 Your emphasis on the idea of restarting the convergence process, it's very much part of the political debate here, and in other member states they think that the purpose of the economic and monetary policies most always be brought back to what kind of convergence we were talking about, and we're talking about economic and social convergence, which appear in the commission's papers, but for some of us don't appear to get sufficient emphasis. May I just open the discussion by asking for a comment from you about the pace of some of the changes that are being contemplated. As you said, the development of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme is controversial. There's a three-stage process being proposed which will take some time to put together. We have the single resolution mechanism, which has new bail-in provisions in it, which seem, although I may be wrong, to have been rather ignored in recent actions to save banks in Italy, and I think perhaps also in Spain. And we have a continuing problem of non-performing loans weighing down on the bank's balance sheets. We have a particular issue with mortgage loans in this country. Some might fear that as we're wending our political way to getting the various solutions in place there, we will be overtaken by another banking difficulty, and we will again find ourselves with insufficient means to deal with the issue. Do you think there's a danger there? And if there is, is there any appreciation of the urgency of getting conclusions on these issues? Well, absolutely. In a perfect world, we'd have it done yesterday, and we'd be prepared well in time. And of course, in a monetary union with now 19 member states with different interests with different problems, it's sometimes difficult to find that agreement quickly. So I think, Edis, let's not forget that we have an agreement on fully harmonized deposit insurance schemes. Every member state now must build proactively, build up a deposit insurance system and a deposit insurance fund, which I think is a good thing in itself, but also will make it a lot easier at some point, hopefully sooner than later, to have that single or European scheme, because it's simply a matter of integrating the funds that are already being built up. If you realize now what little we had when we went into the banking crisis, I mean, it's pretty disgraceful. We told our deposit holders that they were insured, but very few member states had any preparation in place, had any fund build up. Many member states had banking sectors in size and in risks out of their span of control, basically. So I think we've made a lot of progress already. Banking sectors are already much better capitalized, are better supervised. We are building up deposit insurance funds. We are building up a resolution fund. We have the frameworks. So things are a lot more stable and we can manage shocks better already. Should we get it done quickly? Yes. Bail-in. I think one of the key problems that's holding us back, and this is true for the issue of bail-in in Italian banks, Edis, which is not popular in Germany or how we deal with MPLs, we want to go to the perfect set-up of the banking union, but we have to deal with legacy issues. If there were no legacy issues in our banks, not MPL problems in different countries, then I think it would be very easy to today take that step to have that Edis, that European common insurance system. So that's why I keep pushing, let's not wait for it, but let's do things in parallel. While we are all trying to deal with MPLs and progress is being made, we should gradually enter into this European deposit insurance scheme. We've designed it, I mean it was very technical or technocratic if you want. We've designed the same kind of mechanism in the single resolution fund where all of us, or all of the banks I should say, it's luckily not public money, it's bank money, all of the banks are contributing to building up this resolution fund, and gradually over time we are mutualising the debt, sorry, the risks. So if any problem occurs, I believe in 80 years time, you can use the money of all of the fund and not just the national contributions. The same kind of approach and how it will be designed exactly, let's get into it, same kind of approach we should take, we could take in the deposit insurance scheme. So my key issue would be let's not stop us from taking steps to that complete banking union because we are still struggling with legacy issues. We have to go through them in parallel. Now we're open to the floor. The interest rate at the moment is zero. Never has there been a better time for governments to borrow for investment, and at the same time the current construction within the Eurozone is such that governments are literally prohibited from making a set for major investments that will help to create sustainable growth in the future. But I think at a time when alternative energy, etc., the environment, all these things are so necessary and let's face it there are countries within the Eurozone in a very good position to invest. I think we're missing a historic opportunity because I'm very depressed when you talk about the dear term prospects because there's so much money available for investment offering a far higher return than 0%. Thank you very much. Thanks for that. So first of all the points that I hear this a lot that the Eurozone countries is so much worse than the non-Eurozone. So it's interesting to look at some of these examples. For example, Sweden and Denmark, Sweden had a major banking crisis in the 90s and sorted it out heavy-handedly, nationalised all the major banks, deep restructuring, deep recapitalisation, very strict macro-prudential policies. And yes, they went into the crisis in 2008 in a completely different position than many of our countries were. Was that to do with the fact that they were Euro and non-Euro? No, they had the crisis already before we even had the Euro. So I mean, look at Sweden, the reason why the Swedes got through the crisis so much better is because they sorted out their banks and their policies already before the crisis. Finland did actually quite well in the crisis, only had an sort of an adverse almost asymmetrical shocks two years ago, three years ago. So in the first years when all of us went in the slumps, Finland did fine and that was a Euro country. Czechia and Slovakia, Slovakia became a Euro country during the crisis years has done very, very well economically and Czechia, the Czech Republic has done a lot less than Slovakia. Neighbours, Euro country, non-Euro. So if you realise that 90% or more of our policies and how our economies are doing is still influenced by national politics and national structural elements in our economies, you need to look a little deeper. I've had this debate with Stiglitz when we crossed arms in Amsterdam, he made exactly this point, he said, just look at the non-Euro, it's so much better. If you zoom into it, the differences are much more distinctive than just Euro and non-Euro. Anyway, should we now all spend more? It very much depends on what the fiscal situation is. If your debt is at 130%, and investments on the private side are already low, I'm not sure that's a very good idea. I would go for really reforming your economies, reforming your legal system, reforming how your competitiveness rules are, etc., making sure that, first of all, you start increasing private investments in your economy. Instead of on top of that, let's say 130% debt to GDP increasing your spending. In Germany and the Netherlands a lot, this is of course the other example, there is fiscal space, debt is relatively low, the government's can borrow at 0%, but yet the economy is booming. Why would the government, in a period when the economy is at 3% or 3.5% already, and a lot of stress is building up in the housing market again, etc., why would the government then start spending a spending spree, I mean economically in terms of being counter-cyclical, it doesn't make sense. By the way, the investments in solar energy and wind energy in those countries are extremely high, and they need less and less government subsidies. So, with a very small incentive, we can trigger private investments in huge wind parks in the North Sea. It doesn't require a big public spending spree. So here again, I'd look really more specific at countries rather than saying let's start spending a lot of money. Thank you. It seems to me there's a non-Euro country not too far away that hasn't been doing spectacularly well either. Please, please. Thanks very much, Chair. Paul Sweeney is my name. Tomorrow, as you probably know, more than 90 fascist members of parliament will take their seats in Germany, and I agree a lot of progress has been made in Europe in recent years, but that kind of thing that's happening. The rise of the far right is quite worrying. In Ireland, our anti-tax parties are on the far left. We're quite unusual on this. They're particularly opposed property taxes, which I think are rather good taxes. The anti-tax parties are on the far left. Yeah. Right. I'm just letting that sit. They've really done it. They've really milked it, but it's an interesting phenomenon. But my question is, I'm a member of the Economic Committee of the European Trade Union Confederation, and last week we had a meeting, and we had a paper put before us, a technical services note to the Eurogroup, which I find and others found very disturbing. It seems to me, and my question really is, and I'll explain what's in the paper in a minute, that this kind of paper is playing into the hands of the right, and in Ireland's case, the far left, it's basically an anti-tax paper. It's a paper against social charges, which you call financing labor tax cuts. And in it, the word tax is used 17 times, and appended to the word tax every time, 17 times, is the word burden. Now, I have a number of questions to ask you. Do you think that tax is a burden? Do you think that tax is theft? Do you think that tax is a charge or a payment? If it's a burden and you're a public servant, are you a burden? You have to use your words very carefully, and there's a use amongst technical people to use the language of the far right. And if you're disparaging taxes, which I am proud to pay myself and make a point of paying every penny, because I believe I'm buying civilization. But the whole anti-tax coming from you, and you're a social democrat, that's the surprise. Now, of course, you didn't write this paper, it was addressed to you. But you know the paper, I'm sure. But essentially, it's all about reducing employers' purest side. You must be aware that the labour share of national income has fallen by 10% in many European countries and in East Germany, and this is a move to make it fall further. Let me make a remark about the rise of the extreme right in Europe, because it's, of course, extremely worrying. And some people have said that the outcome of the elections in the Netherlands and France has been quite moderate. I don't agree with that. Extreme right has again grown in a number of seats in the Dutch parliament, and they've done extremely well in the presidential elections in France. So that worry is very much alive, and I very much share that. I'm not sure that it's a euro issue. I think the populism and the, is just as strong and the same kind of movements is going on in the US. So I'm not sure the euro crisis whole explanation. I do believe that the fact that ordinary working people have not seen a wage improve, and this is true for the US and Europe, for a very, very long time is one of the factors. In the Netherlands, the, let's say, average disposable income for working people hasn't improved since 2001. So it's been for 15, 16 years completely flat. The paper you refer to is about the tax wedge on labor. Why is that problematic? And why do I think it's problematic? I presume it's drawn up by the commission, but we ask for it. Because the factor labor in our economy is being taxed so heavily that it's become very interesting for, of course, employers and in the economy to have as little labor as possible. So economically, I think it will make a lot of sense to shift that late, that tax pressure away from labor, and to, for example, to consumption, or to green taxes, or to capital taxes. So that's what the paper is about. I'm also proud to pay tax. I very much agree. And I think we should look carefully at who's actually paying it and how we can make sure that the factor labor is not, on the one hand, not improving its wages, and on the other hand, is being taxed very heavily and increasingly so over the crisis years. So there is the two sides I've been pushing in my country, but I don't have direct influence on it, on wage increases. I think there is a lot of space to improve wages in the Netherlands, and the same is true in Germany. And I've been pushing and working on reducing the tax wedge on labor's income. I simply want people to have more money in their pay pocket. How do you call it? Pay package. And that doesn't mean that we have to go along with the sort of the anti tax. By the way, I'm not sure that the extreme right or the populist right are anti-tax. I'm maybe in some countries, but certainly not everywhere. It strikes me that the populist right are also very much in favour of the welfare state and early retirement ages and welfare schemes. If you look at the populist party in the Scandinavian countries and in Denmark, one of their key agenda points is hands off of the social welfare state. So the image that you describe of the extreme right being anti-tax and anti-government etc. is certainly for some of the extreme right populist parties, not quite right. David Kron. In the commission's paper on fiscal policy that was produced with the last years, or the end of years, annual growth survey, it was critical of the lack of a fiscal stance at the Euro area level and that it was producing suboptimal governance because within a time of downturn, it tended to be pro-cyclical, making recovery in some member states even more difficult. And that what was needed was a repartition, or that was their word, but I think that means a division of the fiscal effort into individual member states. Do you go along with that at all? And I'm not quite sure how it would be done either. So the fiscal stance for the Eurozone as a whole has been debated ever since Maastricht. And already then, some people said we shouldn't just have fiscal rules for member states, but we should look at the whole integrated fiscal stance. It was never decided that way, so the whole rule book, so to speak, has been designed on the fiscal efforts of member states. And the complex situation is now that in the member states that are economically doing well, there is fiscal space. So economically there's not many arguments for Germany to start spending heavily, even though you could argue that the infrastructure in Germany or the educational system in Germany really could require an investment. But in other countries where there is very little fiscal space and the rules would require them to take a contractionary sort of approach in their budget. In those countries, there's a huge demand for investments, also public investments. So that we haven't solved it yet. And every time people say, let's have a fiscal stance for the Eurozone, the problem is how to then implement it. So the commission now says over the whole of the Eurozone, a neutral fiscal stance would be appropriate, meaning not contractionary, but not expansionary. It doesn't really mean anything, because in some countries there really would be, in economic terms, need for some public investments in other countries, economically not really. I don't have the answer to it. I think it's become a sort of a symbolic debate. Some would argue that the real answer is having a fiscal capacity, a budget at a European level in which you can then level it out between these countries. That would of course only work if it's really sizable. So having a small fiscal capacity, a small Eurozone budget, I don't think will help us very much. I mean, it can be for a short period of time, for a few small member states, you could use it. But for larger member states, or real adverse shocks. If we want to have in the future a really sizable and effective fiscal capacity for the Eurozone, we need to discuss whether some of the major policy areas that are now in national hands, that we are prepared to give away that sovereignty. What do national governments spend their money on? Welfare systems, pension systems, health care, and hopefully some on educational systems. So these are the big costly policy areas. So if we really want to create a Eurozone fiscal capacity of some size, you would have to give some of this up. Otherwise I don't see how we can shift fiscal capacity to the Eurozone level. That debate is only just starting. So I mean, there are lots of people who say we need as a monetary union to have that sizable fiscal capacity. But no one has really discussed where does the money come from. I will presume it comes from national budgets. We then shifted to the Eurozone budget. What policy area would go with it? Some discussion now about unemployment benefits schemes. Shouldn't we have a Eurozone unemployment insurance system? I think that's quite interesting. But it will be for the future. Why do I say that? Because economically and politically, we are so far apart how labour markets are designed and works. Some countries don't even have an unemployment benefit scheme. I mean, maybe from my perspective, that's hard to imagine, but this is the situation. Some countries have very strong, very sort of elaborate unemployment benefit scheme. But then the governance is very different. In some countries, these funds, social funds, are actually owned by the unions or are owned by or run by the social partners. In some countries, it's an integrated part of the government budget run by the government. So I mean, we really need to think deeper about what it means when we say we want a sizable, in the future, fiscal capacity in Eurozone. It's about these topics. And in this, in this country, probably a referendum. But indeed. Yes, sir. This year. Thank you. My name is Patrick Leningen. Just two questions very briefly. In your remarks, you talked about a reform fund, effectively, at the commission level to support reform in member states. And then you also talked about a European IMF type institution to support reforms. How would you envisage those being financed? Either at an annual basis from national budgets of member states, or by a capital infusion into some type of institution. And secondly, just as you're hearing, as you said, that you're stepping down soon as the Dutch finance minister. Just in that role, just one question. Last year, you agreed the banking sector agreement with civil side organizations with major Dutch banks and the Dutch government. It was with Oxfam and then major banks in the Netherlands. I'm wondering if you could comment on its implementation. And do you see that type of agreement as something that could be used in other European countries either at national level or as a European wide agreement? Thank you. Right. On the funding side, I think we're going into a very difficult debate anyway about the multi annual framework, the financial framework, which is about the seven year period of the EU budget. It's going to be usually complex anyway, so let's make it even more complex. It's going to be complex because the UK is leaving and they are of course a net contributor. And it will have huge effects on the next net contributor, but also the recipient countries. Are we going to downscale the budget to the size of the UK population or the UK contribution? And how are we going to redistribute the costs? So that's one element. I think another one is the financing of the common agricultural policy. I know this is in Ireland also followed very closely, but that debate is also going on. And here the position of countries is changing. Should that remain fully communitarian or should it be renationalised to some extent? I think that could also be part of that discussion. There is a discussion which I'm very interested in, is about European public goods. What is it that the EU actually has an added value? What policy areas? And obviously a lot of attention goes to migration, border control, security, anti-terrorism. And you know I'm not a federalist in the sense that I think everything should be done at the European level. And as long as it's done at the European level it's the best answer to whatever the problem is. I don't agree with that. But there are some very strong cases where doing it jointly at an EU level would be much better. And border control I think is very obvious. Most of our internal borders are gone in Schengen and we didn't organise the outside border control. So let's do that, but it will require really development of institutions and budget etc. The same would go for cooperation on defence issues. So I think creating space inside the EU budget for these EU public goods, security, migration, border control will also require quite a puzzle. Perhaps even extending the budget. But it's easy for me to say as I'm leaving my job as finance minister, if I would be responsible for the next five years I would not be so eager. But there is a strong case here. And then on top of that we want to create a new instrument. I think we should look at the structural funds as we know them. Not to take away the money, but to say we want to connect these transfers from the structural funds to a reform programme or reform efforts that countries are going through. And how can we make them work in parallel? So that's the kind of funding I would be looking at. But it's going to be a hugely difficult debate about the EU budget. The second point, a question was about the agreement which we have in the Netherlands with the banks. This is about sustainability, human rights, and the banks have agreed that they will respect all international standards regarding human rights, that they will take a huge responsibility for sustainability, the climate issue. It's still in development. I mean if you want to know is it a huge success? I think in itself that the banks with the government and the NGOs came to such an agreement was already a huge success. The next step will be transparency. They need to become much more transparent on where they actually invest their money. How do they in practice fulfil these commitments? So I'm positive, I'm optimistic. Ask me again in five years time and I'll tell you whether it's been a huge success. We are actually trying to do that with different sectors of the economy. It's a very sort of Dutch way. I don't know whether you know this world. We like to call it the polder model. Most part of the Netherlands is of course below sea level and the only way we can keep our feet dry is by having this polder model. The polder is the low land below sea level and we have all kinds of institutions and negotiations and talks and tables around which we sit to organise the fact that the Netherlands remains dry. So this is where the word polder model comes from. We like to sit down and have sort of a national agreement with in this case the banks but we try to do that in different sectors. It is said as you probably know that if the Dutch have been born in Ireland they'd be the richest people in the world and if the Irish have been born in the Netherlands they'd all have drowned centuries ago. Thank you Chairman. I have a very simple question. In the Bretton Hood arrangement the emphasis is always on the deficit countries through the adjustment. Something similar seems to be happening in the Euro area. It is always the deficit countries that have to do all the work rather than the surplus countries. In the Euro area this is quite clear that German surplus becomes bigger and bigger because the deficit countries have to do all the work. How do you arrange or what kind of proposals have you discussed in relation to making the adjustment much more balanced between the service countries and the deficit countries? No you're right the rules are much more strict on one side the balance and on the other. So I think that Germany is very much aware of this and the way that it works but it's also very reluctant to become responsible for some of the more domestic problems that our colleagues have and this is very much about the feeling that the Germans have that they always have to pick up the bill in Europe and have to pay for whatever risks occur. But I think the answer is twofold so as long as we don't have a more balanced sort of mechanism on two sides deficit and surplus countries I think the Germans should look at and I think they are at investing more for example in infrastructure but also the educational system in Germany is not the highest ranking and another way to readdress this issue is by increase of wages and there really is a lot of room for wage improvement in the German economy and I was at the IMF meetings a week ago in Washington and one of the things that struck me is that the economists really don't know the answers anymore and the politicians don't have the power to do it. What do I mean by that? That everyone is puzzled in every room I was in in Washington by what's happening now in our economies in terms of technological developments, productivity very low, labor markets not strained not even in the countries that have had a very strong economic recovery there is still very little push on wage levels upward push so what's going on in our economies and it struck me that even the cleverest economists that always are in these meetings couldn't really explain it but it's a it's a huge problem it's a huge problem in the U.S. it's a huge problem in more and more of the eurozone countries why is it that the economy is booming the private sector is heavily investing but we don't see anything in productivity and we don't see anything in wage increase but that's what should happen thank you Jeremy Harrison I was very struck by a point that you made that when you said let's not be too quick to make private risks a public problem and I wondered if you you agree that there's a good case for being very cautious about making private responsibilities a public problem too I mean in the in the affairs of the banks over recent years it's fairly clear that as well as maybe failures of regulation they have above and beyond that been major failures of corporate governments and if you have a situation you may not want to comment on a particular Irish issue at the moment but should you have a situation where frankly the banks have scammed their customers over quite a serious period of time is not the first thing to do to turn around to the boards of those banks and actually to say to them you have not exercised your corporate responsibility for ethical and responsible trading for the period that you didn't do that why should you be paid as directors and if that failure to exercise it becomes willful I you don't do anything about it why should you not be disqualified from being directors in future isn't just a case for saying governments have actually allowed the banks to blame their lack of corporate responsibility on hypothetical lack of regulation I agree that doesn't mean to say that I don't think we need regulation but regulation has sometimes become an excuse for those in charge of the banks or corporates to say well I've stuck to the rules and regulations so I'm fine and that's not always the case you can give your customers a really bad and unfair deal and still be inside the law and I won't comment on the situation that's now all over your newspapers but we've had exactly the same kind of examples in the Netherlands schemes with derivatives being sold to small companies these company owners didn't ever clue how the derivatives worked couldn't imagine how it could go wrong and it did go wrong and we're still sorting it out and now we've had huge scandals with ink I'm not sure what the English word would be sort of income insurance policies in which private people would pay in monthly terms hoping that they would build up some kind of sort of a little pension fund but the administration cost that the banks made them pay every month exceeded the return on their investment and this happened to seven million people in the Netherlands seven million so I mean and we've seen it in England we've seen it in Italy it's happened all over the place miss selling and yes I've been very active in regulating we've did lots of regulating at European level and a national level but every time it boils down to the fact if the financial sector doesn't realize that how important confidence between them and their customer is and how damaging these recurring incidents I mean is to that confidence if they don't see it as their responsibility we're never going to sort it out we will have a highly dense regulation and thousands and thousand people working at the supervisor but we're never going to win that struggle in the Netherlands I don't know how you have done it in Ireland that the supervisors need to check do a fitness check on all the responsible top people in the financial sector. So before you can become anything at board level or even the level below that, you need to be checked. And it's a check on your personal ethical behaviour, also whether you've paid your taxes, but also on how you've done in previous jobs in the financial sector. And if you've been in some way responsible for a scandal in your institution, you may lose your approval to work in the financial sector. And this has had quite a sort of a shock effect, because you can lose basically your professional licence. It's an unfortunate way to do it, but that may have worked. The point is frequently made that in the United States, for example, where financial institutions have been fined huge amounts of money, that simply doesn't solve the problem, because the people who caused the difficulty still stay there or they get paid a large amount of money to leave. Yeah, and the shareholders pay the fine. The issue I'm asking about is, you mentioned about high-debted countries, obviously Eurozone does a few of them, but one stands out like a sore thumb, and it's been an ongoing issue, i.e. Greece. How do you see Greece playing out, going forward? And if Greece were forced out or actually left over on volition, could Eurozone survive? I.e. one goes, can you bring friends to rest them? I think if you look at how much political capital has been spent on keeping Greece inside, I'm sure that we're not going down that road of what if and could it happen? I don't think anyone is going down that road again. And I mean, literally, political capital spent. Governments have fallen in the Eurozone over Greece, and I'm not talking about the Greek government. So a lot of political capital spent in the determination to keep the Eurozone intact and keeping Greece in. So the situation with Greece is, of course, as I said in my speech, many of the problems that we had during the crisis were already caused in the years before, and that was certainly true for Greece. Institutions very weak, the whole society and the economy very politicized. Everything is in the end decided by the politicians. And if the government changes, then it works all the way down into the economy. People lose their jobs and get replaced. So it's a major effort to introduce sound governance throughout the private and public sector. But it's happening and it's gradually taking place. It's slow, it's tough, but it is happening. And I think it's key for confidence to return to Greece. So in 2014 already Greece was coming out of the crisis. It had some growth, unemployment was going down, investors were returning, and then the Syriza government came in and in 2015 everything collapsed and we had to start all over again. Now we're in the third program, things are back on track. So my key point is, and I made it when I was in Athens, it's about stability. Create stability, gradually keep on working on the reform agenda. We will help to stabilize the economy. We will also help to manage the debt burden. A lot has been done there. We've basically flattened out their sort of annual debt burden, the amounts that they have to pay on an annual basis. They've completely flattened it out for the next 20 years. So the debt is still high, but what they have to do to service it on an annual basis is very manageable. And we stand ready if they do their part. We stand ready to do more if necessary. And the program ends in 18, the summer of 18, summer next year. The size of the program is something like 86 billion, but I don't think we'll use half of what is needed. So that's also a good sign. We'll stay well below that 86 billion. And that also helps the debt issue. And at the end of the program, summer next year, we will look again at how sustainable the debt is and what more needs to be done. But stability is very much the key to get that confidence back. I think the final question would be Mary Cross, who's chairing our reflection group on the future of EU 27. Thank you. Mr. Thank you for a very clear expose. I suppose my question in a way is more political than economic. You laid a lot of stress on convergence. And I just wonder if you feel confident that you can keep moving forward in this direction because there's quite a lot of discussion in the papers we have from Europe at the moment and the swirling around in the EU about groups of countries moving forward in certain areas. And obviously a danger is that the Eurozone may move forward and create a chasm with other non-Euro member states. And this is obviously a worry for all of European member states. So how do you keep them moving together particularly with the wide variety of types of countries not in the Euro already? Well I think Jean-Claude Junger is right when he says that in principle we should really push and help countries to gradually catch on and connect to the Eurozone because it's quite complex. I think the integration of the Eurozone countries will continue sometimes with shocks, sometimes gradually, but this process will continue. And it will create political issues if a number of countries sort of follow up or get disconnected. The appetite to become a Euro country wasn't of course very strong during the Eurozone crisis but at the moment the Eurozone is doing better on average than the non-Euro countries. And that is something that a couple of years ago no one would have expected. There is interest now in Denmark and Sweden to become part of the Banking Union. The Banking Union is of course now Eurozone member states but it's an open concept anyone can join, EU members, and I think they will. So I would be very much in favour without forcing countries, I don't think that could ever work but to try and keep countries as involved as possible. That could be in the Banking Union sort of as a halfway station integrating into the Eurozone. I can't solve it completely. I think the integration of the Eurozone will continue, it will progress and if countries say well we simply don't want to be then they will be a different kind of member. Thank you, Jeroen. Thank you very much indeed for your frankness and straightforwardness in dealing with the issues. I'm sure I speak for a good many people here, if not for everybody but I say that I've been struck by your frequent references to convergence and we look forward very much to seeing the results of that kind of thinking and going through in your work for the ESM. Thank you very much indeed for coming. Thank you.