 Well, one thing's really interesting, you both sort of mentioned there is the John McDonnell, Jeremy Corbyn Fisher, and that to me, I mean, we see this repeated in the book, I think it's really well documented, not just on the big issues like Brexit, you know, it was the big constitutional issue of our time, people didn't disagree on the Margaret Hodge disciplinary issue, on a bunch of things like that. And again, entirely entitled to disagree. But the fact that there was such public disagreements was quite new. And the genesis of that does seem to be Salisbury. Do you think that John McDonnell in 2018, did Salisbury trigger something in him? And why did he change? Because obviously we're three years in now to the Corbyn project. He's not done this until now. I mean, why does he start to make these increasingly public interventions at odds with the leaders office? It's a great question. And, you know, as ever in the wilderness of mirrors that is labor, you'll get different answers depending on who you ask. I mean, according to people who are close to Corbyn, a number of people who are sympathetic to his start on Salisbury, they say that Corbyn actually grew in confidence after the 2017 general election. Sure, him and John McDonnell friends and comrades, and I think they had actually expressly said they didn't want to mirror the TBGBs, the rouse between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown over the new labor years. And yet, you know, Corbyn did grow in confidence after that surprising election result. And there are some who think that John McDonnell basically couldn't deal with the fact that, you know, occasionally Corbyn would diverge from him. And ultimately, what Corbyn wanted was what Corbyn got with respect to the party's position. I mean, that probably is quite a kind of interpersonal analysis. I think the kind of political issue at play was that the liberation struggle that ultimately compelled John McDonnell was the liberation struggle, as we write, with the British working class. He was a guy who was obsessed with power and winning power in the country in order to bring Britain to the left, change the way the country's run, democratize power and wealth. Whereas Corbyn, you know, naturally always saw himself as the far left or the hard left, depending on what term you use. He saw himself as a left shadow foreign secretary. And on issues such as foreign policy, for him, the notion you don't die on the hill of Russia or antisemitism would have felt quite unnatural, I think, because the whole point is that he spent his career dying on that hill. He was chair of the Palestine Solidarity campaign. He was a torchbearer of the resistance to Iraq. If the left has this moment of power, moment of influence, why not say what you think about foreign policy? We're not here to appease the Atlanticists, the people who would have voted for airstrikes in Syria, the people who did vote for Iraq. Whereas I think John McDonnell's assessment was arguably more pragmatic. It was one of, well, listen, we can help the Palestinian people when we're in office, but we're not going to get into office if we expend political capital and time on issues such as this. I mean, indeed, after 2017, I think there was this feeling that it's quite rare in politics you get to define the debate. And sure, the majority of the time, it's going to be the government or the media who set the terms of the discussion in the country at large. What we have to do is we have to try to transcend that discussion or we've got to move on from it quickly. We're not going to gain anything from being mired in the debate on Russia. And I think there was a lot of frustration because of that. I mean, I can entirely understand the sort of political analysis there. So you're saying that somebody like McDonnell just wants to neutralize contentious issues of foreign policy to focus on the domestic agenda. But then that doesn't necessarily explain. So for instance, he was saying that members of the shadow cabinet shouldn't be going on Russia today. That's just not his decision. That is insubordination. That's not his decision to make. If he said, it's my personal view, but ultimately it's down to the leader or it's a collective decision for the shadow cabinet or whatever. But he didn't say that. He was often freelancing quite radical, not radical, but ultimately it's regulated by off-com. It's allowed to broadcast in Britain. It's quite a radical thing for a British politician to say that doesn't mean anything. I think if he said their license should be reviewed or something, I mean, that's something else. So that in itself was quite significant. Then you've got, for instance, Margaret Hodge. And you actually, I think it's a nice, again, another vignette where you sort of clarify what happened. It wasn't necessarily as confrontation as people depict, but him intervening there. And for me personally, I think it's just a disciplinary issue. The older I get, the more I realize, I quite like rules. Otherwise, anarchist politics, as you sort of, everybody has to internalize the rulemaking all the time, and some of my anarchist colleagues might get upset with me at the moment of media. But we have rules for a reason, because otherwise we'd all go crazy. Aaron, Law and Order, Bistani. And I just feel like if somebody's being disciplined, that's a matter for the disciplinary process. And I think the more senior opposition, I say, and to be fair, Keir Starmer is a sort of politician who generally, that's the kind of thing he would say, he has a respect for due process. And so when I saw McDonnell do that, the Campbell interview, and of course the positioning on the second referendum, regularly he would have Mandelson and Campbell go to his office. On the one hand, I think that's absolutely true. He was trying to neutralize the foreign policy issues. And Paul Mason says something similar. I think that's one of the things that Paul makes sense on, actually, in the last couple of years. Sid Brass did something similar. I mean, that makes sense. But it does feel like the more you give these accounts of the relationship between Lotto and the Shadow Chancellor's office, it feels maybe there was a bit of jealousy there. I mean, that's how it strikes me. Either there was a bit of jealousy or not even necessarily jealousy. I'm the more talented politician. I know what's right, rather than necessarily saying, well, I think I know what's right. But ultimately, I have to defer to this guy because he is the leader. And it feels like McDonnell lost that towards the end, increasingly over 2018, 2019. Well, that's certainly what people close to Jeremy Corbyn would characterize it as. That sort of, you know, John, you know, there's Carrie Murphy herself has said on the record and says in the epilogue of the book that the coup, which we'll get on to later, that the putsch in Corbyn's office that Carrie Murphy later engineered, no, sorry, John McDonnell engineered against Carrie Murphy and not quite against Seamus Mill. Carrie Murphy suspects was driven by John McDonnell's feeling that he couldn't influence Corbyn as much as he felt he was entitled to. Because Gable mentioned Tony Brown, Gordon Brown before, perhaps a better analogy here is George Osborne and David Cameron, right? Corbyn and McDonnell were partners in an ideological project, just as Cameron Osborne were, you know, people used to refer to Cameron Osborne sort of as a joint premiership with one person as the frontman, the other is the sort of M&R on screens. I say that's probably a fair assessment of what people in Lotto, what people very close to Corbyn think John McDonnell's perception of Corbyn and McDonnell's relationship was. So as Gable said, and as you correctly say, as that starts to diverge, it's no wonder people like Carrie Murphy say, well, obviously this is explained by John Luzer's control. And part of, I think that's also part of partly an explanation for why you have him saying, I'm going to vote remain in this referendum or with banning RT. And frequently he'd be asked, why are you saying this when Jeremy Corbyn doesn't think it? I think a good way of, you know, you can explain it one of two ways. One is that McDonnell realized that public pressure or electoral pressure would push them to that position anyway, and it'd be less painful for Corbyn to make that move if he'd already broken the ground. You know, a phrase you see is, you know, he's like Jeremy Corbyn's Navi. He does the sort of back breaking work of breaking the harplist ground and Corbyn sails through. Or I think people close to Corbyn think, well, he's doing that, so we're hostages to fortune. We're doing that so we have to follow John McDonnell down the road. And obviously, you know, we can't see it's the inside of John McDonnell's head. But I'd say that both of those explanations carry some weight, you think. Because he's an extraordinarily talented politician. I think most people agree, I mean, it's a certain in the book, and I would certainly agree with it. John is the most talented sort of left-wing politician of his generation. And it reminds me of there was the anecdote from Barack Obama in, I think, 2008. He said, you know, I would be a better speech writer than my speech writers. I would be a better policy advisor than my policy advisors. And it feels like John McDonnell maybe felt that was him. It's a bit like Barack Obama being a number two, running as a VP perhaps in 2008. I'm the one that's got the most to offer here. I guess, when do you think that became toxic? Because it feels like it became toxic in this kind of rivalry ultimately between McDonnell's office and Corbin's office by early 2019. Was there a particular moment where, as you say, this culminates in John McDonnell, amongst others, saying we need a complete reconfiguration of the leader's office? So, I mean, to answer that question, I just want to briefly go back to the circumstances of Corbin's initial leadership victory in 2015. I think part of the standing John McDonnell's approach to the way that Lotto was run lies in the fact that, you know, naturally, this won't be news to anybody that watches this channel, that, you know, Corbin did not expect to win. He threw his hat into the ring because Dine Abbott had done it before. John McDonnell had done it as well. We hear a lot about the phrase, it was his turn. And, you know, there are some, including those close to Corbin, who say that it wasn't incidental that Corbin won. You know, naturally, McDonnell couldn't have won because the PLP thought he was swivel-eyed, nasty, trotskiest, whereas Corbin was kind of avuncular and cuddly and harmless. You know, there are those close to Corbin who say that nobody could have, you know, that nobody was as much of an anti-politician as him and therefore nobody could have inspired that kind of enthusiasm and sincerity from the grassroots. But nevertheless, you do have this feeling that emanates from people who are close to McDonnell who echo the fact that, well, yeah, it was his turn, but we were both marginalized over the decades. We've both been fighting a long, lonely fight. There's nothing kind of unique or exceptional to Corbin other than happen to win, but we should jointly be the architects or kind of co-conveners of this. I mean, as you say, over time, it becomes clear that that's just not how the project is run. I think probably the key point at which this becomes, you use the word toxic, is the summer of 2018, because basically, you know, McDonnell took to telling people that if only they'd had one last week, if the 2017 election campaign had lasted for seven more days, they could have won based on where the polls were going at that time. They were agonizing to be close to power. They were literally talking about what Corbin's number 10 might look like in the days running up to the poll and possibility of bringing an unaccompanied migrant or refugee into Corbin's Downing Street or redecorating the number 10 rose garden. You know, they could taste power. And so the summer after that, 2018, was about a big summer of pushing forward, making inroads into the red wall, extending labor's reach in kind of cosmopolitan areas where they'd done better than expected in 2017. And what did it become about instead? They were debating the accompanying examples of the IHRA definition of antisemitism. And I think that just inspired a fury from within. I mean, it's not just John McDonnell. A lot of people were furious that they wasted this moment. I mean, how can that happen? The left is in touching distance of power and you then spend a summer answering questions about whether you're a Zionist or whether you think that Zionism and being pro-Palestine are mutually exclusive. Will Margaret Hodge be expelled or suspended or not? I mean, it was just a waste of time. And I think there was so much frustration towards Lotto because of that. And I think with Brexit, it then never really recovered.