 I think people will be trickling in in the course of the morning making their way through the snow Good morning, everyone. I'm Jennifer Cook. I'm director of the Africa program here at CSIS I want to welcome you to today's conference on Islam in Africa Emerging trends and dynamics We are delighted to host this conference with George Mason University's Ali Viral Aks Center for Global Islamic Studies, and we're very grateful to its director Peter Manderville for Partnering with us on this effort. I also want to thank Farhad to hear of the CSIS Africa program for all her hard work in getting this conference organized Sorry about the the the weather out there. Thanks to all of you for trudging through the March snow And I want to thank our really impressive roster of speakers today for agreeing to come and share their insights and perspectives Uh today our focus on is is on Islam in Africa Obviously, this is a big ambitious topic. It doesn't lend itself easily to generalizations And I think we've tried to balance Comment on some of the big shifts and trends within Islam in Africa Um, with with specific examples and context to underscore the diversity of of muslim experience on the continent Our first panel is going to be looking It will give an overview of some of the changing landscape of Islam in Africa looking at some of the broad trends and influences That are shaping muslim communities and public opinion in Africa today Our second panel is going to look at some of the examples of how community muslim communities are organizing themselves and engaging in political life service delivery community And then our final panel is going to examine an issue that that often dominates washington policy discussions on islam in africa Uh, the apparent upsurge in extremist groups willing to use violence in the name of religion Looking at instances in the sahel in nigeria and in the horn of africa For the csis africa program today's conference stems out of a of a project that's been supported by the henry arloos foundation This is a two-year effort That's looking at the intersection of two important trends First new influences and dynamics within the continent's two main religions dominant religions christianity and islam and the second uh, the expansion of democratization and political space within africa So looking at how these two phenomenon intersect how they play out In individual countries that have different historical social and political experiences And our premise was that while a lot of attention is being paid to The role of ethnicity and ethnic identity In democratic discourse and constituency mobilization And national cohesion much less attention has been played Paid to the role of religion and religious actors in those domains. So This loose foundation grant has allowed us to look more systematically at the issue Through six country case studies And our aim is to provide I think a somewhat more nuanced understanding of the status and drivers An impact of religious players in the political space In the course of this work We've encountered a really wonderful community of scholars who we hadn't been that familiar with coming from a More strictly kind of political Angle Who've been looking at the changing dynamics and trend lines within christianity and islam For far longer than we have and and peter manderville is one of these scholars who we met Peter directs the olive world acc center as I said For global islamic studies The center's mission is to advance knowledge and understanding of islam Uh as a world religion It's founded in 2009 and it supports research and interdisciplinary academic programs Trying to kind of foster a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics that shape muslim communities Peter has worked in state department policy planning during um during the arab spring As He was founding director of gmu's center for global studies He's most recently the author of global political islam and has other books including transnational muslim politics Reimagining the umma and co-editor of a lot a number of volumes of essays on on on these on this various topics So peter is going to lead our first panel Peter, thanks very much again for co-hosting this this with us and and thank you all for joining us I turned it over to you you can Good morning everyone Thank you all for for coming out on a on a less than ideal day in terms of Just the practicalities of getting around the dc area. I I wanted to start by by also thanking Jennifer and farha and richard at csis for the great opportunity to partner with them on What i'm sure we'll all agree is an incredibly timely set of issues to be Discussing This this opening panel this morning is focused on Primarily trying to frame The very complex set of issues we have before us to identify some of the key trends that have been present and important Within islam and africa muslim communities In the in the region as well as to identify some of the key questions that we'll be trying to get at Over the course of our discussions during the rest of the day Um, we we have two very esteemed panelists This morning, uh, jim bell who's the director of international survey research, uh at the pew research center who'll be talking Uh a little bit about some of the data and quite unique data that pew has collected in the public opinion realm around muslim communities in africa and some of the dynamics between islam and christianity Uh in that region prior to coming to pew jim, uh ran the state department's polling operation and so has a sort of Deep and long held feel for Exactly these sorts of issues. Um, his his full bio is available in the packet that you have Also, uh speaking on this panel, uh, is my colleague from george mason university, uh, terrence lions Who's the co-director of the center for global studies at mason? And a professor at mason's quite a unique and well known school for conflict analysis and resolution He is himself an expert, uh on east africa particularly democracy and conflict dynamics In ethiopia and the surrounding region and he'll be helping to frame some of the broad issues At the interaction intersection of kind of politics and society around these issues in in addition to moderating this first panel I'm going to take a few minutes right up front just to kind of broadly frame I think some of the core issues around islam and africa And those of you who have the stamina to see us through to the bitter end Will hear from me again at the very end When i'll be trying to frame some of the policy takeaways Uh, uh that that come from the whole set of discussions that we have to today So I think the kind of first question to engage is kind of why this conference now um, those of you who follow africa Will not have failed to notice that there's been a certain pallor that has hung over the question of islam in africa Over the course of the last couple of years We think of events that we've all been following closely surrounding al-shabab in somalia to Boko haram to nigeria to The more recent events in mali and the sahel The question of islam in africa has tended to be associated with a set of issues related to national security concerns And the apparent upsurge in instances of islamic extremism and indeed this will this is a set of questions that will be engaging In our third panel to today, although i think even there you'll be getting a set of perspectives around those issues that you don't ordinarily hear Our our conviction was that there's a much broader story to be told about islam in in africa however And indeed that to help to contextualize some of these recent events in the broader landscape will actually assist us in Achieving a more nuanced take on on some of the national security issues that tend to dominate Our discussion of these Topics, so there's a set of there's a set of questions. We want to ask about Islam in politics in the region more broadly and this has to do with Any number of issues ranging from the question of the extent to which For example Sufi mystical brotherhoods that have been present in the region for Centuries, how do they interface with broader questions of party politics and political economy? You know when you turn to a country such as Senegal for example, you see very quickly that the Tijania and other Sufi groups You know are closely related to a much broader set of dynamics That are the sort of core of mainstream politics in that country You know not to mention being dominant in certain sectors of the economy Such as the peanut industry There's also an interesting pattern to be noticed in sub-saharan africa at the interface of islaman politics When you compare the region with other parts of the world in the arab world certainly in both south asia and southeast asia There is a fairly clear pattern of the presence of islamist Parties of the broadly muslim brotherhood type mold that are present and operating right across the world. However political islam of that sort Largely seemed to be absent in sub-saharan africa an interesting set of questions to be Engaged there and I think some of our panelists later will have the opportunity to take up that that question But of course, we're not just talking about the role of islam in formal politics But the fact that when we look at a range of issues across The interface of religion and broader questions of of development human development in in society everything from conflict dynamics Issues related to economic development and public health. We find religious actors Including muslim groups playing a role and in our second panel in particular this morning. We'll have a number of speakers who will be able to address that issue very directly, so we see everything from certain muslim groups involved in interfaith work that have had important impacts on conflict resolution in a number of sub regions To for example the development of an islamic take on the Liberation theology movement Coming out of south africa and we're very happy that one of the leading exponents of that approach Professor farid isak will be joining us for this second panel this morning and and then finally there is of course this question of security the apparent upsurge in islamic extremism and again there that tends to be told Today as a story of ultra-conservative largely taliban style groups seeming to crop up in a number of regions and a lot of this is linked to issues of kind of transnational ties that allow Connected groups and networks to gain a foothold in certain sub regions or for example the ability of ultra-conservative Interpretations of islam coming out of Saudi Arabia and funded out of Saudi Arabia To gain a foothold and there is certainly is a story to be told there But I think another dimension of this and one that doesn't necessarily Get get the full hearing that that it needs is the fact that many of the events in The horn of Africa west Africa this hell that we've focused on in Recent months happen on top of and linked in important ways to long running ethno tribal conflicts Dynamics associated with with instances of nation building and state construction that that Have had their own challenges over recent years And so this isn't necessarily simply a case of islamic extremism Suddenly appearing And growing rather rapidly but more a case of and a set of questions that we need to engage Um in terms of how it is that long running Deep-seated conflicts that have been present in some cases for decades Interface with new sorts of religious influences and dynamics There are also I think a set of cross cutting issues That run across this basket of sort of three Politics engagement and security type issues that I just wanted to take one further minute to frame before turning over to our other panelists One of them relates to This question of transnational Islam And the I think much discussed but frequently Misunderstood phenomenon of Salafism, which is often used in a rather generic way simply to refer to ultra-conservative Interpretations of Islam, particularly those emanating out of Saudi Arabia The the upsurge in in Salafism that we see in the world today is not a phenomenon by any means confined to Africa Genuinely is something that you see all all around the world And something that I think can actually be the the sociology that drives it. I think is something that can be understood by looking at How the experience of globalization plays out in a number of subregions the way that that a sense of Intense global interconnectedness particularly at the cultural level creates a sense of on the one hand Siege culturally as external influences appear to come in and challenge deeply entrenched local cultures at the same time as in in Muslim communities the ability of of people to sort of engage with and Uh Connect to Multiple interpretations and understandings of Islam through the internet through new media Sets up a sort of new politics of authenticity within Islam itself a sort of challenge For various groups to be able to represent themselves as the most authentic interpretation of Islam out there And this is certainly a dynamic. That's at work. Uh in in sub-saharan Africa. It's not simply A phenomenon of large amounts of Saudi funding Flooding in and indeed we all also hear quite a lot about The the rise the rising influence and prominence of evangelical Christianity In Africa and I think it's important to kind of track these two dynamics So simultaneously, um, I think when when you look at them comparatively You'll see that some of the dynamics associated with the upsurge in evangelical Christianity Are actually some of the same forces that are driving the upsurge in the socialism. So I think these two phenomena need to be studied Simultaneously And finally, um, I I do think it's important to note The fact that debates about Islam what Islam means what Islam is in Africa today occur within a rapidly involving information and Media ecology where particularly young people today Through cell phones through the internet through satellite television have an unprecedented level of access to new religious entrepreneurs who are packaging Islamic Messages designed to be consumed In in a sort of deeply networked and transnational world and that is having I think fairly tectonic effects in restructuring local Forms of religious authority And that's I think part of the turmoil here is that we're living in an environment today where in some cases Sisi situations in which local religious authorities be they imams and villages Sophie brotherhoods that have been placed for years and years and decades and sisi centuries Suddenly find their own monopoly over the religious sphere challenged by all number of newcomers that are able to Vive for a share of the Religious marketplace and this is a crucially important dynamic to Understand and the final point that I wanted to leave you with before handing over to Terrence Lyons is to register something of a health warning Upfront as we kind of enter into our discussions for the day and that's the And that and that kind of is is the idea that when we focus on islam in africa We are led to engage a particular population particular communities through the lens of Religion to assume that someone's religious identity is somehow their defining feature Or the aspect of their inevitably multifaceted persona That helps us best understand their Motivations and behavior I think it's fair to say that in the post 9 11 environment more broadly the way that the discourse on islam and muslims or muslimness Has evolved has tended to mean That we at times extract individuals who are you know Also citizens of particular nations members of local particular Ethnic communities and sort of paint them more broadly as muslims And sometimes it's useful to do so to understand some things that are afoot But sometimes it also gets in the way to assume that someone's religious identity or muslimness is the best way to to Get a handle on how they see the world and how they engage the world So even though we're talking about islam and africa and muslims in africa I think it's important to begin our discussions today by asking when is that label? When is that frame useful and when does it actually get in the way and without further ado? Let me now hand over to my colleague terrence lions. Thanks Thank you very much, peter and thank you to Two of my favorite washington organizations george mason and csis of which i've both been very happy to be associated with I'm I'm a bit at of In some ways a disadvantage being at this conference because i don't really study islam and africa But i think that's why i was asked to speak i do study african politics and conflict in africa and so i'm continually Encountering groups that are either labeled as islamic or who self identify as islamic or who are networking with Other muslim groups and so as i try to understand african politics i have a particular way of of A particular set of questions perhaps that i ask of these groups and i hope they are of some use as we as we work through Work through the day The first the first point i want to make has to do with regionalism versus globalism When i was a graduate student during the cold war we we africanists were always bemoaning the fact that the cold war framework of That was overlaid onto conflicts like the ethiopia somali conflict Let us say or any number of other conflicts with the reagan doctrine if some of you are Senior enough experienced enough maybe to remember that You know and and so to get Attention all you if you screamed you know there's cuban in those hills This cubans then you would get attention because there was a globalist framework that was being imposed on Were superimposed on let me put it that way on engola And and and other places similarly during the 1990s when the global narrative the global language was about the coming Anarchy and the threats of hyper nationalism Ultranationalism largely coming out of the Balkans concerns arising out of the Balkans But certainly being appropriately used to explain a conflicts and genocide in rwanda for example Oh, it's who to extremists. That's the thing that you need to worry about it You know hyper nationalists are the problem and in this post 9 11 world You know increasingly It becomes The idea that there's extremism that what you need to worry about is the radicalization of islam You know there's Wahhabis in the in the desert and that's what you need to worry about And and so I I start with that not to say that these trends aren't important and not certainly not to say that these To dismiss it as that's the only thing that you need to know But there there are these larger global questions dynamics language that then People like I who cover Try to understand Africa Offensive superimposed upon very local very parochial very deeply historical conflicts One other point it's a reaction to Peter's starting point In fact, I just referred to it with 9 11 when you're trying to understand the politics of islam in africa You go back To an earlier phase in particular in the horn of africa in sudan Where you try to understand nemeri and and why he wanted to impose sharia on a multi religious multicultural state as he did before he was Overthrown and how the national islamic front in sudan was trying to create some kind of larger islamic structure Only to become a fairly cynical corrupt governing party at the moment All right. I'm going to make two large points about about islam and africa relating to Religion as a powerful mechanism of mobilization On the one hand a series of ideas or questions about why religion is so powerful as Means to mobilize disenfranchised and marginalized populations and then second of all how The weakness of the state in africa and elsewhere in the world a kind of a larger theme Shapes how we should maybe think about religion In africa There's in africa I hate talking about africa because it's such a large complicated diverse area But for the purposes of of making these points I will there are certainly lots of grievances lots of poverty lots of marginalized people But less sustained mobilization than you might think would be justified by the levels of grievance And so to me the question then becomes why is it does it seem to be easier to mobilize marginalized people around religion Rather than around other forms of solidarity other ways of people Identify themselves other ways that people Relate to one another and it seems to me religion is particularly well-suited for a kind of a symbolic politics It's one point i'll make religion is an area where there is an institutional capacity that is often lacking elsewhere And religion gets linked to various particularly transnational resources and the ability to mobilize resources Religion you know This i don't know anything about this that you don't know But that it has a a kind of intrinsic Appeal to an emotionally laden symbols and narratives and stories about who we are and where we came from Often most importantly who we are and who they are you know it differentiates you To the others peter mentioned this idea of looking for authenticity religion provides a way to To create that or at least to express that this way religion Serves a purpose that in earlier days and in other places and simultaneously in africa is taken over by Is ethnicity and nationalism serve similar purposes? Who am i? You know, why am i why am i being treated this way? Why is the state marginalizing me? Can be understood through these these frameworks of meeting I think that maybe i will i will propose and allow those who know Islam better than i to to correct me that conservative islam or Salafi as Peter was describing it has a particularly attractive Mobilizing function You know because in parts of africa are in a kind of a post the nationalist age The nationalism of the 60 has not delivered what people wanted it to mean and so nationalism is not the rallying cry that it once was and so conservative islam is able to position itself as a Force a voice of resistance of anti-state. It's not the state Of of militancy and sort of categorical. There's yes and no there's right. There's wrong. There's You know that you don't have to live in a world of gray But it's new it's the newness it says as again peter was saying about some of these more traditional well-established Sufi brotherhoods some of the Salafi groups what one thing you know for sure is it's not your father's islam There's something new here and if if what you're as a as a Young man or woman you want to separate yourself from the earlier generation these ideas are very powerful in that way On Secondly under why religion is a particularly effective particularly uh Useful way to mobilize People has to do with the capacity In in much of africa There are very few alternatives to religion In terms of non-state capacity labor unions for example so important to mobilization and you know north america and europe are largely Some interesting exceptions zimbabwe and zambia and some others But a largely weak divided co-opted by the state civil society again weak co-opted by the state opposition parties very You know very weak, but the but religion does have a structure It does provide A modicum of space for people to mobilize for people to speak about things that are important to them in ways that Are not state sponsored Not only in terms of providing a an arena for speech, but often much more nuts and bolts capacity as well You know places to meet uh, oh networks of communication so that Religious figures and islam scholars Can communicate new and fresh ideas through their own their own Their own channels and in that way to give maybe a different set of ideas The mosque conserved the purpose of the catholic church in solidarity in communist Poland or the liberation theology of el Salvador the african-american church in the civil rights movement here Thirdly religion has a A claim or a particular Global position when it comes to resource mobilization Some of the story of islam in sudan again this earlier Story of the national islamic front is a story of islamic banking and how islamists by being able to Control islamic banking were able to control remittances from sudanese who are working in the gulf and so on that It's not the religious There's a there's a political economy story There's a banking story that explains why the national islamic front became so powerful In the sudan and these networks remain there's powerful Sources of of wealth in other parts of the world the gulf but not just the gulf in saudi arabia That are linked through some of these Al-Qaeda networks whether it's to al-qaeda and the islamic maghreb or shabaab or buqa haram We'll hear much more from people who understand these movements In a second and so that does provide some Increased Opportunities for islamist mobilization That matters but again this question of resources and political mobilization is not necessarily uniquely a religious story I have you know, you can tell I have written a similar story about the ethiopian diaspora and how that set of resources Shaped the opportunities for opposition parties within ethiopia You could tell a similar story of liberia or senegal or to leave africa about, you know Tomo politics or armenian politics that there's lots of transnational money flows that shape Homeland politics not just it's not just a In islamic story So I mean to me as a as a someone who studies politics in africa as I see Things as diverse as nonviolent opposition movements like ethiopian muslims that teri ostobal will talk about later Or violent extremist groups like the shabaab and samalia or corrupt ruling elites like the national ncp In sudan using islam my question is How why does religion serve as an effective means to mobilize people and resources to see this as a political story And in that way try to understand Islam in africa I'll just make my final i'm going to drop my final point Because I think it's the more obvious one and that is The rise of islam in africa may in fact be better understood as the collapse of the secular state in africa That as the secular state and nationalism and some of the Dashed hopes of some movements towards democracy and so on That as the state has lost its It's It's legitimacy that then there have been in opportunities for For islam so rather than thinking of african politics and conflict As islamic extremism to see it as the weakening continuing the continued weakening of the state in africa And I and I say particularly the secular state because the sources of legitimacy that have provided the the You know the rationale for the secular state whether it was nationalism whether it was democracy Whether it was the ability to deliver the goods to you know the developmental state For example, that is a source of legitimacy in ethiopia and so on in a number of places in africa those have Come under great pressure. And so islam rises in the absence of A political alternative. Thank you Thanks. Terence that that that was great. Let me turn over to to jim bell now Thank you. Thank you, peter And I want to say thanks to peter jennifer richard and far out from by to meet you here today and i'm losing my voice That's perfect Hopefully get it back So i'm here representing the pew research center the pew research center has within it multiple projects And one of those is the pew forum on religion and public life And the pew forum is very fortunate to have generous funding from the pew charitable trust and the john temple and foundation To look precisely at the issue of religion and ask people around the world About their religious identity their beliefs their practices and how their identity An affiliation with a particular religion shapes their views on social and political issues In terms of our international work at the pew research center One of our first major surveys was an examination of what it means to be a muslim in sub-saharan africa And that opened a window for us as researchers that i'm i'm hopeful that this group here today and others will appreciate To understand a bit more about what it means to be a muslim in this part of the world That survey um was conducted in 2008 and 2009 and first results were reported in 2010 And then subsequent to that because we were inspired by that endeavor and thought we needed to do more Work in this regard we expanded our coverage in terms of the surveys we did To look at what it means to be a muslim in other parts of the world So eventually um by the end of 2012 we had surveyed in 39 countries around the world in 80 languages with 38 000 interviews With self-identified muslims asking them what it means to be a muslim How they what they believe how they practice their faith? And how this shapes their views about again political and social issues today I will focus on sub-saharan africa, but I will try to place our findings About islam and what it means to be a muslim in this part of the world in both a regional and global context And I'll just make a note that I will not go as far to make some of the bold Analysis that some of the other panelists will we are strictly at the Pew Research Center about presenting this kind of survey research in a very objective Nonpartisan way, but I'm always happy to ask answer any questions I can about our findings of what we think they mean But I will not going to tell you what they mean to you. You're going to have to figure that out A couple things that uh, Peter and Terrence mentioned definitely resonate Obviously with the theme of the conference today. It's islam in in africa. So we're going to talk about islam. We're going to talk about politics Peter mentioned authenticity Terrence mentioned identity and definitely focused on the political economy associated with identity What I'll present today is very much focused on the identity aspect of what we're talking about today Again, what does it mean to be a muslim? So I'll talk a bit about the importance or the role that religion plays in the life of muslims in sub-saharan africa As they tell us themselves And then I'll talk a little bit about how muslims then view some other aspects of life including attitudes towards democracy Attitudes towards christians in particular and also a little bit about Kind of the future as they would see it in terms of interfaith relations in particular So I like to start by talking about the role that religion plays in the lives of muslims Now this survey was done in uh, 16 countries in sub-saharan africa So we include a broad range of countries in terms of the percentage of muslims in these countries It varies from majority to Very evenly divided between christians and muslims to muslims being minority Different colonial backgrounds and people in this room are much more expert on these countries than I I'm going to paint a broad picture of the region. But if you have questions again, please ask later So in terms of the role that religion plays in the lives of muslims We find that religion plays a very important and central role in the lives of most muslims in this part of the world In fact compared to muslims in other regions of the globe Um muslims in sub-saharan africa are as devout if not more devout than muslims in other parts of the globe And if I can click You can see on this slide Our findings from our larger study of 39 countries that went across the globe from europe to asia To africa and north and sub-saharan africa And you can see that compared with muslims in other parts of the world, especially in contrast to those self-identified muslims in southern eastern europe and central asia muslims in sub-saharan africa and among the most devout in terms of saying religion is very salient in their lives It plays a very integral role in how they live their lives And so this centrality or importance of religion I think is a very important premise for this conference today That while there may be other factors involved and terence has referred to some and i'm not going to dismiss that There are other things going on in the region It seems uh evident and how muslims themselves talk about religion that is a very central part of their lives Now this salience or importance of religion is also borne out and how Muslims in this part of the world report practicing their faith So that we see both in terms of mosca tendons and daily prayer for example as indicators That high percentages of muslims in sub-saharan africa are going to the mosque weekly if not more than once weekly And that many are praying several times a day many of those in fact are praying all five slot So i'll show you the global pattern on that if I can go forward so in mosque attendance And the dark bars and these um portions of these bars is more than once a week And then the lighter is once a week for the friday prayer And you can see that compared to muslims in other regions of the world where we surveyed muslims in sub-saharan africa Exhibited very high levels of mosque attendance now in part this may reflect the fact that unlike in some other regions and some other Countries there aren't the same social or cultural prohibitions on women attending mosque So please keep that in mind But still this practice of attending mosque and the levels of which people are attending again indicates a very strong commitment to the faith Sorry, I keep pushing the wrong button in terms of prayer again We're seeing again a very clear pattern in which muslims in sub-saharan africa are very devoted to their faith With high percentages praying several times a day and of those The overwhelming majority across countries who surveyed in sub-saharan africa praying all five salat So again this sense of strong religious commitment coupled with their own self reported importance that they place On religion in their lives is a very defining and clearly defining feature of what it means to be muslim in this part of the world Again compared to other parts of the world Not the same level of religious commitment always found among muslims And I would also just keep you know in perspective that Muslims in general, but especially in sub-saharan africa and among the most devote Of many denominations we survey if you're asking americans We typically find six in ten saying religion is very important among sub-saharan african muslims It's eight and ten or more say it's very important And you europe you would go there about a third or fewer say religion is very important their lives So this is religion is a very distinctive feature of this part of the globe Now talking about distinctive features of what it means to be muslim in sub-saharan africa It's already been touched upon from two different perspectives both peter and terence mentioned it that Sufism plays a very prominent role in many of the countries in this part of the world And in fact we see that in our survey And compared to other regions Of the globe on which asked muslims whether they affiliate with a sufi order or not You can see a very strong contrast between muslims in sub-saharan africa and other parts of the globe Now I cannot tell you for certain that this means that muslims in central asia or south asia Are all telling us You know they're comfortable telling us where they identify with a sufi order or not that may be a factor But as self reported there's no other region where muslims are as comfortable or as frequently mentioned belonging to a sufi order In senegal it's over 90 90 percent of roughly who say they identify with a sufi order And you can see over half in chat also cameroon almost half And among the sufi orders that's most frequently mentioned it's already been cited here is the tijonewa Sufi order in particular with about half. I think in senegal identifying that particular sufi order as their affiliation So again, this is a distinctive feature. I think it sounds like others agree That I think it's important to keep in mind when we talk about islam in this part of the world The other thing i'll mention is that in our survey of islam in sub-saharan africa we asked Broadly about how people practice their faith and what things they believe and what Rituals they observe and another distinctive feature of sub-saharan africa is the continued influence Of african traditional religions as we would term that many beliefs like reincarnation belief and evil spirits sacrifices Ancestors these feature in the beliefs and practices of Substantial number of muslims in the region about a quarter overall a median percentage say that they observe these practices many of them But christians too in this part of the world is not unique to muslims Also about a fifth say they observe many of these things that we might consider traditional religious practices So in terms of all the things going on in terms of religious identity strong identity as muslims A very prominent influence of the sufi tradition in the region and then also influence of traditional religious beliefs and practices Are still observed among both muslims and christians in the region. So that's you know, the broad religious landscape Talking about distinctive features. We know and it's it's clear that If you know the region well that another distinctive feature of what it means to be muslim in sub-saharan africa Is that you're often living very close to if not literally side by side or not actually if not actually in your family with christians So this is a distinctive feature of the religious landscape in sub-saharan africa And now given the fact that you have these two prominent faiths and we actually find christians are very committed to their faith as well One when I imagine two different faiths both With members that are very committed to their religions. This could present the context for some tensions And in fact, we do in our survey find some evidence to point to potential tensions One of those is support for sharia So that was my map that we're skipping over even though i'm a geographer. You'll have to take my over that This is our finding for a question we asked about support for making sharia the official law of the land And so i'll show you the christian side of this in a moment because it's not exactly the same question I want to pause for a moment and look at the percentages that of muslims who say they favor making sharia the official law of land The median percentage that's the midpoint the half the scores are higher half the scores are lower is 63 Percent so that's that's considerably high. That's overall majority across the countries who surveyed in this region It gets as high as 82 percent in jibouti As low as 37 in tanzania But overall the trend as you can see is that majorities in many countries half or more I should say in most countries are saying they favor making sharia the law of the land Now to put that a bit of context and it's not exactly the equivalent question I will acknowledge we did ask christians that they favor making the Bible the basis for the law of the land To get the sense of how much Both members of both faiths would draw on their religion to shape the law in their country And you can see the median percentage for christians is 60 percent I share this because often we do I think I've dropped the lens of saying we're talking about muslims today and that's all we're talking about And so I wanted to include some findings for christians in the region also just to point out that overall religion plays a very important role And overall there's a very intense Commitment to the faith and in this question we see that christians too Think that their religious beliefs ought to have some role in shaping the law of the land in their country Again, this is starting to suggest. Maybe there are some things that could be a source of tensions between faiths But we asked separately too about something more closely tied to extremism And I should say and underscore that it's my experience based on survey research that it would not be wise to conflate A conservative outlook based on religion with support for extremism We should ask and think about these things separately And so we asked separately about justification of violence and defense of religion And among muslims, this is what we found That overall a median percent of 29 percent said yes Sometimes or often violence and defense of islam is justified Now I know enough from my state department days and since that you can look at that Percentage in two ways you can either say well, that's really low A 29 percent compared to the sixty some percent of support of making shrie the law of land Or you could be involved in countering terrorism and say that's extremely high as a lot of people And I acknowledge both perspectives are legitimate But I put it in perspective that again compared to the desire to make shrie the law of the land This is a Substantiously lower percentage saying that they believe violence against civilians and defense of islam is ever justified is justified We also asked the same question about christians again and put it in perspective Overall the median percentage of 19 percent is Significantly lower than the 29 percent among muslims who say violence against civilians is ever justified to defend their religion But this is also I would argue not negligible And it's also important to keep in mind that again muslims do not hold a monopoly I'm thinking that sometimes defense of their religion requires violence I'm not defending that perspective. I'm just saying that more than one religion may have that perspective Again, both of these are you know indications that with this kind of intensity of belief and definitely the preference of That sharia or the bible be of the source of law in their land These are sources of potential tensions between the face and the region But when we look overall at the level of perceived hostility between christians and muslims, this is what we see among muslims This is asking the question. Do you believe that most many are all Christians are hostile toward muslims the median percent overall is 23 percent again not Insignificant, but it's not a majority view. It's definitely a minority view that most christians are hostile towards muslims So even though there is a desire for religious law to shape the law of the land In a sense implied by that that you know we there are There's a basis in what we believe for shaping what is right in our country There's not a perception necessarily that christians are hostile towards muslims And we show the other side of the coin. It's only slightly higher among christians in terms of the percentages say most Many are all muslims are hostile towards christians And so it varies across countries when you look at the country level Guinea-Bissau you see half of almost half of christians saying Most muslims are hostile and guinea-bissau 41 percent of muslims say the same of christians and it does vary But overall this is not a picture of of I would say inevitable Hostilities as perceived by muslims and christians in the region Now there are you know some countries where there are issues of religious conflict as perceived by the people We surveyed In seven of ten countries where we had significant enough samples to look at about four in ten said religious conflict was a very big problem Now just point out Nigeria was one of them with about six in ten saying religious conflict was a very big problem So that's not christian muslim, but that's just an acknowledgement There are some countries where religious conflict is seen as a very big problem Nigeria is one of those So there are some potential sources of tension Hostilities may not be as as intense as one might think based on some of those other findings And overall we did find some other things about the attitudes of muslims towards democracy Towards engaging with other faiths that I would interpret as you know Someone optimistic in terms of thinking about what are the possibilities for this Region in terms of the role of religion and how it shapes views and attitudes towards other faiths and towards politics So this is our finding when we ask you know is democracy Preferable to any type of other type of government. I think this should be heartening for those of you like democracy I won't presume how many of you do That would total percentage the median percentage is 73 percent saying they prefer democracy to any other form of government That is I'm almost identical percentage in terms of the median among christians and muslims across the countries we surveyed So this is a strongly held preference among both muslims and christians For democracy as compared to any other form of government across the countries we surveyed It gets no lower than 60 percent in any one country saying this So that's a majority view across all the countries we surveyed I think it's a very key finding as we have our conversation today We also asked about freedom of worship and whether people Muslims in particular, but also christians you'll see in a second Whether muslims felt that others in their society were free to practice their faith Even if they were not of the same faith as of themselves And when we asked the people that we followed up by asking and in if you believe that's true Do you think that's a good thing? And so this is showing the percentage who believes others are very free and think that's a good thing So it's two things at once and so overall 75 percent a median of 75 percent of muslims say Among those who believe others are free to worship that it's a good thing that they are free to worship And again, it's half or more in all the countries where we surveyed among muslims saying That if people are free and I believe they are then that's a good thing Very similar picture among christians So that you have a meeting percentage here identical 75 percent among christians Who believe others are free to worship say that's a good thing So by combining those two findings what we're trying to say is that if you believe this is true And it's a good and do you believe it's a good thing? I think we're showing again One indicator one possible indicator of tolerance that it's okay for others of different faiths to practice their religion It's not a threat to me. It's okay. It's a good thing And then finally I like to close with some findings on the individual level So you talk a lot about society One of the things we're able to do in our surveys on occasion is ask questions more specific to the individual and what the person does And one of the things we asked about was contact with other faiths and interfaith meetings How much do people engage in this activity? And so here's the percentage among muslims who say they engage in interfaith meetings with christians 30 percent So not an overwhelming number and I would note that majorities of both christians and muslims in this part of the world Acknowledge that they don't know much about the other faith Something important to keep in mind about six and ten and both On a meeting percentage. So this is a situation where Arguably people don't know that much But some people are engaging with people of the other faith So this is a pattern. It's a very wide range from 17 percent in nigeria all the way up to 57 percent in mozambique Saying they personally have engaged in interfaith meetings with christians When we look at christians, it's almost the same median percentage 27 percent say they have engaged in interfaith meetings and the range is almost identical from 54 percent in liberia Down to just 12 percent and cameroon So not an overwhelming percentage saying they've engaged in these kind of interfaith meetings, but again not negligible So the overall picture I would say is is what our report was titled when we released it in 2010 We see evidence of both tensions, but also evidence of tolerance. So it's not a black and white picture It's the perfect subject for an indiscussing. You know, what is the role of religion and politics? How does it shape the political landscape and what I would emphasize is the point made earlier by peter But also by terence that identity I think is what this is tapping into and it's not so simple to say that I'm a muslim and therefore I believe this That it varies across countries that depending on the issue We're talking about attitudes may be more or less conservative than we might anticipate And so it's something we need to pay attention to because it is central to the lives of people in this part of the world But I think it's both dynamic and varied Richard thanks very much. It's it's wonderful to have some actual data to to ground the conversations that we're going to be having over the rest of the day And I want to make sure that that even though we're technically at time for this panel We got started a little bit late and I want to make sure that you have the opportunity to Ask some questions of our panelists. So we'll take a few minutes to do that If you'd like to ask a question, please raise your hand We have a microphone that will go around and and please also briefly identify yourself When when you ask your questions, so please the floor is open. I think we have a hand right up here in the in the front Pascal Siegel from inside through analysis. My question actually my two questions if that's okay Or directed to mr. Bell How do you explain the Fairly big differences by country or did you try to and my second question is did you find a correlation between You know levels of intolerance and a country's experience like, you know, Nigeria for example, I mean like You know recent Conflicts interreligious conflict Well, first of all, thank you for your questions and they're excellent questions um A couple comments both based on the survey findings from Sub-Saharan Africa But also some of the subsequent findings from other parts of the world Um, I would say two things to try to answer both your questions Context does matter. So something I think you're hitting at is very important that not Every country is identical that they have different histories. They have different histories of conflict Separate from this region for example We have found in our larger study that um the history of sectarian conflict in Lebanon and Iraq And how it impacted different generations at different times You can see a correlation between Whether you live during some of the most intense periods of conflict and whether you're more or less Accepting of Sunnis or she is as also being part of your Muslim faith for example So I think you're pointing out something very important um and so the range of Attitudes I think reflects again context in a very important way Also, I think you know you raised the case of Nigeria and although we haven't published it We we did explore a bit more what our data shows us in Nigeria And the one thing I would share is that you know, it's not simply I think both Peter and Terrence have made this point. It's not simply a matter of religion We shouldn't simply conflate it down to that and so um Tribal affiliation seems to be very important from our data in Nigeria So it's not simply muslim christian. It's also about tribal identity. And so The aruba more than the house or the igbo are very mixed in terms of the percentage of people who identify as christian and muslim And it's almost 50 50 actually and there you find uh more accepting attitudes towards Muslims and christians because perhaps I would say I'm not sure of the lived experience of having Christians and muslims being part of the same families and communities So to a greater degree than igbo or house in that country It seems that lived experience that context of who you are and what your experience is day to day of religion Both christian and islam both christian and islam I think shapes your attitudes in an important way One very brief point to add to that just on this final slide here I mean we see a clear pattern where it's in those countries where muslims are a minority That they're more likely to have had some sort of interfaith contact And that just sort of makes sense that if you're living primarily among christians It's natural that you would you would need to do that. There was a hand here, sir. Yes in the middle row. Yes If you could be very very brief It's not true that political islam Is a more recent phenomena that in africa islam and the rest of religions like christianity have lived in peace peacefully It's not true that it came about as a result of Since independence of uh, sordia arabia because sordia arabia Legitimacy depends upon vahabism and the expansion of vahabism ideology and iran for jihadist philosophy And the second one is Regarding the commitment Commitment Of muslims also christians in sub-sahara africa. They are more committed religiously They have more commitment. Is it nothing? Do you think it has something to do with the poverty and desperation of people in in sub-sahara africa rather than A commitment in the real sense and the other comment is It is not better to refer to when we talked about sub-sahara sub-sahara doesn't mean anything because it's not a boundary It's not it doesn't refer to particular specific countries when you do your research. It's not better to Really refer to particular countries as rather than sub-sahara sahal, which doesn't mean anything geographically, thank you Great, so i'll i'll start by briefly responding to the question about political islam And the question of whether it's a recent phenomena and and and i heard in the way you asked the question A suspicion that this may be linked particularly to the influences coming out of uh, sordia arabia I think it kind of depends on how you define political islam if we're simply talking about the way that islam and muslim communities Interface with and and have some role in politics in africa Then there's a much broader story to be told about the ways in which certain political structures and formations uh in in the continent Are very much defined and structured through the susufi brotherhoods that as we've heard are very prevalent and these groups Have been have had a major role in in in in politics For for centuries now if we mean political islam in the sense of a distinct ideology then again I think it's it's interesting that that political islam of the muslim brotherhood variety Broadly speaking with the exception of a couple of countries like sudan is largely a non-factor in in african politics when it comes to the question of The recent upsurge in ultra conservative islam salafi influences I absolutely do agree that influences coming out of sordia arabia are important But I don't think you can simply make an equation whereby Saudi money and funding arrives in a country and then suddenly islamic politics breaks out rather I think it's a much more complicated process Whereby pre existing conflicts ethno natural and ethno national in nature tribal in nature come to be Um Come come to be pervaded by certain kinds of influences That are transnational in nature and which perhaps begin to crystallize and Rigid rigid eyes islamic entities in in certain way and you can I think start to make some linkages between Accelerations and conflict in that regard. I I have to say though I'm I'm rather wary of the of the ease with which the label el qaeda affiliated groups tends to be thrown around These these days I think anytime anyone sees a group that seems to be salafi in nature and willing to use violence as a tactic The assumption is they must be linked to el qaeda or be a franchise in in some way and that's not to say that there aren't Some levels of connectivity that there aren't figures that are in these groups that have links to or personal ties to certain Figures in the broader global el qaeda ecology But I I think it's it's a far too simplistic Move to make to simply make a direct equivalence between the presence of a certain set of ideas and tactics And the idea that these groups are are linked globally jim All right I'll just go back in time real quickly because I am a geographer. So we'll go back to the map I do take your point about region. I mean, what does it mean to say sub-Saharan africa? I will say this I can't go through all 19 countries each time. That's a logistical thing, but your point more conceptually is true I mean, there are different ways to talk about africa as a continent and how you group the countries One of the groupings that's not one that i've been using today that's been talked a lot about when it comes to security issues Is transit hell That actually has more of a physical geographic basis than some other regional Uh definitions and when you look at this map, what this is showing is that the green is muzzle majority The blue is majority christian in the tenth parallel the transit hell region is more mixed Than the other two regions on this continent and I was using sub-Saharan africa really mostly to distinguish it from north africa Which we've studied separately in our surveys And we've grouped that with the middle east for various reasons mainly because of the arabic language being so common across that region But I think your point's taken if you want to understand what's happening In africa there are different ways to group countries and talk about what it means to Be a muslim in where you're a minority of the population versus a majority. And so I take your point And then to the issue of religious commitment. I think it's a very interesting question to raise is this And I think we should be careful about essentializing that I didn't mean to suggest that I On the basis these survey survey findings know that Africans if I can use that label for a moment are more religiously committed by nature than other people around the globe Our survey findings indicate a very high level religious commitment though and both belief and practice among both christians and muslims And I would say to your point about is there some connection to poverty I cannot say we did not find that based on our analysis But we did find in separate questions that concerns about crime unemployment political corruption are very Very much seen as very big problems by majorities in most countries. So what you're raising I think is an important consideration Let me take just a couple more questions in an effort to to keep us on time. Yes, ma'am. Please in the back My name is Mindy riser. I'm vice president of an NGO called global peace services usa I'm interested in the following. We know that china has an interest in africa And there have been a number of chinese there in various capacities and my question is to james bell What do you think the perception of the africans that you've looked at in different countries would be to people who profess No particular religious tradition. You've talked about freedom of worship What about people who either are not christian and may follow a buddhism or confucianism or nothing at all Are they seen as lesser beings or are they simply Beyond conception. Do you have any thinking about that? It's a very interesting question and I do not have data that I would speak through that would speak to that Precise question. I would say though that outside of sub-zerain africa when we I've asked the question about perceptions of americans I'm just trying to get a kind of a parallel Answer here Among muslims and muslim majority countries in the middle east south asia and then also among europeans Whether americans are two religious or not religious enough Europeans are convinced we're two religious and muslims in many countries are convinced we're not religious enough So I think your point is that there are perceptions of how religious other societies are but I cannot tell you unfortunately How africans might view chinese or other religions around the globe David's david's group csis I got one for each of the The speakers It seems to me that We're forgetting our past And if you were to go back to the early 19th century What was one of the most powerful african responses to the economic problems provoked by Paradoxically the end of the slave trade. It would be the attempted state construction through islam So one thinks of the socket to caliphate usman danfordio. One thinks of a la true metal one thinks of Samo ritori Throughout west africa you have this state creation based on islam as a function of the collapse of the Precolonial state so it seems to me It's not particularly surprising that africans are turning to religion. How do africans in senegal cope with the impact of the french colonial conquest? Well, one thinks the mamadou bamboo and the muridia as the driving response So so religion has always been a fundamental element To terry I think My second question is I think we need to feed into your equation and I agree with all the things you said We need to feed in some anthropological issues perhaps or sociological issues We need to feed in how patrilineal or matrilineal particular societies are We need I think to feed in particularly the comparative rates of endogamy Which I think is the fundamental key And we also need to feed in changes in literacy And I think if you actually factor in those three issues You get a very insightful response to those societies where If you like violent islamist reaction is strongest It's the challenge to the old social religious patriarchal culture That is being provoked by rising literacy That seems to me to explain the origins of bokeh haram in the kanuri region It explains I think some of the violence in sudan And it gives an optimistic reading I think to the comparative appeal of violent islamist forces in many other parts of west africa and then to james bell my observation is I was struck by how amazing tanzanier is Because you have a society which is more or less half and half You have a society where your figures indicate that the muslims are extremely suspicious of the christians comparatively speaking and the christians are profoundly suspicious of the muslims and yet When it came to using the sharia as a basis religion you only had 30 percent of muslims saying that which was Very low. You had only 39 percent of christians saying the bible should be used And as to the viability of using force It was only three percent among muslims and two percent among christians Why is tanzanier, you know, does the secular state work in tanzanier? I don't think so But why is is the tanzanier in response? So absolutely abnormal And firm belief In peace and tranquility And the rule of law in a secular context Great, thank you very much three three, you know Deeply important sets of questions. I'll I'll not do anything other than to thank you for the historical contextualization that you provided Which I think just underpins the point that the interface of islam and politics has a history that that long predates the More immediate questions that we tend to deal with on a day-to-day basis and continues to have resonance in them Honestly, I was simply wary of at an event that begins at 9 a.m. On a monday morning saying let's go back to the late 19th century And so so so kato caliphate so right right so so so thank you for that Terrence I would have loved to have started with that I would have gotten me very very engaged But as I said, I introduced myself as the africanist who does Love the history and the anthropology and and the sociology and i'm going to Thank david as well, but and use his question on His on on on different cultures to emphasize how Procule in a non-judgmental sense i mean in terms of a local sense So many of these islamic stories are whether it has to do with a kind of a generational struggle that gets framed As a certain type of islam Whether it's a struggle over land or over who is a citizen and who's not a citizen and that gets framed as a religious conflict in northern nigeria as efforts to come up with a you know a Cross clan way of mobilizing in samalia gets framed as an islamic project each of those are very different very you know culturally historically contingent processes that involve islam in some Former fashion, but in fact very very different stories very different political dynamics very different historical and cultural Dynamics and just leave it there I too will thank david David I think the well first of all i'm not qualified to give you an answer Based on our survey findings. I don't think we have enough information to explain. What is unique or different about tanzania? I've emphasized the overall regional pattern obviously and there are in those findings just in the Few findings i've shared today countries like tanzania that stand out especially if you know these countries Have some sense for the context and so i would go back to that point I think context does matter and i simply don't know enough about tanzania to speculate about what might explain some of those interesting I think you call my data abnormal, which is always a compliment But seriously an outlier an outlier is very important if it doesn't make sense to someone who knows the region knows the country I'm quite sincere. I'd love to you know learn more about what we could try to you know dig deeper on because This is something that at a country level. We haven't focused as much But if the secular state is not a success if you say that is true Then it does raise some interesting questions about what's been institutionalized if these findings are accurate What exists in that society that discourages? More extremist viewpoints when it comes to some of the questions we asked Thanks very much as I hand back over to jennifer for the second panel. Please join me in thanking our panelists Okay, if if if people could take a seat I we are we are one panelist short, but we are hoping That feridesack will be joining us very shortly. Let me just um, okay Okay, we'll give you one minute to settle down Great Well after that really excellent first panel, um, we're going to move into our second panel Which as I say is one panelist short as of now. We're hoping feridesack will join us shortly But the purpose of this was to look at some At some particular examples of how um, muslim communities or populations within particular countries are engaging on on on on various issues In the political realm specifically in the service delivery realm in community mobilization More generally And to do this and I'll keep the introduction short so that we can stay on track We have three excellent panelists or two right now Our first guest is sebastian ellisher who is um An assistant professor for comparative political science at lufana university Lüneburg and a research fellow with the institute of african affairs at the german institute of global and area studies Giga in hamburg germany Sebastian has been with us before really Very well versed in the politics and uh of of niger and has given some excellent presentations here His current research focuses on the rise of hybrid regimes and um, he's done a lot of Has a lot of field experience across africa on democratization the impact of ethnicity on political partners And the interface of security and development as I said intensive study in niger Sebastian will be undertaking our case study on niger for this loose funded project on religion and democracy And today he'll be speaking about conservative islam and political organization within niger and some interesting ways that that that Shapes up. We then have lin allward who's senior fellow with the world faiths development dialogue lin has worked on international economic policy and development at the imf for a long time decades Her country work is focused on sub-saharan africa And she's been focused on poverty reduction growth in low-income countries and the role of faith inspired organizations Today she's going to be speaking to a project. She's been gauged engagement. I think over the last year With the world faiths development dialogues in conjunction with a tony blair foundation On the role of faith inspired organizations engagement on healthcare in africa in particular and Really some interesting Findings and also I think some policy implications coming out of that as we as we think about that Eventually, I hope we will be joined by fiery desac who who his biography defies Kind of a simple one liner, but I'll wait till he arrives to give it and Turn over to Sebastian to talk about niger. Thanks Thank you jennifer for your kind words And thank you to everyone at csis who's been involved in in putting this Very timely and and stimulating conference together As jennifer said my presentation focuses on on one particular country The republic of of niger And it's been in the last two to three decades that nigerian society has seen somewhat of a shift away from What is considered traditional islam to a more reformist version And in the next 10 to 15 minutes, I want to illustrate how this I call it conservative reformist version of of islam Engages with society and engages with the nigerian state at large now Almost all of niger's population is muslim and in in socio economic terms That makes niger the poorest muslim country on earth or the poorest country on earth Under military rule between 9047 and 1991 The autocratic government monitored the practice of the islamic religion through the islamic association of of niger the ain And really monitoring of religious practice was the organization's official goal Now only sufi brotherhoods were part of the ain ain and and most brotherhoods Were part of the tijaniya order a form of maliki islam and it's already been mentioned In in the previous panel that this is if you want to the sort of mainstream islam that that's being found Across the sahel or across western africa it it emphasizes the role of saints relics and the traditional role of of traditional chiefs And tijaniya islam holds that the quran must only be interpreted By trained and by literate imams and and it was the ain that at least on paper in niger Provided this kind of of training And and and direction The national conference of 1991 which set in motion a process of democratization in niger Established the principle of religious freedom And the right to freely associate Uh and over the course of the last two to three decades that has given rise to what are by now I believe 50 officially registered islamic association And it is in this context that niger has seen the spread of of what is considered to be a form of of reformist islam um, and the most widespread form of of this new version of of islam is the itzala movement um Itzala a literal literate translation means Community for the eradication of of un islamic innovations and for the reestablishment of the sunnah The movement originated in northern nigeria In the late 1970s and it found its way to niger through hausa traders They were in constant contact with the nigerian city of of kanu Uh now the goal is The goal of this movement is to convert Muslims to a more Texturally accurate version of the islamic faith as such it rejects local and and african expressions of Of the core interpretations of the koran. It rejects sufi islam It rejects the role of of the marabus of of local priests and and in itzala islam There is supposed to be a direct connection between allah and and his followers And as such the theological convictions of of this movement are of course In line with what in recent years has become known as a salafism And and itzala as such is linked to financial support From so the arabia and also from from katara Today in niger both sufi islam So traditional islam if you want to and itzala islam or reformist islam are represented in all parts of the country Now since uh independence niger has given herself seven constitutions The last such exercise took place in 2010 and and all of these constitutions foresee ally cystic or or a secular state And this reformist movement rejects the democratic The democratic secular nature of the state The failure of the secular democratic state to deliver public goods In combination with the disintegration of an effective religious oversight body Greatly contributed of course to the rise of this movement As most of you will be aware uh niger suffers from some extraordinary adverse structural conditions Only 25 percent of the population are literate 80 percent of the nigerian population are regularly faced by food shortages For the last three to four decades niger has been ranked as one of the four poorest countries on earth Its population growth rate stands at 3.2 percent Which means the nigerian population is estimated to double between 2000 and 2025 84 percent of its population live on the countryside And 60 of the population are under the age of 15 Um and as in many other countries such as algeria or nigeria This reformist movement the itzala movement allocates the socioeconomic failure Of the post-independent state to its democratic and especially to its secular nature And here again this this strategy or this rhetoric is not any different From reformist islamic groups in in nigeria's immediate neighborhood However, and i would like to stress this in the presentation this movement has not just attracted The support of the country's poor It's a movement that's very popular among Affluent and aspiring house of businessmen And that has to do with the financial frustration Traditional islam might impose on aspiring house of businessmen If you're a wealthy house of businessmen in traditional islam You have to take care of a lot of people. Okay, you have to take care of the Local marabous and you have to take care of your immediate family That's not something it's itzala islam prescribes Itzala islam allows for for example much more frugal family weddings It allows for much more frugal family funerals And as such it's important to note that the support of this movement is not confined to the country's poor Now in addition And i will go into somewhat slightly greater detail now Niger's poorest border With in the south with nigeria Have seen the influx of violent jihadist groups in particular, but not only boku haram And nigeria's poorest borders in the north have seen the influx of al-qaeda of the islamic margrep From algeria and equivalent groups most recently from mali Again, i wish to stress here that one must not equate itzala with these jihadist movements akim and boku haram openly promote violent jihadism or they openly promote violence against the secular state and against fellow muslim The itzala movement does not And and i would like to stress what would peter manderville said when he said that you know islam is a very broad tent if you want to Salafism is also a very broad tent And of course a large segment of salafist thinking rejects violence and rejects any sort of political activity However, looking at nigeria's immediate neighborhood And looking at the genealogy of salafist thinking In algeria and in nigeria Certainly illustrate the potential for the itzalamist movement becoming a violent movement In the upcoming month or years The big theological debate if you want to among akim and also among boku haram has always been the question of When does a situation occur occur when it's legitimate for muslims to kill fellow muslims? I do believe that current events as they unfold in mali And with anti-western sentiment running fairly high in niger And with the decision of the united states to station drones in niger There might be potential for further radicalization nigeria has not gone down this road. I'm not saying It is doomed to go down this road But looking at what happened in its immediate neighborhood. I would at least argue that there is potential for this Now here you've got a map of niger This simply shows to highlight the geographical proximity of niger's urban centers Nia Medoso And zander to the nigerian border The border with nigeria is thousands of kilometers long. It is largely unguarded The same is true for its borders with algeria and mali now this Leads us to the question of how this reformist version of islam engages with the nigerian state Certainly at the spiritual level there is a struggle going on in niger A struggle between traditional islam And the itzala movement and it's a struggle that takes place in every region Certainly in the urban areas It's a struggle that manifests itself in the building of different mosques But very often it's also a struggle that takes place in the same mosques When there are prayers of different groups Of these two different groups at different times And as such again this struggle mirrors very much what is going on in in parts of algeria And nigeria I assume At the societal level niger has seen the rise of islamic civil society Largely financed by the arabian peninsula in particular katar and so the arabia And out of the 50 officially registered islamic associations 10 claim to undertake islamic development works Work and they all work in in different policies fears Very often this kind of development work simply means the construction of alternative mosques Very often it also means the building of quranic schools and and and orphanages But it's not really confined to a particular policies feel field But it's particularly visible in the education and in the health sector Consequently International islamic civil society groups Provide the services in niger The democratic or the secular nation state the post independent state has been unable to provide To name a few examples the africa muslims agency An organization based in kuwait is running a very well known eye clinic In the capital of neamae the world assembly of muslim youth It based in so the arabia. There's been increasing activity of katar aid a distinctly anti-secular Organizations and the al-basar foundation based in in so the arabia So if one argues that western development has taken a faith matters turn The same is certainly true for for arabian and development aid In addition, here you see the logos of two muslim associations currently engaged In niger the al-basar foundation and the africa muslims agency The severe sahel droughts of 2005 and 2010 Have led to an increase of this activity in particular in 2005 It was islamic organizations that were the first to hand out Free nutrition to to a starving population Finally and maybe of of greater interest to most of you It ought to be stressed that at the political level the reformist movement has not gained access to formal state institutions niger's political elite is very small And democratization and reoccurring Multi-party elections have meant the circulation of power Among the same elite rather than a change of the political elites All leading members of niger's main political parties as well as the hierarchy of niger's army Which intervened in nigerian politics three times since 1991 Are Members of a traditional sufi order and they're very vocal and outspoken about their support for traditional sufi islam So we have not seen the formation of a kind of Salafist political party as one could witness in algeria 20 years ago or the kind of Political proximity between this kind of movement and political parties as we've we've seen evolving in northern nigeria However on numerous occasions and in my presentation. I can't go into great detail We have seen successful political protest by By by by the reformist movements And some of these examples that you see on the slide show That niger's political elite is certainly susceptible to their demands We have seen a protest against for example contraception campaigns Protest against an african fashion festival. It's most noticeable with regard to The protest against the ratification of a family code With niger to my knowledge being one of the very few african countries Which still does not have if you want to a secular family code in place And what we are seeing or what we've seen in 2010 is a much Louder and much vocal much more vocal protest against the secular nature Of the political setup in niame than let's say 20 20 years ago So to summarize niger has not gone down the same road As some of its neighbors in particular mali algeria and nigeria However, I would say that there is at least potential That what so far has remained a peaceful and a non Violent Salafist movement might at some point become further radicalized. Thank you Lynn You have to point it at the computer, okay I am very happy to be here today to talk about how muslim organizations engaged in public life through health work After leaving office warmer uk prime minister tony blair started an inner faith foundation That aims to show that religion is a force for good in the modern world So the tony blair foundation commissioned the world faith's development dialogue To do a study of health work in africa by faith-based organizations The w f d d where i'm a fellow is a secular research institute That's based at georgetown university at the berkeley center for religion peace and world affairs It's very well known that religious organizations and people are responsible for a large share of health service provision in africa And there's a second main belief around FBOs which is an idea that got a lot of traction Through u.s political ideology in the 80s and 90s that faith-based organizations should be superior At social service provision because of their purported comparative advantages. For example, all the major faith traditions believe in compassion and Religious people are selfless. So they'll be great health care workers willing to work long hours for little or no pay To its credit the tony the the tony blair foundation wanted to take these two broad assertions About faith-based organizations health care not on faith alone But instead to assemble the evidence on the quantity and quality of faith-based health care provision in africa So doing this study inevitably led to a compare and contrast between christian and muslim fBOs And that's what i'm mainly going to discuss. But first i just want to make a few points about faith-based organizations They've been around a long time. They're generally well regarded Large hospitals providing free health care have been a characteristic of muslim society from early times zakat the almsgiving that's one of the pillars of islam Played large roles in alleviating poverty building infrastructure and providing social services in earlier islamic periods For various reasons this level or degree of social engagement and organ organization diminished and we'll talk a little more about that Coexisting with the good reputation of fBOs Is the fact that faith is also divisive and so in the Faith-based world faith distinctions add fragmentation Between and also within faith traditions um Faith can also be divisive specifically in terms of health. So obvious examples are different theological review views on reproductive health And anti-vaccination or campaigns or hiv aid stigma that is mediated through faith leaders These faith distinctions add additional pitfalls when the international development community wishes to engage With the faith-based sector, but religion is an important part of culture Um, certainly jim bell's data on africa indicated How strong religion is in africa? Um, I believe it was president kabaki of kenya who once said that Every weekend 85 percent of kenyans are going to pass through the doors of a church or a mosque so religion a very important part of culture and I think it's generally accepted now that successful sustainable international development must be based in local culture and local communities So one of the most important distinctions between christian and muslim fBOs is that Christian fBOs really dominate. They dominate in africa. They dominate globally um I have to say that okay, so this huge predominance of the christian entities reflects colonialism to a large extent it's also influenced by the nature of islam because islam is a Heterogeneous religion. It doesn't have the same centralized doctrinal authority Um, whereas the well-developed hierarchy of of many christian faith You know really lends itself to managing a far flung network of mission hospitals The muslim approach to charity purportedly tends to be more individualistic and uh spontaneous so sort of taking the the reference of tari there's a lower institutional capacity or tendency in muslim faith-based organizations Another distinction is that muslim organizations and individuals involved in social service provision in africa Have traditionally tended to target their services to needing muslims However, recently the large islamic international development organizations such as islamic relief Certainly emphasized that they they definitely provide health to all people in need regardless of of religion or or any other factor um christian health organizations are so large and long established that in at least 10 african countries There are actually memoranda of understanding between the ministry of health and between christian health associations um these MOUs are there to recognize and operationalize the fact that the christian Faith-based sector is to a large extent supplementing and taking up the slack of public health provision Only in very few cases. I think in two countries kenya and uganda Do these MOUs embrace um the muslim community and again, that's because the type of organization is different So you don't have all these networks and umbrella organizations actually in the case of kenya Which has a very strong ministry of health MOU with the faith-based sector. I think at the beginning they almost had to go out and create a um muslim health umbrella network and I think even now the um muslim partner in that kenyan MOU the the kenyan memorandum of understanding Is actually something called sup ken the supreme council council of muslims and that's definitely that's not a health organization You know or even it's as much a political organization. Um as it is A faith-based one So a final distinction has to do with the types of organizations There are Hundreds of thousands. I mean there are at least a hundred and thousand faith-based health providing organizations in africa That's if you try to count them very comprehensively and include every mother's union at each anglican parish that's providing um some kind of uh palliative care to people suffering from hiv and aides And my last bullet point is is not very well put because the point I want to make there Is not that there aren't that there are just large muslim organizations. In fact, it's the opposite There are many many small muslim organizations providing health care in africa There are very relatively few large international development islamic organizations. So While you know, you can easily just keep naming large international christian fbo's catholic leave services world vision tear funds maritan purse anglican relief and development menonite relief and development You know on and on Basically for muslim fbo's we think about um islamic relief muslim aid the red crescent movement and just a few others A quick interesting aside is that you may think well, why not the aga khan development network? Which is a very large and important organization, but because of the issue of different sex within islam And also because the aga khan network itself is very specific about how it defines itself Sometimes when you see studies on the large islamic International development NGOs the aga khan network is completely left off that list so There are a lot of potential potential interesting reasons between but behind why muslim Faith-based organizations in africa Are so distinct in some ways from christian ones and these Weren't things that we studied for the tony Blair faith foundation So i'm just sort of putting them up there more for the the the sake of interesting background um You know certainly the karan and hadith emphasized charity and the duty of the rich to the poor, but Perhaps there are distinctions in terms of an islamic approach to international development that that are relevant here um for islamic fbo's as well as for other Faith-based entities The trick always is that development agencies want our Religiosity that complies with secular development principles and um this this can be problematic faith-based organizations Are non-governmental organizations and some authors say that different views on civil society And differences in civil society freedoms and freedom of association in arabic countries Have come to impact the size and the vibrancy of the muslim NGO sector one more observation on muslim alms giving islamic financial analysts estimate that Zakat can actually may amount to somewhere between 200 billion and a trillion dollars a year now That's a huge range, but even if it's at the bottom of that range It's 15 times larger than total global humanitarian aid flows. So certainly it's it's a potential resource to be to be reckoned with With with all these large flows, of course, there's there's issues of uh transparency and certainly post 9 11 muslim aid organizations muslim fbo organizations face You know being perceived as threats and they also face additional regulation in terms of mustering resources and just to say the fact is that organizations such as hamas and the muslim brotherhood are health service providers and it Means that for researchers when you want to treat faith-based organizations in africa, you know In some ways you want to treat them as one unified group that that adds You know quite a distinction So I just want to you know, we we said we'd consider it. I'd said I'd consider in more detail where religion and health can be problematic together and of course a very famous case is the Anti polio vaccination campaign That's a suit that took place in northern nigeria beginning in 2003 And the story there is that some muslims heard rumors that the polio vaccine potentially was an effort to reduce fertility To spread hiv aids or to otherwise harm muslim populations The rumors did gain traction when they were repeated by imans and Eventually governors of northern nigeria states refused to allow the vaccination campaign to To proceed in their jurisdictions and the fallout was very serious for the global polio eradication efforts um unicef and other partners eventually Engaged important muslim leaders to speak out in favor of vaccination um subsequent analysis did indicate that while the rumors may have originated from imans or were originated in a muslim community that in fact the campaign the anti vaccination campaign Had as much to do with political factors northern nigerians tend to feel isolated and neglected by the power centers in legos and abuja and in fact in in other incidents because they there are some involving Catholic communities, but in other incidents Where there seems to be a religious objection to immunization or other health initiatives Often when you when you dig down It has as much to do with politics though. It may be mediated through religion but I like to think that any negative aspects involving health and religion in africa either have been or will soon be Dwarf by the positive impacts and just to mention that a very strong initiative is when Faith leaders are used For a behavior change communication to provide health messaging. So the tony blair faith foundation has had a project to promote To to work against malaria in sierra leone and they figure that they have reached one million people Which is one sixth of the country's population through empowering christian and muslim communities To spread anti-malaria health messages The center for internet interfaith action on global Poverty which is based here in washington dc has had a similar interfaith initiative in mozambique That has also trained faith leaders across the country with key health messages, which they then transmit to their faith communities and Not all behavior change communicate change communication Initiatives are interfaith, but in fact a lot of them are and Just to touch again on something that terence said These interfaith initiatives when you build them around something relatively non-controversial such as your kid should sleep under a Under an insecticide treated net That can be very effective. It avoids charges of concerns about Prostitialization or government favoritism of particular religious groups But it also creates an interfaith coalition that maybe then can be leveraged for more sensitive issues such as conflict resolution so to quickly give three specific examples of Hell muslim organizations provide health care in africa I know i've strayed away here from sub-saharan africa But there's a very extensive study of moz societies in egypt, which in the 1970s began to provide health care Feeling that the poor were getting squeezed out between the high cost of private health care and the lousy quality of public health care And it's been found that these mox societies made a really important contribution To the quality of health care in egypt The university of birmingham has run a large religion and development project that was funded by diffid One of the studies they did was they compared christian muslim and secular ngos that were providing hiv and aids care in nigeria The the majority of patients that they surveyed felt that the faith-based providers, whether christian or muslim offered advantages over the secular providers And i think it's very interesting that one of the organizations they looked at A muslim hospital el nori specialist hospital heavily incorporated religious messages and practices and symbols in its programs nonetheless That did not alienate non muslim clients who continued to use the facility because they said it had low cost And um one particular thing they cited was that they felt that when it came to hiv aids this particular muslim hospital um guaranteed confidentiality and That hospital happens to be a really well run one that um has a whole performance management system So among their performance indicators are promoting a more positive view of islam by non muslims Which i think is interesting and a third example the federation of muslim women's associations of nigeria It's an exception that proves the rule because it is an umbrella association. It covers a lot of different organizations in nigeria that promote the welfare of muslim women and children Through the provision of healthcare and education the federation is 25 years old It operates in 34 different states in nigeria It operates hospitals and pharmacies and testifying to the strength of this organization Much of its funding comes from international donors including usaid So i'll quickly conclude with a few observations in one question One observation is that it certainly seems that muslim health face-based organizations are an underutilized partner for the international community For a decade or more people in the faith-based organization slash international development academic world Say over and over again. We really need to know more about um islamic international development ngo's The research is still very scant. So i just want to salute csis's africa program and the work of the ally vorac ox center Which is helping to fill this gap The third observation is that there's opportunities perhaps for muslim health fbos to to to To get into new areas in health. They're not as tied down by their past history as christian fbos are They're not tied down to maybe large mission hospitals that are no longer ideally Located or the christian hospitals tend to or the health programs tend to overemphasize curative care whereas preventative care is More needed in africa. So perhaps muslim fbos can more easily be entrepreneurial in providing Health care finally i conclude with a question last year the usa id and the Organization of islamic cooperation signed a partnership to to strengthen cooperation cooperation on humanitarian issues and usa id administrator rajeev shah called this a Partnership milestone. I just wonder what other opportunities there are for greater engagement between muslim faith-based Organizations and the us foreign aid and foreign policy communities. Thank you Thanks very much lin next we're going to turn to professor farid asak who's joined us as I said at the beginning professor asak Defies any one-line Biographical snapshot. He's a south african scholar writer an activist He's currently professor of islamic studies at the university of johannesburg Many know him as a veteran of the struggle against apartheid in south africa activists in the inter-regional inter-religious solidarity movement for justice and peace And the role he played in the united democratic front the call of islam The organization of people against sexism and the world And the world conference on religion and peace um In addition to his academic Pursuit he continues his activism through positive muslims an organization working with muslims who are hiv positive in south africa and through Multiple development boards on which he sits and he's going to talk a bit today on the muslim community engagement in community mobilization and And development so professor asak welcome to csis and i'm very glad you could join us today I Had a very brief inkling into what the other papers was And without wanting to distance myself from any one of them I'm not really going to be doing a show-and-tell story I'm not interested in public relations And in promoting a kind view of islam To the rest of the world or a nice view of how muslims in south africa conduct things I don't owe you anything Um Yeah, so I'll I know it sounds rather impolite But I don't owe you anything and so I'll just say some of the truths as I see them from the south african perspective The south african muslim engagement With social When your minister of foreign affairs calls perhaps you should be picking it up But this is a public this is a And you know we're having brick starting today the This collection of Of brazil and india and china And argentina and south africa and all their presidents are gathering For a summit and 20 other presidents are joining to them. So it's a fairly momentous occasion In south africa today I suspect that he's calling me to call my hordes off who are demonstrating outside the venue Okay, you can take that later then Ministry brimey brime can deal with his own distinct. I'm sure they have enough security in place um I think south african muslims have charted very well Um an avenue between um a very activist kind of islam It's okay. Well, if it's your first comment Deputy minister mr. Minister brime, how are you? Hello Minister brime Sorry, you must eat I'm sorry. I'm not picking up this one again. Um, it's very interesting how they've negotiated their tensions between uh on the one hand, um being a very traditional community in south africa um And working from that tradition to also challenge very very many what I would describe as manifestations of the empire around them And as they challenge the manifestations of the empire around them The sufferings around them This did not uh lead in a way that they became more insular but in a way that they in fact themselves became more open And so uh through this dual tensions in internal tensions inside the community With their own others with their own marginalised on the other and with their external oppressions on the other All of this contributed. I think to a new to new south african forms of islam And in this engagement of theirs they went beyond a Sustainalism they went beyond the idea of a minority community The idea of minority community for example, I still find very alien when I was at zavia university a number of years ago The president of the university invited me to a dinner for a number of members of the minority community And I was really insulted That had never occurred to me that I was a member of the minor of a minority community a minority community of what? Uh in south africa most of the ideas that I had were the dominant ideas of the Political elite of our country. It was the way in which our country was go Who gave this man the right to define me in terms of the color of my skin? I was really really upset But then of course later on came to terms of the fact that this is how people in this part of the world deal with it I mercifully never bought into it Um So a few things very quickly about the south african muslim community The south african muslims have been there since 1965 Since 1652 and because we've been there since 1652 we don't have any of the anxieties that many other community has Where do we fit in do we belong here? Don't we belong here? Will we be expatriated? Um The country belongs to ours Occasionally people ask me where do you come from and then I say what do you mean? Where do I come from I come from south africa? Well, I actually mean, you know, um, uh, you know your answer Look, how far back do you want me to go and really go back to adam and eve? I'm a south african. Can we keep it at that? Uh Later on the south african community was joined by an indian community About 150 years ago who came to work on the sugar plantations when the blacks found this work to Undignified a smaller community came about 50 years ago about 110 years ago Um, and this is a very interesting community. They it was a shipwreck from the zanzibar coast and They were all muslims and they wore these garbs, but they were africans the Uh, white colonists regime didn't know what to do with them were these blacks who had an african culture Which somehow seemed to be in sync with an indian culture They prayed five times a day And then they decide to classify all of them indian And so all of these blacks with the stroke of the pen became uh, indian In the last 20 years after the new south africa there has been a huge influx from, uh, africans indians pakistanis morocans arabes Sinhalese from different parts of the world coming into south africa And all of this has led to a great reconfiguration of the South african muslims There were a very large part of the population Until the 1880s where in in the smallpox epidemics in the In 1896 It wiped out one third of the a bit more than one third of the muslim population really disseminated the muslim Community and given their own high birth rates at that time They would easily have overtaken the white population the other dominant population In the western cape at the moment and at the moment they are about one third of the population in the western cape Now the western cape is a predominantly colored area with a large white population And it is the only population that is being dominated by the former White opposition parties and that it's the only region not controlled by the african national congress So a bit of an overview about where they fit in This proportionately they play a huge A very very significant role in socio political leadership in south africa in the 1980s They were one comma three two percent of the population in the 1980s 16 percent of all the people in detainees in detention were muslims In the first pro-apartheid south african government 16 percent of all the members of parliament were muslim Our chief justice was a muslim our minister of justice was a muslim The speaker of the upper of the upper house a hijabi was a muslim one of our cabinet ministers Looked straight as he had walked straight out of afghanistan with a big beard and so on He is now the minister of transport Currently our minister of economic development is a transport the deputy of minister of educational affairs is a transport the minister of Science and technology is a muslim the minister of interior is a muslim the deputy minister of interior is a muslim And a number of judges on the constitutional court are muslims And unlike and i'm a very keen reader of the jewish press In part because of my own commitment to the palestinian cause unlike in the jewish press where there is a regular There is an effusive celebration whenever a jewish person comes into The muslim community are stone cold to the fact that all of these important people in government are muslims No fuss is made about them whatsoever when mandela was released three people the committee comprised of three people All three of the people including myself served on the national release committee All three of us were muslims None of us mentioned it to each other Nobody in the country mentioned it to each other it never occurred to anybody that these were all three muslims And so in a very interesting way These muslims have retained their identity A social and a collective identity They have arrived places Due to some sociological dynamic that often brings out the best in minority communities You see the same with the jewish community here But i dare say unlike the jewish community here in south africa muslims have never used Their positions of privilege To try to get other muslims on board We just don't have a cattle mentality or is it good for the muslims? It's a very primary jewish question And i say so without any kind of negativity attached to it It's a very it's a fundamental question When something happens to a jew or in the jewish community, is it good for the jewish community? You don't generally have those questions for muslims muslims don't celebrate when muslim becomes the chief justice of a country It will not feature in a muslim newspaper that so and so he may be religious or not has actually become the chief justice of the country Or a particular minister In a community and so there has been a disproportionate role of muslims in the south african In the south african government This comes from a disproportionate role that they played in the struggle against apartheid And i suspect that one sociological thing had a definite role to play in this the prohibition on alcohol Alcohol really decimated black communities colored communities Up to a third of your salary if not more in many of the rural areas where wine was big Was paid in alcohol And so part of the labor system on the in the rural areas just kept people In states of degradation And this in many ways had saved muslims The first political organization in south africa in 1904 was founded by a by dr. Abdullah abdraman Who was a manumated slave and a and later became a Medical doctor and so in the resistance to apartheid There was a very very strong muslim component and two interesting things about this The one is it drew on all the muslim language muslim symbols muslim icons muhammad abudhar hussein karbala The battle of badr drew on all of those particularly muslim icons And above all jihad But it did so in a way That blended perfectly in with the rest of the population's resistance to apartheid And it was part of the way the struggle was framed. So what we call the national democratic struggle We had enabled different communities different perspective different inspirations come on board Bring the best of your traditions on board and join us in this largest struggle So peculiar inspirations even parochial inspirations all of this invoked in the largest struggle That was defined as the struggle against non-racialism for a divided south africa a struggle Sorry a struggle for a non-racial non-sexist struggle for an undivided south africa And this became the slogan of the struggle and in fact a number of historians have attributed the non-sexist slogans To the vision of our south africa to a muslim theologian So it is very interesting that misogyny and anti-women stuff and so on Emerges in the front of our struggles new vision for an inclusive society And it is attributed to a muslim liberation Theologians so strong synergies between the tutus the bussaks They brime rasul does now our country's ambassador to the city And people like myself muslim organizations and so on invoking jihad all the time And all those cruel blood churning blood churning ayat from the quran In a non-racial democratic struggle for human rights where there was going to be a place for whites and for blacks and for women And for disabled and for gay men and for gay women and for bisexuals and all of this We also spoke about in the middle of us invoking all of our quranic ayat and hadith in the struggle against Pharaoh who was seen as the apartheid regime This kind of militants on the one hand that militants for pluralism And this is not something that I think most people in the united states are familiar with the idea of militants The idea of a pretty aggressive battle for justice, and I'm not talking about drones here. I'm not talking about army I'm not talking about your mig 16s And this goes also for the struggle later on the struggle against hiv and aides Muslims played a forefront in the struggle against aides along with the churches But where the churches came with a form of Assistentialism a form of caring and 78 percent of all the care for hiv people People living with hiv comes from the churches in South Africa But the church was hesitant to come up with issues of abstention Not issues of abstention that they were in the forefront for to come up with issues of condomization But far more Significantly was the church was reluctant With much of the support from the u.s. Government to talk about condomization And to talk about gender issues and The disproportionate impact of women in this pandemic And about other connected things Men who have sex with men the right of adults To have sex with other adults and and the question of sex work The right of adults to negotiate money for their bodies And so year again you found Muslim organizations Inspired by Islam Getting into trouble with their communities But they were in the forefront of raising these issues And in some ways this had to do with the fact that churches were victims of synods Churches are victims of of hierarchies Churches are victims of orders You have to wait for your but in Islam there is far more regal room It doesn't mean that those Muslims don't get into that they don't get into trouble But there isn't an excommunication process that can happen And so organizations like the call of Islam For the churches that were engaged in the struggle against hiv Found themselves in an ideologically and in an intellectually prophetic role The question of philanthropy for example The largest philanthropists in our country Today are muslim philanthropists. We had the interesting case at the moment We a it's a dreadful case A medical doctor Karabus was held in dubai some of you may have heard of it was held in dubai For an operation that had performed 12 years ago And he had forgotten about it on his way now to attend his daughter's wedding or back from his daughter's wedding He was he was arrested 82 years old Jailed he was jailed in abstention 10 years ago a jewish guy And initially the jewish press made a huge thing about this guy being jewish We never knew he was jewish until i led the jewish until i read the jewish press But it's part again of About how jewish identity often is far more central to jews than what muslim identity is to muslims So then i read in the jewish press that oh karabus was actually a jew And then they followed a series of articles about how bad the muslims were and muslim justice were And the sharia and how the sharia is the problems to all of this And now it turns out That the two characters in south africa Is who's been leading the karabus the campaign to free karabus I don't know how the jewish community is going to respond to this in the next week because karabus is coming home Tomorrow or the day after the two leading figures after all this anti sharia stuff Who are bringing karabus home is our deputy minister of foreign affairs Who's a virulent anti zionist on the one hand And on the other hand The medical doctor who heads Africa's largest Philanthropy a deeply religious muslim with a fairly solid what i suspect is a fundamentalist beard And he's been traveling to dubai several time to go and Ensure that karabus is freed And so the muslim community plays an interesting role in local things local politics local philanthropy HIV AIDS and so on many muslims serve on the leadership of a number of NGO organizations um religious and non-religious Um, I serve on about 11 Development boards not one of them is a muslim board despite the fact that i'm a muslim theologian Um, I also have a very other interesting body bds a boycott divestments and sanctions and some of you may not Be happy with that but the very interesting thing about bds in south africa Unlike in many other places bds is a largely black thing And bds is a largely jewish thing bds When it was the commemoration of The the united nations international holocaust memorial day bds had a memorial a large attended memorial at the israeli aparte at the At the aparte museum No, sorry at the constitutional court which was a former jail in the apartheid era and now houses the constitutional court And we had a respectable well attended a Holocaust memorial And it's fascinating because I don't know If in other parts of the world a pro-palestine boycott divestment and sanctions group Would have a holocaust memorial And the holocaust memorial wasn't a screen for palestine solidarity activity We had the chairperson of the human rights commission there Desmond tutu had a podcast a letter to it We had holocaust survivors there and the folk the entire focus of the meeting was the scourge Of anti- jewish racism in the world in general And more particularly the scourge of anti- Semitism inside our own ranks the palestine solidarity ranks The point that I want to make is this that South africa still has a strong We resist We're still part of what many of you guys we resist I think what many of people certainly in dc and the united states still represent We're not friendly to the united states We're not friendly to the international monetary fund. We're not friendly to the world bank We're not friendly to barrack obama. We don't feel beholden to the western world We think of ourselves as a as part of the south But inside this it is possible for us to use our own traditions And to carve out our own Understandings of what it means to contribute to a more humane world A humane world free of homophobia A humane world free of gender injustice a remain a humane world where the death and And those who can't see and people who have fun and people of darker skins And people from the margins of the society that they can really find a place where it is safe for them to be human That's an african conclusion with this. It's not a free We're having a tough time This crime when you open your borders after all these years all sorts of people come in drug traffickers come in And what for you may be all sorts of people also come in you are a muslim You contributed to this country because you thought that under apartheid Muslim marriages weren't recognized If I fight as a muslim Muslim marriages are going to be recognized muslim radio stations are now going to get on board But you have a very narrow idea of what a muslim is You didn't expect when the doors of freedom opened that faggots are also going to move in I'm using the word deliberately The pejorative word deliberately. So what are these? So you thought once we in with our islam and one man four wives No desperation in that direction yet, but kind of signs here and there And your halal food and and and you thought that as soon as you in the doors are going to close behind you But hold it The organization of lesbian and gay activists, they also fought for the new south africa. You're not going to stop us from coming in There are many other whites. There are others also So now inside an africa played a huge role in The freedom of our country. We can't now close our borders to the nigerians But they bring lots of other things with them and so In the new south africa as we struggle with this whole human rights culture that we're building We only used to torturing people in jail We're not used to a human rights culture of dealing with crimes And so we're sitting We're sitting with all of this We're sitting with all of this this open border thing And The lack of respect for authority The age old respect lack of respect for human life in south africa But the dreams of our nation are still intact And i think that this combination of people Desiring diversity and desperate for diversity But also understanding that diversity and social cohesion Can also be code language For the perpetuation of oppression Social cohesion can also be code language For the maintenance of socioeconomic systemic Injustices poverty and a growing gap between wealth and poverty on the one hand So in the middle of this the muslim community negotiates it way Struggles to draw its responses from the quran on the one hand A whole lot of The radicalism of other parts of the world also creeping into the country Us just depending that in south africa the 350 calm moderate Tradition even inside jihad a moderate tradition that has persisted We are pretty confident That um That the angry noisy destructive Misogenic homophobic voices that from time to time raise their voice In the country That it is generally just swamped By swaths of organizational and organized civil society Work that takes place in different forms That drowns out the negative voices in our country. Thank you very much Thank you very much We again we're getting at time. Why don't we take a set of questions together and turn back to our panel We have one in the far back And if you could identify yourself Uh Okay, my name is Ernest. I'm from Nigeria and I'm a PhD student at judgments in university My question is to sabastin And my question is what is the relationship between poverty and extremism? Um, you did mention how niger is one of the poorest country in the whole world And because of that you said that there is potential maybe because of their poverty They can go to extremism maybe as time goes on But I just want to bring you back to the situation in northern Nigeria Because what we have maybe from the press or even from the west is that poverty Is the cost of extremism in northern Nigeria? But I want to tell you that as in Nigeria I find it difficult to believe that poverty is the cost of Is the cost of extremism in northern Nigeria because just from the report that was released recently Um 80 percent of the oil blocks in southern Nigeria is owned by the not the last the muslims But at the same time, uh, the west continue to maybe the theory is that poverty is because of Um, it is the cost of Boko Haram or the cost of what people are fighting in northern Nigeria So based on your study of niger one of the poorest country in the whole world And yet despite the fighting in Nigeria and in and in Nigeria and the marie They're still together despite the poverty level in that country And I just want to quote a religious critic in Nigeria who said that it is an insult to say that the poor Or because they are poor and that is why they are fighting. So I just want you maybe to elaborate on that Great. Thanks very much Questions I actually had one for you for you too, Sebastian, which is The government's response and politicians response to izala and how it's shaping political responses Yes Thank you Pascal Siegel from inside through analysis. My question is to me. Mr. Elisha. Um, sorry You have outlined the risk of radicalization of the izala movement. Do you see any Signs in the society that could prevent that radicalization Okay, uh, thank you and thank you for uh You very justified question. Um, the first question is What's the relationship between poverty and extremism? Um I said in my presentation that what we've seen so far this this version of reformist islam has not turned violent And and as such it belongs to a nonviolent form of Salafism um I don't think Also drawing on my own personal experience or my own research in neighboring algeria That it is necessarily poverty That leads to extremism or that leads to uh, uh Extreme violence if you want to but but certainly if if you look at the living conditions in the sahel Which by the way are different from the living conditions in Nigeria They are much worse Then certainly what what poverty does is uh, almost inevitable because that that is its nature It creates a sense of marginalization. Okay, it creates a sense of a political and economic marginalization If you talk to people on the nigerian countryside and especially if you talk to islamic theologians Uh, who belong to the sufi order. They are pretty outspoken about the fact that things have gotten a lot worse since 1991 Um, and and they see a direct link between a decline in living standards Which in the case of niger has to do Uh, with world market prices for certain goods such as uranium and gas Um, they see this as as a major as a major course Um, and the fact that the itzala movement is of course financially capable Of providing certain services That the nation state is unable to provide Uh, uh leads to the fact that you have uh a shift towards a more conservative interpretation of the quran Now if you look at algeria And I said in my presentation I don't mean to say that a conservative form of islam inevitably leads to violence. That is wrong But if you look at what happened in mali and what look what happened in algeria Normally at some point or another these movements split Okay, they split into two because one islamic cleric Uh, might be convinced that you know a situation now has occurred that justifies the killing of muslims by other muslims That is pretty much what happened in algeria during the early 90s You know during the political struggle of more conservative islam against the nation state Um, I think poverty greatly facilitates this and might play into it Uh, but but I don't think poverty is is the only factor in this Um, but it is a facilitator of of radicalism And maybe also at some point of violent radicalism coming back to your question. What is the response of Uh, the central government. Well, there hasn't been a response until recently Um in april 2011 a new nigerian government was elected in a free and democratic manner And this government so far has undertaken great efforts Uh, uh in in bringing back a sense of political inclusion in niger And it's been fairly successful in attracting western development Uh, all throughout The last decade certainly between 2000 and 2010 when niger participated in the hippie initiative There were very very little genuine initiatives to fight poverty by the central government A lot of that money has gone into the overblown public service A lot of the money that's been set free by the hippie initiative has gone into bribing the military Uh, and really the previous democratic government was not in a constant dialogue with the population In fact, a lot of public attention was taken up by the touric rebellion Which was used to justify a censorship on on the free media So what is the central government doing? I would say until recently it's it's doing very little Or it's done very little What what are the signs in society to counter this kind of extremism Well, I see uh, I certainly see here a positive role for the traditional sufi brotherhoods I also do see a very positive role somewhat ironic though of the catholic church There is a very minute catholic minority in niger And it's been largely the sufi brotherhoods And it's been the catholic church that's been engaged in inter-religious dialogue And indeed it is those fora that are being organized by the catholic church in nirme That provides so far the only opportunities for Conversation between sufi islam And the itzala movement. We are we are Overtime in fact and so I while I hope we you can engage your speaker the speaker is kind of after the next session And as we quickly grab our box lunch there, please do try to grab your lunch Get something to drink and be seated so we can move on with the next panel Please join me too and thanking three fascinating presentations Okay Hope you're all enjoying your box lunches. Um, we're going to carry on with the program right now So feel free to munch away. Uh, and as we as we carry on Um, my name is Richard Downey with the program here and uh, welcome to our third panel Um, we've been very careful this morning to look at the multitude of ways positive and negative in which islam interacts with Politics and social life in africa One trend of course that can't be ignored is the growing problem of violence extremist organizations in some parts of sub-saharan africa At least some of them driven by distorted interpretation Of islam and some again a minority but some which propose or advocate the use of violent methods to achieve Achieve their agenda The popular argument goes and we've heard it several times this morning that new forms of puritanical islam Some of which are violent are alien to africa that they've been imported from the arabian peninsula and elsewhere And if that's the case what accounts for their appeal in places like somalia In marley and northern nigeria and what are the security and other implications for the affected countries? How are muslim? How are mainstream muslims and followers of other faiths responding? And what if anything can outsiders like the united states? Or others do to contain the threat or we best off leaving it well alone? Well our speakers i hope are going to tackle some of these big questions In particular by discussing three case studies marley, ethiopia in northern nigeria I'll briefly introduce the speakers to you but you have their biographies, so i won't do them full justice But on my far left is paul lubeck Who's associate director of the africa studies program at john sopkins the university of advanced international studies seiss Also co-director of the center for global international and regional studies at the university of california and santa cruz And literally just off the plane from nigeria, so we'll have some new insights to share with us this afternoon In the middle terry austubo is assistant professor at the university of florida's department of religion and the center for african studies Long-time researcher into islam in africa particularly in ethiopia And that's the area of the region horn of africa that he'll be discussing And then finally on my immediate left alex thurston who's a phd candidate in the religion department at north western university Currently working on his completing his dissertation On northern nigeria And it's arab educated activist intellectuals Alex is a author of the sahel blog excellent blog which i'm sure many of you are familiar with as well So uh with that i will start with alex and we'll work our way down the line alex. Thanks very much All right. Well, thank you Thank you for that introduction and thank you very much to to csis for hosting all of us today. I'm I'm delighted to be here for to discuss this kind of timely topic I'm going to focus on um al-qaeda in the islamic maghreb or aqim The affiliate of the global al-qaeda movement In algeria and in parts of the sahel And i'm going to be talking about them in particular in uh in the context of algeria and then in northern mali the Key takeaway that i want to leave you with today and i think it it will fit well with some of what especially what dr. Mandeville said this morning um is that Extremism in my view should not be understood as a straightforward importation of foreign influences but rather As the outcome of many factors Including an interaction between the local the regional and the global And i want to talk about that interaction between the local regional and the global in two ways So first i'm going to borrow a term from my friend Dr. Ostobo and talk about the localization Of jihadist groups processes by which aqim particularly northern mali has has Attempted to reach out or to become implicated or become involved in local communities. That's the first way The first form of interaction i want to talk about And then the second is kind of looking at that in reverse almost looking at how Individuals in this case i'll talk about one individual from northern mali became implicated in regional and global jihadist networks So to try and come up come at these interactions from from both sides i'll start with a sort of pre-history and then history of aqim And and i think this will also reinforce the idea that that these movements oftentimes have their origins in specific local histories And then become implicated in broader global patterns or global networks So if we turn to to algeria we find algeria becomes independent in 1962 It's under a one-party rule by the national liberation front for the first several decades after independence Islam became one of the Arenas or or you know one of the channels through which people could could begin to mobilize politically And the you know mosques and and other islamic spaces become became places in in algeria Certainly by the 80s where activists could come together and and begin different kinds of political organization so when algeria Legalized multi-partyism in 1988 There was one of the strongest movements that emerged was the islamic salvation front or feasts in 1989 algeria held Two rounds of multi-party parliamentary elections in 1991 92 in the first round in 1991 the feasts performed extremely well And looked poised to perform very well in the second round, which was scheduled to be held in early 1992 The algerian military at that point Fearing what it might look like to have an islamist party Come to power via the ballot box the algerian military stepped in in a military coup and that action launched You know years of civil war and and the algerian civil war the end of it can be dated to To various points, but we'll say roughly, you know eight years or a decade of civil war So the proto-aq am comes out of algeria civil war out of armed islamic groups that emerged in the context of of the civil war between Muslim actors and and the algerian state and of course algeria is an overwhelmingly muslim majority country, so we're talking about Muslims on both sides in many cases So you have the the formation of the armed islamic group or the the gia in 1992 and then an offshoot of the Gia called the the Salafist group for preaching in combat or the gspc Formed around 1998 is sort of the proto aq am The both of these movements the gia and the gspc were were excluded from various amnesty programs that the algerian state had for militants And were sort of marginalized from algerian society because of their involvement in massacres of civilians Around 2003 the gspc began to take a seherin turn So they were involved that year in 2003 in an incident where they kidnapped 32 european tourists After 2003 the gspc was responsible for attacks For example on an army outpost in moritania in 2005 So we start to see this this seherin turn by the gspc In 2006 i'm an azoahiri the the sort of number two and and the global al-qaeda at that time Released a message, you know affirming sort of unity between the the gspc and and Al-qaeda and then in 2007 the gspc sort of formally rebranded itself as um as al-qaeda and the islamic margaret as a branch or a franchise of al-qaeda But again, I want to stress that Just because they've taken on the name doesn't necessarily mean that all of their orders come from pakistan or something like that And that it's a straightforward process whereby Aq am acts in the name of of al-qaeda central or or something like that um So now I want to get it at some of the mechanisms of of localization and particularly in northern mali And a qi am remains active or has remained active in northern algeria There have been periodic waves of bombing campaigns and attacks and and a qi am retains a presence in algeria But it's also conducted attacks um since its rebranding and and even before as I discussed Conducted attacks in mali In moritania in in nijer It's been responsible for kidnappings and and attacks In moritania for example attacks near the the french and israeli embassies So to turn to these mechanisms of of localization First of all one is is kidnapping itself Of course a qi am in some cases seems to have directly seized European tourists or european aid workers in other cases It seems to have been local criminal outfits that would kidnap these people So the interaction first of all between a qi am and local criminal outfits represents one dynamic of localization another Aspect of that with kidnapping localization is is ransom payments Ransom payments have sometimes been arranged by local intermediaries. So there's yet another way that the a qi am has been Connected with local networks are connected with local politicians even Who brokered hostage negotiations. So yad aghali The the leader of ansara dean one of the the primary players in the islamist coalition that took over northern mali in 2012 Was at one point in the early 2000s one of these negotiators one of these intermediaries between A qi am and and european governments or others seeking to secure the release of hostages So we have kidnapping as a mechanism of of localization Another one is drug smuggling. Of course the the sahara has seen, you know trade and smuggling for for centuries Or millennia even Since the 1990s there's been increased trade in or smuggling of of cigarettes and weapons in particular and then in the 2000s a a lot of trade or smuggling and cocaine And a qi am, you know, according to persistent reports and you know international media and other sources a qi am has become deeply implicated In these forms of smuggling and so I want to argue that smuggling is yet another arena where a qi am becomes implicated in local networks and connected to local actors So these two forms of criminality kidnapping and and smuggling have have been ways In which a qi am has been drawn into to local communities The third arena of localization that i want to talk about is is a qi am's efforts to reach out to people on the basis of local grievances So we saw the the rebellion in mali that began last year that was far from the first rebellion That northern mali has seen there was a prior rebellion Starting around 2006 one that started in 1990 Earlier rebellions one for example in 1963-64 Particularly after the 1990 to 96 rebellion. There were various grievances left in northern mali People who felt that they were marginalized by the state people who felt that the state had abandoned them particularly in periods of drought An a qi am reached out to people on the basis of of those grievances um The final mechanism of localization that i want to talk about is intermarriage So we see what appear to be strategic decisions by a qi am commanders to marry local women So mohtar bel mohtar who's been reportedly killed but who was at one time A major a qi am commander in the sahara married a woman from timbuktu There were recently In the the media there were Interviews with a woman who was married to abu dar dar who was another algerian commander In a qi am and this woman was from gow. I believe in northern mali So we see kind of a pattern or a strategy among algerian a qi am commanders Of marrying local women in order to to forge ties with communities and in order to build bonds and um, it seems that Uh, when a qi am commanders married these women. They're also marrying into families and they're marrying into networks So it goes beyond just a union of two people but but into really a union of two networks or two groups so these are four processes that That i've been looking at to think about how a qi am became implicated in local life um, and localized to some extent despite their Rhetorical affiliations with the global al-qaeda and their their stated objectives of of jihad and so forth that they also Were drawn into local communities in various ways So now i want to turn to looking at the process from a different angle and that's how individuals from Say northern mali have become implicated in regional and global jihadist networks So i'd like to look at the case of someone named umar old hamaha who's A militant commander who was identified in the international press especially early on as a spokesman for ansara dean But this has been increasingly identified as a spokesman and commander for mojwa Or the the movement for unity in jihad in west africa um A sort of splinter group of of a qi am that appears to have especially targeted or made efforts to recruit Black africans and other groups that weren't necessarily represented fully within the original a qi am So hamaha is ethnically arab was born in a place called bear, which is in the timbuktu region of northern mali He was born around 1965 Attended secondary school in timbuktu With many of these these militant figures and assembling their biographies. It's extremely murky and and so this is really just a A sketch and there's a lot that that i haven't been able to fill in But he attended timbuktu secondary school in timbuktu graduated in 1984 and then went To moritania for coronic studies until about 1990 Then returned to timbuktu in 1990 And was apparently denied permission by local authorities to preach in the mosque So it seems that already by the time he came back from from moritania that there was A different understanding or a difference of understanding between him and and local religious elites in timbuktu At the same time as i mentioned before in the early 90s. There was uh, one of these twareg twareg led rebellions The one that spanned from 1990 to 96 One of hamaha's brothers was was reportedly killed In that rebellion and so between these two factors These conflicts with local religious authorities and then Possible fear of repression from authorities for having had a brother who was involved in the rebellion Hamaha went into hiding and at this point his biography becomes extremely murky. So potentially he went to algeria Potentially he went to afghanistan in any case He seems to have left mali and become implicated somehow in regional and possibly global jihadist networks and by the time he resurfaces In the 2000s it's as an aqim fighter and then we see him Coming to even greater prominence during the 2012-2013 crisis as a spokesman for Ansara deen and and then as a commander and leader within mojoa And some of the Some of the confusion about which group he he belongs to may point to The difficulty of obtaining credible information and the difficulty of Using evidence in the media, but I think it also reinforces this point about localization if it becomes hard to differentiate between Ansara deen or mojoa or aqim I think that helps reinforce this point about localization and show that it's not necessarily easy to say Okay, ansara deen because it was founded by iad agali who's a malian national that that's a local group somehow And that these other groups aqim and mojoa are somehow foreign groups I really think that that we need to be much more careful about how we draw lines between local and foreign in these cases So these are actually the the main points that that I want to make and I think that I'll stop here, especially because I know that we're we're running a little bit behind But so just to reinforce my my key points. I think that I think it's unwise to make stark divisions between the local and the global and and to China understand extremism in west africa simply as a phenomenon that's been imported from the outside So I think it's important to pay attention again to these two dimensions one How groups maybe with a global or transnational agenda become tied to local communities? And then secondly how individuals from local communities may enter into these global networks very complicated ways. So thank you Thank you very much. Alex and terry over to you Thank you. Yeah, I'm also happy to be here and also want to thank the organizer for inviting me Uh, I'm going to speak about the horn of africa and in particular Focus on on the countries of Somalia and Ethiopia Every one of us who works on horn africa and I guess terry's would agree that Horn africa is unique But when it comes to religion is definitely unique because of the long history of both islamic christianity and the particular legacy of christian Muslim relations And the way this have had Implications for defining muslim identity and and also for current regional politics in the region Um talking about Somalia in Ethiopia Somalia is known to all of you the way it has shifted the conflicts have shifted from our clan based Civil war to a more religiously based insurgency and then we have Ethiopia Uh, which has not seen the same level of violence far from that But nevertheless have seen Intense debates among muslims Over legitimate religious practices There has been increasing Contestation of religious boundaries The christian muslim relations are becoming more fragile And then the last year we have seen huge demonstrations Within the capital Addis Abba and also other major cities And in both these cases what is dominating the picture is what we commonly label as Salafism There two very different representations of Salafism in two very too close attached countries Somalia and Ethiopia Which by themselves of course are also very very different Um, but in spite of these differences what we see is that local policy makers in the area and to some degree international policy makers tend to Um View them as relatively similar Uh, the al-Shabaab has been labeled and I think for good reasons that terrorist extremists And uh has been targeted militarily something I think would be Hardly could have been avoided Yet at the same time we see that the Ethiopian regime has also equated its Salafism With extremism and terrorism And treated and and reacted quite heavy-handed To the apolitical muslim demonstrations that we're seeing In in the last year and I will argue that this can have some serious implications When we talk about Salafism in Africa and also in general, I mean it's it's I think we all can Can agree that it's it's difficult to talk about a homogeneous phenomenon Uh, one interesting trend that I see is what I call the politicization of purity Um, while Salafism is best understood as a religious movement To maintain or secure religious purity or devoted to religious fear Uh, this politicization of purity means Means a movement or a shift towards trying to carve out symbolic and territorial space For the realization of purity Meaning that they try to establish political and territorial control over certain areas With the objective enforcing purity So what we see in in in contrast to What we used to call or maybe still call Islamism the Salafi the The Salafi thinkers of trying to politicize purity Does not have a similar elaborate political theory. It's more about trying to eradicate Sufism and trying to destruct Sufi shrines and then enforce and pose a certain Morality upon the people And al-Shabaab is a very good example of that al-Shabaab in Somalia The way it established control of a large part of southern Somalia And how it immediately started the programs of of flogging appetitions destruction of of Sufi shrines And moreover banning of cut and then even banning the world championship in soccer, which is Little hard to comprehend But it's important to underline. I think we talk about this that what we see here is that these are rather This trend is observable in some few cases. We cannot talk about this as being a dominant trend within african Salafism we have seen Like in Sahel, it has nevertheless had significant Consequences, but the majority of Salafis in Africa remain devoted To maintaining religious purity Through peaceful means such as Dawa and and education And then we have another interesting if we may use the word trend within Salafism, which is directly opposed To this increasing Policization or politicization of purity The movement has been labeled by some as the al-hadith movement And the Albanian born Nasser al-Din al-Albani has been a very important figure in this Um, and he has been directly opposed to any sort of Of political activism that stems from Thinkers like the the muslim brotherhood side cooked and so on Uh, and instead advocated for a quietest apolitical approach to how to advocate his program And it's been underscoring Dawa and education As the means to purify the individual and the society And here is the interesting point that when we talk about or see Salafism in Ethiopia Particularly the young generation of of Salafism Ethiopia We clearly see that this this uh, this movement draw much much inspiration From this apolitical quietest form of of Salafism They have been avoiding any kind of political engagement Uh, they have been relatively self protective And we may also say that they they entertain somewhat xenophobic attitudes towards Engagement in formal poly political life if we then talk about political institutions And and so on And the irony however is that when the Ethiopian government is Accusing Salafis of of becoming more politicized the irony is that It is those groups that most clearly are advocating this quietest approach that then are being accused of being political And what have been responses to to this in Horn of Africa And I want to hear focus on on the the policy of the Ethiopian regime of the last year or so Um, historically we may say that within Ethiopia that there has been inherent fear or Concern of Islam as as an outside force as a political threat, which we can trace back to the to the 16th century I will not do that here And but this this this constant this constant notion that Islam is a potential threat to this To to the Ethiopian polity And what we also have seen in in with the current regime is that over the last decade or so there has been an increasing trend um Or increasing Development where they have been more concerned over potential or or growing radicalization Among Ethiopian Muslims and what we see is that it's the Salafi movement that Has been brown been branded as those that As as as extremist And this took a new turn by summer 2011 where the so-called alabash movement were Brought in from Lebanon. I can maybe return to that in the q&a the movement has portrayed itself as the main advocate of islamic moderate moderate ism and it was brought in to contain the spread of Salafism and We may say it in the way was being Working together with the government. It was said to or could be seen to in Bring in some sort of a political governmental form of Islam um And the same time we have seen over the last decade or so how the regime has been um Co-opting major islamic institutions most uh, particularly the Supreme council of islamic affairs But even mosques they have been trying to monitor quite closely with the objective of curtailing any form of of expansion of Salafism But what we see I argue is this a blanket labeling of Salafi Muslims as one category and um and clearly I believe we see an regime that is very in an ill informed of what goes on within its own Among its own Muslim population They have no very little idea about the the logical features And most Much of its policies are based on pre-emptive premature assumptions And the demonstration we have seen over the last year has been a reaction to this and the demonstrators are accusing the regime of uh interference in internal religious affairs The regime uh, that the dream is is deciding what kind of islam is to be practiced in Ethiopia And the demonstrators are also accusing the regime of violating the secular principle of separation between religionists and state um, and What we see is that uh over the year or so The result has been increasingly tense relations between the Muslim population and and the state And and there is a clear risk that the labeling of Muslims or Salafis as extremist as politicized Could be a self fulfilling prophecy That the movement then would move in in the very direction which the government is trying to avoid And I think the the situation in a horn particularly when we talk about when you talk about Ethiopia, but also other areas There are two major points That that that are that are important to to to remind ourselves. The first is that Salafism or any kind of islamic reformism far is far from any homogeneous phenomenon And connected to that it is extremely important to be aware Of the ideological and social political nuances of each context secondly uh Local and international Actors policy makers regimes tend to ignore these nuances and often we see over generalized Uh labels such as extremism terrorism and then subsequent policies Being carried out that do not differentiate between more militant groups and those who are apolitical quietists who would be focused on religious reform rather political engagement and I think these have very Serious or very can have very negative implications as it creates new tensions And possibly situation of increased militancy What I talk about this is self-fulfilling prophecy when people are labeled as extremist They've been alienated and then They turn in that direction And finally, I I think the situation in Ethiopia is extremely worrisome We all know that Ethiopia has been celebrated as its model for peaceful coexistence between christians and muslims That is the truth with some reservations though But the regime's policies are clearly Aligning the larger parts of the muslim population They're being they're feeling that they're under attack And it seems so far. They're determined to keep on demonstrating against Uh the the regime's policies Christian muslim relations are coming in more and more fragile and what we see is that uh To a large extent the christian population is buying into the rhetoric or even propaganda from the regime Where they are portrayed as extremist and muslims are portrayed as extremist and I think this Um This is going to be something which is going to be hard to mend the way the two groups are now moving in a more polemic relationship And also given Ethiopia's size is strategic Place in the horn I think what happens there will have it can have Also region original implications in the way that other muslims and other areas of the horn are reacting to the way The muslims are treated within Ethiopia. So i'm worried about uh the future in terms of of Relationship within the state and the muslim populations and also the social fabric of christian and muslim relations within the area Thank you Thank you very much and uh over to uh pool to round us off pool. Thanks Thank you very much. Uh We'd like to thank you very much for inviting me. I'm I've just returned from uh 10 days in Nigeria and I can spend time on some of the in the q&a and And some of the points i'll make uh in the powerpoint. So i've compressed enormous amount of material here and uh edited it for the Time uh allocated here. So there'll there'll be some bumps in the transition which I I want to warn you about uh my uh take on uh Northern Nigeria and Boko Haram is centered on uh social movement theory and I view Boko Haram unlike other movements As an indigenous Urban insurrection. It is multi-class. It has members of the elites affiliated with it It has school dropouts It has a network Within the region of west africa and globally Also, it draws upon global sourcing of ideas resources I believe now funding And it is fragmenting like all Salafist groups It had the interesting aspect of Salafism Is nothing can be invented Or it would be An unacceptable innovation. So Uh innovation occurs by discovering that which was originally authentic and once pious ancestors So what i'm going to begin and talk about the situation in northern Nigeria, uh, which constitutes 72 percent of The land mass of Nigeria. I make this point because there will be No stability, I believe in Nigeria nor Economic growth nor security for american energy resources Unless the crisis in northern Nigeria is dealt with So much of my argument begins with a discussion of the nature of the crisis Which has multiple dimensions. It's been going on for decades And it has created the environment that has incubated Boko Haram The major feature of Boko Haram that is shocking the population of northern Nigeria Is the nihilist violence suicide bombings Uh, the amount of conflict that is unprecedented in previous periods Uh, so here's a brief summary on why Nigeria matters And most of us are aware of this. I won't spend time on it Nigeria especially in the Lagos region Southwest Nigeria is is doing very well economically innovating But the economic growth rate of around 7 percent is impressive It has many functioning institutions within Nigeria But its problems are As well as we know enormous disorganization and criminality including The petrol oligarchy who shares and redistributes petrol rents Enormous leading enormous poverty and corruption in Nigeria Which is not in a direct cause of relationship with Boko Haram But certainly creates the population of Potential applicants to radical movements This is true everywhere else in the world and it's been verified in the northern Nigerian case Now this map here summarizes The situation in the election of 2011 The Muslim northern candidate Buhari took these states here Those are the sharia states the states between 1999 and 2003 that implemented criminal sharia law Private and personal law in courts were available to Muslims Between 1999 and 2003 12 states Legislatures implemented sharia criminal law and it's very important for understanding the background to Boko Haram This is the old northern region here This area here is mixed middle belt and Christian and Muslim. They're Christian and Muslims here But the key to understanding the region is the enormous inequality Poverty and human misery in the far north here and I'll provide you some evidence for that The Pre-colonial states the Sokoto-Kelafate here Touches Niger all the way to Burkina Faso Cameroon down here southern Nigeria To Eloran and Yoruba speaking areas and Bornu the state here, which once stretched up into Chad and into Libya also in Cameroon and in Chad here All of these networks have not disappeared. I lived on the border once between Niger and Nigeria They're completely integrated porous flows Around these regions so that these networks were formed during these pre-colonial Regimes states they involve scholars pilgrimage routes Students trade And shared languages and culture. So this is clearly an environment for a regional movement This is a map of the old northern region again I've given you an idea of the scale The the Boko Haram arises from an unprecedented multifaceted crisis in northern Nigeria A crisis of legitimacy for the political elites You have the collapse of bargaining in the 2011 election the north feels marginalized Uh, there's no coordination between the 19 governors or the 12 governors of the muslim Sharia states There's a fracturing of the former Politically elite they had three or four four candidates for the presidency in 2011 And a fragmentation of Islamic authority where in earlier periods The politically elites Integrated and symbolized by the Sultan of Sokoto provided a common narrative At least one that was was hegemonic that hegemony is now Been destroyed by the fragmentation You have a realignment in the middle belt as Pentecostal Christianity What its roots in the United States has made enormous inroads, especially with the Christian Association of Nigeria Which northern muslims feel threatened by and its most radical elements They are anti ecumenical They argue that Allah is a different god than the god of abraham Uh, and I believe for that reason the catholic church has withdrawn from the christian association of Nigeria This uh, the outcome here is a loss of confidence on the part of the elites where they fear for their lives Uh, and you have a true legitimacy crisis Now we all know that crisis is the midwife of innovation So I think we have to look at the upside here and the possibility that the northern elites will face their problems and attempt to deal with them And I'll try to provide some of them. So The problem the heart of this problem I'll go to it with some data in a moment is a demographic crisis Jack Goldstone's work on this Is key reading for anyone wishing to understand northern Nigeria have an enormous increase in population Nigeria's overall population is barely 50 percent urbanized that means Every 14 years there'll be a new cohort Of people moving to cities So you have the urbanization of northern muslim youth One group that gets a lot of attention are the karanik students that wander And beg and then become part of the lumpen population of northern cities They were recruited into boko around but didn't play That don't they don't play leadership roles And you also have western school leavers filling the city and in large numbers of university graduates who lack any opportunity to use the Degrees that they had spent and devoted themselves to You have the collapse of industrial production in the industrial estates of northern Nigeria And the decay of agro infrastructures irrigation and others that Undermind the potential to grow food And the problem is the increasing number of states have produced economically Unviable states, so they're talking about doing the zones as a way to reorganize Nigeria And there's no recovery strategy So here's here's an example of the I've taken the sharia states Average fertility and separated them and compared them to Nigeria in general So the average birth rate in a number of children per woman the crude fertility rate is 7 0.3 to 7.4 On average in the 12 northern states in Sokoto it is 8.6 And when I was there in december I asked health workers that this was accurate and they thought it was an underestimate So the population Is growing and it is one Where the north is producing the conditions for increasing Misarization compare it to the southwest the most developed area And this is a dynamic that would be very difficult to stop It's also important that it cannot be uh Delt with unless the economic educational and social status Of northern girls and women are raised. That's the policy issue to solve the demographic Time bomb that is underneath the insurrection So that if you look at the genealogy and the origins of Boko Haram, Boko Haram Is the invidious term used by critics of The movement it arises from a Salafist movement Uh, and it combines two elements. I believe first is Restorationism to restore The golden age of the empires you saw earlier in return Northern Nigeria to good governance under sharia law given the failure of western law and the in the failure of governance by western educated elites who are known as the the Boko the yum Boko Uh, the Discourses and uh, which I'll go over with Muhammad Yusuf a charismatic leader In my dugary, uh becomes it's the key center He has a conflict with security forces in 2009 and then the muslim president yar adewa Calls in the Army and they level the area and then begin a purge over the Anyone who is seen to be associated with Boko Haram, which I'll talk about The insurgency then takes place after the suppression of 2009 The key event is in september 2010 would have very well organized prison break in In bouchie a Emirate of northern northern, ijiri this so kato caliphate And then you have movement Targeted assassinations of police Prison breaks taking of weapons from police stations Score settling against people they perceive As having taken their property or were involved in the suppression of the movement The strike against kano with six suicide bombers hitting all of the security centers Displayed a level of sophistication That the nigerian security forces could only admire admire for its organization They took out the triple s the regional security Immigration and then police headquarters opened up the prisons all Carried out with discipline without An announcements to the local population to avoid being attacked I'll talk about the breakup of the movement so the the movement culturally the The the theology and the ideology of this movement arises from a Salafist movement led by a Elite scholar abubakar gumi who very early on Develops contacts in saudi arabia He is an innovative preacher He returns to nigeria campaigns against sufi's particularly the tejani of brotherhood He has great networks within saudi arabia The petrol wealth of saudi arabia is funneled as patronage through gumi Gumi then Leads this campaign against magic and Other practices that he Defines as un islamic. He forms an organization as a long name Calling for the eradication of innovation and the return to the suna because under the name the azala And he spearheads a demand for sharia law in northern nigeria He also and this is a element that's taken up and described in detail by roman in roman lohmire But is available in field interviews Breaks what i would call the tech fear barrier Where he declares? Tijaniya followers to be apostates He recants on this later on but it's a key element in Boko haram's later evolution because they practice tech fear the condemning of other muslims Izala splinters after the death of gumi in 1992 A moderate jafar adam who is educated in teacher's training college in kano and in the islamic university of medina Preaches in my dugary and Muhammad yusuf the charismatic shake who leads Boko haram is one of his students They have a rupture Muhammad yusuf in about 2002 Sets up a Community in my dugary and it becomes a state within a state with its own shura He appoints Amir's for nijer chad To different states highly organized politically Yusuf then is a member of the ulama. It's important for people to understand He's accepted as a member of the ulama who is extreme He is invited to preach uh To just to not to preach but to defend his views in many video Exchanges with other scholars and he presents himself as a credible person. He doesn't present himself as a lunatic. He's polite and his literal reading of the Quran. I believe is consistent and he opposes western Education in his present form in nigeria because it mixes the genders and he opposes any belief that conflicts with a strict Reading of the his reading. I might add of the Quran and the hadith And he debates these issues quite credibly with scholars. These are on youtube if you wish to follow them He preaches the other other other element is a condemnation of what's called political sharia This is the political sharia. This is the sharia that was implemented from 1999 to 2003 Uh, he and because it is under secular judges in each state Ultimately and not a true sharia as he imagines it and as the majority of the population imagines What would true sharia be in this restorationist vision that motivates the sharia movement in nigeria? He also speaks Uh Vokes hostility towards the nigerian state and the way in which his followers are abused by the police He makes an alliance with the governor of borneau The governor of borneau appoints one of his members to be commissioner of religious affairs by 2007. They have a falling out Uh, there's mohammed use of his arrested his followers have conflicts with the police In june of 09 There's a traffic conflict over whether his followers are wearing helmets 17 of his of his followers are shot by the nigerian police This leads to a declaration of war of jihad A final sermon by mohammed use of which is on video And uh an insurrection begins there the insurrection he launches Shows the network of bokeh oram it occurs in bouchi. Yobe outside of kano city katsina Possibly so kato. So there's clearly a network of bokeh oram And I also found them early on and by 2005 throughout kano Okay, the part of what he's articulating is the voice voice Grievances of the urban poor in this radical insurrectionist ideology Now the next wave is a wave of extraordinary political violence in northern nigeria But it's a wave of violence not solely by jihadist but by criminals and then counter violence by the security forces there's uh One of the problems in northern cities and in northern states in nigeria is that local government Authorities are under governors. They are not Local government elections are only held and perhaps half of the local government authorities If governors Have local governments and no elections They get to appoint people and they get to gain control of the share of the petroleum revenue that goes to local governments So local governance collapses in this period because of the absence of A local government authority of any type the report after the commission In kano after the conflict of 2012 Describes the virtual collapse of governance at the community level people in cities are not Under any form of governance People do not know who's there. It is easy for insurrectionary cells to set up Because of the collapse of governance in northern nigeria security forces the other it is not a question of poverty leading to a causal outcome of Insurrection but a set of variables one of which is the Authority of the abuses of the nigerian police The with the absence of local government authorities the default relationship Youth and cities have especially if they're attached to unpopular sex that are condemning the nigerian state is the nigerian police and the nigerian police's reputation for abuse for violence for extortion Are is quite extraordinary and verified by human rights groups and ngos that have studied it both within nigeria and in international human rights groups so that the Problem of we have to explain then how a movement that actually begins in 2003 In yobi the so-called taliban Still continues to 2013 And the causal variable i believe that plays its role is the role of the nigerian police and security forces another dimension of the security forces is that they do not They allow Boko aram preachers to preach and convert within the prisons So the when the prison breaks occur led by boko aram They attempt to recruit the other prisoners in the that are incarcerated with boko aram followers So the prison system itself becomes part of the incubation of the movement Again, I think that the it's clear that the crisis of governance in northern nigeria Creates the conditions for boko aram for an insurrectionary movement like this And it's a symptom of a larger crisis of governance and development So I'm going to leave with what I think are the three factions that have emerged since 2009 with muhammad yusuf The first move group is under shakao and this is members of the original shura set up by muhammad yusuf in his interview that's on youtube muhammad yusuf States that he's designated shakao as his Both of them are from yobes state And and allegedly they were quranic students together Much of the biography of muhammad yusuf in shakao yet remains to be written They are much more focused on northern nigeria their Use of indiscriminate violence is their key characteristic and they are focused I believe and others believe On dismantling the nigerian state and making it ungovernable by the levels of violence They're inflicting on christian populations international Organizations like the un and newspapers schools enormous amounts of violence the second faction that's emerged is under someone named abdul aziz Who is calling for negate negotiations? I actually spoke to people who are part of the negotiations led by the northern governors In the past two weeks people are actually negotiating with this faction In my dugary But one of the big issues here is the boko oram has made it clear that it wishes to have The rule of law and accountability For those who murdered their leaders three of their leaders and many of their followers were killed in 2009 Videos by al jazeera are available on youtube where you can see the documented slaughtering of anyone that was perceived as a member of boko oram Lastly the ansaru faction has emerged they emerged With by kidnapping in kebi state later Attempt to save them by british and nigerian troops led to the killing of the two the key Evidence for the international connections for me came in the Kidnapping of the german engineer in january 2009 Where the video that appeared was an al qaeda in moritania and the videos In al qaeda in moritania. We're calling for a prisoner swap with someone in germany So you have someone in kano moritania and germany being involved here And by chance the nigerian security forces Rated the home Which they believed was boko oram, but it was ansaru, which is a splinter group and the german was killed But it shows the sophistication of ansaru. So ansaru is perceived from interviews as uh in a A much more international perspective widespread use of arabic Linked to al qaeda in the maghreb in a more direct way with trainings in mali and calling for Reduction and indiscriminate violence by the chicow faction. There's also Beliefs by security forces Western security that they've been assassinating each other So at this point the movement is Fragmented, but i would say endemic and deeply rooted in Nigerian cities as cells But certainly the majority of nigerians Northern nigerians are not supporting them But there's a Series of concentric circles if you wish with a large number of people that favor sharia and a large number of people that have grievances against the by the Abuses inflicted upon them by nigerian security forces So i'll stop and we can follow up more with q and a thank you very much Thank you paul and all of you in fact and time is very much up against us, but i want to give The floor open to some questions and let's start with the two gentlemen over there And the table and just behind Good afternoon, i'd like to i'm mr. Lloyd from Baltimore. I'd like to address my question to Dr. Lubeck You talk extensively about sharia law just how Qualified are sharia lawyers in the northern part of Nigeria and are they Members of the nigerian bar where they can Use sharia law in the northern part of Nigeria And number two if the purpose of this islamic movements is to create A peaceful society co-existent with north and south Nigeria Are they really law abiding people or they're trying to make Issues of their own so that they can make a war of their own as well And my next question is Is the Julian military really capable Of crawling the problems up in the north. Thank you Yes before this Meeting starts. I was in Bethesda, Maryland. I was watching live one internet then when Jennifer said like the other panel was not here. I just let me make my way there Then I made it here So originally I'm from Ethiopia. So my question will be focusing on Dr. Ostebo So he's From historical background Ethiopia was the first country even the islam rich's madina from Makkah Prophet Muhammad sent his messengers to Ethiopia to the abyssinian king with a message about In the verse of the Quran Mary and Jesus then The king led them to practice their religion as they want and they are they were served And then the other main point here why Ethiopia is important to Islam and Ethiopia are inseparable and the christianity as well. So Ethiopia is the second largest black African like when it comes islam after Nigeria the the number Even though the government constitutes the number is like 35 31 person They are not good in statistics our government. So They are like 50 50 the christian population is a muslim population These two great religion lived side by side 1400 years without any, you know bullet So now as you mentioned the ahbash is imported from Lebanon His originality was born in Ethiopia then kicked out from every country it reached it just it got to Lebanon and then it becomes Hafiz al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad's regimes promoting this religion now When you mentioned like the Ethiopian government muslim population in christian population is deteriorated I think that's I found it. It's wrong. That's the historical high time between the relationship between muslims and christians They are working together because this government came from one ethnic background And it wants like the muslim leaders has to come from that. Sorry to interrupt. Do you have a question? Do you have a question to us? Yes, I do have a question Oh, you don't have a question. Okay. Well, I do have a question. Okay, please. So Dr. Rostebo, you should advise us what the western government should advise The Ethiopian government before these 40 million People become radical and dangerous for the region. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much Given the the time constraints anyone have a question on Mali so we can spread the questions are out for our Participants, okay. Let's go with the gentleman in the corner there My name My name is christian. Malanga I'm a new politician from the Congo raising Utah in Salt Lake City my concern is I heard like what the gentleman other than state about the extremists And we have a country which we call the democratic public of Congo Which we know the wealth of that country and what it's capable of doing We have people like the extremist like Asbolla that's the second To al-Qaeda in taking american lives which operating out there. We have a regime that is unpredictable okay, and My concern my question was, you know, looking at the climate right now in the Congo We have a lot of minerals out there. That's we're seeing people from Mali What in there extremists we're seeing people are coming there to buy from libya and Naming all this thing we just said right now. I did not hear anything about that You know, if is it possible you guys can start like a research On the Congo because you know, we don't want as I said, we don't want the smoking gun to be the mushroom cloud Because looking at that, we've seen what kong was capable of doing 1945 when it comes in Hiroshima Okay, and now we're seeing North Korea threatening my hosting country. That's america Okay, that's really concerned me the most and when we have a regime that cannot protect its borders Okay, it encourages and corruptions So to me, I feel more like it's a safe haven You know, it's not safe for my kids who are here and it's not safe for any other friends of Any friends of democracy sorry to cut you off again in the interest of time and Not sure if any of our speakers want to address the Congo, but I'll give them the opportunity to do so if they wish Let's let's address those questions on the table and see if we have any time for any more pools Do you want to go first? Yeah, I would be clear that I I'm a militant secularist myself here. I'm opposed to many of the ideas of the minority party In america I'm for freedom of religion and secular law. However in the case of nigeria They've had sharia law since some form of it since 1500 1450 it is Penetrated the house of language completely one of the words for justice is sharia Adilchi is another so it is It is part of everyday life. It is imprinted in how they think about their culture or what their practices are The 19th century movements of the sokhana caliphate and borneau Especially the sokhana caliphate were about the implementation of sharia. The british followed Ruled indirectly had a court system. It functioned The criminal law was taken away in 1960 the so-called compromise of 1960 It would be possible to have a system Of qualified judges is your question in northern nigeria. Yes, it is one of the interesting innovations that nigerian University are dual degrees in sharia law and What would be called common law? There I think the question you have to ask yourself is are the secular Judges that are operating in nigeria also qualified to be fair to the muslims because sharia law Gains traction in the populace because of the abysmal performance of transferred institutions And the judges it comes because of governance failures and a demand to have a system that they at least understand So I think it is possible to have them I don't think in the way it was set up Following here sinusi limito sinusi the central bank A director and his writings on that he has a degree in islamic theology and sharia law from cartoon also And he is for sharia as an ideal But believes it should not have been implemented because the way it was it became political sharia Were the only people who are convinced of crimes Convicted of crimes and punished were poor people and women While the while the elites pilfered the state Built massive houses wrapped in razor wire and cities And generated the resentment that fuels this generational rage that's driving bokeh around The military, uh, is it uh, the military is probably reformable Probably but it resists from talking to western military security people in the audience. I'm sure they can provide the details uh the the security Unilaterally consistently Refuses to recognize any human rights abuses when Uh, it is impossible to talk to people in nigeria and not find human rights abuses You can find them on youtube in great detail Uh, and I believe with the shifting from The national security advisor to the current national security advisor. You're beginning to get true counter insurgency where uh programs for entrepreneurship employment are finally being Brought up again. This is this movement began in 2003 and it's very late to decade later Thank you Thank you for your comments. I I have to disappoint you I'm I'm not in a position to to advise any western governor what they what they should do towards Ethiopia Um, I just want to calm a little bit on on the relationship between christians and muslims and I think it's Um, I think it's far more complicated than just to say that for for 400 hundred years Has been peaceful and tranquil. I think that is um, we have to to kind of keep two perspectives Balanced in the way that yes, you have seen, um Coexistence and peace yet at the same time also periods of intense conflicts. I am arguing that Things have become more fragile. You can see the from bollo to gondar to to jimma to to arsi Over the last 20 years arise in conflicts And I'm also I this is something we need far more research on but um The the clear sense I have is that over the last year The christian populations are becoming more wary about what is going on within the muslims and in the most recent event was The screening of the jihad jihad that we had to cut the documentary Which in fact was banned by the supreme court, but the government screened it nevertheless Which then portrayed the european muslims in particular demonstrators as boku haram as ansar al deen and and and What is clear is that? There are christians buying into that And kind of having a more tense Tense attitudes towards a christian and I think that is that is very worrisome Thank you, um, I'm afraid we're really out of of time and uh, as I'm sorry you've not been able to ask more questions Perhaps you can follow up with our speakers afterwards, but please join me in thanking our panel for a great discussion now We've covered an awful lot of ground This morning jumping from one side of the continent to the other and covering a lot of trends in islam as well And we're going to finish up as we started with peter manderville With the unenviable task of trying to pull some themes together and wrap things up for us This morning. Thanks, peter Thanks, richard. Hi me again So I I will be very brief because you've you've been very patient and bearing with our the rather aggressive pace with which we've worked through a lot of Material although I think you'll agree some incredibly rich And provocative discussions I I have the the task of trying to sort of draw out from amidst this richness some potential implications for policy not just in terms of Things that the u.s. Government might do But things that those who are concerned with are primarily in the business of trying to affect change in the world Be they governments be they non-governmental entities be they educational institutions What what might those of us involved in that kind of work take away from this rich set of discussions I think it's first of all worth noticing noting that a number of our panelists actually made quite specific policy Mech recommendations in the course of their remarks whether it be lin aleward Asking us to explore possibilities for building greater synergy and bridge bridging capacity between philanthropic entities and developmental policies in the international community in the west and counterparts in the muslim world Or paul lubek quite straightforwardly telling us that in his view One clear policy takeaway for dealing with the potential fallout of the dramatic Disjuncture in demographics in north and south nigeria is the need for a focus on the education and empowerment of women In the northern part of that country. I think that teria ostubo did a wonderful job of crystallizing for us A major gap what what I would take to be the major gap in us policy towards the the muslim world right now And that is coming to grips with the very complex phenomenon that is Salafism I think the u.s. Government this administration in particular has developed something of an industry in the realm of muslim engagement Broadly reaching out to the muslim in the street if you will Or trying to uh, it's certainly obviously Continued as the previous administration did to contend with issues relating to Islamic militancy and the tectonic political changes sweeping the middle east in the last few years Has also forced the u.s. Government to come to terms with its policy towards islamist parties of the sort represented by the muslim brotherhood, but I think that the phenomena of salafism And the varying ways in which it interacts with a wide range of broader social and economic issues in a wide range of countries in in africa Is still a space that that sort of needs some attention and where we need to get a better handle and basic understanding Of what this is about In terms of my own Quick list of of policy implications coming out of these comments Of these discussions looking over them. I I have sort of three broad categories and I noticed and it is perhaps testament to our long-time Collaboration and common worldview that they that they exactly mirror the three categories that terence lions Let off with this morning. First of all the idea that islam as a vocabulary or a discourse of social mobilization that Arises in situations in conflicts whose origins perhaps far predate the arrival of islam as an active Factor I think there's a clear policy flip flip side to this Which is to say that the u.s. Government for example when it observes certain forms of what it sees as islamic extremism Or militancy in various sub regions that we've talked about today Tends to recategorize that under the policy frame of ct counterterrorism or cve Countering violent extremism and the u.s. Government has a particular toolkit that it uses for dealing with those kinds of things Namely things that blow up and drones these days And you know we can have and there is going on today a very robust debate about the efficacy of those sorts of tools But I think something that's come out of the conversations We've had today is the idea that you perhaps deal with these things that we're coding as islamic militancy or islamic extremism By attending to the root problems that give rise to them in the first place So how do you deal with some of the things that we've seen in malia and the trans-sahel region? By perhaps paying attention to the legacy of only partly resolved conflicts from years past How do we deal with things going on in northern nigeria by by attending to what paul lubeck has flagged for us as a broader crisis of governance rather than as an isolated incident of islamic Militancy point number two And I think this really arises from the insights that we gained in panel number two Is the idea of religious organizations and religious actors As enormous repositories of social capital in many instances that there's great capacity there That can be brought to bear on all manner of problems in productive ways One idea there is then the need for policy space and policy makers to get more comfortable with the idea of integrating religion into foreign policymaking Religious engagement now the u.s. State Department has been trying to do this in varying ways In recent years, but I think it's still been pursued in a way that tends to ghetto eyes religious engagement as Having an event where you invite religious leaders, and that's religious engagement rather than the more comprehensive and holistic approach that Would proceed by trying to integrate attention to the need to talk to Consult with and engage with religious actors and organizations across all facets of of us diplomacy and outreach Although and I think this was the core insight that I took away from farid sacks quite unique presentation Because what he was I think drawing our attention to is the fallout of the legacy of What some have termed the politics of good muslim bad muslim that has followed the events of 9 11 The idea that if muslims seem to be supportive of pluralism and tolerance in human rights They're good muslims, and they're on our side and we can work with them And those that don't support those things are bad muslims I think what came out quite clearly from farid's comments is the idea that no no no no no hold on It's not that straightforward. There are plenty of muslims in this world who are supportive of tolerance, pluralism, women's rights, gay rights, the rights of all peoples, but yet who are politically opposed to Western policies Which means that engagement with religious actors, engagement with certain kinds of muslim organizations Whose capacities one might want to tap into and leverage towards the attainment of say american development goals Is not necessarily always going to be an easy conversation And finally, and this is the third of of terence's leadoff points this morning Is the idea of islam and africa as a thoroughly global and networked force And what that means is that when one is trying to bring influence to bear In in the region that doesn't necessarily Always involve or doesn't need to involve to today efforts to exert diplomacy engagement or to blow things up in africa itself and less you think i'm about to Encourage us to start going to blow things up elsewhere Really where i'm going with this point is to to to say that when one is seeking to have an impact on The ecology of islamic voices and actors that are present in a given situation There are ways of exerting influence At a point well divorced distance wise from the actual local context that you're trying to affect And this may have something to do with certain kinds of conversations that this country can have with the government of saudi arabia Those of you who follow saudi affairs know that there's a Well developed over the last hundred years set of tensions between the saudi government itself the administrative apparatus of the government and the wahabi religious establishment The wahabi establishment has this instinctive Propagatory Orientation that that it pursues both within the kingdom and outside Whereas the saudi government has a distinct marked preference for stability and security And it's quite possible to have a conversation with that governmental apparatus about the need to in certain cases reign in the excesses of the religious establishment Thinking of more recent events in the sahel and mali I think here we're also dealing with questions that have to be raised about the ways in which the fallout of the tectonic events sweeping egypt, tunisia, and particularly Libya are having effects in countries that Neighbor that region so again the idea that that having an impact on stabilizing Certain portions of northern sub-saharan africa has something to do with Working to anchor and consolidate the complex transitions that are currently sweeping the rest of north africa So I I want to end just again by by thanking my friends and partners at csis jennifer richard and farha for You know the the common vision we have of trying to provide a forum to have a rather different kind of conversation about Islam in africa than one might ordinarily hear in washington dc To thank our panelists some of whom came Quite some some distance to share their unique insights with us and of course to all of you for for for joining us Thank you so much