 Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jeffrey Edwards the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle translated by Thomas Taylor book 10 chapter 1 after these things perhaps it follows that we should discuss pleasure for this appears to be especially familiar and allied to our race hence those who educate youth regulate them by pleasure and pain as by a rudder but it appears to be a thing of the greatest consequence with respect to the virtue of manners to rejoice in those things in which it is proper to rejoice and to hate those things which it is proper to hate for these things extend through the whole of life and have a preponderation and power towards virtue and a happy life since things which are delectable are indeed the objects of deliberate choice but those that are painful are avoided it seems however that things of this kind are by no means to be passed over in silence especially since they possess an abundant ambiguity for some indeed say the good itself is pleasure but others on the contrary assert that pleasure is a very bad thing the former indeed being perhaps persuaded that it is so but the latter thinking that it will be more beneficial to our life to evince that pleasure ranks among bad things even though it should not for the multitude tend to it and are subservient to pleasures hence say they it is necessary to lead them to the pursuit of the contrary to pleasure for thus they may arrive at the medium perhaps however this is not well said for words respecting things which pertain to passions and actions are less credible than deeds when therefore they are discordant with the perceptions of sense being despised they also subvert the truth for he who blames pleasure if he is at any time seen to desire it seems to incline towards it as if every pleasure was of this attractive nature for to distinguish one pleasure from another is not the province of the multitude two assertions therefore appear not only to be most useful with respect to knowledge but also with respect to life for they are believed when they accord with deeds hence they exhort those who understand them to live conformably to them of things of this kind therefore thus much may suffice let us now discuss the assertions of others concerning pleasure chapter 2 eudoxus therefore thought the pleasure was good itself because all animals are seen to desire it both such as our rational and such as our irrational but in all things the eligible is good and that which is especially eligible is the best of things and because all things tend to the same thing it is an indication that the object to which they tend is to all things that which is most excellent for everything discovers that which is good to it in the same manner as it discovers nutriment hence that which is good to all things and which all things desire is good itself these arguments however are rendered credible more through the virtuous manners of their author then through themselves for it appears that he was a remarkably temperate man it does not seem therefore that he made these assertions as the friend of pleasure but because he believed them to be true it likewise appeared to him to be no less evident that pleasure is good itself from the contrary for pain is of itself avoided by all animals and in a similar manner the contrary to pain is eligible to all animals but that is especially eligible which we choose not an account of something else nor for the sake of another thing it is however acknowledged that pleasure is a thing of this kind for no one asks another person what the final cause is why he is delighted as if pleasure were a thing eligible of itself and which renders the good to which it is added more eligible such for instance as to act justly and temperately the good therefore is itself increased by itself this argument therefore evinces that pleasure ranks among the number of goods and that it is not more good than another good for every good in conjunction with another good is more eligible than when it is alone Plato also subverts an argument of this kind that pleasure is not good itself for he says that a delectable life in conjunction with wisdom is more eligible than without it but if the mixed life is better than a life of pleasure alone pleasure will not be good itself for good itself will not become more eligible by anything being added to it it is evident however that neither will anything else be good itself which in conjunction with something which is of itself good becomes more eligible what therefore is the thing of this kind of which we also participate for a thing of this kind is the object of investigation those however who deny that it is good which all beings desire say nothing to the purpose for we say that the thing which appears to all beings to exist does exist but he who subverts this belief does not assert that which is very much more credible for if they denied that to be good which is desired by beings destitute of intellect there would be some truth in what they say but if they also deny that to be good which beings and dude with prudence and wisdom desire how will they say anything which can be admitted perhaps also even in bad men there is a certain natural good which transcends their depravity and which aspires after its proper good neither does that which is asserted of the contrary to pleasure appear to be well said for does not follow say they that if pain is an evil pleasure is good since evil is opposed to evil and both good and evil are opposed to that which is neither and these things indeed are asserted by them not badly yet they're not true when applied to the present subject for if both pleasure and pain were bad it would be requisite that both should be avoided but if neither is bad neither is to be avoided or each is similarly to be avoided but now indeed it appears that pain is avoided as an evil and that pleasure is chosen as a good in this manner therefore they are opposed to each other chapter 3 neither does it follow that if pleasure is not among the number of qualities it is not on this account good for neither are the energies of virtue qualities nor is velocity equality they say therefore that good is definite but that pleasure is indefinite because it receives the more and the less hence if they form this judgment from the being delighted the same thing will also take place in justice and the other virtues in which men evidently assert that there is more and less of things of this kind for some are more just and brave than others it is likewise possible to act justly and to live temporarily in a greater and less degree but if they admit this to take place in pleasures they do not seem to have assigned the cause of it if some pleasures indeed are unmingled but others are mingled what however hinders but that in the same manner as health which is a definite thing receives the more and the less this also maybe the case was pleasure for there is not the same symmetry in all things nor is there always one certain symmetry in the same thing but suffering a remission it remains for a certain time and differs in the more and the less a thing of this kind therefore may also happen to pleasure as they likewise admit that good itself is perfect but that motions and generations are imperfect they endeavor to show that pleasure is motion and generation they do not however appear to assert this well since pleasure is not motion for to all motion swiftness and slowness appear to be appropriate and though not per se such as to the motion of the world yet they are appropriate with reference to another motion but neither of these is inherent in pleasure for it is possible indeed to be rapidly delighted in the same manner as it is possible to be swiftly enraged but it is not possible for the delight itself to be swift or slow not even with reference to something else it is possible however that walking and argumentation may be swift or slow and everything else of the like kind hence it is possible to be changed quickly and slowly into pleasure but it is not possible to energize swiftly according to it this to be delighted swiftly according to it and in what manner will pleasure be generation for it appears that not any casual thing is generated from any casual thing but that a thing is dissolved into that from which it was generated and that of which pleasure is the generation of this pain is the corruption they also say that pain is the indigence of that which is according to nature but that pleasure is the complete fullness of it but these are corporeal passions if therefore pleasure is the complete fullness of that which subsists according to nature that in which this fullness takes place will also be delighted hence the body will be delighted but it does not appear that this is the case pleasure therefore is not complete fullness but complete fullness indeed taking place someone may be delighted and when cut he may be pained this opinion however appears to have originated from the pleasures and pains pertaining to food for when we are in want of nutriment and have been previously pained in consequence of this want we are delighted with being completely filled this however does not happen to be the case in all pleasures for mathematical pleasures are unattended with pain and also those sensible pleasures which subsists through the smell and hearing and the sight many recollections also and hopes are unattended with pain of what therefore will these be the generations for in these there have been no previous indigence of anything of which these may be the complete fullness but to those who adduced disgraceful pleasures in confirmation of this opinion it may be said that these are not simply delectable for it must not be admitted that if these are delightful to those who are badly disposed they are also simply delectable but that they are so to these only as neither are those things simply salubrious or sweet or bitter which appear to be so to those who are diseased nor again are those things white which appear to be so to those whose eyes are dimmed with room it may likewise be said in reply that pleasures are indeed eligible yet not from these things just as to be rich is eligible yet not by treachery and to be well as eligible yet not by eating any kind of food or it may be said that pleasures are specifically different for those pleasures which are produced by worthy are different from those which are produced by base pursuits and it is not possible for anyone to be delighted with the pleasure of a just man who is not just or with the pleasure of a musician who is not a lover of music and in a similar manner in other things a friend also who is a different person from a flatterer appears to evince that pleasure is not good or that pleasures are specifically different for it seems that the association of a friend is with a view to good but of a flatterer with a view to pleasure and the one is reprobated but the other is praised in consequence of their associations being directed to different ends besides no one would choose to live possessing a purile understanding through the whole of life and being delighted as much as possible with those things which are the objects of purile delight nor would anyone choose so to rejoice in doing something most base is never to be grieved for having done it we likewise earnestly apply ourselves to many things though they should procure us no pleasure such as to see to recollect to know and to possess the virtues but it makes no difference if pleasure follows these things from necessity for we should choose these though no pleasure should be produced from them that pleasure therefore is not good itself and that all pleasure is not eligible appears to be evident as likewise that some pleasures are eligible of themselves but differ in species or in the things from which they are produced and thus much may suffice with respect to what is asserted by others concerning pleasure and pain chapter four what pleasure however is or what kind of thing it is will become more evident by resuming the consideration of it from the beginning for the site indeed seems to be perfect at any time since it is not indigent of anything which taking place afterwards will give perfection to its form but pleasure seems to resemble a thing of this kind for it is a certain whole nor can a pleasure be assumed at any time the form of which would be perfected by the accession of a longer time hence neither is it motion for all motion is in time and is referred to a certain end thus for instance the motion which exists in building a temple is perfect when it affects that which it desires to accomplish it is perfect therefore either in the whole of the time or in this time but in the parts of the time all the motions are imperfect and are specifically different from the whole motion and from each other for the composition of the stones is different from the erection of the pillar at right angles and these motions are different from the fabrication of the temple and the motion indeed employed in building the temple is perfect for it is in want of nothing to the proposed end but the motion employed in laying the foundation and the roof is imperfect for each pertains to a part the motions therefore are specifically different and it is not possible to assume a motion perfect in its species in any time except the whole time the like also takes place in walking and other motions for if lation is a motion from one place to another the specific differences of this motion are flying walking leaping and the like and not only so but in walking itself there is a difference for the motion from one place to another in walking is not the same in the stadium and a part of the stadium and in the different parts of it nor is the mutation of place the same in passing through this line and that fizz in passing through a curve and a straight line for not only a line is passed through but a line existing in place and this line is in a different place from that we have therefore accurately discussed motion elsewhere i.e in the fifth book of the physics hence it appears that motion is not perfect in every time but that the multitude of motions are imperfect and specifically different since they are formalized by proceeding from one place to another the form however of pleasure is perfect in any time it is evident therefore that motion and pleasure are different from each other and that pleasure is something whole and perfect this would also seem to be evident from the impossibility of being moved except in time but the possibility of being delighted without time i.e in an instant for that which is affected in the now or an instant is a certain whole from these things however it is manifest that it is not well said that pleasure is motion or generation for motion and generation are not predicated of all things but of those only which may be distributed into parts and are not holes for there is not generation of sight nor of a point nor of the monad nor is there either motion or generation of these neither therefore is there of pleasure for it is a certain whole hence from what has been said it is evident that a certain pleasure is conjoint with every sense in energy which energizes without being impeded but the energy of the sense is perfect which is well disposed towards the most beautiful of the objects that fall under the sense for perfect energy appears to be especially a thing of this kind it is however of no consequence whether it is said that the sense itself energizes or that in which it exists but in everything the energy is the most excellent of that which is disposed in the best manner towards the most excellent of the things which are subject to it but this energy will be most perfect and most delightful for there is pleasure according to every sense and in a similar manner according to every discursive energy of the soul and every contemplation but the most perfect energy is the most delectable and that is the most perfect which is the energy of that which is well disposed towards the best of the things subject to it pleasure however perfects energy but pleasure does not perfect energy after the same manner as the object of sense perfect sense when both are in good condition just as neither our health and a physician similarly the cause of being made well it is evident however that pleasure is produced according to each of the senses where we say the things which are seen and things which are heard are delectable and it is also evident that they are especially delectable when the sense is most excellent and energizes about the most excellent object but where the sensible object and that which perceives it are things of this kind there will always be pleasure the agent and patient being present pleasure however perfects energy not as an inherent habit but as a certain supervening end such as the flower of age in those who are in their acne as long however as that which is sensible or intelligible is such as it ought to be and also that which judges or contemplates pleasure will be in energy for when that which is passive and that which is active are similar in subsisting after the same manner with reference to each other the same thing is naturally adapted to be produced how therefore does it happen that no one is continually delighted is it because he becomes at length weary for all human concerns are incapable of energizing continually neither therefore can pleasure be generated in an uninterrupted continuity for it is consequent to energy some things however delight when they are new but afterwards for this reason because pleasure cannot be generated incessantly do not similarly delight for at first indeed the discourse of power of the soul inclines towards and intently energizes about these in the same manner as those who look intently at anything afterwards however an energy of this kind is no longer produced but it becomes remiss hence the pleasure also is obscured it may however we thought that all men aspire after pleasure because all of them desire to live but life is a certain energy and everyone energizes about and in those things which he especially loves thus for instance the musician energizes with the hearing about the melodies but the lover of disciplines energizes with the discourse of power of his soul about theorems and in a similar manner the lover of other pursuits but pleasure perfects energies and it likewise perfects life which is the object of desire reasonably therefore do all men aspire after pleasure for it gives perfection to the life of each which is an eligible thing we shall however omit for the present to consider whether we choose to live on account of pleasure or choose pleasure for the sake of living for these things appear to be conjoined and do not admit of being separated for pleasure is not produced without energy and pleasure gives perfection to every energy chapter five hence also pleasures appear to be specifically different for we are of opinion that things specifically different are perfected through perfections specifically different for this appears to be the case both with natural and artificial productions as for instance with animals and trees pictures and statues houses and furniture in a similar manner therefore we are of opinion that energies specifically different are perfected by things that differ in species but the energies of the discourse of powers of reason differ from the energies of the senses and these are specifically different from each other hence also the pleasures which give perfection to these are specifically different this however will also become apparent from hence that each of the pleasures is intimately familiarized with the energy which it perfects for appropriate pleasures co-increase energy since those who energize in conjunction with pleasure energize about everything more accurately and with more exquisite judgment thus for instance those become more excellent geometricians who are delighted to geometrise and they understand in a greater degree everything geometrical the like also takes place with the lovers of music the lovers of architecture and the lovers of the other arts for each of these makes a proficiency in his proper employment if he delights in it pleasures therefore co-increase energies but things which co-increase are appropriate into things which are specifically different the things also which are appropriate are specifically different again this will in a greater degree become apparent from considering that pleasures which are produced from different things are an impediment to energies for the lovers of the flute cannot attend to discourse if they hear anyone playing on the flute in consequence of being more delighted with the melody of the flute then with the present energy ie then with what is said the pleasure therefore which is produced by the melody of the flute corrupts the energy of discourse and in a similar manner this also happens in other things when a man energizes at one and the same time about two things for the more delectable energy expels the other and this in a still greater degree if it very much surpasses in pleasure so as to render it impossible to energize according to the other energy hence when we are very much delighted with anything we do not in any great degree perform anything else but when we are only moderately pleased with certain things we can do others thus those who in the theaters eat sweet meats are especially accustomed to do this when the performers act badly since however appropriate pleasure gives accuracy to energies and renders them more lasting and better but foreign pleasures corrupt them it is evident that these pleasures differ very much from each other for nearly foreign pleasures affect the same thing as appropriate pains ie as the pains which are consequent to certain energies thus if it is unpleasant and painful to anyone to write or to anyone to reason the former indeed will not write and the latter will not reason in consequence of the energy being painful from appropriate pleasures and pains therefore that which is contrary happens about energies but those pleasures and pains are appropriate which are essentially consequent to energy and with respect to foreign pleasures we have already observed that they affect something similar to pain for they corrupt though not in a similar manner since however energies differ in probity and depravity and some of them indeed being eligible but others to be avoided and others being neither pleasures also have a similar mode of subsistence for there is an appropriate pleasure in every energy the pleasure therefore which is appropriate to a worthy energy is worthy but that which is appropriate to a bad energy is depraved for the desires indeed of things truly beautiful are laudable but of base things are blameable the pleasures however which are in energies are more appropriate to the energies than desires are for desires indeed are separated from energies by time and by nature but pleasures are approximate to energies and are so indistinct from them as to render dubious whether energy is the same with pleasure it does not appear however that pleasure is either the discursive energy of reason or sense for it would be absurd to suppose that it is though on account of the inseparability of pleasure from energy it seems to certain persons to be the same with it as therefore energies are different so likewise pleasures but the site differs from the touch impurity and the hearing and the smell from the taste hence the pleasures also of these senses similarly differ and those which pertain to the discursive energy of reason likewise differ and both these differ from each other it seems however that there is an appropriate pleasure to every animal just as there also is an appropriate work for this pleasure is that which subsists according to energy and this will be apparent from a survey of each particular for there is one pleasure of a horse another of a dog and another of a man and as Heraclitus says an ass would prefer straw to gold because food is more delectable to asses than gold the pleasures therefore of animals specifically different are likewise specifically different but it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasures of the same animals are without a specific difference there's no small variety however in pleasures among men for the same things are painful to some and pleasing to others and to some indeed they're painful and odious but to others delectable and lovely this likewise happens to be the case in sweet things for the same things do not appear sweet to a man in a fever and to one who is well nor does the same thing appear to be hot to him who is weak and to him who is of a good habit of body and in a similar manner this happens to be the case in other things in all such things as these however that is simply delectable which appears to be so to the worthy man but if this is well said as it appears that it is and virtue is the measure of everything and a good man so far as he is good those things will be pleasures which appear to be so to the good man and those things will be delectable in which he rejoices it is however by no means wonderful if things which appear to him to be of a troublesome nature should to another person of a different character appear to be delectable for many corruptions and noxious circumstances happen to men but these are not simply delectable except to these persons and to those who are thus disposed with respect therefore to those pleasures which are acknowledged to be base it is evident that they are not to be called pleasures except by corrupt men but with respect to those pleasures which appear to be worthy what is the quality of the pleasure or what shall we say the pleasure is which is proper to men or shall we say that this is evident from energies for pleasures are consequent to these whether therefore there is one energy or whether there are many energies of the perfect and blessed man the pleasures which give perfection to these may be properly called the pleasures of man but the remaining pleasures in the same manner as the energies may be denominated the pleasures of man secondarily and multifariously chapter six having therefore spoken concerning the virtues and friendships and pleasures it remains that we should delineate felicity since we admit that it is the end of human concerns hence by recapitulating what we have before said the discussion will be more concise we have said then that felicity is not a habit for if it were it might be present with him who passes the whole of his life in sleep living the life of a plant and also with him who is involved in the greatest calamities if therefore these things cannot be admitted but felicity must rather be referred to a certain energy as we have before observed but of energies some are necessary and eligible on account of other things and others are eligible of themselves if this be the case it is evident that felicity must be admitted to be some one of the energies which are of themselves eligible and not one of those which are eligible on account of something else for felicity is not indigent of anything but is sufficient to itself but those energies are eligible of themselves from which nothing except the energy is the object of investigation but the actions which are conformable to virtue appear to be things of this kind for to perform beautiful and worthy deeds is among the number of things which are of themselves eligible and among diversions this is also the case with those that are delectable since they are not chosen on account of other things for those who are addicted to them are rather injured than benefited in consequence of neglecting their bodies and possessions many of those however who are said to be happy men fly into diversions on which account those who are versatile in such like methods of spending their time are esteemed by tyrants for they render themselves pleasing in those things which they desire and they are in want of persons of this description these things therefore appear to pertain to felicity because men in authority and power are at leisure for these perhaps however persons of this description are no indication that these things pertain to felicity for neither virtue nor intellect from which worthy energies proceed consist in dominion and power nor if these men not having tasted of genuine and liberal pleasure fly to corporeal pleasures must it be supposed that on this account these pleasures are more eligible for children also fancy that things which are honored by them are the best of things it is reasonable therefore to admit that as different things appear to be honorable to children and men so likewise to bad and worthy men hence as we have frequently said those things are honorable and delectable which are so to the worthy man but the energy to everyone is most eligible which is according to an appropriate habit and to the worthy man the energy is most eligible which is according to virtue felicity therefore does not consist in diversions for it is absurd to admit that diversion is the end i.e. the chief good of man and that the whole of life is to be busily employed and molestations endured for the sake of indulging in sports since as I may say we choose all things for the sake of something else except felicity for this is the end but to act seriously and to labor for the sake of diversion appears to be foolish and very purile he however who engages in sports in order that he may act seriously which anacharsis thought was proper appears to be right for diversion resembles repose but as men are incapable of laboring incessantly they require relaxation relaxation however is not an end for it subsists for the sake of energy but a happy life appears to be conformable to virtue and this is a worthy life and does not consist in amusements we likewise say that serious pursuits are better than those that are ridiculous and accompanied with gesting and sport and that the energy of the better part and the better man is always more worthy but the energy of that which is better is more excellent and more adapted to felicity any casual person also and a slave may enjoy corporeal pleasures no less than the best of men no one however would ascribe felicity to a slave unless they also ascribe to him a worthy life for felicity does not consist in sports and corporeal pleasures but in the energies according to virtue as we have before observed chapter seven if however felicity is an energy according to virtue it is reasonable to suppose that it is an energy according to the most excellent virtue and this will be the virtue of the most excellent part or power whether therefore this be the intellect or something else which appears to rule and be the leader by nature and to have a conception of things beautiful and divine or whether it is itself divine or the most divine of all our parts the energy of this according to its proper virtue will be perfect felicity but we have said that this energy is contemplative and this appears to accord with what we before asserted and also with truth for this energy is the most excellent since intellect is the best of all our parts and of objects of knowledge those are the most excellent about which intellect is conversant this energy also is most continued for we are able to contemplate more incessantly than to perform any action whatever we likewise think that pleasure ought to be mingled with felicity but the energy according to wisdom is acknowledged to be the most delectable of all the energies according to virtue wisdom therefore appears to possess pleasures admirable both for their purity and instability it is reasonable also to think that those who possess knowledge live more pleasantly than those who investigate that too which is called self-sufficiency will especially subsist about the contemplative energy for of the necessaries of life the wise and the just man and the rest of those who possess the moral virtues are in want but even when they are sufficiently supplied with these the just man is in want of those towards whom and together with whom he may act justly and in like manner the temperate and the brave man and each of the rest but the wise man when alone is able to contemplate and by how much the wiser he is by so much the more does he possess this ability perhaps indeed he will contemplate better when he has others to cooperate with him but at the same time he is most sufficient to himself this energy alone likewise will appear to be beloved for its own sake for nothing else is produced from it besides contemplation but from things of a practical nature we obtain something more or less besides the action itself felicity also appears to consist in leisure for we engage in business that we may be at leisure and we wage more that we may live in peace the energies therefore of the political virtues consist either in political or in military transactions but the actions which are conversant with these appear to be full of employment this indeed is perfectly the case with military transactions for no one chooses to wage war or prepare for it for the sake of waging war since he would appear to be perfectly homicide who should make enemies of his friends for the sake of fighting and slaughter the energy too of the politician is of a busy nature and besides the management of public affairs is employed in procuring dominion and honor or a felicity for himself and the citizens different from the political energy which also as something different we evidently investigate if therefore political and military actions surpass in beauty and magnitude all other virtuous actions but these are of a busy nature aspire after a certain end and are not eligible for their own but the energy of intellect which is contemplative appears to excel other energies in order and to desire no other and besides itself if also it possesses a proper pleasure which increases its energy and has in addition to this self-sufficiency leisure and unweird power so far as the condition of human nature will permit with whatever else is attributed to the blessed and appears to subsist according to this energy if such be the case this will be the perfect felicity of man when it receives a perfect length of life for nothing belonging to felicity is imperfect such a life however will be more excellent than that which is merely human for man will not thus live so far as he is man but so far as he contains in himself something divine and as much as this part excels the composite so much does its energy surpass the energy belonging to every other virtue if therefore intellect is divine with respect to man the life also according to intellect will be divine with respect to human life nor ought we according to the exhortation of certain persons to be wise in human affairs since we are men nor to regard mortal concerns since we are mortal but as much as possible we should immortalize ourselves and do everything in order to live according to our most excellent part for this part though it is small in bulk far excels all things in power and dignity it would seem also that each of us is this part since that which obtains dominion is also more excellent it would therefore be absurd for a man not to choose his own life but the life of something else that too which was before asserted according to what is now said for that which is intimately allied to any nature is most excellent and pleasant to that nature and hence a life according to intellect will be most excellent and pleasant to man since this part is most eminently man this life therefore is also most happy chapter eight but that felicity ranks in the second place which subsists according to another virtue for the energies according to this virtue are human for we act justly and bravely and perform other things conformable to the virtues towards each other in contracts in necessaries in all various actions and in the passions preserving to everyone that which is fit and decorous all these things however appear to be human some things likewise appear to happen from the body and the virtue of manners is in many instances conjoined and rendered familiar with the passions prudence also is conjoined with the virtue of manners and the virtue of manners with prudence since the principles indeed of prudence subsist according to the ethical virtues and the rectitude of the ethical virtues subsists according to prudence these however are connected with the passions and will subsist about the composite or that which consists of soul and body but the virtues of the composite are human the life therefore and the felicity conformable to them will also be human the felicity however of intellect is separate for thus much may be asserted concerning it since to discuss it accurately is a greater undertaking than is adapted to the present treaties it would also seem that this felicity requires but little of external supply or less than ethical felicity for let it be admitted that both require necessaries and this equally bracket though the political character labors in a greater degree about the body and things of this kind close bracket since this is but of small consequence yet it makes a great difference with respect to energies for the liberal man will be in want of wealth in order to perform liberal deeds and also the just man in order to make retributions for the wills of men are a manifest and those who are not just pretend they wish to act justly but the brave man will be in want of power in order to affect something conformable to the virtue of fortitude and the temperate man will be in want of the means of acting temperately for how will this man or he who possesses any one of the other virtues become manifest it becomes however an object of inquiry whether deliberate choice possesses greater authority in virtue or whether it is possessed by actions virtue subsisting in both these it is evident therefore that the perfect will be in both but many things are requisite to the perfection of actions and in proportion as they are greater and more beautiful a greater number of things are necessary to him however who energizes according to theoretic virtue there is no need of things of this kind so far as pertains to this energy but as i may say they are impediments to his contemplation yet so far as he is a man and lives with many others he also chooses to perform actions conformable to virtue he will therefore require external things in order that he may act like a man but that perfect felicity is a certain contemplative energy may become apparent from hints that we consider the gods to be especially blessed and happy what kind of actions however is it fit to ascribe to them shall we say just actions or will they not appear ridiculous if they form contracts and return deposits and do other things of the like kind shall we say then that they are brave sustaining things of a terrible nature and encountering dangers because it is beautiful so to do or that they are liberal but to whom will they give it would however be absurd to suppose that there is money with them or anything of this kind and if they are temperate what will this temperance be or it's not the praise unappet which celebrates them as not having to crave desires but if we should enumerate everything pertaining to actions it would appear to be small and unworthy of the gods all men however acknowledge that they live and therefore that they energize for it must not be supposed that they pass their life in sleep like endemian hence if action is taken away from that which lives and in a still greater degree production what remains except contemplation so that the energy of god since it excels in blessedness will be contemplative and of human energies therefore that which is most allied to this energy of god will be most adapted to procure felicity but as an indication of the truth of this other animals which are perfectly deprived of an energy of this kind do not partake of felicity for the whole life of the gods is indeed blessed but that of men is blessed so far as they possess a certain similitude of such an energy as this of other animals however no one is happy because they do not in any respect participate of contemplation as far therefore as contemplation extends itself so far also is felicity extended and the felicity of those beings is greater in whom there is more of the contemplative energy and this not from accident but according to contemplation for this is of itself honorable hence felicity will be a certain contemplation external prosperity however will be requisite to him who energizes according to theoretic virtue since he is a man for human nature is not sufficient to itself for the purposes of contemplation but it is also requisite that the body should be well and that it should be supplied with food and other necessaries it must not however be supposed that because it is not possible for a man to be blessed without external goods a happy man will therefore require many of these and such as are great for neither a condition of being sufficient to itself nor judgment nor action consists in an excess of external goods but it is possible for those who have no dominion over the earth and sea to perform beautiful deeds since a man from moderate possessions may be able to act according to virtue the truth of this however may be clearly seen for private persons appear to act no less equitably but even more so than potentates but moderate possessions are sufficient for this purpose for the life of him will be happy who energizes according to virtue and so on perhaps well defined those who are happy by saying that they are such as are moderately furnished with external possessions and to perform the most beautiful actions and live temporarily since it is possible for those whose possessions are but moderate to do those things which ought to be done an axagoras likewise appears to have thought that the happy man was neither the rich man nor the potentate when he says quote that it would not be at all wonderful if I should be considered by the multitude as an absurd and miserable man close quote for the multitude judge from external circumstances having a sensible perception of these alone the opinions also of the wise seem to accord with these assertions things of this kind therefore are attended with a certain credibility a judgment however is to be formed of the truth in practical affairs from deeds and the life for in these that which possesses principal authority consists hence it is requisite to consider what has been before said by referring it to the deeds and the life of a man and when the assertions accord with deeds they are to be admitted but when they are dissonant they are to be considered as nothing but words but the man who energizes according to intellect who cultivates this and is mentally disposed in the best manner is also it would seem most dear to divinity for if any attention is paid by the gods to human affairs as it appears there is it is also reasonable to suppose that they will be delighted with that which is most excellent and most allied to themselves but this is intellect and likewise that they will remunerate those who especially love and honor this as taking care of that which is dear to themselves and acting rightly and well it is however not a manifest that all these things are especially present with the wise man hence he is the most dear to divinity it is also probable that the same man is most happy so that thus also the wise man will be especially happy chapter nine are we therefore to think that if these things and the virtues and likewise friendship and pleasure have been sufficiently delineated our purpose is completely affected or shall we say as has been before observed that the end in practical affairs is not to survey and know each particular but rather to perform it neither therefore is it sufficient in virtue to know it but there should also be an endeavor to possess and use it or in some other way must we strive to become good men if therefore words were sufficient of themselves to make men worthy they aren't justly as the Agnes says to be valued at a great price and it would be necessary to procure them now however they appear to be sufficiently powerful to exhort and excite liberal young men and to make those whose manners are noble and who are truly lovers of beautiful conduct obedient to virtue but they are incapable of exhorting the multitude to probity for the multitude are not naturally adapted to be obedient from shame but from fear nor to abstain from bad conduct through the disgrace with which it is attended but through punishment for living from passion they pursued their pleasures and those things through which they may be procured but they avoid the pains opposed to these they have not however any conception of that which is beautiful in conduct and truly delectable in consequence of not having tasted of it what discourse therefore can dispose such men to orderly conduct for it is not possible or at least it is not easy to obliterate by words things which have been for a long time impressed in the manners but perhaps we must be satisfied if everything being present with us through which we are accustomed to become worthy we may be able to partake of virtue some however are of opinion that men become good from nature others that they become good from custom and others from doctrine as to goodness from nature therefore it is evident that this is not in our power but that it is inherent in those who are truly fortunate through a certain divine cause but it must be considered whether it is not true that words and precepts are not accompanied with power towards all men but it is requisite that the soul of the auditor should have been previously excited by manners to rejoice and hate properly like land which is intended to nourish seed for he who lives under the influence of passion will not attend to the reasoning which dissuades him from such a life how therefore is it possible to induce one who is so disposed to alter his mode of conduct in short passion does not appear to yield to reason but to violence hence it is necessary that manners should pre-exist in a certain respect appropriate to virtue in order that their possessor may love what is beautiful and be indigent with what is disgraceful in conduct to obtain however a right education for virtue from our youth is difficult without being nurtured by laws which enforce the offices of virtue for to live temporarily and accustomed to endurance is not pleasing to the multitude and especially to youth hence it is necessary that education studies and pursuits should be ordained by laws for by custom they will cease to be painful but perhaps it is not sufficient for youth to obtain a right education and to have proper attention paid to them but it is also necessary when they have arrived at the perfection of manhood that they should study and be accustomed to these things and in these we shall likewise require the assistance of the laws and in short through the whole of life for the multitude are more obedient to necessity than to reason and to punishment than to the beautiful in conduct and some persons are of the opinion that legislators ought indeed to excite men to virtue and exhort them to it for the sake of the beautiful in conduct because worthy men will presideniously from their manners obey their exhortations but the castigations and punishments should be inflicted on those who disobey them and who are naturally more unapped and that the incurable should be entirely exterminated from the community for say they the worthy man and he who lives with a view to the beautiful in conduct will be obedient to reason but the bad man who aspires after pleasure is to be punished by pain like a beast of burden hence they add it is necessary that such pains should be employed as are especially contrary to the pleasures which they embrace if therefore as we have said it is requisite that he who is to be a good man should be well educated and accustomed to virtuous conduct and afterwards should thus live in worthy studies and pursuits and neither unwillingly nor willingly perform base deeds and if these things may happen to those who live conformably to certain intellect and right order possessing power and strength if this be the case the paternal mandate indeed is neither accompanied with strength nor necessity nor in short the mandate of one man unless he is a king or a person in dude with a similar authority but the law possesses a necessarily compelling power being a mandate proceeding from a certain prudence and intellect and those indeed who are adverse to the impulses of depraved men though they are right in so doing are hated by the multitude law however when it ordains what is equitable is not attended with molestation but in the city of the lacedemonians alone the legislator appears to have paid attention to education and studies or pursuits while in most cities things of this kind are neglected and everyone after the manner of the cyclops lives as he pleases quote by these no statutes and no rights are known no council held no monarch fills the throne but high on hills or airy cliffs they dwell or deep in caves whose entrance leads to hell each rules his race his neighbor not his care heedless of others to his own severe close quote it is best therefore that a common and right attention should be paid to the citizens and that there should be an ability of affecting this but if these things are neglected in common it would seem to be fit that everyone should contribute to the promotion of his children and friends in virtue or should predetermined to do so from what has been said however it would seem that this may especially be affected by him who possesses the power of a legislator for attentions to the general welfare are affected through the laws but equitable attentions are accomplished through worthy men it does not however seem to make any difference whether the laws are written or unwritten nor whether one person or many are disciplined by them it's neither does it make any difference in music and gymnastic and other disciplines for as in cities legal institutions and manners are efficacious so in families paternal mandates and manners and they are still more efficacious on account of alliance and the benefits conferred by parents on their children for children previous to these mandates loved their parents and are naturally disposed to be obedient to them father still private differs from public education in the same manner as in medicine particular differ from universal prescriptions for universally indeed abstinence and quiet are advantageous to one who has a fever but to this particular person perhaps they are not and he who is a master in the pugilistic art will not perhaps enjoy the same mode of fighting to all his pupils it would seem however that particulars will be more accurately managed when private attention is paid to them for then each individual will in a greater degree obtain that which is adapted to him but the physician the master of gymnastic exercises and every other artist will in the best manner pay attention to an individual if they know universally what is beneficial to all persons or to persons of a certain description for sciences are said to be and are in reality of that which is common nothing however perhaps hinders but that a man may pay attention to one certain thing in a proper manner though he is destitute of science while he accurately surveys from experience what happens to each particular thing just as some persons appear to be most excellent physicians to themselves but are unable to give medical assistance to another person perhaps however it would seem notwithstanding this to be no less requisite for him who wishes to become an artist and to be theoretic to proceed to that which is universal and to know this as far as it can be known for we have already observed that sciences are conversant with this perhaps also it is requisite that he who wishes to make others better by the attention which he pays to them whether they be many or few should endeavor to become skilled in legislation if we can be rendered good men through the laws hence it is not the province of any casual person to render some man or one committed to his care fitly disposed to become virtuous but if it belongs to anyone to affect this it is the province of the man of science just as in medicine and the other arts to which a certain attention and prudence pertain it is requisite therefore after this to consider whence or how a man may acquire a legislative skill or in other arts is this to be learned from those who are conversant with the management of public affairs for this appears to be a part of the political science or shall we say that a similar thing does not seem to take place in the political science and the other sciences and powers for in the others the same persons are seen to impart the powers and to energize from them as is evident in physicians and painters but the sophists profess indeed to teach politics yet no one of them acts in a political capacity and it would seem that those who are engaged in the management of public affairs do this by a certain power and experience rather than by the exercise of the reasoning faculty for they do not appear either to write or speak about things of this kind though perhaps this would be better than to compose forensic or popular iterations nor again is it seen that they have made either their own children political characters or some other children of their friends it is reasonable however to suppose that they would have done this if they had been able for neither could they have left anything better to cities nor could they have deliberately chosen anything more excellent than this power either for themselves or their dearest friends nevertheless experience appears to contribute in no small degree to the management of public affairs for otherwise men would not become more political through being accustomed to political affairs hence experience seems to be necessary to those who desire to be skillful in the political science those sophists however who profess to teach the political science appear to be very far from possessing this ability for in short they neither know what kind of a thing it is nor what the things are with which it is conversant for if they did they would not suppose it to be the same with the rhetorical art or inferior to it where would they think it easy for him to act the part of a legislator who has collected the most celebrated and approved laws since they say that the best laws are to be selected just as if the selection did not require intelligence or as if to judge rightly was not one of the greatest of things in the same manner as in what pertains to music for skillful men judge rightly respecting the works in which they are skilled and understand through what means or in what manner they may be accomplished and what the appropriate adaptations of them are but to the unskillful it is sufficient not to be ignorant whether a work is well or ill done in the same manner as in the painter's art laws however resemble political works how therefore can anyone be adapted to become a legislator from these or to judge which of them are the best for neither does it appear that men become skilled in medicine by reading medical books though these books not only endeavor to point out the cures but likewise the remedies which are to be applied and the methods of cure distinguishing also the habits of each person it seems however that these things are beneficial to skillful persons but useless to the unscientific perhaps therefore collections of laws and politics may be useful to those who are able to survey and judge what is well established or the contrary and what the appropriate adaptations are in these but those who discuss things of this kind without the political habit will never be able to judge well except from chance though perhaps they will become more intelligent in these particulars since therefore the politicians prior to us have admitted to investigate legislation it will perhaps be better for us to consider it more attentively and in short to discuss a polity universally in order that the philosophy which pertains to human affairs may as much as possible be brought to perfection in the first place therefore if anything has been well said by the ancients on this subject we shall endeavor to relate it in the next place from the collections which have been made of polities we shall endeavor to survey what the nature is of the things which preserve and corrupt cities and several polities and from what causes some of them are well but others ill governed for these things being surveyed perhaps we shall be able in a greater degree to perceive what kind of polity is the best how each is to be arranged and what laws and manners it should use we shall begin therefore the discussion of politics end of book 10 end of the nicomachean ethics by Aristotle translated by thomas taylor recording in memory of mitchell edwards