 Good morning, everyone. I'm Maaren Leid at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and I'm very honored this morning to have Brigadier General Jerry Glavey with me. A few admin notes quickly. First, this is the second event in a series of ones that we are doing on the future of Rotocraft, generally, as part of our security dialogues. And we're very grateful for the support of Ballantextron in making that series possible. So many thanks to them. If people could, if they have devices, make sure that they are on silent. I would appreciate it. And the order of battle here is that I'll do a brief introduction. General Glavey is going to run through a few slides. I'll pose a couple of questions, and then we'll open it up to the audience for questions and get into a broader conversation. So thanks for taking the time to come. It's great to see some midshipmen here who are hoping to talk to their alum after the event. So thanks for you guys for making the trip down. Future marine aviators here with us. So again, this is Brigadier General Glavey. He is currently serving as the deputy assistant commandant for aviation on the Marine Corps staff. A reward for a successful tour as the commander of Marine Helicopter Squadron I, the squadron that flies the president and other White House dignitaries out and about. So because that went pretty well, he got to do a Pentagon tour as a reward. He's been in multiple operations around the world, from the Philippines to East Timor to Desert Storm, Fox, Shield, Iraq, all over the globe as, I think, emblematic of the Marine Corps tradition. It's commanded at every level. As I mentioned, the Naval Academy graduate. And now, in the absence of a senior leader guiding, he's at the helm for guiding Marine Corps aviation until his former boss's replacement is confirmed. So hopefully everything goes well for the next hour, and he can get back to the building. So again, thanks, everyone, for coming. General Glavey, over to you. Thank you, Dr. Lee. Quite an honor being here today. Thank you for this invitation and this incredible honor. So last time we were to meet, if you remember correctly, we had a snowstorm. So I had a kind of a cancellation and a rescheduling event for me. So on the 17th of March, I was supposed to be over here. And I had a great lead-in, right? Because it was St. Patrick's Day. So if you could click the next slide, Rich. And we were going to talk about the Marine Corps' favorite Irishmen and really an icon that every Marine, whether you're in Parris Island or San Diego or in the hills of Quantico, knows this gentleman very well. Obviously, one of the icons of the Marine Corps, double medal of honor winner. And it was going to be my lead-in on St. Patrick's Day. But I'm going to keep it as my lead-in on today. Dr. Lee, thank you very much. But really, the important part of Sergeant Major Daley isn't so much as heroics, right? It's that goes without saying, unparalleled, incomprehensible. But really, his career and what he did and where he did it to the construct that our 35th Commandant that you saw on the first slide led us to. Those comments on the first slide were his 2010 planning guidance. And I just wanted to kind of put those up and talk about 2014 and where the 35th Commandant has taken us. But Sergeant Major Daley, his two double medal of honor winner, weren't one in major combat operations. They were in those small wars, those lower intensity conflicts that are very intense, but really symbolic of Marine Corps mission. First of all, in China, during the Boxer Rebellion, he's deployed to protect American interests, American missionaries, American citizens, very symbiotic of what the Marine Corps does today, obviously. And again, in Haiti, Haitian Caicos, thugs, terrorists, criminals disrupting the order of the Western Hemisphere, creating a really possible slight to the Monroe Doctrine. Again, Marines from ship's company called the Shore, amazing what a Marine with a machine gun can do. But Sergeant Major Daley, again, an incredible read if you ever have time to go through those two scenarios. It's very, very impressive. But perhaps, and again, his greatest achievement is in the wheat fields of Bellow Wood, where in World War I, part of the expeditionary brigade, he leads his Marines across that famous wheat field to Bellow Wood. And the famous cry that he makes, come on you SOBs, do you want to live forever? Different variations of that. I kept it very neutral. For this brief, again, back to an hour of fame, can quickly turn the other way. But again, very famous Marine, very iconic Marine, but really his career path, very symbolic of what the Marine Corps today is, this idea of a middleweight force, this idea of being able to box above your weight class, but also, again, being four-deployed, crisis response ready. Next slide, Richard. So the environment right now, and again, this is going to sound like the dumbest guy in the room, but chaos, right? I don't know how else to describe what's going on in the world today, but it's a very chaotic environment. Everybody reads the newspaper. Doesn't take much to figure out that we are in a very strange period of time. One, I think, is going to be continuous. I think the goal of looking at stability is probably not ideal, and one needs to understand what's going on in the world today to know that is hypersensitized. It's hyperconnected. And in some respects, hyperinformed. And though we think that is a good thing, certainly, that can create some of the chaos that you see behind us. Just here in Washington, DC, as we fight through the budget battles, which I spend most of my time on, and trying to figure out how we are going to execute based on the constraints and limitations that are placed on us from continuing resolution to sequestration, et cetera, I would tell you that it's chaotic, whether it's in the Pentagon or out in the operating forces fighting and winning. There is nothing normal about what's going on. And our commandant, leading in the Quadrennial Defense Review, and I will tell you the last 18 months you talk about change and chaos, but certainly what we've been through. And I talked about the budgetary stuff. But we just went through the strategic choices management review or scammer or skimmer, depending on your perspective on that. Also, we executed the Quadrennial Defense Review. The commandant from the bottom up built the 175k force. And also, operation enduring freedom as that phase wraps up, what comes next, what does come next? And next slide, please, Rich, is this idea in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the commandant wanted to shape the environment. He wanted to come out of the other side of the Quadrennial Defense Review with the Marine Corps that he wanted to build, not the one that he was being told to build, but what he wanted to do. So from the ground up, he built this force called the 175k force. And what that is, it's a four deployed crisis response force. And again, why that's important is, in the past, prior Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the Marine Corps hung their hats on major combat operations. Nothing wrong with that. That's a powerful construct. Defense planning scenarios, ICSs, all the latest and greatest, four structure drills to say this is the size of the Marine Corps we need for our nation. This QDR, this Quadrennial Defense Review, led by Major General McKenzie, had a different nuance to it. And really, the commandant led with this crisis response, four deployed crisis response force that can aggregate, composite forward, to be the MCO force that our nation needs to execute those O plans, et cetera. It's a nuance, but it's a very important one. But I will tell you one, that any Marine haven't done any new rotations would tell you that that's always been our card, right? This idea of being forward deployed crisis response, but to actually come out and lead with it, I guess, is the nuance. And not only lead with it and play it with the Secretary of Defense, but play it well, right? He came back, briefed his 175k force, briefed it to the hill, briefed it to the Secretary of Defense. And they said, you know what? We kind of like our 182 Marine Corps. So that nuance is taking place right now, and we'll see how all that evolves. But a pleasant surprise, and I don't know if it was one the commandant predicted, but to say, hey, appreciate what you've done, like what you've done, want to exploit what you've done. And that's kind of this 180k, as we're calling it, iteration is taking place. And again, iteration being a key word. But what's important is that we built, as we build back even to 180k from our 175k, because we slapped the books, right? The commandant said, this is the force for tomorrow that I'm going forward in budgeting today. Very important, you guys know, the lead time for a force to change is significant. So as he buys back to 180k, it will truly be about buying back to a forward deployed crisis response force. So again, very important nuance. And so how does aviation, and it's the reason that Dr. Leed, how does it play in this? What's aviation's role in this forward deployed crisis response force? And again, next slide, if you could. So back one, I think I get a new slide turner. Anybody want to volunteer to turn slides for me? It's okay, Rach. So- It might be our fault. No, no. So what is important is, the Marine Corps has made significant, my job every day when I show up to work is to execute the Commandant's Aviation Plan. It's the only reason I exist, right? The Commandant has set up a plan and we are here in aviation to execute it. And one of the keys to that AAV plan has certainly been the V-22. So in the wake of the terrible tragedy in Benghazi, there had, something had to be done. I mean, you've read about it, obviously terrible tragedy. But what is the response? What does the Marine Corps do in order to support the combatant commander in this endeavor? So part of this construct was called the Special Purpose MAGTAF Crisis Response. It was our response to the COCOM in the new normal warning order to say what can the Marine Corps provide to the Joint Force? What can it provide to the combatant commander to mitigate this challenge, this threat? And it truly is a mitigation strategy. You know, at the end of the day, anytime Marines are forward deployed, Crisis Response, and they're not on ship, they're sub-optimized. If you walk away here and remember anything I said, if Marines are forward deployed and they are not on board a ship, they are sub-optimized. Because that's, you know, for 238 years, going on 239 years, that's been our bread and butter. And that's the autonomy, the freedom of maneuver, the freedom of execution, the logistics, the C2. It's just where the Marine Corps needs to be. But with that said, opportunity was there, not gonna cry in our beer. And what we did is created this force that can operate out of Morón, Spain, and the power of maneuver of the V-22 and the KC-130J afforded the commandant to provide the combatant commander this relevant, you know, respond to today's crisis with today's force today, right? That's the whole idea. Back to his 2010 guidance, come to fruition in 2013 with the crisis response, Meg, comes to fruition daily. But really, I mean, you know, it's one thing to have a PowerPoint slide and a guidance, it's another thing to go into practical execution, which we have done. So a powerful force. So the combatant commander was able to execute this force. We saw the relevance of it recently with the crisis in South Sudan. So the ability to fly four V-22s with appropriate marines, 3,200 plus nautical miles from Morón into the crisis area, similar distance from Alaska to Florida, though many of you have done that probably in the last week, the idea that you could take off from a field, any field and land in a parking lot is what makes this connoisseur and this scheme of maneuver so powerful, right? The ability to go where and when the combatant commander needs that force. So a very powerful evidence of relevancy on what this force can provide and what it has provided. These marines are on alert status, firehouse status, imagine coming down the pole, ready to do the do, taking this very serious, very serious as you would expect. And these are strategic maneuvers, right? So the president of the United States has a challenge in one of his embassies. That's a challenge in the United States of America. So it takes on a very strategic role. The Marine Corps takes it very serious and organized and trains this force to be relevant, to be able to respond and respond in a timely fashion. So again, another powerful demonstration of maneuver, the KC-130J, the V-22 have really afforded the opportunity for the combatant to provide this force. Next slide please. So again, you've seen this already as we whizzed through these slides three times. But here's another classic case of the power of maneuver. So November 10th, this past year, the 238th birthday of our beloved Corps, the day prior, super typhoon hits the Philippines. Awful tragedy, terrible tragedy. Now what's the ability of the United States of America to respond to a close allies request? And Brigadier General Paul Kennedy is lead element of that task force. He arrives on scene, does host nation coordination, and the very next day, his four V-22s and KC-130Js are in route, 1,000 nautical mile transit to the Philippines. Again, the sea base is the ideal way to do this, but unfortunately, not as timely as being able to fly 260 knots and be able to execute that kind of range. So Paul was able to base those capabilities outside of the destruction zone. So planning your force inside of the destruction zone, not helpful, not an ideal way, we're here to help, but be able to now displace that force in and around Manila in this case, the air bases in Manila, and be able to fly 300 nautical miles daily in and out of the destruction area to provide all that humanitarian assistance required and do it in a timely fashion, create the tempo to make a difference. Again, demonstrates the power of this capability, specifically these two capabilities with the V-22 and the KC-130J. There was other aspects of that mission. Again, the George Washington comes down, creates that sea base. Now the V-22s could fuel, execute a quicker sortie generation rate going out to the sea base. Again, all very powerful constructs, all great tools for the combatant commander to choose from and how he's gonna respond in this case to humanitarian assistance disaster relief mission set. Next slide. So there is a lot of exciting stuff going on in aviation and though our timing is probably a bit off in the fiscal environments that we have right now, but we are transitioning every type model series of aircraft for the commandant. Not easy, not easy to do, but I tell you, it makes coming to work pretty exciting because these capabilities are exactly that. They bring war fighting punch for the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The last vignette I wanted to talk about after Operation Damion is Odyssey Dawn. Operation Odyssey Dawn, a huge success story for the Marine Corps and really the Joint Force. It's a huge success story from the command and control that the L-Class ships provided to what the Air Force did and kicking down the door. Just great textbook of how the Joint Force should be gathered. But I'll be honest with you, as the MAGTAF does its debrief of that, you will see that the AV-8s were on deck of the ship for the early parts of this. AV-8s a great platform, incredible platform. Not many close, better close air support. Bombs on targets, aircraft in our nation's arsenal. So Marine Corps is very fortunate to have that capability. But the debrief and the what if is, what if you have a fifth generation low observable strike sensor capability? How does Odyssey Dawn take place? What opportunities for the combatant commander and the Joint Force commander does that provide? And it provides a lot. You become very early into the planning cycle and how we're going to do something when you have fifth generation low observable capability. And you can carry that through to Syria, right? We had a very close call with Syria. The Marine Corps has to look at that very close and say what if, what's the debrief of that? What, how is it different in the future? Again, if the combatant commander, if the Joint Force commander has a fifth generation low observable strike sensor capability floating around on L-class ships either in the Mediterranean, East or West, could be on the Horn of Africa, could be in the Northern Arabian Gulf, what capabilities, what opportunities and options from a planning and execution standpoint does the CFAC and JFAC provide? Because that weapon system obviously is part of the early stages of what a CFAC, JFAC is going to do in kicking down the door. And then coming right behind it, you want to talk about power projection, the ability to move a V-22 company landing team to the point and place and choosing of the Joint Force commander, a very powerful one-two punch to kick down the door and do power projection and carry really our nation's most lethal weapon, that 19-year-old Lance Corporal, to where he needs to be in the back of that V-22. So a powerful one-two construct that's coming of age. You know, we've got 16 airplanes down at VMFA 121, we're on track to IOC that squadron in summer of 2015. And everything's pointing in that direction. So the Marine Corps, again, our optimism is high. Again, you can see in the top right corner, where is opportunity? You know, the V-22, we didn't plan on air-to-air refueling capability for that airplane, but now I can take a 600, 500 nautical mile F-35B and turn it into something much more than that. Again, it's just opportunity-based and this type of construct, this demonstration that Bell and Boeing did, good on them, to show that this is possible. And that F-18 is just in the prep position. We filled it with water and not fuel, just to keep the tension on the hose, but it's a very powerful demonstration of what if and when we're obviously gonna follow through on. You can see, if you go to Afghanistan and you talk to an infantry officer in OEF and you ask him what weapon system is key to his successful execution, he'll tell you the H-1. Both the Yankee and Zulu have been a powerful capability in the counter-insurgency fight. The H-1, with its ability to carry eight combat-loaded Marines, carry APKWS advanced precision-kill weapon system, a 2.75-inch rocket, laser-guided rocket, really turn the page on what that airplane can do. Very significant capability, and of course there's no substitute for an H-1, right? The ability to kill hardened targets with precision and timeliness, and again, the Yankee and Zulu are both linear improvements two to three times better than what they replace. So again, another powerful construct. Our 53K program is live and well replacing the CH-53, the King Stallion, as we're calling it, on the 5th of May, doing a rollout ceremony down in West Palm Beach, you're all invited. But we're spinning that airplane. We're engaging rotors, spinning the turnin' engines and engaging rotors. That program's alive and well. We're gonna fight hard through it. It's the last one through the pipe, and you know that's always a challenge, but we're fighting hard. This is another advanced three times as far, three times as the load, at high, hot, heavy conditions as a 53 Echo. So again, significant improvement in capability for the Marine Air Ground Task Force. I put the RQ-21 in the middle. That's gonna be our organic ISR capability. Sweet spot for this middleweight force that I was referring to. Shipboard-based, that's the key, right? Shipboard-based. You can't launch and recover UAS capabilities from the ship for a seaborne force, right? You got real challenges. And that's why Stovol is so important and why this UAS capability is so important. It's gonna be the eyes and ears of the Mu Commander. The first IOC comes up here. We're gonna deploy with the 24th Mu, Eggs Benedict, the Mu Commander, and very excited about what this platform's gonna provide for the force. And we're doing a lot of unique stuff with this capability. We're looking at some of our cyber EW capabilities. As you know, the EA-6B is gonna sundown here in 2019. So we need a force, a capability similar, not all in the same aircraft or in this unmanned system, but perhaps spread across multiple systems, right? Multiple aircraft to do what that airplane did and did so well for so long. But this is part of that. It's a more nimble way to do it. Dr. Leed was able to come out to MOTS-1 and see some of the ideas that we're talking about, this asymmetric advantage, using it in ways that we didn't envision, talk about disruptive innovation, but here's a classic case of using capabilities, perhaps that you didn't intend to do that way, but see great opportunity to do so because you don't have the money to get everything you want. So again, very, very powerful construct. So I kind of wanted to leave it there. That was my big picture of marine aviation. I'll tell you, it's a pretty exciting time. We got our work cut out for us. We absolutely do. There's an old saying, what have you done for me lately? And literally every morning, show up to work, with that exact contract. But I will tell you, it is opportunistic. And we're gonna double down on opportunity. Expeditionary Force 21 has come to be, and this idea of, it formalizes really what the Marine Corps has been doing for 238 years, but this idea of forward deployed crisis response forces being at the ready, and then being able to composite forward to provide the punch that the combatant commander needs in a major combat operation. So very, very exciting stuff. So with that, I was gonna turn it back over to you, Dr. Leed, and take on your questions. Thank you very much. Thanks for that overview. Very helpful. I wanted to, since you brought up Expeditionary Force 21, probe it a little bit further. One of my, I have to admit, it's still on my night stand. I haven't quite made it all the way through, but I assume everybody else here has read it multiple times. One of the interesting things about it to me was that it seems to implicitly challenge what I think had been most people's, or at least the official expectation that we were gonna operate outside the A2AD envelope until we could deal with the, overcome the AD or anti-access challenge, and then get into the theater. And again, it seemed to me that EF 21 doesn't accept that premise, and says we're gonna have to operate potentially even without air superiority. And A, I wanted to see if that was a correct inference to draw from the document, and B, probe a little bit more about what you think for how aviation operates in that context. So I agree with you. I think Expeditionary Force 21 even gets into specific distances that you're referring to. So absolutely, it takes it head on. And the Marine Corps has to, again, this idea of the middle-weight force being able to box up a weight class. The ACV is about that, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1. Again, more disruptive innovation that you're gonna see come in your way. I think there's an incredible opportunity there. This ability to displace via connectors, in this case, the LCAC, and move a pretty significant capability that the ACV 1.1 of wheeled vehicles is going to be. Again, more unique opportunity, but you can't discuss any type of weapon system without being able to discuss what it's gonna do in that environment. It's always been the 800-pound gorilla in the room, so Marine Corps needs to address it, needs to address it head on. And I think Expeditionary Force 21 has done it. I'll be honest with you, from an aviation standpoint, the whole F-35B is about that. That gives this, the firepower of the MAGTAP, in many respects, is based on aviation. The Marine Corps has artillery, tanks have been reduced over the years, further reduced in the 175K force, but you still need that firepower. So the firepower, as a MAGTAP decision, supporting the whole scheme maneuvering the MAGTAP, is a big chunk of it's gonna rely on the aviation combat, it's a no-no. So the ability to work in that A2-AD environment Stovall provides you, and Expeditionary Forces provides you many unique opportunities. So I don't need an 8,000-foot runway for an F-35B, right? I may need 800 to 1,000-foot of some superhighway somewhere to take off and recover that airplane. More, that's obviously a more plentiful ability than 8,000 or 10,000-foot runway provides. So this idea of distributed Stovall operations is something we spend a lot of time on in countering the A2-AD environment. And all you're doing is adding complexity to Red's targeting cycle. I'm up, he sees me, I'm down, right? Where am I going next? And the ability to do that requires a MAGTAP scheme maneuver, requires fuel, right? That our 53Ks and V22s and land-based assets are gonna have to provide. It requires ordinance, right? Because every time he's down, upload ordinance, fuel, and off he goes. But it provides a con-ops, that I'll be honest with you, is intriguing. This hardened fortress is nice, it feels good. Probably tough to do if you look at the enemy order of battle. And many people are coming to those conclusions that we need to look at dispersion. It's the natural state of warfare. It continues to be that way. This is MAGTAP 101. When I talked to an infantry officer about this con-ops, and it's somewhat revealing at a higher level, it's obvious at a MAGTAP level. The idea of having a distributed, farmed, forward-arming, or fueling point capability for your aviation assets is how the Marine Corps does business, but put it in an A2-AD environment and have a distributed lay-down, I think it affords the MAGTAP a very strong opportunity and capability more importantly for our great nation in the A2-AD environment. Let me ask another quick question about something where you have a bit of a parochial interest, but I wanted to ask about what you could share with us about the Navy Cod mission and some of the alternatives being looked at. The Marine Corps did an operational assessment of the V-22 for that mission. I don't know how much you can say about that, but how do you see that debate playing out? So again, it is a tough fiscal world out there, and I know you all know that, so master of the obvious, but the United States Navy's gonna have to make tough decisions. We did do an operation evaluation for V-22 as a possible replacement for the carry-on-board delivery mission that the C-2 has done so well for so many years. Possible, C-2's getting old. The Navy has to start planning on how they're gonna replace that remarkable capability, and they're in the early stages of doing that. Sometimes the Marine Corps, we can be a little too overbearing sometimes, so we just, hey, the V-22, this is what is providing the Marine Air Ground Task Force. Here's certainly some of the capabilities. We were able to take VMX-22, Hoover Warren's Marines, take them out to the carrier and demonstrate it. Demonstrate, here's the pluses and minuses. Here's the unique operative disruptive innovation, but here's a unique way to do this mission, perhaps one that you haven't done for so many years successfully, which is important, but a different way to do that mission set with different opportunities. So again, we're providing whatever the Navy needs from a subject matter expert standpoint, and they'll make, like us all, have tough decisions in this tough fiscal environment. Finally, one last question about, you've expressed your optimism about the F-35B, and hopefully that will be warranted. What are the implications if the current plan doesn't pan out as envisioned? So like everything else, there's certainly challenges. The complex weapon system, read about it. The Washington Post did a good job describing some of those challenges and don't need to go through all those here, but at the end of the day, I just sat down with Lieutenant General Bogdan on Friday. So the F-plan, you've heard the Commandant speak numerous times, right? He talks about his two priorities. Used to be F-35 and ACV. F-35's doing fairly well. Now it's ACV, F-35, if you've known the nuance in his message, but those are his two priorities. Those are the two things the Commandant repeatedly talks about wherever he goes. So that's something that, you know, if the Commandant's interested, we're wildly fanatical about over an aviation, and we spend a gigantic chunk of our time making sure that that weapon system comes to be. You know, we have an objective and threshold for IOC of the airplane. The objective is July of 2015, and we are focused. We're gonna go and brief the Commandant on the 8th of May, and the Commandant will tell you, he's the lead action officer for F-35. So it's important. The threshold for it is December of 2015. You know, we are aimed squarely for July. There's a lot of unknowns out there in that complex world, but I will tell you, optimistic would be the word, perhaps cautiously optimistic, but VMFA-121 is flying those airplanes right now. We've got 16 airplanes out in New Arizona. They're shaking them out, and again, learning a lot that we probably wouldn't have done if we did it another way. 501 as well, our replacement, our fleet replacement squadrons doing great stuff. Working very closely with the UK on this very exciting times as QEC comes online, Queen Elizabeth Care comes online the 4th of July, and all the great work very closely that we're doing with our UK counterpart. So yeah, eyes wide open, working very closely, very closely with the Joint Program Office on this one, and the Commandant is intimately involved. So again, cautiously optimistic. Okay, let me open it up. If people could wait for the mic and identify themselves, we would appreciate it, and if you could also be succinct to the best of your abilities. Okay, we've got two up here, and one over there, and then we'll go to Sydney. Sir, Hi, George Knuckles, I'm a policy analyst for SOCOM. I did the initial requirements for the CV-22 for SOCOM, was the lead analyst. One of the key things is the importance of tanking right now. Are you giving any thoughts, particularly since the increased demands on the KC-130J by 53 kilos, the B-22, F-35, within AFSOC and with an air rescue, all of our tankers, 130 tankers, can take gas from strategic tankers. They fly out, they pass gas, they don't have to go back and land and refuel. The other thing is when we did the ORG for the V-22 that still stands, there was a threshold in there for it to be able to refuel off the strategic tankers, and that seems to be at the bottom of the list right now. But increasingly now, with the distances that you're planning on flying, with their MV-22s, is that being looked at? When we sent four V-22s to Mali four years ago, it was an aluminum overcast. They had to be supported by MC-130 tankers going down, who in turn had to hit KC-135 tankers to get gas to get them on down. So are you looking at any of those kinds of opportunities or changes? Yes, sir. So we are, matter of fact, and very appropriate. The KC-10 is approved to tank the V-22. What the KC-10 has not approved yet to do from a flight clearance standpoint is to do the internal tanks, which we're doing right now. So we're evaluating it. We're starting with the KC-10 to start somewhere. And optimistic, again, being the word here, is again, we are looking at the internal fuel tanks. If you're familiar, the V-22 has internal fuel tanks. Right now, we do have flight clearance for the mains on the V-22 with KC-10, but looking at the internal fuel tanks. So those flight clearances are very, are brand new, sir, within the last 30 days. For all the reasons you just said, sometimes baseball bat way of learning is the way to go, but we have to be able to take advantage of the strategic tanking capability. Thank you. Okay, I think right behind, right here? Larry, did you have a question? No, I'm sorry, right there, right behind you, there. Hi, sir, Greg is from Raytheon. Your legacy, Hornets and Harry, is it gonna be going out to probably 20, 25, maybe 2030? Can you give me an idea of what you're gonna do to improve those aircraft, to keep them combat-robin out to that timeframe? Sure. So obviously, the Marine Corps is focused on F-35. We understand very clearly, right now, we are forecasting to phase out the AV-8 first, 2024 timeframe, and then the F-18, the 2030 timeframe. I'll be honest with you, for AV-8, very focused on all the mature readiness side of that airplane, making sure that it continues to do the Mew, the Marine Exhibitionary Mission that we needed to do, and to be relevant doing it. We are also exploring all the interoperable piece, and please, my next slide, can you click one slide forward, Rich? This will help answer this question a little bit, is, so as we get to F-35, and all these great capabilities that we have, I was gonna try to avoid not putting this slide up here, but it's important, right? So it's important. So we got this linear capability improvement that we have on the aircraft, from Yankee Zulu through V-22, even 53K, right? One plus one equals two. We made them twice as good or three times as good. Linear progression, physics, very good. But really, the next phase, the next ridge line is interconnecting these capabilities. So we really, really want one plus one to equal 22, right? We wanna take the Yankee Zulu sensor package, which is phenomenal, the TSS and the Bright Star, right? And we need to put that into the ACV, right? How do you do that? How do you do that? And it's all about waveforms and networks. I've learned more about waveforms and networks that I ever cared to know about, but it's a very technical and complex discussion. And unless you're willing to check your ego at the door and be schooled on this stuff, you'll just go around life not really knowing, right? You turn your cell phone on and it works. Well, it's hard job to really understand how those networks like, those networks like apply to the battle space. We're spending a lot of time and energy on this. And Dr. Lee got to see some of this as well out there, but the ability to have multi-waveforms, multi-channel interconnectivity with the MAGTAP is complex. So the classic Marine Corps way to do this, right, is set a standard, you know? This will be, right, variable message format will be the standard. We tried to do that about four years ago. It was a terrible failure, right? Because so everything's changing. It changes so quickly. CDL, Link 16, TTNT, all these waveforms, Sojournwadia waveform, the ANW2 waveform. There's so many out there that it's so hard, right, to say this will be the standard. So, can't beat them, join them. So this idea of a Rosetta Stone gateway capability, right, based on processing power, which is key, right? We do processing power very well, right? We can create bigger, smaller computers. We do that pretty exponentially. So that's really the growth area, right? That's the area of opportunity. So that's, instead of chasing waveforms, we'll let the waveforms happen, right? And we will chase the processing power to convert the waveform to the, and so what am I talking about? So I bring in, so for instance, on AV-8, I have a lightning pod, which by the way, one of the most asymmetric advantage that's happened to that airplane in a long time, but I have lightning pod on that airplane, and I bring, I can take the full motion video, very significant capability. I can bring it into a V-22, and then I can take it from the V-22 and push it to multi-platforms. So I bring it in on TTNT, sorry to get into the technical side of this, but it's important, and then I can take it and push it out via an A&W2 waveform. So instead of trying to just, everybody has to have this one, I can have multiple waveforms, multiple channels, have the processing power, gateways, to do the conversion piece, but it's a very powerful construct. And if you can do this in a software reprogrammable format, in other words, you're not tied to black boxes, I mean, this stuff's happening fast, very fast. And so if you can do that instead of, so Link-16's here right now, I need Link-16 for my AV-8s, I'm answering your question right now, right? I need Link-16, how am I gonna get it? Am I gonna chase a single black box that can do Link-16, maybe, right? That'll come up as we develop the course of action, or is there another way to push Link-16, like, you know, because really, we're talking about PLI, right? Position, location, information, precision, precision, position, location, information, right? Pushing that around the battle space so we can make decisions, so we can do targeting, so we can pass information that the ground force commander may need. So this idea, unfortunately in a long way, answers your question, sir. And at the end of the day, right? So right now, those Marines traveled from Morone, Spain to Djibouti, right? 3,200 plus nautical miles. When they got out of that airplane, it's just like they were flying in a Vietnam CH-46, because, right, we don't have this yet, and we gotta go get this. That raid force commander, on that length of time, how much has changed? How much has the situation changed? What's going on in the objective area? What's going on, what's the enemy doing? What's the friendly doing? And you cross the line of departure, everything changes. To the point that, I'll be honest with you, as V-22s come into a landing zone and take fire, hostile fire indications, we have systems that can detect that. Those systems talk to nothing, right? One of those systems talk to each other, and maybe talk to the raid force commander in the back of that airplane. So when he got out, he says, hey, we're taking fire off the nose. So he knows, instead of running Marines out and running out the back doing the HD-360, we don't, that's, so he has fresh data, right? Knowledge, I'm gonna call it. Not information, but knowledge on where the enemy is and what they're doing. It's a powerful construct, but what we want to avoid, as best we can, is this classic stove pipe one-off solution set, right? It just takes us down, and it's easy, right? The guy's down at Pax River, don't like this conversation, because what I just said is very complex, very intellectual, and this is where Lieutenant General Schmidel is dragged. So let me tell you, the Knuckle Dragon 46 pilot is being dragged along, perhaps like off a car with wedding cans on the back, on where we need to go with this. So powerful construct, but this is it. This is where one plus one equals 22. All the capabilities we're bringing to bear have a linear effect on our MAGTF. This, in my opinion, professional opinion, has an asymmetric impact on our MAGTF. Long answer, but I had to get that out and understand the whole construct of what we're doing. General Gallinetti, sir, how you doing? Can you wait for the mic, excuse me, and then? Sorry. John, Gallinetti rolls, Roy, it's good to see you, skirt. My question, I will flow right in to what you just mentioned here. Very, very good discussion about platforms and the strategy where the Marine Corps is going, especially Marine Corps aviation. What I'd like to ask, and I know you know this well, a lot of it's about tactics, techniques, and procedures in how we train, especially MOTS-1, Marine Aviation Weapons Tactics Training Squadron-1, out at UMarrows Zone, everything that's going on there. Not only with what's going on here today, but in the future, and to blend all these other techniques and this instrumentation and the technology into what they're doing today. If you could just explain that a little bit. Yes, sir. Okay, so twice a year, we do our Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course where we bring our best and brightest into the schoolhouse, and on the backside, they come out as planners and instructors, state-of-the-art capabilities across the MAGTF and really the Joint Force. That's the mission of MOTS-1 and that's what they do very well. So we bring 50 plus airplanes of the MAGTF that doesn't happen too often together. We bring a battalion of Marines to the schoolhouse and we bring these students in and we run a Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Size Vignette scenario. And the AOR is the Western United States, right? They're really to flexure, spread your wings, right? Not constrained to this corridor, two up one back like stuff, but this truly idea of distributed dispersed forces and then, you know, fights on. How do you see to that? How do you do the logistics for that? You know, electronic warfare, cyber, et cetera. So in conjunction with that class, and I will tell you almost in an air gap with the class, so the students don't necessarily intimately involved and nothing's holding back their instruction, is we lay in on top of that this idea of tactical demonstrations, right? What if? What if we took our Q-21, right? It's pre-IOC, so it's not even IOC'd yet. And what if we put cyber EW capabilities on it and what if we took a V-22 in this gateway, this network I just described, you were able to put it on a couple of them and what if we were able to create a network from U-Marizona through multiple gateways to RQ-21 or another UAS in the China Lake Range, right? 400 nautical miles or so. All terrestrial line of sight communication, right? Avoid the SETCOMPY, SETCOMPY, SETCOMPY's not easy. SETCOMPY's an easy answer, but to a tough problem and you can talk about vulnerability, et cetera. And it's part of the solution, it's part of the solution, it's just not the only solution and that's, so this terrestrial piece is a little harder than SETCOMPY. So what if we could do that and demonstrate it in the course of a strike mission that's going on so you have real airplanes doing real stuff and now I'm going to do something that helps them in their mission, right? And I'm gonna establish this terrestrial node capability real time and the success and failure, Dr. Leeds saw both, right? Of how that happens and the challenges of that. You know, invite industry, it's a bit of a, it's disruptive innovation at its best. By definition, what we're doing out there is disruptive innovation because we can't get everything we want, right? We'd love to buy Link 16 for all my friends. We'd love to put it on, but unfortunately, the Marine Corps can't make those decisions and be bounded by it for the next 30 years. So it's kind of what we're doing out there, we're doing other things from exhibition or airfield security to RFID, right? The back of a, right now, getting the back of a V-22 or 53K guy, no idea who's back there, none, zero. You know, accountability is a big deal, it's a big deal. And so cargo or Marines, you know, we have learned the last 12 years, we've flown airplanes around empty, half empty, right? Why? Because no idea, right? We can do better, right? We've got a, MCDP-1 tells us, General Gray dictated it, 29th commandant, we need to fight smart. And smart, based on knowledge, we need knowledge to fight smart. So ID, the idea for RFID, which we're also doing, is, hey, I got Jonesy's, broken window, you know, everybody's on board, I know where they're sitting, it's just SA, but I know I got them, right? Because that's important to me. It's really important to me. Or the cargo that, or the TAC, the wing commander in the Techler Command Center. He may want to know. Maybe I don't need to launch that story. Maybe they need to wait for the next, you know, the disguise limit, knowledge for you, opportunity, and decisions. And that's really all we're trying to, General Schmidl, and I'm just really here as a repeat on the play button. You know, he articulates this very well. And that's what he's done in his tenure as Deputy Commandant, is all this, you know, is disdain for status quo, as we used to like to say. You know, he always wanted to see a new way. Oh, what's the next page? Don't tell me what we used to do. That's informative. I need that. But, oh man, we've got new capabilities. Why do we want to fight them the same way? So that's kind of what's going on, sir. And that's what we're doing out at MOTS One. Sir. I hear no one extra. Wait, wait, let's go here. Ariel, I promised him a while ago. Sir, my name's Jaco Lloro from the Embassy of Finland. Sorry, no. A question. In case the fiscal environment stays difficult in the coming years, how do you see the future of the classic Hornet fleet? And on the other hand, the F-35C version, if you need to make further cuts, could you consider a retiring, for example, the Hornet fleet earlier than you plan, or is there a plan B? Good point. I'll tell you that as the priority, the F-35 is a priority. If I have $1, the 99 cents is probably going to that most important priority. So that's what priorities mean. Right now our plan is that Hornet's gonna go to 2030, and we got a very good plan. We've had opportunity as the Navy got out of Hornets, there's more Hornets, so A through D. So we've been able to make our own luck on some of the Hornet stuff. We do have some challenges making a 6,000 hour jet into an 8,000 hour jet, into a 10,000 hour jet. There's a physics problem there, but none that's not attainable to go through. And we, eyes wide open, we're looking at every possible way to make sure that Hornet, cause it's a great airplane, terrific, still is, makes it to the transition. Coa B is not acceptable, American people won't let it be acceptable, so we're doing everything to make Coa A the right choice. But if 35B is the priority, an opportunity is how we're gonna get through the transition with F-18, A through D. Thanks, sir. Let's go here and then we'll go back there. Hi, thank you, Dr. Mayor. Lead, Sidney Friedberg, General from BreakingDefense.com. This is a beautiful slide. The idea of dispersed operations is very exciting. The idea of improvised airfields and so forth is very exciting, running off highways and so forth. But when people have all sorts of man pads out there, not talking even about full up A2AD, but just guys with anti-aircraft missiles off their shoulders, which are becoming more prevalent around the world. When people are able to jam and hack and otherwise disrupt the dashed lines over there, maybe your F-35Bs can operate in that kind of environment, but maybe the network and the logistics can't keep up with them. How do you actually make sure that whole thing can function inside this contentious, contended environment, rather than just the high-end aircraft going in and having to come back out again because there's no support base? So I'll tell you that what will be always be in place in the Marine Corps, technology or no technology, is what's referred to as commander's intent. The Marine Corps is not an effects-based force, we're a commander's intent force. So every Marine leaves the planning session, given the warning order, given the execute order, leaves with the commander's vision for success. That will always be the ace in the hole on how we're gonna go. That last line in there kind of alludes to that. It alludes to the fact that technology still is upon us and do ignore it. So I envision that a joint tactical air controller, for instance, will have his map, his laminated map, will have his compass, absolutely. Will have the masters of those capabilities. But I also envision that the same JTAC Ford air controller will also be in a digital environment where he can, and having been up on OP feet up at MOTS-1 and watching us produce our JTACs up there and trying in a 20-not, 30-not win, trying to execute coordinates off a map, write down a nine line brief, there's a better way to do it. Can you still do that? Absolutely, absolutely. And I will tell you every part of the MAGTF, because that's what commander's intent is all about. Perhaps one of the most famous is General Mattis's famous commander's intent, no better friend, no worse enemy. So every Marine that was there that day, part of that division, part of his verbal delivery of the order knew, they walked away there, they walked away with one thing, no better friend, no worse enemy, commander's intent, shoot, no shoot. All those ideas, that last filter in that scenario is exactly that. What did the commanding general tell me his vision of success was? So all C2 has to be degradable, has to be redundant, has to be back to yellow canaries, that you, this is me over. We still will train, that's why this is tough. None of this stuff is easy. It actually makes it harder. I believe it makes it much more effective, but there's nothing simplistic going on here. And we are not easing the requirement on our individual Marines. We are expanding it, because this is hard stuff. But with that said, knowledge is power, and we're gonna continue to go down this technology trail. We're not gonna be wed to it, but we gotta be able to thrive in it. And that's really all we're talking about. There's a lot of different scenarios. HF is still a high-frequency communication modulation is still alive and well. We gotta be able to operate in that spectrum. And so this multi-wave form, multi-channel capability is exactly about that. It's about redundancy. One wave form fails, there's another one. And there's another one. To you, this is me over. To HF, you know, with this. It's still familiar with that. So again, technology isn't gonna answer. Good training's gonna answer it. Basics, mastery of the basics from a map laminated map and a compass and a grease pencil to a book, a notebook, a tablet, et cetera, to how we're gonna fight our force the best of our ability. Okay, we are, what I'd like to do, because we're almost close to time, is I think there were two or three hands up back here. I'd like everybody to ask our questions quickly and then have you use it as a get off the stage if we can just to make sure everybody gets a chance. Bill Linux, marine perspective on joint vertical lift and JMR. Okay, and then I think there was one more and then we'll go back there. Now, Sullivan, question about the AFF plan with 175, 180, 182, 188. How you doing on keeping up with the AFF plan? Are you putting anyone, are you putting one out? My question would be, Marion's thoughts about airborne early warning platforms. Early warning. Airborne early warning. Okay, all right. Good, I can tie most of these together. So, we're obviously wildly enthused about V-22. I'm telling, V-22's gonna be a 50 year airplane, 50 year plus. We're buying all 360 program or record. I'll be honest with you, the 180K force, as I was telling you, we build back that force. The strong possibilities will be a 17th VMM in that force. There's gotta be, right? If you were to do what the commandant wants us to do, begin with the end in mind, you're gonna see that this four deployed crisis response force needs all the maneuver that it possibly can get to be relevant to the combatant commander. So, V-22 is very important to the AFF plan. We are producing an AFF plan. The JMR and future vertical lift is gonna inform all the great things that are gonna be cooked in next to V-22. Eyes wide open, watching everything that's going on in that program, because it's gonna be powerfully impactful to what we are gonna do for the future, whether it's tilt rotor or not. But we are gonna pay very close attention to you. The Yankee is probably the next airplane that we gotta look at in the future post 2030. And so, that's when future vertical lifts post will come online. So, Marine Corps is paying very close attention to it. We're in the midst of our own procurement cycle, as I've mentioned. So we got our own challenges with respect to that. But everything that's going on in the S&T world, anything that industry's doing from an IRAD perspective, the Marine Corps is very interested in paying very close attention to it. And we wanna use it ultimately to make all these weapons systems better, whether it's a V-22C in a midlife upgrade standpoint around 2030-ish, or it's a UH-1Y replacement somewhere around there. We're gonna pay very close attention. And the AF plan, we've come out of this QDR scammer, even the 175, 180K force. And we got a little more clarity. Last year was chaos. This year, there's some clarity. We will be producing an AF plan. We're out briefing General Rutter, the first Marine Aircraft Wing Commander and General Robling Marfor Pack Commander this week. I got three colonels out there doing that. So we're doing the do and making sure we have the best AF plan possible. As far as early warning, I tell ya, we're buying the state-of-the-art ground-based sensor called the TPS-80. Oh man, it is, I could spend the next hour talking about it is truly, as I get excited about what we're doing in AF plan is what this sensor's gonna be. It's all about fighting smart. Type zero, type one, type two targets. The ability of that radar to network with the rest of the MAG TAF, the rest of the joint force is powerful. And it is a quality capability. AESA, air-cooled capability. Again, C-130, roll in the back of the seat. Where do you need it next? Where do you need it next? Or 53, Echo or Kilo, Externable. Where do you need it next? And you'll be able to put it where the COCOM, with the combatant commander, joint force commander, C-FAC, JFAC needs it. It's all about being relevant. And that TPS-80 is our sensor to provide some of that early warning as far as the MAG TAF goes. Our area of responsibility and how we're going to do it, along with F-35, again, all network-based systems talking to systems. So pretty exciting. Well, General Glavy, thanks so much for coming this morning. We really appreciate it. We're so energized having, I mean, it was very inspiring, very, it's a lot of fun to listen to where you're headed and good luck. Thank you again for a very informative hour. Thanks you all for coming. Thanks. Thank you. Thank you very much.