 Good morning and welcome back. It's been, I believe, two weeks already since we did not have a class, but we had the midterm exam. I did not have time to read your exam papers, but I hope to have time today in the afternoon during my flight to the Hague via Munich. So I usually read exam papers during my flights in order to, you know, use time more efficiently. And people sitting right next to me are amazed with the grades that I'm giving. Well, some of them say, well, 90. So, hi. Well, I say, he or she deserved. So, you don't have to be afraid if you did not have a good exam. Some of you sent a couple of messages saying that your exam performance was below your expectations. Actually, I don't think I asked anything unexpected. But if there's anything, I mean, if your performance was below the level that you expected, well, I think you should revise the method that you're studying for this course. But we will have another exam, the final exam. There will be op-ed and the simulation as well as your attendance, class participation. So there's nothing to press the panic button. I'll tell you if you have to press the panic button. So I believe there are two or three students who missed the exam. Are they here? Not even today? Okay, fine. That's, I was going to announce, yes, you're one of them. All right, somebody has to warn you that professor is speaking about something that interests you, right? So give your full attention to what I'm saying here, all right? But not to miss other things. I believe this attendance paper is being circulated. Please mark your names and signatures. All right, I think I will have to wait another while for announcing the date of the exam, the makeup exam. Because I have to have everybody here, all three of you. And also I have to consult this with my assistant because she's going to give you the exam and I don't know much about her schedule. And most probably it will be sometime in the later afternoon, like 4.30 or something, or maybe 3.30, depending on your schedule. And the exam will be something that you will have to study for that exam, right? So just don't take things easy. Second announcement, as you know, time is approaching for due dates, deadlines, like op-eds. You must have something like about a month to go. A month is much more than necessary for writing an op-ed. As I said, for those who know what he or she is going to write, even a couple of days is more than necessary. So if you concentrate on what you have to think about and write about, it's not going to be a big deal. And if you are not clear about what an op-ed is and how it should look like, please don't come to me again because I explained this many times in my office during this progress report times as well as on some individual discussions, on one-on-one discussions, as well as I spent at least an hour, a full hour on the op-ed thing. And just go to the video.billcant.edu-tr and find a podcast, one of the podcast recordings at the beginning of the semester, the second, the third or whatever. I don't remember exactly one. And watch that video, all right? So you have there everything you need about the op-eds. But as a final note about the op-ed, it is something that has to be analytical, that it's something that you argue something, defend an idea, a position, and of course you substantiate your position, your argument with some facts, figures. That might be available. It's not something that threw from the top of your head, but something that not at all also either it's anything like, well, that part says this or the other part says that. I don't want this kind of just mere descriptive discussion. I want you to have an opinion, a position with something, and also substantiate it or sort of support it, force it with some other arguments, facts, figures, thoughts, views, whatever. All right? Just think about it. With respect to simulation, I believe you had your meetings scheduled, at least with the embassies, and don't forget, as I said, at least several times. Embassy meetings are not actually the only thing. I mean, you have to carry out extensive research about the formal positions of the countries that you are going to represent. So therefore, you have to consult with as many people as possible, and also consult with just many sources that you can find on the Internet or other places, all right? Just think about these things, because we are going now toward the end of the semester. We have passed already the half way, and we're going towards the termination of the semester in about a month from today. You still have the screen. Of course, I will advance several screens, several slides. We're not going to take from the beginning, but I just want to say something just to see the whole picture here, Iran's ambitions and emerging crisis. We talked about the background. We sort of set out the puzzle. What is the issue which creates problem among nations? What is the problematic issue? And we were studying the position of the actors in the puzzle. Well, as you will remember, this actually is something that comes from November 2006. It's not an updated version. I actually did not update this on purpose, because in some places, I mean, as we go, as we advance, you will see some differences between the past positions of some countries, especially European Union and partially Russia, and back in the 2006 and 2007, these years, and also today, and this is something that can tell us that there might be further changes in their position. So in foreign policy, nothing is static. Foreign policy is a dynamic process, and the task of the foreign policy makers is to watch this screen, look at this screen at all times, and to read our screen, and take positions, and if necessary, change positions with the emerging sort of risks as well as chances or opportunities that may arise. So therefore, we will see here rather clearly that especially there has been a significant change in the position of the European Union. So we'll advance with this, and if there's anything that you cannot remember or you want to refresh your minds with respect to the past slides, just as I will go rather quickly, please raise your hand and ask questions about these slides and about this information. So we talked about the past or the history of Iran's nuclear ambitions starting from the Shah period as early as the 50s and 60s, but more so after the OPEC crisis when Iran actually confronted with large sums of money. Then, of course, we stated the puzzle. Why is it that some of the activities which Iran claims to be totally legal and legitimate are found to be illegitimate or illegal or as part of sort of something that violates Iran's treaty obligations according to some other party. We stated here the reasons why. Maybe we can just refresh minds starting from here. As we know now very well that because Iran is a state party to the MPT, the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, and it was signed and ratified by Iran in 1968 and 1969. So Iran is a state party to the treaty, the MPT, and Iran is a state party. A state party means a state which is signed and ratified. Just to remind you and just to refresh your minds, governments or whatever administrations may exist in countries because there are 200 countries, states, nations in the world, and they may have different administrative structures. And usually international treaties, conventions, documents are signed by the governments, and assigning a document is an indication of the intention to comply with the terms of the treaty or convention, whatever it is, whatever the document might be. And it has to be ratified by the upper house. In some countries, this upper house is a senate. In some other countries, the upper house is a parliament. In some others, there might be a council of, I don't know, wise men or something, or the emperor or the monarch. I don't know. So therefore, when a state actually signs as well as ratifies a treaty, then it becomes a state party. State party means it is now bound by the terms of the treaty. Just by signing a treaty, a country does not become bound or is not obliged to comply with the terms of the treaty. After ratification, this is an obligation for the state. And this obligation remains as long as the state is in the treaty or is a part of the convention or whatever. And in the case of the MPT, you might remember from our past discussions, since 1970, in five-year intervals and so on, the MPT was reviewed. And in 1995, there was a review and extension conference. Therefore, the conference after 1990 review conference, it was reviewed and also extended. And the extension was indefinite and unconditional. So actually, that means there is no condition attached to the extension of the MPT. And because its extension was indefinite, so there is no deadline or there is no expiration date for the MPT. So as long as we can foresee actually into the future, the MPT will remain with us unless there is something unusual that happens and all of a sudden a number of countries deposit their desire or express their desire to withdraw from the treaty because there is such a possibility under some extreme conditions and if a country decides that staying in the treaty is something that runs counter to its vital interest by making an early notification for some time, then that country may withdraw from the treaty. For instance, North Korea was late to come or become a state party. And then after some developments, it was forced, in a sense, by Russia and China to first sign and ratify the treaty. Ratification came a little bit late. But during the second Gulf crisis, I mean 2002, North Korea withdrew from the MPT. Now it is outside of the MPT. And therefore whatever North Korea is doing these days cannot be found guilty just within the context of the MPT because they are not at all and any more bound by the MPT. Any country can do that. But of course, now one of the issues that are being discussed in the international security community is whether we should make it difficult for countries to withdraw from the treaty. Whether it should be easy or straightforward for countries to withdraw from the treaty because by withdrawal, I mean you just get rid of all your obligations. I mean one might ask, of course, as the first question that comes to one's mind, what is wrong with that? I mean if a country doesn't want to stay in a treaty, it is sovereign right to withdraw from the treaty, fine. But by becoming a member of the treaty, you entertain certain privileges. You acquire some rights. You get some capabilities. Then you advance your level thanks to being in the treaty. And then by exploiting these privileges actually to the extent possible, then one day you say, well, you know what, I'm off with the treaty. I don't want to stay anymore. Now I'm withdrawing. So there is this fear of developing what is called breakout capabilities. A breakout capability is such a capability that gives one a country the ability, the capability to develop nuclear weapons or come closer to developing nuclear weapons after having sort of, in a sense, abused, of course, the rights by staying within the MPT. So therefore this is an issue which has to be also kept in mind. I mean this is not that simple. You can just say, well, that country was, or use its sovereign rights to sign the treaty, right to fight the treaty. Now it is using the same right to withdraw from the treaty. It is not that simple. And therefore if a country declares its intention to withdraw from the treaty, every other country or all other countries will be concerned about what is the reason for this country to withdraw from the treaty. Did this country develop breakout capabilities? And is it going to develop nuclear weapons soon? Which is not, of course, something desired by the rest of the international community. Anyway, so going back to this point, Iran signed, ratified the treaty during the Shah period. And of course after about 10 years later, there was a revolution, the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Things have changed. The entire sort of ideology has changed. State structure to a great extent has changed. And of course the regime has changed. And the foreign policy priorities have been affected from this. I cannot say entirely changed, but because there are other factors that affect countries foreign policy and what I see, I mean personal, this is my personal comment, you may agree or disagree or some other people might agree or disagree. But what I see is pretty much this continuation of the previous policy of becoming a nuclear power. So what was the ambition back in the Shah period to become a nuclear power, a nuclear capable state? Actually something that continues in the Islamic regime. So with respect to the clerical sort of administration or the Mullah regime. So therefore Iran is a state party to the MPT. And according to the MPT, it sort of provided that Iran never diverged its capabilities from peaceful to mean to purposes. It can develop indigenously by itself or by way of transfers or by way of sort of bilateral, multilateral agreements with other countries. It may import capabilities, transfer, nuclear technology from other countries. So long as they all remain under sort of peaceful purposes. So this is the essence of the question because according to the United States, Western powers, most of the rest of the world actually Iran's desires actually according to group of countries, Iran's desire is not a peaceful one. And there are certain indications according to these people's view that Iran's intentions actually not clear. And most probably has military intentions or just has the intention to divert peaceful applications, peaceful capabilities to military capabilities. So and one indication of this actually is not reporting the construction of a very significant facility, which is enrichment facility which was built since 1984 until 2002 by the Chinese actually helped to a great extent. And during these 18 years Iran did not report this facility to the IAEA, which is something that it had to do. I mean there is no explanation for this. And this is an indication of its sort of unclear intentions, let's say at the least. So this is the crux of the matter. It's part of the puzzle, let's say. And there are countries, I mean there are different countries who have different views with respect to Iran's capabilities. From the US perspective, actually Iran's capability, I mean, United States sees Iran's nuclear capabilities no matter how developed they are or whether they have built a nuclear weapon or not. Well, to our knowledge there is no sign of nuclear weapons built by Iran. Of course we cannot know the entire truth, but I mean I think we would have known by now if Iran had developed already. But most likely Iran does not have nuclear weapons capability for the time being. But the United States sees Iran's capability as a threat and wants Iran to permanently halt uranium enrichment. Because just remember, nuclear weapons need either highly enriched uranium, HEU or plutonium. And I'm not going to go into technical details again. And for HEU you have to have enrichment facilities. You have to enrich the percentage of 235 isotope, uranium 235 isotope from its 0.7% proportion in the natural uranium to 90 plus percentage. So therefore you need enrichment capabilities and Iran as I just mentioned in Natanz area has built a large enrichment facility. Which has the capability or capacity to install 55,000 centrifuges. I mean centrifuges are used just one of the techniques to enrich uranium. There are other techniques but Iran has seemingly adopted this technology. And with 55,000 centrifuges you can enrich up to 3.5% for one power reactor per year. So for Bush air for instance which is not very large but a large power reactor which has just started operation this autumn. Scheduled for August I believe there were some technical difficulties. And since September early October they have started generating electricity at small amounts. And with 55,000 centrifuges you can use this facility and run this facility for one year in order to supply enough low energy uranium for one power reactor. Amelia? Well let me just talk about this briefly because we covered this issue a little bit extensively. The IAEA I mean once a state becomes a member of the MPT not only by signing as I said by becoming state party I mean after ratification. That state party must conclude with the IAEA an agreement based on the safeguards agreement. What is called safeguards agreement. Based on model protocol which is also in the language of the international atomic energy agencies information circular 153. This is a tiny blue book. There are some 116 or 114 paragraphs articles. And it is a model protocol which is applied to almost every country every non nuclear weapons state and any non nuclear weapons state. Once signed and ratified a treaty within six months must sit with the IAEA and discuss the terms of the safeguards agreement as to how inspections will be carried out in that particular country. And this there is this model protocol according to which this safeguard agreement is decided or just signed. So this is something that comes from 1977 to one and back in 1970 because of the conjunctural developments because of the position of Japan and Germany which I discuss here again extensively. But because they did not want to be negatively affected from the intrusive or from the frequent inspections because during the inspections you have to shut down the reactor. And during these days I mean you cannot run or generate electricity you cannot run the reactor or what you cannot do whatever you want to do. And if a country has a number of reactors and if that country's reactors are being inspected frequently and and if you bear in mind that a nuclear reactor normally operates less than 200 days a year. And if there are 1015 or so maybe 20 days just passed with these inspections of course they this is it creates some sort of a commercial disadvantage. So Japan and Germany which had a number large number of reactors and large power reactors in which inspections would last longer than other sort of reactors or other facilities. So they put some restrictions or actually they created an environment whereby in 1971 the model protocol did not come out as a very powerful document. So according to model protocol of the safeguards agreement assume this is a country assume there are these nuclear facilities. The IAEA can go only to the declared nuclear facility if a country has declared all these facilities but not this one. The IAEA even if it knows that there is another facility here cannot go to that sort of facility according to model protocol. Well hopefully after the 1990s there were some developments the Iraq war, South African revelations about its nuclear capabilities that they built. The 7th was underway et cetera et cetera there is now additional protocol which was developed during the second half of the 1990s and open to signature in 1998. And it is enforced for some 60 or 70 countries because it is not obligatory. So the states that are members of the NPT have to they must sign a safeguards agreement according to model protocol but the additional protocol is not something that they must sign or ratify. It is optional additional protocol which is a more powerful document. Now Iran's nuclear facilities are being inspected according to the 1970s protocol and the IAEA goes to facilities that are declared by the Iranian authorities. And since Iran did not declare the Natanz facility from 1984 to 2002 under revelations by an opposition group in Washington then this facility which was in Natanz area was not inspected. And the IAEA did not know anything about it. Now it has been inspected in limited fashion because once in 2002 August this opposition group provided all the information to the international community. And similarly the IAEA Director General Mohammed Al-Baradeh gave an ultimatum to the Iranian authorities and asked from Iran to sign the additional protocol by 31st of October 2003. Yes Iran did sign the additional protocol but did not ratify the protocol. And since Iran did not ratify the protocol the IAEA still conducts to the extent possible inspections in Iran Iranian facilities according to the 1970s protocol or the insert 153. Well once this country signs the NPT and ratifies the NPT it becomes a state party to the NPT. And if this is the case it is obligatory for the state to sign the additional model protocol. This is an obligation. Then you can ask the same question not as what is the motivation for signing the safeguards agreement but what is the motivation to sign the NPT? Well that's a whole different issue. And in 1969, 1968, 1969 when the NPT was open to signature of course many states were given this deal. Remember this bonus question, bargain? What was the answer? What was your answer to the bonus question? Sorry, let me put it in this way. Put it in any way you like. If countries state their clear intentions about not getting the NPT, they will get a rich Iranian from... Well not only a rich Iranian. Yes, sure. But the bargaining essence is the non-nuclear weapon states. If you want to join the NPT they don't have to give up. They have the same purposes. There is only one condition they get the other nuclear power. Alright, other answers? Or did your answer look like anything like this or is it entirely different? What was your answer? You don't remember? Ennis, remember your answer? Well, you seem to be a little bit confused. Actually it's very simple. For giving up the option to build new weapons, you are given this chance to acquire peaceful nuclear technology. So the nuclear weapon states say this. Look, now we have nuclear weapons. We cannot put the genie back in the bottle. We cannot disinvent nuclear weapons. We have invented these weapons. Now we have these weapons. Sorry for you guys. Well, they don't say this way. It's a little bit an arrogant way of saying. But they say now that we have nuclear weapons we will do our best to disarm ourselves in the foreseeable future and we will start with goodwill negotiations as to how to do it. But in the meantime, if you promise not to acquire nuclear weapons or not to sort of have the intention to develop nuclear weapons we will give you peaceful nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. So that was the bargain. So therefore, why should I state? If nuclear weapons are so important for prestige, for security, for this or that because nuclear weapons are found to be significant or important because instead of standing large armies, thousands of tanks, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, maintenance, all this administrative cost and everything I mean if you have a couple of nuclear weapons you might think you might become untouchable just look at the position of North Korea for instance and my students as well as other people in the conference has always asked that this preferential treatment of the West towards North Korea and Iran and my answer is that North Korea is not a threat to Israel and that's why Iran is thought to be a threat to Israel when looked at the issue from the US perspective, from the European perspective and of course from the Israeli perspective and therefore Iran is put on the radar screen. So some countries think or believe having nuclear weapons is a privilege is a matter of prestige, is a matter of deterrence, is a matter of power so if this is the case, why would a state forgo the option, give up the option of developing the weapons once and for all? Well, from my personal perspective I hate nuclear weapons and therefore I'm a man of disarmament and I explain this on many occasions here I'm against nuclear weapons, I'm against proliferation, et cetera, et cetera why would a state do that? If nuclear weapons are associated with prestige, power, deterrence, economic or efficiency, anything because there is this bargain countries especially big in the 1970s, 68, 70, 72, 75, 80s I mean, nuclear technology was a state of the art technology not all states could have access to the technology so therefore they thought if we become a state party to the MPT we will get nuclear technology transferred to us from other countries which have nuclear capabilities, nuclear technology and since in our position we do not need nuclear weapons if they think so or we cannot even develop nuclear weapons or some others might have been more intelligent quote-unquote some states might have thought well let's enter, let's become a state party to the MPT let's entertain the privileges, let's acquire technology let's develop some indigenous capabilities ourselves let's develop a cadre of scientists, scholars, technicians, experts and then when the day comes we can develop breakout capabilities and we can walk out of the MPT so other many states may have had different motivations, different reasons but what is important here is once a state becomes a member of the MPT that is signed and ratifies the MPT according to the terms of the MPT it has to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA within a certain period of time and this safeguards agreement must be according to the model protocol of 1970 which was a weak document or weaker document than compared to the more current document which is an additional protocol but as I said Iran is a state party to the MPT and the safeguards agreement is signed according to the 1970 the weak model protocol according to which only the facilities that are declared by Iran can be inspected and according to this safeguards agreement there are certain periods and again there are some loopholes and shortcomings in the procedures Iran signed an additional protocol after the revelations about the Natanz facility in August 2002 but it has not yet and most possibly will not do so in the foreseeable future as ratified the addition protocol and therefore addition protocol is not enforced for Iran so therefore it is not possible to have a clear picture of Iran's nuclear capabilities inspections in Iran are conducted by the IAEA to the extent that are allowed by the former weaker older document there is a period as I will talk about in the next hour probably and in the coming days there is a period from late 2003 early 2005 Iran acted as if it was a member of the addition protocol or it had ratified as if it had ratified the addition protocol and opened most of its facilities to IAEA inspections still the west was not satisfied because the west fear of the presence of existence of some hidden facilities and there were some indications of this as again we will talk about later on therefore from the west's perspective or from the perspective of those who are concerned about what Iran's capabilities are it is not possible to say what exactly the situation is no one can say Iran's capabilities are at this level or that level because we don't know we know to the extent the IAEA was allowed to enter some facilities and visit some of the facilities and some specific places within these facilities they cannot go everywhere they cannot take samples from water I don't know air soil whatever so there are certain differences in perspective Iran says I'm not doing anything wrong and my capabilities are fully peaceful I have no such intentions and therefore all these allegations are baseless unfounded and are just you know you know conspiracy of Israel which itself is not in the MPT well that's also another fact that we will have to talk about because MPT is signed and ratified by almost all of the countries except for Iran sorry Israel Pakistan India and now North Korea as a withdrawal has withdrawn from the MPT and now it's a non-member so they are not bound by the terms of the MPT Israel India and Pakistan as well as North Korea are not bound by the obligations or by the terms of the MPT so this does not mean that they can do whatever they like well in theory yes maybe but everything international law is not everything it's most actually important but of course there are certain limitations as well Israel has very little relations with the IAEA because nuclear weapons states have voluntary agreements with the IAEA for their non-matry facilities because nuclear weapons states have a number of nuclear reactors or nuclear facilities not all of which are you know used for major purposes there are approximately 100 actually 104 103 nuclear reactors in the United States and some of them are used for major purposes I mean to produce enough plutonium in the waste to be extracted later on and so therefore because countries like Germany which had a number of some 35 or so nuclear reactors I might be mistaken in terms of numbers Japan 53 54 maybe 55 nuclear reactors and other countries which had nuclear reactors and which had to accept all these inspections and bring these inspections as I said the nuclear reactor must be stopped must be shut down for a while or at least some parts must be shut down now there are technologies which you do not have to shut down during the inspections etc. but they said look this is to our commercial disadvantage and therefore nuclear weapons states which have nuclear reactors and which are used fully for peaceful purposes have voluntarily agreed even though it was not necessitated by the MPT have voluntarily agreed with the IAEA to open their facilities for inspections from time to time but these are not to kind of inspections that you expect from a non-nuclear weapons state because the purpose of inspections remember this the purpose of IAEA inspections is to detect on a timely fashion I mean timely detection of diversion of significant quantity of fissile material from peaceful to major applications so at the cracks of the inspections the purpose is to detect if there is anything that is wrong I mean diversion from peaceful to metri something against the bargain the bargain was give up to metri ambition I'll give you nuclear technology that's it so if you take this technology and use it for a while for peaceful purposes and then decide to divert from peaceful to metri the IAEA's task is to detect this diversion but on a timely fashion not after some time has passed so we'll continue with this after the break