really a message. The other point which will not surprise you is in a role as supervisors we have to apply day by day, national law also, because we are the supervisors not only of completely unify the regulation but also the parts that are in directives. By the way in the regulation there are also options to the member states. You have something like less massive but something like you have in the directive that these are principles that are European but then the regulation, the law, the regulation that we are applying is national. Of course for us we are in charge of 21 nations supervisory shows to increase the convergence of the national legislation is an essential task. And there are a lot of things but mainly by the way where I would say the legal tradition of each country is very peculiar very very very entrenched, rooted in national history where it's difficult to move. Two examples I've worked with sanctions and fit and proper because it's corporate law. Here we are in situations where it was extremely divergent in the nation. So of course the second message we had to give to the legislation is to try to push and to make it more uniform like that. By the way I think we succeeded in sanctions very much, fit and proper it was very difficult but we have succeeded a bit if I understand what is the political agreement at the end of the day. But that was an absolutely existential issue for us to give this opinion and to intervene. Second point we have the AMLA package and I take it because it's exactly the opposite. You say you have not and you have and the ECB has said a lot of times that they doesn't want to be an AML supervisor. Why are you interested in it? You were saying that you shouldn't be there. Yes, but we are looking for efficiency of supervision. So we very much welcome the creation of a European supervisor for AMLA and we think that our experience we are the only precedent of real European supervisor of the day today that we need to work very closely together precisely because we thought it should be different. We are very interested in designing it in a way that allows to build on our experience but essentially on synergies with us. So for us it's big deal. It's something that we are really really very interested in it. By the way it's certainly the biggest step ahead in integration for the banking market in Europe that is really at hand. So we have to foster it. So same thing. We did a message and we have made a lot of suggestions and some of them we find them in the parliament in the country. So let's see what's come of it. It's important for us. And the last one that we've worked on it is on the crisis framework. This is the CMDI for the ones who know it. The reform of the crisis management framework. And again here it's very important for us for two reasons. This is a message first because this is the road to completing the banking unit and we were created for the banking unit. We are the first step of the banking unit. So we are really impatient to see it completed. And this is not an easy task. What is the way to progress is the CMDI. So we wanted to show the importance. Global importance because this could be a pice meal very technical reform of points for treating specific because it's not a complete overhaul. It's a bit of pice meal reform on the crisis framework. But this is very important. We really want to give the message. We want to keep rolling in advancing integration. This is an essential thing. And this is why we try to show because it's a field where it's not easy at all to advance. Try to show that at least we are a very broad image of the banking unit. We have the 26 competent authorities because some countries have more than one on our table. So we were able to manage to see this is a technical way that we can propose to support this proposal to make the progress that it's necessary to keep the banking union on its route. And again, we always when this opinion I mean we are not just giving an opinion just to say this is what we think. For us the opinion is a tool. It's a tool to give a message and technical indication of how we can do it. And it is also a message to say we are ready. We are available to speak with the colleges later to try to discuss things to the issues because there are issues, of course. We are not in the decision making part and this is how it is. This is the framework. But I think that to try to put the results of the experience of applying the law in the design of the law is good for both parts. For the ones that do it and for the ones that are applying and for us is really an existential issue. So that's why for us it's very important when we will be discussing also in this panel. And to discuss that I really have the pleasure to introduce you to our panelists that are very, very interesting one. May I begin with Diane, Diane fromage what I want to just to stress for her. She is now professor of European law law in the in a very nice place, Salzburg and the Paris Law on University in Salzburg. And here you are really the deputy director for European Union studies. And I know that you were after what you did in Chanspour and in Maastricht, quite a city for the banking union. You are working a lot on the economic and monetary union and especially on the banking unions, of course. I'm quite happy to have you here to give us your view, your analysis of this kind of interaction. We have also David, who is a professor at the University of Charles III in Madrid, but also collaborates in Bologna. And what I will say also that is very, very important that he has a big experience in working on finance there. And even also practical experience because he is an alternate member of the panel of the single resolution board or fellow in charge of the second pillar of the banking union. But also the joint board of appeal of the European supervisory authorities, which, by the way, are the ones that have these tasks that we don't have about the convergence, the technical support to the commission for the regulatory part and the convergence of supervisory things. So quite a relevant experience for our matters. And for the third Miguel, he is working at our church, which is, everybody knows here, the essential role that the judiciary has taken in the creating of all kinds of European unions. And so also, of course, in the monetary and in the banking union, even if I think you will preside, you are not direct to ruling on us. But really, I think that your work after an extensive experience of the member state level in interaction with the judicial in the European union. But your role in the court, the general court, which is the one that goes for first rulings of all 3,000 decisions I was speaking about is, of course, absolutely essential. And to see how in this matter, which is always delicate and mandatory consultation, it's always delicate because you have to balance the fact, mandatory consultation, what does that mean? That someone that is not the legitimate authority for the side should be heard. This is what you're saying. So really, you have to need a balance between having a process that is really useful for both parts, for the one that is just giving the advice and for the one that is receiving the advice. How you balance the mandatory part with the one that is not is a crucial one for this efficiency. And so I think we will learn a lot of it. So if not, maybe we can begin, because Diane, you have prepared an overview of all the opinions, so I think it's the best to begin by that. Thank you very much for this kind introduction and thanks very much to Piatta as well as Antonia and of course, Edouard for this opportunity to talk to you about a topic which I think has not received a lot of academic attention, which is that of ECB opinions on national legislative proposals. So the way I'm going to look at this, okay, yeah, thanks a lot. So as has been anticipated by Edouard, what I'm going to do is I'll try, I'll start with an introduction in which I'm going to, well, look at the legal framework, but also at the aim of those opinions, then I'm trying to practice. And in conclusion, I will draw some conclusions on the impact of those opinions of the European Central Bank, but also try to look forward as to how this procedure should in my view continue to evolve moving forward. So as is known to all of you in the room, basically since the creation of the ECB, there is a duty for the European Central Bank to be consulted on any proposed union act in its fields of competence, but also by national authorities in its fields of competence. Although the council is there to define the conditions of this duty set on national institutions, at the same time the ECB can also on its own initiative submit opinions on any national or European legislative proposal. So we have this dual possibility for on the one or this dual duty on the one hand for EU and national institutions to consult the ECB, but also for the possibility for the ECB to adopt its own initiative opinions which allows it, in my view, to then compensate for the EU institutions and the member states deliberate or genuine failure to consult the ECB. But the question maybe I'd like to raise here is whether this hasn't set a burden on the ECB because in the that would, I think, at least looking at it from the outside necessarily imply that the ECB then follows up on all legislative Evolutions within all member states. So what is the aim of this consultative advisory role of the European Central Bank? Well as we've just heard by in the introductory statement essentially that allows the ECB to provide expert advice to ensure the compatibility of the national measures and to ensure the suitability to contribute to the achievement of the ECB and the ECB objectives and also to guarantee their alignment with the Euro system, the ECBs and the ECBs policies. So that's beyond this it also allows for the sharing of information and expertise because as I will emphasize further on basically because it's a governing council opinion essentially there will be a spread of information and exchange of information also among central bank experts. It fosters harmonization as we've just heard. It's a useful source of reference for the call of justice but also for national courts and finally it contributes in to the ECBs communication function and also to its transparency. So the conditions of these well these ECBs advisory responsibilities in the member states is then detailed in the council decision of 98 as I mentioned but also in the guide to consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions that was last updated in 2015 where we have a definition of draft legislative provisions and here I'll only emphasize that basically the measures that are taken at the national level to transpose EU legislation are excluded from this duty to consult the ECB because the ECB has already been consulted by the EU institutions. There is also a distinction that's being made between Euro area and non-Euro area member states whereby the duty for Euro area member states to consult the ECB is larger or broader and there is a minimum period of one month that is set for the ECB to deliver its opinion although in practice it's not always respected and then there is also a duty for the member state to take the measures necessary to ensure effective compliance with the council decision. Now moving on to practice which perhaps is the most original part of my presentation. You see here the figures of the total number of opinions so far so starting from 1998 until today and there well we see very clearly that the share of opinions adopted regarding national pieces of legislation is much larger as is only logical of course but if you turn to the evolution over time well we see very clearly that there is a peak in the number of opinions between well 2008 2009 and essentially 2015 which corresponds to the financial crisis so I think it's well very unsurprising to see this peak. What I think is also quite interesting is that despite the number of member states having gone much larger after 2004 and we are still going back to figures that were pretty similar to the ones we had before the enlargement so that's I think also quite an interesting finding. Then if we consider the topics on which ECB opinions are being adopted we see very clearly on the right hand side that there is much larger number of opinions that regard financial market stability and then this followed by issues related to institutional provisions and bank notes as well as payment systems so we see quite an imbalance in the various areas on which the ECB delivers its opinion. Moving on to practice and the divide of opinion per member states and that's again is a representation of the number of opinions from the beginning of the ECB so I think it's quite interesting again to see that despite the fact that some of the member states joined much later than others we don't see this clear divide between new member states and older member states because if you look at the figures we don't see huge differences. On the other hand we do see some cases standing out and I've tried to come up with some hypothesis as to why that might be the case. So if we look at the member states circled in yellow which are Cyprus, Greece and Ireland my suspicion is that it's also got to do with them having been former in crisis countries whereas Hungary and Poland well are member states that have notably introduced quite a few initiatives or proposals for reform of their central banks and generally where there have been tensions where I'm not quite sure yet about the interpretation because I couldn't really figure anything out looking at the topic of those opinions as well for instance Austria, Belgium and Slovenia that stand out as having quite a few number of opinions. I suspect that it could have to do with them having introduced more reforms but also potentially with them being more zealous and more keen to send their proposals to the European Central Bank. Another point I'd like to make regarding practice so far is that if you look at the annual reports of the ECB you will see an interesting process of what I have termed naming and shaming whereby essentially the member states that have or are guilty of clear and important cases of non-consultation are being named. There are very few so we have five cases last year, three cases the year before and five cases in 2020 so there are very few cases where the member states apparently do not fulfill their duty. On the other hand I think and again that's a hypothesis for now but the question should be raised as to whether these are all cases because the report very clearly says we're talking here about clear and important cases so whether there are not more cases. So this I think this practice of naming and shaming is interesting because it's clearly a preventive measure and it's perhaps a softer alternative to judicial procedures before the court of justice for the member states failure to fulfill their obligation to consult the ECB. Now turning now to my conclusion and looking at the impact or the potential impact of those opinions because as we've heard they are not well binding on the member states and here I'd like to start with a disclaimer to say well it's quite difficult to assess the actual impact because obviously it could be a case that you have changes that are made to the national pieces of legislation that are aligned with the ECB's opinions but come from the legislature, the national legislature. However I think it's fair to say that on the whole you do have some impact as is visible from the various opinions that you may have on one and the same topic on various pieces of national legislation but also the convergence reports that are being adopted by the ECB for those states that are not yet part of the EU area every other year. And on the other hand we do see if you look at the various opinions issued by the ECB you see that some issues remain so some issues are still well again pointed out as not being aligned with the EU framework. And I think that's one sign that these are advisory opinions so because the member states are still free to follow those or not. And in some ways I believe that this raises the question as to whether some opinions may be more non-binding than others and by this I mean that well arguably if the national piece of legislation is more closely related to one area, one of the core issues. If the ECB has a task of the ECB they should have a stronger impact so meaning for instance if they are more closely related to monetary policies, central bank independence etc. They should be taken more into consideration by the member states than if it's an issue that only in the margin has to do with what the ECB has as a task. Another point that I'd like to raise here is about the duality in the national representation in this whole process because although as I said before we do have national representation in the whole procedure of the adoption of those ECB opinions because the ECB opinions are adopted by the general council, by the governing council and therefore are also fed back into the national central banks. The governors still belong to the national central banks and are not the legislative or the executive powers that are later on going to be in charge of adopting eventually those national pieces of legislation which raises on the one hand the issue of the circulation of information between the various institutions and the national level and also shows that in this whole process of in some ways peer review among central banks, among central bankers at the super national level, the national involvement is only indirect and that goes to show once more the dual nature, the dual EU and national nature of NCBs. As I said before on the other hand, while the preparation of those opinions is most probably resource demanding for the ECB also because there is this timeline of one month etc. So I was wondering and I wanted to put here in the room whether there wouldn't be some margin for NCBs to feed more information into the whole process. Not necessarily of course with the views to compensating for the government's failure to consult the ECB because I understand that this would be a problem at the national level. On the other hand perhaps NCBs obviously are more closely linked to what is going on at the national level that ECB could ever be so perhaps there could be some more horizontal as well as vertical cooperation among national and European central banks. And the last point I'd like to make here is perhaps a proposal or some food for thought because while preparing for this presentation one thing that came to mind was the fact that, well, like I said before, arguably the ECB is more reliant in certain areas on the national structures than in other areas where it needs to conduct or to fulfill certain tasks. And therefore I was wondering and I wanted to put this here like I said as food for thought whether the ECB should not be given the possibility to directly bring a member state to court in Luxembourg instead of relying on the commission which again has this question to choose to bring a member state to court for a failure to consult the ECB or not. So thank you very much. Quite an interesting food for thought. And now we will turn to David that will dwell especially on the analysis of these mechanisms from the point of view what is soft law and very interesting one to research on whether to be articulated to the idea should we go for enforcement but what is the nature of soft law and how it manifests itself in these kinds of interactions. Thank you very much. Thank you very much to Mr. For his introduction and thank you very much to to Kiara and to Antonio for their invitation and to their excellent team for the organization of this conference is it is truly an honor to be here. I also thank Diane for the excellent introduction which saves me a lot of trouble and for the practical analysis of ECB opinions. So my goal here is to more or less bridge a gap between the practical analysis of what ECB opinions are and then the remedial perspective that will be presented by by Miguel afterwards. So hopefully providing some theoretical background to to discuss needless to say I only include my academic affiliations because I speak on a strictly personal capacity and that that should be stated but it is important to restate it. So to start with and to address this topic ECB opinions as part of of soft law. I'd like to start with that with a quote from Oscar Wilde who said that I always pass on good advice. It is the only thing to do with it because it's never of any use to oneself. I like this quote not just because it is fun and witty like Oscar Wilde was but because it captures two ideas that advice is something good and worth sharing or giving. It is also something no one wants to own. So we like to share advice we don't like to own advice very often that that transpires through the provision of this advice. So in light of this I will try to discuss the ECB advisory function in light of its text context and purpose briefly and then talk about the role of opinions and soft law in a shared normative space and how these normative space has evolved in the case of the ECB and what may be the implications for external controls and accountability hopefully paving the way for some of the topics that Miguel will address afterwards. So the text has already been discussed by Diane. We have section four of article 127 which talks about the advisory function in the ECB's fields of competence. Article 282 talks about areas falling within its responsibility so there's a little bit of difference in the wording of the provisions. And then this is complemented by the context which is section two of article 127 which refers to tasks. Those tasks include monetary policy, foreign exchange operations, foreign reserves, payment systems and we see these to a certain extent replicated in the council decision article two on the duty to consult by member states. With that I would say vague or ambiguous reference to rules applicable to financial institutions in so far as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions on market. So this is probably one of the fields where probably the council decision has not kept up with the times in light of the ECB's prominent function when it comes to a prudential supervision of financial institutions. So when it comes to the purpose of the advisory function, what we have is the decision in the Olaf case which I believe Miguel will also address. The ECB contested the applicability of a legislative act to the creation of an anti fraud office because the ECB was not consulted. And in two paragraphs very succinct but very insightful. The Court of Justice laid its vision of the role of the ECB's advisory function saying that it is ensured that the legislature adopts the act only when the body has been heard that by virtue of the specific functions has a high degree of expertise and is particularly well placed to play a useful role in the legislative process. But the ECB had not been assigned any specific tasks on the prevention of fraud. So that's what the court told us. And naturally there are different potential readings of this vision. So when it's a constitutional reading saying there is a sort of immutable core of competencies that should not be encroached upon a sort of institutional balance reading. A functional reading basically saying that if the ECB has been conferred or transferred specific tasks then the consistency in the application of those tasks should not be jeopardized by a failure to consult. But there is also a third informational reading which is that to the extent that the ECB has expertise in a certain area it should be consulted. We will come back to these possible readings of the Yolaf ruling afterwards. So when it comes to trying to address the role of opinions I think that opinions are part of the SOV law that emanates from the ECB and to a certain extent to understand the role of SOV laws. It is important to transcend purely positivistic ideas that rely on a rule of recognition that differentiates between legal norms and non-legal norms. And I propose that one possibility is to think about social norms as understood by for example Christina Bicchieri as formed by conditional beliefs, behavioral expectations, what behavior will be followed by agents, legislative or not. And normative expectations about what behaviors ought to be followed. So to that extent SOV law would contribute to the formation of social norms and may crystallize into legal norms that meet the rule of recognition. So how can SOV law in general and opinions in particular contribute to this? I think that as a source of information, as a source of coordination and as a source of authority. So how would this work? As a one, by allowing diffusion and concentration of information that is otherwise dispersed. So this function does not have a specific structure. So different policymaking bodies, different agencies and authorities may disseminate information stating their opinions or views on a certain issue. And these may be picked up by legislative bodies or policymaking bodies. But two, SOV law also allows coordination by non-producing institution. And this function I think is specific to the role that each institution occupies in the system. So it is not simply a dissemination of information. So there is a certain structure to this perspective of SOV law and therefore we can have horizontal coordination. For example, through MOUs, vertical coordination through guidelines and recommendations directed to national authorities. But we could also have multi-directional coordination in the form of joint policymaking but also in the form of consultation and opinions. Three, by acting as a source of authority, but not in the positive sense of rise of exclusionary reasons, but perhaps in the sense of the broader sense of first-order reasons to act that somehow impose a burden to come up with alternative reasons not to follow these authoritative advice. This is the way that authority is formulated. So why is this relevant? Because even if we tend to speak of SOV law in general terms, I think that the relevance of specific pieces of SOV law depend on their function. And at least their coordination and authoritative functions depend on SOV law's place in the system. So what is that place would be the next question. And I think that this depends on what I call shared normity space, which is a fancy term partly adopted from an article by Rosie and Freeman that tries to explain the role of multiple acts by different bodies, not as a source of duplication and redundancy. So as a way of saying the same thing several times, but as a way to acknowledge the complexity of certain regulatory tasks and promote information production and compromise solutions on the face of the impossibility or undesirability to concentrate the non-producing tasks. So from this perspective, the role of the ECB opinions and SOV law may depend on the ECB's shared normative space. And thus this is tricky because rather than a single ECB normative space or shared normative space, the ECB's normative space is comprised by three superimposed normative spaces. So one first the original or core space is defined by the central banking space formed by the ECB and the national central banks with a relatively inward looking dimension. So ECB speaking to national central banks and and vice versa to the European system of financial supervisors where the ECB in the design takes a relatively secondary role because it is the European supervisory authorities that have the main contributory function by means not only of proposals but also of advisory responsibilities. The ECB would act more indirectly through the European systemic risk board for example by way of opinions but less so directly. But on top of this then there is the space of the banking union where the ECB retains direct supervisory responsibilities, intrusive responsibilities and a direct interaction with the agency in the marketplace. So this somehow makes for a difficulty of finding a sort of consistent view of what the ECB's shared normative space is and therefore what the role of opinions is in that shared normative space. So in that sense this is important because in the initial stages we could see that the ECB adopted some soft law acts for its coordination mostly with national central banks and its opinions acted as a sort of external underpinning with the interplay with legislators for an interaction with national central banks that was relatively internal. With the financial crisis and then the advent of the single supervisory mechanism there has been a lot more external projection by external I mean interplay with market players directly and that has led to a proliferation of ECB's soft law acts that were systematized by Reinspars and Andreas Witte in a very enlightening contribution. So the ECB shared normative space has expanded as a matter of practice and even if ECB opinions still perform the same role if the space has expanded as a matter of practice the question is whether this is relevant as a matter of law. So this is the way I see this and this depends on how we define the role of external controls and accountability and its interplay with soft law. One idea that I propose to you as a basis for discussion is that in this regard legal accountability acts as a sort of a flip side of soft law function that is to ensure that soft law performs the functions it should that is information coordination and an authority but at the same time does not become an open door for disinformation breach of procedure abuse or misuse of powers. So in this way controls I think are contingent on the function that soft law performs in the system and the sensitivity of this function to the configuration of the shared normative space. So what would be the implications of this? In the case of the information function I think that the control of the information function is less sensitive to the shape of the normative space. Information is diffused and then is taken on board by different legislative or policymaking bodies but there is not pre-assigned role to the party that is providing the information provided it is a non-producing authority. And this is why I think that the general court was correct in finding in Steinhoff that easy-to-be opinions could be actionable under the action for damages for non-contractual liabilities. I also think that the court was right in saying that even though the threshold for justiciability would be set relatively low so to speak the threshold for liability would be set high and I would stress in this case quite high. Apart from agreeing with this assessment my only comment as to the challenges ahead is that although the court is right in shaping the action for non-contractual liability was with a common ground sometimes the basis for the action on non-contractual liability is not entirely suited for the specificities of liability for misinformation or liability for misstatements which normally are related to the attach importance to the materiality of the information or the fact of whether that information is relied upon or reasonably relied upon by parties for example market parties. The second aspect that has to do with the coordination role has to do with the relevance of ECB opinions in the legislative and regulatory process and here I think it depends on the ECB's role in the shared normative space. So here we go back to Olaf and the different potential readings that we have and I think that the court was correct in leaving the door open not only for purely constitutional reading or sort of reading of the advisory function as sort of crystallizing a core central banking function that is set in stone from day one and remains forever but instead a functional perspective that is more related to the specific tasks that are conferred and on the ECB. Now naturally the challenge with this and the flip side of this is the need for caution about the consequences because although it is my view that the ECB should now be consulted on its areas where it performs function and tasks, concrete functions and tasks as a matter of legislation and practice, the consequences of a failure to consult are quite drastic and I think that Miguel will elaborate on this. So if we combine the expanded shared normative space where the ECB operates with the drastic consequences of the failure to consult we could increase the very great area of potentially zombie legislation that is invalid for the mere fact of a failure to consult the ECB. And this is not an insignificant consequence of applying an expanded normative space in the context of the control of the duty to consult the ECB. So in terms reaching my conclusions I have tried to address the role of ECB and the ECB advisory role and the role of its opinions as part of its soft law. I believe that soft law can be a useful source of information coordination and authority and those functions are partly dependent at least on the form and shape of the ECB shared normative space which I think is not immutable. It has been evolved with time as more tasks and functions have been transferred and this in my view affects the judicial control of maybe not so much the information function but at least the coordination function. I hope that there was some ideas in this presentation that you found useful and in any event please remember that I am just passing on advice. Thank you very much. Thank you David and now we are going with Miguel to see really what to think about this more bindingness in some cases or not or consequences of expanding the weight that is given to the opinion. Thank you very much and good morning to everyone. I would like also to thank the European Central Bank for this kind invitation to this distinguished legal conference and also to thank the ECB because in the recent years I have more the opportunity to listen than to speak. So today I'm speaking and you will be judging so don't be too tough. So the first thing that I wanted to say is that I need to make a clear clear disclaimer so I'm not currently dealing with any banking cases. And the second disclaimer I wanted to say that my opinion today is based basically on the dozen of articles that have been produced concerning the legal consequences of not asking or requesting an opinion by the ECB either by the national legislators or by the EU legislator and also on the case law the current stage of the case law of the European Court of Justice meaning that for the time being this may evolve and also my thinking may evolve according to that. So what I would like to draw your attention today and I think Diane and also David helped me a lot on it's working. Now OK so so I will specifically address the case law on the relation to consult by legislators or to inform legislators to the institutions agencies or EU bodies. I think it's an important element to take into consideration and to do so what I'm trying to do is testing a little bit from the legal point of view. Is it a valid argument what is stated in the guide on consultation by the ECB at the end of this guide produced by the ECB. There is a reference of the potential legal consequences which I must say that are dramatic when the national legislator or even the EU legislator does not consult the ECB. Basically in this in this guide it is stated that in that case the legislation should be declared void. So I think this is an important element to discussion and I will try to test this according to the current situation of the case law. And after that I will make a reference to the legal implications and also the possible remedies and I would like to make some overall comments at the end. So as regards the legal framework I am not going to enter into the details because it has already been said by the previous speakers. I think also concerning the nature of the ECB opinion. Also David mentioned this recent case law by the general court but it was clearly stated and clearly established that the opinions by the ECB are non-binding which I think results already from article 288. What I think it is important and it is basically an element that also David already introduced is how we should interpret the judgment by the court of justice in the Olaf case. And this is an important I think element in our discussion today on this particular topic because we have on one hand the opinion by Advocate General Jacobs in this case where it states clearly that it was not contested but neither party in the case and he also confirmed that in his opinion the requirement to consult the ECB according to the primary law is an essential procedure requirement and failure to provide this request it should mean that the legislation is void. So the opinion is quite clear on this question. On the contrary then we have the judgment and we have these two points that David already mentioned which did not answer this specific element but somehow I think centered the analysis of this requirement to the particular function behind the provision of the treaties. And then one can discuss whether there is a constitutional interpretation functional or but the court did not conclude precisely on this element of stating if lack to consult the ECB is breaching an essential procedure requirement. So trying to test this as I said this assumption that is in the in the guide to consult by the ECB. I think it is interesting to take a look at the case law on primary law that the ECJ has produced on regards to the obligations to consult that exist in the treaties. And I think there are two cases that I would like to mention because there are different case law where the court has already analyzed when you have to consult either the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and also the Commission. And I think the two important cases that I would like to talk to your attention. The first one is the Rocketfair case which is a milestone judgment which is well well known because it established clearly which is the role of the European Parliament. And what is interesting in this case is that in the Rocketfair case. For the first time, the Court of Justice said that precisely because the Parliament has this role as to comply with the principle of democratic representation. The Consulate's not to consult the ECB by the Council is that there was a breach on an essential formality in regard of which meant that the major concern was void. So it was the first time that the Court of Justice established this important or dramatic consequence of not consulting. The second judgment which is I think also interesting in our discussion today is precisely another milestone judgment is the Costa Enal case which also analyzed article, the previous article 93, paragraph 3 of the treaty. It concerns state aids. And interpreting this article, the Court of Justice also said that this paragraph confer rights to the citizens so they could confer rights to the citizens. They had the right to be protected by national cause. So it also established for the first time the possibility that when there is in the treaties an obligation in this case to consult an institution and to wait until the institution takes a decision on that. This confers to the citizens that might be protected by the national courts. And then there is also additional case law. I will not enter into the details concerning the obligations to consult according to articles 114 and 117 which basically also established that failure to consult cannot be in benefit of the national authorities. On the other side there is also an important bunch of case law on secondary law. And here there are two cases which I think are important because they help us to differentiate some obligations whether we are in front of an obligation just to inform or we are in front of an obligation to consult and also because behind that there is an obligation somehow to monitor a procedure or there is some kind of obligation for an institution or an agency or body to adopt a decision explicitly or implicitly. And the two cases I'm referring are a special and in base case and also the demon and from in case. So in those in those cases and especially the first one because it was the first one in which the court of justice had to to distinguish these two two elements. The court of justice analyzed the directive. It was it was the directive on on on waste and an Italian court request the premier ruling to the court of justice asking whether if the fact that municipality of Italy had adopted some some some plans to to restrict the plastic bags might be affected by the fact that the directive provided an obligation to consult the commission to inform the commission on any waste plans adopted by the member states and the court of justice analysis directive and concluded that in this case there was only an obligation to inform the commission so she's aware about the different plans adopted by the member states in order to take in the future maybe modifications of the legislation or he has to if they have to change the harmonization the harmonize the legislation. So it clearly differentiate what is the purpose behind the consultation. If it's only an obligation to inform then you cannot declare that the legislation is bought. But on the contrary if behind the purpose of that requirement if there is that an obligation from the institution to take a decision or to control something then you might consider that it might be bought and this is important because in this case we will also discuss for the following case law from the court of justice in order to differentiate over these two points. A similar approach was also adopted by the court of justice in this case concerning the directive on the protection of authorities in case of insolvency of the employer demon and from and on the contrary when interpreting the directive on the TVA the court of justice considered that there was there was a it was a case where a national a national legislator adopted the derivation from the directive but did not inform the commission and in this case the judgment from the court of justice to consider that in this case as there was a process to authorize a derivation from the directive any derivation implemented by a national legislator which had not been consulted to the commission and obtain this authorization was to be considered a void. Maybe what is even more important is the the bunch of cases that the court of justice has produced on on in the area of technical regulations so the in 1983 1998 and 2015 there's been a directive which establishes a procedure when the member states adopt technical regulations which might affect the which might affect goods and so we might might affect the freedom of movement of goods and precisely through different preliminary rulings the court of justice has established more clearly maybe this this legal consequences that we are qualifying as quite dramatic and the first case and where this was established was the CIA international security case in 1996 not in 2014 and in this case for the first time maybe and more particularly very clearly that the court of justice established that the fact that a national legislator in this case it was the Belgian state adopted some technical regulations that affected some the movement of goods where to be considered void because the Belgian authorities fail to consult the commission and also the member states we have according to this directives deadline in order to produce an opinion to suggest making amendments in order to avoid any obstacle to the free movement of of of threat it is also important this case because for the first time the commission the court of justice in a clear manner use the effect until interpretation in order to to base this legal consequence because this is quite dramatic as a consequence there is a subsequent case law which has somehow limited or clarified this this this this consequence so for example in the laments case the case that the court of justice clarified for example that even though there is this legal consequence this not does not impede that for example an apparatus that was approved according to to a technical regulation that was not notified to the commission could be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding so meaning that the court of justice concerned that sometimes there might be some many different implications but it it somehow limited the effects of of of the first declaration also in the in the in this case concerning the gambling sector the court of justice somehow also limited or limited or clarified this this this legal consequence stating that when you have a law that has been passed without this with failing to notify according to a legal according to the technical regulations that directive is not the whole law that is void but it's only the specific parts of the law that provide for the technical regulation so the case law limits also to the specific elements that might be affected by the opinion of the commission on the member states. And another interesting and recent case that has been produced by the court of justice is the Airbnb island case it's a recent case adopted by the great chamber in 2019 and this one concerned that directive on the information information society services where there is also some kind of obligation to consult before adopting some regulations that might affect the information society services. And in this case the court of justice precisely make reference to the any hand base case that I mentioned before to clarify that you have to always look at the wording and the purpose of the legislation to clear differentiate what is behind the obligation to consult and according to that then you might take some legal consequences. And in this case he considered that the main purpose of the legislation is to avoid that member states can adopt obstacles to trade but also and this I think that is also important in our context to impinge the competence of another member state which is normally the member state who has the power to regulate the information society provided that provides service in another member state so also the question of competence is an important element to take into consideration. So to conclude to those all these elements maybe what what I would say is that either from the primary law case the case law that analyzed the obligation to consult to consult under primary law and under secondary law. The court of justice takes especially into consideration which are which is the purpose behind which is the wording and the purpose behind the obligation to consult and for example in the in the all of case it stay clearly the legislation adopts the act only when the body has been heard so it is I think it it it focus the analysis on this purpose. So in that case and as I said it might be possible that in a case where there is a lack of consultation of the CB it could be a challenge that in that case this article from the from from from primary law may confer rights to to the citizens may confer rights to the agents and so in some cases you could you could legally state that the legislation may be void and unforeseeable. How could you I mean challenge all this of course there are several possibilities the first one is not mentioned here but it's concerning national legislation it's the cornerstone of the system the primary ruling it's been basically how the all this case law has been developed in the technical regulations directive. A second possibility is to bring an action for an almond of course it could be an action that could be bring from one of the institutions or bodies of the European Union. Potentially one could think about maybe an individual or company but this may there is another problem the problem of Locos Astandi I cannot maybe go into details here but this is a clear problem. The second element is good with the object the object could be the piece of legislation produced by the by the EU legislator. Some some authors have questioned whether if you can contest delegated act which has been not which has been adopted without the consultation of the ECB this is a legal question that might be maybe clarified. And then there is another possibility which is maybe much more clear for an individual or for for an agent in the market which is the use of the plea of legislation according to article 241 so in a challenging a specific decision that applies legislation that has not been notified you could be it could be possible as it was the case for the ECB in the all of case to somehow contest the possibility to apply this legislation according to the case of the ECB which is so. Another element that we have to take into consideration is they also have the infringement procedures and the Commission for example has brought different member states before the Court of Justice in the case of the technical regulations directive and the Court of Justice finally contend the member states failing to notify legislation. This is a possibility. There is also the specific case of the ECB potentially starting an infringement procedure to a national central bank. And then finally other other other areas where this this problem can be can be raised is for example the possibility to ask for damages. We already I mean David already mentioned that there is also difficulty behind that it's the difficulty of the threshold that is established by the case law considering that. But as the state of the case has already said you cannot exclude that somebody can ask for compensation of damages caused for a breach of a treaty obligation provided that all the all the all the different conditions established by article 268 and the case law of the Court of Justice are complied with. So to conclude as an overall comment I think we are now and I think David already pointed that in a situation where we don't really know what the all of case implications are. I mean what what it is clear it is that the Court of Justice has established that there is an obligation to consult concerning the specific tasks assigned to the ECB. But we don't know if this can be construct finally as an essential procedure requirement. Concerning the question that the guide consultation of the ECB produces is the case law on an unforcibility of non-notified legislation in all that is applicable to the situation. I think it could be a valid argument as I said because if we analyze the wording and the purposes and specifically because if we analyze the council decision article 4 establishes a clear obligation for example for national authorities to ensure the compliance with that decision and this is quite similar to what is established in the technical regulations directive. Then other questions may arise for example a dilemma what happens if the ECB is confronted to a situation where he has to apply a non-notified national legislation. And another question that I think David also addresses what is the impact of all this in the new areas of competence for the ECB. And then concerning the legal actions I think in the in the future you can you know we cannot exclude that there would be a preliminary ruling probably maybe challenging all these questions maybe we'll get some clear some clear answers. Thank you. Thank you and may extend the thanks to all the three because you've really kept the time frame that we had in mind more or less so that we have time for having questions. I must say that I wanted to raise two questions on behalf of Chiara who wanted to raise but had to leave unfortunately so I will begin for that and then ask if you want to cross there and also the audience. Chiara was very interested by your expression more binding than others of some aspects that are more binding than others and he wanted to ask you but others feel free to express whether you think that one indicator of the fact that there is this more binding thing would be that in addition to the generic legal basis. So for one hundred twenty seven four in the treaty there can be other legal basis saying for these things really you need to consult the ECB so where the existence of different legal basis additional to one hundred twenty seven could be one of these. I would extend that I think that this is more or less what is also said in by specific task but but maybe certainly if there is a specific legal basis for consulting it should be that it is more or less but maybe not related to the idea of the specific task. In the in the Olaf thing and second question that she wanted to to relate to that but also to the to your developments on on the nature of soft flow is whether the timing of the consultation is not an essence of an essence in the consultation. I mean that is if you really value and I think this is will be for the also for the specific task but if you really value the fact that you should really receive an independent advice by by the ECB for the college is later than the moment where it is could be important. So if it's too late I mean in the process maybe this could also be problematic from the point of view of ensuring the effectiveness of the idea. And to this I wanted to add myself a question specifically for Miguel for me you said would you have to apply consultation legislation that has not been consulted. Here we really have an issue for banking supervision so that's where I think that the legislation will have to apply is the transposition legislation. But on the other side we have case law that said for transposition legislation you don't have to to to reconstruct but it is a very practical issue because in the transposition you have a lot of divergence. And we will have to apply the divergence and we only know the divergence when we have the transposition not before not at the moment where we are giving our advice on the directive. So here we have a conundrum that for the efficiency this is exactly the thing we it is more important for us to be consulted but this is where it is not mandatory. So here we this is a kind of conundrum for us. So maybe you can begin further by the first question on. No thanks a lot. Yeah I think I'd like to first react to your last point if I may because yeah I think you're raising the point that was slightly I mean I think that was underlying the whole of our presentations and in some ways. And David you mentioned it we have an misalignment between the framework that exists and the way the ECB has evolved and I fully agree with you that supervision is probably one of the areas in which the ECB should be consulted in in the case of transposition measures as well. But that then leads me to to care as question. I must admit I had not thought about it but probably if you have an additional because this generic consultation obligation to consult is naturally also comes on top of the other obligations and yeah that's probably an element to be taken into account. Yeah I think. Again the question is a lot more intelligent than the answer that you're going to get. I'm afraid because you've had the time to to think about it. I think that that the taking a step back the the the core issue is whether the duty to consult is is sort of a discrete requirement either there is a duty or there is not if there is then. There is a breach of procedural requirements and so on or whether it is something that can be calibrated depending on the role that consultation plays in the system and depending on the potential consequence of lack of consultation meaning in this case a misinformed piece of legislation. So if we adopt that discrete perspective then timing whether it is as long as it is done within the legal frame and then it is of no consequence but my view is that the duty to consult should not be understood in such a rigid way but also in light of the role that consultation plays in the system. I think that even in the cases of the parliament the the court of justice stresses that it is not just consultation of the parliament per se but consultation because the parliament is the repository of democratic legitimacy. So there is a finality to the duty to consult and this finalistic perspective is is also important to assess the consequence of no consultation. So from that more finalistic perspective. I would agree that the timing of the consultation is important when assessing whether the duty has been complied properly and and the consequences of of of it. So that's that would be my initial reaction. Yes. Maybe on the timing I would I would add two things. The first thing is that we have article four from the 98 council decision that states that members they shall take the measures to ensure effective compliance with the decision and also establishes that to that then it shall ensure that the CB is consulted at an appropriate stage. So there is some room to interpret in that. And so and I have to say from from the case law I just mentioned that until now the court of justice takes a lot of attention to the purpose which is behind. So this and the fact that it wasn't a key element as I said in some in some of the cases and maybe another element also important is that in the rocket for a case the court of justice. There was a question whether the council requested the opinion but did not wait until the parliament adopted the opinion because it was at the end of the legality of the legislator. So what the what the court of justice said it is it's not enough just to request you have to exhaust it says you have it is essential to exhaust all the possibilities to obtain the opinion. That's what what what he was said by the rocket for a case but just to mention a little bit that that timing has been also questioned in some of the case law that I have address for each other before I open to to the audience. No. Okay. But we only have five minutes. Well, you were the and we have a lot of questions. So please see the same. Could you even if you're worried. Well, no, could you. Right. Jesus had the manual from the bank of Greece and the University of Bureaus to very specific questions. The exams that you have given by way of analogy seem to me to present a significant difference from how the duties framed in the treaty in relation to the ECB. In the case of primary law, they relate to particular procedures. And in the case of secondary law, they relate to very specific areas of the law. But doesn't it make a difference that in this particular case we have a blanket treaty provision and not only a blanket provision but also one which is not it is quite ill specified in terms of its subject matter areas of competence. What are the ECB areas of competence? This is something that needs to be clarified. And in any case interpretation of this closed and be uniform across the various competences. This is the one. And the second thing is, I did not really understand your point about the implications for national legislation. It appears to me that you somehow raise the possibility that the national legislation might be questioned in terms of validity. Would this be conceivable? Shouldn't the right remedy be an infringement action? Could national legislation being validated on European grounds? Please continue because there wasn't. Thank you. Yes, sure. Okay, so Elena Sedano from the European University Institute and this would be for David Ramos. But in view of maybe of the obligation to consult the ECB. So it's a little bit of an abstract question. How much is the shared normative space of the ECB? A formal rationality does these regards in the end as substantive rationality. Talking about knowledge, as you said, it's dispersion and it's concentration. How much the shared normative space of the ECB endorses a bias of an economic culture that is foreclosing alternatives? And how much is the same legal framework impeding these alternatives to take shape? Is there a formal rationality leading the ECB to stand by a financial system that creates imbalances? First and foremost, the impossibility to act promptly when faced by the environmental imperative or when faced by a staggering level and ever growing level of wealth inequalities or still in front of rule of law issues, contradictions and incoherencies within its mandate? So the question basically is shouldn't the ECB and EU institutions more broadly take a more substantive approach to the economy and less formalistic? Thinner when it regards to the law focusing more on legal principles than on many complex rules and norms? And do you think this would lead to a tangible risk of capture or instrumentalization of the law? Thank you. Daniel Guhi, ECB. Slightly provocative question related to what we consider the soft character of ECB opinions. I feel what Professor Formas has identified are exactly those type of cases where ECB opinions are less than soft. Some ECB opinions are not so soft and those are in particular two cases. First, the program countries, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, where what ECB said about legislative proposals was the factor part of legislative conditionality that would be followed quite for roughly. And secondly, maybe less visible because it's of interest to specific countries. It's pre accession cases where what actually is asked of ECB is a legal certainty about certain detailed issues such as, for example, the conditions for central bank backstop to deposit guarantee schemes. And what both sides, the consulting member state and the ECB achieve in such an opinion is the factor, a sort of technical legislative standard about how far you could go, for example, with central bank backstop for DGS. And both sides would follow this because of accession process, the convergence reports, et cetera. So I was really soft law instruments in those cases. Many thanks. I don't know, three more. And then that's the end. So begin there. Another, Julian, your daughter, Bundesbank, just another question regarding the soft law character because in particular in the institutional field where the ECB has built, in particular in the field of monetary financing, kind of rules for the national lawmaker. And we had a case when actually the ECJ then said, okay, we don't accept these rules. Since there are so few cases actually brought to the ECJ, such a change then really change with the world for what has been granted for quite a while. Do you see a problem in these kind of established ECB opinions that form the legal landscape and then are totally turned over by the ECJ? Thanks. One there and one there and that's it. Thank you. My name is Dominic Batso from the National Central Bank of Slovakia. I have a simple question which will be as follows. Can a national court, and we spoke about this yesterday, contest the ECB opinion within the preliminary reference? Because the article says that the acts of the union institution bodies might be brought to the court of justice and opinions are acts. So there is not a set whether those acts have to be binding or not binding. So this is my question. It's not working. Sorry. Yes, Philippe Lefevre, Belgian Central Bank. I must say, I must confess I was a little bit puzzled by the idea that the opinions would be soft law. In fact, of course, there is no definition of soft law, but soft law is supposed to have an impact on the subjects of the regulation, even if it's not binding. Because there we fall in another decision of the court of justice is ECB against the United Kingdom in the location policy that said clearly that there is a principle of substance over law, over form. And in this case, as the ECB has no regulatory competence, it would not, in fact, issue soft law that is binding. But regarding, in fact, the opinions on national legislation to take that case, we are in a very specific context because the opinion is given, in fact, of a draft law. And the opinion, there are two possibilities of the consequence of that opinion, or it is taken into account, and then it becomes, in fact, art law, or it is rejected, and then it is simply a contra-legum opinion. And of course, it gives what the ECB thinks about one thing, but it is not going beyond that to my feeling. And thanks a lot for this excellent questions and a lot of food for thought, I'll pick and choose if I may. Yeah, I think perhaps I'll answer the question by the person from the Bundesbank regarding the, when there is a change basically that is introduced by the court of justice. And I completely see your point and I think you are referring to the Bank of Slovenia and the case of financial independence, et cetera. But on the other hand, I wonder whether this is so specific to the ECB in a sense, you know, isn't it a case that whenever you have an interpretation, for instance, by the European Commission that is later on overturned by the court of justice, then you have a change of expectations, et cetera. So I see the problem, but I don't think this is so specific to opinions. So, yeah. And yeah, thanks for the examples, Julie noticed. Okay. So what we can see from the questions by the audience is that the softness of ECB opinions is a matter also of context. We've had examples where these opinions are not even software. So basically, they can be safely ignored, but even in those cases, there is a duty to consult. So that's the hardness, if anything. Whereas in other cases, the duty of consultation goes a step beyond that because if it is a specific country subject to specific conditionality, then it has to comply with the opinion in which case then the function of the opinion. And that goes back to the point I made before. So it is not a general duty that can be assessed regardless of the circumstances. I think that the context of the duty to consult has to be assessed in the specific case and the breach of the duty to consult has to be assessed in light of the finality of the duty in the concrete case. This is why I think that the question by Professor Haji Manuel is right on point. It is a blanket duty included in the treaty instead of a specific duty included in a secondary act. If it were a duty included in a secondary act, then we could more easily assess what the duty is there for and the consequences of a breach. In the absence of that, though, I think that we should not simply apply a blanket understanding of a failure of the duty to consult but assess it in the specific circumstances. I think that your examples were right on point in that respect. So thanks a lot for the questions, incredibly informed questions. Thank you. Maybe to pop up also on this question, I guess you can take into consideration the fact that the obligation to consult is in this article 110 and 27 and that it is quite different from what it exists in the directives. But I think we also have to take into consideration that considering national authorities, there is this reference to the council decision. The council decision gives a context on how to produce this consultation in some areas, specific areas which are clearly identified. And also, and I didn't have the time to address very detailed, but there is this article four, which provides for something that you have to obtain from this consultation, I think. This is the part of the context that might be taken into consideration and considering this maybe you can go to the legal consequences I mentioned. I'm not saying that the court judge will do it, but there is this article four that provides for two clear obligations. The obligation to ensure that this consultation, that the decision is effectively complied by the member states and secondly also that the member states ensure that the consultation is done at the appropriate stage and also is taken into consideration for the authority adopting the national legislation. So I think this element will be also, can play also a role on this discussion we're having. And secondly, and I thank you for your question because maybe I was not precise. I think we have to differentiate two situations according to the article from the treaties. The first one is the consultation concerning EU legislation. There, as the Olive case mentioned, the EU legislation might be declared void. And then concerning the national authorities, then it could be applied this case law that I mentioned by analogy as it has been the case, for example, in Airbnb Ireland case, the CIA International Security. What it would be said is that the legislation is enforceable in the precise case. So it's the clear or the normal conclusion. But maybe because I was talking about the two legislation, maybe I was not precise. Thank you for your question. Thank you everybody for the questions and following yet, but a special thanks for our panelists.