 led by Prime Minister Eir Lapid, at this moment, is signing a deal that will delineate the country's maritime borders with Lebanon. That's despite the fact that the two countries are in a technical state war. So how and why is this all happening now? What does it all mean? Just days ahead, truly, of Israel's fifth election within the last three and a half years. Now, just some of the questions we'll address here in the coming half hour and beyond. But first, here's some from Prime Minister Lapid, just a short while ago. I'm very happy to open this special cabinet meeting to authorize the historic agreement on the maritime border with Lebanon. It's a major achievement for the state of Israel, for the government of Israel. This is an agreement that strengthens our security and our freedom of action against Hezbollah and the threats from the north. There's a consensus, a rare consensus, among the entire security establishment about the need for this agreement, Defense Minister Benny Gantz, IDF, National Security Agency, all of them believe this is a good agreement for the state of Israel and its needs. It's a diplomatic achievement, not every day an enemy recognizes an agreement with Israel, with the United States and France, providing guarantees to this agreement. This is also an economic agreement. Yesterday, we began extracting gas for providing gas and also from the Kana rig in Lebanon, the money will come in. And while this deal is being signed this hour, we're joined in the studio by our Defense Correspondent Jonathan Regiv, as well as Amir Owen, Defense and Government Commentator and Shai Bazaar, Political Strategist, Consultant, Former Media Director, Spokesperson for Benjamin and Yahoo. Thank you all for being with us here again, it's a big development, certainly, and head of the elections here. Amir, I'll come to you first with a broad perspective on the issues, whether we go political, security. On this deal, first of all, good deal, bad deal, it's not a no deal, we know they're doing something here. But where does this lie on the spectrum of for Israel? It's a very good deal. You may remember from 400 years ago that a British scholar coined the expression Pennywise and Pound Foolish, this is the exact opposite. The critics who nibble at various clauses and the fine print missed a big picture. And the big picture is that Israel and Lebanon are sweeping away a sore spot in the relationship. Now in 1949, in the armistice agreements, Israel and Syria, for instance, also Israel and Egypt, kept some issues to be solved later, the militarized areas, Mount Scopus with Jordan and others. And these points always raised conflicts later. Now if Israel and Lebanon can set aside their maritime dispute, and if Lebanon now has a lot to lose by abrogating the agreement, and all the other arguments regarding Hezbollah and Iran, no need to cover that, it's all for the good. And obviously, if both countries want outside investments, they want energy companies, they want superpower involvement, in this case, United States, but also France, which is not a superpower. They've got to settle the issues though around this, it's hard to make those big deals. It's all to the good. Yeah, with something unresolved. The glaring fact though tries we're just ahead of elections here, and not everyone is cheering this deal today. I mean, we're here, fine, Lapid talked about, you know, the quote-unquote consensus around this, just being nothing but a positive deal. Political opposition is saying something else right now, just ahead of elections. They're calling it capitulation to the enemy, essentially, you know, on certain terms. Where does Benjamin Netanyahu take this now, just ahead of elections? I can imagine that if Benjamin Netanyahu would be the one who signed this agreement, he would be very happy with this. But as you said, it's political days, and we are in the middle of another, yes, election cycle in Israel, and politicians before... Can't you just remember, yes, this is actually happening again. They are not very happy to give some gifts to their opponents when they are running for elections. So, of course, he has lots of criticism on this agreement, but it's interesting to see that he started with this very harsh criticism, but then he backed off because I think he got it by the polls and everything, that the public opinion in Israel are not being convinced by his argument when you have all the defense intelligence establishments, as Prime Minister Lapid just said, supporting this agreement. When people look and say, okay, it's going to be a good thing for us because we're going to have a gas from the Mediterranean, they just started to extract it, I believe, today or yesterday, but also the Lebanese are going to have gas for them, and we want them to have something to lose, and also morally, we want them to flourish. We are not happy to see them starving, and they are really starving. I understood the Salah Baniz said, I wish we would live in Gaza, it's better situation than us. So we want them to flourish, we want them to have energy and food, and if it's going to be good for both sides, and as you said, we are still in enemies, it's good for everybody. And I said again, I believe that if Netanyahu would be Prime Minister today, I believe, I cannot guarantee, he would sign some agreement, very happy. He stopped saying that he's going to cancel it, yes, he's back in power. Right, he hasn't gone that far, and as you say, you may soften that rhetoric a little bit in the coming days. Tahran on the security front, though, in a mere touch on this now, sort of giving the countries here in war footing, and certainly with all the tension that's been there between Hezbollah and Israel, this gives Hezbollah perhaps, and I talk about Hezbollah in terms of looking at Lebanon, the power broker they are out there, something to lose in case of a conflict here, or is there another side to this that's worried about actually empowering Hezbollah by providing some sort of infrastructure to them, economic viability? I would say both. First, does it give Hezbollah something to lose? Yes, because it gives the Lebanese state something to lose. Lebanon may, we do not know what's under the Kanarig, but there may be gas there, which would be very beneficial for Lebanon, who's literally starving, as was said here, and needs this energy. So yes, it would give Lebanon and Hezbollah something to lose, and they would think again before starting a war, they're already thinking about that. It's no coincidence that the northern border has been nearly completely quiet for 16 years. Israeli deterrence is working, and here we have another brick in the Israeli deterrence. But does this empower Hezbollah? Absolutely, because this maritime issue has been disputed for years, for years. And now Hezbollah can come and say, why did the Zionists come and sign their agreement? Now, it came because we threatened them, because of our resistance, because we sent our drones there. Those drones were not sent there to attack, those drones were sent as a message. We threatened them, we did not shoot a bullet, and they capitulated. That's the message Hezbollah would give to the Lebanese people. Therefore, I think both are correct, is the Lebanese state gaining from this? Yes, is Hezbollah gaining from this? Also, yes. We are not sure, but these people are believing the message from Hezbollah. They understood that, two months ago, they were all against this agreement together with Iran, and suddenly they are for it because they see that there are no other options, because Lebanon is needed. Well, Niahu actually take this line as well, that, hey, they threaten the gas rig, I believe in the first days of the peace reign as Prime Minister. They flew these drones at the gas rig. Amir, is there a connection there between the threats and the fact that now we're reaching a deal after years of negotiation? No, there is little to no connection. Yes, there is mutual deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah. As far as attacking targets within Lebanon goes, and even as far as killing Lebanese operatives of Hezbollah outside of Lebanon, in Syria, for instance. But it does not apply to this particular dispute. And it may surprise you to learn that in the Israeli defense establishment, Hassan Nasrallah now is now perceived to be a stabilizing force within Lebanon if they were given the choice. A remarkable statement, but as Jonathan highlighted, a lot of years to support that. Yes, but right now, given the choice of killing him, if he pops out of his bunker or not, they would not, because in this particular instance, Nasrallah acted more as a Lebanese than as a Shiite. We're stepping out for a short break, you know what, Shabadak, at Jonathan Reagan's stay with us. We'll be right back after a short break here, continue covering the subject.