 First of all, I would like to, as a veteran who was here at the creation in 2008, congratulate Thierry de Montréal and his extraordinary team to give us the chance to see each other again in person in this terrible crisis that we've had. It's wonderful to see each other again in person. The preceding panel focused on economic trends, although they touched about some power questions looking at the relationship between China and the world. This panel will focus on power relationships in present international politics. There's a lot of noise, there are many tumultuous events. We want to look beyond them and identify how various key actors in regions, U.S., Europe, Russia, China, how they are affected by the tectonic shifts in the geopolitical structure and how they shape them. One of the typical examples of a lot of noise and tumultuous events is the withdrawal from Afghanistan. But what we have to ask ourselves is what is the geopolitical meaning of the withdrawal? Who is to gain? Some argue the U.S. lost, others argue the U.S. gained from this withdrawal. Similarly, the orcus pact between Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. cost an enormous shock. Lots of consternation, disappointment, hurt feelings, breach of trust, all of that. But we have to look beyond it. Is there a new constellation of power, a new power balance emerging between China and a group of western states led by the U.S.? Where does France place itself? Where does the European Union place itself in this? What role does the U.S. accord to Europe? What do we have to think about the notion of European autonomy in this context? What does it mean? Is it real? Is it a genuine alternative? And looking at the somewhat inept way the U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan and organized the orcus pact, how is the U.S., the Biden administration, going to balance this what the economist called ferocious complexity of reconciling on the one hand, confrontation and conflict with China with, on the other hand, the need for cooperation on global issues such as climate or health. And if you look at Russia, again, we have to go beyond the conflict, which is definitely the case and at the moment, relations with the world, with the West are not really at their lowest point. We have to look beyond it and ask ourselves the geopolitical question of the future. And the Russians to that too, is it in the West's interest to have a Russia that remains a satellite of a powerful and rising China? Is it in Russia's interest? And as we sit here, the Trade Technology Council created between the European Union and the U.S. to reset their economic relationship is actually meeting in Pennsylvania. Are the two blocks, still the most important power block in the world in terms of economics, are they going to reformulate and redo the orders and regulations of the liberal world order and do this at a time when the Biden administration has not discarded many of the protectionist and America first ideologies of the Trump administration? So these are open questions. And to conclude my questions, two general questions. Is the emerging conflict with China going to structure and dominate the world in the same way as the old Cold War with the bipolar structure between the U.S. and the Soviet Union once did and in its combination of confrontation and interdependence and cooperation on the other hand, how does this conflict differ from the preceding Cold War conflict? And how does this affect the likelihood of war, which after all the Cold War avoided? Thank God. So with these questions, I turn to the panel where we have wonderful expertise gathered here. I'm not going to introduce them with all their background because you can read that in the introduction. And I will start and please, since our time is limited, confine yourself to six to seven minutes, I will hold up my watch when the time comes. And we will start right here on my left with Jean-Claude Cruffaut, who is a banker by background and who now heads who is now the chairman of the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington. Jean-Claude. Good afternoon. Thank you very much. I'll start by apologizing for not wearing a tie. I'm the victim of a transit of luggage between two airlines, a good lesson. Always take the same airline to make sure that your luggage follows. Having said that, I will try to be brief and essentially cover three points. First of all, we have the constant, I would say, of the U.S. policies since World War II. And we have several periods and several themes. We're all driven by the United States. The first one was the Cold War. You just made a reference to that. That Cold War was specific in a sense that it was purely military. There was no other type of relationship between Russia and the Soviet bloc and the rest of the world. It was purely military. There was no investment. There was no trade. There were two different worlds. The Cold War we're talking about potentially between China and the rest of the world or part of the world is a very different nature. When the Cold War was followed by the war on terror, the war on terror was a mixed bag and the result was, in a way, and you mentioned Afghanistan, personally I think it was a mistake to be in Afghanistan for more than taking care of bin Laden and Al Qaeda and tried regime change. We've seen that the basic failure of the war on terror was the attempt to change regimes and impose a different type of democratic institution on societies and culture that were not ready for that. We can mention that's clearly the case in Afghanistan, that's clearly the case in Iraq, that's the case in Libya and probably the case in Egypt as well. Then followed the Trump period, if you will, and the Trump period was essentially characterized by the fact that I'm quoting someone else, Trump's point policy was both immoral and transactional. He had no ideology, Trump had never had any type of ideology, he had, if you will, sort of opt-to-curve reflex, he has fixation, he's a person with narcissists and psychopath type of attitude. I can say some negative things on Trump because I'm also going to say some positive things about Trump. But the fact of the matter is that Trump, with America first, essentially didn't change fundamentally the relationship with the rest of the world but the style changed dramatically and there was this fascination for authoritarian regime and that was also the fact that he wanted to abolish, go back on some of the engagement that had been taken by previous administration, whether the Paris Accord on climate change or the so-called Joint Cooperative Agreement on the G2PA which is the nuclear deal with Iran. So we had this policy and then there was a change and then there is the renegotiation of NAFTA with the new Mexican-Canada trade agreement. So that's the first point. The second point is, in spite of the change of administration, there is a continuity of policies in terms of foreign relations. And I can only refer you to a paper just published by Richard Haas that I'm sure many of you are familiar with from the Council of Foreign Relations in the last issue of foreign affairs where it basically says there's not much difference between go back to Bush 43, then Obama, then Trump, then now Biden. Essentially as you mentioned, there's been no real change in terms of the protectionist measures that were taken by the Trump administration, the tariffs that were imposed on China but also on European product, the limitation that we've seen in terms of international trade. These policies have not really been modified substantially. The only thing that you can say, there might be a difference of style and I'm not even sure of that. And the second point is that we've seen effectively that Biden is trying, and you mentioned it for China, Biden is trying to rebuild the relationship saying we may be in disagreement on all the things but at least we have an agreement on climate change. And then he sent Kerry to China recently as you well know, and that was not a big success to be perfectly honest. So there is some uncertainty about that. The other point that I want to mention is the building frustration that have happened over the last decade and again over many presidencies. And we can talk about the percentage of contribution to the NATO budget. The US administration started with Bill Gates but continued with other administration, during other administration, wants to see at least a contribution of 2% of the members of NATO to the budget. And we are only on average at 0.170, 180. The only two countries that are spending more than 2% are the US and the UK that explain a number of things. There was also some frustration on the other side, the European signing agreement with China just at the time of the change of administration in Washington in December 2020 and that was not very well received by the administration. On the other hand, you have, as you mentioned, Afghanistan where clearly the decision and the logistic of the pullback was purely an American decision without any consultation with allies or even the member of the coalition. And the result is what we've seen, which is a complete debacle. So when you put all of that into perspective, you shouldn't be surprised if things are not going well between the different parties to the transatlantic alliance. And the result of that can be seen in some of the things that we've observed recently, the story of the submarines. I'm told that the story of the submarine is largely the fact that the Australian became very well aware of the assertive policy of China and were concerned that the solution brought by the French were not necessary but was needed. They went to the Brits and the Brits went to the Americans and then happened what you won't know. I'll finish by just talking briefly about the new Cold War. The new Cold War in my sense does not really exist as a Cold War because the other relations are too important and they are particularly important and I'll stop here for China because just two numbers to keep in mind. The import export of goods and services represent 25% of the American GDP and 35% of the Chinese GDP. So the trade relation is much more important for China than for the US, particularly because the balance between import and import is much more in favor of China. China export, for the US we export about 11%, the Chinese export half of the 35%, so they're much more dependent on that. So I'll stop here and I'll be happy to take questions. Thank you very much, Elisabeth Guigou, we know of course as former chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly National and member of the French government. Thank you Carl. I'm going to speak French, that's possible, and since I'm supposed to give a French point of view here, and I'll also give the point of view of a very European French, before Zaki expresses himself for Europe, since I'm here with a French point of view first, I want to remember first of all that France is staying and will remain a faithful ally within the Atlantic Alliance, even if the transatlantic relationship is no longer what it was, and which will indeed be necessary to try to envisage all the consequences of the occassion and the withdrawal of Afghanistan. So a brief historical call, also as Jean-Claude just did, first of all, there has been a remarkable continuity in French politics in the face of the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Since the Second World War, but even before, while of course France is very aware of the decisive support in victory, and obviously very aware and very aware of the sacrifice of so many young Americans, but there has never been a total alignment of French politics on the United States politics. And you notice that, from General De Gaulle to Emmanuel Macron, passing on by François Mitterrand and by Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande. That is to say that allies, yes, allies, no, France and Europe, from a French point of view, have interests that can converge, which are globally converging with the United States. If we look at the values, naturally, the will to maintain a multilateral system that works, but France and Europe have own interests to value, which sometimes do not always coincide with those of the United States of America. And so, if I want to summarize the French point of view, I would also say that France seems to me to please, so that there is a share of roles, so that on its fundamental hearing, which foundation the Atlantic Alliance, we can work together rather and work in a good spirit of mutual respect, and not as it has just occurred with Ocus, not with attitudes that, at least in the form signed on the bottom, there may be in the contract, but we can see that the denunciation of this contract has less consequences on the industrial plan than on the geostrategic plan. And that seems to me to be important. However, what I personally notice with regret, I'm not the only one, is that since the beginning of the 2000s, we are witnessing a cut-off, which is not a divorce, but finally a distance from France, from Europe and from the United States. And that it does not focus on the essential, fortunately, but it reinforces the non-alignment, precisely, on the United States of America, despite the stronger depressions of the latter. So there are three dates, which are essential. 2003, the Iraq War, which caused, as we know, that it was founded on a lie, but that was followed after, which caused a division between the European Union and a distance from the United States, with repercussions on the tiny kingdom. I think that it is the first act of the Brexit, it is there. The Iraq War and the division. The second date is August 2013, when the chemical bombings of Bashar al-Assad on his own plop constituted a red line for Barack Obama, everything was ready for an intervention, a bombing of chemical facilities in Syria, at the last minute, Obama decides not to intervene. So after the speech on the Asian pivot, of course, it was felt as a relief by the United States. And so we have this difference that is often expressed in the attitude vis-à-vis Russia, because France has always taken the continuity of the dialogue, even if it is difficult, and more and more difficult, especially since the invasion, the annexation of Ukraine, but which also made this attitude of the United States has had considerable consequences. Russia helped Bashar al-Assad to win the war, but not peace, has extended its influence in all the Middle East. Iran has found much more free to do what he wanted, and Turkey too. So after August, where are we now? Some say that once France has expressed its anger, it may be a anger, it will be business as usual. It will not be business as usual. Because, first of all, my feeling is that even if August can have a tactical interest for the United Kingdom, it is the first global agreement since Brexit. But it is not Australia that will help the United Kingdom to solve these daily problems. For the United States, of course, it is important to strengthen its strategic presence in this Indo-Pacific space. But listen to Europeans, who have a presence, who have a strategy, I imagine that Zaki will talk about it. And anyway, we need to be together, European and American, to face these global issues. And we need that too. Fortunately, Jean-Claude, I hope that there will be no new Cold War, because I do not see how we can solve the climate issue by spending in a cold war with China, which is the first CO2 emissions in the world. So, all this pleases for dialogue, the continuation of dialogue, and with Russia and with China. It also pleases for the Europeans to focus on the priority challenges for them, which are naturally the security in the East. I am happy to meet Bogdan, with whom we have a dialogue to follow. The security in the East, Germany plays a fundamental role, but it is ambiguous in terms of Russia, with Nord Stream. But the security in the East has researched with Putin, even if it is very difficult, and then Africa. There is no more strategic danger important for Europe than for Africa. And it is very important for the United States, because China does not cease, China and Russia and Turkey, do not cease to reinforce their presence on this continent, which in my eyes is a continent of future. In any case, if Europe and the United States are interested in the unemployment of young people in Africa, the security in the Sahel, the question of the climate, can be, in terms of having solutions, I think that the United States is quite interested in what Europe feels much stronger, and in what we are looking for a complementarity, rather than a competition between Europe and the United States. I am very happy that the naivety, in view of Chinese politics, which has prevailed for a certain time, each European fighting for them to be the best friends of China, is over. I think that now we examine with lucidity what is happening, but at the same time, it is also with China that we need to find solutions on the climate. Thank you very much. I'd like to perhaps later on in the discussion come back to that question. How do you reconcile what you said, on the one hand the decoupling between the US and Europe, and on the other hand the necessity of maintaining a relationship, but perhaps some of the other speakers can address that question, I turn to Bogdan Klitsch, who is former Defense Minister of Poland, and of course, who is particularly involved in the question of organizing the security relationship between Europe and the US. Bogdan. Thank you very much. Carl, I will not concentrate on the history, even the recent history, between our meeting in Rabat and here, although so much happened that it would be necessary to mention that. I will concentrate on the current threats and challenges for perception, not going too far, not going beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area. So some words about Russia, NATO, and the response of the European Union. Russia, without doubts, remains an aggressive and disruptive power that challenged the international order. In Ukraine, we were talking about that two years and three years ago, showing to be ready to use the force overseas, then in Syria, now in Libya, and also in the Sahel. Let's remember about the presence of Wagner units in Sahel. Russia tries to reintegrate into this biggest part of the post-Soviet space, as possible. We are witnesses of the soft annexation of Belarus that didn't begin recently, that began before the revolution of freedom in that country in Belarus, but accelerated according to those processes recently. Without doubts, Russia will interfere with political processes of the West, mainly with elections as it did in 2016 in the US and 2015 in my country, trying to deepen in divisions in the West, both within NATO and within the European community. I am convinced that Russia will try to establish a dominant military position in the Arctic. Let's take it seriously into consideration, although this rivalry between powers and various actors is not so clear right now, and will continue to set up new relationships in Africa, playing here in the Middle East an important and influential role. On the other hand, one should be aware of Russian disadvantages, I mean, especially small economy that creates around 2% of global GDP and dependence on energy prices. But let's take into account also its advantages, that's important, large conventional forces, modernized weapons of mass destruction, energy resources and aggressive foreign policy that we can observe, especially during the last decade. So when China from the European point of view is a big challenge for Europe, Russia creates a threat for Europe, especially for Central Europe. What about NATO in such circumstances? We wait, of course, for a new strategic concept. The former, the current one is outdated. I took part in shaping this Lisbon strategic concept in 2010, so let's remember that among its three essential goals, essential tasks, the second, I mean, the crisis management was put aside and will not be introduced in years or decades and quick withdrawal from both the ISAP mission before and recently the Resolute Support Mission shows that there is a crisis management fatigue and the Alliance will not return easily to this task. And the third essential goal, I mean, the international cooperative security model doesn't exist anymore, doesn't exist anymore because it was based on the assumption that dialogue is much better than confrontation, that cooperation is better than that confrontation. And frankly speaking, it was blown up by the invasion of Russian troops in Ukraine, both in the Crimea and in Donbass. And it was not replaced by any other concept of security. So we have from this existing current strategic concept only the first essential goal and this is deterrence and defense. The next strategic concept has to be extended and has to incorporate the current challenges and current tasks stemming not only from Russian but also from Chinese foreign and security policy and should respond to current main threats like for example energy or cyber threats. The report NATO 2030 is a kind of indicator what could be and what should be according to my understanding introduced into this concept and into the practice of the Alliance. First of all, a real political unity of NATO. We witnessed during the President Trump's area a good military cooperation, absolutely a good military cooperation, but with a bad political dialogue within NATO. So such a political unity, such an improvement of the political transatlantic link should be the main task for all the allies. Secondly, what is important is the return to values, to those values that are important for both, I mean for NATO and for the EU that were described in 1949 in the preamble of the Washington Treaty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, public liberties, et cetera, et cetera, that should create the real basis for cooperation between nations. I don't exclude, of course, national interests and they will be the driving force of the Alliance, but this ethical basis should be reinforced. And thirdly, what was important part of the report, this is the cooperation with the European Union. Not only the political, but institutional cooperation with the European Union. I will try to continue this in the discussion because within the EU, right now, we are after the end, after the recovery from the crisis of political will explore the development of the common security and defence policy with creation of European defence funds, with activation of PESCO, with a card mechanism and with implementation of the global strategy of the EU, but we are facing another crisis connected with financial challenges that we face right now because of the coronavirus consequences. Thank you. Thank you, Bogdan. This question of reconciling Atlantic and European approaches to deal with security, we should really come back to that in the discussion because it's absolutely central in the wake of the present crisis between the U.S. and Europe on the issues that were mentioned before. I'll turn to Jim Bitterman, who... Jim is not here. Oh, he's not here. I'm sorry. I'm very sorry. Zaki? No, no, it's yourself. No, no. Are you talking to me? Yes. Since you didn't mention the name of the speaker, I was wondering if you were mentioning my name or the name of my neighbour, it's myself. Sorry. Are you talking to me? Yes. Okay, thank you. So, well, I will try to answer the question you addressed and the question is how do you understand power relations in the world today, right? So, in my view, there are two main trends in the international system. One is the rise of the Sino-American competition in the world, which is certainly going to be the dominant feature of the international system in this century and there's no doubt about this. And in comparison to the Cold War, I mean, there is a difference and the difference is that the competition between the United States and China is much more, is wider than the Cold War because it includes an economic and technological component which didn't exist during the Cold War. So, in a sense, the challenges of the Sino-American rivalry or competition are much wider. Now, it is not going to be like the Cold War. Why? Because at the same time in the international system, you have a second dynamic which is taking place and the second dynamic is created by the rise of a multipolar world. In other words, what characterizes the international system today make it quite complex and unstable is the articulation between this bipolar structure and a multipolar structure. So, we have a combination of both in the international system. So, when we start thinking about the international system, we have to keep in mind both dynamics. And the important question is to understand how international actors are reacting to those main dynamics. And in my view, this new organization of the international system is creating three kind of actors. The first are what I call the followers, the second are what I call the bystanders and the third are what I call the hedgers. And let me develop, if you allow me to do so, those three main actors. The followers are those who decided on purpose for national reasons to take side in the Sino-American competition. So, they think that they will increase the national leverage in being part of that competition. And what we saw is Australia is a perfect illustration of this in a sense that three years ago the Prime Minister of Australia said that Australia is not going to take side between the United States and China and now they decided to align on the United States which is a perfectly respectable choice made by the Australian. My point here is not to say if it's good or bad. I'm just trying to analyze the international systematic works. But the decision taken by the Australians has another implication. It means that China's influence is resented in the world, negatively, by an increasing number of countries. And not only in the West, that's what our Chinese friends think. But in many other parts of the world, the Chinese influence is resented. And I think that it's a mixed message which is sent by AUKUS and in my view the Chinese should take this into account. But obviously there is a source of polarization around this conflict. So on the other side, on the Chinese side you can for example argue that Pakistan has decided to side with China and the Pakistanis used to say that China is an all-weather ally. So you have countries who are going to take sides very clearly. You have a second category of countries who are bystanders. They are waiting, they are seeing. In many cases they don't feel for the moment concerned by the competition between the United States and China. And many countries in Africa, even in the Middle East or in Latin America are seeing the rise of this competition. But I mean, don't feel necessarily concerned. But so they are bystanding. They are now taking side. They have good relations with both sides and they think that they can increase their leverage and defend their national interests without taking side. And for the moment it's the majority of the countries. You have a third category which is in my view extremely important which is what I call the hedgers. So the hedgers, coming from the verb to hedge, concerns large countries, significant countries who want to increase their leverage in the international system, who understood that this competition is going to be crucial and want to play on this competition to increase their leverage. And I'll give you three examples who are totally different. You have the case of Russia, you have the case of Turkey and you have the curse of India. If you take the case of Russia, Russia obviously understood that it's not going to become once again the big power, but they want to increase considerably their leverage in the international system against the West, against Europe, against the United States and in building an informal alliance with the Chinese, not a formal alliance, it's an informal alliance to increase their leverage. So they think that this competition between the United States and China is going to benefit Russia in a way or another. And there are plenty of examples in this regard. They are not going to become the followers of the United States. That's not in the Indian parameters. But they are certainly going within the Quad, for example, increase the strategic cooperation with the United States. Of course, they are not going to become the followers of the United States. They are not going to become the followers of the United States. They are not going to become the followers of the United States. Of course, to balance China, which is their main rival in the international system. And the third case, which is also very different from the two others, is the case of Turkey. Of course, Turkey is not concerned by the Sino-American rift as such. But Turkey understood that there is a slightly weakening of the position of the United States in the world. And they want to take advantage of this to increase the leverage vis-à-vis the United States in, for example, having a purely, let's say, I mean, interested relationship with Russia. And Russia, of course, understood that they can or they have to accept many things from the Turks if they want to have the Turks more independent from the United States. Now, in all this where Europe stands, Europe has two liabilities in this. First, because Europe is not a state. It's not a state. And second, Europe was not historically constructed to deal with power politics. So we have structurally to face those two main constraints. Not being a state, so we have to define common interests. And second, I mean, the driving force behind the European Union was not power politics. I mean, I used to say that Europe was historically built against power politics. So it's a sea change. But we cannot afford staying like a soft power because all instrument of soft power are becoming now instrument of hard powers. So, if we and I will finish with this we have those three main actors the United States, Russia and China among others, of course. It's heavy, the United States. I mean, nobody seriously in Europe discuss the fact that NATO is the backbone of our security. So there's no serious debate about this. The debate is whether NATO is the exclusive instrument for our security. That's the first question. It's a professional question concerning the nature of the relationship within NATO. And obviously on those two questions there are debates but I think that there is an unsatisfaction on both on those two points. There are areas in which obviously Europeans have interests but within which NATO is not going to be involved and you mentioned Sahel it's a good illustration of this so we need to have a common position we need to have a common European involvement in this part of the world because NATO is not going to be the answer to all our security problems. And I think that the Americans are understanding this quite seriously and that was mentioned in the communique between Biden and Macron. And second, there is a kind of unsatisfaction on the nature of the dialogue between the United States and Europe within NATO so obviously this view is not shared by all member states in Europe but the point then I think that the HRVP will develop it later on in his dialogue with Thierry. The point is that first of all you have NATO members who are not part of the European Union and this is a problem and this is a problem because when we talk about constructing a European pillar in Europe within NATO we have non EU countries who are part of the debate in NATO so by construction NATO cannot be the exclusive place where our strategic dialogue with the United States should take place and actually the United States have accepted that following the visit of President Biden in Brussels the United States have accepted the idea of a strategic dialogue between the EU and the United States but it's not in opposition to NATO it's just if we want to have a European pillar within NATO we need to construct this European pillar and in order to construct this European pillar we need to have a concentration at dialogue among Europeans so there is no contradiction accepted if we consider that the status quo is quite perfect now two words thank you very much this still raises the question whether with regard to the Indo-Pacific Europe to use your express will be a teaching or a following partner and we turn now to Ana Palacio former Foreign Minister of Spain will help us to define Europe's position thank you Carl I would like you to forget my name and you will be more flexible on time but now seriously thank you Thierry and thank you to the organization for this entry but now it is more important that he has entered post-COVID well I will switch into English now I will elaborate on what what Mr. Likey has said and I would say that speaking late it's just like it's difficult because you would like to respond or to back certain many of what has been said so I will try to take another position we always face these two poles power and rules and we have heard this morning several times that what these as take is a rules based order this liberal international order and it is and it has been mentioned by different speakers I mean it's not adapted to this reality this post-World War II order is not adapted to the new reality of shifts in powers of private actors or plethora of actors and these change in instruments law is not what it used to be it's not just treaties but what is today very striking is how it is contested but I will just mention the UNGA the 76th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly it came from different geographies with different voices so I will elaborate on this and I will take again a kind of taxonomy in the end and French biculture so I would not in three but in five we have here the actors and this is just the complementarity with your actors the rules-based order we have the Europeans the Europeans are no doubt the standard bearers the standard bearers of the rules-based order with internal problems I mean it has been mentioned by Bogdan externally but also internally we have to agree on what is the interpretation of Article II or to agree that the interpretation of Article II of our treaty is for the court and we could go there I leave it we have the ambivalent which is the United States ambivalent historically the United States created this order but has always been ambivalent about participating the United States just signs but not ratifies and we have seen this from the inception of the of the 20s before even before the San Francisco Charter and even then we have then the smooth operator and this is China and if I would mention this quickly and this gives you an answer to this issue of Cold War for me the most expected intervention which was the intervention of President Biden was loaded by the insecurity of this nation that is broken of this country that needs healing of this society that is polarized in 89 they ask Europeans to be whole and free we ask them to be healed because unless we have that it will be extremely extremely difficult but the President Biden said we don't want a Cold War nor insisted on that I don't I cannot just quote but I'm paraphrasing why this excuse we don't want we are not pursuing a Cold War why this excuse we don't want to look at and China is the smooth operator of these rules based order the smooth operator in bringing certain concepts that are completely alien like the harmony concept and taking advantage of this weakness of the United States and then I would say that there is the world and again in Unga in the General Assembly to listen to other actors I will mention Iran Iran open with an aggressiveness you have mentioned about this aggressiveness about China Iran was brutal starting there are two events that have marked this year the the attack by the people against the Congress in United States and then people dropping from planes Afghanistan Afghan people dropping from planes Afghanistan was brutal but to me the most the most salient in this in this complex just this complex was Lavrov Lavrov made in cause general a general indictment against the rules based order it's a speech that is worth being from first to last word because it's extremely well done and as I say it takes this position that makes Russia disruptive but the disruptive strategies so we have the standard bear we have the ambivalent we have the smooth operator and Russia has a clear strategy and it is a disruptive strategy nevertheless I the quotes we should quote all this speech with references to Crimea with reference to the United Nations last but not least and this is hope it's the intervention by India I could mention other intervention by Africans that were extremely interesting but as I don't have time India India Prime Minister Modi does something which is extremely interesting he dissociates democracy from the heritage of colonialism he said at the beginning of the speech I'm speaking on behalf of the mother of democracy because democracy is a tradition in India for 2000 years and then he says it's our 70s we just celebrated our 70s anniversary of independence so with all that what do I mean and I conclude here we Europeans we have a role to play to play by convincing United States that it is in their interest to update to keep what is important and there are many important things about the international rules based order but to adapt it and in this adaptation we have to give voice to other visions of what democracy means when you listen to Prime Minister Modi you say what democracy is speaking about, why he explains it we need to be open to other cultures other formulations that do not weaken the basic pillars but adapt this rules based order to the world of today Thank you Anna Finally we turn to Igor Jürgens I see we have Wang Yixi on Zoom that's wonderful so before we turn to Igor I think I would like to turn to Wang Yixi can you hear me Yes I can hear you Wonderful who joins us now from Beijing he heads the Institute of International Strategic Studies I trust you have listened to us to our debate so far and you may want to comment on some of the points that were made with regards to the conflict between China and the United States and its allies so the floor is yours I'm honored to make a presentation to WPC Today October 1 is the national day of the People's Republic of China everybody is on holiday today and I saw I'm speaking from a humble house prior to this date three international events have boosted China's national pride and stimulated Chinese nationalistic feelings the first event was the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in August the second was the quarrel between the US Australia and the UK on one side France and the EU on the other side over Orcas a trilateral security pact between Australia and the United Kingdom and the US announced on September 15th for the Indo-Pacific region under the pact the US and the UK will help Australia to acquire nuclear powered submarines the pact is largely seen as directed at China the Morrison government of Australia announced it was canceling its 90 billion US dollar submarine contract with the French on September 17th France recorded ambassadors from Australia and the US four days later EU officials were demanding answers and apology from Australia the Chinese of course take pressure from these tensions among westerners although China would not gain anything substantive from their discord the third event was the release of Ms. Moon Wan Zhou the CEO of Huawei who had been detained in Canada for three years due to internal charges related to secret deals with Iran Chinese officials and citizens alike celebrated Ms. Moon's return home as a significant victory and the sign of China's medical power and diplomatic clout without mentioning ever knowing any compromise on the Chinese side I will make a few comments only on China's reaction to the changes in Afghanistan for good reason Beijing has gloated over US pullout from Afghanistan after a costly 20 year intervention in this country China's diplomats remarked that America's myth is down and more and more people are awakening when it is seen as a failure of western type democracy in a full country in the Chinese eyes the loss of US influences in Afghanistan is a reflection of what China calls the east rising west declining tight in global politics in general and the waning of US power in the greater Middle East in particular China's comparative advantage in Pakistan and the Middle East are two-fold first is economic and technological capacities China borders Afghanistan in this seeking ways to engage with the Taliban regime when the west is reluctant to do so China will provide food whether supplies vaccines and medicine to Taliban controlled Afghanistan worth almost 31 million US dollars China will also be capable of improving Afghanistan's telecommunication networks in the Taliban controlled area if needed as it has done in the Gulf region such actions could strengthen China's hand at the expense of US influences now that China's US strategic competition intensifies it is increasingly observed that China's gain is the west's loss another Chinese advantage is its diplomatic standing that does not offend any governments and groups in the Middle East and Central Asia but India seems to be a loser after the Taliban's occupation of the country backed by Pakistan as a strong informal ally of Pakistan China could use its leverage to gain better connections with the Taliban China has already coordinated diplomatic activities with Russia, Central Asian states Pakistan, Qatar Turkey and Iran on Afghan affairs at the same time China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi also talked to US Secretary of State Tony Blake Blinken and NATO's Chief concerning the Afghan situation China urged an end to sanctions on Afghanistan and said Taliban should be given access to foreign reserves to ease financial crisis underscoring its policy differences with the west in return the Taliban called China a good friend and pledged to never allow any forces to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China however China also has its weaknesses in the region for one thing, apart from Pakistan China has few allies and these social and humanitarian connections with regional states are limited its connections are basically with government officials compared to western players China is a late comment in talking to local interlocutors China also lacks force for means to take actions enterprises, businesses and citizens when they are at stake there were increased incidents in the China Pakistan economic corridor or CPEC that threatened Chinese workers even if the Afghan Taliban could be a bit more friendly to China the Chinese should be concerned about other radical groups such as ISK and Al Qaeda in earth an uncertain number of Xinjiang Uighurs insurgents or refugees have fled to Afghanistan, Pakistan and some other Islamic countries China has asked for their return but so far has had only limited success this sense of insecurity and uncertainty explains why China is showing caution in moving into Afghanistan for economic benefits China does not seem to be ready for granting the Taliban government diplomatic recognition given international pressures and the lack of transparency and inclusiveness of the new Kabul government in this sense China is faced with opportunities and challenges alike what is more less U.S presence in the Middle East may mean more U.S presence in the Asia Pacific region that China does not want to see thank you thank you very much Yixi for your remarks we come back to them in our discussion and finally I want to turn to Ego Juergens who is the president of the Russian Union of industrialists and entrepreneurs we've talked a lot about Russia Ego you may want to comment how you see the long-term future of Russia's relations particularly with the West which at the moment are politically very bad although interestingly trade is going up all right Ego thank you very much Carl and special thanks to Teri Demombrial of course for this fantastic opportunity to talk I'm sorry that I couldn't get all of the speech of our Chinese colleague because I will start with your idea of followers and hedgers we are at the same time followers and hedgers and believe me inside Russia there are followers who would definitely would like to go along the centrally planning economic and politically robust anti-western policies and there are hedgers who want to use this to restore the relationship with the West in 2003 Mr. Putin signed strategic partnership and cooperation agreement with European Union we started building common economic space common security space common everything so now we arrive to the situation of strategic confrontation and vice versa with the Chinese people Republic we were at war in the Monsky Island 50 years ago and now we are in strategic partnership embracing each other this partnership is not harmonious many in Russia think that economic cooperation is lopsided one sided and investment is not coming but militarily and politically at this particular period we don't have any other place to go and this is a marriage of convenience which will go on for some time no question about that but the coupling of the United States and China which is taking place now is very hard test for us too it will bring more volatility on the financial markets on economic markets on the supply chain it will bring more tension to the international system and to Russia also and from the point of view of making an estimate whether it's a cold war or not yet a cold war but something else I would say it's very close to the cold war with this broadening of extent of the cold war because it only two years ago from the same rostrums and from the same panels as today I was hearing that there is no ideological component of the cold war now because we are all in the free markets and everything else judging by the statements from the President Xi Jinping and what is being in the make for the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China for the next year it is now ideological too the same way it was between the Soviet Union and the United States so from this point of view I would say that hedgers in Russia would be very cautious in taking sides if the coupling takes a resolute final countdown because I cannot imagine what will happen on the Russian stock exchange there is a conflict around Taiwan and this conflict isn't the making if I hear alright then the example of Hong Kong can show what might happen in the Chinese world including Taiwan if this decoupling goes all the way down and which brings me to AUKUS AUKUS is the creation of the new block for Russia it's very dangerous because it is an opponent bordering on being an enemy but it's an understandable enemy it's an enemy with whom we have relations for all those 50 years it's an enemy or opponent with whom we have diplomatic relations we have Russian NATO Council it's idle at the moment but we have this instrument what will happen with AUKUS or something else which would be created instead of unified NATO is a big question mark if tomorrow for example our Polish friends and Baltic states would decide to create the same kind of AUKUS on the borders of Russia because of the Ukrainian situation or something else then it's a real danger so this is the second danger China-Russia China-United States decoupling then comes Afghanistan which was mentioned here too Afghanistan I'm not talking and not commenting on how Biden decided to execute logistically this thing but it's a smart move if you talk about Russian-American confrontation because you give all this Islamic problems to Russian border and you give it partly of course to China and Pakistan but that's beside the point the most serious thing is happening on the Tajik-Uzbek Turkmenian border where we have our troops and our military installations so from this point of view I think that we are heading into a very serious confrontation before the things will get better because when the United States said that semiconductors will not be given to China at all finished we are building that in Wyoming and other states when the United States said that we are blacklisting Chinese PLC's publicly owned companies blacklisting them on the one hand and then Chinese replied that no more information will be transferred from abroad without our full control which is the blockade or informational blockade and everything else so it's the beginning of something which we don't know the end of and Taiwan would be probably one of the testing grounds but it's a very serious showdown at the moment Russia will be with China at least verbally but we'll be hedging its risk no question about that so just to end I would say yes sustainable development concept if they take it seriously in Glasgow next month and if we really have an architecture for this sustainable development, decarbonization green economy and all of that stuff that gives us the platform for the green diplomacy no question about that but before we get that here I'm with Greta Turnberg it's 30 years lifespan all of the tycoons in oil and gas say okay 2050 but we will do our profit at the moment and before we agree on all those transitory taxation of carbon and everything else we'll blackmail Europe by coal by gas by oil because you need that you see what's happening with the gas price in Europe so this is before we get better we will get worse and unfortunately the blame should be put on both sides and I would then die by saying that my colleague on the right remembers perfectly well when in Brussels we signed cooperation partnership and we thought that we are in the same family and where we are now we see, thank you thank you very much Iro we have about a quarter of an hour so we have time for some please short questions from the audience and short answers so let's start and I don't see who would like to start from the audience my name is Eti Samil Ketby I am the head of MRS Policy Center in Abu Dhabi this competition between China and United States has been discussed in Burslav Global Sec security conference and there were two European the Eastern European and the Western European the debate was that well when it comes to money United States does not give money does not give any importance for Eastern Europe and if they ask to see the president they've never been give the chance while China comes with the money and whatever they will ask they will be given same in the Gulf now we have the same dilemma United States wants also nowadays of course with the new alignment that we give everything by United States are not going to give anything and they're asking us to leave China now this is the dilemma while you have your economy the Chinese are able to help but the American are not willing to help in terms of economy even with the protection literally protection the American are moving away from the region so that's the question now if we are the Western European the Gulf is to choose between these two this is also the question to be debated thank you Eastern Europe was addressed so Bogdan and America was addressed for you Bogdan you start thank you very much for this question because it is important to underline this between the approach of the United States and European Union towards China we say in Europe that China is a challenge when Russia is a threat and there is a difference with for example this opinion that was introduced into the national security strategy of the United States from 2018 and the specific the specific challenge the countries of Central Europe this is the format 16 plus 1 now 15 plus 1 after the decision of Lithuania government to withdraw from this format 16 plus 1 that country and after you know the confrontation with China that was against the involvement of Taiwan in the relationship with Lithuania majority of countries from Central Europe decided to weaken the relations with China not to go as far as president Prime Minister Viktor Orbán from Hungary did involving its country and its economy in the full cooperation with China with the presence of banks and Chinese capital instead of many other European partners so within the European Union we try to have the common approach to China although I tried to describe you know those two let's say different positions one of Lithuania's government and the other of Hungarian government as well okay thank you before being leading a sink tank in Washington and participating in another one I was for many years as some of you know a banker and I work for Citibank and between 2010 and 2014 I was based in New York and I was covering the emerging markets and talking to companies and seeing how we can help in providing banking services around the world and I visited many countries like Pakistan, Algeria Central America and everywhere surprisingly Chinese construction companies were often the clients of Citibank where were they the clients of Citibank for a very good reason they didn't want to deal with the local banks often were not well organized corrupted they didn't want to work with the Europeans often because they were representing the old colonial powers and they were willing to deal with us because we were the alternative not the alternative of choice but the alternative of choice or non-choice of the other one having said that I remember very well some conversations and the conversation was as such how's the business and the people were saying well Chinese companies come they are very aggressive on the commercial side they offer us some very attractive terms so we give them the contract and then the problem starts the problem is delays the problem is cost overrun and the problem is the fact that they don't create jobs because they bring their workers and once the contract is over they take back to workers and at the end of the day you end up in a situation where you didn't get what you wanted you paid too much for it you get into some debt look at what happened in Malaysia it's a very good example Malaysia was part of this bridge and road project for China and ultimately they pulled back and that happened with other countries just one sentence Anna and then Saki I think that with Europeans and in this case you from the Gulf we cannot be so self-flagellating yes it is true that in our cooperation there are strings attached in our side always human rights and so but what we have to remind our partners in Africa all over the world is that China has strings attached not just bringing workers is that normally there is a barter change I build this stadium and you give me the product of this mine and this is what is behind we are seeing how in Sri Lanka in other places we have taken hold of just ports big infrastructures in exchange for loans so again we have a lot of issues but with China we have to be very clear as well that it's not just giving money no strings attached they don't give money and there are strings that in the end are even even more difficult to face the ones that we from the start put on the day thank you Anna I may ask Wang Yixi in a moment but Saka you have the next from a European perspective the way we deal with China is in my view quite smart in a sense that we have in our strategy defined our position vis-à-vis China as a partner a competitor and a strategic rival and nobody mentioned the fact that's exactly at least officially the position which had been adopted by the new American administration it's exactly the same wording I'm not saying that the policy conducted is not in this line necessarily but the way we behave vis-à-vis China is hedging in a smart way there are areas in which we have to cooperate with China it's indispensable and very important for the international order climate change is a very important issue even the GCPOA is an important issue and the Chinese are playing a positive role in this in this area now we have divergences and from the discussion we had with the Chinese counterpart they said we are partners but we are not rivals so please drop the idea of rivals no there is a rivalry with China because in terms of value there are strong differences and even in terms of interest there are strong differences and my personal view is concerning the 60 plus 1 personally I would prefer to have all members of the European Union being within the European Union when they talk to China there is no need to have a specific subsystem of relation between Europe and China thank you very much Yixi would you like to comment on China's policy vis-à-vis the European Union and the US in this context yes I think the Chinese approach to Europe is different from its approach in China's eyes the United States is a major problem and you would be less of a problem but they are going to each other in denouncing China's twice and some European powers even join the United States in doing some military effects in South China Sea and as we see European countries are closer to Taiwan than before and these actions are eliminated Europe from China but my point is not as angry to Europeans as to the history of the Americans it's actually the strategy to put it in place to drive the wish between the Union and the United States but whether they do so or not I'm not too sure on the one hand China's actions are not so much conservative or aggressive especially it's very much a personal aggressive those better weeks are catering for China's domestic audiences but it's difficult to distinguish between China's domestic purposes and international propaganda so this is a problem unfortunately time is up and the chairman reminds me that we should stick to the time because there are more events to follow so first of all I would like to thank the panel for their contributions and I would like to conclude with a word of caution on what we have said despite your relevant point that there's a great deal of continuity between the present administration and the previous one the point has been made very well indeed by Richard Haas in this very readable piece however the uncertainty of American domestic politics is a fact and we do not know we do not know what America will look like in 22 and in 24 and there may be a return of what we had before and what consequences that will have for the transatlantic relationship for multilateralism for relations with China I'm sorry to say is at this point unpredictable so there is this point and it was made in an earlier discussion by Pierre Chacet there is always something unforeseen around in international politics and it may happen again but in any case at this stage I think we can say that a new geopolitical structure is emerging the Europeans are challenged to play a role in affecting this structure and it poses enormous pressure on the Europeans themselves to get their house in order and with that I would like to thank the panel and close the session thank you