 First of all, let's explain a little bit what is the SS7. SS7 is basically a network which interconnects all the mobile operators in the world. And through that network, certain elements of telecom flows like SMS messages and USB, which is the most, let's say, more dominant means of developing economies, of users in developing economies to interact with their bank and their bank accounts. This network has been around since the 70s, and it hasn't changed much since then. And it is reloaded with a lot of vulnerabilities, and most of them cannot be resolved because of the telecom basic requirement of network compatibility. So, we were tasked in handling this situation. We were given this hot potato and in the Fiji infrastructure and the security group, and what we've tried to do is analyze the situation since we determined that there is no fixing the core issues of SS7. There's only migrating it out once 2G and 3G in cellular will start to fade out. Then this network will also be fatal, but we're talking about 5, 10 years from now. So, what we focused the most is about learning how to educate the telecom regulators around the world, especially in developing economies, and help them to establish tools for mitigation. Because the mitigation of the vulnerabilities in SS7, especially in the financial vertical, is not in the hands of the banks, it's in the hands of the operators. And there is a regulatory misalignment of interest, which is inherent, because the telecom regulator moderates the telecoms, and the financial regulator moderates the financials. The vertical being hurt due to scams is the financial sector, while the telecom sector is not held accountable. So this is our main goal in Fiji was to encourage them to learn, to help to teach them about this, and to instruct them on how to build roundtables of telecom and financial regulations in order to solve this issue. Like I said in my previous answer, there is a regulatory gap, because the affected vulnerabilities, the vulnerabilities affect the financial sector. But the vulnerabilities stem from the telecom sector. So it's like a little nomen's land, where you have contradicting jurisdictions between the telecom and the financials. So I think this sentence is very, very true. And this is what we're trying to do. We're trying to bring them together and show them use cases of successful roundtables that were conducted around the world in several countries, that helped solve this and bridge the gap. Once the telecom regulators and the financial regulators set on a single table discussed the issues, they were able to come up with effective regulation, which regulated both the telcos and the banks and the DFS providers in order to successfully mitigate those SS7 vulnerabilities. In study group 11, which I am a member of, we have already drafted or we've already committed the technical report from Fiji as a technical report for ITU on study group 11. And we also finished and committed the first recommendation, which is Q3057, which is the base for establishing trust within the SS7 network, which is addressing the core vulnerability of the SS7 network because it was designed so early in the late 70s, early 80s, that cybersecurity was never an issue. Nobody thought that about hackers and that they and age. So there was no security in this network and there still is no security in the network. So we are building in study group 11, we are building the foundations for establishing trust and security inside the SS7 network. Hopefully it will be in time and it will be adopted before the SS7 network shuts down once 2G and 3G are shut down as well. And that's one contribution. Another contribution which we are working on in study group 11 is due to the advancement of SIM cards, of technology of SIM cards and the computation capability which relies inside the SIM card, it is not possible to actually encrypt and decrypt data inside the SIM card. And what we are working on today is looking at a way that a new generation of SIM cards can handle encryption over the SS7 network especially for USSD, which is one of the two most dominant mediums in which developing economies users access their bank accounts. And USD is of course plain text because once again it was standardized really, really, really long time ago and we're trying to do that. So this is currently the two ongoing activities in study group 11 which are aimed at solving and mitigating those SS7 probabilities in developing countries.