 Part 1 Preface and Chapter 1 of Canada's One Hundred Days with the Canadian Corps from Amiens to Mons August 8 to November 11, 1918 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by David Lawrence. Canada's One Hundred Days by John Livesey. Part 1. Preface and Chapter 1. Preface. This book has been written to give the Canadian people a clear, fuller concept of the wonderful work of the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days. To that consideration, every other has been subordinated. By identifying, so far as possible, the actual battle positions of individual battalions, it is hoped to stimulate local pride and interest in their respective territorial or recruiting areas. Difficulties were here encountered, both through absence of detailed official narratives and limitations of space. But if full justice had not been done each fighting unit, it is not from lack of application and goodwill. With this prime consideration always in mind, it has been sought to make the book intelligible to the general reader, as well as to the military student, and pains therefore have been taken to explain at length the former military technicalities and terminology that come within the common knowledge of the latter. Whenever practicable, the original and official sources drawn upon for description of operations have been quoted. Such may at times be a little tedious, but is preferable to loose paraphrasing, which, while denying the reader an inspection of the documentary evidence, makes heavy drafts upon its credulity. Thus the official report of the Corps commander covering these operations have been reproduced practically in full, paralleling in its proper place the general narrative. This might be expected to make for confusion and overlapping, but in practice it has not altogether worked out that way, for whereas the official report deals mainly with technical aspects, the book itself seeks to clothe these with the pulsating life and color of the battlefield. The alternatives must have been either to have buried the official report in a lengthy appendix or to have emitted it altogether. It has felt the right course has been followed because whatever the book may suffer from these occasional breaks in the story, this loss is overwhelmingly counterbalanced by placing before the reader in an accessible form this extremely valuable and compellingly interesting report, carrying with it the authority of an authenticated historic document. Among official or semi-official narratives of which free use has been made are those of the First Canadian Division, the Fourth Canadian Division, the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade, as well as several battalion narratives. Valuable material has been drawn from the narrative of the First Army, published by the London Times, entitled, The Final Blow of the First Army in 1918. The author is greatly indebted to a number of friends of all ranks in the Canadian Corps for information and suggestions. Special acknowledgement must be made to the very efficient work of Lieutenant J. I. P. Neal, Canadian Corps Survey Section, who throughout these operations superintended the core map section, and has now prepared the accompanying maps and plans. End of Preface. Chapter 1. The Situation on the Western Front. On July 18, 1918, Marshall Faulk, supported by the new American levees, struck his hammer blow on the marne. We shall hear a good deal in history of Chateau Théry and the Great Victory, but it remains that, at the end of July, the West Front, the traditional West Front of Flanders, Picardy, and the Somme, was intact, unpierced, to all seeming an impregnable wall built by German blood and iron, but it was not the line of 1917. The spring offensive had cramped its defenders into a narrower, a more perilous ring. In the north the enemy Bivouac, on the field of Passchendaele, and from Mount Kemmel, cast his shadow over the channel ports. To the south he was knocking on the gate of Amiens, and thrusting through Mont-Didier at Paris. Only in the centre, at Souchet, on Vimy Ridge, and before Arras, where through all those fateful days of March and April, the Canadian Corps had kept watch and guard, the line of 1917 stood firm. There was abundant evidence that at the end of July, while the enemy regarded the situation in the south as serious, and was preparing to admit that his last great offensive had failed, he still held the West Front, the Somme, the Hindenburg Line, and the Valley of the Lai to be invincible, and counted on the British armies frittering away their strength upon its formidable defences as they had in 1916 and 1917. Further than that he had actually, in preparation, a new offensive on the Amiens Mont-Didier Front, with which he hoped to restore the military balance in his favour. It was only after the Battle of Amiens in which the Canadian Corps took so glorious and leading apart that he began to despair. Ludendorff clearly admits this in his book. The defeat of our arms on August 8th in the Franco-British offensive near Albert and north of Mont-Didier finally resulted in our losing hope for a military victory, he writes. Conferences were held with Chancellor von Herting, Admiral von Hinze, the Foreign Minister, and Field Marshal von Hindenburg on August 14th, 15th, and 16th, and there was also a meeting of the Crown Council, at which I clearly stated that the work could not be won militarily. The kickoff of August 8th at Amiens was the first general offensive attempted by the British armies in 1918, and the events leading up to it must be briefly rehearsed in order to get a true strategic picture. This can best be done in the words of Field Marshal Hig, as contained in his famous Victory Dispatch of December 21, 1918. After describing the weakened condition of the forces at his command following the enemy offensive, he says, the German attacks, though they had failed to break the Allied line, had stretched the resources of the Allies to the utmost, while before Amiens and Haysbrook they had brought the enemy within a short distance of strategic points of great importance. In these circumstances the possibility of an immediate renewal of the enemy's offensive could not but be viewed with grave anxiety. At the commencement of the period under review in early May, the Allied High Command repeatedly expressed the opinion that the enemy would renew his attacks on a large scale on the front Arras, Amiens, Mondidier. The strategic results to be obtained by the capture of Amiens, the separation of the French and the British armies, and an advance toward the sea along the valley of the Somme, were very great, and might have well proved decisive. The enemy's opening offensive in March and April had already brought him within a measurable distance of success in this direction, and had carried his armies through practically the whole of our organized lines of defense. In short, the enemy still possessed a sufficient superiority of force to retain the initiative, and it was known he would be compelled to act within a comparatively limited time if he were to turn his superiority to account before it passed from him. These were the two main factors which had to be taken into consideration when deciding the policy of the British armies during the late spring and early summer. The common object of the French and ourselves was to tide over the period which must elapse until the growth of the American armies and the arrival of Allied reinforcements placed the opposing forces once more on a footing of equality. The situation was an anxious one, but, as it turned out, the enemy was in no condition to push a new offensive, and when it did come at last he elected for a direct thrust at Paris from the Ayn front. Launched at the end of May, this great offensive swept steadily on until, despite the desperate resistance of the French, reinforced by British and American troops, the marnier was reached, and accommodated on July 15 with the opening east and southwest of Reims of what was to prove the last enemy blow on the grand scale. On July 18 struck his shattering counter-stroke. Meanwhile the British armies on the west front had been engaged in what Field Marshal Hague describes as a period of active defense. This included local attacks, the building of a new system of railways behind Amiens, and the digging of 5,000 miles of trench. The lesson of the necessity for great depth of defense had been hardly learned in March. Coming to July he says, two months of comparative quiet worked a great change in the condition of the British armies. The drafts sent out from England had largely been absorbed, many of the reinforcements from abroad had already arrived, and the number of our effective infantry divisions had risen from 45 to 52. This, in addition to nine British divisions, engaged on the marnier. In artillery we were stronger than we had ever been. As a consequence we entered early in June on a more ambitious local offensive operations, in which the Australians had a considerable share. By the end of July he goes on, the reconstruction of the British armies had been completed, and the success of their various local operations had had a good effect. I had once more at my command an effective striking force capable of taking the offensive with every hope of success when the proper moment should arrive. That moment now approached. At the conference, held on July 23, Field Marshal Hague writes, when the success of the attack of July 18 was well assured, the methods by which the advantage already gained could be extended were discussed in detail. The Allied Commander-in-Chief asked that the British, French, and American armies should each prepare plans for local offensives, to be taken in hand as soon as possible with certain definite objectives of a limited nature. These objectives on the British front were the disengagement of Amiens, and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens Railway by an attack on the Albert Mondidier Front. The role of the French and American armies was the free other strategic railways by operations farther south and east. It would depend upon the nature of the success which might be obtained in these different Allied operations, whether they could be more fully exploited before winter set in. It was subsequently arranged that attacks would be pressed in a converging direction toward Misniere by the French and American armies, while at the same time the British armies, attacking toward the line of Saint-Canclé, Cambrai, would strike directly at the vital lateral communications running through Mubeirge to Herzogne and Misniere, by which alone the German forces on the campaign front could be supplied and maintained. Such a movement would also threaten the group of German armies in Flanders, and therefore it was obvious of vital importance to the enemy to maintain intact his front opposite Saint-Canclé and Cambrai, and for this purpose he depended upon the great fortified zone known as the Hindenburg Line. It is necessary to keep this in mind as it is the key to the extraordinary fierce resistance the enemy maintained throughout the critical days of the Battle of Cambrai. Summing up the general scheme of British operations, Field Marshal Hague says, the brilliant success of the Amiens attack was a prelude to a great series of battles in which, throughout three months of continuous fighting, the British armies advanced without a check from one victory to another. This period was divided into two well-defined phases, the first being the breaking through of the Hindenburg Line, and the second the pushing of the enemy before us from his hastily prepared defenses. The second phase had already reached its legitimate conclusion when the signing of the armistice put an end to the operations. Finally defeated in the great battles of November 1 and 4 and utterly without reserves, the enemy at that date was falling back with a coherent plan and in widespread disorder and confusion. End of Part 1, Preface and Chapter 1, Recording by David Lawrence in Brampton, Ontario, September 2009. Part 1, Chapter 2 of Canada's Hundred Days with the Canadian Corp from Amiens to Mone, August 8 to November 11, 1918. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Ian Meyer. Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesay, Part 1, Chapter 2. The Canadian Corp Ready for Battle. It is the purpose of this book to trace the leading part the Canadian Corp played in the Battle of Amiens and in the subsequent great offenses that carried it from Arras through the Drogor-Con line across the Canal du Nord over the stricken field of Canberra and thence to Valencian and Mone. In those proud days of victory, no less than in the long stern years of trench warfare, it lived up to its great reputation. Its deeds speak for themselves. As that tried soldier, the king of the Belgians remarked in Mone, there is no core in Europe of higher renown. In the words of its commander Sir Arthur Currie, In the last two years of strenuous fighting, the Canadian Corp never lost a gun, never failed to take its objective and has never been driven from a foot of ground it has once consolidated. What was the Canadian Corp doing in the spring and summer of 1918? Little was heard of it during the Great Spring Drive, north through May, June and July. People at home were asking, what was the matter? Had it not yet got over its bloody wounds of passion tale? Was it not to be thrown into stiff in the weakening line? On August 8, it was to burst upon their consciousness almost with the force of a blow. After the hard-won victory of passion tale in October 1917, the Canadian Corp returned to its old line before Lens and on the Vimy Ridge, where an offensive had been planned just before it had been moved north. Corp headquarters returned to Coomblund Lab and remained there throughout the winter and spring months, the time being employed in holding and strengthening the Vimy Front and in assimilating reinforcements to make good the wastage. When the March offensive came, it was anticipated that the attack would develop north of Arras, and the sector became vitally important because if this pivot of our defense went, there might be no stopping short of the sea. Behind this, there was another vital consideration. This story may be apocryphal, it does not matter, for in essence it is true. Folk was asked to use the Canadian Corp to stem the tide of the invasion. No, came the reply, or so the story goes. I cannot afford to do that. By their valour, the Canadian troops won back at Vimy the most valuable of our remaining coal fields. These are the nerve centre of France. We cannot afford to entrust their defence out of the hands of my Canadians. In his dispatch of July 8, 1918, Sir Douglas Hake wrote that behind the Vimy Ridge, quote, lay the northern collaries of France and certain tactical features which cover our lateral communications. Here, little or no ground could be given up, end of quote. In the same connection, the Canadian Corp commander, Sir Arthur Currie, in his interim report to the operations of the Corp during 1918, writes, quote, a comparative shallow advance beyond Vimy Ridge would have stopped the operations of the collaries, paralyzing the production of warm material in France. On the other hand, a deep penetration at that point by bringing the Amin Bethune railway and main road under fire would have placed the British Army in a critical position by threatening to cut it in two and by depriving it of vital lateral communication. The tactical and strategical results to be gained by a moderate success at that point were so far reaching in effect that notwithstanding the natural difficulties confronting an attack on that sector, it was fully expected, i.e., before the March offensive developed, that the German offensive would be directed against this, the central part of the British front, end of quote. He goes on to tell of the great defensive works built up by the Canadian Corps on the Vimy Front during the winter in anticipation of the 1918 enemy spring drive, a story of interest in itself, but not to be described in detail here. It must suffice to say that if the blow had fallen in this sector, the result would have been far different to what befell at San Quentin. After March 21, the pressure became very great, and there was a tendency to throw in divisions of the Canadian Corps wherever needed, quote. Thus, under the pressure of circumstances, writes Arthur Currie of the situation at the end of March, the four Canadian divisions were to be removed from my command, placed in two different armies, third and first, and under the command of three different corps, six, seventeen, and thirteen. This disposition of the Canadian troops was not satisfactory, and on receipt of the orders above referred to I made strong representation to the first army and offered suggestions which to my mind would reconcile my claims from the standpoint of Canadian policy with the tactical and administrative requirements of the moment, end of quote. As a consequence, the first, third, and fourth Canadian divisions were reunited under his command and given a very extended line, quote. From April 10 until relieved May 7, the corps held a line exceeding 29,000 yards in length. The second Canadian division, then with the sixth corps, was holding 6,000 yards of front, making a total length of 35,000 yards of front by the four Canadian divisions. The total length of the line held by the British Army between the was and the sea was approximately 100 miles. Therefore, the Canadian troops were holding approximately one-fifth of the total front. Without wishing to draw from this fact any exaggerated conclusion, it is pointed out that although the Canadian corps did not, during this period, have to repulse any German attacks on its front, it nevertheless played a worthy part of its strength during that period, end of quote. But although the Canadian infantry did not take active part in repelling the Great Enemy Drive, its other arms were worthily represented. At 11 p.m., on the night of March 22, 23, in the blackest hours of the Psalm fighting, word came to the Canadian corps headquarters for the first Canadian motor machine gun brigade, then in the line on the Vimy sector to be withdrawn and move south to the Fifth Army area. By the following midnight, all its batteries were in action on a 35-mile front east of Amia, having traveled over 100 miles during the day. Sir Arthur Currie describes its activities as follows, quote. The first CMMG brigade, Lieutenant Colonel W.K. Walker, under orders of the Fifth and later the Fourth Army, was ordered to fight a rearguard action to delay the advance of the enemy and to fill dangerous gaps on the army fronts. For 19 days, that unit was continuously in action north and south of the Psalm fighting against overwhelming odds. Using to the utmost its great mobility, it fought over 200 square miles of territory. It is difficult to appraise to its correct extent the influence, material and moral, that the 40 machine guns of that unit had in the events which were then taking place. The losses amounted to about 75% of the trench strength of the unit, and to keep it in being throughout that fighting, I authorized its reinforcement of by personnel of the infantry branch of the Canadian machine gun corps, end of quote, fighting over the same ground and with equal gallantry was the Canadian cavalry brigade attached to the British cavalry corps. The brilliant work of both arms in the desperate and successful effort to stem the enemy hordes will ever be a proud chapter in the Canadian military annals. On May 7, the Canadian corps, with the exception of the Second Canadian Division, still in the line in the Third Army area, was relieved and placed in the general headquarters reserve in the First Army area. This movement is explained by the Times history as follows, quote, after consultation with the commanders of the First and Second Armies at the more northern portions of our line, it was determined that each should contribute what divisions could be spared to form a general reserve for the British army for use where it might be required. The Canadian corps formed part of this force and was intended for counter-attack in case the enemy broke through the British front. Its place of assembly was in front of Amia, end of quote. Early in May, Canadian corps headquarters moved to Perna and on May 25th, Dubria. There followed a period of intensive training in the tactics of the offensive. The three divisions not in the line being concentrated in the area, Monchee, Breton, Langeret, Lecoura, Dival, Ochelle, Chateau de la Haye. While they are there, we may inquire briefly into the causes that led to the recognition of the Canadians as a corps delete to be used as storm or shock troops in desperate or critical adventures. Canada's First Contingent has been described as a mob of amateur soldiers, passionately inspired to give their all for a great cause. Discipline was lax, the officers unproved, and though the stuff was there, it took time to transmute it into the perfect fighting machine it became. Take the simple matter of saluting. To men of democratic birth and habit of mind, saluting had in it something of kowtow. To the young officer it seemed an insult to his men. The tried comrades of his civil life, and they in turn might resent the implication of a social distinction that had no existence in fact. And so for long, saluting was a perfunctory affair. But there came certain officers who explained patiently and carefully that saluting was of the essence of military life, that the constant exercise it affords of vigilance and smartness is part and parcel of the making of a good soldier. At the end of the war, there was no smarter saluting in the British army than that of the Canadians, as there was no better marching regiments, no superior staff work, no alert or intelligence, nor more scientific gunnery. The Canadian Corps owes an immense debt to its former commander, Sir Julian Bing, who first welded it into a perfectly coordinated fighting machine, knit together in spirit and applying to all its problems and difficulties the idea of a common loyalty to the Corps. It was not long when, in the shock of battle, the Canadian Corps came into a full appreciation of its own strength and superiority over the foal. Passiondale had been the fastest of these occasions. On that field fell many brave young Canadians, but the Corps went on to victory, not daunted by loss nor unduly elated by success. A number of special causes contributed to the preeminence of the Canadian Corps, as good as the old guards, they said in London. One was that it was at full strength throughout. For owing to the waste of war, other Corps were obliged to cut down the number of their bayonets. The Canadian Corps always maintained its 48 battalions of infantry, divided into 12 brigades and four divisions, with unusual strength in artillery and Corps troops. Right up to the Battle of Canberra, reinforcements of trained men were always forthcoming, and this proved the wisdom which resisted proposals to create the 5th Canadian Infantry Division, and then the 6th, with the ultimate prospect of two-week Corps of three divisions each. By a rather happy chance, this proposal went so far as the actual formation in the depots in England of the 5th Division, whose trained units proved highly valuable reinforcements, while the 5th Canadian Division artillery was brought over to France intact, and thus the Canadian Corps had its disposal, no less than five artillery divisions, besides a number of heavy artillery brigades throughout these operations. Much of the success during the intensive fighting to follow was due to the great strengthening the Canadian Corps received during the winter and spring of 1918. On August 8, the Corps went into action stronger numerically than any other Corps in Europe. How this was brought about and in the face of what dangers is best explained in Sir Arthur Curry's own words, quote, at this time, i.e. the winter of 1917-18, the British Army was undergoing far-reaching alterations in its organization. The situation as regards manpower appeared to be such that in order to maintain in the field the same number of divisions it was necessary to reorganize the infantry brigades from a four-battalion basis to a three-battalion basis. Although the situation of the Canadians regarding reinforcements appeared to be satisfactory so long as the number of divisions in the field was not increased, a proposal was made to adopt an organization similar to the British, that is, to reduce the number of battalions in the Canadian infantry brigades from four to three. Concurrent with this change it was proposed to increase the number of Canadian divisions in the field from four to six. I did not think this proposal was warranted by our experience in the field and I was quite certain that, owing to the severity of losses suffered in modern battles, the manpower of Canada was not sufficient to meet the increased exposure to casualties consequent on the increased number of Canadian divisions in the field. I represented very strongly my views to the minister, overseas military forces of Canada, and on further consideration it was decided to drop this project and to accept instead my counter proposal, these, to increase the establishment of the Canadian infantry battalion by 100 of all ranks, to proceed with the reorganization of the engineers and machine gun services, and to grant the various amendments suggested by the establishments of other arms and branches. I am glad to be able to say that my proposal regarding the reorganization of the engineer services, machine guns, etc., as well as the increase of strength of the infantry battalions received the favorable consideration and support of the commander-in-chief." End of quote. Commenting on this, the Canadian overseas minister, Sir Edward Kemp, says, quote, the Canadian Corps in the existing formation had proved itself a smooth-running machine of tremendous striking power, and any radical alteration in its constitution might have resulted in a reduction of such power without any compensating advantages. At a time of national crisis, such as that in the spring of 1918, it would not have been permissible to allow sentiment to stand in the way of any change likely to further the common cause. Every soldier would have been prepared to sacrifice the pride which he had in his particular brigade and in the Corps as a whole. At the same time, it should be a matter of deep gratification to all Canadians that for practical reasons it was possible to avert what, from a sentimental point of view, would have almost amounted to a national calamity, namely the breaking up of the Corps, which as such had gained a unique position among the armies of the Western Front. End of quote. For six divisions meant two-week Corps instead of one strong one. It must have meant loss of that Corps spirit that made the Canadian Corps a thing apart. More valuable even than its material strength was the fact that it was perhaps the only Corps in the British Army to maintain its identity throughout all its units, its divisions, its brigades, its battalions, its leaders, its staff, and the whole body of officers and rank and file. Other Corps had little about them permanent, but their name and their staff. They became the clearing house for divisions brought from all quarters, used for a special purpose, and then removed elsewhere. This resulted inevitably in lack of Corps spirit, so conspiciously present throughout the Canadian Corps. The average Canadian citizen thinks in terms of the Canadian forces or the Canadian Army. He does not appreciate just how every Canadian soldier cherishes the idea of the Canadian Corps. It may serve to make the point clear by quoting from the report of Sir Edward Kemp referred to above. Quote. The word Corps is an abbreviation of the term Army Corps and at present is a very uncertain and indefinite military term. In the military sense today it means a formation consisting of a headquarters from two to six divisions, a varying number of corps troops composed of all arms, and is ordinarily commanded by a left-handed general. Army Corps in the British Army during this war have never been stable units, varying month by month and often day by day as to their composition. Division and corps troops being very frequently transferred from corps to corps. The units composing the Canadian Corps have, however, been so far fortunate as to have been mostly under the same commander and administered by the same staffs. Canadian units and formations have been taught to look upon themselves as belonging to the Canadian Corps and whilst away from the Corps have been spoken of as being attached to other Corps and in consequence a very true SBD Corps has sprung up amongst all Canadian units administered by the Canadian Corps headquarters end of quote. We have seen how the Corps commander fought hard to preserve the Corps as an entity. It meant something more than a hundred thousand men or so of all arms. In illustration a little digression may be permitted. At a later day a certain infantry unit had the honour of first entering Cambrai. A newspaper correspondent proceeded to congratulate a company officer on the work of his battalion. Don't say that, he said. Isn't the fifth Canadian mounted rifles. It isn't even the eighth brigade or the third Canadian division. It's the good old corps that's captured Cambrai. You know our model, one for all and all for one. There was something rather fine about this at such an hour when men's emotions run high but it was the instinctive spirit of the Canadian soldier. End of part one, chapter two. Part one chapter three of Canada's Hundred Days with the Canadian Corps from Amia to Moons, August 8th through November 11th, 1918. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Mike Vendetti, Tainan City, Colorado, mikevendetti.com. Canada's Hundred Days by John Lévisier. Part one, chapter three. From Eras to Amia. The Canadian Corps was fortunate that it had in Sir Arthur Currie a chief it both loved and trusted. A brilliant citizen soldier. It was proud to follow anywhere, but its greatest asset lay in the unconquerable spirit of the rank and file. Bred to free open skies, adaptable to changing circumstances, seasoned by many battles, inured to hardship, submitting willingly to stern discipline, thus transmuting these clerks, artisans, lawyers, farmers, railwaymen, lumberjacks, and the like into as fine a body of professional troops this war has produced, but troops that also happily sought only in victory the hour to lay aside the sword and return to the plowshare. And now before them was a splendid adventure. On July 1st the 2nd Canadian Division was at last relieved from the line the 3rd Canadian Division taking its place. It had passed under orders of the 6th Corps on March 28th, relieving the 3rd British Division in the Nouvelle-Vitas sector just south of Eras, and on the night of March 31st, extended its front southwards by relieving the left battalion of the Guards Division. The front held extended from the south of the Coahuil River, east of Boiseleux-Saint-Marc, to the slopes of Telegraph Hill, 6,000 yards. The 2nd Canadian Division held this front for an uninterrupted period of 92 days, during which time it repulsed a series of local attacks and carried out no less than 27 raids, capturing three officers, 101 of the ranks, 22 machine guns, and two trench mortars, and inflicting severe casualties on the enemy. The aggressive attitude adopted by this Division during those critical days and under such adverse conditions had a most excellent effect on the troops generally, and it certainly reduced to the lowest point the fighting value of two German divisions, namely the 26th Reserve Division and the 185th Division. On June 30th, when the 2nd Canadian Division was about to leave the 3rd Army Command, General Bang sent the following letter to Major General Sir Henry Burstel, I cannot allow the 2nd Canadian Division to leave the 3rd Army without expressing my appreciation of the splendid work it has done. Knowing the Division of Old, I had great anticipation of offensive action and thorough field defense work. These anticipations were more than realized, and the 2nd Canadians have now added another page of lasting record to their history. I can only hope that they are as proud of their work as I was of again having them under my command. It returned under orders of the Canadian Corps on Dominion Day, but its rest was brief. For on July 6th, the Canadian Corps was warned to be prepared to relieve the 17th Corps in the line, being released from General Headquarters Reserve on July 10th and completing the relief by July 15th. Disposition at that time was as follows, Headquarters Canadian Corps, Douziens, 1st Army Area, 2nd Canadian Division in the Line Telegraph Hills Section, 1st Canadian Division in the Line, Tuenche Fempoque Section, 4th Canadian Division in the Line, Gavarelle Opéé Section, under 6th Corps 3rd Army Area, 3rd Canadian Division in the Line, Nouvelle Vitesse Section. The general policy adapted was to foster in the mind of the enemy the idea of a pending attack in order to retain or draw his reserves into this area, and consequently active patrolling was carried out by day and night, and raids were constantly engaged in. The artillery executed a vigorous program of harassing fire and counter-battery work. From prisoners it was learned that the enemy expected an attack and that troops had been frequently rushed forward to defend the Drogkortkent Line. On July 20th, the Corps commander was informed of the plan for the Amiens Offensive. Then came the admirable police of work that led the enemy to believe the Corps was going to Flanders. To quote Sir Douglas Hague, Preliminary Instructions to Prepare to Attack East of Imnia, at an early date had been given to the 4th Army Commander, General Sir Henry Rawlison, on July 13th and on July 28th. The French 1st Army, under General Devney, was placed by Marshal Folk. Under my orders for this operation, further to strengthen my attack, I decided to reinforce the British 4th Army with the Canadian Corps and also with the two British divisions which were then held in readiness astride the Sommay. In order to deceive the enemy and ensure the maximum effect of a surprise attack, elaborate precautions were taken to mislead him as to our intentions and to conceal our real purpose. Instructions of a detailed character were issued to the formation's concern, calculated to make it appear that a British attack in Flanders was imminent. Canadian battalions were put into line on the Camel Front, where they were identified by the enemy. Tour headquarters were prepared and casualty clearing stations were erected in conspicuous positions in this area. So much depended on the secrecy of the movement and in the deception of the enemy that the precautions taken were very elaborate. On July 21st, says Sir Arthur Curie, I attended a conference at 4th Army headquarters where the operations contemplated were discussed. The 4th Army commander dwelt upon the importance of secrecy. The operation, as outlined at the conference, was of limited scope and was designed to relieve the pressure on AMIA and free the AMIA Paris Railway line, thus improving the situation at the junction of the French and British armies. A large number of tanks were to be made available for this operation. The methods for maintaining secrecy and misleading the enemy were discussed. I pointed out that I had been considering a scheme for the capture of Orange Hill, east of Eris, and it was regreed. It would help materially to deceive everybody if preparations for this scheme were still continued. The following day a conference of divisional commanders and members of the Corps staff was held at Canadian Corps headquarters, where the outline of the scheme for the capture of Orange Hill was explained and the divisional commanders and heads of branches and services concerned were asked to make all preparations for this attack as quickly as possible. It was stated that tanks would be available for the operation and it was therefore essential that all concerned should familiarize themselves with the combined tactics of infantry and tanks. I explained that demonstrations had been arranged with the Australians and that it was my wish that the greatest possible number of officers should witness them. In the meantime, the enemy was to be harassed on the whole Canadian Corps front fire, artillery and machine gun fire, and numerous raids were to be carried out to secure positive identifications, thus leading the enemy to anticipate an early attack in force. Further conferences were held from time to time at the 4th Army headquarters, where plans were made for the necessary reliefs and moves and the necessity of the maintenance of secrecy emphasized. On July 26th the 4th Army commander stated that the plans originally put forward and which had been approved by the Commander-in-Chief had been modified by Marshal Fult. In that the 1st Army would now cooperate with the 4th British Army and be responsible for the right flank of the attack. On July 27th, the general boundaries and the objectives of the first day were fixed and movements of the Canadian Corps and tank units were arranged. It was decided notably that units were to leave their areas without knowing their destinations and that it would be given out freely that the Canadian Corps was moving to the Ypres Front, where the 2nd Army expected a German attack. With a view to deceiving the enemy, two battalions of the Canadian Corps were to be put in the line in the Camel area and two Canadian casualty clearing stations were to be moved to the 2nd Army area. Canadian wireless and power buzzer stations were to be dispatched to the Camel sector and messages were to be sent worded so as to permit the enemy to decipher the identity of the senders. Meanwhile, the Canadian divisions were busy preparing their scheme of attack on Orange Hill and numerous tanks were substantially assembled in the vicinity of St. Pole. On July 29th, the 17th Corps was ordered by 1st Army to relieve the Canadian Corps in the line during the nights of July 31st through August 2nd. Reliefs to be completed by daylight on August 2nd. This Army order stated plainly that the Canadian Corps would be prepared to move to 2nd Army which, as indicated above, was then holding the northern section of the British Front. The 27th Canadian Infantry Battalion and the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion respectively from the 2nd and 3rd Canadian divisions were moved by a strategic train to 2nd Army area where they were placed in the line. They did not rejoin their divisions until August 6th. On this day, July 29th, the Canadian divisional commanders were personally informed of the operations which were to take place on the 4th Army Front and they were instructed not to discuss the operations with any of their subordinate commanders. On July 30th, Canadian Corps headquarters moved from Moles-Vendaine and to transfer the Canadian Corps from 1st Army area to 4th Army area began. When this move was well underway and in order to continue to deceive our troops as to their eventual employment, a letter issued by 1st Army was repeated to all Canadian divisions and communicated by them to their formations and units stating that the Canadian Corps was being transferred to the 4th Army area where it would be held in General Headquarter Reserve and be prepared in case of attack to 1. Move south at short notice to assist the French on their Reims-Salons Front. 2. Support either the 1st French Army or the 4th British Army. It has seemed worthwhile to describe these measures at length, for in the result they furnished the greatest surprise attack of the war. There were some curious developments certain foreign officers attached for liaison purposes to the Canadian Corps hurried north to secure good billets at the new Corps headquarters. An indignant message came to British General Headquarters from the Belgian General Headquarters staff to the effect that the Canadian Corps was being moved to Belgian territory without notice of any kind whereas common courtesy should have suggested that the Belgian Army be notified in order that it might be in position to make arrangements for the comfort and well-being of the Canadian troops. Necessarily the destination was a profound secret and officers of even high rank within the Corps who knew it might be counted on the fingers. One by one the divisions moved round about routes being followed and until it developed the general direction was south. The men for the most part thought they were going back to the salient. Thus at the end of July the 3rd Canadian division came out of the line and moved west to the vicinity of Durlens where it entrained under sealed orders. Battalion commanders not even knowing whether they were going north south east or west. As an example of how it was done the 8th Brigade Canadian Mounted Rifles detrained at Prozul and marched that night to Herbalcourt where they lay hid next day marching the following night to Du Bois de Vévois west of Avare arriving on August 2nd the rest of the division being behind them. On that night they moved up to the General's trench system behind the Australian support line where there was accommodation for a large body of troops. Absolutely no movement was permitted during the day and not a single man being allowed out of the trenches and dugouts except for reconnaissance. The 7th and 9th brigades joined the 8th on August 6th. All roads were packed. The brigades taking 5 hours to get from Beauvais to General's Wood an hour and a half march. Even the confidential men employed with the Corps General staff were equally mystified. Corps headquarters was at Du Zan's when early in the morning of July 30th. They were ordered to prepare for an immediate move. There was much speculation. Some declared it was to Camel, others Du Zan's, while one in Genius Theory was that the Canadian Corps was to be shipped to Zebrugy. They're to fall on the enemy rear in Flanders. The long train of 60 or 70 lorries moved off with no other guide than a transport officer on a motorcycle who declined to talk. That evening Corps headquarters was established at Moulin's Vadim better known to the Canadian soldier as Molly B. Damned a dozen miles due west of Amiens. There followed a week of strenuous preparation. Red tabs are not popular in the army but no one who watched the staff officers of the Canadian Corps then and through the overcharged weeks to follow could have anything but admiration and wonder. There is no Sunday in the army and there are no specified hours except that a man works until he can see no more, catches a few hours sleep and goes at it again. 14 hours a day weekend and week out was quite normal. Inactive operations officers of the general staff and A and Q branches would work right through the 24 hours. All had not the wonderful physique of the Corps commander whom one left studying battle reports at two in the morning and heard at breakfast that he had been in the field at six o'clock. It was a breathless bustle at Molly B. Damned not least so for the staff of the Canadian artillery which had to work out in detail the ranges and barrage of the great opening show then the intelligence branch had the collection and coalition of last-minute information whether from our aircraft or by prisoners three clerks of the general staff worked in a tent all by themselves all were under canvas and it rained a good deal engaged day and night in copying out operation orders which in great detail must all be prepared and in the hands of the various commanders these three clerks for a whole week led the life of trappist monks refusing confers with their fellows finally about noon of a thursday com sergeant tell us when the show is to open that it's a good fellow one weedler petitioned the show opened at 20 minutes past four this morning and by now we are 6 000 yards inside the bush lines on august 7th the first echelon of corps headquarters moved to Dury a village on the paris road three miles south and me a faint buzzing went around among the messes that there would be an attack within the next day or two friday was generally selected that afternoon the corps commander sir arthur curry had a talk with the two canadian correspondents before him was a large-scale map and the barrage map it was all very clear and lucid we take up our line here our first objective is there zero hour was named and this of course a dead secret from all but the privileged few our final objective for the day over there constituting a world record for a first day's advance one was struck with the speaker's simplicity and his quiet confidence and certainty he of course knew the canadian corps and what it could do it was a finely tempered weapon it had been proved before in the tightest corners in the somme at viny and more recently at pashash and where it had gone in and conquered gone in against the better judgment and advice of the corps commander himself but gone in where others had failed to win and now added to this war experience were the long patient intensive months of preparation the knowledge that the artillery support was to be the greatest known and that all units went into the field actually over strength with ample reinforcements on the spot to make good casualties he knew his men who abundantly he knew them and trusted them he knew to their leaders from the divisional commanders down to the platoons and had the assurance there would be no botching and yet when all this was admitted there was something astonishing in the calm certainty for our intelligence people had it straight the enemy was masked on the very sector for a new offensive had not but the day before attacked in force the third corps immediately north of somme in all the history of the west front nothing so ambitious had been proposed let alone accomplished the biggest things in which the canadian corps had been engaged were but small affairs besides this and then there was the memory of other shows that had promised great things but had turned out but have successes or flat failures had we but had the courage to admit as much but confidence of that kind is infectious after the talk was over we agreed on our luck in being in for the biggest thing yet end of part one chapter three recording by mike vendetti canyons city colorado mike vendetti dot com part one chapter four of canadas hundred days with the canadian corps from amiel to months august 8 to november 11 1918 this is a libre vox recording all libre vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libre vox dot org recording by swawek shinjitzky canadas hundred days by john life say part one chapter four the battle opens so at last all is ready the story goes that the corpse commander was asked how soon could he deliver the corpse in fighting trim at the appointed place by the 10th he had said too long do it by the eight and he did it an epic fit it meant hardship some units only reached the ground to go straight into action but everything was there every field battery in place with ammunition to burn all the imperial heavies the tanks great and small cavalry supply columns signals ambulances everything and it was all done secretly and by night for an entire week the men of canada were passing south from their old front taking circuits and puzzling routes none knew where they went they moved by night sleeping by day without gossip or undue curiosity that was essential to the greatest surprise attack the war had produced they were going into a fight and they were ready they sang as they marched i think they had not done for two years for most that night of nights was one sense of wonder at how it had been done how by many tangled threads of railway and lorry and march all that great and intricate machine more complex far than wellington had gathered on the field of water low had been assembled in perfect order to the minute from canadian corpse headquarters at duree a crossroad runs through san fuzion and then downhill into above where we pass over the avra except for a scaring dispatch rider all traffic is going the one way miles on miles of lorries and dark masses of marching men the night presents a sky clear and starry with light just sufficient to illumine the truck and silhouette the regulated avenues of trees inseparable from a french highway far above is the drone of our aircraft hain is not over or the curious scene could scars escape his attention the white roads are checkered with moving oblongs of black all canada is on the march so down a steep hill into the interminable street of buffs that leads at length to the avra it is a puny stream its ancient stone bridge no bigger than a good-sized western calvert later on our men are to bathe in the lewis ways deep in its biggest pool these rivers are poor affairs but they have been inscribed by the blood of her sons upon the role of canada's history their trickling streams turn the crepit mealwheels but their names match on down the generations the som the avra the lewis the scrap the cogiel the sonciae the shelt the sushi or the lease on the far side lies the hamlet of santa nicolà and thence it is a long climb over chalk uplands to the wood of jontel up the winding hill go all the impedimenta of war marching battalions traction engines towing great guns ammunition trains long lines of red cross lorries everywhere the pengent odor of petrol from every little wood belch forth men they march silently they might be phantoms dim hordes of valala where it not for the spark of a cigarette a smothered laugh there is no talking all is tense excitement for miles and miles in a white concentric sweep every road and lane and by path is crowded with these slow moving masses over the bare hillsides lumber the heavy tanks just keeping pace with the marching men should the enemy of a sudden lay down a barrage our losses must be appalling ship for a slaughter on these light chalky uplands the recent rain has drained away and the going is good at length somewhat foot sore we pass through gond village unhappies on tell where stars shine down through skeleton rafters and all is ruin presently the troops are defiling into their appointed place the australian support line for australian units still minded trenches in front of us lest an enemy raid give the show away so rigid have been the precautions that none of the canadian officers and men on leave have been recalled not four days later do some staff officers rejoin their headquarters a bitter disappointed lot berlin thinks we are in flanders london that we are in the south all is well the sky is clear and empty only the stars shine down these and an occasional flicker in the east and the long delayed rumble of a bursting shell for against the eastern horizon is the usual pyrotechnic of trench warfare neither more nor less once every few minutes one of our heavy howitzers sent across a shell a dull report and then a wobbling vibration before it steadies down upon its course more seldom fritzy makes reply the perfunctory business of the night a shrill messenger ending in a roar of explosion the night is very still it seems incredible that all this unpreventable hum and bustle can have failed to reach an alert enemy the watch hand is creeping ground half past three four ten past four an interminable laggard it is to be the greatest bearish of the war what will this stunning experience be like one can only imagine zero is set for four twenty and the pointer has barely reached that figure when behind us there goes up a mighty flare and simultaneously all along the line ten miles to north and to south of us other flares light up the countryside at the same instant there breaks out the boom of our heavy guns the sharp staccato of 60 pounders the dull roar of howitzers and the ear splitting clamor of wits banks a bedlam of noise shells whistle and wine overhead they cannot be distinguished one from another but merge into a rushing cataract of sound in front right outward the horizon so far as the eye can reach spreads out a hell of flame and fire and bursting charge reverberating back to us in mighty unison that the battle has begun bright from out this fiery furnace break out quick flashes shooting into the air and they're dividing into twin red balls the s o s call of the german trenches for artillery support but answer there is none our counter battery work is too perfect their batteries are neutralized not an enemy shell comes across in that murky inferno all is confusion and terror for a minute the din is stunning but the ear quickly becomes accustomed the heavens are lightened up across their broad expanse by a continuous sheet of lightning playing relentlessly over the doomed lines now defined light of dawn shimmers in the east and soon blots out the fireworks a lark rises high carling our own man can be plainly made out walking pleasantly or so it seems forward tanks lumbering ahead already some of our filled batteries gallop past hard after the infantry it is a perfect plan working out without a hitch the heavy batteries behind raise the bearish step by step ahead of the man all is coordinated to victory then down comes the fog blotting out the spectacle but saving many casualties the attack is such a complete and overwhelming surprise that the enemy's initial defense is people many of his batteries fall into our hands wearing their tarpaulin hoods their cruise deep in their dugouts our own artillery comes off almost skage less except among the galloping quiz banks one two ventures being put out of action by a direct hit at point blank range by nine o'clock these field guns are three miles inside the enemy front line six hours was set for the lifting of the bearish but long before that its work is done and the enemy in headlong flight after them go the wipe at tanks little uneasy beasts of steel and petrol that can do their 12 miles an hour across country when the going is good and here over these great rolling up lands and gentle valleys it is perfect the fog lifts it is eight o'clock the cavalry a wonderful sight appear on the scene they have come up from on just so some and have lain overnight in the great park of amio like a jug in the box they have sprung from nowhere miles on miles of gay and serid ranks led by the canadian cavalry brigade lancers too and many famous brutish regiments this is the day so long awaited shortly this is their chance to pass through the broken enemy line to harry and raid his back area as is the cavalry way they do reckless and incredible things and heavy is the price they are to pay they pass south of vile botany vile botany of bright memory in darkest days of the march retreat now in the hands of the stout australians neighbors on our left already prisoners are coming back in little knots in squats in whole detachments sometimes under guard often are left to their own device mounting soon into the thousand slouching figures in field gray among them grizzled veterans and mirrors triplings but for the most part in the prime of life and of good physics with them a number of officers some swearing bitterly others jointly and spruce still rubbing the slip out of their eyes in good spirits you canadians have no business down here says one in excellent english we were told you were in flanders how i would like to hang our fools of intelligence officers intermingled with them come our walking wounded a good blithy cried a greening clad wounded in the wrist how is it going fine you can't see his heels for the dust he's in kilts a highlander from the pacific coast one of the third brigade he tells us how a piper atop of the tank dominion led into action his battalion the 16th canadian scottish the battle has trimmed the way to the east and the battlefield of a few hours ago is as peaceful as an ontario landscape after storm whose bolts and flashes still play over the distant horizon the most striking thing about the battleground is the extraordinary good target our gunners made this was particularly so along the enemy front line and support in our northern area immediately west of marzalkov this run over a wide sweep of prairie pockmarked throughout with shell holes in regular sequence like one of those round boards on which children play at marbles nothing could have lived there nothing did live as it attested by hundreds of bosch death among the unguarded with it had afforded good cover to snipers and now to corpses here since much the tight of battle ebbed and flowed and the crop will not pay the ripping some of our men engaged in mopping up are laden with great store of bosch gear hereabouts too we captured many heavy guns dead horses testify to the heavy shelling which caught our cavalry as they pushed forward they offered a clear target to distant gunners where a line of infantry patiently working its way along is almost indistinguishable from the done color of the landscape horsemen stand out boldly against the skyline this plateau unlike the heavy wooded area on our center and right which fell only after a bitter struggle offers no natural impediment and the enemy overconfident of his power in the open field and with the fixed idea of breaking away from trench warfare had been too but small pains to dig himself in his trenches were rudimentary and the barrage wiped out much of their outline there was surprisingly little wire more might have been done because a vast amount of it was captured it lay in rows everywhere but the Bosch was lazy and arrogant the wondrous Superman caught napping it was over these trenches our airmen performed so gallantly they were to aid the attack by bombing the front and support lines but the mist came down in such dense faults that they must either abandon their job or take Perilias risks so they flew as low as 50 to 100 feet sweeping the trenches with their machine guns their losses were heavy extraordinary to relate an enemy trench mortar secured a direct hit on one of them cutting it into their crumpled frames lie here and there upon the plateau plodding across the fields are little knots of stretcher barriers and burial parties occasionally a shell breaks among them but they carry on their task unheeding from that high level one looks over what had been the smiling plant of France dotted with Bosque villages and grateful church spires along these roads children came singing from school and from this plateau of santerre was garnered much of the nation's agrarian wealth below that eminence in the distant days of peace the broad valleys shown in the sun like the bright pattern of a patchwork quilt the many hues of the ripening grain width oats and belly millet wedge and beans undivided by hedge or fence but melting one into the other in their erratic little squares and oblongs undistinguished indeed saved by the bright hues of nature's palette now all is desolation the hand of the Han lies heavy on the land tottering walls and empty shells are all that are left of the villages church towers are leveled in sad heaps of stone and murder or less happy exposed to heaven scared flanks and the sacred altars not a living soul is to be seen safe man in khaki upon this road stands a monument to the heroes of the army who on this spot made their heroic stand in the war of 1870 mentioning them lovingly by name officer this and sold at that it has been torn in two by a shell already in a dugout were in a few hours before the Bosch sat secure a forward dressing station is established here first aid is given to all and sundry our men and Bosch stretcher cases and walking wounded prisoners reinforce our overtaxed stretcher barriers working in parties under their own officers good nature ingratiating the ymca is here too and serves out indiscriminately hot tea biscuits chocolate and cigarettes there is a little grumbling because the Bosch fair as well as our own men but it is a free handout and the supply seems inexhaustible especially are the tired troops grateful for the cigarettes a scarce commodity a young farmer from the otava valley a walking case tells of his experiences he is full of the battle and with difficulties persuaded to go back three or four days it is all so long ago our battalion the second was at rest a few miles west of aras he says we knew something was in the air two days before we moved all the paybooks were collected and when we got them again and noticed was pasted on the back warning us to be careful in our talk with the French people and ending up with keep your mouth shut on the evening of august four we got our moving order and marched about three hours to a small station where we entrained in box cars labeled 40 men or 16 horses we had our rations and banked on the straw now we hadn't the faintest notion where we were going but the talk was back to Ipa next morning we passed through a biggest town and someone said it was upville and from there until noon the railway followed a river valley we detrained at a little station where we had tea with our bully beef and then marched two or three hours it was very warm and raining finally we came to a village we knew not what there we had tea and expected to spend the night but we were ordered to march again we rested once in the field and all of us officers included supplemented our ration with raw turnips at about 10 that evening we crowded onto lorries once going up a long hill we stuck in the mire and got off to lighten the load away back on the main road behind us we could see a solid line of headlights like a gigantic serpent endless lorries laden with troops early next morning just after dawn we got off at a village and marched into a wood where we be walked all day it was full of troops and guns and horses showers kept slipping over us and the ground was sodden but we were dead tired and slept most of the day that evening a few men were picked out from each platoon to stay behind as a reserve about enough from the whole battalion to make up a company for the first time we were served our fresh meat which we packed along then when evening came we started a long heavy night march the roads were choked with moving columns of men guns and lorries we passed down a steep hill through a village and the two o'clock in the morning came to a wood where we were to stay dog tired we lay down in the dump and pulled our grand sheets over us shortly after sun up the bush started to shell the wood the whole wood was packed with men like sardines we ran across the 38th battalion in other otava unit and sank out to them we met many of our old chums and had a good time we hoped for a day's rest but that for noon we were put on fatigue packing up water and ammunition we slept in that afternoon in the evening a canvas bag was handed round to each man and we were given two days ion rations with mills and smoke bombs i was getting pretty well loaded down for being one of the machine gun unit i was carrying 20 pounds of ammunition there were seven of us the nco number one carrying the louis gun number two carrying the spare parts and the rest of us the ammunition each platoon was given a map and our officer and sergeant explained the lie of the land and our objective and we were told to take particular note of the louis river which we were to cross this was the first hint we had as to where we were some of us had an idea that we were due east of amiel but we were further south batteries were coming up and taking their positions at half past 10 we were off again and marched up towards the line getting to our positions at one in the morning of august 8 we understood the british were holding the sector and were surprised when we heard it was the australians rising ground lay between us and the front line a mile away we were tired out and opened cans of bully beef and beans and had a little breakfast then we lay down but it was bitter cold nobody of men could have been fitter physically we were in fine trim and excellent spirits and had confidence the canadiens would go through anything they were up against but we knew we were in for a hard job and a lot of us wouldn't be there next night we weren't exactly keen on going in but meant to do the job right our officer was out in front reconaturing while we were asleep he was a fine chap and we felt he knew what he was about and we could follow him with confidence at about a quarter to four the corporal came around with a shot of rum which was welcome for we were called all through at 4 20 a six inch naval gun set the ball rolling followed by 12 inch howitzers and a terrible rocket of witzbank battery right in the valley behind us we waited 25 minutes our third brigade jumping off first they were the canadian highlander battalions the tanks were a great sight all night long we had heard them puffing and groaning as they took up their position and wondered why the Bosch didn't too but our bombing planes flew overhead drowning their noise we couldn't see anything of the battle because of the slope in front of us but soon we were off and as we reached the front line we passed the time of day with the australian boys the mist came down but lifted again an hour or two later and by that time we were working along through width fields over on our flank we saw some Bosch machine gunners beating it back fighting as they went and we started to work around them our own gun was now in action suddenly i spotted a Bosch machine gun 75 yards dead ahead of us we threw ourselves down and tried to outflank him but he got me here and killed our number one our nco took the gun and another man my harness and ammunition our section commander was hit and he had to go out but he took with him a Bosch machine gun officer who had surrendered he was hit in the leg and was leaning on his arm i beat it out too and ran across this dressing station there won't be room in the lorries so after my arm is dressed i shall hike back to a casualty clearing station he didn't say much about himself this lot but he had been through some of the hottest fighting of the war our bar rage he said didn't seem anything like so bad as what the Bosch put down on us in march 1917 end of part one chapter four recording by swawek księżycki part one chapter five of canada's hundred days with the canadian corps from amiao to mo august 8 november 11 1918 this is a libre vox recording all libre vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libre vox.org recording by swawek księżycki canada's hundred days by john life say part one chapter five operations august 8 the impressions of an onlooker recorded above are of a rather confused scene the rough and tumble of battle where but a fraction of the canvas comes under the eye and no just estimation can be formed of the picture as a whole in reality it has been all worked out beforehand in minutes detail and every piece falls into its place almost automatically the plan and course of the first days operations can be best followed in the words of the corpse commander the front of attack was to extend from moray to wil sur angra on a front of approximately 20 000 yards the dispositions of the troops participating in the battle were as follows a on the right from moray to ten inclusive the first french army under orders of commander in chief british army b in the center from ten exclusive to the army on shul railway the canadian corpse c on the left from the army on shul railway to the some the australian corpse d the left flank of the australian corpse was covered by the third british corpse attacking in the direction of mor la cor the object of the attack was to push forward in the direction of the line roy shul with the least possible delay thrusting the enemy back in the general direction of am and so facilitating the operations of the french on the front between moan didir and noion the french on our left were not to attack until our movement had been well advanced the battlefront of the canadian corpse exceeded 8 500 yards in a straight line from a point about half a mile southwest of hoax to the amio shul railway crossing the louis river about half a mile north of hoax and then trending in a northeerly direction west of angar through the western edge of angar wood to east of kashi whence it swung off to the northeast joining the australian line on the railway just east of vilei buattoni for the purpose of the operation the following units were placed under the canadian corpse commander third cavario division including the canadian cavario brigade fourth tank brigade and fifth squadron royal a force a mobile force was organized consisting of the first and second canadian motor machine gun brigades the canadian corpse cyclist battalion and the section of six inch newton mortars mounted on motor lorries this force was named the canadian independent force placed under command of brigadier general r brutaniel and given the task of cooperating with the cavalry in the neighborhood of the amio roy road covering the right flank of our right division and maintaining liason with the french i was notified continuous sir arthur curie the two british divisions were held in army reserve and could be made available in the event of certain situations developing the total artillery at my disposal amounted to 17 brigades of field artillery and nine brigades of heavy artillery plus four additional batteries of long range guns the canadian corpse was disposed as follows on the right the third canadian division major general lj libsett in liason with the french in the center the first canadian division major general ac mcdonnell on the left the second canadian division major general sir henry e burstle in liason with the australians in reserve behind the third canadian division the fourth canadian division major general sir david watson the australian corpse leutnant general sir j monash had two divisions in line the second division on the right in liason with our second division and the third australian division on the left resting on the south bank of the sum with the fifth and fourth australian divisions in support north of the sum the third british corpse had the 58th and 18th divisions in line and the 12th division in support it may be explained here that in recording all dispositions objectives and the line held it is the practice to name units as from the right flank on the south in the present case to the left or north the objectives of the canadian corpse for the first day where one the green line just east of the line amon wood courcelle marxel cuff la motte and center north of the amion roy railway two the red line just east of mesier mision blanche camp vermon farm and the high ground east of gilakor on the amion shul railway three the blue line comprising the outer defenses of amion which run east of the line on jest gisnell ke arbonnier the latter was not intended as the final objective for the day and the cavalry was to exploit beyond it if possible the average depth of penetration necessary to capture the blue line was 14 000 yards the ground was very difficult most of our forward area consisting of bare slopes exposed to enemy observation from the high ground south of the lewis river and east of course on our right the lewis river and its marshes from 2 to 300 yards in width provided an obstacle impossible to troops here the only practicable access to the jumping offline was by the bridge and road from domach to hoax a narrow defile about 200 yards long commanded throughout by the high ground immediately to the east and especially from dodu and moray woods these conditions rendered the assembly of troops prior to the attack very difficult some distance west of our front line woods villages and sunken roads gave a certain amount of cover in the preparatory stage and in jontelwood space was found for tanks as well as troops opposite our front say sir arthur curie the ground consisted of a rolling plateau cut diagonally by the deep valley of the river lewis this river flows almost due west through a strip of wooded marshland some 300 yards wide from which the sides of the valley rise steeply numerous ravines generally running north and south cut deep into the plateau the ground between these ravines forming as it were tactical features difficult of access and more or less inter supporting woods and corpses are scattered over the area and many compact and well-built villages surrounded by gardens and orchards formed conspicuous landmarks the remainder was open unfenced farmland partly covered with fields of standing grain the hostile defences consisted chiefly of unconnected elements of trenches and the vast number of machine gun posts scattered here and there forming a very loose but very deep pattern our intelligence had reported that the enemy had 24 battalions less than three divisions in the forward area and about six battalions in support the latter belonging to divisions of the french front but known to be situated within the area we were to attack it was believed that the enemy had four divisions in reserve immediately available and the two of these were west of indian biore line the canadian corpse commander outlines the battle plan as follows the general scheme of attack was to overrun rapidly the enemy's forward area to a depth of about 3600 yards under cover of a dense artillery barrage which would begin at a zero hour then without halting to seize the red line relying on the help of tanks to overcome the machine gun defenses at that moment the cavalry was to pass through the infantry and seize the area so far as the blue line supported on its right flank by the canadian independent force the cavalry was to be followed as quickly as possible by the fourth canadian division passing through the third canadian division on the right and by reserve brigades of the first and second canadian divisions in the center and on the left every effort was to be made to exploit success wherever it occurred special arrangements had been made to support the attack beyond the green line as long as possible with heavy artillery and sections of field artillery were detailed to advance in close support of the attacking infantry the attack had been synchronized with the australians who were to jump off at the same hour as the canadian corpse the first french army was to submit the bois de moiré to a 45 minute bombardment before developing infantry action but the general officer commanding had agreed that the bombardment should only begin at zero hour the canadian corpse being as it were the spearhead of the attack the movements of other formations were to be synchronized with ours it will be seen from the above that a great deal depended upon the artillery and before detailing the work of the infantry it will be well to give some little account of this truth of scientific gunnery between six and seven hundred guns were massed on the canadian corpse front and the bar rage laid down was the greatest of the war to date far exceeding that at vim ridge in the first place the difficulties attending the accumulation of all kinds of ammunition for the operation in such a short space of time were very great the nearest army dump from which our gunners could draw ammunition was so far away that loris could not make more than one trip a day advanced refilling points had not been selected and the dumping of ammunition at these points did not really begin until august three there was a great shortage of loris a considerable number of the heavy artillery brigades imperial arriving only two or three days before the attack when the loris of these brigades became available there was not sufficient petrol to keep them in operation it may be said in parenthesis that there was a shortage of petrol throughout this operation the canadian independent force in particular being put out of action for a considerable time from this cause add to this the fact that all traffic had to go over two roads the amio roy road and the amio vile boantier road the latter being also used for australian supply and the general congestion can be realized nevertheless though only after incredible exertions many loris running continuously for 48 and even 60 hours a great quantity of ammunition was gathered together 600 rounds per gun being available great credit is due the administrative branches of the canadian corpse of whom the deputy adjutant and quartermaster general brick general gj farmer was an imperial officer of outstanding talent and energy the bearer should have been wonderful if the ground had been known and prepared and every feature of the artillery problem carefully studied out in advance it was nothing less than marvelous when the facts are taken into account that many of the batteries were only brought up a few hours before the engagement opened that it was impossible for them to expose their presence by any attempt at registration and that the barrage had to be plotted out entirely from maps and by triangulation the guns were endormant batteries unregistered and without permanent emplacements when zero hours struck it was a true for canadian gunnery five days only were available for preparation and great credit is due the general officer commanding major general e w b morrison his staff and divisional brigade and battery commanders with their rank and file the canadian divisional artillery commanders were as follows first brigadier general h c thacker second brigadier general h a pannet third brigadier general j s steward fourth brigadier general w b m king and fifth brigadier general w o h dots great credit is also due the imperial and canadian heavy artillery brigadier general r h massie whose counter-battery work was so magnificent that the enemy artillery was smothered and we overrun many batteries that never got into action and whose crews were deep in dugouts much of the credit for this was due the corpse counter-battery officer leutnant colonel a gl magnotin and his staff sir arthur curie describes the first day's operations in the following terms at 4 20 am august 8 the initial assault was delivered on the entire army front of attack and the first french army opened their bombardment the attack made satisfactory progress from the outset on the whole front east of hoax opposite the third canadian division the high ground which dominated our front and a portion of the french front had been seized quickly by the ninth canadian infantry brigade brigadier general d m ormond and the way was opened for the canadian independent force and the fourth canadian division the very complete arrangements made by the third canadian division to keep the bridge open and to repair the road completely allowed the reserves to go forward without delay the heavy task of the canadian engineers was remarkably well carried out by the afternoon the canadian corpse had gained all its objectives with the exception of a few hundred yards on the right in the vicinity of lee kissnell where steve resistance was offered by unexpected reserves but this was made good the following morning the days operations in which the four canadian divisions took part represented a maximum penetration of the enemy's defenses of over eight miles and included the capture of the following villages in addition to these the independent force assisted the french in the capture of mezihue which was holding up their advance the surprise had been complete and overwhelming the prisoners stated that they had no idea that an attack was impending and captured documents did not indicate that any of our preparations had been detected an officer stated that the canadians were believed to be on the camel front it will be interesting to reproduce here the following extract from sir daglas hikes victory dispatch at 4 20 a.m. on august 8 our massed artillery opened intense fire on the whole front of attack completely crushing the enemy's batteries some of which never succeeded in coming into action simultaneously british infantry and tanks advanced to the assault the enemy was taken completely by surprise and under cover of a heavy ground mist our first objectives on the line demo yon marcell clave sir see south of marlan cure were gained rapidly after a halt of two hours on this line by the leading troops infantry cavalry and light tanks passed through and continued the advance the different arms working in cooperation in a most admirable manner at the close of the day's operation our troops had completed an advance of between six and seven miles the amio outer defense line including the villages of ke army now and more core had been gained on the whole front of attack except at lucky snail itself cavalry and armored cars were in action well to the east of this line and before dawn on august 9 lucky snail also had been taken north of the sum the enemy was more alert as the result of the recent engagements in this sector and succeeded by heavy fighting in maintaining himself for the time being in the village of shipy lee east of the line of our advance the enemy at nightfall was blowing up dumps in all directions while his transport and limbers were streaming eastwards towards the sum offering excellent targets to our airmen who made full use of their opportunities over 13 000 prisoners between 300 and 400 guns and vast quantities of ammunition and stores of all kinds remained in our possession the brilliant and predominating part taken by the canadian and australian corps in this battle is worthy of the highest commendation the skill and determination of these troops proved irresistible and at all points met with rapid and complete success end of part one chapter five recording by slovek księżycki