 An explosion rocks the little town of Port Gaston, Virginia. As residents stream out of their homes and businesses, they discover a Navy helicopter has crashed. Part of it is landed in the park. The pilot is dead. They wonder about the tremendous explosion. Could the helicopter have been carrying nuclear weapons? It is extremely unlikely that a nuclear weapon would be involved in such an accident. However, if it should happen, the immediate and long-term problems for local, state and federal agencies could be very complex. The Defense Nuclear Agency, or DNA, a joint military command, has been tasked by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy to sponsor exercises for the military and civilian accident response organizations, which would be called upon to resolve these problems. The exercises are designed to improve the nation's capability to respond to an accident such as the one described, and to develop national-level guidance for such a response. Through its field command in Albuquerque, New Mexico, DNA has sponsored three full-scale field exercises. This film is an account of the latest in the exercise series, New Acts 83, and some of the lessons learned during that exercise. Because of safety features built into the nuclear weapons of the United States, there has never been an accident which resulted in a nuclear yield. Further, no nuclear weapon accident has resulted in the spread of radioactive contamination since an incident in Tule Greenland in 1968. DNA, the United States Navy, the Department of Energy, or DOE, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, that is FEMA, and the Commonwealth of Virginia, planned New Acts 83 as a follow-on to the previous exercises. The objectives were to build upon previous experience and provide for continued upgrading of national response capabilities. Planning included increased participation by federal, state and local organizations. Further, the U.S. Navy was the primary military response organization following the Air Force in 1979's exercise and the Army in 1981. A Naval Ordnance Facility and a nearby civilian community were staged at the DOE's Nevada test site for the exercise. The exercise staff created the town of Port Gaston and Jefferson County, with simulated facilities which would be affected by the simulated accident. The Catfish Cabin Cafe and Fish Market, Captain Nemo Memorial Park, a radio station and newspaper, a trailer park, the Jefferson County Building, hospital, industrial park, RV park, and a reservoir. Helicopter wreckage and training weapons were brought in and placed in realistic accident configurations. Navy and Virginia response forces were brought into place. Others were prepositioned at nearby Nellis Air Force Base to provide reasonable response times. Shortly before D-Day, real contaminants were spread in a pattern which would realistically simulate explosive dispersal. The contaminants, Radium-223 and Palladium-103, cause monitoring equipment to react as it would the plutonium. The radioactivity of these isotopes will decay to background levels in a matter of months. The scenario called for two Navy CH-46 C-9 helicopters, one a Marine escort and the other a transport carrying three nuclear weapons from the Ordnance Facility to another nearby naval station. A mechanical problem forced the escort to land. The transport attempted to turn around and return to the facility. Suddenly a rotor broke off, slicing into the aircraft. As the helicopter broke apart, two of the weapons fell and hit the ground. One exploded and scattered radioactive debris. The front portion of the helicopter fell inside the base. The rear section fell into the park. The helicopter's crew members died, as did a fence maintenance man and a couple in the trailer park. Some civilians were injured along with sailors and the Marine guards at the entrance to the base. The people of Port Gaston ran toward the wreckage, anxious about families and friends. Firefighters and rescue personnel responded from Jefferson County and from the base. Inadvertently, the citizens and rescuers contaminated themselves and spread the radioactive contamination from the accident site. Local, state and Navy medical personnel attended to the injured people. Care of casualties in the exercise medical facilities was very good. In the case of the Navy, exceptional. But there were some delays in getting people to medical facilities, resulting in one of the lessons learned in this no-fault exercise. That all medical response forces need to coordinate with each other and use a systematic method of searching for, receiving, verifying and recording casualties in the field. Marines quickly moved into position to guard the weapons and classified components. Immediately, local news people tried to interview Marines. State police, firemen, anyone who might have information. Anxious citizens confronted military and civilian law enforcement personnel, trying to find friends and trying to re-enter their businesses. The service response force commander, Navy Rear Admiral Joseph F. Frick, set explosive ordinance disposal teams to the accident site. These EOD teams, as they're known, first confirmed radioactive contamination. A contamination control station, or hotline, was set up to monitor military personnel and residents who were being evacuated, and to decontaminate them if necessary. It is important to note that everyone involved in the exercise, players, official visitors, and members of the exercise staff, were informed of the hazards present, monitored for contamination, and decontaminated if necessary. Permanent records of each individual's exposure history reside at the DNA field command. The main radioactive hazard was alpha particles in the air, which could be taken into the body through the respiratory and digestive systems, or through a wound. Response forces set up air samplers to monitor for airborne contamination, providing another lesson learned, that response forces need more detailed and standardized guidance than is now available on the use of air samplers. Another observation was that although the Navy and the Commonwealth of Virginia both had contamination control stations, an actual evacuation of residents and monitoring and decontaminating them would take a great deal of time and personnel. Improved procedures are required to handle evacuation of large numbers of people. Problems include decontamination of people and equipment, providing receipts for contaminated articles, and furnishing uncontaminated clothing when necessary. Meanwhile, notification of the accident reached the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. Service command centers, DOE, and FEMA notified their response organizations. The National-Level Navy Crisis Team, composed of experts in radiological health, explosive ordinance disposal, security, and legal and public affairs personnel, was extremely effective in using and distributing information from the scene. An impressive array of accident response specialists was deployed for Admiral Frick to call upon as he needed them. An exchange of liaison officers helped information flow between the various agencies and should be encouraged. The Department of Energy's Accident Response Group, including members from the National Laboratories, which designed the weapons involved in the crash, arrived early in the exercise. After checking in with Admiral Frick and the EOD team chiefs, they prepared a plan to help assess the damage to the weapons and to assist in their recovery. Other Department of Energy assets were put to use. The AIRAC, a computer program, generated a plot of the predicted area of contamination, using information on bomb design, wind conditions, and topographical features. The initial plot was sent to Admiral Frick via telefacts in the first hour. Refine plots were provided as better data became available. Over the next two days, teams used the aerial measuring system data as a guideline to define the area and level of contamination around the perimeter and along the roads going through it. State police blocked roads leading into the contaminated areas. Several lessons were noted in the complex area of contamination plotting. The revised AIRAC, recommended by the previous new acts, was extremely useful to response forces. Other organizations contributed radiological expertise. Virginia sent its hazardous materials team. Jefferson County provided civil defense personnel. The Army deployed its radiation control team, and the Air Force sent its radiological assessment team. The Commonwealth of Virginia called in the DOE's Radiological Assistance Program team from Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The exercise staff suggests that all special radiation teams should automatically be deployed to the accident scene as soon as contamination is confirmed, and that they initiate preliminary radiation surveys upon arrival. In addition, all teams should be equipped to make accurate radiological and engineering surveys. The teams in new acts 83 did an excellent job of finding and quantifying contamination, but they could not always pinpoint the locations of their readings within the area or accurately define the area. All response forces need to be aware of the protective clothing, masks, and other equipment they would need for an extended operation. The Radiological Advisory Medical Team discovered that one of the commercial airlines would not take their equipment with a low-level radioactive source used for instrument calibration. Response forces must ensure that the tails for transportation of radioactive equipment are arranged in advance with the airlines. In order to assist the Service Response Forces Radiation Health Officer and to better coordinate their response, all radiological teams should provide representatives to a joint radiological control center. One agency will supervise the center and use lists from each team as to its personnel, capabilities, equipment, and any logistical support needed. The Navy EOD teams, one from Naval Weapon Station Yorktown, Virginia, and another from Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, assess the damage to the three weapons. According to established procedures, they reduced the immediate explosive hazard. When the DOE's Accident Response Group arrived, the Navy informed them the high explosive in one B-57 weapon had detonated, causing extensive damage to another B-57 weapon and scattering radioactive and classified debris. A W-55 warhead was still intact. Once the Accident Response Group had produced good radiographs of the damaged weapon, a joint recovery plan for the B-57 was formulated. There was no internal damage. Cracks in the weapon case were filled with oil to prevent pieces of explosive from rubbing together. Loose or broken components were foamed into place. Careful joint planning preceded the disposal and removal of the W-55 and the scattered components of the other B-57 as well. The weapons and hazardous weapon parts were packaged so they could be shipped to a facility equipped for final disassembly and disposal. The exercise showed that response organizations not familiar with EOD terminology often do not recognize the difference between the terms rendered safe and nuclear safe. Since a weapon could undergo a high explosive detonation even after it is declared nuclear safe, the recommendation is that EOD teams should not report to other organizations that a weapon is safe until it is both nuclear and explosive safe. Additionally, entries into the weapon locale should be coordinated with EOD teams and escorts furnished by them if necessary from a safety standpoint. Services and DOE directives should include this caution. The most critical initial public affairs problem will be to provide emergency public information and to decide whether to confirm the presence of a nuclear weapon. Local officials can be expected to announce the presence of a nuclear weapon as soon as they are aware of it. The initial response force should be the first to make this confirmation if possible when public safety is at risk or when necessary to allay public alarm. This will allow for the coordination of response efforts and protection of the public and will assure credibility and trust in the federal response. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should be informed of the on-scene confirmation in advance if possible to enable him to fulfill his responsibilities in the Washington area. Public Affairs officers of the responding organizations formed a Joint Information Center, or JIC, the day of the accident. Even so, public affairs people need to be prepared to function without a JIC until one is organized. The first press conference was held the morning after the accident. So could you just give us the names back to write them for note-taking now? We're Admiral Joseph Frick, F-R-I-C-K. Mr. Kim Anderson, Commonwealth of Virginia. Mr. Joe Winkle, W-I-N-K-L-E. Senior official with FEMA. And Mr. Don Shuler. I am Don Shuler, senior member of the accident response group for the Department of Energy. We also have available here this morning. Post-exercise critiques pointed out that in a real accident there would be much more involvement by senior-level public affairs people, especially in Washington. They also pointed out the need for response agencies to make sure news releases are sent consistently to all principal federal departments and agencies. Citizens were concerned about the extent of the contamination. This, maybe, public affairs, yesterday did confirm, I mean, his name was Smith, did confirm that the weapons, nuclear material was plutonium. We had an interview with several others with Dr. Strash, a radiologist who was on site yesterday. He said that the word plutonium in particular form would be inhalation and ingestion. And it says why the respirator. Can you tell me, could this be dispersed through the wind? Does it leak into the soil? Does it get into the water? I mean, what are the modifications of what we're looking at on plutonium? Well, I think I'm going to turn that over to an expert on the subject. Don, could I ask you to address that? During a meeting at FEMA headquarters the day after the accident, numerous federal and state agencies began to address the question of how to clean up the contamination and restore the site. FEMA has the overall responsibility to coordinate emergency type of activities, whether they be man-made or whether they be natural type situations. In this particular incident, we do have national security concerns and we recognize that the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, whichever is appropriate, has the operational responsibility for security of the classified materials that may be involved. Of course, one of the first concerns was financing. And I'm sure it's a concern of yours and that is for the funds that are going to come from to do the site restoration work. We expected that to be the first question we expected. That's where I brought my lawyer along. A number of federal and state agencies responded to plan and accomplish the clean up. Meet Jill Finnelli with the Virginia Department of Agriculture. Some of the things that we're interested here on the site in Fort Gaffings are the GAVE's meat market, right here meat packing plant, JV's produce farm. And so meet Dr. Albert Roth, Virginia Department of Agriculture. The second role that we have basically is to be involved with the health of animals. The question is concerned of the health of the cattle or other livestock on the farm as well as small animals. This is Charles Cox, U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The role of the Food and Drug Administration is to ensure that foods, drugs, medical devices, biological products, animal feeds, cosmetics are safe, wholesome, free from contamination. And also that the population receives as minimum radiation as possible. EPA was called to port Gaston through FEMA to supply laboratory support to the state of Virginia. And this is Wayne Bliss of the Environmental Protection Agency. Our role is to provide that support through FEMA as well as represent the agency in advising the state on proposed clean up criteria and procedures for restoration of the area. For example, this simulated sample of frog legs was collected yesterday by the state and has been delivered to us for analysis. It was previously... Inside meet Michael F. O'Connell, Health Physicist with EPA. This sample as brought in is going to be counted for looking at nuclear lives that emit gamma radiation. This system here is an intrinsic germanium lithium detector, the solid state device with liquid nitrogen stored above. The sample just goes down inside the well, which is a...this case is a 3,000 pound lead shield. This is Larry Brown of the American Red Cross. Working with some of the other agencies here, we're learning the capabilities of agencies that usually don't respond in natural disaster situations. And perhaps this knowledge will be useful in the future to assist in response to hazardous material situations or other natural disasters. Red Cross workers would also respond to act as liaisons with the state and the state ELC and as liaisons with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This work for FEMA comes into play to serve as the coordinator of these various federal executive agencies to provide the necessary support to the state and local governments to go about the site restoration and taking care of the public health and public safety needs of the people involved. From the foregoing it is apparent that all responding agencies must be attuned to the public's wide variety of legitimate concerns. These agencies must make every effort to allay fears and to take rapid, positive action to restore normalcy to the community. Although site restoration problems were not completely solved in the brief exercise, they did result in some recommendations in the areas of funding and assignment of responsibilities. One of the first things a response agency does upon arrival is to set up communications. In accordance with recommendations of previous exercises, 83 players set up a joint office of communications control. Such a center should be established on the first day. Each organization should provide a written list of its equipment, required frequencies, associated capabilities, and logistical support required. Then communications assets can be used in the most efficient manner. This is Bill Peebles with the National Communications System. As one another's resources as necessary, I can make an assessment of what our requirements are and then pull together anything that I need to satisfy that requirement. Now I've gone around and coordinated with each one of the unit supervisors and I've got telephone numbers that will allow me to contact them to pull in their radio net or their secure voice or their crypto or whatever we've got to have for our use down here. This then allows the senior FEMA official access to the Air Force AutoDIN network, which happens to be here. We've got the Hammerace satellite link here. We've got the Navy and we've got a myriad of communications resource that we can utilize. Reporting of casualties, removal of bodies, and disposing of contaminated remains were areas for learning in the 83 exercise. Depending on how long it was up there, the explosive ordnance demolition teams, when suited up in their suits and looking throughout the area, and my point is that while there, they brought out three bodies across the line. That's one. Is that three more than the 15 that we had? No, they said brought out of the area. Three more. Three? Five. I don't know who they are. I have no indication of that at this time. This is in addition to the 15 they had listed here press release. That is not so. This is three bodies that were just brought across the line. The confusion points out that it is best not to report casualty information until it is verified. While the exercise was in progress, representatives of the press and official visitors were invited to observe. Lead officials of the major response organizations and DNA briefed the visitors. Briefings were also given in Washington. Marines tenaciously guarded the weapons and scattered parts. Their perimeter, the national defense area, or NDA, included a small practical controllable area meeting all requirements, although Navy directives currently require a much larger area. Since security clearances are not standard and do not transfer automatically between organizations, some delays in admitting emergency personnel into the area occurred. Review of established procedures is required to allow specialized emergency response teams to begin work immediately upon their arrival. For an introduction to legal problems dealt with in the exercise, listen to Cynthia Bailey of the Virginia Attorney General's Office. In this particular exercise, as would be true in any emergency, the major questions come in the area of constitutional rights, the power of the state, the power of the federal government, and the power of the locality to restrict individuals' rights, both a private citizen as well as members of the press. The state wasn't a party to the suit, but some citizens of Fort Gaston did file suit against the federal government, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. In a similar fashion, in this type of emergency, we have three types of government. We have the federal government, the state government, and the local government. And there are many jurisdictional questions that arise and who can best handle it and who is legally empowered to handle the various problems which arise. A looter inside the NDA was handed over to Fort Gaston Police, who passed him on to the FBI, who passed him back to the police, who passed him back to the Marines, who turned him over to the Naval Investigative Service, who finally turned him over to the Navy Command Security Officer. The matter was complicated by the fact that he had been in a contaminated area. It is evident that detailed plans need to be developed concerning legal jurisdictions. New Act 83 was a tremendous success. It verified solutions to problems discovered in previous exercises and identified a few new problems. With each exercise, response forces have responded more competently. Improvement comes with greater comprehension of the problems which will be faced in an accident with a nuclear weapon and an appreciation of the difficulty of allaying very real public concerns. The New Act series has demonstrated the capabilities of response elements throughout the federal, state and local communities and the challenge of coordinating their activities. It is clear that additional exercises will further improve the nation's response capabilities. The Defense Nuclear Agency is proud to be a part of this effort.