 Thank you for joining us this morning. And a special welcome to Minister Khan and to Ambassador Jelani. We're very pleased that Minister Khan could make it here through the turbulence and the snow. And join us here in Washington, DC. And thanks, all of you, for making your way here. We are very pleased to host Minister Khan this morning. He is in town, of course, for a series of countering violent extremism events hosted by the White House and the State Department. And this is an important conversation that we're very pleased he's able to be here for. I, as many of you know, am still relatively new here as the president of USIP. And nonetheless, I am looking forward to making one of my first trips to Pakistan in the next month or so. Pakistan has been a very important area of focus for USIP since 2007, working with a variety of partners in Pakistan and working on various research projects. We have also convened a number of events here where we've been able to bring important thought leaders both from around the world and from Pakistan to discuss critical issues. We've had the privilege of hosting Pakistan's prime minister, His Excellency Mia Nawaz Sharif, for his first public event in Washington, DC after taking office. So I'm especially pleased that we're able to do the same for Minister Khan as this is his first public event in Washington, DC since taking his current position as minister of the interior in Pakistan. This is, however, the sixth time that he has held a ministerial position over his years as one of Pakistan's leading politicians of various portfolios. So we're very, very pleased to have him here with us today. He, of course, in addition to the interior, he was previously minister of science and technology, minister of petroleum, of natural resources, so obviously a man of far-ranging capabilities. After he has made some remarks, he will be joined on stage by Moid Yusuf, who is our South Asia director, for a brief conversation. And so those of you in the audience have received question cards. And I invite you to note the questions down, and then we can pass them forward and include those in the conversation after the remarks. So with that, I would like to welcome Minister Khan and invite him up to make some comments for us today. Thank you. Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. President of the Institute, my colleagues, honorable ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed a pleasure for me to be here amongst you this morning. At the outset, I'd like to thank the US Institute for Peace for providing me this opportunity to interact with all of you here. And I would like to thank you for taking out the time to be here. I've been told that the basic focus of my talk should be on the current situation, not only in Pakistan, but in the rest of the region in South Asia, across the border in Afghanistan. To try and give you from the ground, so as to say, the developments which have taken place over the last few months, over the last couple of years. But before I give you the exact situation as it stands today, I think a certain perspective, a certain background, a certain historical background also needs to be narrated in order to make sense of what I'm going to say. Let me also apologize at the outset that I don't have any written notes. So I'll be speaking of the cuff. So if I go off a tangent somewhere here and there, I hope you'll excuse me. But I'll try and keep my conversation and my talk and my interaction with you as focused as possible so that we are able to come to some kind of an understanding as to the situation in my part of the world. I think all of you know that Pakistan has been in the eye of the storm for the last many years, starting in the late 70s when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan had the option to remain neutral. It had the option, like a few other countries in the region, to be quietly supportive of the Soviet Union or it had the option of standing up to the communist invasion with the international community and making itself be counted. We took the third option. It was a long war. It was a very difficult war. It was a very uneven war because it was not a war between two superpowers. It was a war between a superpower and an underdeveloped country which was being helped by other developing countries of the region in which Pakistan played a very proactive role. I think most of you will not probably be aware of the fact that there's only one proxy war with the United States as one in the last century and that has been the war in Afghanistan. Most of the proxy wars which have been fought, not just by the United States but a whole lot of other countries, if you go into the history of the last 100 years and probably even before that, they've all been failures. So I think that particular war is a testimony to the alliance, to the friendship between the United States, Pakistan, other countries of the free world which made us come out victorious, as I said, in a very, very difficult war. But the victory came with the price. Once the victory flag went up, the international community, the United States included, sang their national anthem, pulled down their flags and left the region to the devil, so as to say. So Pakistan was left to pick up the pieces, the backlash, the negativity of a war between superpowers. War did not lead to peace. A victory in the war did not lead to peace. It led to fragmentation. It led to turbulence, political, military, sectarian, tribal, and there was nobody, absolutely nobody, to try and make some sense of a solution. Pakistan received the major thrust of this backlash. We were still reeling from an avalanche of over 3 million refugees when things went from bad to worse and 9-11 happened. Now I'm sure you must all be aware, and if you're not, I'd just like to restate the fact that Pakistan was in no way, no Pakistani was involved in the tragedy of 9-11. All of those who took part in this crime had absolutely no connection with Pakistan in any way. And when 9-11 happened, within Pakistan itself, there were a few problems here and there, law and order problems, if I can call them, but there was not a single instance of terror. There was not a single case of terror-related crime, of suicide bombings, of the situation as it exists today. Again, Pakistan was asked to take a decision. Pakistan was then being governed by a military ruler. He decided to take a decision, which was in many ways controversial. To this day, it remains controversial. But he took a decision and he decided to throw his lot in unilaterally, consciously, and fully with the international community in the post-9-11 scenario. It has been 13 years now. From a total peaceful country, Pakistan has been turned into a battle zone. We have lost over 50,000 lives in the last 13 years. As I said, Pakistan or any of its population had absolutely nothing to do with the tragic event of 9-11. But the backlash of 9-11 was totally taken by Pakistan. If the role of Pakistan had been appreciated, if the sacrifices with this country made had been appreciated, if the very difficult circumstances in which Pakistan found itself then and finds itself today, even 13 years down the line, if there was a greater understanding of Pakistan's position, maybe all the sacrifices would have been worth it. But it has not been so simple. In spite of the sacrifices, in spite of the turbulence, in spite of the many lives lost, Pakistan continues to be on the hit list of anybody who considers himself with due respect, and I'm sorry to use that term, of most analysts and critics who have focused on the war in Afghanistan. They have generally refused to understand our predicaments and our situation and totally focused on what they wanted Pakistan to be and how they wanted it to be achieved. A few weeks ago, in this state of turbulence and of violence and of terrorism, we were hit by a singular incident which changed the mindset of every Pakistani. This was the incident in which seven terrorists at about this time, about 10 o'clock in the morning Pakistan time, climbed the walls of an army public school right in the heart of Peshawar, which is our provincial capital of the northwestern, of the troubled province of northwestern frontier province and blatantly marred down anybody and everybody who came across them. Over 145 lives were lost, most of them children, or almost 133 young children, some of them toddlers, were blatantly killed without remorse, and in fact, one of the excerpt, communication excerpt, which was picked up by our agencies, conveyed something to the effect that one terrorist is calling up somebody in his headquarters and saying, we have killed dozens of boys and girls and he at once responds, kill all of them. So it was a method to the madness. It was not that this took place by accident or this was collateral damage. Very consciously, very blatantly, the target were the children of Pakistan. Mercifully, this country has had only one 9-11. In the last 13 years, Pakistan has faced many 9-11s, similar incidents, but this particular incident in which the target with children, per se, changed the mindset of even those elements who felt that military operation is not the only way out of the crisis. So if I were to say that as far as changing the mindset of the people of Pakistan across the country and particularly changing the mindset of those special elements who still looked upon the military option with a lot of suspicion, then this particular incident with this very tragic incident which took place in Pishar did actually contribute to that. It put the focus on the government, on all the political forces, our country's prime minister at once on the very next day convened the meeting in Pishawar of all the major political parties. After the meeting, there was a very high-profile meeting of the civil and the military leadership. The entire military hierarchy was there in Pishar. And similarly, the civilian leadership was there. And it was decided that we have to now take the bull by the horns. Yes, we had been engaged in this exercise for the last 13 years. But it was a roller coaster ride. We would take a few steps ahead. And then for some reason, the other one or the other step had to be taken back. I think if one single incident has proved to be a catalyst, I'm sorry to use that term, but a catalyst in much the same way as 9-11 did in this country to somehow nudge the people of Pakistan, the civil society, the political forces, the civil military leadership, the media to come on one platform and work out an agenda to eliminate these criminals, these animals. Then I'm very, very clear that the Peshawar incident provided that opportunity. As a result of all the political parties getting together, and let me also tell you, these political parties included a few political parties who are basically who have a religious background. There are a few political parties also who have been consistently against any kind of military operation against the terrorists. They have always emphasized on the need for dialogue. But after this incident, there was only one voice. There was only one message. There was only one agenda that we must avenge the little angels, not only because they were our children, but also because of the fact that the people whom we were trying to somehow bring into the mainstream, who we were trying to engage through dialogue, if that was their mindset, that there are no limitations on who would they kill, there are no limitations on their barbarity, on their cruelty, on their animal instincts. So there was a feeling that if they are the people we are handling or we are engaging, I think we have been wasting our time and they would only understand the language in which they were speaking. So the operation, as we call it, the military operation against them, which was started sometime last year, was activated. A national action plan was worked out. It was a 20-point national action plan. I happened to chair the meeting of all the political parties which worked together over many, many hours and over many, many days. Within a seven-day timeline, which was announced by the Prime Minister, and within the seven-days timeline, we, through mutual consensus, evolved a national action plan. I was very happy to see the agenda of the summit meeting that we are having here in the United States. At least 11 or 12 points in the national action plan coincide with the agenda items of the counter-term summit, which is taking place here in Washington. So I'm very happy to exchange views with the international community, our allies, our friends, the United States of America, and other partners to try and identify the best way forward. I think Pakistan has never been so focused, as it is now, on the job at hand. There has never been this kind of unity over the last 13 years. And there has never been this kind of unity of purpose, which has emerged across the length and breadth of the country. But having said that, let me also say that it is no easy task. All the troubles, all the problems that have been built up over the last 13 years, they will take a lot of effort cleansing. More importantly, once the pressure on the terrorists has increased, once they have been put to the wall, once their headquarters in our northwestern frontiers or across the FATA area have been destroyed, they've gone across the border, and they are trying to reorganize themselves. And since their headquarters have been destroyed, now they are going for the worst option. They are going for the softest targets. They attack schools. They attack religious places of worship. They attack marketplaces where people normally congregate in large numbers during the daytime. Now, the option for us are very difficult. We obviously can't close down our schools. We can't close down our places of worship. We can't close down our markets. We have to keep normal life flowing. That is the most important aspect and the most important obligation and responsibility of the government. And at the same time, we have to protect our country and our people against terrorists who are not foreigners. They are not of a different color. They don't speak a different language. They cannot be recognized on the street as people any different from the rest of us. They have the same stock. They speak the same language. They have the same color. They wear the same clothes. So how do you then sift the terrorists from the normal citizen? It's a very, very difficult task. But as I said, for the first time, an environment has been created in which the government is moving forward on a very, very fast track traditionally and historically. There has been a divide and I'll be very open and candid about it over the last 10 or 12 years between the civil and the military on how this operation against terrorism should move forward. It originated basically because the decision taken by General Musharraf was taken without consensus. That led to a lot of divisions not only between the civil and military, but within the military itself. Mercifully, we managed to wade through the initial few years. And as time went on, the system started to institutionalize and things began to get better. But as I said, it has been a roller coaster ride and I cannot say that these last 13 years have been consistent in this respect. But giving you this historical background, I think my idea was to apprise you of the difficulties of the way forward. It is important now not to harp on what has gone in the past. The important thing is to look towards the future. And it is an area about which we are now, well, hopefully optimistic because unless and until there is a clarity of purpose, a clarity of vision, you cannot expect to move forward. So trying not to be too immodest, I would still like to take the credit that when this government took over about a year and a half ago, we tried to lend some sanity to the system. We knew and we were very conscious of the fact that the last 12 years or so, and I'm talking about pre-2013, the one single largest factor which has affected Pakistan's fight against terrorism was the lack of unity. So the Prime Minister in September 2013 convened a meeting of the All Parties, it was an All Parties conference, and it was decided in the first instance to engage the militants in some kind of a dialogue. With the condition that any dialogue which takes place will take place under the Constitution of Pakistan. That whole process took about eight months. For the first time in the history of this kind of negotiations and dialogue, those people came down from the hills and engaged in formal dialogue with the civilian leadership. Within a few, in a matter of weeks, we became conscious of the fact that they were operating on a two-point agenda. They were, on the one hand, talking to us and on the other, some segments of the terrorists were engaging in the same terrorist activities so as to put increasing pressure on the government to agree to their demands. And the bottom line came when they attacked one of our main airports in Karachi, the only seaport of Pakistan, and one of our premier airports. Once that attack took place, we broke off the dialogue process, and after a lot of deliberation, we went for the option of the military operation. Let me tell you that the dialogue process was important for the military operation to take place. As I have said repeatedly, there were a lot of divisions within Pakistan's political hierarchy, political parties, particularly parties on the right of center about the decision to eliminate the terrorists through a military operation. Apart from so many other problems, one of the main issues that was constantly talked about was the fact that this is not Pakistan's war. This was a foreign war, more specifically, a United States war, which has been imposed on this region. And Pakistan Army is actually fighting a foreign superpowers war. Successive governments are fighting the United States war. So the option of the dialogue process on which all the parties were united was to ensure that we play out the dialogue process. We engage in the dialogue process with all honesty. It was not a facade. We were very honest in engaging the other side in this dialogue process. Unfortunately, as I said, it didn't last very long. And then when the decision to undergo or to carry out the military operation was taken, another meeting was convened. And because of the situation on the ground, all the political parties came on board. So that element of unity, that element of community participation, that element of fighting the terrorists from the states and the markets of Pakistan, engaging the youth, engaging the women, that I think was practically used in Pakistan. And practically, I think now it is a part of the policy of fighting terrorism within Pakistan. What are the areas of concern as of today? The positive thing is that almost all the headquarters of the terrorist organizations within Pakistan, and they were very close to the border, have been destroyed. Over 2,000 terrorists have been killed in the operation. Some of them very important figures of the terrorist network. There is a general support for the military operation across the country. That divide, which existed in the first few years between the civil and the military, has been completely erased. And I can now say, as somebody who is responsible for internal security, that the civil and military in Pakistan are working in very close harness, not only at the strategic level, not only at the operational level, but also at the strategic level. And that gives a lot of space for the government to work out its strategy on a long-term basis. But we also have the negatives. One of the major negatives is our concern about the capacity of the administration across the border to handle the situation in the absence of the ISAF forces, of the foreign support, which had been extended to this country post 9-11. I do not see any restriction in numbers as far as the military strength of the extremist groups are concerned. I'm talking about Afghanistan. But the strength of the coalition forces has gone down drastically. At the time of the surge, there was anything upwards of about 140,000 ISAF troops. And not just ISAF, there were other countries also, over 140,000, over and above the Afghan troops in Afghanistan. Now there will be just around 10,000. And they will be restricted to the major towns and the major bases. And their objective is going to be mainly defensive in nature. So the crucial question, which is going to come to face us over the next couple of months is, will the region be able to protect itself after the drawdown of the foreign forces? This is the crucial question, which is going to be answered in the next two, three months. The positive development in this respect has been the very close coordination. I hope I'm not, how much time do we have? The very close coordination and cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have never been better historically. And that is a very, very big positive for stability in the region. There have been a few incidents on both sides of the border. And for the first time, there have been no finger pointing from either side. Our agencies, our intelligence agencies, security agencies have been working very closely. They have been visits at the highest level. The Afghanistan president has been here. Our foreign minister has gone to Afghanistan. Our army chief has gone there. In fact, he was there yesterday. I think this is probably his third visit. And similarly, the intelligence chiefs have been constantly in coordination and in close touch with each other. This is a relationship which is of vital importance to bring some kind of sanity in the region. But it is also important that the focus of the international community must remain as focused as before. In fact, probably there's a greater need for the focus to be even more considered because there are certain areas in which the support of the international community is vital. I think meetings or the conferences, like the one that we are having right now, play an important role in keeping that coordination moving forward. But my personal view is that interaction and coordination should take place at the regional level, at the local level. You can't generalize the problem which the international community faces as far as terrorism is concerned. You cannot correlate the extremists in South Asia, in the Middle East, or in North Africa. They have separate agendas. One thing I'm very concerned is the tendency of the international community to generalize the extremist threat all over the world. I think whereas there are certain common strands, but the regional aspect must be emphasized. The regional genesis, the regional origins, the regional agendas must be emphasized. Only then we will be able to bring or suggest solutions in fighting these extremists in their own regions. Lastly, there has been a lot of concern shown all over by the recent development of the extremist threat in North Africa, and particularly in the Middle East. There's also been a lot of concern about the extension of this threat to South Asia. As of now, I can say quite confidently, with a lot of confidence that the ISIS that exists today, for the time being, it is totally a Middle Eastern phenomenon. It has absolutely no presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. There has been a lot of media hype about this. There have been a lot of very responsible people talking about the threat of ISIS to that part of the world. Like I was talking to our ambassador here in Washington, the space in South Asia, the terrorist space is almost totally occupied. The TTA, the Tariq-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, Tariq-e-Taliban Pakistan have their own agendas. I do not foresee them sharing that platform, or their agendas, with a group like ISIS. The ISIS at the moment is totally focused on the Middle East. The agenda is totally Middle Eastern. But in the future, unless and until we address the regional threats, unless we address the international threats, yes, you cannot rule out the possibility of a grand alliance later on. But to overreact to the ISIS threat, I think, would not be a wise thing to do. But an area of concern for a country like Pakistan is that the diversion of focus and the diversion of interest now by the international community to the emerging ISIS threat could lead to a lessening of the focus in South Asia. That, I feel, must not happen. I think 13 years of sacrifice, 13 years of blood and toil, of effort has gone into, well, reducing the threat in South Asia, in Afghanistan, in the borders of Pakistan. We need to further cement and further coordinate our efforts for the mopping up operation, so as to say. And we must not repeat the mistake of the 90s when the United States and the international community, after the defeat of the Soviet Union, left a huge vacuum in Afghanistan, in South Asia, enabling the militants to occupy that place. That vacuum under no condition must be left open. It is important for us to learn from our mistakes. It is important for us to learn from our history. It is important not to underestimate or to overestimate the threat from the extremists and from the militants. I think it's not just Pakistan. Internationally, I see a grand coalition and a grand consensus building up over the barbarity and cruelty that are these militant groups. I think we need to work together, hand in hand, brick and mortar, so as to say, right in the nitty gritty. We need to work together as member states of the international community, as allies, as parts of the civilized world to try and eliminate the scourge of terrorism in all its form and all its aspect. Pakistan has been playing that role for the last 13 years. We are now renewed in our commitment to fight the scourge not only within the borders of Pakistan, but in the region, even beyond. We are fully committed and we are willing and hoping that the international community will work with countries like Pakistan to make that happen. I thank you for your attention. Mr. Khan, thank you very much for your very comprehensive remarks and also bringing out some of the challenges and opportunities that Pakistan has as you move forward. What we'll do here is have a few questions for you from the audience and a couple from myself and have a conversation before we end. Let me begin, if I may, you've talked about Peshawar being the 9-11 of Pakistan and sort of the nation being moved. I was there myself during that time. I saw that happen. It was remarkable in some ways. But I think this is not the first time we've seen the Pakistani nation moved because of the horrendous attacks by one or the other group. What does Pakistan do to keep this sentiment and the support going without having major attacks take place that galvanize people for a time being and then we seem to forget? First and foremost, I think we must keep the momentum against the terrorists on at a very high level. More and more success in the battlefield will motivate the people of Pakistan. Secondly, the international community must keep its focus and support in the region totally centered on the regional perspective. There might be quite a few things which we might not do or might not come up to the expectations of the international community. I think it is very important that the international community must understand the problems that we face. So on that account, that perception, that impression must not go across, that we are constantly being asked to do more, that impression must not go across, that we are fighting somebody else's war, that impression must not go across, that we take directions from some other country. If we are fighting it, as we are fighting it today, as Pakistan's own threat, as Pakistan's own war, we continue to get results on the battlefield and we manage to evolve a strategy for protecting our cities, our schools, our towns. In other words, strengthening our internal security, I think the momentum and the fervor will not evaporate. Do you feel that the Pakistani state over the years has done enough to reiterate and convince its own public that this is Pakistan's war? Because there have also been times, as you talked about the civil military disconnect in the earlier part, post 9-11, where there were some, one may say, mixed messages even for the Pakistani people in some ways. No, absolutely not. I think there have been failings on so many counts. If I get into the details, I think it'll take a long time. I'll not get into the details, but yes, there have been failings on the part of the state. I don't know whether it's part of the state or on the chain of events. It has not been handled as it should be. Starting from the day, General Musharraf took the decision without consensus, without taking anybody on board. It has been an issue of missed opportunities, but having said that, let me go back to the early remark that you have made. You said that there have been other horrendous incidents, no doubt, but there has never been this coming together of the Pakistani nation, and that is the reason I compare it with 9-11. So, it's coming together of Pakistan, as happened for the first time, and that is the positive area that we need to work on. The failings, I think, we'll address them once there are better tidings for the country as far as victory of the terrorist circles. Let me also ask you in the same vein, sort of having worked with the Pakistani public sector and otherwise over the years, I find Pakistan has done fairly well in coming up with policies and visions on what to change and what to do. The implementation inevitably lags. So we had the national internal security policy that you had authored a year ago. How does the national action plan now relate to that? And why do we need NAP if the NISP was already a vision to do exactly what the state has to do now? Well, you come from Pakistan, you know, we normally, or most of the time, we act first and strategize later. We have been engaged in this war against extremism for the last 13 years. We had no strategy. Almost everything was being handled by the military and a lot of it was off the cuff. A lot of it was knee-jerk. There were a lot of problems on who was responsible and who was accountable. So for the first time when I took over and when this government took office, I think one of the first imperatives for all of us was to have a strategy, have a policy. So that is the reason we worked almost six months. We worked with the military. We worked with the provinces. The provinces are a very, very important part in the whole organizational and administrative setup. And it was difficult. It was easier working with the military. It was more difficult working with my fellow colleagues in the provinces. We worked with a whole lot of experts, with the media, national security experts, and it took almost seven to eight months to come up with this policy paper. Part of it was implemented. You know, I could sit and discuss the internal security policy paper with you for hours. But it was not announced. For the simple reason that we cut corners, we cut ends, a rapid response force, it would have taken anything upwards of a year to year and a half to put in place. We, as a short-term measure, got the civil armed forces and forces from the military to act as our rapid response force. The Joint Intelligence Direct Rate, before we announced it, in fact, Pakistanis were jolted by this revelation that we have almost 33, not almost, but exactly 33 intelligence agencies working in Pakistan. I mean, a country engaged in the war against extremism for whom intelligence agencies' role and work is of paramount importance. You'll be surprised to know that even at a very high level, we were not aware of the total number of agencies. Now, most of these agencies were working in competition with each other, sometime at variance with each other. They were never sharing information. I can say now that there has been a sea change. I don't say that there's been a total transformation, but a sea change from June 2013. There's a lot of intelligence sharing. There is a lot of close coordination. If a certain agency is working in a certain area and the lead moves on to another area where another agency is working, without a moment's hesitation, they pass on the information and let the other agencies take over. I could give you more than a few incidents in this regard. So a joint intelligence direct trade, which was a dream a few years ago, is operationally working. Yes, most of it is being handled by the military, but it is working under the Ministry of Interior. So it is working under the intelligence, under the civilian leadership. A whole lot of other things. National internal security policy was the organizational and administrative and strategic policy paper that we announced over a year ago. National action plan is the proactive part. Some of it is part of the internal security policy that would have followed anyway. And some of it, I think, was needed given the precarious situation that Pakistan was faced. Okay, thank you. Let me just ask one more thing on the coordination part, since you mentioned it. We at USIP published a book last year on Pakistan's counter-terrorism challenge, getting Pakistani experts to write on various aspects of it. One thing that came out across the whole book, I mean, there was a common thread, was NACTA. And if I may, the history of NACTA is not too pretty. Having started, became a political football, one place to another. What we at least concluded is that that has to be the apex body that takes sort of the front and center role of Pakistan's counter-terrorism task. Where do you see NACTA going from there? Is this a paradigm shift as we are seeing now, or are we still deciding what its role is gonna be? No, it's just a start. I think there's too much vested interest. There's too much competition between agencies, between departments. So for NACTA to become a sea change, to basically assume the role that it was designed to play, I think it'll take a bit of time. But a start has definitely been made. The Ministry of Interior is playing a proactive role to try and build that framework under which NACTA can work as a totally independent body. It'll take a bit of time. We come, you know, just to make a reference to what happened in the United States. It took upwards of a year, if not two years, before the Homeland Security put its act together. In a country like Pakistan in which the systems are not as firm and as strong as they're here in the United States, I think it will probably take time. But I think for the first time, everybody is convinced that NACTA has a role. And you need to, every department, every organization needs to seed space to NACTA for it to play that overall coordinating and proactive role, which I think is important if we are to be successful in this fight against extremism. Let me ask one more question and then we have a few to go through from the audience, which is we've talked about Peshawar here and we've talked about the TTP as being the perpetrators. We've talked about Afghanistan and the safe havens. There's a whole slew of other organizations that we have to look at when we look at terrorism in Pakistan. Just this morning, we had another major attack in Pindi in an Imam Bargah, a sectarian attack. And this is the fourth, I think, in the last month and a half. There are also reports that one hears that Lashkar-e-Jangvi, for instance, is active in Balochistan and is sort of complicating the Baloch problem in some ways. How does your national action plan and how does the planning after Peshawar address the sectarian groups? And then, if I may add, there's that whole question of southern Punjab and one keeps hearing this is the hotbed, this is the hotbed. And one is never clear what really exists there and what kind of threat it poses. So is this plan comprehensive enough to deal with it or is the Pakistani state's capacity stretched in a way that it has to sequence this? Obviously, we will have to sequence the questions of capacity. Problems build up over the years, will take time. But as to its success, I mean the taste of the pudding lies in its eating, we will have to work over time to address the sectarian problem. The sectarian problem has been there, I think, almost for 30 years now, if not earlier. One of the offshoots of the Afghan jihad was that these religious elements went and joined the jihad and then used that as a bulwark or as a platform to attack sectarian groups within Pakistan. So it has been a problem now for over 30 years. It is difficult because it's insular We were just talking about the Raul Pindi accident. In fact, the Chicago incident, Raul Pindi and another one, Peshawar. The difficulty here is that these people do not come from outside. They are living amongst you. It is very, very difficult for intelligence to pick up their communication or any kind of other excerpts or any other warnings. They normally interact through word of mouth, through direct communication. So it is very difficult. As I said in my initial remarks, you can't close down your religious places. You have to keep life going. So it is a difficult process. How, what is the strategy of the National Action Plan? Use the consensus built up on the fight against extremism. And use the religious elements amongst the community to try and work out lowest common denominator of understanding of tolerance between various sectarian groups. And this is not just hogwash. This is not just talk. I think within the first few weeks, we were able to do that. I chaired, in fact, a convened a meeting of all the religious segments of society. And we were able to work out an agreement on Madrasari form. This has never happened in the history of Pakistan. And that included auditing of funds. That included registration. That included, you know, transparency of curriculum. So, and a whole lot of other things. So we need to work from the inside to address the sectarian problem. There is no, there is no outside factor or force which can resolve the sectarian problem in Pakistan. We are trying to work from the inside. And hopefully over the next few weeks, you will see an improvement in this regard. But the sectarian attacks, which are taking place right now, they are terrorist related. Luxury Jhangvi, which is, well, unofficially part of the TTP, Thariq-e-Taliban Pakistan. This is the reaction to the military operation. This is not totally the secretarian divide which is being targeted, which is a normal secretarian divide in Pakistan. This is totally terrorist related. And since most of their activity has been limited by the military operation, so they are using the secretarian divide through the Luxury Jhangvi to hit the softest targets. What do you make, though, of some of the reports which say that Luxury Jhangvi is also operational in Balochistan, and perhaps even targeting some of the Baloch nationalists at the same time? No, it's not just the Luxury Jhangvi. In fact, a lot of movement of the terrorists have taken place. Once the military operation took place, a lot of them moved across Afghanistan. Then there is a certain corridor which they use the Afghanistan territory, and then they cross over into Balochistan. So it is not just the Luxury Jhangvi. It is major factions of the Thariq-e-Taliban Pakistan who have moved into parts of Balochistan. There have been over 500 intelligence-based operations by our military, our civil armed forces, and the police. We have managed, in a very major way, to restrict their activities and to curtail their violence. Unfortunately, that particular progress is never identified, not even appreciated, because for so many reasons, we don't always make it public. So we are focused. The Pakistani government is focused. The military is focused on these developments in Afghanistan, the transformation that has taken place, the migration of the terrorists into vast areas of Balochistan. But I think, generally speaking, things are under control. There are two or three questions at least, and I'll sort of lump them together about the banned organizations and the recent move to ban more organizations. And the concerns expressed here are one, there's been a history of banned organizations using new names and coming up and doing what they were doing in the past. There's also specific concerns here about groups that are seen to be anti-India, Jamaat-U-Dawa, Lashkar-E-Tayeva, and others. We hear that the Pakistani state now very clearly says that we're going after everybody. And yet there seems to be some confusion about who's being banned, there's a delay, is there a delay, what is the policy now on banning organizations and on ensuring that it's not only going to result in a name change and their operations continuing. Well, I'm almost embarrassed to give you a feedback on this because it's not a question of this government, a past government, whatever past governments have done, that goes into the area of responsibility of the state of Pakistan. They have been very vague policies on these and other issues. And that has led to a lot of confusion on the number of prescribed organizations, even though they have, that have been prescribed, have gone into other areas with different names and they're operating within Pakistan. When we decided to identify these organizations, you'll be surprised to know there was, there was no tangible record on the exact number of prescribed organizations, which the government had taken a decision on. So it was a difficult area, I said I'm almost embarrassed to give you this particular feedback, but over the last few months, we have worked very proactively, as you rightly said, there is now a tremendous unanimity amongst all sections of the government on treating every prescribed organizations with the same rule and the same stake. But lack of government action over, spread over so many years has led to a lot of looseness on the part of the government in this respect. So it will take a bit of time, but the positive thing is that there is now a consensus that anybody picking up arms must be disciplined, must be brought to book, must be prevented, no militias, no armed militias should be allowed in Pakistan and only official security agencies should be allowed to carry arms. That is a policy which is being implemented. Various terrorist groups have been arraigned, arrested, put in jail, their militias have been put in jail. So it's a major step forward, but it's going to take time. Giving a free hand to most of these groups over the years has given rise to a lot of problems, but now the commitment is to treat everybody alike and you will see improvement in this area sooner rather than later. So we've lost your microphone, it's somewhere there. So if we can, I think it's because we're telecasting this live, so that's great. If I may, let me push you a little bit more on this, specifically on the question of groups that this town talks a lot about and one is asked over and over and those are groups that may not be doing anything in Pakistan, but are seen as being operational elsewhere. So the anti-India groups being the obvious ones, maybe the Afghan insurgent groups being the obvious one. Some of the concerns arise because for instance, people see on TV, December 4th, Jamaat-ud-Dawar does a big rally in Lahore and then it's also listed as one of the organizations that is to be banned or taken to task or whatever. This dichotomy, I think, confuses a lot of people about the intent of the Pakistani state. Well, I can speak about the intent of the Pakistani state as of today. I cannot speak about the intent of the Pakistani state or various Pakistani governments over the years. But more importantly, the international community have understood the point of view in this respect of successive Pakistani governments. So why blame us at this stage of time when I think the intent in this respect is very, very clear. Our point of view is that it'll take a bit of time. Things have reached such a pass that you cannot expect overnight solutions. The intent is there which was never there before and actions have been taken over the last few weeks which are a manifestation of that intent. Okay, thanks. Another question in the same vein and you rightly pointed to the improving relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan at the track one level. But the question pertains to the perception of Afghans about Pakistan and about Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan and specifically to the presence of Afghan insurgent groups, some of them in Pakistani territory. And so the question from the audience is what would you tell an average Afghan today if they were to raise the same concern? What is it to show that the policy has moved on from the past? No, I think it's not a question of my telling them or the government of Pakistan telling them. It is reflected by actions on the ground. I think the operation, the military operation which was started within Pakistan in June last year, it has given very, very positive results. And I think it's not just within Pakistan. There's an awareness of it across the border. But having said that, let me also say that there is a whole area on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan which is inhabited by tribes which live on both sides of the border, Afghanistan side and Pakistan side. So movement across the border is a normal phenomenon. And these terrorists have used these means of communication, this open and porous border to move freely between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As of now, I can say with a lot of confidence and a lot of responsibility, most of the terrorist groups have run across the border into Afghanistan. We are now working very closely with the Afghan government to work out a strategy to not through a joint operation through coordination, operate they on their side and we are on our side. And once that particular exercise takes place, a lot of the concerns that you have expressed will die out automatically. Okay. Let me just ask a couple more before we end. On Afghanistan Pakistan, one of the periodic irritants if you will, is in terms of the status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The track one moves forward and then one sees a press report saying, oh Pakistan has decided to have all of them expatriated, et cetera. What is the Pakistani state's policy at the moment on Afghan refugees because they are the first ones, legal documents are missing, there are problems. So whenever there's a crackdown in that sense, they tend to stand out perhaps. No, we have a serious problem on that account. As I said, there's any way of upwards of three million one time, few have gone back. We are still left with a huge majority. As of today, the figures are about around 1.2 million registered and almost the same number who are there without any papers. There are huge drain on our economy. But most importantly, we have hosted them for the last 30 years and we are willing to host them for many years as long as necessary. But as per the agreement, they were to restrict themselves to IDP camps, they were to be fully registered. The international community would also lend a hand, supporting hand. All of that now is not there on the ground. No camp is populated now. They've all moved out of camps. They are living in populated areas. They have their own society, so as to say. And a lot of terrorists coming from across the border or even from within the frontier use these camps. Use these avenues to carry out terrorist activities in Pakistan. So that is an area of concern. What we are trying to do is we are trying to put them back into the camps as originally envisaged. So exercise of registration has started. It is going to take time. We are going to have serious financial problems taking them back. The agreement to let them remain in Pakistan runs out in December 2015. The bottom line is that although we are concerned about the role of some of these camps, which are playing, which is being played as far as the security of Pakistan is concerned, we are also conscious of the fact that we will not do anything which can be an area of concern for the new Afghan government. So we will work with them to work out a timeline and a schedule for their eventual repatriation. In the meantime, how do we handle them within Pakistan? After the registration is over, we have again promised the Afghan government to sit with them and work out a mutually agreed timetable for the repatriation of the unregistered Afghans in the first place and discuss the eventual withdrawal of the IDPs, the Afhan refugees, closer to December 2015. Finally, Minister, one specific question on the police. And I know you've been invested quite a bit in terms of seeing how to make the police do a better job. The rapid response force is one element of it. What is the Pakistani state doing in terms of either revamping or improving the police, per se, because ultimately they are going to be the frontline of crime prevention and terrorism control? Well, as you've rightly said, it is a police. If the police is able to, somehow, we are able to, in the shortest possible term, carry out an exercise of capacity strengthening. I think that will do wonders for our fight against extremism. But we have a lot of problems on this score. The element of time, finances, training, the police in Pakistan, as you know, is not equipped or trained for anti-terrorism or counter-terrorism. It is for normal law and order activity. The little help and support that was available internationally that is thinned out now. So we have now engaged the military in capacity building of the police. And the first deputy response force of the police, which passed out just recently in Punjab, that was entirely supported by the military. So in the short term, we are getting their support, not only in terms of training, but also in recruiting some personnel from the military in the police force also. People who are close to retirement in the military or people who have left the army and are now willing to join the police force. So it is going to be a bit of a mixture of police and retired army officials working as a deputy response force in the short term. And in the medium and long term, of course, we have a program of training chocked out, but that will take anything between 18 months or two years. I did say finally, but there's one last, finally, which is there's some concern here and otherwise about international NGO presence in Pakistan. There's this new bill to regulate NGOs. And there's one other question as asked, what is the Pakistani state's outlook towards NGOs who are doing some very good work in Pakistan for a number of years and whether there is going to be a lesser space, perhaps for them to operate, or is this bill and the current sort of structure or the effort just to bring them into the mainstream because there seems to be some concern with this new sort of NGO bill and sort of movement around it? Look, there should be absolutely no concern. I think basically we are out to regulate the whole system. Over the years, we actually didn't have a policy in this matter. So the idea is to regulate, there will be no circumvention of their area of work. There should be absolutely no concern on that score. The idea is for the government to know which area a particular NGO is operating and to ensure that it works within that framework. And for the NGO to be very clear about its own area of responsibility. So it is simply the idea is to bring about clarity in the system, not to bring any kind of restriction on any NGO. Minister, let me thank you. Let me, before we end, also invite our Vice President Andrew Wilder to present you with a memento. And let me say that you have an unenviable task and we wish you the very best of luck. Thank you for joining us. Thank you. Thank all of you for braving the cold and joining us today. And also for those who joined online. But very much, I'd like to also take this opportunity to thank the Minister for joining us today. This is a topic which we could go on and talk about for quite a long time, but fortunately run out of time. Small memory of your visit to USIP. More importantly, Pakistan's counter-terrorism challenge edited by Mouid Yusuf. Also signed by Mouid Yusuf. We'd like to connect you as a gift to the visit here. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.