 Thank you very much, Ambassador Park. It's a great honor and privilege to come here to share with you some of my thoughts. As Ambassador Park mentioned, I was lucky enough to be invited to, not to participate, but actually to watch the opening and the closing ceremony of the 19th Party Congress as a member of the CPPCC, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Standing Committee of that organization. And why did he spend three and a half hours? I think this is a special occasion. And he wanted to enunciate or explain his systematically, his thoughts in a systematic way. Now that thought has been included into the Party Charter and probably early next year will be included into the Constitution. Maybe they will revive a little bit the Constitution to insert the Xi's thought on socialism of Chinese characteristics in the new era. That clause probably will be inserted into the Chinese Constitution next year when the Chinese People's Congress is held. So he needs the time to explain his views. And also there are a lot of things in his report. I think he deserves a careful study. I was sitting there trying to understand what's going on and I was quite impressed. A lot of things were mentioned in the report. One of the things probably we should pay attention to is that he talked about the principle contradiction facing Chinese society. Now he says it's between the unbalanced and inadequate development and people's ever-growing needs for a better life. So this is the central problem that the Chinese Communist Party is supposed to deal with in the years ahead. In the past it was something like something like a backward level of economic development versus the socialist social relations or something like that. How do we put it? I can't remember. The people's pursuit for better life, the contradiction between the people's pursuit for better life and the backward productive. Backward productive. Now he thinks that China is no longer that backward. But then China's economic development is inadequate and unbalanced to meet the ever-changing demands of the people for a better life. And also he talked about the change of the way of development which means less emphasis on GDP growth and more emphasis on the quality of economic growth. It sounds great. And also he talks about the environment. He says green mountains and clear waters are better than mountains of gold and silver. And of course he also talked about the necessity of rule of law. Chinese understanding of rule of law is somewhat different from what is understood here. And also democracy. Some people regard CPPCC, the organization to which I belong, is something special in the Chinese democracy. CPPCC is an organization like a Senate without legislative power. It's a consultative body, orderly consultation to help involving different democratic parties. We have eight democratic parties. And a lot of social organizations are represented in that institution. They are supposed to help the Chinese Communist Party to rule by voicing criticisms in a constructive way rather than trying to take over. And also on foreign policy he talks about the common, trying to build a community of common destiny. In other words, I think he believes that we are in the same boat, we should help each other. Our interests are not zero sum, you know, our competition. We can have competition, but it's where our relationship is not a zero sum relationship. We can through our efforts to achieve a winging outcome. And he spent a lot of time talking about how to run the party, how to make the party more clean and more effective. On foreign policy, we find both continuity and change in China's foreign, in the foreign, in the policy. On the continuity side, you know, he has been talking about non-zero sum game as China's approach to its relationship with the outside world. I remember years ago, probably six years ago, when he was the vice president of the PRC, he gave a speech at Tsinghua University. He said, if you want to develop, you should let other countries develop. If you want to have security, you should make sure that other countries have security. If you want to have a better life, you should make sure that other countries have a better life. I think he has adhered to this kind of reasoning and approach on China's relationship with the outside world. And the community of common destiny is a concept that he has been using for some time. And also, he talked about multilateral cooperation as a way to deal with international and global problems. And also, he also talked about China should assume great power responsibilities in dealing with world affairs. In terms of change, I think if you read the report very carefully, I mean the foreign policy section, he talked about at one place that China should help maintain the world order. In the past, you know, Chinese government, you know, Chinese Communist parties always talked about how to reform the world order to make it more just and fair. Now, he's still talking about trying to make the world order more just and fair, but at the same time, he talked about maintaining the world order. So clearly, I think it means two things. One is China has benefited from the world order, and now China look at the world order from a stakeholder's perspective. The second is as China rises, China increasingly becomes a superpower. A superpower cannot take a free ride in the world order. It has to take care of the world order. If you take a free ride, the bus collapses. So that, to some extent, is something new, I think. And also, he talked about China's successful developmental experience represent another option to other developing countries when they try to develop. This has cost a lot of repercussion in other countries. Some people say that the Chinese Communist Party is coming up with alternative to the American or Western approach to development. But this is probably for a long time, for the first time, that the Chinese Communist Party is talking about the so-called Chinese approach in dealing with growth as something with international implications. In other words, it can be a frame of reference for other countries to think about how to develop their own countries. I think in general, the foreign policy section sounds very positive. I think if these views accept the point on the approach to development as another option, if these views were presented by Donald Trump, probably the world would be exhilarated given the fact that he's talking about America first rather than a multilateral cooperation. The second point is one should not regard Xi's claim that China's developmental experience provides another option to developing countries as the beginning of Chinese efforts to push for the so-called China model. Actually, the Chinese model, I don't know whether there is a Chinese model. Basically, we are talking about socialism with Chinese characteristics. If you talk about Chinese characteristics, it is not supposed to be replicated. But basically, so there is no Chinese model in a universal sense. China officially labels the approach as socialism with Chinese characteristics. It stresses on the uniqueness rather than universality of the China's developmental experience. That is to say, there is no universal model for development. Every country should adopt their own approach to development according to their own country's unique conditions. In other words, you don't have to follow the western approach in your development. Find your own approach on the basis of your situation. China has been successful in this regard. You can be successful too. That's the message, I think. So what we expect in the next five years, I think will have more continuity than change in China's foreign policy. Second, Chinese foreign policy would have more Xi's imprint. In other words, if during the past five years, certain institutions in China conducting foreign policy, they have more leeways. Now in the days to come, probably they have already learned Xi's ideas as to how to conduct foreign policy. Probably there will be more uniform approach. And also, probably Chinese foreign policy would be more nuanced and pragmatic given the fact that Xi and the new team have five years to learn how to deal with international relations and perfect their skills. Yeah, let me stop here. I think I've talked long enough. Another round. Before I invite our second panelist from China, I will have some, based on what you presented, I will give some very quick questions, but you don't have to reply right now, maybe. The first question will be why President Xi did not appoint his heir apparent? As previous President did. Second, will he, there's many speculation that he will definitely extend his stay in powers after five years later. So maybe officially or with some other indirect way. And you mentioned that there will be more continuity than change. But in accordance with his phrase, I mean, gradual step-by-step approaches, these outside observers have some conviction that in the year of 2050, China will arbitre in Asia Pacific vision in politically or in the military. So maybe there is another concern. And also, you know, we expect the future China during the next five years will be more assertive than before, based on what achieved during the first Xi Jinping's, you know, the, you know, some satisfactory achievement. As we saw the same assertiveness foreign policies which just in the wake of Beijing's Olympic Games 2008. So, you know, it is evident that people outside the world experienced very assertive, you know, assertive change of their outside, you know, foreign policies. So we have some similar analogy could be made, you know, based on past observation. So maybe I'd like to expect your answers. And also you mentioned the developing countries, you know, based on Chinese model. But we have to very carefully watch out that the most of the current Chinese, you know, cooperation based on loan, not based on grant. So this principle is very difficult from the, you know, OECD attacks, you know, the practice. So, you know, so I don't know why, you know, China tried this very, very independent unique model.